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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONSORTIUM

INTEGRATING HUMAN SECURITY INTO MILITARY OPERATIONS

A REFERENCE HANDBOOK FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION



PROTECTING POPULATIONS | ENSURING INFRASTRUCTURE | ENSURING ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES | STRENGTHENING LOCAL RESILIENCE | SUPPORTING ECONOMIC STABILITY

PfPC REFERENCE HANDBOOK SERIES

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Integrating Human Security into Military Operations

A Reference Handbook for Professional Military Education

Edited and Published by The Canadian Defence Academy for the Partnership for Peace
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This handbook, entitled *Integrating Human Security into Military Operations – A Reference Handbook for Professional Military Education,* builds on existing NATO, UN, and selected national policies, directives, guidance, and concepts on Human Security and examines potential military roles and tasks related to Human Security.

Developed by the Partnership for Peace Consortium's Human Security in Operations Working Group, this handbook fills an identified gap to support the examination and discussion of Human Security in professional military education. The approach to Human Security in this document incorporates input from working group members, external, and contracted sources to promote a broad range of perspectives to provide an understanding of Human Security and the contributions the military can provide within a comprehensive approach. A common understanding of how NATO, Allied, and partner militaries conceptualise and operationalise Human Security is essential to professional military education, as it supports intellectual interoperability and contributes to NATO's warfighting advantage. Pending further advances in how NATO, and specific countries, may integrate Human Security in missions/operations/activities, this handbook can serve as the primary reference document to inform officer and NCO professional military education.

The authors used artificial intelligence in the editing of the document.

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FOREWORD

Professional military education (PME) prepares leaders to think critically, exercise sound judgement, and act effectively in a range of complex, contested, and unstable security environments. Strategic competition, transnational threats, environmental shocks, social polarisation, and fragile civil infrastructure require military professionals who understand the often-divergent approaches of employment of force and the human dynamics that shape strategic outcomes.

Human Security belongs at the core of PME because it affects this dynamic environment. Operations occur among populations and within interconnected institutions, infrastructure, and essential services that influence operational effectiveness, legitimacy, freedom of action, and strategic advantage.

A Human Security approach provides a disciplined framework for understanding the human environment and identifying risks and threats to diverse populations, institutions, infrastructure, and essential systems. Through critical inquiry, case analysis, and exercises, PME connects strategic theory, operational art, professional ethics, and practice while improving awareness of second- and third-order effects. In this way, leaders must be developed to recognise the myriad ways in which adversaries exploit insecurity and can incorporate these dynamics into analysis, planning, and decision-making. NATO's 2022 Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles require these considerations across the Alliance's core tasks and military activities. PME translates that direction into professional understanding and institutional practice, strengthens intellectual interoperability, and prepares leaders to apply Human Security Factors across strategic, operational, and tactical contexts.

This handbook addresses a gap identified at the 2025 Partnership for Peace Consortium Capstone Event by providing a common PME reference for integrating Human Security into military operations. It supports commanders, staffs, and PME institutions in integrating Human Security into analysis, planning, decision-making, and operations with civilian partners. I recommend it to defence academies, staff colleges, faculty, commanders, and practitioners as a practical contribution for developing thoughtful, ethical, and operationally effective military leaders to achieve successful outcomes.



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Chapter 1 – General

Chapter 1: Key Takeaways

- Military Contributions to Human Security (MC2HS) describe deliberate military action to understand the human environment, plan and execute operations, mitigate vulnerabilities, protect populations across the Human Security Factors, and preserve systems essential to survival, societal stability, and military objectives within a comprehensive approach.

- Human Security expands the military focus beyond State Security by addressing how populations perceive threats to survival, livelihood, and dignity.

- Human Security considerations require a consistent approach when they are implicit, inconsistent, or discretionary, supporting intellectual interoperability and understanding of the White Picture.

- Human Security consists of nine factors: Physical Security, Infrastructure Security, Political Security, Economic Security, Cultural Security, Health Security, Food Security, Information Security, and Environmental Security.

- Human Security Factors are interrelated and can amplify risks, requiring analysis of cumulative effects beyond the immediate Area of Operations.

- Military forces will rarely lead Human Security responses but may be the first actor to respond during humanitarian crisis.

- Military roles and tasks should be considered across all nine Human Security Factors to support coherent planning, execution, and assessment.

Introduction

1. For nearly eighty years, Western military power operated within a relatively stable strategic architecture defined by the Bretton Woods system, predictable state adversaries, and a rules-based international order that constrained escalation and structured competition. That architecture is now fragmenting. Great power competition has returned without the stabilising norms that governed Cold War rivalry; economic interdependence has become a weapon rather than a restraint; and transnational actors, cyber networks, multinational corporations, proxy forces, and criminal organisations now exert strategic effects once reserved for states. Simultaneously, climate change, social cleavages, demographic instability, and infrastructure fragility generate persistent crises that degrade state capacity without triggering traditional thresholds of armed conflict. These dynamics have fundamentally altered the operational environment. Military forces do not operate exclusively against discrete enemy formations within defined battlespaces, but within complex human and civil systems where legitimacy, resilience, and population stability determine whether tactical

success produces strategic effect. The erosion of the rules-based order has not eliminated the relevance of military force; it has expanded the conditions under which force must operate. Within this context the modern battlespace has seen Human Security concerns become intertwined with traditional military tasks and therefore commanders and planners must be prepared to consider the multidimensional nature of security threats. Thus, Human Security emerges in this context not as an ideological departure from military logic, but as an operational framework for understanding how contemporary threats manifest, propagate, and ultimately determine the success or failure of military operations.

Issue

2. NATO Allies and partners acknowledge the competitive advantage that a Human Security approach offers but lack structured guidance to systematically integrate Human Security Factors into the analysis, planning, and execution of missions, operations, and activities. When Human Security Factors are used, they are often implicit, inconsistent, or discretionary; therefore, until professional military education (PME) incorporates how to secure the human environment that sustains national power, both at home and abroad, tactical victories will not translate into strategic success.

Aim

3. The aim of *Integrating Human Security into Military Operations* is to provide PME institutions with a common reference handbook for how the military understands, participates in, and contributes to Human Security to enable the comprehensive approach across the full spectrum of operations, and all operating domains.

Scope

4. *Integrating Human Security into Military Operations* is intended to inform Human Security training and education within the Partnership for Peace Consortium, NATO's Defence Education Enhancement Programme, NATO members', and partners' PME, and to potentially inform the integration of Human Security into policy, doctrine, and missions, operations, and activities. This handbook does not attempt to define or expand the broader Human Security agenda[1], but is limited to examining the military contribution to Human Security and how military forces must understand and account for the human environment of the operating environment to achieve strategic objectives. As such the handbook serves to:

a. create a common understanding of the military contributions to Human Security for PME to include legal and normative frameworks, key factors, different perspectives, and definition;

[1] https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2022/10/20/human-security and amplified by NATO Human Security Agenda, 2024 https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/legacy-wcm/media_pdf/2024/8/pdf/240830-human-security-en.pdf

b. provide a common understanding of Human Security to inform PME at all levels, including Service-specific training and education;

c. emphasize the importance of integrating Gender Perspectives in Military Operations (GPMO) [2] to better understand and address population insecurities across strategic, operational, and tactical levels;

d. inform NATO and national Human Security doctrine and policy; and

e. potentially inform work on the UN's Human Security approach and subsequent military doctrine and training material.

Human Security in Major Combat Operations

During the early phases of the full-scale Russian invasion, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) rapidly recognised that the predominant battlespace was urban, with civilians remaining in situ across contested zones. Rather than treating this as a constraint, the AFU integrated civilian considerations into planning at every level—tactical, operational, and strategic.

Over 4,000 personnel were deployed in Human Security roles. Tactical withdrawals, redistribution of medical supplies, and coordination with civil networks were deliberate operational decisions. These actions preserved civilian support for the AFU, enhanced intelligence collection, and significantly reduced sabotage and collaboration with invading Russian forces, even in ethnically mixed regions.

The opposite is also true: Russian forces' freedom of action was challenged.
Human Security evolved into a joint function, embedded across brigades, and supported by formal training and doctrine. The front line expanded from 420 km to over 3,500 km, necessitating decentralised Human Security planning and execution.

Key Definitions

5. Definitions used in this handbook are drawn from existing UN and NATO approved definitions where available and appropriate. Where no definition is available, one has been developed for PME purposes and is noted as such. The key definitions are:

a. **Human Security** is defined by the UN as *the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential*[3]

b. **Human Security Approach** *is a people-centred approach that enables an increased understanding of and ability to address the human environment of the operating environment, by anticipating and, where mandated,*

[22] NATO ATTP-6567 is still in draft
[3] United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/290

preventing and/or responding to threats to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of populations influenced by armed conflict or crisis.

c. **Military Contributions to Human Security (MC2HS)** *are the deliberate actions undertaken by the military to understand the human environment, and to plan, execute, and generate effects that mitigate vulnerabilities and protect populations from harm across the Human Security Factors.* Planning and actions should account for the distinct vulnerabilities, roles, and functions of different population groups, and preserve or restore the systems and conditions essential for survival and societal stability required for the achievement of military objectives within a comprehensive approach.

d. **Human Environment** *is the social, cultural, and demographic components of the human population, including their strengths and vulnerabilities, within the operational area. It includes all human interaction with the environment. The primary aim of analysing the human environment is to integrate these factors into the planning of operations to mitigate harm, avoid causing civilian casualties, and support local populations.*

e. **Civil Environment** *is the civil component of the overall operational environment. It encompasses non-military factors, including civilian actors (such as governments, international organisations, and the public), civilian infrastructure, and the cultural or demographic dynamics of a region.*

f. **White Picture** *is the civil-domain component of the operational picture that depicts relevant non-military factors, actors, systems, infrastructure, services, and population-related conditions within the operating environment*. It supports commanders and staffs in understanding the civil environment and complements the recognized operational picture by informing planning, coordination, assessment, and civil-military interaction.

g. ***Information Environment*** *is an environment comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs.*[4]

Note - In NATO doctrine, there is no agreed definition of the civil environment or White Picture. For the purposes of this handbook the civil, natural, and human environments are distinct but overlapping concepts used to understand, plan, and execute military operations.

[4] NATO Terminology Database, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc.

Chapter 2 – Understanding Human Security

Chapter 2: Key Takeaways

- A Human Security approach focuses military analysis of insecurities and threats as perceived by populations, making it relevant to modern armed conflict and crisis.

- Human Security approaches vary across the UN, NATO, the UK, and NATO nations, requiring PME to distinguish between development-focused models, political-military frameworks, national defence approaches, and resilience-based concepts.

- Gender Perspective in Military Operations is integral to Human Security because it helps commanders and staffs identify differentiated vulnerabilities, roles, and risks across affected populations.

Introduction

1. A Human Security approach reframes the understanding of the operating environment by broadening current analysis focused on adversarial threats and expanding that of the Civil Environment (White Picture) to include the insecurities experienced by affected populations during crisis and armed conflict. This provides a more comprehensive understanding of the interlinked nature of security threats the population faces and provides a method of deepening the military's understanding of the human and civil environments. This approach draws upon existing legal and normative frameworks, including the Law of Armed Conflict, International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law, migration law, and key UN protection instruments, to structure how the military anticipates, mitigates, and responds to harm affecting civilians. It does not create new legal obligations; rather, it integrates established requirements into a coherent, people-centric analytical lens.

2. A number of major international actors have adopted distinct, but complementary, Human Security models. The United Nations employs a broad developmental construct centred on seven dimensions of insecurity, while NATO adapts the concept to a political-military alliance through cross-cutting topics to include Protection of Civilians, Children and Armed Conflict, Cultural Property Protection, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. The United Kingdom further operationalises Human Security within defence structures, adding information security and counter-corruption considerations. Across NATO Allies, national variations reflect domestic policy and institutional priorities, yet all recognise that integrating Human Security enhances operational effectiveness and long-term stability.

3. Since the adoption of the NATO Approach and Guiding Principles on Human Security in 2022, various member states have begun to consider integrating this concept into their national security frameworks and PME. The degree of formal integration varies considerably among Alliance members. While some states address

the concept primarily at the operational level, most frame this mainly through foreign action, peace, and security rather than military doctrine.

4. Annex B provides greater detail on different perspectives on Human Security.

A Need for an Approach to Military Contributions to Human Security for PME

5. A Human Security approach increases a military's freedom of action by securing the human environment of the operating space and denying it to the adversary, thereby providing a warfighting advantage. Modern conflict is conducted in and amongst the people, unconstrained by borders, and amplified across the information domain, making the human environment key terrain. By proactively addressing the insecurities that adversaries can, and do, exploit, we help increase resilience, reduce risk to the mission and force, protect legitimacy, and prevent strategic setbacks from tactical actions.

Legitimacy as a Force Multiplier

Prior to operations against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, UK trainers worked with Nigerian Special Operations Forces preparing for deployment into the Sambisa Forest. Rather than focusing on legal obligations or abstract discussions of human rights, training concentrated on realistic operational scenarios. Troops explored how the treatment of civilians, detainees, and local communities directly affected intelligence gathering, freedom of movement, and mission success. As soldiers experienced the practical advantages of gaining local support and legitimacy, behaviours changed. Human Security principles were adopted not because they were mandated, but because they improved operational effectiveness. The approach strengthened both partner capability and the wider defence relationship while reducing operational and reputational risk.

6. This is not ancillary activity. It is a means of securing key terrain, preserving operational flexibility, and generating a durable strategic advantage.

7. Assessments were conducted of current doctrine, concepts, and practices focused on understanding the human environment in operations. Throughout, the focus was on the implications to PME and specifically whether additional guidance on Human Security would enhance the planning and conduct of missions, operations, and activities. While there is evidence that PME institutions consider aspects related to Human Security, initial analysis suggests that these considerations are implied and are left to the discretion of PME institutions; that doctrine and guidance is incomplete, inconsistent or, in some cases, contradictory; and that some professional discourse is distorted due to the lack of a common definition or understanding of Human Security.[5]

[5] 2025 Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes - Human Security Conference Report January 2026

Chapter 3 – Human Security Factors

Chapter 3: Key Takeaways

- Human Security expands the military focus beyond State Security by addressing population insecurities resulting from threats to survival, livelihood, and dignity.
- State Security and Human Security are interdependent: legitimate State Security supports population needs, while Human Security reinforces sovereignty, territorial integrity, rule of law, and economic stability.
- Human Security consists of nine factors: Physical Security, Infrastructure Security, Political Security, Economic Security, Cultural Security, Health Security, Food Security, Information Security, and Environmental Security.
- Human Security Factors are interrelated and can amplify risks, requiring analysis of cumulative effects on populations, communities, States, and regions beyond the immediate Area of Operations.
- Military forces are rarely the lead actor for Human Security Factors, but a Human Security approach improves situational awareness and supports assessment and response during crisis and armed conflict.

Introduction

1. This chapter provides a deeper analysis of the concept of Human Security to inform subsequent military roles, tasks, and considerations when implementing a Human Security approach. Human Security broadens how the military considers security to include fear and want-based insecurities as well as risks of indignity that populations experience during armed conflict and crisis.

2. Notwithstanding the different ways to understand State and Human Security, there is a symbiotic relationship in which Human Security relies on effective State Security to provide for the needs of populations, and State Security relies on effective Human Security so that populations can contribute to resilience, sovereignty, territorial integrity, rule of law, and economic strength. 21st Century security practices suggest that there cannot be State Security without Human Security.

Human Security Factors

3. The Human Security Factors (HSF) listed below, individually and collectively, make up the lens used by the military to expand its understanding of the human environment of the operating environment. The abbreviation HSF is used only in tables where space requires. While AJP-1.0 references the UN categories of Human Security and uses the cross-cutting topics outlined in NATO's Human Security strategy, the nine

Human Security Factors used in this handbook—*Physical Security, Infrastructure Security, Political Security, Economic Security, Cultural Security, Health Security, Food Security, Information Security, and Environmental Security*—were developed by examining approaches and factors used by the UN, NATO, the UK, and professional and academic literature to provide elements of security suitable for military operations.

4. Threats to these Human Security Factors that potentially affect the levels and perceptions of security in populations are typically analysed by identifying root causes, such as natural disasters, structural inequalities, health crises, and armed conflict. When threats interact, they become more complex and can amplify security situations. The cumulative effects can be catastrophic for individuals, populations, communities, States, and regions.

5. Human Security Factors do not exist in silos; they interact with each other in a variety of ways. An increase in one factor may have no effect or result in either an increase or a decrease in another. For example: in an urban conflict zone, damage to the electrical grid (infrastructure insecurity) disrupts water treatment and hospital operations, leading to an increase of disease outbreaks (health insecurity). It also causes food storage and distribution systems to fail, resulting in a steep increase in food prices and decreased access to basic goods (economic and food insecurity).

6. Further, it should be noted that influences on one or more Human Security Factors may exist outside of the assigned area of operations (AO) of a specific military force yet have an impact within it. As such, there must be an awareness of the Human Security Factors not only in the AO, but also within the area of intelligence interest (AII), area of intelligence responsibility (AIR) and area of interest (AOI).

7. **Human Security Factors:** Human Security Factors make up the lens used by the military to expand its understanding of the human environment and its interactions with the civil environment of the operating environment. By understanding how the population perceives and defines security, the military can identify conditions and threats which result in insecurity for a given population. This greater understanding enables military commanders and planners to conceive, design, plan, execute, and assess military missions, operations, and activities to mitigate or reduce insecurity in one or more Human Security Factors. For understanding and acting, the military considers when populations perceive levels of insecurity in one or more of the following Human Security Factors:

   a. **Physical insecurity** refers to when populations perceive themselves to be at risk from bodily and/or psychological harm as a result of crisis or armed conflict. A lack of physical security will greatly increase the risk of insecurity in all factors.

   b. **Infrastructure insecurity** refers to when the system of systems that exists in the physical dimension providing populations with the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g. water and food

distribution systems, power supplies, buildings, domiciles, roads, communication systems, and information systems) is threatened or disrupted and therefore unable to meet basic needs. A lack of infrastructure security will greatly increase the risk of insecurity in all factors.

c. **Political insecurity** refers to the inability and/or unwillingness of the State to uphold the basic human rights of populations as outlined in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[6] in situations of crisis or armed conflict.

d. **Economic insecurity** refers to the inability of populations to meet basic needs during crisis or armed conflict through the exchange of basic goods and services.

e. **Cultural insecurity** refers to the inability of populations to maintain tangible and intangible cultural[7] elements and means of cultural reproduction during crisis or armed conflict. Cultural security considers more than just property; it includes the tangible and intangible aspects of culture whether they are recognizable or not by other parties.

f. **Health insecurity** refers to the inability of populations to access healthcare, and to be protected from threats to their health, including disease, and public health emergencies[8].

g. **Food insecurity** refers to the inability of populations to access food and water that meet dietary needs in accordance with cultural norms during crisis or armed conflict.

h. **Information insecurity** refers to the inability of individuals, communities, or institutions to access, verify, trust, and safely use information needed for decision-making and societal function. It is generated by disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, cyber-enabled information activities, platform and algorithm manipulation, artificial intelligence-generated content, and attacks on information and communication systems. Its effects are realised in the cognitive domain, where adversaries seek to shape perception, risk assessment, decision-making, social cohesion, and confidence in legitimate institutions.

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[6]The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 A) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

[7] Shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values, and assumptions that a group has learned over time as an effective means of maintaining internal social stability and adapting to its environment and that are transmitted to new members as the correct ways to perceive, think and act in relation to these issues.

[8] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security

i. **Environmental insecurity** refers to threats that extreme environmental events and trends pose to individuals, communities, or States. This includes situations where environmental degradation, resource scarcity, climate variability, or exposure to natural hazards disrupt access to water, habitable land, or other essential ecosystem services upon which communities depend. Environmental insecurity can directly threaten populations through disasters or resource loss and often acts as a threat multiplier that intensifies other forms of insecurity, including food, health, economic, and infrastructure instability.

8. As can be seen by the Human Security Factors listed above, Human Security is multifaceted. The Human Security Factors are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Thus, actions taken to improve one aspect of Human Security can generate impacts, positive and negative, on others.

9. The Human Security Factors broaden the view of the operating environment beyond security of the State, to include considerations of insecurities experienced by populations during armed conflict and crisis.

10. Similarly, a Human Security approach is a method of analysis of the different Human Security Factors. A key part of Human Security's conceptual uniqueness is the need for actors to engage with populations to identify needs and situations of vulnerability, as perceived by the diverse parts of the population. The information collected can then be used by the military in planning processes, for example to better understand the White Picture. This enables military planners to provide commanders with an increased understanding of the operating environment, enhance awareness of the effects of operations on and by affected populations, civilian objects, and essential services, and establish feedback loops within other processes to avoid or mitigate harm.

11. Integrating a Human Security approach allows the military to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the human environment through assessment of risks and threats to Human Security Factors, how they interact with each other, and how they ultimately impact campaign success, which would inform potential military roles and tasks.

12. Ensuring a Gender Perspective in Military Operations, as outlined in ATTP- 6567, is applied helps to identify and appropriately respond to the specific needs of men, women, boys and girls, as well as various communities and groups, within a given society in the local context that is affected by armed conflict and crisis.

13. In doing so it is critical to understand that safeguarding these Human Security Factors is generally a national sovereign responsibility, supported and complemented by the international community.

Chapter 4 – Military Roles and Tasks Contributing to Human Security

Chapter 4: Key Takeaways

- Military forces will normally not lead responses to the full range of Human Security-related insecurities.
- Human Security Factors are relevant to crisis prevention, crisis response, and collective defence, where military forces may perform similar roles in different contexts.
- Military Contributions to Human Security involve assessing, planning, and, where mandated or operationally necessary, responding to threats to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of populations in coordination with civilian and military actors.
- Military Contributions to Human Security address Human Security-related risks and threats to inform decision-making and support the achievement of military objectives.
- Military roles should align with Human Security Factors by protecting populations at risk, preserving infrastructure and essential services, strengthening local resilience, supporting economic stability, and enabling a comprehensive approach.
- Military tasks should follow an Understand and Act framework to integrate Human Security Factors into planning, execution, and assessment.
- Integrating Human Security Factors gives the military the analytical perspective, population insight, and long-term awareness needed to strengthen warfighting advantage and support sustainable security outcomes.

Introduction

1. Addressing threats and vulnerabilities to the Human Security Factors involves a range of actions across key stakeholders that collectively contribute to a more secure and stable environment for individuals and communities. NATO's Human Security Approach is people-centred, gender-responsive, and prevention- and protection-oriented. Its objective is to avert and respond to risks and threats to all civilians, civilian objects, and services, especially in situations of conflict or crisis.

Guiding Principles[9]

2. A Human Security approach provides a structured and systematic framework to guide conceiving, planning, generating, conducting, and assessing missions, operations, and activities; it is a way to understand the human environment of the

[9] Adopted from NATO Guiding Principles https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_208515.htm

operating environment and provides a way of conducting military operations rather than just a list of potential tasks. A Human Security approach consists of the following principles:

a. emphasize the use of a people-centred lens to ensure integration of intersectional perspectives in order to understand and address the effects of armed conflict and crisis on different populations;

b. consider the positive and negative consequences that actions of the military and other actors in the operating environment have on each of the Human Security Factors for different populations, and take steps to mitigate negative consequences;

c. incorporate tasks to prevent and protect against threats to the Human Security Factors;

d. consider local customs and social norms of communities within the area of operations;

e. ensure consistency with national policy, law, and international law;

f. acknowledge that the primary responsibility for meeting the needs of populations related to Human Security Factors lies with the host State, in line with its international obligations and commitments;

g. provide space for humanitarian actors; and

h. work within a comprehensive approach through engagement with relevant actors, such as the United Nations, host States, partners, and civil society, as appropriate on Human Security-related issues.

Military Tasks

Understand and Act Tasks in Mali

During United Nations operation in Mali in 2021, a long-range reconnaissance contingent deployed in to reach remote and underserved diverse communities. Initial assessments indicated that many communities had limited contact with the mission and often perceived international forces as distant or ineffective. By applying a Human Security lens, patrols adjusted their focus from demonstrating reach in remote areas to understanding the specific insecurities affecting local populations and identifying practical ways to respond.

Patrols gathered information directly from communities, identifying priorities that ranged from access to healthcare and markets to concerns about armed groups and freedom of movement. By helping secure marketplaces, protect key routes, enable medical outreach, and share information with UN civilian components, humanitarian actors, and local authorities, trust increased between the

population and the mission. Communities subsequently provided information that improved situational awareness and supported wider mission objectives.

Human Security became both a protection activity and an operational advantage, helping all components of the mission to generate effects while strengthening its legitimacy among the population.

3. Translating applicable roles of the military contributing to Human Security into strategic, operational, and tactical-level tasks can be done by using the framework of Understand and Act:

a. **Understand Tasks** provide an understanding of relevant Human Security Factors, incidents, trends and patterns, and their connections within the context of a specific crisis or armed conflict. This requires the use of a people-centred lens to ensure intersectional perspectives are integrated into the conception, planning, conduct and assessment of missions, operations, and activities, enabling the military to understand the human environment within the operating environment. Linking to *Act Tasks,* which engage the population through activities such as patrolling and information collection, is a critical component of this process. The questions asked, the concerns explored, and the actions taken in response to the information gathered send powerful signals about the priorities and intentions of security forces and can significantly influence levels of trust, credibility and legitimacy among conflict-affected populations. The following outline of *Understand Tasks* may be applied across each Human Security Factor.

(1) Physical Insecurity. Assess threats to populations arising from violence, coercion, armed actors, criminal groups, or the breakdown of public order. Apply Gender Perspectives in Military Operations to identify differentiated vulnerabilities and populations at risk, including their location, mobility, and exposure to threats. Analyze adversary capability and intent to harm, coerce, or exploit civilians, including risks associated with Protection of Civilians (PoC), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB). Assess the capacity and legitimacy of host nation security forces to provide protection.

(2) Infrastructure Insecurity. Identify infrastructure systems essential to population survival and societal function. Assess vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to adversary action, systemic failure, environmental conditions, or military activities. Analyze infrastructure dependencies and potential cascading effects on population stability,

with particular attention to facilities associated with essential services or protected sites relevant to Protection of Civilians (PoC).

(3) Political Insecurity. Assess the legitimacy, authority, and functionality of governing institutions and identify threats to governance, institutional stability, or public confidence. Analyze adversary capability and intent to undermine governance structures through coercion, corruption, or manipulation of the information environment. Identify corruption risks and governance vulnerabilities consistent with Building Integrity (BI) considerations.

(4) Economic Insecurity. Assess economic conditions affecting population stability, including employment, social, cultural, and gender norms, access to markets, supply chains, and availability of essential goods and services. Identify economic vulnerabilities exploitable by adversaries and analyze economic dependencies affecting societal function. Assess the potential impact of military activities on local economies and market stability, including corruption risks relevant to Building Integrity (BI).

(5) Cultural Insecurity. Assess cultural identities, institutions, and social cohesion affecting stability. Identify cultural vulnerabilities exploitable by adversaries and recognize sites, institutions, and practices requiring protection consistent with Cultural Property Protection (CPP) frameworks.

(6) Health Insecurity. Assess the capacity and functionality of health systems and identify threats to population health that may affect stability or military operations. Monitor disease patterns, degradation of medical services, and vulnerabilities affecting health infrastructure or personnel protected under international law and Protection of Civilians (PoC) frameworks.

(7) Food Insecurity. Assess population access to food and water and identify vulnerabilities in production, storage, and distribution systems. Monitor risks that may disrupt supply chains affecting population survival and analyze adversary exploitation of food and water vulnerabilities. Assess the potential impact of military activities on food and water systems.

(8) Information Insecurity. Assess the structure of the information environment, including communication systems, influence networks, and population access to information. Identify adversary information activities targeting populations and analyze how narratives and perceptions may influence operational outcomes or population behaviour. This includes assessing the impact of cyber-enabled

operations, digital platform manipulation, and the use of artificial intelligence to generate, amplify, and target disinformation or misinformation. Additionally, assess the resilience of populations and institutions to detect, resist, and respond to such threats.

(9) Environmental Insecurity. Assess environmental conditions affecting population survival and livelihoods, including access to water, habitable land, and natural resources. Identify environmental degradation, climate variability, resource scarcity, or natural hazards that may increase population vulnerability or interact with other forms of insecurity.

b. **Act Tasks** draw on the analysis from *Understand* to inform military planning (OPP, targeting, CIMIC, and other related processes). Informed by an intersectional analysis, and in coordination with other actors and local communities, *Act Tasks* can include both physical and information activities. In developing military options, commanders and planners must consider how actions taken by the military can affect other actors and populations. *Act Tasks* include tasks that allow others (i.e. political groups, human rights organisations, humanitarian and development actors, police, child protection actors, and local communities) to deal with those factors that make populations vulnerable, where the military is not usually the lead actor. The following outline of *Act Tasks* may be applied across each Human Security Factor.

(1) Physical Insecurity. Activities may include establishing and maintaining secure conditions in populated areas, conducting patrols and presence operations to deter violence, responding to threats against civilians, and securing key population centres or routes used by civilians. When engaging with the civilians, consulting them on their perceived physical risks and demonstrating responsiveness can build trust and credibility and provide reassurance. Military forces may also support host nation security forces through training, mentoring, or joint operations to enhance their ability to protect civilians. Where mandated, activities may address cross-cutting Human Security topics such as Protection of Civilians (PoC), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB).

(2) Infrastructure Insecurity. Activities may include securing infrastructure nodes such as power facilities, water systems, transportation hubs, and communications networks; preventing sabotage or degradation of essential services; and supporting restoration or stabilization of infrastructure where directed. Activities may also involve coordinating

with civil authorities and partners to maintain essential services and mitigating the impact of military operations on civilian infrastructure.

(3) Political Insecurity. Activities may include maintaining secure conditions that allow civil authorities to operate, protecting key governance personnel or facilities where mandated, and supporting the continuity of government functions. Engagement with local authorities and partners may help ensure that military operations reinforce legitimate governance structures and avoid actions that undermine public confidence in institutions.

(4) Economic Insecurity. Activities may include maintaining security along key economic routes, protecting economically significant infrastructure, and enabling access to markets and essential goods where mandated. Military forces may also ensure their presence and contracting activities do not distort local economies and that engagement with local suppliers adheres to principles associated with Building Integrity (BI).

(5) Cultural Insecurity. Activities may include identifying and safeguarding cultural property, preventing looting or destruction of cultural sites, and ensuring military operations respect cultural practices and heritage locations. Opportunities to enable cultural events/celebrations under threat or ceased due to enemy/adversity reprisals/targeting constitute a powerful means of developing trust with local populations. Actions related to Cultural Property Protection (CPP) may be coordinated with civil authorities and international partners responsible for cultural preservation.

(6) Health Insecurity. Activities may include securing hospitals and medical facilities where mandated, enabling the safe movement of medical personnel and patients, and supporting the continued operation of health services. Measures may also be taken to mitigate health risks associated with military operations and ensure that military actions do not disrupt access to essential medical care.

(7) Food Insecurity. Activities may include securing food and water distribution points, protecting infrastructure associated with food production and water supply, and preventing disruption to supply routes used for food and humanitarian deliveries. Measures may also be taken to ensure that military activities do not degrade agricultural systems or disrupt local food markets.

(8) Information Insecurity. Activities may include engaging with local communities to provide reliable information, countering adversary narratives that threaten population stability, protecting communication

systems that enable access to information, and supporting digital literacy and media resilience initiatives. Efforts may also support broader actions to counter adversary information operations targeting civilian populations. This can include addressing cyber-enabled information threats, such as coordinated online influence campaigns, disruption or manipulation of digital communication platforms, and the use of artificial intelligence to generate and disseminate disinformation or misinformation at scale.

(9) Environmental Insecurity. Activities may include minimizing environmental damage resulting from military operations, protecting access to water sources and other critical natural resources, and coordinating with civil authorities or partners to mitigate environmental risks that affect population stability, and environmental systems critical to livelihoods.

4. Refer to Annexes C and D for more specifics on military activities.

5. Cross-cutting topics (CCTs) provide established NATO policy and operational frameworks for addressing specific risks affecting civilian populations during crisis and armed conflict. The Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles, adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, provide the Alliance with a common framework for Human Security. NATO doctrine identifies the CCTs as Protection of Civilians (PoC), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), and Building Integrity (BI). These topics are not Human Security Factors; rather, they are NATO policy areas and operational frameworks that help military forces identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to specific risks affecting civilian populations. They may inform MC2HS tasks and often intersect with several Human Security Factors, but they should not be treated as a separate factor list.

6. Human Security is broader in scope and provides a framework for understanding the wider human environment in which military missions, operations, and activities occur. The cross-cutting topics are important NATO policy areas and operational frameworks within that broader framework, but Human Security is not limited to them, nor are those topics confined exclusively to Human Security Factors. The Human Security approach provides a means to integrate and coordinate these topics while also addressing the broader conditions that influence population stability and operational effectiveness. MC2HS tasks in support of the cross-cutting topics can be found in Annex E.

Human Security Threat and Risk Assessment

7. Risk management[1]. Commanders should identify, assess and manage the risks involved in their military operations, and provide guidance to the staff and subordinates for risk reduction, mitigation and exploitation. This should include delegating appropriate

risk ownership to subordinates or transferring intolerable and unmanageable risk to superiors. The commander is ultimately responsible for accepting risk. For more on risk analysis and management, see Annex F Military risk management.

8. Risk Evaluation – this is the process of understanding the overall Human Security net effects of the identified threat and opportunities. The recent NATO guidance and practice suggest that the result of risk evaluation is a certain expected value, expressed either numerically (1-5) or qualitatively (low-high) for risk likelihood, impact, as well as overall level of the risk. In the end, Human Security risk evaluation is the result of combined assessment of:

a. Likelihood – estimated chance of a particular risk or opportunity occurring during mission/operation;

b. Severity/Impact – estimated consequences of one or more effects, decisive conditions; and

c. Proximity – considers the fact that risk factors change over time, and it informs of impeding urgency.

9. Human Security Threat and Risk Assessment should use:

a. Language of probability;

b. Threat level definition;

c. Level of confidence; and

d. Term definition.

10. In considering the military contributions to Human Security, a risk assessment is required to ensure that potential positive and negative impacts of military activities are fully understood. In doing so there are two related considerations: military activities which satisfy the needs of populations as the subject or focus of that activity, therefore have a positive impact on the Human Security factors; and military activities which are not directly focused on the needs of the population but could have negative unintended consequences on the Human Security Factors. A risk analysis consists of four components:

(1) Risk to Populations – do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the risk to populations during a specific mission, operation, or activity? This is based on the Overall Population Threat Analysis[10] which consists of:

[10] Ref. MC0668 Concept for the PoC, dated 4 July 2018

(a) PTA - Threat to people – do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the risk to people during a specific mission, operation, or activity?

(b) STA - Threat to Services – do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the risk to civil services during a specific mission, operation, or activity?

(c) OTA - Threat to Objects – do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the risk to civil objects?

(2) **Risk to Mission** - do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the risk to achieving operational and/or strategic objectives of a specific mission, operation, or activity?

(3) **Risk to Own Forces** – do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the risk to own forces during a specific mission, operation, or activity?

(4) **Risk to Reputation** - do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant element(s) of Human Security increase or decrease the legitimacy of the mission, operation, or activity?

Human Security and National Resilience

11. Human Security considerations contribute directly to broader national resilience and civil preparedness by identifying vulnerabilities within the human environment that affect the stability and functioning of societies during crisis or armed conflict. By examining how disruptions to population security, essential services, infrastructure, information, and governance affect communities, a Human Security–centred analysis provides insight into risks that may undermine societal cohesion, weaken institutional legitimacy, or be deliberately exploited by adversaries. Integrating Human Security into military planning therefore strengthens the ability of nations and alliances to anticipate, withstand, and recover from shocks that target populations, institutions, and critical services.

12. Civil Preparedness refers to the measures and actions undertaken by national and allied authorities during peacetime to ensure a nation is prepared to manage crisis or attack and to contribute effectively to collective defence. In line with NATO’s approach to resilience, civil preparedness focuses on ensuring that societies are able to function under pressure by sustaining continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population, and civil support to military operations. A Human Security

lens supports these functions by identifying risks to population stability, access to essential services, and the resilience of communities, thereby enhancing coordination between military planners and civil authorities to protect populations and preserve societal stability during crisis or conflict.

13. The role of the military in identifying and addressing societal vulnerabilities within national territory raises questions that differ significantly from those encountered in expeditionary operations. In the expeditionary context, the operating environment is external, and the military's relationship to the population is mediated by host-nation authorities and mandate limitations. In the domestic context, armed forces operate within their own society and are subject to constitutional and legal provisions that vary across nations. Some states assign the military a broad role in civil protection, disaster response, and crisis management; others maintain strict legal boundaries that limit military involvement in domestic affairs to narrowly defined circumstances.

14. Resilience through Civil Preparedness (RtCP) is a critical enabler of deterrence and defence and aligns with NATO's baseline requirements for national resilience. These baseline requirements include the ability to ensure continuity of government and critical decision-making; resilient energy supply; the ability to manage large-scale population movement; resilient food and water resources; the capacity to deal with mass casualties; resilient civil communications systems; and resilient transportation systems. Integrating Human Security considerations into resilience planning ensures that the protection of populations, the continuity of essential services, and the safeguarding of societal trust are embedded across these baseline requirements. In doing so, Human Security strengthens societal resilience and helps ensure that military operations are conducted within an environment capable of sustaining national and Allied defence efforts over time.

15. Integrating national resilience as a distinct consideration within Human Security education ensures that PME institutions prepare military professionals to contribute to resilience efforts within diverse national frameworks, rather than equipping them solely for Alliance-specific planning processes. This is particularly relevant because many of the threats to societal stability described in this handbook, including hybrid interference, infrastructure degradation, disinformation, and erosion of institutional legitimacy, manifest at the national level before they emerge as Alliance-level concerns. A Human Security approach that treats national resilience as an independent requirement, rather than only as a subset of Alliance commitments, therefore provides PME institutions with a more complete foundation for preparing military professionals to operate across the full range of contemporary security challenges.

Human Security Factors and NATO Baseline Requirements for Resilience

16. The relationship between Human Security and NATO's approach to national resilience is mutually reinforcing. NATO defines resilience as the ability of states and societies to resist and recover from major shocks, including armed attack, hybrid activity, and systemic disruption. This is operationalised through the Baseline

Requirements for National Resilience, which establish minimum conditions necessary to support deterrence, defence, and civil preparedness. The Human Security Factors provide a complementary analytical lens that enables military planners to assess how degradation across these baseline requirements affects populations, legitimacy, and freedom of action.

17. The table below provides a crosswalk between the Human Security Factors used in this handbook and NATO's baseline requirements for resilience, illustrating how population-centred insecurity maps directly to Alliance-level resilience priorities.

Human Security Factor	Primary NATO Baseline Requirement(s) for National Resilience	Operational Relevance
Physical Security	Ability to deal with mass casualties; continuity of government.	Widespread violence, civilian casualties, or displacement undermine public trust, overload emergency response systems, and degrade state authority, directly affecting resilience and operational legitimacy.
Infrastructure Security	Resilient energy systems; resilient transport systems; resilient communications systems.	Disruption to power, transport, or communications degrades both civilian life and military mobility, limiting reinforcement, sustainment, and civil support to operations.
Political Security	Continuity of government; civil preparedness to support military operations.	Loss of institutional legitimacy, governance paralysis, or corruption weakens decision-making and coordination, reducing national capacity to resist pressure or manage crisis.
Economic Security	Resilient supply chains; continuity of essential services.	Economic instability, market disruption, or loss of livelihoods amplify social unrest and displacement while reducing the state's ability to resource defence and recovery efforts.
Cultural Security	Continuity of government; societal resilience.	Attacks on cultural identity or heritage damage social cohesion and legitimacy, increasing grievances and susceptibility to adversary influence.
Health Security	Ability to deal with mass casualties; continuity of essential services.	Collapse or saturation of health systems reduces civilian survivability, degrades force health protection, and undermines confidence in state response capacity.
Food Security	Resilient food and water resources.	Disruption of food and water supply accelerates humanitarian crises, displacement, and instability, increasing operational risk and demand for military support.
Information Security	Resilient communications systems; continuity of government.	Information disruption, disinformation, or loss of trusted communications degrades public confidence, decision-making, and Alliance narrative cohesion.
Environmental Security	Resilient infrastructure; resilient supply chains; mass casualty preparedness.	Environmental shocks act as threat multipliers, stressing infrastructure, food systems, and emergency response capacity while compounding other insecurities.

Table 1 – Crosswalk between Human Security Factors and NATO baseline requirements

18. The crosswalk presented above shows how the Human Security Factors align with NATO's Baseline Requirements for National Resilience. However, treating national resilience solely as a function of Alliance frameworks obscures a more fundamental point: national resilience precedes Alliance membership and exists independently of it. States develop the capacity to withstand and recover from shocks according to their

own constitutional arrangements, historical experience, and threat environment. This reinforces the linkage between State and Human Security.

19. Finland's comprehensive security model (kokonaisturvallisuus) and Sweden's concept of total defence (totalförsvar) illustrate this distinction. Both models reflect long-standing national practice in integrating military, civil, and societal preparedness into a unified approach to security. Rather than deriving resilience from Alliance baseline requirements, these models build it from the ground up by assigning responsibilities across government ministries, local authorities, the private sector, and civil society. The underlying premise is that societal resilience depends on the capacity of all sectors to function under pressure, with the armed forces constituting one actor within a broader national effort. A Human Security lens reinforces this premise by focusing attention on the conditions that enable populations to endure crisis, including access to essential services, trust in institutions, social cohesion, and the integrity of information. These conditions are not contingent on membership in any particular Alliance; they reflect the basic requirements of a society under stress.

20. This relationship with civilian crisis preparedness therefore extends beyond NATO's baseline requirements. NATO's framework establishes minimum conditions necessary to support deterrence, defence, and civil support to military operations. National resilience, however, also depends on factors those baselines do not fully capture, including the strength of community networks, the depth of institutional trust, the adaptability of local governance, and the ability of populations to distinguish reliable information from deliberate manipulation. These factors shape whether a society can absorb shocks without fracturing along existing fault lines. A Human Security approach helps military planners and analysts assess these dynamics systematically, even where responsibility for action lies beyond the military's mandate. For partner states that organize resilience outside NATO's institutional architecture, this analytical contribution may be the most immediately applicable element of the concept.

21. Using this crosswalk, Human Security analysis enables commanders and planners to translate population-centred vulnerabilities into resilience-relevant risks. This supports early identification of where adversaries may seek to undermine deterrence through pressure below the threshold of armed conflict, including hybrid activities targeting civilian systems and social cohesion. By integrating Human Security Factors into resilience and civil preparedness planning, militaries enhance freedom of action, support national and Alliance resilience objectives, and ensure that military missions, operations, and activities are conducted within a societal environment capable of sustaining defence, recovery, and long-term stability. Annex G provides guidance on how to integrate Human Security considerations into operational planning.

Summary Military Approach to Human Security

22. Taken together, the definition, factors, roles, guiding principles, tasks, and risk assessment, linked by integrating a gender perspective to military operations, provide the military with a way of viewing, understanding, executing, and assessing Human

Security. The key linkages between the main aspects of the military approach to Human Security are depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1 – Military Approach to Human Security

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Annex A – Understanding Human Security – A Legal and Policy Perspective

Understanding Human Security

A Human Security approach to operations does not replace or compete with counterinsurgency and traditional stability operations; rather, it complements them by providing a framework for understanding how populations experience insecurity. By incorporating the perceptions, priorities, and vulnerabilities of affected communities, it enhances the military's ability to achieve security objectives while supporting more sustainable and legitimate outcomes. The contemporary and future security environments challenge the traditional notion of the State as the sole guarantor of security, while also raising potential legal and policy implications related to addressing human insecurities. Of note is the resurgence of Human Security within this contemporary security environment because of its relevance to armed conflicts and crises around the world. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1994 report, *New Dimensions of Human Security*, provided the beginnings of a blended approach between traditional State Security and Human Security, as a people-centred, context-specific, comprehensive, and prevention-oriented approach to peace and security. R2P is historically linked to broader debates on human protection, although it constitutes a distinct political concept and should not be conflated with Human Security.

Within this context, this section offers insight into contemporary shifts in protection and prevention discourse related to military operations, from which a military approach to Human Security is developed. It summarizes the normative and legal frameworks on which the concept of Human Security is based, then presents an overview of the Human Security approaches applied by the United Nations (UN) which have been underway since the 1990s; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approach; and the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence's military approach. A review of the approaches adopted by selected NATO nations and NATO's reconceptualization of National Resilience is conducted to ensure that the approach considers these developing concepts. Then, finally, issues that present widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of affected populations, which also have implications to military operations, are examined to assess how these might inform a definition and approach to Human Security.

All the approaches have several common features that are significant to the considerations toward integration of Human Security into a formalized lens for expeditionary and domestic operations.

Key Legal and Normative Frameworks

With its comprehensive people-centred focus, the concept of Human Security draws from various fields of international law and practice that contemplate the protection of individuals from fear, from want, and their right to live in dignity. Given the breadth of international treaties, customary law, and non-binding instruments that potentially

embody Human Security principles, this section is non-exhaustive, focusing on key sources of legal obligations and non-binding commitments relevant to military missions, operations, and activities.

Legal Frameworks

Human Security is informed by a range of international legal obligations. These in turn provide guidance on responsibilities to key stakeholders in implementing thier roles related to Human Security. These obligations are outlined in:

- Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), regulates the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict. Balancing military necessity and humanity, LOAC seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict by prohibiting the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. In doing so it provides for the protection of civilians and civilian objects, the sick and wounded, and prisoners of war. It also prohibits certain methods and means of warfare.

- Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Control concern the elimination, reduction, use, or control of weapons of mass destruction. Canada is also party to conventional arms control regimes, including the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (the Ottawa Treaty), the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Arms Trade Treaty.

- International Human Rights Law (IHRL) provides for the promotion and protection of the fundamental rights and dignity of individuals' civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. IHRL also comprises peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) which are binding on all states and have no territorial limitation. These include the prohibitions against genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and slavery.

- International Criminal Law (ICL) deals with individual criminal responsibility for the gravest violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

- International Migration Law (IML) concerns the movement of persons across borders. It encompasses the Refugee Convention and international agreements that, for example, criminalise human trafficking, prevent the exploitation of migrant workers, and protect migrants at sea

Soft Law Instruments and Frameworks

Human Security is also informed by "soft law" instruments and frameworks. While non-binding, they do provide guidance on interpreting established law, set minimum standards, reflect political commitments, and promote best practices for implementing legal obligations:

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. A series of UN resolutions specifically address the protection of civilians in armed conflict and their susceptibility to serious human rights violations beginning with Resolution 1265 (1999), then others recognizing the vulnerability of specific groups: women 1325 (2000), children in situations of armed conflict 1261 (1999), sexual violence in armed conflict 1820 (2008); trafficking in persons 2331 (2016); protection of journalists 1738 (2006); protection of medical personnel 2286 (2016); persons with disabilities 2475 (2019); and cultural heritage 2347 (2017). This has been reinforced in subsequent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions as well as through other initiatives such as: the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (2022), NATO Policy on Women, Peace and Security (2024), child protection instruments including the Paris Principles (2007), the Safe Schools Declaration (2015), and the Vancouver Principles (2017), as well as the UN Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2010).

- 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) sets out a 15-year plan to achieving peace and prosperity for people and the planet. Centred around seventeen interconnected sustainable development goals (SDGs), Agenda 2030 aims to end poverty, reduce inequalities, improve health and education, and protect the environment.

Summary.

Whilst grounded in legal and normative foundations, Human Security extends beyond compliance. It provides a practical framework for understanding and addressing the insecurities experienced by populations, enabling military forces to enhance the impact of missions, operations, and activities, complement traditional military capabilities and effects, and contribute to more sustainable security outcomes. By improving understanding of the human environment, it supports decision-making that strengthens legitimacy, builds trust, and increases operational effectiveness.

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Annex B - Other Approaches to Human Security[11]

Human Security is a concept that is being considered by a range of organisations, Allies, and partners looking to build on the normative and legal frameworks related to military operations and their interactions with populations. Developing a Human Security approach integrates these norms into operational requirements for the military. To ensure the military remains interoperable with key organisations, it is important to examine how different organisations, Allies, and partners approach Human Security; this will help in developing an approach to Human Security.

The United Nations (UN)

The United Nations' 1994 Human Development Report introduced Human Security as a concept which equates security with people rather than territory. In the post-Cold War era, this concept viewed security through the paradigm of sustainable human development, leveraging the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation, and a restructured system of global institutions.

Using a developmental lens, the UN expanded the concept of security from the narrow context of "security of territory from external aggression", suggesting that security involves more than just the absence of conflict. The concept now includes safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, jobs or communities. This shift in emphasis from security of the State to security of populations resulted in the UN determining that threats to populations can be identified through the seven dimensions of Human Security:

- Economic Security - unemployment, job insecurity, income inequality, inflation, underdeveloped social security and homelessness;
- Food Security - the problems of physical and economic access to food;
- Health Security - threats to life and health and inadequate access to health services;
- Environmental Security - the degradation of ecosystems, pollution of water, air and soil;
- Personal Security - physical violence, war, discrimination, domestic violence, child abuse;

[11] This section is based on the review of open-source material and assessment by the members of the working group of that material in relation to the Human Security definition and approach offered in this handbook. Therefore, if used for PME the information should be checked for currency.

- Community Security - ethnic tensions and violent conflicts; and

- Political Security - state repression and violation of human rights.

More recently the UN has summarized the basic elements of Human Security as *Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want, and Freedom to Live in Dignity*. In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, which confirms that: “all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy their rights and fully develop their human potential.”[12]

In 2012, The General Assembly adopted UN resolution 66/290 which defines Human Security as “an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people.” In accordance with this resolution, the concept of Human Security means: the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. Thus, the resolution also reiterates the idea of Human Security as formulated at the 2005 World Summit Forum.

The UN approaches Human Security primarily from a developmental and human rights perspective, incorporating a range of UN departments, agencies, and organisations with a focus on conflict prevention, stating that security cannot be achieved without development and that conversely, development cannot be attained without security and neither of these can be achieved without respect for human rights.

From a military perspective, this idea reinforces the need for a comprehensive Human Security approach in which physical security is an important aspect but is not the only consideration, reinforcing the requirement to collaborate with and support other non-military actors.

NATO

NATO has not implemented a specific policy and does not have a definition for human security, however, NATO doctrine states that its approach to Human Security is drawn from the United Nations Human Security concept, echoing the need for a multi-sectoral approach to security that identifies and addresses widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of the people to ensure that the entire population is minimally impacted by conflict and disaster. This shifts from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security. In doing so, NATO views Human Security as an approach to increase its understanding of the human environment to enhance the White Picture leading to operational effectiveness and contributing to lasting peace and security.

Operationally, this means embedding considerations for the comprehensive safety and security of populations into NATO missions, operations, and activities with the objective

[12] paragraph 143 in Outcome Document A/RES/60/1.

of preventing and responding to risks and threats to populations. NATO has tailored the UN approach to Human Security to that which is appropriate to a political-military alliance by identifying the following cross-cutting topics as policy areas and operational frameworks that support consistent action in relation to specific risks affecting civilian populations.

NATO has stated it will implement a Human Security approach in accordance with the following principles:

- Be people-centred, actively integrating gender perspectives and addressing the differentiated impacts of conflict and crisis on different people in the population, especially individuals in situations of vulnerability or marginalization;

- Be prevention and protection-oriented;

- Account for local customs and social norms in the communities encountering NATO in Alliance missions, operations, and activities, while respecting the common values and principles of the Alliance;

- Be consistent with international law;

- Respect and provide space for the neutral, independent and impartial work of humanitarian actors, whose operational viability and safety is essential during armed conflict and other situations of violence;

- Fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; and

- Pursue two-way staff-level engagement on Human Security-related issues with relevant actors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union, host nations, partners, and civil society, as appropriate.

NATO has adopted a Human Security Approach and has begun to integrate this approach into doctrine, specifically AJP 1.0 and DRAFT 5.0; however, at this stage, NATO has not developed detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide Allies and partners in implementing this approach. What has been developed is often different and at times contradictory. The NATO cross-cutting topics should be understood as policy areas and operational frameworks that may inform military roles and tasks. They are not Human Security elements, although they often intersect with one or more Human Security Factors.

NATO Members' Approaches to Human Security

The following summarizes the approaches adopted by select NATO nations. Note that none of these approaches provide the same level of military guidance as issued by the

UK. The summary below is grouped by how explicitly Human Security appears to be incorporated into policy, doctrine, operations or national resilience.

Members with explicit Human Security policy or strategy

Canada: Canada does not have a stand-alone Human Security defence policy. Its approach is reflected primarily through Women, Peace and Security, gender-based analysis, protection of vulnerable populations, crisis response, inclusion, and accountability. For PME purposes, Canada offers a Human Security-aligned model that links military effectiveness to gender perspectives, protection analysis, and cooperation across defence, diplomacy, development, and security institutions.

Germany: Germany's National Security Strategy is built around the concept of Integrated Security, which brings together defence, resilience, sustainability, development, climate policy, and societal cohesion into a single policy framework. Within this framework, the strategy references human security as an important concern, particularly in relation to civil protection, human rights, and the implementation of NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept. Civilian crisis management, the protection of civilians, and conflict prevention feature prominently alongside traditional defence commitments.

Spain: Spain’s Foreign Action Strategy 2025–2028 prioritizes compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, the protection of civilian populations during armed conflicts, and a preventive, anticipatory approach to conflict centred on diplomacy and mediation. It emphasizes peace, security, international humanitarian law. It reflects a broad, preventive, multilateral approach consistent with Human Security principles, though its current public summary frames this mainly through foreign action, peace, and security rather than military doctrine.

United Kingdom: The UK has the most explicit defence policy among NATO members through JSP 985: Human Security in Defence, updated in 2024. It directs incorporation of a Human Security approach into military operations and identifies themes including Protection of Civilians, Women, Peace and Security including Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, Children and Armed Conflict, Cultural Property Protection, Building Integrity and Countering Corruption, and Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking.

United States: The United States does not normally frame its approach as Human Security, but it incorporates closely related principles through civilian harm mitigation and response. DoD policy emphasizes understanding the civilian environment, reducing civilian harm, improving accountability, and integrating protection considerations into planning, operations, training, PME, and security cooperation. For PME purposes, the U.S. model demonstrates how protection and legitimacy can be institutionalized as operational requirements.

Members emphasizing comprehensive security, total defence, or national resilience

Czechia: Czechia's approach can be framed as a whole-of-government and whole-of-society model drawing on NATO and EU approaches. It emphasizes citizen engagement, resilience, international cooperation, and the protection of democratic institutions, which support Human Security outcomes in national and collective defence contexts.

Finland: Finland's approach is best understood through comprehensive security, which links government, military, private sector, civil society, security of supply, societal resilience, and preparedness. For this handbook, Finland can be characterized as a national resilience and whole-of-society model that aligns strongly with Human Security logic, particularly in relation to continuity of essential services, institutional trust, and population resilience.

Latvia: Latvia's comprehensive national defence approach emphasizes collective defence, societal resilience, deterrence, and civil resistance. It aligns with Human Security where it strengthens population preparedness, institutional resilience, and the ability of society to withstand hybrid pressure and armed conflict.

Sweden: Sweden's total defence model emphasizes whole-of-society preparedness across military and civil defence. Its relevance to Human Security lies in its focus on protecting the population, sustaining essential services, maintaining social cohesion, and enabling national resistance and recovery under crisis or armed attack.

Switzerland: Although not a NATO member, Switzerland is relevant as a partner example because its security policy links comprehensive security, neutrality, civil protection, foreign policy, armed forces, intelligence, police, economic policy, and peace promotion. Switzerland's approach aligns with Human Security where it emphasizes protection of the population, resilience, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, peace promotion, mediation, and contribution to stability beyond its borders.

Members emphasizing protection, stabilization, and civilian harm mitigation

Belgium: Belgium's approach appears aligned with NATO's Human Security framework and emphasizes a comprehensive, people-centred approach, civilian-led intervention, protection of civilians, and addressing root causes of conflict.

France: France's approach can be characterized as linking defence, stabilization, counterterrorism, political settlement, civilian protection, human rights, and rule of law. Within a NATO Human Security framing, France is most relevant where military action is connected to broader stabilization and governance objectives, including protection of civilians, support to legitimate authorities, cooperation with international partners, and the restoration of security conditions that enable political and social resilience.

Italy: Italy's approach emphasizes stabilization, civilian protection, conflict prevention, stability policing, political engagement, and socio-economic cooperation. This is consistent with Human Security where military activity supports broader stabilization and civilian protection objectives.

Norway: Norway's military approach is closely associated with Protection of Civilians and systematic threat analysis for civilian protection during armed conflict. It aligns with Human Security by focusing on civilian harm mitigation, protection of non-combatants, and operational planning that accounts for population risk.

Members emphasizing NATO alignment, resilience, and civil-military cooperation

Bulgaria: Bulgaria's national security and defence approach places the security of the citizen, human and civil rights, NATO and EU integration, resilience, civil-military cooperation, crisis management, and civil protection within a comprehensive national security framework. Its relevance to Human Security lies in the explicit connection between national defence, protection of individual freedom and dignity, whole-of-society resilience, and alignment with NATO resilience and civil emergency preparedness standards.

Denmark: Denmark's approach is strongly linked to UN-oriented, civilian-led peacebuilding, conflict prevention, capacity building, human rights, and rule of law. It aligns with Human Security through a comprehensive approach that normally places the military in a supporting role within broader civilian-led efforts.

Netherlands: The Netherlands' approach emphasizes civilian protection, comprehensive security interventions, civil-military cooperation, conflict prevention, stability, justice, and inclusivity. This aligns with a Human Security approach where military activity supports broader protection and stabilization outcomes.

Poland: Poland's approach aligns with NATO's protection and prevention logic, emphasizing regional resilience, civil-military cooperation, humanitarian action, and civilian protection in operations.

Portugal: Portugal applies a comprehensive security approach that links traditional defence concerns with the well-being of citizens and NATO Human Security work. Its relevance is reinforced by the presence of the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon, which has supported analysis on military contributions to Human Security.

Romania: Romania's approach is framed through a comprehensive and citizen-centred understanding of national security. The National Defence Strategy for 2025–2030 places the Romanian citizen at the centre of national security policy and links security and defence to personal safety, community security, prosperity, fundamental rights and freedoms, institutional integrity, economic security, civil protection, societal resilience, and the renewal of trust between citizens and the state. This broad understanding of security also extends to equitable access to quality health services, the reduction of educational inequalities, the protection and promotion of

cultural heritage, and the prevention and management of environmental and climate-related risks. This citizen-centred agenda is framed by Romania's commitments as a member of NATO and the European Union and is shaped by the strategic relevance of the Black Sea and the consolidation of national and Allied defence on NATO's Eastern Flank. Although the strategy does not explicitly use the concept of human security, its approach to security is fully convergent with the substantive scope of human security.

Ukraine: Ukraine's national security framework is explicitly people-centred, linking Human Security to State security, comprehensive defence, resilience, civil-military coordination, continuity of essential services, critical infrastructure protection, and Euro-Atlantic integration. For PME, Ukraine provides a wartime example of whole-of-society resilience and adaptation under sustained attack.

Summary

Across NATO members and relevant partners, approaches to Human Security vary in terminology, level of formalization, and military application. The United Kingdom has the most explicit defence policy through JSP 985, while Canada, the United States, France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and other Allies or partners connect Human Security-related outcomes to Women, Peace and Security, civilian harm mitigation, stabilization, protection of civilians, total defence, comprehensive security, national resilience, civil protection, civil-military cooperation, and continuity of essential services. Switzerland, while not a NATO member, offers a useful partner comparison through its comprehensive security, civil protection, peace promotion, and resilience model; Ukraine offers a highly relevant wartime partner example of people-centred security and whole-of-society resilience under sustained attack.

For PME, the key implication is that Allies and partners do not have a common MC2HS framework; therefore, there is a need for a shared PME reference that supports intellectual interoperability by linking varied national approaches to common operational requirements, including understanding the human environment, mitigating vulnerabilities, protecting populations, and preserving the conditions required for mission successt. Table 2 summarizes these approaches and their PME relevance.

Table 2 – Comparison of selected national approaches to Human Security and PME relevance

Country	Status / NATO relationship	Primary framing	Human Security emphasis	PME relevance
Bulgaria	NATO member	Comprehensive national security, civil-military cooperation, crisis management, civil protection, and NATO/EU integration	Links national defence to citizen security, human and civil rights, freedom and dignity, resilience, and emergency preparedness.	Useful model for connecting civil-military cooperation, resilience, crisis management, and Human Security outcomes.
Canada	NATO member	Women, Peace and Security, gender-based analysis, protection of vulnerable populations, crisis response, inclusion, and accountability	Reflects Human Security through gender perspectives, protection analysis, inclusion, accountability, and cooperation across defence, diplomacy, development, and security institutions.	Useful model for linking Human Security to military effectiveness, gender perspectives, protection analysis, and whole-of-government cooperation.
Denmark	NATO member	UN-oriented peacebuilding, conflict prevention, capacity building, human rights, and rule of law	Uses a comprehensive approach in which military activity normally supports broader civilian-led peacebuilding and stabilization efforts.	Useful model for understanding military support to civilian-led peacebuilding, governance, and rule-of-law objectives.
Finland	NATO member	Comprehensive security and whole-of-society resilience	Links government, military, private sector, civil society, security of supply, preparedness, institutional trust, and population resilience.	Useful model for whole-of-society security, preparedness, resilience, and continuity of critical functions.
France	NATO member	Stabilization, counter-terrorism, civilian protection, human rights, and rule of law	Connects military action to broader stabilization and governance objectives, including protection of civilians and support to legitimate authorities.	Useful model for linking military operations to political settlement, stabilization, and resilience outcomes.
Norway	NATO member	Protection of Civilians and threat analysis for civilian protection	Focuses on civilian harm mitigation, protection of non-combatants, and operational planning that accounts for population risk.	Useful model for teaching Protection of Civilians, threat analysis, and population-centred operational planning.
Romania	NATO member	Extended national security, NATO and EU alignment, Black Sea security, resilience, and civil protection	Connects citizen security, democratic resilience, critical infrastructure protection, institutional integrity, and whole-of-government action.	Useful model for eastern flank resilience, hybrid-threat awareness, civil protection, and inter-institutional coordination.

Sweden	NATO member	Total defence and whole-of-society preparedness	Emphasizes protection of the population, essential services, social cohesion, resistance, and recovery under crisis or armed attack.	Useful model for total defence education, civil preparedness, societal resilience, and continuity of essential services.
Switzerland	NATO partner / non-member	Comprehensive security, neutrality, civil protection, peace promotion, and mediation	Emphasizes protection of the population, resilience, international humanitarian law, human rights, and stability beyond national borders.	Useful partner comparison for civil protection, resilience, peace promotion, and whole-of-government security education.
Ukraine	NATO partner / aspirant	Human security, comprehensive defence, national resilience, civil-military administration, and Euro-Atlantic integration	Places human life, dignity, rights, security, societal resilience, continuity of essential services, and protection of civilians at the centre of national security under wartime conditions.	Useful model for teaching wartime resilience, civil-military coordination, critical service continuity, territorial defence, and adaptation under sustained attack.
United Kingdom	NATO member	Explicit Human Security in Defence policy	Directs incorporation of Human Security into military operations and identifies themes including Protection of Civilians, WPS/CRSV, CAAC, CPP, Building Integrity, and Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking.	Most explicit NATO member model for integrating Human Security into defence policy, doctrine, education, and operations.
United States	NATO member	Civilian harm mitigation and response	Emphasizes understanding the civilian environment, mitigating civilian harm, improving accountability, and integrating protection into operations and training.	Useful model for institutionalizing protection and legitimacy as operational requirements through doctrine, reporting, lessons learned, and PME.

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Annex C – Military Contributions to Human Security - Understand Tasks

Human Security Factor	Indicators and Warning Signs	Understand Activities
Physical Security	• Increased activity of armed groups or criminal networks. • Formation of community self-defence groups. • Increasing attacks on civilians or community infrastructure. • Attacks on IDP or refugee camps. • Increased availability of small arms and light weapons. • Sudden reduction in civilian presence (especially vulnerable populations) in markets, schools, or transportation hubs. • Reports of targeted harassment or intimidation of specific demographic groups. • Increased medical treatment for non-conflict injuries consistent with abuse or coercion.	• Assess threats to populations from violence, coercion, armed actors, criminal groups, or systemic breakdown of public order. • Identify populations, population groups, and sub-groups at risk, including their location, mobility patterns, exposure to threats, and specific vulnerabilities, using disaggregated data and analysis of patterns of life to inform prioritisation and decision-making. • Analyze adversary capability and intent to harm or exploit populations. • Conduct engagement with populations to understand their perceptions, prioritisation and attitudes towards physical security. • Assess host nation security force capacity and legitimacy. • Monitor patterns of violence, intimidation, exploitation, and coercion. • Assess how NATO military activities may directly endanger the physical security of the populations concerned — through civilian harm resulting from the use of force, targeting errors, or collateral effects; operationally induced displacement; security vacuums created by redeployment or withdrawal; retaliation against civilians perceived to cooperate with NATO forces; explosive remnants of war; and sexual exploitation, abuse, or other violent misconduct by personnel.
Infrastructure Security	• Targeting of power, water, or mobility infrastructure. • Military use of dual-use infrastructure. • Destruction, closure, or occupation of schools and hospitals.	• Identify infrastructure critical to population survival and societal function. • Assess infrastructure vulnerabilities to adversary or military action, systemic failure, or environmental conditions.

Human Security Factor	Indicators and Warning Signs	Understand Activities
	• Closure or disruption of transport and communication networks. • Irregular or intermittent service outages rather than full disruption (suggesting testing, probing, or degradation campaigns).	• Analyze infrastructure dependencies and cascading risks. • Monitor infrastructure functionality and resilience. • Analyze the adversary's capability and intent to disrupt, degrade, or destroy essential infrastructure systems in order to coerce, displace, or weaken the population. • Assess how NATO's own military activities may damage or degrade critical infrastructure — through kinetic effects, the use of routes and facilities, or interruption of essential services on which the population depends. • Integrate appropriate mitigation measures so that operations do not deepen the population's exposure to infrastructure insecurity.
Political Security	• Closure or reduced operating hours of government offices, courts, schools, or police stations. • Withdrawal of state officials or security personnel from local communities. • Public calls for mobilization or retaliation against perceived threats. • Increase in public messaging or mobilization along ethnic, religious, or sectarian lines. • Emergence of alternative governance structures or militias. • Declining participation in local governance processes • Escalation in politically motivated arrests or detentions.	• Assess legitimacy, authority, and functionality of governing institutions. • Identify threats to governance, institutional stability, or public confidence. • Analyze adversary efforts to undermine governance. • Monitor population trust in institutions. • Assess how NATO's own military activities may undermine institutional legitimacy, authority, or public confidence.
Economic Security	• Sharp increase in food, fuel, or staple commodity prices in local markets. • Closure of markets, reduced market attendance, or disruption of commercial transport routes. • Expansion of illicit trafficking networks or smuggling routes.	• Assess economic conditions affecting population stability. • Identify economic vulnerabilities exploitable by adversaries. • Analyze economic dependencies affecting societal function. • Monitor economic disruptions affecting operational objectives.

Human Security Factor	Indicators and Warning Signs	Understand Activities
	• Armed groups exploiting natural resources or illicit economic activity. • Shift toward barter systems or informal economies (where they were not already common) replacing currency-based exchange. • Increased reliance on humanitarian assistance for basic needs.	• Assess the potential impact of military activities on local economies and market stability, including corruption risks relevant to Building Integrity (BI). • Establish the existence and degree of threats to economic stability — such as the disruption of markets, supply chains, and livelihoods, the denial of access to essential goods and services, or the exploitation of economic hardship by adversaries to coerce, recruit, or destabilize the population. • Assess how NATO's own military activities may disrupt local economies and market stability — for instance through inflationary effects, distortion of labour markets, interruption of supply chains or trade routes, or corruption risks relevant to Building Integrity (BI).
Cultural Security	• Destruction or occupation of cultural or religious sites. • Changes in use or closure of cultural centres or heritage locations. • Public messaging or propaganda targeting specific ethnic, religious, or cultural groups.	• Assess cultural structures, identities, and cohesion affecting stability. • Identify and assess cultural vulnerabilities exploitable by adversaries — such as inter-communal tensions, grievances along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, the exposure of cultural property to damage or looting, and the susceptibility of identity-based groups to marginalization, division, or manipulation. • Identify cultural sites, practices, and institutions requiring protection. • Analyze the adversary's capability and intent to exploit cultural fault lines — for instance through the deliberate destruction or desecration of cultural property, the incitement of inter-communal hatred, the suppression of cultural or religious practices, or the manipulation of identity narratives to divide and coerce the population. • Establish the existence and degree of threats to cultural identity and social cohesion — including attacks on cultural heritage, the persecution of identity-based groups, and the erosion of the practices and institutions that sustain communal stability. • Assess how NATO's own military activities may damage cultural property or offend cultural and religious

Human Security Factor	Indicators and Warning Signs	Understand Activities
		sensitivities — for instance through kinetic effects on protected sites, the use or occupation of culturally significant locations, or conduct perceived as disrespectful.
Health Security	• Closure, evacuation, or damage to medical facilities. • Reports of medical supply shortages or denial of access to clinics. • Disease outbreaks or public health emergencies.	• Assess capacity and functionality of health systems. • Assess civilian risk appetite/threshold to transit insecure areas to access healthcare. • Establish the existence and degree of threats to population health that may affect societal stability or military operations — such as epidemics, the collapse of medical services, or the deliberate denial of healthcare. • Analyze the adversary's capability and intent to undermine population health — for instance through attacks on medical facilities, personnel, or transport, the denial or obstruction of healthcare and humanitarian access, the contamination of water or food supplies, or the weaponization of disease — in violation of international humanitarian law. • Monitor disease outbreaks, injury trends, and health system degradation. • Assess how NATO's own military activities may degrade population health or health systems — for instance through damage to medical infrastructure, strain on local health resources, interruption of supply or evacuation routes, or environmental and sanitary effects of military presence
Food Security	• Rising food prices or food shortages. • Disruption of agricultural production or water systems. • Disruption of food transport routes or storage facilities.	• Assess population access to food and water. • Identify vulnerabilities in food and water distribution systems. • Identify the food and water resources and systems on which the population depends. • Monitor disruptions affecting population survival and stability. • Assess the potential impact of military activities on food and water systems.

Human Security Factor	Indicators and Warning Signs	Understand Activities
Information Security	• Increased distribution of propaganda encouraging violence, ostracization, or mobilization. • Shutdown or disruption of telecommunications or local radio networks. • Shutdown of credible information sources. • Sudden emergence of coordinated online narratives across multiple platforms; · widespread dissemination of deepfakes or manipulated media. • Large-scale bot activity or coordinated inauthentic behaviour. • Impersonation of government or military communication channels. • Cyber attacks against media organizations or communication infrastructure. • Rapid spread of false information causing panic or population movement. • Foreign information campaigns targeting specific identity groups. • Increased distrust in public institutions and traditional media. • Sudden migration of populations toward alternative or encrypted information platforms.	• Assess information access, influence structures, and communication systems. • Identify adversary information operations targeting populations. • Analyze population perceptions affecting operational outcomes. • Identify and assess the vulnerabilities that expose populations and institutions to information threats, reflected in their limited resilience to detect, resist, and recover from manipulation — such as low media literacy, fragmented or untrusted information sources, and dependence on platforms susceptible to interference. • Assess how NATO's own activities in the information environment may adversely affect the population — for instance through messaging perceived as propaganda, the loss of credibility from inconsistent or inaccurate communication, the disruption of local communication systems, or second-order effects that erode trust and play into adversary narratives.
Environmental Security	• Environmental disasters affecting populated areas. • Water scarcity or degradation of agricultural land. • Armed presence or checkpoints around water sources, grazing land, or resource extraction sites.	• Assess environmental conditions affecting population survival and livelihoods. • Identify environmental degradation, resource scarcity, or natural hazards affecting stability. • Analyze the adversary's capability and intent to exploit or aggravate environmental conditions to the detriment of the population — for instance through the deliberate contamination or destruction of water sources, land, or natural resources, the weaponization of scarcity, or the seizure and control of resources essential to survival.

Human Security Factor	Indicators and Warning Signs	Understand Activities
		• Establish the existence and degree of threats arising from environmental conditions that may affect population survival or societal stability — such as water and food scarcity, environmental disasters, resource-driven displacement, or competition over depleted resources. • Assess how NATO's own military activities may degrade the environment to the detriment of the population — for instance through contamination of land or water, damage to natural resources, the environmental footprint of bases and movement, or the disruption of livelihoods dependent on environmental conditions.

Annex D – Military Contributions to Human Security - Act Tasks

Human Security Factor	Strategic Activities	Operational Activities	Tactical Activities
Physical Security	• Establish mandates, policy, ROE, and priorities for protection of populations. • Allocate forces and authorities to deter or defeat threats to civilians. • Integrate Protection of Civilians into strategic guidance.	• Plan and conduct operations to protect populations within the operational area. • Integrate Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) into operational planning and targeting. • Coordinate protection efforts with the host nation and partners. • Capacity building and support of host nation security forces to enhance their ability to protect civilians.	• Conduct patrols and presence to reassure and/or protect populations. • Prevent threats to civilians. • Respond to immediate threats to civilians. • Secure key population centers. • Mitigate civilian risk during tactical operations. • Capacity building and support of host nation security forces to enhance their ability to protect civilians.
Infrastructure Security	• Establish strategic priorities for protection of critical civilian infrastructure. • Allocate resources to ensure essential civilian systems. • Integrate infrastructure resilience into strategic planning.	• Protect infrastructure from adversary and own actions essential to mission and population stability. • Protect infrastructure from advisory and own actions essential to mission and population stability. • Coordinate infrastructure protection with civil authorities.	• Secure infrastructure nodes such as power, water, transport, and communications. • Prevent sabotage or degradation. • Support restoration efforts where directed.
Political Security	• Align military posture with political objectives. • Support legitimacy of host nation governance. • Avoid actions that undermine affected nation's legitimate institutional authority.	• Enable secure conditions for governance within the operational area. • Support institutional continuity. • Integrate political stability considerations into operational planning.	• Maintain secure conditions for local governance. • Protect governance personnel and facilities where mandated. • Avoid actions that undermine local legitimacy.
Economic Security	• Protect strategic economic infrastructure.	• Enable secure conditions for economic activity.	• Maintain secure conditions for markets and local economic activity.

Human Security Factor	Strategic Activities	Operational Activities	Tactical Activities
	• Integrate economic stability considerations into strategic planning. • Support conditions for national economic stability. • Plan to counter adversary actions to destabilise local economy.	• Protect operationally significant economic infrastructure. • Prevent adversary disruption of economic systems.	• Protect economic infrastructure where directed. • Avoid disrupting economic activity unnecessarily.
Cultural Security	• Establish directives, guidance, and priorities for cultural property protection. • Integrate cultural considerations into strategic planning.	• Identify cultural sites, institutions, and practices requiring protection. • Coordinate cultural property protection with civil authorities and partners.	• Safeguard cultural property and heritage locations where mandated. • Avoid unnecessary harm to cultural practices, sites, or institutions.
Health Security	• Establish directives and priorities to protect health systems and medical services. • Integrate population health, medical access, and disease-risk considerations into strategic planning. • Allocate resources to support continuity of essential health services where mandated.	• Protect medical infrastructure, personnel, evacuation routes, and supply chains where mandated or operationally required. • Coordinate health-security actions with host-nation authorities, humanitarian actors, and partners. • Integrate health threats, disease outbreaks, and medical system degradation into operational planning.	• Secure or avoid damaging medical facilities and routes used for medical access. • Enable safe movement of medical personnel, patients, and supplies where directed. • Avoid actions that degrade population health or access to healthcare.
Food Security	• Establish directives to allow the force to protect strategic food and water supply systems. • Integrate food system stability into strategic planning (harvest season). • Allocate resources to prevent systemic disruption.	• Protect critical civilian food and water infrastructure. • Enable distribution of food and water. • Prevent adversary and own actions disrupting supply systems.	• Secure food and water distribution points. • Prevent disruption to local supply. • Avoid degrading food and water access.
Information Security	• Establish strategic communication objectives.	• Conduct information activities to counter adversary influence.	• Conduct local engagement to counter adversary influence.

Human Security Factor	Strategic Activities	Operational Activities	Tactical Activities
	• Counter adversary strategic information threats. • Protect integrity of national and alliance information systems. • Integrate cyber and AI-enabled information threats into national and alliance strategic communication planning. • Develop policies and frameworks to counter disinformation, including synthetic media and deepfake threats. • Coordinate with governmental, private sector, and international partners to protect the broader information ecosystem (including social media platforms and digital infrastructure). • Establish mechanisms to rapidly attribute and respond to large-scale information attacks.	• Protect civilian information systems. • Integrate the information environment into operational planning by considering how information, narratives, perceptions, digital systems and information-related threats may affect the population, adversary, own forces and mission outcomes, and incorporating these considerations into operational design and decision-making from the outset. • Detect and analyze cyber-enabled information operations, including bot networks and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. • Counter AI-generated disinformation through verification, exposure, and coordinated messaging. • Integrate information environment analysis (including digital and cyber dimensions) into targeting and operational design. • Coordinate with cyber, intelligence, and strategic communications functions to synchronize effects in the information environment.	• Protect civilian information systems. • Prevent adversary exploitation of local information environments. • identify and report disinformation, deepfakes, and manipulated content affecting local populations. • Support local population awareness and resilience against misinformation and disinformation. • Monitor and engage within local digital and social media environments where relevant and authorized. • Protect against exploitation of unit-level digital signatures (e.g., social media exposure, geolocation risks).

Human Security Factor	Strategic Activities	Operational Activities	Tactical Activities
Environmental Security	• Establish strategic priorities to mitigate environmental risks affecting populations. • Integrate environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural hazard risks into strategic planning. • Coordinate with civil authorities and partners to protect resources essential to survival and livelihoods.	• Assess environmental conditions that may affect population stability, movement, or access to resources. • Plan mitigation measures to reduce environmental harm from military activities. • Coordinate protection of water sources, agricultural land, and other resources essential to livelihoods.	• Minimise environmental damage during tactical operations. • Protect access to water sources, agricultural areas, and critical natural resources where directed. • Avoid actions that contaminate land or water or disrupt livelihoods dependent on environmental systems.

Annex E – Military Contributions and NATO Cross-Cutting Topics

CCTs	Understand Activities	Strategic Activities	Operational Activities	Tactical Activities
Protection of Civilians (PoC)	• Assess threats to civilians from military operations, adversary activity, and systemic instability. • Identify civilian populations at risk, including location, vulnerabilities, and exposure to harm. • Analyze adversary intent and capability to harm civilians. • Monitor civilian harm trends, displacement, and access to essential services.	• Establish strategic priorities and authorities for civilian protection. • Integrate Protection of Civilians into strategic guidance and planning. • Allocate forces and resources to mitigate civilian harm.	• Integrate civilian protection into operational design, planning, and targeting. • Prioritize protection tasks within the operational area. • Coordinate civilian protection with host nation and partners.	• Conduct patrols and presence to protect civilians. • Respond to immediate threats to civilian populations. • Mitigate civilian harm during tactical operations.
Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)	• Identify risks to children from recruitment, exploitation, violence, or displacement. • Assess presence and use of child soldiers by adversaries. • Monitor impacts of conflict on children's safety and well-being.	• Establish policies to prevent harm to children and prevent recruitment or exploitation. • Integrate CAAC considerations into strategic planning and directives.	• Integrate child protection considerations into operational planning. • Identify and mitigate operational risks to children. • Coordinate with partners where mandated.	• Prevent harm to children during military operations. • Identify and report presence of child soldiers. • Separate suspected Child Soldier detainees IAW best practices. • Adjust tactical activities to mitigate risk to children.
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) / Gender Perspective	• Assess how conflict affects different population groups. • Identify gender-specific vulnerabilities and roles affecting operations.	• Integrate gender perspective into strategic guidance and planning.	• Integrate gender perspective into operational design, planning, and execution.	• Apply gender perspective in engagement and operations.

CCTs	Understand Activities	Strategic Activities	Operational Activities	Tactical Activities
	• Analyze adversary exploitation of population vulnerabilities. • Integrate gender perspective into operational analysis.	• Ensure gender perspective informs force employment and objectives.	• Ensure operations account for impacts on all population groups.	• Avoid actions that create disproportionate risk to vulnerable groups.
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)	• Assess threats of sexual violence linked to conflict. • Identify patterns, risks, and vulnerable populations. • Analyze adversary use of sexual violence as a tactic.	• Establish policies to prevent and respond to CRSV. • Integrate CRSV prevention into strategic planning and directives.	• Integrate CRSV risk mitigation into operational planning. • Identify operational risks contributing to CRSV.	• Prevent and mitigate risk of CRSV during operations. • Identify and report CRSV risks or incidents. • Adjust tactical activities to reduce vulnerability.
Cultural Property Protection (CPP)	• Identify cultural property, sites, and institutions. • Assess risks to cultural heritage from military operations or adversary activity. • Analyze cultural factors affecting stability and legitimacy.	• Establish strategic priorities for protection of cultural property. • Integrate CPP into strategic planning and directives.	• Integrate cultural property protection into operational planning. • Identify and protect cultural property within operational area.	• Protect cultural sites and institutions. • Avoid damage, interreference, or destruction during tactical operations. • Prevent looting or exploitation.

Annex F – Human Security Threat and Risk Assessment

This annex provides a practical Human Security threat matrix using a NATO-style 5 x 5 likelihood and impact format. It supports PME, JIPOE, mission analysis, course of action development, operational assessment, and risk management by translating the nine Human Security Factors into threats, indicators, consequences, and mitigation considerations.

Military risk[1]

Military forces face Human Security factors and influences that make it uncertain whether and when they will achieve their objectives. The effect this uncertainty has on their objectives is **"risk"**. The potential adverse consequences of a risk are generally referred to as **threats**.

Risk considerations

Risk has different implications at different levels of operations, however there is a linkage between levels of risk. In the same way that tactical events can have strategic repercussions, and strategic decisions can have tactical implications, so too can risks at the tactical level have consequences at both the operational and strategic levels. Commanders should always be aware of this broader perspective when assessing likelihood, impact and ownership of risk. It may be appropriate for commanders at all levels to compare their risk assessments to identify those risks that may migrate up and down the chain of command**.**

Risk Management Process

Commanders and forces manage risk by **identifying** it, **analysing** it and then **evaluating** whether the risk should be modified by risk treatment to satisfy their risk criteria. Throughout this process, they communicate and consult with stakeholders and monitor and review the risk and the controls that are modifying the risk to ensure that no further risk treatment is required. This specific annex is more focused on **Risk Evaluation**.

[1] AJP-3, Annex

Risk Evaluation

The purpose of risk evaluation is to assist in making decisions, based on the outcomes of risk analysis, about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment implementation. Several tools are available to evaluate risk: matrix, probability impact graph, risk matrix which combines threats and opportunities.

Likelihood and impact are each scored from 1 to 5. Likelihood describes the probability that a threat will occur within the planning horizon. Impact describes the likely operational and population effect if the threat occurs. Overall risk is calculated by multiplying likelihood by impact. Scores of 1–4 are Low, 5–9 are Moderate, 10–16 are High, and 17–25 are Very High. Scores should be updated as the operating environment changes and should be informed by intelligence, civil-military reporting, population engagement, host-nation input, humanitarian information, legal advice, and operational assessment.

Impact

How Severe Would the Outcomes be if Risk Occurred?

Probability

What is the Probability the Risk will Happen?

	Insignificant 1	Minor 2	Significant 3	Major 4	Severe 5
5 Almost Certain	Medium	High	Very High	Extreme	Extreme
4 Likely	Medium	Medium	High	Very High	Extreme
3 Moderate	Low	Medium	Medium	High	Very High
2 Unlikely	Very Low	Low	Medium	Medium	High
1 Rare	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Medium	Medium

Human Security Threat Matrix

The matrix is an initial staff product and should not be treated as static. It should be reviewed during mission analysis, COA development, targeting, operational assessment, transition planning, and significant changes in the operating

environment. Where a threat is assessed as High or Very High, the staff should identify decision points, early-warning indicators, mitigation measures, responsible staff leads, reporting requirements, and residual risk.

Human Security Factor	Representative Threat	Key Indicators	Risk	Operational Consequence	Mitigation Considerations
Physical Security	Targeted violence, coercion, criminal exploitation, civilian harm, or breakdown of public order.	Attacks on civilians; intimidation; armed group activity; displacement; reduced civilian movement; reports of abuse or exploitation.	20 Very High	Civilian casualties, displacement, retaliation, loss of confidence in authorities, and reduced mission legitimacy.	Prioritize civilian harm mitigation, protection of civilians, patrol and presence activity, early warning, force discipline, and coordination with host-nation security forces.
Infrastructure Security	Disruption, sabotage, military use, or degradation of essential infrastructure and services.	Power, water, communications, transport, school, hospital, or market disruption; dual-use infrastructure damage; repeated service outages.	20 Very High	Cascading failure across health, food, economic, information, and mobility systems; reduced sustainment and freedom of movement.	Map critical nodes and dependencies, protect dual-use infrastructure, assess second-order effects, coordinate restoration priorities, and avoid unnecessary damage.
Political Security	Loss of institutional legitimacy, governance paralysis, coercive governance, corruption, or adversary manipulation of public confidence.	Closure of government services; withdrawal of officials; alternative governance structures; politically motivated intimidation; declining trust.	12 High	Reduced compliance with lawful authority, weakened host-nation legitimacy, increased adversary influence, and coordination failure.	Support legitimate authorities, avoid bypassing governance structures where possible, integrate Building Integrity considerations, and monitor trust indicators.

Economic Security	Market disruption, livelihood collapse, inflation, supply-chain interference, illicit economy expansion, or predatory contracting.	Price spikes; market closure; disrupted trade routes; illicit taxation; smuggling; labour-market distortion; dependence on aid.	12 High	Grievance generation, recruitment opportunities for armed groups, displacement, and reduced economic resilience.	Protect key economic routes, avoid distorting local markets, monitor corruption risks, and coordinate with civilian economic and humanitarian actors.
Cultural Security	Destruction, desecration, occupation, looting, or manipulation of cultural property, identity, religious practice, or social cohesion.	Threats to cultural sites; identity-based propaganda; inter-communal tension; closure of cultural or religious spaces; looting.	9 Moderate	Identity-based grievances, reduced legitimacy, community fragmentation, and adversary exploitation of cultural narratives.	Map cultural sites and practices, integrate Cultural Property Protection, avoid disrespectful conduct, and consult appropriate local authorities.
Health Security	Collapse or obstruction of health services, disease outbreak, mass casualty stress, denial of medical access, or damage to medical facilities.	Medical supply shortages; hospital closure; attacks on medical personnel; disease indicators; interrupted evacuation routes; public health warnings.	16 High	Higher mortality, degraded force health protection, public panic, reduced trust, and increased demand for military support.	Protect medical facilities and routes, coordinate with health actors, monitor disease indicators, and avoid placing excessive demand on local health systems.
Food Security	Disruption of food or water access, storage, production, distribution routes, or culturally appropriate dietary supply.	Food or water shortages; price increases; disrupted storage; damage to agriculture; blocked distribution; water contamination.	15 High	Humanitarian crisis, population movement, social unrest, and increased vulnerability to coercion or recruitment.	Protect food and water systems, enable safe distribution, coordinate with humanitarian actors, and assess operational impacts on agriculture and markets.

Information Security	Disinformation, misinformation, cyber-enabled influence, AI-generated deception, communication disruption, or impersonation of trusted sources.	Coordinated narratives; deepfakes; bot activity; attacks on media or communications; false alerts; distrust in institutions; panic movement.	20 Very High	Panic, mistrust, reduced compliance with public instructions, polarization, and weakened Alliance or host-nation credibility.	Monitor the information environment, verify and communicate rapidly, counter false narratives, protect communication channels, and coordinate StratCom, cyber, and intelligence functions.
Environmental Security	Natural hazards, environmental degradation, contamination, water scarcity, resource competition, or military activity degrading livelihoods.	Water scarcity; contaminated land or water; resource conflict; environmental disaster; displacement; degraded agriculture or grazing areas.	12 High	Threat multiplier effects across food, health, infrastructure, economic, and displacement dynamics.	Assess environmental dependencies, minimize operational environmental harm, protect water and natural resources, and coordinate with civil authorities.

Updating the Matrix During Planning

The Human Security threat matrix should be updated as a living staff product throughout the planning process. During mission analysis, the staff should confirm the baseline threat descriptions, likelihood scores, impact scores, indicators, and mitigation measures using current intelligence, civil-military reporting, population engagement, host-nation input, humanitarian information, legal advice, and operational assessment. During COA development and wargaming, the staff should test how each COA may reduce, transfer, or increase risk across the nine elements of Human Security, including second- and third-order effects on linked elements. During plan development, high and very high risks should be translated into tasks, constraints, CCIRs, decision points, reporting requirements, mitigation measures, and residual-risk statements.

The matrix should be reviewed whenever a major incident occurs; adversary tactics or threat activity change; civilian harm, displacement, disease, environmental shock, or essential-service disruption is reported; governance legitimacy changes; the information environment shifts; a mandate, ROE, force posture, or mission phase changes; or any risk

moves into or out of the High or Very High category. Updates should identify what changed, why it changed, which Human Security elements are affected, what mitigation is required, who owns the action, and what decision or guidance is required from the commander.

Annex G – Integrating Human Security Considerations into Operational Planning

NATO is committed to integrating Human Security principles into all the Alliance's core tasks. Human Security may be threatened by conflict and supported through military intervention. In modern operations, the achievement, or reinstatement, of Human Security may be a key contributor to mission success. Promoting Human Security increases stability and reduces the drivers of conflict, making it a potentially key component of conflict resolution.

For NATO, taking a Human Security approach means embedding considerations for the comprehensive safety and security of the population into all stages and levels of Alliance operations, with the objective of preventing and responding to risks and threats to all people, especially in conflict or crisis situations.

This annex identifies how to integrate Human Security Factors as planning considerations into the operational-level planning process (OLPP). While subject matter expertise can be provided by a range of specialist staff and sections (Human Security Advisor, the Military Child Protection Advisor, Gender Advisor, J9), it is the responsibility of commanders and all staff to ensure that considerations regarding military contributions to Human Security are included in accordance with the mission mandate and objectives.

The OLPP consists of the necessary steps to support a commander and their staff to develop the operational-level operation plan (OPLAN) including the conduct of the operational estimate process. The steps also comprise the campaign and operational assessment during execution to review or revise the plan, when required. Using the OLPP found in NATO AJP 5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations[13] this annex provides specific Human Security considerations drawn from this concept note. In doing so it does not outline all the detail for each step but only highlights those aspects where Human Security considerations are relevant.

Throughout all stages of the planning process there is a requirement to integrate a gender perspective in military operations by collecting, assessing, and using sex and age disaggregated data to properly:

- Support the mission analysis;
- Support course of action development;
- Shape the operational plans; and
- Monitor measures of performance and measures of effectiveness in the plan review.

[13] AJP-5 Edition B Version 1 Ratified Draft 2025 – Note: at the time of writing this AJP has been ratified but not promulgated. .

Step 1 – Planning Initiation

The purpose of Step 1 is twofold: first to understand the strategic situation and the nature of the problem; as well as the proposed end state and strategic objectives; and second to support SHAPE staff efforts in the development of initial strategic military advice for SACEUR on his military response options (MRO) and to assess the operational-level viability of strategic response options. Consequently, the main products of this step are an initial operational estimate, warning orders to subordinate commands and the document containing the JFC's operational advice. These products aid SACEUR, the subordinate commands and the own staff to prepare for their subsequent planning activities.

Once the Strategic Warning Order is received the following activities take place:

- **Activate Planning Staff.**
    - Ensure that Human Security Advisor or expertise is included within the HQ[14].
    - Establish Human Security focal points within HQ J-staff as needed.
    - Establish contact with other mission protection advisors (military and civilian) including other contingents or members of the coalition or UN mission.
    - Identify and establish contact with non-mission Human Security-related actors.

- **Gather Planning Tools**.
    - Obtain NAC and/or SHAPE guidance including a mandate on the military contributions to Human Security (this could be in the form of direction related to one or more CCT).[15]
    - Obtain or develop a Human Security directive from higher HQ and Commander.
    - Obtain national, coalition/UN/NATO military contributions to Human Security mandates, directives, guidelines, SOPs.
    - Obtain appropriate publications and documentation.

[14] The use of a Human Security Advisory is not consistent across nations. In some cases the Human Security and Gender Advisor roles are combined.

[15] NATO Cross-Cutting Themes (CCTs) represent a population-centric approach to modern security, ensuring that military operations comply with international law and mission legitimacy. According to NATO's AJP-01 doctrine, the core CCTs include Protection of Civilians (PoC): Minimising the negative impact of military operations on local populations. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) / Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV): Ensuring the integration of a gender perspective and preventing gender-based violence. Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC): Protecting children from the effects of warfare. Cultural Property Protection (CPP): Safeguarding cultural heritage during conflicts. Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB): Preventing the exploitation of vulnerable populations in operational areas. Building Integrity (BI): Promoting good governance and anti-corruption within defence establishments. Combatting Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA): Establishing strict codes of conduct for deployed troops.

- **Guidelines to Staff.** Guidelines on how to apply the Human Security-related threats, factors, and considerations to the planning process. The guidelines should also include direction on (not exhaustively):
    - How the staff is to coordinate their internal efforts with the Human Security Advisor and other protection advisors.
    - Establishing the necessary external higher and subordinate Human Security contacts.
    - Direct Liaison Authority and contacts with Host Nation stakeholders.
    - Establishing contacts with national OGD stakeholders.
    - Direct Liaison Authority and contact with related civilian actors and lead agencies coordinating efforts in the mission area.
    - Developing military response and consequence management options to prevent and respond to threats to the Human Security Factors.
    - Establish monitoring and reporting processes within the mission and identifying how to exchange this information with Host Nation and/or UN or other coordinating agencies.

- **Identify Risks and Threats as part of the Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating Environment (CUOE).** Identify the nature of the crisis, the main actors, their interrelationships, and the influencing PMESII factors, including specific factors that could place populations at risk and specific risks to population groups (by integrating a gender perspective). Establish how risks and threats to the Human Security Factors affect the likely course of future events and potential outcomes, and how they may develop into strategic risk to NATO's security interests. This step establishes:

    - How are diverse elements of the population differently exposed to risks and threats through conditions of vulnerability? Are there are any minority or marginalised groups that are more vulnerable that others?
    - What are the main threats diverse elements of the population face? Are there any patterns? Where are these threats primarily occurring? Why are these actions occurring?
    - Is the impact of these risks and threats different for particular groups?
    - Who are the main perpetrators of actions or threats to the population?
    - What are the known or presumed motivations, capabilities and capacities of perpetrators for committing the actions?
    - Do NATO, United Nations or coalition forces or operations pose a threat and/or cause harm to the population?
    - Does the mitigation of operational risks (i.e. risk to mission and risk to force) through force protection posture, involve the transfer of risk to the civilian population, and if so, how can this be avoided or mitigated?
    - Identify the specific risks and potential threats military operations may pose to increasing levels of insecurity.
    - What are the specific risks that elements of the population may face as the crisis develops and in relation to the draft MROs?

- What are the capabilities and capacities of the Host Nation and other mandated protection actors to mitigate or avoid risks to the population and support a resilient population? How can protective effects be created through the use of complementary non-military activities?

- **Issue Warning Order to Subordinate/Supporting HQ**. Include specific direction regarding military contributions to Human Security.

Step 2 – Mission Analysis

The purpose of Step 2 is to systematically assess the strategic context to establish precisely what the mission involves by determining the operational problem that must be solved, the specific operational conditions that must be achieved, and where it fits in the bigger picture. It also identifies the key operational factors that will influence the achievement of those conditions, and most likely to affect COA development, and any limitations on the JFC's freedom of action to develop an overall operational design.

JOPG will conduct a thorough appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis by reviewing available information and assessments to gain an understanding of the nature, scale and scope of the problem to include a review of potential risks and threats to the Human Security Factors and the extent to which Human Security considerations limits or enhances freedom of action.

Understanding the Desired End State, Strategic Objectives and Effects. Operational-level planners must be prepared to conduct their analysis of the end state and strategic objectives in a dynamic collaborative process with the SOPG. The understanding needs to cover how Human Security Factors inform, are included, and are framed by the Desired End State, Strategic Objectives, and Strategic Effects.

Mission Analysis includes but is not limited to:

- **Assessment of the strategic context**
  - Analysis of the strategic intent, NATO strategic communications (StratCom) direction and guidance, the outcomes sought and related strategic objectives to Human Security;
  - Identifying the role of the joint force, key objectives and conditions to reach in relation to the Human Security Factors;
  - Refining the joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment to ensure that the Assess actions can take place;
  - Review international legal aspects of Human Security considerations related to the crisis in terms of political guidance and policy constraints or restraints, applicable international law, treaties and agreements, as well as relevant United Nations resolutions. They also review international commitments;
  - Developing an overall operations design, including effects, lines of operation (LoOs) and decisive conditions which include increasing Human Security within the AO;

- Forwarding requests for information, provisional rule-of-engagement requests and recommendations for the authorisation to declare response measures (RMs) to enable the force to execute Assess and Act tasks; and
- Adapting initial Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) to include relevant dimensions of Human Security.

- **Factor analysis and key factors.** The JOPG should examine specific aspects, facts or conditions of the operating environment and the capabilities, goals, relationships and interactions between actors to determine their impact on the Human Security Factors and how they relate to operational success. Key Factors can include:
  - The key strategic PMESII factors contributing to the crisis.
  - What are the security threats and risks faced by diverse groups of the population and what are their needs and priorities as related to the dimensions of Human Security, and how might unmet needs affect the mission?
  - How imminent is the threat to civilians, and specifically to at-risk populations, in the Area of Operation (AOO)? Is the threat incidental or deliberate, targeted or systemic?
  - Who are the perpetrators, or likely perpetrators, of threats or actions against the relevant Human Security Factors?
  - What are the Most Likely or Most Dangerous COAs of each actor in relation to the Human Security Factors? What are the likely impacts, both to the mission and to the civilian population?
  - What capabilities do perpetrators require to threaten one or more Human Security Factors?
  - What security threats and risks faced by diverse groups of the population are a consequence of the operational actions and effects required to establish conditions for NATO/UN operations and activities? How can these be avoided, minimised or mitigated?
  - What community early-warning and protection mechanisms are in place? What is the percentage of women compared to men participating in these mechanisms? How does this influence the anticipation of risk and planning for military contributions to Human Security?
  - What is the role of military forces in preventing, pre-empting, or responding to threats against Human Security Factors (including supporting roles to other mission components and/or non-mission civilian actors)?
  - What are specified, implied and essential military prevention tasks (including for the avoidance, minimisation and mitigation of incidental civilian harm from UN/NATO operations and activities)?
  - What are specified, implied and essential military response and consequence management tasks (including for the response to grave violations and other serious violations or abuses by perpetrators)?
  - Does the coalition/UN/NATO operation have the capacity to address the threat, in whole or part?

- What are the constraints that affect the conduct of prevention or consequence management tasks and operations (such as the availability of forces, distances and timings)?
- What are the limitations of our own force's capabilities?
- What are the Host Government forces' capabilities and willingness to prevent the threats against Human Security Factors?
- What are the most dangerous consequences of inaction for the at-risk populations? For the mission and overall peace/stabilisation process?
- What are the potential risks to vulnerable persons or groups posed by own actions?
- During the assessment of operational factors in mission analysis, the planner must consider all civilian aspects associated with the mission, how they relate to the Human Security Factors, and specifically how prevention and consequence management tasks support, or are supported by, the other military objectives.

- **Identify Threats**. Using the factors and indicators and warnings found in chapter 2 conduct the Understand function appropriate for the level of HQ to:
  - Identify specific factors that could place diverse parts of the population at risk.
  - Assess the main violations/threats diverse parts of the population face.
  - Identify the threats to elements of security and the impact on the population.
  - Identify the motivations and capacities of perpetrators for committing the violations.
  - Assess the risk of NATO, United Nations or coalition forces or operations in causing or increasing harm to vulnerable persons and groups.
  - Assess the risk the population, or violations against the population, pose to military operations – how do they have a bearing on specified or implied unacceptable conditions in the area of operations?
  - Assess the impact of threats to the Human Security Factors on the 7 baseline requirements for Resilience and the implications on military operations.

- **Constraints/Restraints.**
  - Are there specific constraints and/or restraints related to political, policy or legal commitments or authorities in relation to prevention and consequence management tasks?
  - Are specific restraints identifiable from assessments and Lessons Learned in relation to historic civilian casualty incidents, or investigations following grave violations and other serious violations or abuse incidents by perpetrators?

- **Key Strengths and Weaknesses (Own, Friendly Forces, Neutral and Enemy).**
  - Focus on the operational conditions to be established or maintained and the operational effects to be created in relation to the ability to conduct tasks to prevent or mitigate threats to Human Security Factors. Included in this assessment is the willingness of all actors to prevent, perpetrate or respond to these threats.

- The Goals and Objectives of each actor: What do the actions or statements of each actor reveal about what they seek to achieve in relation to the Human Security Factors resulting in a safe and secure environment, or the basic needs of the population? What conditions do they seek to achieve in their end state?
- The Critical Capabilities (CC) of each actor: What must the actor be able to do, and what capabilities does the actor require, in order to achieve the goals and objectives related to Human Security Factors? What does the actor need to threaten Human Security Factors or to respond when harm has occurred?
- The Critical Requirements (CR) of each actor: What are the system components, conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships and influences required to sustain the CC?
- The Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) of each actor: What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the CCs and CRs through which the actor, and the Centre of Gravity, may be exploited or protected? What are the Critical Vulnerabilities in the civil environment, focussing on Human Security Factors, that increase the exposure of population groups to risk or threat, or can amplify the impact of the threat?
- Determine the Centre of Gravity: What is the primary CC for the actor to achieve its objective? Consider this primarily in relation to the perpetration of harm to the population, the prevention of harm, or consequence management when harm has occurred.

- **Information, Knowledge and Intelligence Requirements.**
  - Are there any gaps in information, knowledge and intelligence, particularly in relation to Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR) and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) and Critical Capabilities to prevent or respond to civilian harm?

- **Tasks (Assigned/Implied).**
  - Using Chapter 4, and Annexes D and E, what are the assigned and implied tasks related to the military contributions to Human Security using Assess, Act and Support?
  - As a minimum this would include reporting and monitoring and referral to other mandated responders.

- **Operational Objectives.**
  - Are there specific objectives directly related to Human Security?

- **End State.**
  - How do prevention and consequence management tasks contribute to achieving the end state? Are they operational objectives, lines of operation or decisive conditions?

- **Develop Mission Statement**. A draft Mission Statement for the operation is prepared based on the mission analysis. Unless this is a key element of the overall

mission then it is unlikely Human Security will be noted in the mission statement; however, military contributions to Human Security tasks must be linked to the mission statement.

Commander's Guidance. The Commander should issue planning guidance to the planning team(s) that includes specific guidance and direction related to Human Security to ensure that relevant information on Human Security Factors is obtained, that Human Security considerations are explicit in planning, and that force structure and appropriate training requirements are identified and in place. Additionally, the Commander's guidance should include how tasks fit into achieving the end state - Are they operational objectives? Decisive conditions? Other? The Commander should issue a Commander's Human Security Directive as part of the final plan.

Step 3 – COA Development

COA development is about determining how to accomplish the mission according to the Commander's intent and the initial operational design.

Each COA should include assumptions, limitations, CONOPS, refined operational design, operational graphic, TASKORG, C2 arrangement, risk assessments, opportunities assessment, ROE requirements, and provision missions for subordinate commanders. Human Security considerations are to be integrated across each element. Consider whether there are specific constraints and restraints from Human Security policy or law that shape the possibilities for the operation. The CONOPS for each COA should include possible effects, including secondary and tertiary effects, on the civilian population and civil environment, it should also specify the required non-military activities.

- In developing COAs, there are a number of key principles to apply:
  - Coordinated actions with relevant protection actors should be planned to take into consideration all sections of the local community with a focus on those in vulnerable or marginalised situations.
  - Communities are in the best position to identify their own vulnerabilities and how threats and insecurity are perceived by the population.
  - Military personnel must be mindful in their engagement with communities so that they do not expose the population or civilian protection/humanitarian/developmental actors to risk or cause harm through their engagement.
  - Constraints and restraints related to the use of military force must be clearly understood related to Human Security.

- **Force Capabilities and Groupings**. Ensure that the force has the capabilities, training, policy, and direction required to execute prevention and consequence management tasks (see Chapter 3 for details associated with force generation).

- **Command and Control Structure Required**. Relationships with Host Nation security forces (if any), mission protection actors, and non-mission protection actors should be identified, and a coordination mechanism established. A reporting mechanism for violations against the population, based on the Human Security Factors, should be identified within the mission command-and-control context (NATO or coalition) and within the national reporting chain.

- **Rules of Engagement**. Ensuring that ROE include the ability to execute the range of military tasks to prevent or respond to threats to the Human Security Factors is a vital aspect of developing feasible COAs that allow the military to take the required actions to achieve mandated tasks.

- **Conflict Termination**. As the staff analysis considers the desired or expected nature of the post-conflict "landscape" in physical terms as well as in terms of the political, diplomatic, and economic environment of the AOO, consideration to the impact on diverse elements of the population must be considered including supporting stabilisation as tasked.

- **Transition Conditions**. Specific Human Security considerations, particularly prevention tasks in the transition phase, must be considered to ensure continuity of effort with mandated civilian protection actors, as NATO forces transition out of the theatre.

- **Risk.** In considering the military roles in contributing to Human Security, a risk assessment is required to ensure that potential positive and negative impacts of military activities are fully understood. In doing so there are two related considerations: military activities which satisfy the needs of populations as the subject or focus of that activity, therefore have a positive impact on the Human Security Factors; and military activities which are not directly focused on the needs of the population but could have negative unintended consequences on the Human Security Factors. A risk analysis consists of four components:

    - **Risk to Populations**
        - do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant Human Security Factor(s) increase or decrease the risk to populations during a specific mission, operation, or activity?

    - **Risk to Mission**
        - do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant Human Security Factor(s) increase or decrease the risk to achieving operational and/or strategic objectives of a specific mission, operation, or activity?
        - Will the impact of a Human Security risk affect the completion of a tactical task, or endanger the achievement of an effect, a decisive condition, or an objective?
        - What are the hazard risks from the civil environment to the mission?
        - What are the hazard risks from the mission to the civil environment?

- **Risk to Own Forces**
  - do military actions and/or inactions related to the relevant Human Security Factor(s) increase or decrease the risk to own forces during a specific mission, operation, or activity?

- **Risk to Reputation**
  - do military actions and/or inactions in the relevant Human Security Factor(s) increase or decrease the legitimacy of the mission, operation, or activity?
  - What are the compliance risks that relate to Human Security constraints and restraints? How will the impact of these risks be mitigated, minimised or avoided?

Step 4 – COA Analysis

The purpose of COA analysis is to evaluate our own COAs based on the Commander's guidance, reaffirm their viability and refine them before they can be validated and compared during the next planning activity. The final product of this activity is a series of COAs derived from a comprehensive, logical cross-functional evaluation and synchronisation, including through wargaming.

Tentative COAs should be tested for viability using the feasibility, acceptability, completeness, compliance, exclusivity and suitability (FACES) criteria. The principal criteria for Human Security issues are Acceptability and Compliance: Consider whether the COA contains any unacceptable risk of collateral damage to civilians, civilian objects and services.

Human Security experts should be included in wargaming of the COAs.

Step 5 – COA Validation and Comparison

The aim of this stage is to validate and compare the COAs and recommend the COA to be selected based on the Commander's selection criteria.

- **COA Validation.** Inclusion of Human Security experts should be considered to provide additional perspectives and expertise during COA development and validation. This can include civilians from within the mission structure and relevant actors outside the mission structure, where feasible.

- **Compare COAs.**
  - Each COA should aim to reduce or eliminate the risk to Human Security Factors and in doing so must rigorously consider the impact on the population.

- Identify the strengths and weaknesses of each COA, focussing on the cost/benefit to prevent, pre-empt, and respond to threats to Human Security Factors as outlined in chapter 3 including consideration of risk mitigation.
- The preferred COA should balance the military advantages they yield with the potential incidental harm, and where a choice is possible between two or more equally efficient and effective COAs, preference must be given to the COA entailing the least potential incidental harm.

Step 6 – Commander's COA Decision

The JOPG presents COAs with a coordinated staff recommendation to the Commander, typically by a decision briefing. The brief includes an update on the operating environment and assumptions used in the COA development. The staff normally uses the wargaming evaluation criteria to brief the Commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. The presentation must ensure the Commander has optimum information on which to base the decision: detailed enough to identify focal points but summarised for effectiveness and brevity. Military contributions to Human Security and relevant threats to the dimensions of Human Security and actions to prevent or mitigate these threats should be included.

The main outcome of this COA decision activity is to issue the Commander´s OPD to promulgate the output of the COA decision brief including the refined COA, the Commander´s (refined) intent, the final operations design, a synchronisation matrix, and the missions of subordinated commanders. The OPD is the formal tasking to the components to start planning in accordance with the selected COA and should highlight the military contributions to Human Security.

Step 7 – Plan Development

The purpose of this activity is to produce a coherent CONOPS and an OPLAN. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organisations are integrated, synchronised and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The OPLAN has the same structure and format but includes more detail and further particulars. In general, the CONOPS accomplishes the following:

- Expresses the Commander's methodology and rationale to attain specific objectives related to Human Security focussing on the elements of security.
- Advises the Initiating Authority of the Commander's intentions related to the use of the military to prevent and respond to the perpetration of threats and violations against the population, and provides an instrument for them to concur and, if necessary, to obtain further political approval.
- Informs subordinate commanders, headquarters' staff and supporting formations of the scope, nature and likely prevention tasking required for their plans.

Key Considerations – The Plan

- Ensure the mission's mandate related to Human Security-related tasks is clear.
- Are Human Security-related tasks integrated into the main plan?
- Is the plan clear on and how the associated authorities impact the ability to monitor, mitigate or prevent threats/violations
- Are Human Security-related tasks/issues integrated across the J sections and related Annexes and Appendices?
- Are Human Security-related tasks/issues included in the decision support matrix?
- Is the reporting process of threats and violations against the population based on the Human Security Factors in place and clear?
- Are the ROE sufficient to allow subordinates to execute the assigned tasks?
- Is there a review and assessment that considers impact of operations, missions, and activities on the human environment?

Annex H - Joint Staff Roles to Integrate Human Security into Military Operations

This annex provides examples of staff roles and responsibilities; these are illustrative and are not exhaustive. They can be developed, enhanced or further integrated depending on the operational level and structure of the HQ involved, the nature of the military operation being conducted and the type and scale of military forces assigned to operations. They are an amalgam of lessons identified and good practise.

These roles and responsibilities are derived from the UK's JSP 985 Human Security in Defence Part 2 v.4 (draft) publication, and the NATO ACT Open Publication 'The Usefulness of the Human Security Concept for NATO Collective Defense (Vol 11, Nos 5, 2026) and the NATO DRAFT ATP 6567 Gender Perspectives in Military Operations.

Assess/Understand

Function	Responsibility
J2	• Lead IPOE including HS risk and civilian harm assessment. • Integrate HS factors and considerations including understanding of the capacity, intent and tactics and identifying the most likely and most dangerous COA of military actors and nonstate armed groups towards the civilian population. • Ensure data is collected by sex and age (Sex and Age Disaggregated Data – SADD). These different groups (men, women, boys, and girls) are impacted differently by armed conflict and crisis, play different societal and cultural roles and possess unique information as a result. • Develop Human Security specific early warning indicators to help identify trends or threats. • Information requirements (PIR and CCIR) should guide the collection of data disaggregated by sex, age and other relevant factors, allowing identification of Human Security related threats.
J2 (Military Police)	• Understand the capacity, intent and tactics of the organised/opportunistic criminals toward the population (CRIMINT), and the effects of their criminal activities on the population.
J4 (Engineers/Geo)	• Assess infrastructure and hazards • Incorporate environmental protection and cultural property data into all intelligence and geographical products • Provide advice on long term effects of hazardous materials on environment and affected populations, where these are collateral concerns.
J4 (Medical)	• Consideration of treatment of CRSV and population medical needs (including children where necessary).
J4 (Logistics)	• Consider modern slavery and human trafficking risks in logistics supply chains. • Consider corruption risks in procurement (with G8) and logistics operations.
J5	• Integrate HS into planning and requirements • Assess if collateral damage estimations have disproportionate impacts on specific elements of the population and, if so, determine if and how they may be mitigated.

Function	Responsibility
	• Assess different security concerns or needs of different elements of the population; knowing the different types of threats can better mitigate negative outcomes.
J8 (Force Structure, Resources & Assessment)	• Ensure contracting with reliable and transparent resources to avoid own force implications in modern slavery and undue risk to civilian personnel • Consider conflict sensitivity in sustainment procurement to avoid competition over potentially scarce local resources, and market distortions that drive up prices for vulnerable population groups or undermine civilian population coping strategies.
J9 (CIMIC)	• Ensure Human Security factors are integrated into civil system analysis, and civil-military interaction • Identify the various actors in the area and the differing services they provide to different elements of the population noting that support services and agencies have different mandates which determine what groups or people they can aid.
J10 (Info Ops / CULAD)	• Conduct target audience analysis and develop understanding of the information environment.
LEGAD)	• Advise on legal frameworks and constraints.
HS Advisor	• Provides thematic SME input and a HS 'lens' to the work of their functional area.
All Staff	• Treat HS as a cross-HQ responsibility.

Plan

Function	Responsibility
HS Advisor (HSAD)	• Provide specialist input and guidance.
J2 (Intelligence)	• Assess civilian risk and vulnerability. Provide intelligence support to targeting to feed into the HSAdv and Commander's Advisory Group advice on vetting targets.
J4 (Medical)	• Prepare COAs for potential medical support to Host Nation or, subject to the medical rules of eligibility, support to the health needs of vulnerable persons while they are under the duty of care of the military, particularly those who may be suffering from a lack of medicine and health services for medical conditions.
J4 (Logistics)	• Consider and mitigate modern slavery and human trafficking risks in logistics supply chains. • Consider and mitigate corruption risks in procurement (with G8) and logistics operations.
J5 (Plans)	• Lead integration of HS into plans and orders.

Function	Responsibility
	• Integrate HS considerations of vulnerabilities of civilian population, civilian objects and services into plans. • Identify options to reduce civilian harm, incidental harm, infrastructure damage and essential service degradation throughout COA development. • Require reports and data collection to include SADD which will assist in such things as establishing patterns of life and movement necessary for targeting.
J9 (CIMIC)	• Provide civil factors/HS consideration integration across J staff functions
J10 (Info Ops / PSYOPS)	• Assess population behaviour and narratives. • Assess adversary mis/disinformation operations likely against civilian population.
Targeting / LEGAD / POLAD	• Ensure compliance and inclusion of HS constraints.

Examples of potential Planning outputs:

Output	HS Requirement
OPLAN / OPORD	• HS tasks and constraints included in main body.
Annex W (CIMIC)	• Civil objects and critical vulnerabilities to protect. • Audiences and actors for civil-military interaction toward HS outcomes.
Annex Human Security	• Detailed HS measures and coordination – this could be included in RR, as a separate annex. Or other annexes depending on how HS is integrated into the HQ. The default is RR.
Targeting Guidance	• NSL/RSL and HS-sensitive constraints.
Engagement Plans	• Coordination with civil actors.
Assessment Framework	• HS indicators and reporting mechanisms.

Conduct Activities/Execute/Coordinate

Function	Responsibility
J1	• Enforce conduct, manage SEA response and coordinate welfare support for Service Pers who are survivors of SEA or CRSV. Contribute to own force behaviour – such as preventing sexual exploitation and abuse.
J2	• Provide intelligence on civilian risk and assess civilian and adversary behaviour. Integrate HS into the Common Operating Picture (by previous understanding of the capacity, intent and tactics of the most dangerous COA of military actors and nonstate armed groups towards the civilian population).
J3	• Conduct operations in accordance with HS principles, lead and coordinate consequence management of incidents and events, including CIVCAS. Provide support to G9 Ops. • Deliver day-to-day coordination and information flows. • Confirm rules of engagement (ROEs) address immediate responses to incidents which put the population at risk based on the Human Security factors. • Determine if the Force has the appropriately trained. • personnel for anticipated circumstances such as the necessity to conduct physical searches of both sexes at checkpoints and during building searches. • Establish procedures for determining/confirming the age of children and guardianship.
J4 (Logistics)	• Manage logistics to minimise negative civilian impact. Mitigate: modern slavery; human trafficking; procurement and logistics corruption in supply chains.
J4 (Military Police)	• Provide policing and investigative capability to conduct investigations of crime and incidents. • Control and regulation of military ensuring free and unimpeded humanitarian access, and the voluntary movement of the civilian population away from close area of operations. • Conduct humane and pragmatic management of POWs to maintain campaign authority and internment of civilians for imperative security reasons. • Undertake liaison and joint patrolling with Host Nation civil and military police. • Reinforce/replace local police in recaptured areas in order to maintain law and order. • Liaise with Host Nation policing and security agencies.
J4 (Medical)	• Subject to the medical rules of eligibility, provide medical resources to support the health needs of vulnerable persons while they are under the duty of care of the military, particularly those who may be suffering from a lack of access to medicine and health care, those suffering from malnutrition and victims/survivors of Conflict Related Sexual Violence and/or the six grave violations against children in time of war.

Function	Responsibility
J4 (Engineering)	• As a result of own or adversary activity, assist in restoring power supply and distribution, utilities repair work, and water purification that are critical to the population.
J5	• Adapt HS tasks in FRAGOs. • Integrate coordination into subsequent planning.
J6	• Develop and deliver messaging, monitor HS information environment and counter misinformation/disinformation.
J7	• Capture lessons and reinforce training. Integrate HS approach and factors into education, training and exercises.
J8	• Allocate and monitor HS-related resources.
J9 (CIMIC)	• Integrate civil factors of the operating environment in decision-making. • Interact with civilian actors and population. • Act as primary interface with civilian actors and authorities. • Facilitate engagement with NGOs, IOs, and Host Nation.
J10 (Info Ops)	• Counter adversary mis/disinformation operations that are targeting the civilian population. • Communicate and amplify Host Nation communications to inform affected population of safe routes, shelters and aid points. • Ensure that advanced warnings of attacks are effective.
LEGAD	• Advise on legal frameworks and constraints.
HS Advisor (HSAD)	• Provide specialist input and guidance on HS considerations. • Lead HS coordination and provide specialist input.
GENAD	• Provide specialist input and guidance on gender considerations.

Assess/Evaluate

Role	Responsibility
Commander	• Direct HS assessment priorities and use outputs to inform future plans. Commanders must determine: • Whether HS objectives are being achieved; • Whether trends indicate increasing or decreasing civilian risk; • When to adjust plans, targeting, or operational approach; • Whether mitigation measures are effective or require revision; and • What lessons must be captured and applied immediately.
J2 (Intelligence)	• Provide civil environment analysis and trend assessment.
J2 (Military Police)	• Assess and evaluate data from CRIMINT, CRSV and other associated crimes against civilian population or activity in breach of LOAC/IHL.
J3 (Operations)	• Collect operational data and implement monitoring including data on civilian deaths and injuries, property damage or destruction for analysis to reduce civilian harm.
J4 (Logistics)	• Assess damage and estimate engineering repairs and effect on civilian population.
J4 (Medical)	• Assess impact of military operations on medical facilities and access to healthcare, evaluate effects of military operations and the medical impact on civilians, record and identify trends in CSRV.
J5 (Plans)	• Integrate findings into planning cycles.
J8 (Finance)	• Track resources related to HS activities.
J9 (CIMIC)	• Provide civil insights and partner engagement.
J10 (Info Ops)	• Assess efficacy of adversary and own information operations on civilian population to evaluate effectiveness and impact of military operations on enhancing or degrading HS considerations.
HSAD	• Lead HS-specific analysis and reporting.

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