From Peace to War, from War to Peace

Conflict Initiation and Termination: Implications for Policy Makers

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Preface

The annual Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) of the Partnership for Peace conferences originally started in 1999 with the aim of establishing and cultivating a regular and multilateral exchange of information, viewpoints and ideas between official military history and defence institutions. On the way towards fulfilling its mission, the CSWG group also started to improve defence and military education and research, as well as supporting professional military education to improve the intellectual and professional interoperability of NATO and partner countries' staff. The CSWG also brought together experts to share the official historical perspectives of their respective countries. I would like to add one more to the official goals of the group as the effort also resulted in establishing a uniquely dedicated group with a common passion towards our field of expertise.

At the turn of September and October 2021, the Slovak Institute for Military History in Bratislava together with the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam prepared the 20th annual international scientific conference of the Euro Atlantic CSWG of the Partnership for Peace Consortium that was held under the auspices of Mr. Jaroslav Naď, the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic. Great help was provided by the co-host of the conference, the Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice. Colleagues from the university helped us to solve all kinds of relevant issues. As far as the Slovak Institute for Military History is concerned, it was the third time it has taken an active role in hosting the CSWG conference. In 2006, the conference was prepared in cooperation with the French Service Historique de la Defense. In 2014, we cooperated with colleagues from the Danish Royal Defence Academy. Finally, at the meeting in Budapest in 2019, Col. Miloslav Čaplovič, the head of the Slovak Institute, agreed to host the conference in Slovakia once again and this decision was supported by helping hands offered by our colleagues and friends from Potsdam. However, due to the coronavirus pandemic and widespread lockdowns, the event had to be postponed until autumn 2021. Despite the pandemic and the reality of a hybrid conference, many colleagues found their way to Košice and presented their paper in person.

The 2021 CSWG conference topic "From Peace to War, from War to Peace/ Conflict Initiation and Termination: Implications for Policymakers" unfortunately, within a few months, turned out to be very up-to-date. Issues related to the initiation and termination of conflicts seem today even more important and policymakers in our respective countries should hold them even more so. We may learn from history not to repeat itself only in cases where we interpret history well, as unwise interpretation of historical events – as we may see today – often proves very misleading.

Therefore, I would like to wish all who are about to read the anthology that their interpretation of past events may profit from it.

Matej Medvecký

Hans-Peter Kriemann

Lessons Learned? How Wars Begin and How They End

This book addresses the fundamental question of how wars begin and how they end. The various articles are based on military history and political and cultural science, and offer multi-perspective insights into aspects of a changeful transatlantic history from the beginning of World War I to the present.

The debate on how wars begin and how they end has tragically become highly topical with the large-scale attack by Russian forces on the territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. A good thirty years ago, however, the perspective was quite different. After the end of the Cold War, contemporaries had hoped for an era of stability and unity, in which living together was to be determined by democracy, peace and human rights (Paris Charter, 1990). Francis Fukuyama took the view, in his book *The End of History*, that the liberal world order had now prevailed. However, the conflicts and wars that erupted almost at the same time quickly showed that the hoped-for peace dividend did not materialize. In early 1991, even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War began, with a United States-led international coalition fighting against Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait shortly before. This distracted the Western public from another conflict: on 13 January 1991, pro-Soviet forces, supported by Soviet troops, tried to overthrow the young democracy in Lithuania. Moscow was not prepared to accept the independence of the Baltic states. This event is referred to as Bloody Sunday in Vilnius and exemplified a completely different problem that would prove to become a typical feature of and a central challenge for the intended stable and united Europe. It turned out that the Western states and Russia soon perceived a threat to their own security caused by the power struggles in East and Southeast Europe, which were accelerated by or resulted from the end of the bloc confrontation. This was true both for regional destabilization processes through the expansion of such conflicts and for the consequences for national security, for example, through massive refugee movements. In the resulting process, in which states and international organizations had to realign and reposition themselves within the international political arena, the question arose particularly for NATO as to which role it should play in a different world order of the future.

This was reflected in two important processes. NATO's eastward expansion, on the one hand, was to prevent the development of a security vacuum and incalculable security-related dynamics. This stabilization approach was also important in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the territory of former Warsaw Pact member states. On the other hand, Western policymakers soon

perceived military intervention as the most effective means to prevent and end armed conflicts, such as the ones in former Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1991, the fighting in Slovenia and the war in Croatia marked the beginning of a series of national wars that gradually affected the entire former Yugoslavia and threatened to destabilize Southeast Europe. Driven by the international attempts to handle the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–1995, NATO subsequently became the most important enforcer of mandates within the scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Four years later, in 1999, the NATO air war against Serbia ended the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, and, with a great effort, a stable peace order was established there. Subsequently, NATO-led troops secured the volatile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo with a 50,000-strong, well-equipped peacekeeping force each. The air war, which had been conducted without a UN mandate, also raised questions about the legitimacy and legality of the NATO air strikes. Dealing with such conflicts simultaneously posed an ethical problem and a problem regarding international law. An international process of self-reflection on the possibilities of protecting people from serious human rights violations and the breach of international humanitarian law, which had been initiated shortly afterwards by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, resulted in the adoption of a responsibility to protect (R2P) in 2005. This protection concept revealed an understanding according to which the protection of human rights increasingly took precedence over national sovereignty rights.

At that time, relevant Western policymakers assessed the large-scale stabilization operations in the Balkans as a successful concept and, thus, also as a yardstick for future large-scale state and nation-building missions. This perception changed in the course of the subsequent international engagement in Afghanistan.

The September 11 attacks against the United States in 2001 permanently changed the global public's international sense of security. The images of the burning twin towers have burned themselves into the collective memory. The subsequent deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), however, was not completed within a few years' time as hoped. Instead, it developed a dynamic that made it the largest mission in NATO history. But despite the immense political and military efforts of a NATO-led and dominated international community of states, the international commitment ended in a humanitarian disaster after almost 20 years on 31 August 2021. The efforts to stabilize Afghanistan in a sustainable manner had not been successful.

The thirty years since the end of the Cold War have been an ongoing learning process of trial and error for the NATO states and their partners. Just as threat situations and their perception by the Alliance community changed, the Alliance underwent an adjustment process that was driven by crises and conflicts. In the process, the security policy instruments also changed, especially regarding the manner of using military assets. This was accompanied by a change in the understanding of the legitimacy of such interventions. The questions for NATO behind these developments have always been: how to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts and wars, how to contain and end such conflicts, and how to achieve sustainable stability.

Structure and intent of the conference and this book

The analysis of historical developments, and the explanations and possibilities of contextualizing current security challenges in our recent history can provide a valuable orientation in dealing with current security challenges in the understanding of a lesson learned. Historians and security policy experts have gathered at annual conferences of the Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program at different venues over the past 20 years to discuss their research, views and ideas with a focus on security challenges. At the same time, the format of CSWG Conferences is a means to intensify Euro-Atlantic cooperation and mutual understanding through the exchange between official military history institutions and academies.

The 20th anniversary of the CSWG Conference, which is the basis of this volume, was an outstanding event for all participants. In view of the developments in recent conflicts and against the background of the security policy changes relevant to its own history over the past thirty years, the CSWG deliberately chose the overarching topic for the conference to mark its anniversary: "From Peace to War, from War to Peace/Conflict Initiation and Termination: Implications for Policymakers."

The decisions that eventually lead to a war and conflict management are both complex processes. There are several interrelated levels and fields that are important for the actors, states and organizations involved. In terms of domestic politics, national actors are forced to legitimize their interests and the resulting behavior in the international arena. Intensive military commitment, in particular, is often closely monitored and assessed. However, the developments of military operations and their domestic implications are hardly predictable. In this area of conflict that arises from actions on the international and national level as well as from the employment of military forces, there are many other factors required to explain the developments and dynamics that may result from the employment of military forces. National history and culture as well as the manner in which experiences of violence in military conflicts are dealt with are instrumental for the security policy identity. In addition, the perception of threats and the feeling of security are decisive factors. However, these parameters are not solely determined by military factors. They also include interdependent aspects, such as geographical situation, climate, resources, the economy or refugee movements.

When the 20th CSWG Conference, on which this volume is based, was planned, and took place from 27 September to 1 October 2021 in Košice, Slovakia, nobody had any idea that a Russian attack on Ukraine was imminent. However, ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, a paradigm shift toward a stronger role of national and alliance defense had become apparent. For the Alliance, this raises the question of whether the multilateral world order will continue, or if the current international positioning processes will lead to increasing regionalization.

The papers in this conference volume are based on presentations given at the CSWG Conference in Košice. The volume covers a period of one century in 17 essays. It addresses political, social and cultural causes and processes relevant to the

beginning, course and end of armed conflicts and wars. It focuses on the interests of the actors, their logic of action and takes different perspectives to examine structures and dynamics from the outbreak of World War I in 1914 to the present day. The essays, which are dedicated to rather different wars and conflicts, are arranged according to the conference program.

Incalculable – How Old and New Wars Begin

The first section of our conference was dedicated to the fundamental and, we believe, timeless question that all decision-makers are confronted with: How should and can I behave in crises? This behavior is, in turn, based on premises and anticipations. In our context, this is linked to the central question of the predictability or unpredictability of wars and conflicts, as Clausewitz saw it, for example, who understood war as a contingency phenomenon.

Taking the Kosovo War of 1999 as an example, *Hans-Peter Kriemann* analyses the mutual influence of political conflict management processes, and military planning and capability horizons. He focuses primarily on the threat of military force and the associated credibility dilemma. He argues that the threat of military force to end armed conflicts may lead to incalculable dynamics which, paradoxically, can even increase the danger of an escalation of military force.

*Mark E. Groteluesche*n *and Derek Vable* then focus on executive behavior. They argue that in 1917, the US Administration was no longer able to use deterrence to an extent that would have allowed them to adequately protect their interests vis-a-vis the German Empire. According to the authors, with the subsequent declaration of war, the United States had forfeited its role as a mediator and, thus, the chance of an earlier end to World War I.

Philipp Münch explores the question why the operation of the ISAF in Afghanistan became the largest, most intensive and second longest operation of NATO in its entire history, although at the beginning of the mission in 2001, both the United States and the majority of their partners had initially tried to avoid any involvement of the Alliance. On the basis of downgraded documents, primarily from the United States, he maintains that the relevant players within NATO, supported by influential national civilian and military decision-makers, pressed for an assumption of ISAF command.

Means and Ends – The Interaction of Political Thinking and Military Planning

Our second section is about the interrelation between political action and military thinking and possible resulting interactions. The three examples from the period during and at the end of the Second World War already illustrate the different ideologies and interests behind such behavior and how they can be interwoven.

Morgane Barey highlights the importance of domestic perceptions and the resulting attitudes for a state's foreign policy behavior, which can also be applied to explain the use of military force. After the French defeat in June 1940, the Vichy regime had focused on candidates loyal to them when selecting officers for the reconstruction of the French armed forces. With those candidates, however, they also took over the old doctrines and modes of thinking. As a result, it was this domestic perspective that made it impossible to achieve a fundamental military reform and, thus, a reconstruction of a demoralized French society in the spirit of the "Révolution Nationale."

Boyan Zhekov elucidates how political interests and military action can be intertwined. Based on newly available documents from Bulgarian and Russian archives, the author demonstrates how especially the Soviet representatives of the Allied Control Commission acted regarding the development and restructuring of the Bulgarian armed forces in the three years after the ceasefire signed by Bulgaria in October 1944.

The article by *Paul Lenormand* is another example of the reorientation process of the state in the setup of national armed forces that began after the end of the war. Using material from Czech and Slovak archives, the author examines the quantitative and qualitative ramifications of the ideological cleansing process during the reconstruction of the officer corps that began after the end of World War II. Similar to Morgane Barey in her study on the setup of the French officers corps after the French defeat against Hitler's Germany in June 1940, he identifies a major conflict between political loyalty and military effectiveness, in which the latter is to the disadvantage of politically promoted circles of the officer corps in both cases.

War Mortgage – After Old and New Wars Have Ended

Researching the manifold effects of wars and conflicts is a broad field, for it often takes a considerable amount of time to distinguish between cause and effect and to be able to explain them. This is certainly also due to the changing perspectives over the generations. Not only political and military aspects are affected. In fact, all dimensions of human life are at stake. With the nation-state as the point of reference, two very different contributions in the following section explain how both military action and the collective memory resulting directly and indirectly from it can have an impact on the later national constitution.

Blaž Torkar's case study explores what role the Slovenian partisan army played in the implementation of the program of the Slovenian national movement in 1945. Torkar works out what possible consequences the actions of the partisans had for the future disposition of Slovenia as a constituent republic of Yugoslavia. In the long term, some of the elements contained in the constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also influenced Slovenia's process of gaining national independence in the early 1990s.

Beyond the research on specific actions in wars and conflicts, and endeavors to prevent them from the outset, more than before, attention should be paid to the ev-

er-present long-term consequences of such events. *Erin McCoy* explains in her study how potent the collective memory is also regarding government action in future conflict scenarios. She does not focus on what actually happened but rather on how events are remembered and, thus, evaluated. With reference to possible social and political consequences, she challenges whether the Vietnam War, in fact, ended with the withdrawal of the last US soldiers in 1975.

The Picture in the Mind – Imagined Wars

The central characteristic of military action can be described very well as a military planning horizon. After all, it is ultimately the experiences of the last war and the premises derived from them that are confronted with the contingency of this phenomenon. If no armed conflict occurs, such military planning remains a theory. However, this does not mean that they do not entail social, economic or other effects. In other cases, it is a successive trial and error learning process.

In recent years, historical research on intelligence activities has become increasingly more important. The article by *Matej Medvecký* can be located in the field of intelligence history. In his study, the author researches the functioning of the Czechoslovak military foreign intelligence service from 1945 until its dissolution in 1946. Their operational activities in defeated Germany were focused on preventing Germany from regaining military strength. The author concludes that despite the obvious importance of these intelligence operations, the Czechoslovak government had underestimated the capability of its military foreign intelligence service. The reasons for this were manifold and complex.

The wars and conflicts after 1990 made it necessary to develop new international strategies of conflict management. This was accompanied by a process of self-reflection by the international community to come to an understanding about the future role of the United Nations. It is often forgotten that such basic issues have accompanied the United Nations since its foundation. In this regard, this article can be understood, in the best sense, as a historicization of the role of armed forces under the changing conditions of such conflicts. *Prokop Tomek* takes the Czechoslovak delegation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on the Korean peninsula as an example to address the question of how such missions can contribute to peacekeeping.

Jordan Baev analyses the escalation dynamics of the bipolar bloc confrontation in the last hot phase of the Cold War by taking an intelligence operation of the Warsaw Pact as an example. Military careers were built under the conditions of an autocratic leadership in the Kremlin, which was incapable of reform, by taking increasingly rigorous action against the United States. According to Baev, the example under examination led to a psychosis of the relevant decision-makers and, therefore, carried the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy if the worst had come to the worst.

Non-military Factors – The Domestic Dimension of Conflicts

To understand armed conflicts and wars, it is essential to look at the interests and motives of the actors. In this context, state action is to a large extent also an expression of the social constitution. Therefore, domestic political reasons are very important drivers of state actor behaviour. In this context, it is often also important who the key decision-makers are.

The article by *Daniela* Șișcanu focuses on the Romanian national political debate following the beginning of the Great War in 1914. Her essay sheds light on the way Romanian elites looked after national interests. The two emerging movements of Ententophiles and Germanophiles shared the common perspective of a national settlement, but tried to sway public opinion in favor of their own position regarding an entry into the war.

Petr Janoušek also describes the outstanding role of individuals as important decision-makers in conflict management processes. The author uses important milestones in the foreign and security policy of Václav Havel, the president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and, in a later term of office, of the Czech Republic, immediately after the end of the Cold War, and interprets his behavior against the backdrop of his experiences and resulting values.

In terms of chronology, the article by *Orit Miller Katav* finally carries this volume into the period after the end of the Cold War. The author examines the complex field of Israel's foreign and security relations with its neighboring countries. She uses the case of Israel returning the Naharayim and Tzofar enclaves to Jordan's King Abdullah II in 2019, as stipulated in the peace agreement of 1994, to take a closer look at the relations between the two countries. She reconstructs the underlying complex events that resulted in the peace agreement, the subsequent handover of the enclaves to Israel and, eventually, their return. She critically examines which steps the various Israeli policymakers could have taken to fulfill the clauses of the peace treaty.

Who is the Enemy? – Changing Typologies of War

At the end of the Cold War, the international community was confronted with forms of warfare that were different than previously in many respects. Initially, it was attempted to illustrate this phenomenon academically with the help of the model of new wars; later, it was continually developed using the approach of hybrid wars. *Peter A. Kiss* uses the historical example of the Kashmir conflict of 1947 to raise the question to what extent this is a new phenomenon at all, and examines which elements of the current explanatory models only appear to be new, for example, due to the use of modern technology.

The Present

The volume concludes with a topic that gets far too little attention, and is, however, quite depressing. *Ruth Amir* examines the employment of child soldiers in several exemplary cases. She argues that it is necessary to address the tactical employment of child soldiers by prevention, demobilization, disarmament and deterrence throughout the conflict and not only after the cessation of hostilities. She highlights the importance of the process of international criminalization and the hurdles involved, as well as the shortcomings that still exist. Such a juridification process can only be one instrument in dealing with urgent situations. The abuse of boys and girls as child soldiers can only be terminated in a sustainable manner if the problem is tackled at its roots: bitter poverty and ethnic conflicts.

Lessons Learned

The essay by *Slatávka Otčenášová* is the first of two articles in this book – the other was written by Erin McCoy – which are dedicated to the importance of historical awareness for the collective memory and, thus, for a collective identity. She uses the representation of World War I in Slovak school history books throughout the 20th century as an example to explain how depictions, which were occasionally simplified and characterized by normative ideals, contributed to the development of enemy images. And yet history books for school teaching are not only an organic part of historiography, but also the most widespread medium for conveying historical knowledge.

I.

Incalculable – How Old and New Wars Begin

Hans-Peter Kriemann

Just Bombing? Germany and NATO in the Kosovo War 1999

Abstract

The following essay uses the German participation in the Kosovo War of 1999 as an example to study how the political process of conflict management and the military planning of NATO influenced each other. In addition to political and economic means, the threat to use military force can be another important instrument to end armed conflicts. However, this always involves the danger of a credibility dilemma. Security is, first and foremost, based on the capability of being able to implement the threatened military force in cases of doubt. As soon as this political instrument is used without the opposing actor responding at least in a face-saving manner, for reasons of credibility this could trigger a process with its own dynamics.

I. Introduction

On 10 January 1999, a Serbian policeman was shot in the Račak area in Kosovo.[1] Thereupon, Serbian security forces cordoned off the village on 15 January 1999. Heavy fighting ensued with several people being killed and quite a few arrested by Serbian security forces. When the observers of KVM – the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) – visited the location in the late afternoon, they found one dead and several injured people, and were told of other deaths and arrests. The following day, the OSCE members discovered 11 bodies in houses and 23 partially mutilated bodies in a gully above the village.[2] William Walker, the United States (US) diplomat and head of KVM, came to Račak in person accompanied by journalists from the international press and made an emotional statement on the events triggering a huge media response.[3] The event, which Walker had labelled a massacre, was now open to debate as a political topic

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1 The following analysis is based on my research regarding the Kosovo Conflict: Kriemann, Hans-Peter. *Hineingerutscht? Deutschland und der Kosovo-Krieg* (Bundeswehr im Einsatz, vol. 2, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2021).

2 'Täuschen und vertuschen,' in *Der Spiegel* 12, 19 Mar 2001. URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-18759112.html> (last retrieved on 19 Jan 2022).

3 Joetze, Günter. *Der letzte Krieg in Europa? Das Kosovo und die deutsche Politik* (Stuttgart/Munich: DVA, 2001), 46–47.

with images of horridly mutilated people, and it had a polarising effect on the public response and the political assessment. At that time, it was still uncertain what had actually happened at Račak. While there had been much more severe incidents with more deaths in the previous months of the Kosovo conflict, Račak has stood to this day blaming of the Serbian government for the crimes against humanity committed against Kosovo Albanians. On this 16 January 1999, the attempt by the KVM to stop the Kosovo conflict had, de facto, failed. Similar to the Dayton Process, the negotiations at Rambouillet from early February 1999 in response to the so-called "massacre of Račak" were to result in the signing of a peace treaty that would subsequently be implemented with 50,000 peacekeepers, as had been done with the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[4] The negotiations failed, however, and on 24 March 1999 NATO began an air war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

The significance of Račak lies primarily in the fact that the events played an important role in the mobilisation of the public in the NATO states and were crucial for the legitimisation of the air strikes. The belatedly published investigation results proved to be problematic. Although the extent of the displacements of the Kosovo Albanian population, of killings and other crimes had meanwhile become known, in view of the partially unresolved events in Račak, time and again the question was raised whether the public had been manipulated.[5] In reality, the intervention of NATO was the result of complex dynamics of political and military processes.

In the following, I will use the example of the Kosovo conflict to explain the role of the threat of using military force in the outbreak of armed conflicts and wars, and how NATO, in this case, successively became a party to the war. For this purpose, I will study the development of military planning in NATO and the use of military means as an instrument and leverage in the political process of the international community to resolve the Kosovo conflict. My focus will be on showing how both the political process of conflict management and the military planning influence and are shaped by each other.

II. The immediate history of the Kosovo Conflict

The immediate history preceding the Kosovo War began as early as in 1989 when the status of autonomy, which had been achieved under Tito in the 1960s, was revoked – an act of deep humiliation for the Kosovo Albanians. When the disintegration of the Yugoslav state escalated in such a manner that it turned into open violence in the summer of 1991, Kosovo initially played a minor role in international attempts

[4] Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 54, note 118.

[5] A much noticed and highly controversial report on the German TV station WDR argued that it was the NATO air war which caused the humanitarian disaster: "Deutschlands Weg in den Kosovo-Krieg – Es begann mit einer Lüge," in *WDR*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtkQYRlXMNU> (Last retrieved 8 Sep 2021). An article in the *Die Welt* newspaper accuses the authors of the report of manipulating the public by confusing cause and effect and failing to research the history of events. 'Einseitig,' in *Die Welt*, 14 Feb 2001.

at conflict resolution. The Cold War had just come to an end, and a process of international reorientation and repositioning had begun. The initial focus of the European Community was on not endangering the young European peace order and preserving the whole of Yugoslavia. Similar to the developments in the constituent republics of Yugoslavia, a disengagement process from the Socialist FRY had also begun in Kosovo. Unlike the constituent republics, Kosovo, as a Serbian province, was part of a sovereign state under international law and especially of Serbian identity. Subsequently, the Yugoslav constituent republics were given the prospect of international recognition of their national sovereignty under clearly defined conditions at the beginning of 1992.[6] This, however, did not apply to Kosovo. Despite unresolved problems and massive tensions in the Serbian province, international attention was focused on the resolution of the civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina.

Initially, the democratic camp was dominant in Kosovo.[7] After the end of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Dayton Agreement concluded in November 1995, in which Kosovo once again was not considered, the number of dissatisfied people in Kosovo increased due to a lack of prospects. Attempts at achieving a certain autonomy from a stifling Serbian dominance that determined all aspects of everyday life failed repeatedly.[8] The time in which an international resolution of the problem had a chance of success passed rapidly, and the number of militants increased. Although even as late as 1997, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which had been founded in 1992, consisted of a mere 150 fighters; however, their attacks against Serbian or Yugoslav security forces, which had started in 1995, triggered a cycle of violence that finally escalated at the beginning of 1998.[9]

III. Military means as a political instrument

Massive attacks by Serbian security forces against the Albanian population ensued. The threats made by Western powers and Russia as well as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 (imposition of an arms embargo on FRY) of 31 March 1991 were unable to persuade Milošević to relent. Many Kosovo Albanians had been expelled from their hometowns and villages. The German federal government was afraid that Germany would be confronted with a similar influx of refugees as it had

6 On 9 Nov 1991, the Badinter Arbitration Committee, which had been set up by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 27 Aug 1991 to clarify matters of international law, came to the conclusion that the Socialist FRY was in the process of dissolution and argued in favour of creating the prerequisites for the recognition of the constituent Yugoslav republics that want their independence. The requests of the republics were subject to examination by the Badinter Arbitration Committee to implement the resolution, i.e. their recognition on 15 Jan 1992. Cf. "Erklärung der EG-Außenminister zu Jugoslawien am 16. Dezember 1991 in Brüssel." in *Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994. Hrsg. aus Anlaß des 125. Jubiläums des Auswärtigen Amts*, Cologne 1995, Dok.-No. 274.1; Cf. Sundhaussen, Holm. *Jugoslawien und seine Nachfolgestaaten 1943–2011. Eine ungewöhnliche Geschichte des Gewöhnlichen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlag, 2012), 317.

7 Sundhaussen, *Jugoslawien und seine Nachfolgestaaten* (see note 6), 367.

8 Biermann, Rafael. *Lehrjahre im Kosovo. Das Scheitern der internationalen Krisenprävention vor Kriegsausbruch* (Paderborn: Brill/Schönningh, 2006), 508–510.

9 PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, vol. 223.994.

been at the beginning of the decade after the civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had broken out.[10] Therefore, Germany and France considered military options of deterrence in order to ensure regional stability on the Balkans.

Due to reasons of domestic policy and legitimation, the US government could envision their participation in military activities against the FRY only in the multilateral context of NATO. They were not in a position to do anything in this respect in view of the domestic challenges caused by the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal.[11] Sandy Berger, the then security adviser to US President Bill Clinton, was particularly not interested in exposing other areas of conflict. In view of the principle of consensus, which only allowed for joint action, he feared NATO would fail. This had to be avoided by any means.[12] Therefore, the Franco-German tandem explored options for assigning this task to the Western European Union (WEU). This soon failed, however, because the German Federal Government did not think it was in a position to make an appropriate military contribution. The talks centred on the surveillance of the Kosovar border with Albania. Based on the experiences in Bosnia, the Germans feared that an escalation of the situation could indeed necessitate the use of military coercive measures during such a mission. This was only an option for Germany, for domestic reasons, if there was a mandate for the employment of armed forces as specified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a matter of principle. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Minister of Defence Volker Rühe discussed possible military implications of the further conflict resolution process on 1 April 1998. Two days later, after careful consideration, the German Federal Ministry of Defence rejected all proposals of the German Foreign Office with the exception of a participation in a potential United Nations Preventive Deployment Force follow-up mission in Macedonia.[13] As a result, the number of WEU police advisors in Albania was increased from 60 to 100 police officers; this was the only WEU participation in this conflict.[14] After the hoped-for dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina did not come about within a week after the last meeting of the Contact Group of 25 March 1998 as the German Federal Government had intended, and the prospects for a diplomat-

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10 Friedrich, Roland. *Die deutsche Außenpolitik im Kosovo-Konflikt* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 41.

11 US President Bill Clinton was accused of having had a sexual relationship with intern Monica Lewinsky and lied about it. The affair became public knowledge in January 1998. The impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton, which had been initiated in early January 1999, ended with his acquittal on 12 Feb 1999.

12 Albright, Madeleine. *Die Autobiographie* (Berlin: Bertelsmann, 2003), 464; Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly* (see note 4), 30.

13 The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, as the follow-up mission of the United Nations Protection Force, had been tasked with the surveillance of the borders of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since 31 Mar 1995 in order to contribute to the stability of the republic and the region. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Nations Preventive Deployment Force UNPREDEP, URL: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unpredep.htm> (last retrieved on 4 Feb 2022).

14 WEU Ministerial Council, *Rhodes Declaration*, 12 May 1998 and WEU Ministerial Council, *Rome Declaration*, 17 Nov 1998, in Weller, Marc. *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999* (Cambridge: Documents and Analysis Publ., 1999), 233–234. The Multinational Advisory Police Element was a multinational advisory police contingent of the WEU in Albania.

ic solution continued to fade, the German Foreign Office in the person of Political Director Wolfgang Ischinger approached the US Administration in Washington. When talking to Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, to representatives of the US National Security Council (NSC) and of the Pentagon, he tried to convince the US Administration that the situation required the leadership of the USA. The only solution for the current blockade that promised success would be the US "shuttle diplomacy" between Belgrade and Pristina. It was also necessary to include military actions when considering options. Since the WEU would not have been a feasible option according to the German Ministry of Defence, a solution within the framework of NATO would also require US leadership. The US Department of State, especially Talbott who assumed that he would be given the task, was very interested in this proposal. He even asked Ischinger to present his statements on the necessity of a military component to the Pentagon and the National Security Council.[15]

The idea of building a credible military threat scenario against the FRY had fallen on sympathetic ears, especially in the US Department of State. And yet, until the second half of May 1998, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright failed to overcome the resistance of the White House. After European military measures had been deemed impossible, the French and Italian governments introduced the idea of military measures into NATO in early May. The German Foreign Office had been informed, however, it preferred that Germany did not initiate the examination of military options but later supported the French-Italian proposal. At that time, the German Federal Ministry of Defence was still trying to convince NATO to drop the development of a military threat scenario against Milošević.[16] It was not alone in this opinion, the US Pentagon was also very sceptical about this idea.[17]

The analysis of the conduct of the German Federal Government in the search for international solutions of the Kosovo conflict revealed interesting details regarding the functioning of German foreign and security policy. There was a disagreement between the German Foreign Office and the German Federal Ministry of Defence regarding the question of whether military pressure should be used as a political instrument and how credible it would be.[18] Interestingly, something similar was observed within the US Administration. While the two ministries of defence were rather reluctant to use military means, the two foreign ministries were more inclined to favour them. This is surprising only at first glance, however. A different strategic understanding lies behind it.

The threat of military action by NATO against Milošević was a political instrument in both the German Foreign Office and the US Department of State, along with other political and economic sanctions, for instance, to enforce political inter-

15 PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, vol. 223.997.

16 BArch, BW 2/34949, BMVg, Fü S III 6, Einsatz ehem. Jugoslawien, Vorlagen 21/22 von 03/1998 bis 10/1998, Vorlage an den Bundesminister der Verteidigung vom 30 Apr 1998, Subject: Meeting of the Political Directors of the Contact Group in Rome on 29 Apr 1998, 2.

17 Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly* (see note 4), 30.

18 PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, vol. 223.998, Bonn, 7 May 1998, Subject: Kosovo conflict, here: possible contribution of increased international, in particular military presence, to the objectives of the KG policy from the German perspective.

ests. These different foreign policy instruments allowed for actions tailored to the specific situation. In the opinion of foreign policy experts, the threat of military means was a leverage to achieve political objectives. In so far as it did not present a moral or ethical problem because the foreign policy actors did not really intend to wage war, instead, according to their understanding, they only threatened war.

This opinion, however, was diametrically opposed to the operational military understanding of the use of armed force. In the latter event, the military, in this case NATO and its member states, needed to be capable of implementing the threatened use of force in certain scenarios not only theoretically but also in concrete terms and practice. This required credibility, which, in turn, implied the capability to implement this with an appropriate military structure, equipment and training. In line with this logic, the ministries of defence and military officials understood that a threat to use military force should only be made if those who made it were ready and able to implement it as an ultimate consequence. Otherwise, NATO and its national armed forces would forfeit their credibility, according to military officials. This would result in a loss of power and, thus, a limited protective function. There was also a fear of getting entangled in military adventures with unpredictable consequences.

In the present instance, this way of military thinking was shaped to a considerable degree by the US view, which obviously had been adopted or shared by not only officials of the German Federal Ministry of Defence, with Federal Minister Volker Rühe himself at the top, but also the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, German General Klaus Naumann.[19] Once made, the threat to use military force had to be carried out in order to maintain credibility.[20]

This also explains the initial rejection and unease of not only the German Federal Ministry of Defence, Federal Minister Rühe and General Naumann but also of the US Department of Defense. Against this background, it becomes obvious, however, why after consensus was reached among NATO member states about the threat of military measures from the entire spectrum, it was the military officials in NATO and the national ministries of defence who pressed ahead with the planning process underlying the threats, and who urged the implementation of these plans if Milošević did not cooperate.[21]

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19 Interview of contemporary witness General (ret.) Klaus Naumann in Munich on 9 Dec 2014.

20 "The Obama Doctrine. The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America's role in the world." "Interview of US President Obamas by Jeffrey Goldberg," in *The Atlantic*, Apr 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/> (last retrieved on 17 May 2016); On the role of domestic obligations to use military force in US foreign and security policy, see Böckenförde, Stephan. "Militärische Gewalt als Mittel künftiger amerikanischer Außenpolitik," in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 4, 2001, 398–411, 399. On US hegemonial foreign policy, see Rudolf, Peter. *Amerikapolitik. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum Umgang mit dem Hegemon* (SWP-Studie, No. S 22/2006, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006), 12–13, 20–21.

21 Interview of contemporary witness General (ret.) Klaus Naumann on 9 Dec 2014 in Munich. The former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed a similar logic; against this backdrop, he demanded not to use the military as diplomatic leverage unnecessarily and set a high threshold for operations. Böckenförde, *Militärische Gewalt* (see note 20), 402.

IV. The beginning of military planning

The German federal government proceeded in June 1998 on the assumption that 140,000 asylum seekers had already flocked to Germany.[22] As early as April 1998, the German Foreign Office had been among the first to propose to the US Department of State a credible threat of military force also with the objective of containing the emerging humanitarian disaster in Kosovo at an early stage. After the Alliance had indicated at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998 that military means of conflict resolution were not excluded,[23] consensus on the actual threat of using military means was reached among the member states at the latest at the meeting of the NATO defence ministers in Brussels on 11 June 1998.[24] This marks a turning point in the international process of managing the Kosovo conflict. However, in contrast to the remarks in the autobiography of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright or other literary works, as mentioned above, it was not primarily the US that transferred the political solution of the Kosovo conflict onto NATO.[25] Initially, Germany and later Italy and France, the states that were immediately affected by the Kosovo conflict, had urged that the matter be discussed in NATO, while the White House, unlike the US Department of State, had so far not shown any interest in exploring the option of exercising military pressure on Milošević.

After the meeting of NATO foreign ministers, the North Atlantic Council was, at first, tasked with considering options of preventive deployments of forces in Albania and Macedonia.[26] While these measures still aimed at a stabilisation of the Balkan region, the perspective had changed with the meeting of the NATO defence ministers regarding an evaluation and planning of a possible military intervention, at the latest.[27]

Since NATO authorities also recommended not undertaking "preventive deployments," the International Military Staff of NATO subsequently began to plan broad offensive options in early July 1998. On 1 July 1998, the International Military Staff submitted a draft with options A and B ranging from the enforcement of a cease-fire

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22 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/242 of 19 June 1998, Speech by Kinkel, 22422. Later surveys confirm, however, that only 30794 requests for asylum were submitted in the Federal Republic of Germany by people of Albanian ethnicity in 1998. Biermann, *Lehrjahre im Kosovo* (see note 8), 615. The data were compiled by Biermann and confirmed by the German Federal Office of the Recognition of Foreign Refugees.

23 Statement On Kosovo, Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm> (last retrieved on 24 May 2016).

24 "Statement issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, 11 Jun 1998," in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo* (see note 14), 276.

25 Friedrich, *Die deutsche Außenpolitik* (see note 25), 40.

26 Statement on Kosovo, Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm> (last retrieved on 24 May 2016).

27 Kriemann, Hans-Peter. "Germany's participation in the NATO intervention," in *Periphery or Contact Zone? The NATO Flanks 1961 to 2013*, ed. by Bernd Lemke (Freiburg: Rombach, 2015), 146–153.

agreement to a forced invasion by NATO ground, air and naval forces to end the hostilities.[28] It soon emerged that particularly the phased air strikes of Operation Allied Force were best suited as leverage to support the political process.[29] They facilitated a gradual military escalation by echeloning, and NATO politicians hoped that with the beginning of an air operation at the latest, Milošević would relent in view of the demonstrated credibility of the military threat scenario and implement the conditions laid down by the international community. Furthermore, the employment of technologically sophisticated air forces and precision weapons promised to minimise casualties among both NATO and civilians. This was an important aspect for domestic debates in all NATO member states. Therefore, it was no surprise that NATO ambassadors had little interest in a forcible invasion of Serbia by 200,000 NATO military personnel within the scope of option B and neither were they interested in option B minus, which provided for an invasion of Kosovo by at least 75,000 military personnel.[30]

As a result, the military agencies of NATO were to refine the various air operations and the employment of ground forces in the scenario of option A (cease-fire agreement and peace agreement), since an air strike alone only promised success if secured by ground forces.

Germany offered 8 ECR Tornados equipped with HARM missiles, which were able to fire their remote-controlled weapons from high altitudes to protect NATO aircraft from Yugoslav missile defence positions, and 6 RECCE Tornados for reconnaissance purposes.[31] In view of the plans for air operations that were emphatically pushed ahead to generate credible pressure in the political process, the German fed-

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28 BArch, BW 2/34949, BMVg Fü S III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 22, 2 Jul 1998, Subject: "Further Measures by NATO with respect to the crisis in Kosovo – Assessment of Ground Options"; BArch, BW 2/34949, BMVg Fü S III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 22, 3 Jul 1998, Subject: "Assessment of Ground Options by NATO with Respect to the Crisis in Kosovo."

29 BArch, BW 2/34949, BMVg Fü S III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 22, 24 Jun 1998, Subject: "Further Measures by NATO with respect to the crisis in Kosovo – Beschluß des NATO Rats zu den Optionenstudien."

30 BArch, BW 2/ 34952, BMVg FüS III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 27, 9 May 1999, Subject: Überarbeitung OPLAN 10413-Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, Anlage 1, Weisung AA in Einvernehmen mit BMVg an DNV zum weiteren Vorgehen bei der Überarbeitung des OPLAN 10413 JOINT GUARDIAN.

31 BArch, BW 2/34949, BMVg Fü S III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 22, 12 August 1998, Subject: "Further Measures by NATO with Respect to the Crisis in Kosovo – Beschluß des NATO Rats"; BArch, BW 2/34949, BMVg Fü S III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 22, BMVg Fü S III 6, 17 Aug 1998, Betr. "Crisis in Kosovo – "Contingency Planning For Option K." Since 1995, the 1 Operational Wing of the German Air Force (EG1) had been stationed at the Piacenza North Italian airfield. It had been used within the Operation Deliberate Force four years before Operation Allied Force in a peace-enforcement operation in cooperation with other NATO partners, albeit with a UN mandate and without any live round being fired by German crew members. Cf. Jertz, Walter. "*Einsatz der Luftwaffe über Bosnien" in Von Kambodscha bis Kosovo*. Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr seit Ende des Kalten Krieges, ed. by Peter Goebel (Frankfurt a.M., Bonn: 2000), 136-153. The ECR Tornado (Electronic Combat Reconnaissance) is a two-seat multi-role combat aircraft; equipped with HARM missiles (High Speed Anti Radiation Missile) to suppress the enemy air defence. The RECCE Tornado is a reconnaissance aircraft.

eral government was able to meet the ensuing obligations in the Alliance. Regarding the domestic debate, the risk of their own losses was kept as low as possible, while the precision weapons of the ECR Tornados contributed to the fight against hostile air defence positions and avoid so-called collateral damages. Accordingly, the dispatch of a total of 14 Bundeswehr Tornados was in several ways suited to implement German political guidelines. The US carried the main burden of the air strikes as they carried out 61 per cent of the sorties while the Germans participated in about 3 per cent.[32]

V. The threat of military force

Shortly after the wide-ranging plans for military operational scenarios had been largely completed in mid-September 1998, the security situation in Kosovo once again deteriorated significantly. As a consequence, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199, and NATO issued an ultimatum to Milošević: either he cooperated by fulfilling the demands to end the violence in Kosovo or NATO would begin air strikes against FRY. In view of the aircraft fleet assembling in preparation for an air war primarily at the Italian air bases but also in other NATO member states, such as Germany and Great Britain, as well as on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea after the action warning (ACTWARN) was issued on 24 September 1998[33] and the obvious approval of the air strikes by all NATO member states by 12 October 1998, Milošević eventually relented on 13 October 1998. The NATO Council, nevertheless, approved the operation order for "Allied Force" for reasons of credibility and in order to be able to respond in case the agreement with Belgrade was not complied with.[34]

When the NATO Council decided on the Activation Order on 13 October 1998, all NATO partners had followed the "credible threat" rationale, including France and Italy who had hesitated until the end, and above all the German Foreign Office. Until 12 October 1998, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel had refused to approve the participation of German armed forces in the air operations without a valid mandate from the United Nations. In the end, all NATO member states approved. In the case of Germany, the advocates of the "credible threat doctrine" had succeeded in convincing the politicians from the autumn of 1998 on that it was absolutely necessary to implement the threat.[35] The US government had already decided in favour of this in the summer of 1998. Beginning with the so-called Activation Warning of

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32 BArch, BW 18/6860, Führungszentrum der Bundeswehr, BerÜbEAA, Fachbereich Einsatzauswertung, *Kosovo Lessons Learned, Jahresbericht 99*, 23 November 1999, *Vorläufiger Auswerteberichte des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zur Operation "Allied Force" – Nationale Auswertung*, 9.

33 NATO Defence Ministers Meeting Vilamoura, 24 Sep 1998, Briefing by Undersecretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe and Ambassador Vershbow, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980924b.htm> (last retrieved on 18 Jan 2022).

34 Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly* (see note 4), 47.

35 Fischer, Joschka. *Die rot-grünen Jahre: Vom Kosovokrieg bis zum 11. September* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), 107.

NATO for the planned air operations of 23 September 1998, the logic of military action successively complied with military thinking.[36]

Immediately after all arrangements between NATO and Belgrade on the modalities of the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the Kosovo had been completed in late October 1998, the NATO air verification operation Eagle Eye was ready to monitor the arrangements.[37] This rapid provision of suitable military instruments to support the political process had been possible because of the extensive NATO plans made the previous summer which provided for several options for air forces in addition to ground operations. They considered all available scenarios to support the political process ranging from the phased air operation "Allied Force" to air strikes at short notice to verification flights. At the same time, the international community had decided to monitor the political agreements with Milošević primarily through an OSCE Verification Mission on the ground with 2,000 observers. When the first OSCE observers were deployed with the purpose of being able to adequately protect the unarmed civilian forces in the event of a renewed escalation of hostilities in Kosovo, early November 1998 saw the beginning of military planning for operation Joint Guarantor, a NATO extraction force to evacuate the verifiers.[38]

The plans based on these assumptions were not without justification as demonstrated by the renewed flare-up of violence in Kosovo in late 1998. Serbian security forces had begun to respond to the violence of the Kosovo Liberation Army with increasingly severe repressive measures with no regard for civilian casualties. When the security situation escalated completely with the massacre of Raçak in January 1999 mentioned above, further military phases were added to the evacuation mission. The evacuation operations Tier 1 to 3 – depending on the level of escalation – could be used in this way to remove the OSCE observers of the KVM from Kosovo, if necessary with massive support from infantry and even combat tanks.[39]

In parallel to these plans, the preparations for a conference in Rambouillet were a last effort to achieve a political resolution of the conflict which would lead to a treaty to be implemented by a Kosovo Force (KFOR) comprising some 28,000 military personnel. It soon became obvious with the beginning of the negotiations at Rambouillet that at least part of these forces in the strength and equipment of a combat brigade would be needed immediately after the conclusion of the negoti-

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36 Although UN Resolution 1199 of 23 Sep 1998 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter did not explicitly authorise the use of military force, the US Administration used the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers to make the member states discharge their duties. NATO Defence Ministers Meeting in Vilamoura, 24 Sep 1998, Press Conference Secretary of Defense, William Cohen and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry S. Shelton, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980924c.htm> (last retrieved on 4 Feb 2022).

37 BArch, BW 2/34950, BMVg FüS III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 23, 15 Oct 1998, "NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

38 BArch, BW 2/34950, BMVg FüS III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 24, 2 Nov 1998, Subject: "NATO Support for a possible Extraction of OSCE Verifiers in Kosovo."

39 BArch, BW 2/34950, BMVg FüS III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 24, 10 Nov 1998, Subject: "NATO Support for a possible Extraction of OSCE Verifiers in Kosovo," Main part and Annex A (Operation concept).

ations on 23 February 1999 to monitor the implementation of a potential treaty; therefore, elements of the extraction force were re-designated into KFOR troops, while the home garrisons of the troop-contributing NATO member states continued to train military personnel for the build-up of both contingents. In the case of KFOR, the military planners were once again able to resort to their original concept as the basis for the further development of an adapted military support for a political process. These were variants of option B minus to secure the cease-fire agreements in the strength of 6,000 troops, which still bore the designation of KA-FOR (Kosovo-Albanian Force) in early September 1998.[40]

The negotiations at Rambouillet near Paris, scheduled to take place only three weeks after the Račak incident, had been a last attempt to resolve the Kosovo Conflict politically. After they had ended on 23 February 1999 without concluding the intended agreement; NATO worked at full speed towards a further build-up and achieve full operational readiness for both operations. In view of the escalating violence in Kosovo, the evacuation of OSCE observers could become necessary at any time and in various escalation situations. At the same time, there was hope that the talks scheduled in Paris in continuation of Rambouillet after 15 March 1999 could ultimately be successful. In this case, an operational KFOR would have been required once again. However, the outcome of the talks at Rambouillet rendered the scenario of an air war increasingly possible, so that after 23 February 1999, NATO put great efforts into the preparations for operation Allied Force. Ultimately, the military leadership of NATO and their planners tried to meet the requirements of all available political developments with appropriate military options in order to prevent the political process from being limited in its courses of action by unilaterally focusing on a certain scenario.

In March 1999, once again, hundreds of thousands of displaced people were fleeing, both within Kosovo and abroad. After the negotiations in Paris had ended without result on 19 March 1999, the political process had, in fact, failed.[41] The only option to prevent a humanitarian disaster for the NATO member states was the implementation of the threatened air strikes.

VI. Achievable within a relatively short period of time? The beginning of the air strikes

NATO began an air war against the FRY with an air force of 350 aircraft in the evening of 24 March 1999. US Secretary of Defense Albright expressed a rather common opinion in an appearance on national TV in the evening of the beginning of the air strikes: "I don't see this as a long-term operation. I think that this is something

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[40] BArch, BW 2/34951, BMVg FüS III 6, Vorlagen Einsatz – ehemaliges Jugoslawien, Ordner 25, 14 Feb 1999, Subject: SACEUR'S OPERATION PLAN 10413 "JOINT GUARDIAN" – for the Implementation and as necessary the Enforcement of an Interim Agreement in KOSOVO.

[41] "Statement by the Co-Chairs of the Contact Group, France, 19 Ma 1999," in Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo* (see note 14), 493.

… that is achievable within a relatively short period of time."[42] After three weeks had passed and despite a permanent increase in sorties, the number of bombs dropped and missiles launched as well as the addition of other target categories, Milošević was by no means ready to give in; therefore, political and military preparations for a ground invasion of Kosovo began. An estimated 75,000 to 100,000 NATO military personnel of a total force of 175,000 military personnel, also drawing on KFOR troops, were to advance fighting.[43] The same time as these plans had been put in very concrete terms approximately after 24 May 1999, Belgrade indicated their readiness to unconditionally yield to the demands of the international community.[44]

The importance of anticipatory military planning was also reflected in NATO's response to the massive refugee movements from Kosovo after 19 March 1999. By May, the number of refugees had reached 850,000.[45] NATO had launched operation Allied Harbour in late April to provide a stable environment for many international organisations and NGOs for humanitarian reasons and in order to stabilise the neighbouring countries of Albania and Macedonia that were affected the most.[46] The complex scenario of military action in the Kosovo conflict also included up to 20 ships in the Adriatic Sea as well as the Apache combat helicopters stationed in Albania, which remained under US command to the end.[47]

More than 900 aircraft from 14 member states of the alliance had participated in the operation by the end of the air strikes on 10 June 1999; they had dropped more than 28,000 bombs and missiles over the territory of FRY in more than 38,000 sorties.[48]

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42 Cited from: Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly* (see note 4), 91; Friedrich, *Die deutsche Außenpolitik* (see note 25), 92; Joetze, *Der letzte Krieg* (See note 3), 91, 121; Judah, Tim. *Kosovo. War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT, London: 2002) 229.

43 ZMSBw, Deposition of Vice Admiral (ret.) Hans Frank, Memo on the Quint CHOD Meeting at SHAPE on 24 May 1999; Kriemann, Hans-Peter. Der Kosovokrieg (Ditzingen: 1999), 107–118.

44 Joetze, *Der letzte Krieg* (see note 3), 146; "NATO. Markt der Eitelkeiten. Verwirrende Friedenssuche im Konflikt um das Kosovo. Betonkopf Milošević macht Zugeständnisse," in *Der Spiegel* 21, 24 May 1999.

45 Scheidler and Alscher state that between 100,000 and 150,000 Kosovo Albanians were displaced and most of them had left the region by 24 Mar 1999 when the NATO air strikes began. In the period between 24 Mar and late May 1999, their number had increased to 850,000. Scheidler, Antje, Ralf Ulrich and Stefan Alscher. *Balkan: Über zwei Millionen Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Migration und Bevölkerung, 4/1999, 1-3.* These data are in agreement with those raised by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); they recorded an influx of 850,000 refugees fleeing from Kosovo for 11 weeks after 24 Mar 1999. UNHCR Standing Committee, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response EC/50/SC/CRP.12, 9 Feb 2000, <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/3ae68d19c/kosovo-refugee-crisis-independent-evaluation-unhcrs-emergency-preparedness.html> (last retrieved 19 Jan 2022); Kosovo Emergency, in UNHCR Global Report 1999, 345–347, <http://www.unhcr.org/publications/fundraising/3e2d4d5f7/unhcr-global-report-1999-kosovo-emergency.html> (last retrieved on 19 Jan 2022).

46 NATO, Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, Operation "Allied Harbour," <https://jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/17-operation-allied-harbour-> (last retrieved on 19 Jan 2022).

47 Feichtinger, Walter. *Die militärstrategische und operative Entwicklung im Konfliktverlauf* in Der Krieg um das Kosovo 1998/99, ed. by Erich Reiter (Mainz: 2000), 93-136, 122–123.

48 BArch, BW 18/6860, Führungszentrum der Bundeswehr, BerÜbEAA, Fachbereich Einsatzauswertung, Kosovo Lessons Learned, Jahresbericht 99, 23 Nov 1999, Vorläufiger Auswertebericht des

After the ongoing expansion of the air war, the beginning preparations for a ground invasion of Kosovo by NATO and the increasing political pressure of the international community, Milosevic eventually relented and accepted the conditions laid down in UN Security Council Resolution 1244.[49] The air war ended in the early morning hours of 10 June 1999. The invasion of the KFOR, which began on 12 June 1999, concluded the second ground war between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army and the associated mass expulsions and killings.

As a result, the military intervention of NATO was crucial in ending the displacement and mass migration of Kosovo Albanians and containing violence in general. Above all, it bought time for the political process. The NATO-led KFOR and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo were instruments and pioneers of this political process. In view of the absence of administration, a legal system and functioning police force, as well as of government institutions that were mostly incapable or hardly capable of functioning, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo exercised influence on all spheres of life of the inhabitants of Kosovo. For the first time in their history, the United Nations took on a broad responsibility also with an executive mandate.

Basically, UN Resolution 1244 tasked them with establishing an interim civilian administration in Kosovo; it was to grant the inhabitants of Kosovo, which constitutionally continued to be part of Serbia, an autonomous existence until the question of the status of the province was decided.

VII. Conclusion

In the end, it was German and US foreign policy officials who insisted on the threat of military force against the advice of their fellow ministers from the national ministries of defence. When the threats had been made, they started a military machinery which, on the basis of the underlying understanding, resulted in the outbreak of the air war of NATO against the FRY. This could easily have grown into a major European ground war. The fact that this was not a far-fetched idea becomes apparent when considering that the planning had started as early as mid-April 1999 at the insistence of NATO military officials after the air war did not have the desired success, and Milošević seemed to be far from relenting. This is also based on the idea of "credible threats" and of thinking military operational actions through to the end.

Eventually, the responsible officials in NATO and Germany had agreed that a short engagement with manageable losses and costs was the smaller and, thus, more acceptable evil than an assumed loss of credibility and power following the non-implementation of a threat once made. This, in turn, would have reduced the security of or increased the threat to the Alliance and, thus, the own country.

Regarding recent military history, this finding raises the interesting question of whether and to what degree such foreign and security policy mindsets might be the

Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zur Operation "Allied Force" – Nationale Auswertung, 9.

[49] United Nations Resolution 1244, <https://unmik.unmissions.org/united-nations-resolution-1244> (last retrieved on 19 Jan 2022).

driving force contributing to increasing escalation dynamics and, thus, play a considerable role in the outbreak of conflicts and war.

The question of whether and to what degree these conflict dynamics are to be found in earlier wars would be of great interest not only from a historian's perspective. Obviously, wars cannot be easily calculated. In 1999, the officials of NATO member states could not imagine not to follow through with the engagement once they had threatened Milošević. Just like we cannot know today, they could not have known what would have happened otherwise.

Derek Varble and Mark Grotelueschen

Provocative Weakness: The Failure of American Deterrence in 1917[1]

Abstract

United States (US) President Woodrow Wilson secured reelection in 1916 after campaigning on an assertion that he "kept [the US] out of war," referring to American neutrality in World War I. Five months less one day later, Congress declared war on Germany, ending over two and a half years of neutrality, the US having failed to deter German attacks against American interests. The government's dubious will and inadequate capabilities contributed to this failure. As a result, the US, now a belligerent, lost its standing to mediate a settlement ending the war, which, instead, expanded into 19 more months of global suffering, dislocation, death and destruction. Deterrence, if properly implemented, may have averted, or at least reduced, these horrific developments.

> *I commanded them not to set apart their sons and their daughters unto Molech, neither came it into My mind, that they should do this abomination. (Jeremiah 32:35)*

I. Deterrence Dilemmas

When the United States (US) joined the Great War on 6 April 1917, its military establishment was woefully unprepared to make war on the German Empire. In fact, the armed forces of the US were so weak that many political and military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were not even sure what America's belligerency would mean for the war. When the German Admiralty Staff recommended the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare to Kaiser Wilhelm II in early 1917, it took for granted that such a move would bring the US into the war. While the German chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, viewed this gambit as a "very serious decision," senior German naval officers insisted that America was "of no importance to the Fleet" and that the military effect of American belligerency "was zero." In one of naval history's most inaccurate predictions, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff,

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[1] The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense or the US Government. The authors would like to thank Dr. Brent Talbot for his comments on a previous draft of this paper.

the chief of the Naval General Staff, arrogantly proclaimed, "I guarantee on my word as a naval officer that no American will set foot on the Continent!"[2]

The leadership of the German Army shared the Navy's dismissive attitude. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the chief of the German Army's General Staff, admitted that, "We expect war with America and have made all preparations [for it]. Things cannot get worse." He then insisted that any potential American military involvement in the war was going to be "minimal" and "in any case, not decisive."[3] His partner in command, First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff, simply stated, "I don't give a damn about America." The Kaiser, who would make the critical, and ultimately fatal, decision that brought the US into the war, apparently shared the views of his military and naval advisors, admitting that he "fully expected America's entry into the war," but believed that it was "irrelevant."[4]

From the very start of the war, the consensus position in American society and the US government was to remain neutral for the duration of the Great War. This was consistent with more than a hundred years of US foreign policy tradition, ranging back to George Washington, of attempting to stay neutral throughout European military conflicts. However, despite the Defense and Naval Acts of 1916, which were 'too little, too late,' US trade policies made it an important economic player in the war, while its military forces – on land, sea, and air – remained so weak that German military and political leaders thought they could completely discount American entry, at least in the short term.

While modern scholars and policymakers have often associated deterrence with nuclear weaponry, the concept is as old as national security itself.[5] Many writers have stressed the dangers of the "security dilemma" – when the desire to be safe by being strong leads potential enemies to increase their own strength, thus, generating more danger to the initial party. However, the opposite side of this coin – what we might call an "insecurity dilemma" – exists as well. Weakness, both in will and ability, can invite attack, and it certainly did so for the US in 1917.[6]

Two decades later, Great War veteran F. Scott Fitzgerald described the "ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still be[ing] able to

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2 Woodward, David R. *Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917–1918* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 31.

3 Hindenburg might have based this conclusion on the overconfident assessments of the naval and economic advisors, who were hoping the new submarine campaign would bring the Allies to their knees before the start of their next harvest in the late summer and fall of 1917. Had that been achieved, it would have proved Hindenburg accurate, and made Holtzendorff's overconfidence an insignificant error. Herwig, Holger H. *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918* (London: Arnold, 1997), 312.

4 Quoted in Herwig, *First World War* (see note 3), 314–315.

5 For an example of the common association of deterrence with nuclear weapons, see the articles in the special "Perspectives on Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century" edition of the *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, which includes ten papers from the 2016 United States Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, every one of which is about nuclear deterrence. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10/5, 2016, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-10_Issue-5/USSTRATCOM.pdf> (last retrieved on 21 June 2023).

6 Jervis, Robert. "Competition Under the Security Dilemma," in *World Politics*, 30/2, 1978, 169.

function" as the "test of a first-rate intelligence,"[7] a test that faced President Woodrow Wilson as he attempted to balance these dilemmas so that the US could continue to follow a neutral middle path. The latter was a necessity for Wilson as he sought to pursue his broader political objectives, which included ending the war with a peace settlement based on liberal ideals, such as freedom of the seas, and the continued domestic development of reforming impulses consistent with his Progressive philosophy.[8]

To one side, loomed the hazard of provoking war with Germany through aggressive behavior, while, on the other, lay the danger of inviting a German attack against an easy target of opportunity that would, in the German estimation, contribute to its victory over its Great War adversaries. Where Odysseus and his crew succeeded, steering right down the middle between Scylla and Charybdis, Wilson failed, overcorrecting away from the security dilemma and, therefore, colliding with the insecurity dilemma that invited a German attack, which, in turn, plunged the US into a disastrous war, rendering Wilson's objectives unattainable.[9]

This narrow passage would be perilous for any mariner, although Wilson did himself no favors through his faulty understanding and application of deterrence theory. Deterrence, similar to Caesar's Gaul, consists of three parts, each necessary while insufficient. Wilson only addressed one of them, communication. By early 1917, Wilson's neglect of the other two components, both of which are related to deterrence *credibility* – will and capability to deter – left Germany undeterred, at which point that empire made its fateful decision to attack the US, thus, expanding, and arguably prolonging, the war, a tragic outcome that deterrence, if properly understood, may have avoided.[10] Thus, did this opportunity for an earlier, less costly resolution to the conflict slip away on a bloody tide.

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7 "American Masters, F. Scott Fitzgerald: Winter Dreams", PBS, 31 Aug, 2005. Fitzgerald included the observation in his *Esquire* essay "The Crack-Up," February 1936.

8 The role of freedom of the seas as an aspect of Wilson's broader political vision is addressed in "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and Freedom of the Seas," Naval History and Heritage Command, <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-i/history/ww1-freedom-of-seas.html> (last retrieved on 21 June 2023).

9 Homer. *The Odyssey*, trans. Robert Fagles, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1996), 278–279. To be fair, Odysseus did have the planning assistance of a supernatural being, Circe, and he did lose six men from his crew when Scylla grabbed and devoured them as the vessel passed her lair. Curiously, Odysseus disregarded Circe's advice not to arm himself in preparation for combat with Scylla. Instead, he took up arms, even if his adversary was, as Circe suggested, an 'immortal devastation.' Perhaps Odysseus' previous success against Polyphemus, Poseidon's offspring, inspired a determination to retain agency even when ranged against apparent invincibility. Wilson's overcorrection as a result of focusing on one peril at the expense of noticing the other is in "Washington In No Fear of War at This Time," in *New York Times,* 22 Dec 1916, 1.

10 Deterrence frameworks are available in Haffa, Robert P., Jr. "The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition," in *Strategic Studies Quarterly,* Winter 2018, 96–97; Chapters Two and Eight in Mearsheimer, John J. *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Chapter Five in Snyder, Glenn H. *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), which considers the roles of communication, or 'declaratory policy' as Snyder labels the concept (240), in implementing deterrence.

The purpose of this essay is not to serve as a historical monograph chronicling the US path to Great War belligerence, as many esteemed historians have published on this topic excellent monographs that are currently in print.[11] Nor does this essay purport to provide cutting-edge scholarship on deterrence theory.[12] Rather, this essay is a synthesis, incorporating a case study approach that combines elements of multiple disciplines to analyze deterrence efficacy in considering questions such as:

– For this particular case – US-German Great War interaction before US entry into that conflict – did any factor(s) render deterrence more or less efficacious? If so, which one(s), and why did they have that effect?
– Which consequences arose from enhanced or diminished deterrence efficacy?

Context being paramount, any simple 'lessons' from this and every other case study are elusive; nonetheless, some basic contours may emerge that could help inform those who encounter deterrence-related issues in the course of scholarship, policy-making and other endeavors. The historical background that follows helps to establish relevant context for this case study.

The term deterrence is now, for understandable reasons given the apocalyptic stakes of great power conflict in the nuclear era, often associated with Cold War strategy. In fact, deterrence has a long history, its essential qualities being evident millennia ago, with one example being Republican Rome's experiences in Ptolemaic Egypt. On that occasion, Roman official Gaius Popilius Laenas' deterrence of Seleucid monarch Antiochus IV from further Seleucid involvement in Ptolemaic Egypt, which Rome considered its inviolable sphere of influence, incorporated all three elements of effective deterrence: communication, will and capability.

In *communicating* with Antiochus, Popilius informed that monarch of Roman expectations that the latter stay out of Egypt. Forcing Antiochus to answer on the spot demonstrated Roman resolve as an expression of *will*. And Rome, having just secured a decisive victory at the battle of Pydna, clearly had the military *capability* to fend off any Seleucid invasion. Deterrence, thus, succeeded, with its result being preservation of peace in the region, avoiding the horrific human toll of a Roman-Seleucid war.[13] None of this analysis is to claim that following some checklist assures that deterrence will succeed. Instead, the argument is that fulfilling certain conditions tends to increase the likelihood that deterrence will succeed, while neglecting them tends to increase the likelihood that deterrence will not succeed.

More than two millennia later, Wilson – who may, through his undergraduate studies in history at Princeton University, have been familiar with this tense Seleucid showdown in Alexandria – faced a deterrence situation of his own. In this case, Wilson needed to deter Germany not from invading Egypt, but from attacking US

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11 See, for example, Neiberg, Michael S. *The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).

12 Readers interested in such scholarship can consult the work of Lawrence Freedman, including Chapter 13, "The Rationality of Irrationality," in Freedman, Lawrence. *Strategy: A History* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013).

13 Livy. *Rome and the Mediterranean*, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 1976), 611 (XLV.16).

shipping, as well as American civilians aboard and foreign vessels.[14] Any such attacks curtailed US agency, limiting what the country and its citizens could do in the world. This affront to Wilson's liberal sensibilities was so grave as to constitute a casus belli.

II. Diminishing Deterrence

In the aftermath of his November 1916 presidential re-election, Wilson may have been lulled into complacency by what appeared to be an effectively deterred Germany. Germany had attacked US interests three times over the previous two years, only to back down, apparently deterred when stern US words resulted. On the first occasion, when U-boat U-20 sank the RMS *Lusitania* off Ireland, resulting in over a hundred US passengers losing their lives, Germany revised its U-boat policy in response to US diplomatic pressure.[15] Nevertheless, just three months later, Germans sank the British SS *Arabic,* killing forty. Germany subsequently pledged not to sink passenger ships without sufficient warning. The following year, a U-boat attack on unarmed French ferry SS *Sussex* resulted in injuries to three US passengers aboard; as had been the case with the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* incidents, Germany ultimately modified its U-boat rules of engagement in ways that lessened the threat to civilians at sea.[16]

The way the first two maritime crises developed evidently gave Wilson pause; in both instances, more than a month passed, with intense factional conflict throughout German government and society on display, before Germany revised its rules of engagement to align them more closely with US demands, and the long-delayed *Sussex* revision was conditional (although the US disregarded the German conditions). The fact that submarine attacks on passenger vessels continued to recur, along with the

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[14] Of course, Egypt was of keen interest to Entente member Britain, whose imperial lines of communication passed through the Suez Canal, just over a hundred and fifty miles from where Popilius kept Antiochus at bay through well-balanced deterrence.

[15] "Berlin to Modify Submarine War in Reply to President's Demand for Safety of Passengers," in *New York Times,* 25 Jun 1915, 1. The text of the full note with this passage is also on page one, "Full Text of the President's Note to Germany," in *New York Times,* 24 Jul 1915. It took three notes before Wilson wrote: "The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom [of the seas], from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost …. Repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly." *The Lusitania Resource* <https://www.rmslusitania.info/primary-docs/wilson-notes/us-protest-3/> (last retrieved on 21 Jun 2023).

[16] "President Wilson in Final Note to Germany Accepts Promise of New Submarine Policy, But Rejects Any Condition as to Blockade", in *New York Times*, 9 May 1916, 1; Gerard, James W. *My Four Years in Germany* (New York, NY: Grosset & Dunlap, 1917), 184–190. Wilson warned that if Germany did not stop unrestricted submarine warfare, the US would be "forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue and otherwise would break off diplomatic relations." De Santiago Ramos, Simone. "Sussex Pledge," in: *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer and Bill Nasson (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2014) <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/home.html> (last retrieved on 21 Jun 2023). Wilson also noted, in reply to Germany's reply to the *Sussex* note, that Germany's revised policy "will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany." The reply is reprinted in full in "President Wilson's Reply to Germany," in *New York Times*, 9 May 1916, 1.

considerable German delays in responding to foreign protests, demonstrated the frailty of US deterrence, which, at that point in the war, seemed a thin reed indeed. Wilson apparently realized this tenuous position, leading to his secret decision in the immediate aftermath of the *Sussex* crisis to press strongly for peace when a reasonable opportunity to do so presented itself. That excruciating interval just after the *Sussex* attack, when the US found itself on the brink of war, convinced Wilson that, were war to continue indefinitely, the US would, almost inevitably, be drawn in as a result of some similar crisis in the future. But ending the war via a negotiated peace offered an alternative future, one in which the US would remain at peace because the threat to its peace, the Great War, had ended.

Wilson accurately anticipated how the war's intensification posed an ever-greater threat to US neutrality; the conflict's changing context increased the likelihood that events would entangle the country in war despite its desire for perpetual neutrality. Germany's U-boat fleet had expanded, offering unrestricted submarine warfare against all, including US, merchant vessels traveling to and from Entente ports, greater prospects for strategic success.[17] More U-boats could be expected to sink more vessels, interdicting, to Germany's benefit, Entente lines of communication and supply, enhancing the viability of a 'tonnage' strategy that deprived Entente states of necessary resources.

Additionally, Germany had grown increasingly desperate as a result of serious food supply shortcomings, as well as various military setbacks, such as its failure to achieve its objectives in its massive 1916 offensive at Verdun. Unlike circumstances in previous years, German officials became convinced that Germany's only opportunity for victory was in the short run.[18] Some sort of negotiated settlement on terms favorable, or at the very least not especially unfavorable, probably ranked as the first preference among many influential German officials, although for the time being, they discerned no obvious path to such a settlement. A crisis mentality, thus, fostered greater German belligerence than had been the case during the *Lusitania, Arabic* and *Sussex* crises, necessitating deterrence measures stronger than those that had previously sufficed to resolve the earlier incidents.

Wilson presumably knew of German food shortages and the U-boat expansion, as prominent daily newspapers regularly published stories chronicling these developments. Wilson may well have misinterpreted the effects of German food shortages, incorrectly concluding that, in the face of such suffering, Germany would move primarily in the direction of peace as a way to end its domestic anguish. Germany, instead, preferred victory as its path to peace, and, with victory on the battlefield

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17 "President Drops All Other Business to Deal With Problems Due to War," in *New York Times*, 20 Nov 1916, 1.

18 Henning von Holtzendorff's 22 Dec 1916 memorandum characterizes this line of thought; his memorandum is reprinted in its entirety in *Naval History and Heritage Command*, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/wwi/1916/chief-of-the-admiral.html> (last retrieved on 21 Jun 2023). Analysis of the Holtzendorff memorandum and its implications for German operations is in Chapter Two of Breemer, Jan S. *Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare,* Naval War College Papers 36 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010).

seemingly unattainable in the immediate future, an indirect resource interdiction approach appeared to be Germany's only route to victory.

In hinting at a future pivot away from the *Sussex* agreement, a pivot that Wilson had predicted, German officials tipped off their intended strategic direction to US diplomats: a two-track path consisting of peace negotiations first, and then an expanded unrestricted submarine offensive against maritime commerce traveling to and from the Entente. Commensurate with the first of these tracks, Germany signaled its interest in peace talks, including potential US involvement as a broker to mediate among the belligerents. Clear warnings indicating Germany's strong consideration of the second track arrived in the weeks following the November election.[19]

At the time that Germany's proposal emerged in September 1916, Wilson held the position that his ongoing presidential campaign, and upcoming election scheduled for early November, precluded, for the time, any direct involvement in peace talks; the opportune moment that he sought had not yet arrived, excluded, for now, by partisan politics. Were he to win reelection, an outcome by no means assured, Wilson could, thenceforth, become involved in peace efforts, a path he had envisioned since at least May of that year. In the event, Wilson did win reelection, carried to a second presidential term as a result of US public opinion favoring the country's neutrality in the Great War, which Wilson had maintained to that point, due in part to the success of his previous deterrence policies towards Germany.[20] Aside from communication that reiterated the importance of Germany honoring its previous pledges, Wilson took no clear action suggesting he understood the need to augment his deterrence efforts as a complement to his peace program.[21]

A month later in December, Wilson, through diplomatic correspondence with belligerents, expressed support for Germany's proposed peace conference, 'suggesting' that all parties to the conflict give such a conference serious consideration, its basic premise being that all belligerents would state their objectives; ideally some, or all, of these objectives would overlap among the various participants, leading to a 'peace without victory,' as Wilson described his objective when recounting the initiative the following month. Wilson did not directly propose peace, nor US mediation of any peace conference(s) that might ensue, although peace was his overwhelming preference at that time.[22] Unfortunately for Wilson's long-established plans, a nego-

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19 U.S. Counselor of Embassy at Berlin Joseph Grew to the Secretary of State, 1 Oct 1916, Document 386, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement, The World War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 291; "Chancellor Again Cites Peace Offer," in *New York Times*, 1 Dec 1916, 1; "Acts of U-Boats Stir New Alarm; Odd Hints from Berlin," in *New York Times,* 24 Nov 1916, 1; "Gerard Confers on U-Boat Issue," in *New York Times,* 28 Nov 1916, 1.

20 "Votes of Women and Bull Moose Elected Wilson – Peace a Powerful Issue – 'He Kept Us Out of War' Won Women," in *New York Times*, 12 Nov 1916, 1.

21 "Last Word to Berlin is Given to Gerard; President Instructs Him to Say that We Expect U-Boat Pledges to be Kept," in *New York Times*, 30 Nov 1916, 1.

22 Germany's proposal is reprinted in full in "Text of the Teutonic Notes to the Neutral Powers and the Pope," in *New York Times,* 13 Dec 1916, 1. Wilson's public position from earlier that month is in "Peace Offers Now; Washington Sounds Warning," in *New York Times*, 11 Dec 1916, 1. Wilson's note is in "President Wilson's Note to the Belligerent Nations," in *New York Times,* 21 Dec 1916, 1.

tiated settlement along anything approaching what Germany had in mind – minor German concessions from the late 1916 status quo, in exchange for a cessation of hostilities – looked to be out of reach due to Entente opposition to any such deal.[23]

The Entente's lack of enthusiasm for a negotiated settlement suggested its belief in an eventual total victory.[24] In fact, the war had reached an outright stalemate, with neither side possessing a distinct advantage over the other, and neither possessing a clear path to victory. Germany and its allies arguably had the advantage on some fronts, such as the financial, with Entente financial affairs in shambles. Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Andrew Bonar Law, warned in early 1917 that he could finance only three more weeks of spending. Complete financial collapse, a real likelihood, would end Entente war efforts, at least at the present scale. Germany appraised the situation much more realistically than did its Entente adversaries.[25]

Wilson's peacemaking, were it to materialize, could bring the Entente closer to reality in understanding that their war effort dangled by a thread. No aspect of the deadlocked war indicated that Entente victory was imminent, assured or even likely. However, the US had to remain neutral for any of this progress to come about. Neutrality, in turn, rested upon effective deterrence that kept the US out of the conflict, in keeping with Wilson's reelection campaign themes that propelled him to electoral victory (the most prominent election slogan for Wilson's Party was "He Kept Us Out of War"). Thus, stronger deterrence measures were now necessary. Secretary of State Robert Lansing hinted as much in late December 1916, suggesting that the US was "drawing near to the verge of war ourselves." Lansing's foreboding statements can easily be interpreted as an expression of US will regarding potential German escalation – war would result were Germany to proceed with the threatened escalation. However, at Wilson's direction, Lansing quallified these statements shortly thereafter. If Lansing meant them as an attempt to enhance deterrence, Wilson undermined the attempt. Wilson may have concluded that Lansing's veiled threat jeopardized prospects for near-term peace, with Wilson having decided months earlier that peace represented the likeliest path for sustaining US neutrality.[26]

Ambassador Gerard received word in early January 1917, through German backchannels, of Germany's intention to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. He informed the State Department, who notified Wilson accordingly.[27] The crisis that

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23 Gerard describes German willingness to consider concessions, such as withdrawing its occupation of Belgium under certain conditions, although Gerard was unsure whether Germany seriously considered making such concessions. Gerard, *Four Years* (see note 16), 263.

24 "Peace Proposals Not Likely Now, Says Lord Derby," in *New York Times*, 23 Nov 1916, 1.

25 Strachan, Hew. *The First World War* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2003), 228; Stevenson, David. *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 354.

26 "Washington In No Fear of War at this Time," in *New York Times*, 22 Dec 1916, 1; Lansing, Robert. *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing Secretary of State* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), 187. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (see note 10), 240, analyzes the efficacy of threats in deterrence contexts.

27 Gerard, *Four Years* (see note 16), 262. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to President Wilson, January 12, 1917, Document 550, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, volume 1, ed. J.S. Beddie (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939).

Wilson foresaw the previous spring had arrived. His plan for averting such a crisis, successful peacemaking, had not materialized. Some sort of 'Plan B' – a robust deterrence initiative – needed to be in place, but was nowhere to be found. As the statements from German military, naval and political leaders noted previously show, they were not deterred from risking war with the US. Wilson had warned them of the consequences of a return to unrestricted submarine war, but he had done nothing to convince them of America's will or ability to wage large-scale war against Germany.

When Germany's renewed unrestricted submarine campaign drew his administration closer and closer to declaring war in the weeks after 1 February 1917, President Wilson appears to have had a very cloudy understanding, at best, of what being at war with Germany might mean for the country. While he knew that American financial, industrial and naval support would be beneficial, he seems to have hoped that he could avoid sending any land forces to join the seemingly futile slaughter on the Western Front.[28] As the constitutional commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces, he had certainly done very little to ensure they were prepared to wage war on Germany – preparation that would have had deterrence value as well as obvious benefits should the US need to declare war. Despite the relatively minor strengthening measures included in the National Defense Act of 1916, Wilson offered only cautious support of the so-called Preparedness Movement that had been so stridently advocated for years by many Americans, including such political rivals as former President Theodore Roosevelt and current US Army Major General Leonard Wood.[29]

III. Inadequate Preparation Dooms Deterrence

Equally problematic was Wilson's strange belief that any serious planning or preparation for war was tantamount to a breach of neutrality. Wilson made this point clear to his own War Department when, back in the autumn of 1915, after reading a brief report in the *Baltimore Sun*, he called in the Assistant Secretary of War, Henry Breckenridge, to ask him if it was true that the General Staff was "preparing a plan in the event of war with Germany." According to the journalist Frederick Palmer (who in 1917 would take a commission and manage all press correspondents in the American Expeditionary Forces), Wilson was "trembling and hot with passion" when Breckenridge met him. Breckenridge replied that he did not know if the story was accurate, at which point, the president directed him to immediately investigate the

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28 Woodward, *Trial by Friendship* (see note 2), 37.

29 Wilson, who narrowly won reelection in 1916 after using the "He Kept Us Out of War" slogan, certainly had reason to believe his commitment to neutrality was supported by a large percentage of the American people, and perhaps even a majority. Wilson's Republican opponent, former Supreme Court Justice Charles Evan Hughes, had not advocated becoming a belligerent, but did criticize Wilson for not taking the "necessary preparations" required to prepare the country for the danger of being forced into the war. He declared in Oct 1916, "we have been shockingly lacking in adequate military preparedness. The lack of military preparation is beyond debate." Thompson, J. Lee. *Never Call Retreat: Theodore Roosevelt and the Great War* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillen, 2013), 138, 140–141; "Hughes Assures 'Young America' That He Will Win; Dwells on Army Unready," in *New York Times,* 26 Oct 1916, 1; <https://woodrowwilsonhouse.org/election-1916/> (last retrieved on 2 Oct 2023).

report, "and if it proved true, to relieve at once every officer of the General Staff and order him out of Washington."[30] Clearly, this was not an environment conducive to serious contingency planning.

In fact, Wilson's opposition to war planning was only one of many impediments to American preparedness for a major overseas conflict. The paltry size of the US Army's General Staff, the overburdening of the US Army's staff and command elements by the mobilization to secure the border with Mexico, and nearly 150 years of American military and diplomatic tradition of steering clear of European wars all inhibited serious military planning during the period of US neutrality.[31] Unfortunately, even some elements of the legislation intended to strengthen the US defensive establishment weakened its ability to prepare for involvement in the World War.

The National Defense Act of 1916 specified that the General Staff Corps would be composed of the Chief of Staff, two general officers to serve as assistant chiefs of staff (one of whom would serve as the president of the Army War College), ten colonels, ten lieutenant colonels, fifteen majors and seventeen captains; a total of only 53 officers. However, the act also stated that "not more than one-half of all of the officers detailed in said corps shall at any time be stationed, or assigned to or employed upon any duty, in or near the District of Columbia." This meant that the actual General Staff in DC consisted of no more than 26 officers, including the chief of staff himself. Only eleven of these were assigned to the War College Division responsible for developing war plans, but even these officers were entirely preoccupied with a wide range of peacetime administrative and organizational matters, to include highly political questions, such as universal military service, the role of the National Guard and even the continued existence of the General Staff itself. John M. Palmer, a member of the War College Division who also served on the Committee on War Plans from early 1916 until he departed for France in May 1917, described in his postwar memoirs a General Staff routinely engaged in any number of activities *except* actual war-planning. By comparison, the small, prewar British Army started the war with 232 officers on its General Staff, while the Germans had 650. By the end of the war, the US would have 1,072.[32]

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[30] Palmer quotes at length a handwritten memorandum on this incident by General Tasker Bliss, who was Acting Chief of Staff at the time. According to this memo, Bliss told Breckenridge that "the law creating the General Staff made it its duty 'to prepare plans for the national defense,'" that from its inception, the War College division "had studied over and over again plans for war with Germany, England, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, etc.," and that "it would be absurd," for the President to "take the action threatened." Bliss states that he thought "the President realized this in a cooler moment," and that "nothing further was said to him about the matter, nor did he again mention it. But Mr. Breckenridge directed me to caution the War College to 'camouflage' its work. It resulted in no further *official* studies." See Palmer, Frederick. *Newton D. Baker: America at War*, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead, 1931), 40–41; Pershing, John J. *My Experiences in the World War* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Stokes, 1931), II: 88.

[31] See the National Defense Act of 1916 at the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/64th-congress/session-1/c64s1ch134.pdf> (last retrieved on 21 Jun 2023). For the size of the War College Division, see Woodward, *Trial by Friendship* (see note 2), 52.

[32] Holley, I. B., Jr. *General John M. Palmer and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 241–276; Smythe states that the US had only 19 officers serving on the General Staff

Wilson continued his admirable efforts on behalf of peace in early 1917, offering his good offices to help energize a peace process. However, an increasing threat of German attacks did not spur increased deterrence efforts on Wilson's part, who limited his efforts to one track, peace negotiations, of Germany's two-track 'peace/quick victory' strategy, which German officials had publicly announced by mid-December.[33] Germany's second track – risking war with America by restarting its submarine campaign – lay undeterred, posing a grave threat to continued US neutrality. The first deterrence component, communication, was already in place from previous incidents, such as those involving the *Sussex* and *Lusitania.* Communication on those occasions had sufficed in deterring Germany, even in the absence of any substantial capability to wage war. The context having changed in early 1917, communication was no longer sufficient; the other two elements, will and capability, had become necessary for the effective deterrence of Germany. As David Halberstam observed in his analysis of another twentieth-century war, "The essence of good foreign policy is constant re-examination."[34] At this crucial juncture, when reexamination of Wilson's deterrence policy regarding Germany had become essential, no meaningful reexamination transpired.

Such reexamination, had it ensued, could have revealed that Wilson had at hand at least a few 'will and capability' enhancement options; arguably the most straightforward of these entailed consultation on this topic with experts, such as senior US military and naval officers, regarding their professional advice on projecting national will and capability in furtherance of deterrence efforts. Perhaps US naval vessels could provide a defensive screen for merchant vessels plying the Atlantic, thereby degrading U-boat effectiveness to diminish the appeal of an unrestricted submarine warfare strategy. Combining efforts by sea with those on land would demonstrate additional will and capability, presumably strengthening deterrence, despite lengthier timelines involved in organizing, training, equipping and deploying an expeditionary force that could wage industrial warfare on land, as a result of previous neglect in developing these capabilities. Such measures would constitute what deterrence scholar Glenn Snyder describes as "force demonstrations," efforts that, in Snyder's analysis, "have more deterrent potency in some situations than do declaratory threats."[35] Moreover, by "forming a sort of bridge between pristine peace and active war," "force demonstrations" could potentially have helped balance the perils of the 'security' and 'insecurity' dilemmas that Wilson faced, instead, establishing a middle path between them.[36]

Whether any of these or similar efforts, singly or in combination, would have deterred imminent German attacks on the US is, of course, unknowable. Wilson did not even make the attempt, meaning his half-hearted deterrence based solely

in Washington, D.C. Smythe, Donald. *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 10.

33 "Berlin Ready for a Death Grapple In Case the Entente Allies Reject or Ignore the Peace Proposals Now Made," in *New York Times*, 13 Dec 1916, 1.

34 Halberstam, David. *The Best and the Brightest* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1993), 121.

35 Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (see note 10), 254.

36 Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (see note 10), 256.

on communication, without any substantial efforts to strengthen American will and capability, predictably failed. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare left the US awaiting an 'overt act' of German violence against US lives and property, which arrived a few months later, bringing with it war and an end to nearly three years of American neutrality. Belligerency found US naval and military forces inadequate in almost every way – in size and numbers, equipment, training, as well as in intellectual and doctrinal preparation for intercontinental, industrial warfare.

When Congress declared war, the US Army was composed of only 5,791 officers and 121,797 men. In fact, the Army was approximately 20,000 men short of its legislated maximum size. Thankfully, due to residual security concerns on the Mexican border, 80,446 National Guardsmen had already been federalized. Unfortunately, all these troops were scattered across the breadth of the US and its territories, including the Philippines and Panama, and the Army did not have them organized into any units larger than a regiment. That meant the Army lacked even a single existing combat division, the essential integrated combat organization of the Great War; of course, nothing even close to an army corps existed, not to mention an actual field army.[37] The even smaller US Marine Corps had just 462 officers, 49 warrant officers and 13,214 enlisted men on active duty, and more than 2,200 of these were already on duty outside of the continental US.[38] By way of comparison, in the spring of 1917, the German Army had approximately three million men on the Western Front, fielded in approximately 150 divisions. Still fighting a two-front war at the time of American entry, the Germans also had more than 80 divisions on the Eastern Front.[39] The French Army had approximately three million men in 113 divisions along the front, while the British Expeditionary Force added approximately one and a half million men in about 60 divisions.[40]

Of course, real military power has long been based on more than just raw numbers of troops and units, and this was particularly true in the Great War. The battlefields along the Western Front were dominated by a wide range of new weapons and technologies by 1917, including multiple kinds of aircraft, tanks, machine guns and automatic rifles, magazine-fed rifles, grenades, flamethrowers, trench mortars, vari-

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37 Another 101,174 guardsmen were still under state control and scattered across the country. Coffman, Edward M. *The War to End All Wars: The American Experience in World War I* (Madison, WI: University Press of Wisconsin, 1986), 18. Trask gives 133,000 in the Regular Army, and that only 67,000 guardsmen had been federalized. Trask, David F. *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–18* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 4.

38 Amerman, Annette D. *The United States Marine Corps in the First World War: Anthology, Selected Bibliography, and Annotated Order of Battle* (Quantico, VA: History Division, USMC, 2016), xiii.

39 Stevenson states that the German Army had 3.25 million men and 147 divisions on the Western Front on 1 Nov 1917. Wawro claims the Germans had 150 divisions in the West early in 1917, and another 103 in the East. By 1 Mar 1918, the German Army still had 47 divisions on the Eastern Front, while its Western Front force had risen to 191 divisions and over 4 million men. Stevenson, *With Our Backs to the Wall* (see note 25), 36; Wawro, Geoffrey. *Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World War I* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2018), 9–10.

40 Stevenson, *With Our Backs to the Wall* (see note 25), 49; Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. *The French Army and the First World War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 250–251; Wawro, *Sons of Freedom* (see note 39), 9–10.

eties of rapid-fire field artillery, as well as long-range heavy and superheavy artillery. The use of poison gasses had become common, and military operations were coordinated by means of telephones, and increasingly, radios. Many of these technologies did not exist, at least not in their current forms, when the war began. Some leading scholars have labelled the changes experienced between 1914 and 1918 as a military revolution, and to the extent that is true, the US military of 1917 was on the wrong side of that revolution.

The US Army possessed only a handful of obsolete aircraft and no tanks whatsoever. Although its standard infantry rife, the 1903 Springfield, was a good one, it did not have sufficient quantities on hand or an established industrial arrangement to produce the number required. Only after joining the war did it select and begin producing the heavy machine guns and automatic rifles so essential to modern infantry combat. The army completely lacked mortars, hand and rifle grenades, and flamethrowers, and did not possess any chemical warfare personnel or expertise. Regarding the latter, when the US declared war on Germany, not only did the Army have no gas masks, but the Surgeon General had not yet even begun a program to develop them, despite having been directed by the Secretary of War to do so. Unsurprisingly, no one had any practical knowledge of, much less any expertise in, the details surrounding the offensive use of chemical weapons.[41] As for the most important class of weaponry, artillery, which was the greatest killer on the Great War battlefield, the Army possessed a grand total of 900 field artillery pieces, almost all of which were light, 'old model' three-inch field guns. It was almost completely lacking the kind of heavy howitzers and long-range guns that had, since mid-1914, proved to be essential elements of any field army on the Western Front.[42] In sum, the US Army possessed neither the latest versions nor sufficient quantities of the kinds of weaponry required for anyone, then or now, to consider it a modern first-rate army.

Of course, for the US military to have any impact on the Western Front, its soldiers, marines and airmen would need to get to Europe safely, and that was going to involve extraordinary efforts by the US Navy. The Navy was in better shape in mid-1917, at least comparatively. President Teddy Roosevelt had built and promoted his Great White Fleet between 1907 and 1909. Wilson had publicly stated in February 1916 that he wanted it to become "incomparably the greatest navy in the world," and Congress authorized a major expansion in that year that would add 156 new vessels, including 10 battleships and 50 destroyers, over the next three years.[43] Unfortunately, war came in 1917, not 1920, and when it came, the US Navy was not ready for a major foreign war, and was completely unprepared for the challenges soon to be forced upon it. The Navy was comprised of about 5,100 officers and

41 Heller, Charles E. *Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917–1918*, Leavenworth Papers, No. 10 (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Ft Leavenworth, 1984), 36–38.

42 Woodward, David. *The American Army in the First World War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 20–21; Grotelueschen, Mark. *The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat on the Western Front* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 13–14.

43 Coffman, *The War to End All Wars* (see note 37), 87; Thompson, *Never Call Retreat* (see note 29), 138.

60,000 sailors in early 1917, spread out on approximately 300 ships and 130 shore stations.[44] Ninety percent of its warships were understaffed, two-thirds were considered "not materially fit," while other vessels – such as submarines, minelayers, patrol boats and sufficient troop transports, all of which were particularly important for the missions the Navy would face during US involvement in the Great War – had not been built.[45]

All told, considering the comprehensive condition and capabilities of the American armed forces and the unprecedented demands soon placed upon it, the US military establishment may have been less prepared for its role in the Great War than in any other war since the one that secured the Republic's independence.[46] For neither the first nor the last time in American history, the country would go to war in mid-1917 with the military forces it had on hand, counting on the patriotism, productivity, ingenuity and creativity of it citizens to develop in wartime what it had no appetite for maintaining in times of peace. Despite this deplorable state of affairs, Wilson ultimately decided, for the first time in US history, to send a significant military force to Europe to make war on a major European power. In light of these facts, it is no wonder the German leaders were undeterred from drawing the US into the war.

IV. A Missed Opportunity to Deter in Service of U.S. National Security Objectives

To conclude that deterrence had failed is inaccurate, or at least incomplete. Wilson never attempted full-spectrum deterrence, even as the stakes rose ever higher; his feeble attempt clearly failed. War was at hand by early April 1917, a latter-day Moloch to which the country would sacrifice vast blood and treasure, and its own ideals, with this unnecessary offering coming at the expense of Progressivism, Wilson's signature issue through the course of two presidential elections, which soon faded to the back burner and, ultimately, to oblivion during Wilson's lifetime.

Woodrow Wilson, who, as president, had primary constitutional responsibility for developing and executing effective US foreign policy, failed to achieve his own foreign policy goals regarding the Great War and with relation to Germany more specifically. This failure, ultimately a failure to enact effective deterrence, and the US declaration of war that followed, resulted in the collapse of Wilson's domestic objectives as well.

Wilson's halfhearted deterrence efforts suffered from a number of serious shortcomings that served to doom them. Communication, the only deterrence domain in which Wilson made an effort, would have benefited from greater strength and direct-

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[44] The maximum number of German U-boats at sea at any point in 1917 was 127 in Oct. Coffman, *The War to End All Wars* (see note 37), 91, 97.

[45] Woodward, *Trial by Friendship* (see note 2), 33. Congressional efforts to provide funding for expanding the US merchant marine in 1914 faltered in the face of both domestic and international opposition. Kennedy, David. *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980), 303, 325.

[46] Woodward, *Trial by Friendship* (see note 2), 33.

ness to ensure Germany knew specific consequences, such as war with the US, which would arise from various courses of action. In the domains of will and capability, deterrence would have benefitted from some credible demonstration of US resolve, in addition to possessing sufficient capability to reinforce what Wilson communicated. Instead, neither domain was in place; US will remained open to question, while its capabilities, military and otherwise, for addressing the task at hand lagged as a result of sustained neglect.

These deficiencies and omissions had the effect of conceding agency; Wilson no longer controlled his own, nor his country's, destiny. That had passed over to Germany by 1917. German leaders, not Wilson, would essentially determine whether the US would remain neutral or enter the war. Retaining autonomy, in which the Wilson administration established US courses of action on vital matters of peace and war, seems far preferable for any statesman, but was a road not taken on this occasion.

Effective deterrence is challenging, and requires considerable wherewithal as well as careful planning; deterrence has its greatest chance of success when those implementing it integrate several complex skills. In Wilson's case, he depended too much on one of those skills, communication, to the neglect of other vital skills, such as showing the kind of resolve that would have led to significantly enhanced military capability, and a clear articulation of a willingness to use such forces should the need arise. This imbalance – a focus on communication and a neglect of will and capability – reduced the probability that deterrence would succeed. Wilson's uneven approach also plunged his country into an *insecurity* dilemma, skewing US defense policy toward doing too little, rather than appropriately balancing between this pole and the security dilemma that arises from doing too much. Where Odysseus avoided external depredations through skillful seamanship that threaded multiple dangers, Wilson instead, by letting the US retain a provocative level of military weakness, strayed into the 'horrible whirlpool' of war.[47]

Moreover, Wilson attempted to hold all strings in his own hands, rather than delegating some of them to others through consultation and/or some other process, increasing his cognitive load to a point at which, anticipating Fitzgerald, he could no longer function. In the end, botched deterrence came at a severe cost, both to Wilson himself and, more significantly, to humanity, which bore the burden of a broader, quite possibly longer, global conflagration, with all its associated tragedy.

[47] The 'horrible whirlpool' reference is from Robert Fagles' *Odyssey*, 278 (see note 9), Book 12, line 255.

Philipp Münch

NATO and the Beginning of the West's Afghanistan Entanglement: The Role of Its Secretariat, Political and Military Leadership[1]

Abstract

This article raises the question of how NATO became bogged down in Afghanistan. I scrutinise how the alliance became involved in Afghanistan and formulated its strategy. I demonstrate that the actions of permanently seconded representatives of member states and NATO's administrative cadre were crucial in drawing the alliance into Afghanistan. I argue that their actions contributed significantly to the creation of a fatal common sense: that the alliance had to become and remain engaged even in the absence of clear political goals. This provided the basis for a means-focused mission.

The United States (US) started the international military Afghanistan intervention on 7 October 2001 as they led a small coalition of states into this country. Despite having invoked (conditionally) its collective defence clause on 12 September 2001, NATO did not participate as a military organisation. Not only were major US decision makers reluctant to involve the alliance, but also the governments of most other member states. Yet, two years later, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan had become a NATO mission and incrementally began taking over security responsibility over the whole country. How did NATO end up with this enormous burden despite the initial reluctance among the highest levels of member state governments? I argue that the major reason lies in the continued efforts of the NATO administrative cadre as well as national civilian and military representatives at NATO to involve the alliance in Afghanistan. They succeeded in making Afghanistan a NATO issue and persuading the alliance to assume command of ISAF thanks to a major policy shift in the US government in 2003, supported by US officials responsible for NATO affairs. This contribution is based mostly on declassified US and some German and British documents.

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[1] This is an updated and shortened version of an article published first as: Münch, Philipp. "Creating Common Sense. Getting NATO to Afghanistan," in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 19, 2021, 138–166.

I. Introduction

Newly elected US President Joe Biden announced to the world on 14 April 2021 that it was "time for American troops to come home." Soldiers would start leaving Afghanistan on 1 May.[2] The same day, the foreign and defence ministers of the NATO member states also decided to end their Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, starting to withdraw on the same date as the US.[3] By July, as a result of the international troop drawdown, the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces quickly started to lose ground to the Taliban and finally collapsed. The Taliban took Kabul on 15 August 2021, forcing the US and other NATO member states to evacuate their citizens and Afghan supporters and briefly deploy even more troops than during the previous year. According to the US Government Accountability Office, the NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan, unanimously decided by the member states in May 2012, planned for a commitment through to 2024. The alliance's military engagement in Afghanistan, therefore, came to an abrupt end.[4]

Like its chaotic end, even at first glance, the alliance's course appears erratic: engaged in Afghanistan since 2003 when NATO took command of ISAF, the alliance initially intensified its engagement. NATO then reduced troop numbers in the early 2010s and transitioned to the downsized Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, only to increase it again in 2017 and begin reducing it by 2020. Most independent scholars agree on the core problems of NATO's Afghanistan engagement: the majority of studies point out that member states did not agree (or not early enough) on a clearly defined common goal that would have allowed the organisation to set priorities. They only defined a vague, over-ambitious mandate that unrealistically sought to help transform Afghanistan within a relatively short time frame into both a peaceful country, free of "terrorists", and a modern, economically thriving liberal state.[5] Apart from this debate on strategic mistakes, scholars also point out that "on the operational level", member states did not apply the appropriate approaches and never fully cooperated or were willing to dedicate enough resources to the enormous tasks.[6]

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2 "Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan," *The White House*, 14 April 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023).

3 "NATO Allies Decide to Start Withdrawal of Forces from Afghanistan," *NATO*, 14/15 April 2021, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_183086.htm> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023).

4 United States Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan. "Key Oversight Issues, Report to Congressional Addressees," GAO-13-218SP, Washington, DC February 2013, 41.

5 Berdal, Mats and Astri Suhrke. "A Good Ally – Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001–2014," in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41/1–2, 2018, 61–88; Farrell, Theo. *Unwinnable. Britain's War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014* (London: Bodley Head, 2017); Bird, Tim. "'Perennial Dilemmas': NATO's post-9/11 Afghanistan 'crisis'," in *NATO Beyond 9/11. The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. by Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti and Ben Zyla (Basingstoke; New York, NY: Springer Link, 2013), 118–139; Carati, Andrea. "No Easy Way out. Origins of NATO's Difficulties in Afghanistan," in *Contemporary Security Policy*, 36/2, 2015, 200–218.

6 Auerswald, David P. and Stephen M. Saideman. *NATO in Afghanistan. Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Johnson, David E. "What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch between Ends, Ways, and Means in Afghanistan – and

The focus of the literature on strategic mistakes and operational shortcomings provides a convincing explanation for why NATO has struggled to execute and successfully end its engagement in Afghanistan. However, while the problems of strategy making and gathering domestic political support and other questions concerning the execution of the mission have been well addressed, we still lack an understanding of why the mission started at all. The main question should be: why did NATO become involved to such an extent in Afghanistan at all without a clear and widely shared purpose? I divide this broad question into two sub-questions: why did the alliance ever engage in a mission with an unclear purpose (the main reason behind all strategic problems)? Why did it expand its engagement despite the lack of clear goals and most member states' unwillingness to risk the lives of an adequate number of soldiers?

In order to answer these questions, it will be necessary to move beyond approaches that focus on states and international organisations as unified actors. Such approaches struggle to provide fully convincing explanations for the alliance's course of action in Afghanistan. Instead, it will be helpful to pay attention to groups of real-world actors who constitute what we usually perceive and interpret as states and international organisations. With this perspective and in response to the research question, my main argument is that the alliance's paradoxical moves were caused by the common sense held by NATO's "administrative cadre" (i.e. the "secretariat") and member states' "seconded representatives" (e.g. diplomats, military officers), according to whom the alliance had to be intensively involved in Afghanistan.[7] Their actions alone did not weigh heavily enough to cause fundamental decisions on the direction of the alliance. But combined with occasional support from the national leadership ("major national representatives") of important member states, they provided the necessary weight in favour of the alliance's paradoxical decisions.

I rely primarily on declassified documents from several online archives, such as the National Security Archive, The Rumsfeld Papers, the Freedom of Information Act online reading rooms of the US Departments of State and Defense, and some that I received from the German Federal Chancellery and Federal Foreign Office pursuant to the German Freedom of Information Law. I also analysed the memoires of decision makers who held positions in NATO and relevant member states during this time period. Furthermore, I conducted semi-structured face-to-face or telephone interviews from 2011 until 2020 with individuals who worked as civilian staff and military officers in a NATO role at the time of the interview or shortly before. I also scanned through the almost 600 interviews the US Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted with decision makers in the Afghanistan engagement up to the ambassadorial and four-star general level.

To answer the question of why NATO became engaged in Afghanistan without a clear political purpose, I will look at two key decisions that led to this result. These

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in the Future," in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34/5, 2011, 383–401; Rynning, Sten. *NATO in Afghanistan. The Liberal Disconnect* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

7 See more details on the theoretical and methodological background: Münch, "Creating Common Sense" (see note 1).

were the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter (collective defence) after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the assumption of the command of ISAF by the alliance in August 2003. I answer the main research question (why did NATO become involved to such an extent in Afghanistan without a clear and widely shared purpose?) in my empirical analysis by showing that the alliance's administrative cadre and seconded representatives were guided by a common sense to preserve and increase NATO's importance by participating in the Afghanistan intervention and expanding the engagement. They also cooperated with elements of the member states' governments who were in favour of expanding the mission.

II. Making Afghanistan a NATO issue

It is necessary to analyse the practice of the most powerful actors after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US to understand how NATO became involved in Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the events, actors in the NATO Headquarters and the alliance's member states made very different assessments. There is no evidence that members of the governments of NATO member states considered consulting the alliance at that point in time. Senior members of the US administration were occupied with emergency measures and – since nobody declared responsibility – assessing intelligence on the possible perpetrators of the attacks.[8] Decision makers in allied governments condoled and contemplated how they could support the US or protect their own countries from similar attacks.[9]

The only actors who instantly referred to NATO as news of the "9/11" attacks spread were seconded representatives and members of the administrative cadre. Most witnesses agree that it was the Canadian dean of NATO ambassadors, David Wright, who in a conversation with the US permanent representative, Nicholas Burns, brought the idea onto the table to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter that would call for collective defence.[10] Although the article provided for alliance assistance in the event of a state attack on a member state, in a conversation with Wright, NATO Secretary General George Robertson and US Permanent

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8 Morell, Michael J. "The Turn to War. 11 September 2001: With the President," in *Studies in Intelligence*, 50/3, 2006, 27–34; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2004), 330, <https://9-11commission.gov/report/> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023).

9 See e.g. on Britain, Germany and Norway, respectively: Farrell, *Unwinnable* (see note 5), 38–45; Fischer, Joschka. *I'm Not Convinced. Der Irak-Krieg und die rot-grünen Jahre*, (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2011); Berdal and Suhrke, "A Good Ally" (see note 5), 21, 25.

10 See the eyewitness accounts of the then NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Operations Edgar Buckley: Buckley, Edgar. "Invoking Article 5," in *NATO Review*, 1 Jun 2006, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/Invokation-Article-5/Invoking_Article_5/EN/index.htm> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023);SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Nicholas Burns", United States of America. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 14 January 2016, 6, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/documents/burns_nicholas_ll_01142016.pdf?v=26> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023).

Representative Nicholas Burns had agreed by the next morning.[11] Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Joseph W. Ralston also supported the invocation of Article 5.[12] Unsurprisingly, there is evidence that no more than one day after the attacks, seconded representatives at NATO started contingency planning for "an assault [that] would involve tens of thousands of ground troops".[13]

It is worth noting the ease with which seconded representatives and members of the administrative cadre "quickly satisfied [themselves] that there was a good case for declaring that the attacks had triggered the Washington Treaty's collective-defense provisions", as one of them recalled.[14] Designed for an "armed attack against one or more of" the member states that constitutes a breach of "international peace and security", the article, in fact, clearly referred to interstate war and not to acts of "terrorism" by non-state actors such as those behind the attacks. To include the vague category of "terrorism" could have involved the alliance in contested internal struggles, such as Turkey's Kurdistan issue. However, seconded representatives and members of the NATO administrative cadre disqualified all these objections in favour of a common sense that gave way to a situation which made the alliance more important. Accordingly, about a week after the attacks, US Ambassador Burns pointed out in a North Atlantic Council session that the invocation of Article 5 "did not only send out a clear political signal, but it also made every single US citizen aware of the importance of the alliance".[15]

Early on the morning of 12 September 2001, shortly after he requested it, Burns received approval to invoke Article 5 from US President George W. Bush through his National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice and, somewhat later, from Secretary of State Colin Powell – but only as a declaration of solidarity, not as a "NATO military response".[16] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld opposed the idea in the

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11 Hendrickson, Ryan C. *Diplomacy and War at NATO. The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 120–121; Robertson, George. "Being NATO's Secretary General on 9/11," in *NATO Review*, 4 Sep 2011, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/11-september/Lord_Robertson/EN/index.htm> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023).

12 SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Burns" (see note 10), 6.

13 Borger, Julian, Richard Norton-Taylor, Ewen MacAskill and Ian Black: "US Allies the West for Attack on Afghanistan," in *The Guardian*, 13 Sep 2001, cited by Hallams, Ellen. *The United States and NATO since 9/11. The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed* (London, New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 58.

14 Buckley, "Invoking Article 5" (see note 10). See also similarly his then colleague: Rühle, Michael. "Reflections on 9/11: A View from NATO," in *NATO beyond 9/11. The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. by Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti and Ben Zyla (Basingstoke, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 54–66, 54; SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Burns" (see note 10), 7.

15 Permanent Delegation of Germany to NATO, Cable no. 617, Terrorismusbekämpfung, hier: Unterrichtung durch US-Delegation über Meinungsbildung und Stand der Beratungen in Washington [Counter-terrorism. Information from the US delegation on opinion-forming and the state of discussions in Washington], 19 Sep 2001, Restricted, 1 [translation by author].

16 Faurby, Ib. "Musketéreden: NATO'sreaktionpåterrorangrebenepå USA 11. september 2001," in *FraKrigog Fred. Dansk Militærhistorisk Kommissions Tidsskrift*, ed. by Michael H. Clemmesen (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2015), 11–51, 17; SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Nicholas Burns" (see note 10), 8.

US administration.[17] After Robertson then formally consulted the member states on invoking the collective defence clause, he and the Permanent Representatives gained the support of the heads of government during the course of the day in sometimes intensive telephone conversations with the capitals. Many heads of government were reluctant since they feared being drawn into the Afghanistan war permanently and uncontrollably.[18]

Advocates of the Article 5 invocation in other member states also had to overcome the reluctance of major national representatives. The latter were looking for ways to show solidarity with the US and participate in her reaction to the attacks. But, contrary to the most widely known narrative about the events of these days,[19] their position-takings were not too different from Rumsfeld's.[20] Like him, most heads of government and ministers of defence preferred to see Article 5 as a declaration of mere political support. They were reluctant to give a military carte blanche not only to the US, but also to NATO. This indicates that they did not want to contribute numerous troops to the massive ground operation some on the NATO field envisioned at the time.[21]

Finally, in order to maintain control over the deployment of their forces, the governments agreed to invoking the collective defence clause to the proviso that the US would have to provide evidence on the perpetrators of the attacks. In the end, however, governments, such as Germany's, interpreted NATO's conditional declaration on 12 September 2001, and its confirmation on 2 October, as a purely political declaration with no compelling consequences.[22]

The US administration later identified Usama-bin Laden as the mastermind of "9/11" and unsuccessfully demanded his host – the Afghan Taliban regime – to extradite him. Consequently, President Bush decided to attack Afghanistan and that

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17 Kreps, Sarah. "When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan," in *Security Studies*, 17/3, 2008, 531–567, 542.

18 Faurby, "Musketéreden" (see note 16), 17; Hallams, *The United States and NATO* (see note 13), 59.

19 See e.g. Porter, Jack J. "North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Transformation under Fire," in *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan. The Politics of Alliance*, ed. by Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 184–198, 185; Gordon, Philip H. "NATO after 11 September," in *Survival*, 43/4, 2001, 89–106, 92.

20 Smith, Martin A. "How NATO Survived George W. Bush: An Institutionalist Perspective, in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 15/1, 2017, 61–75, 71.

21 According to a US official interviewed in Hallams, *The United States and NATO* (see note 13), 59, "there wasn't any European official who said let's have a NATO flag, a NATO operation …". See similarly: SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Burns" (see note 10), 10. The British and Norwegian chiefs of defence, for instance, advised against a large military engagement in Afghanistan. Berdal and Suhrke, "A Good Ally" (see note 5), 51–52; Farrell, *Unwinnable* (see note 5), 92–93. The German chief of defence – who aspired to become chairman of the NATO Military Committee – approved it, but the cabinet rejected this. Fischer, *I'm Not Convinced* (see note 9), 16–17, 42–43.

22 AA Referat 505 an Staatssekretär, "Verfassungsrechtliche Folgen des Beschlusses des NATO-Rates vom 12.09.01, hier: keine Aktivierung von 'Notstandsgesetzen' nach Art. 80a GG" [Constitutional consequences of the NATO Council decision of 12 September 2001 – no activation of 'emergency laws' under Art. 80a GG], 14 Sep 2001; Bundesministerium der Justiz an Bundeskanzleramt, "NATO-Beschlußfassung zu den terroristischen Anschlägen in den USA: Keine Beschlüsse i.S. des Art. 80a Abs. 3 Satz 1 GG" [NATO resolution on the terrorist attacks in the USA: No resolutions within the meaning of Art. 80a par. 3 sentence 1 GG], 17 Sep 2001.

this operation should not be conducted under NATO command but through the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).[23] Yet, probably as a concession to the multilateralists, the Bush administration asked NATO for help outside Afghanistan and used its institutions as a forum to bilaterally gather Afghanistan-related support.[24] On 2 October 2001, US representatives also provided evidence on the attackers, which representatives of other member states accepted as a condition to invoke Article 5. Some did so reluctantly, but also did not want to be seen as "bad allies".[25] Even though NATO did not fully participate in the Afghanistan intervention, the position-takings of the majority of seconded representatives and the administrative cadre were decisive steps to get NATO involved in the first place. They contributed to the emergence of a common sense that was tailored to their positions on the alliance's field. This common sense demanded that NATO had to be engaged in Afghanistan. The invocation of Article 5 made it harder for national representatives to legitimise decisions that did not involve NATO in Afghanistan.

III. Assuming responsibility against all odds

The OEF intervention into Afghanistan started on 7 October 2001 and, with the help of Afghan opposition forces, within a few months led to the collapse of the fragile Taliban regime.[26] Early on, major US representatives struggled over the direction of post-conflict policy. The multilaterally oriented representatives of the Department of State (DoS) favoured a preferably UN-led, long-term, countrywide peacekeeping and nation-building project significantly supported by the US.[27] Representatives of the US Department of Defense (DoD) also considered a peacekeeping force, but clearly spoke out against nation-building.[28] To avoid interference with the

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23 SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Burns" (see note 10), 11–13; Kreps, "When Does the Mission" (see note 17), 542–543.

24 Lansford, Tom. *All for One. NATO's Response to the Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2002), 79, 88, 132; Kreps, "When Does the Mission" (see note 17), 542–544.

25 Fearing a debate about arms exports to Pakistan, representatives of the German Federal Chancellery and Federal Foreign Office also did not support the US demand to assist non-NATO states who support the "war on terror". However, they stepped back from this for the sake of unity. Federal Chancellery, Division 211 through Friedrich, "Terrorangriffe auf die USA, hier: Konkrete Anforderungen der USA an die Bündnispartner in Umsetzung des am 2.10. festgestellten Bündnisfalles " [Terrorist attacks on the United States. Concrete requirements of the USA to the allies in implementation of the collective defence clause determined on 2 October], Restricted, 3 Oct 2001, 1–2.

26 Wright, Donald P., James R. Bird, Steven E. Clay, Peter W. Connors, Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia and Dennis F. Van Wey. *The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001–September 2005. A Different Kind of War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2010), 102.

27 Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 192, 219, 231, 308, 314, 333. See the account of the then Special Envoy for Afghanistan: Dobbins, James. *After the Taliban. Nation-building in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), 129–131.

28 Memo from Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld, "A Marshall Plan for Afghanistan", 30 Sep 2001, Secret [excised]- <http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/International_Security_Affairs/06-F-2381_A_Marshall_Plan_for_Afghanistan_09-30-2001.pdf> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023).

heavy-handed OEF, the peacekeeping force (of yet undetermined shape and origin) should be limited to Afghanistan's capital Kabul and its immediate surroundings.[29]

Again, not too different from Rumsfeld, most allied major national representatives did not have a big appetite for becoming engaged in a long-term peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Most forward-leaning were those of the United Kingdom, who tried "to be seen as the senior partner to a US-led war".[30] Therefore, the British declared that they would lead the peacekeeping force, but demanded that it should be integrated in OEF. However, major representatives of Germany and France and other member states fought this proposal in order to avoid strong US control over the mission. Finally, the British decided to lead the mission anyway, but only until June 2002. ISAF – established in the 2001 international Bonn agreement – deployed in January 2002 to Afghanistan. It was limited to operating in the Kabul area, where it patrolled and trained Afghan security forces.[31]

Contrary to Rumsfeld's assumption, American absence from ISAF rather decreased incentives for allies – who mostly sought proximity to the US – to contribute costly capabilities and take on the burden as a lead nation. Not bound to any international organisation, ISAF increasingly struggled to gain those assets. The US even had to materially support Turkey in exchange for its willingness to succeed the United Kingdom as lead nation in June 2002.[32] Representatives of the DoD, therefore, began to revise their stances on ISAF. Especially as violent conflicts between armed factions increased after the fall of the Taliban, they now also considered expanding ISAF beyond Kabul and/or bringing it under the authority of an international organisation. Yet, reservations against an expansion of ISAF and its subordination to an international organisation remained in principle.[33] During the summer of 2002, the US government decided to expand US instead of multilateral efforts in Afghanistan. The means to this end were US inter-agency civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams that, one after another, started to become operational in January 2003.[34]

In this undecided and dynamic struggle, seconded representatives at NATO and members of its administrative cadre, through different measures, decisively supported those domestic representatives of member states who supported a NATO assump-

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29 Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs to Secretary of Defense, "Thoughts on Afghanistan Diplomacy", 15 Nov 2001, Secret [excised], <http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/ FOID/Reading%20Room/International_Security_Affairs/10-F-0668_Thoughts_on_Afghanistan_Diplomacy.pdf> (last retrieved on 29 Jun 2023); Rumsfeld, Donald. *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2011), 398, 403–404; Feith, Douglas J. *War and Decision. Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism* (New York, NY: Regan Boks, 2009), 100–101, 132–134; Dobbins, *After the Taliban* (see note 27), 123–124.

30 Farrell, *Unwinnable* (see note 5), 422.

31 Farrell, *Unwinnable* (see note 5), 92–93, 96; Rynning, *NATO in Afghanistan* (see note 6), 83–84.

32 Rynning, *NATO in Afghanistan* (see note 6), 86.

33 United States Mission to the United Nations, Briefing Memorandum for the Permanent Representative, From: Josiah Rosenblatt through: Ambassador Cunningham, "Issues for discussion during your meeting with SYG Annan, April 16", 15 Apr 2002, Secret, 4, <https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/Dec16Jan17/F- 2013-18510/DOC_0C05742076/C05742076.pdf> (last retrieved on 22 Mar 2021).

34 Wright et al., *The United States Army* (see note 26), 227.

tion of ISAF command and its expansion beyond Kabul. The NATO ambassadors from the first two lead nations, the United Kingdom and Turkey, viewed ISAF positively and advised major representatives back home to let the alliance assume command.[35] However, this did not help overcome resistance in member state capitals. The NATO policy on ISAF only started changing with the next two lead nations. In the summer of 2002, the governments of Germany and The Netherlands agreed to assume the lead nation role, but only if they received NATO command support.[36] Secretary General Robertson endorsed this proposal and successfully gathered support among the member states, who approved the request in October 2002.[37]

The NATO support role provided the decisive basis for its eventual assumption of ISAF command, which was still a contested policy among major representatives of the member states. The French, for instance, even initially opposed the German-Dutch proposal.[38] The seconded representatives at the alliance's major command, headed by the SACEUR, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), who now assisted ISAF, proved especially crucial in pushing NATO's engagement. This was not quite in accordance with established procedures: to ensure that military planners in the NATO command structure do not constrict member states' political decisions, they require an "initiating directive" from the North Atlantic Council to start planning. Yet, SHAPE planners did not wait for such a directive. The only reasonable explanation for this being that they had a strong interest in NATO assuming command. They started to draft options for NATO assumption in early 2003 and presented them to the secretary general, who supported and lobbied for assumption,[39] and to member state representatives. This provided the basis for an official request in March to assume command by Germany, The Netherlands and Canada – who had voiced willingness to assume command as next lead nations if ISAF were posed under NATO command.[40]

To make NATO assume command of ISAF and overcome resistance among the member states required the support of the most powerful alliance member –

35 Schmitt, Olivier. "International Organization at War. NATO Practices in the Afghan Campaign," in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52/4, 2017, 502–518, 512.

36 The then-commanding general of 1 German-Netherlands Corps, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Norbert van Heyst, communication with author, 17 Jan 2020; the then-chief of staff of 1 German-Netherlands Corps Lieutenant-General (ret.) Rob Bertholee, communication with author, 29 Jan 2020.

37 US Department of State to European Political Collective Priority, "U/S Grossman's meeting with Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, 9/14/02, New York", 18 Sep 2002, Confidential, 4, <https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/NEA/F-2012-30126/DOC_0C05319481/C05319481.pdf> (last retrieved on 22 Mar 2021); NATO, "NATO to Support ISAF 3", 27 Nov 2002, <https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/news_19209.htm?selectedLocale=en> (last retrieved on 30 Jun 2023).

38 [US Department of Defense], "Illustrative List of Recent Examples of French Opposition to the United States", 23 Oct 2002, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/302/Re%20Illustrative%20List%20of%20Recent%20Examples%20of%20French%20Oppostion%20to%20the%20U.S.pdf> (last retrieved on 04 Oct 2023).

39 Rumsfeld to Feith, "NATO and ISAF", 20 Feb 2003, 11-L-0559/0SD/14612.

40 Beckman, Steve. *From Assumption to Expansion. Planning and Executing NATO's First Year in Afghanistan at the Strategic Level*, (US Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, Pa. March 2005), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA431768> (last retrieved on 04 Oct 2023), 5.

the USA. For this support, US seconded representatives Ambassador Burns, the SACEUR and other NATO experts in the US government were crucial. Burns recalled that "particularly in the second half of 2002 … we push[ed] hard, my mission and I, assisted by my military colleagues in Europe [the SACEUR is dual-hatted as Commander of US European Command][41], to convince Washington that we ought to think of a NATO deployment".[42] A former US National Security Council (NSC) staffer observed at the time that "NATO was anxious to expand their role, and so were people inside DoS and DoD working on European/NATO directorates who were suddenly important again".[43] One of them was a senior DoS official responsible for European affairs who also advocated NATO assumption and identified Frank L. Miller as another crucial NATO expert who during this time "kept insisting that we needed NATO".[44] Miller was Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council staff. Immediately before these postings, he had served at NATO HQ and previously had been responsible, *inter alia*, for NATO issues at the DoD.[45]

By early 2003, in the struggle for NATO assumption, Rumsfeld had become more favourable towards an alliance command over ISAF.[46] Yet, while the per se more multilaterally oriented DoS representatives endorsed NATO assumption, Rumsfeld still did not dare to make a final decision.[47] According to a US military officer and eyewitness, the efforts of the most senior US military seconded representative, SHAPE's SACEUR General James Jones, as successor to Ralston, eventually won him over. Aided by DoD officials with responsibilities for NATO, who acted as "NATO lobbyists" in the Pentagon, Jones finally "sold Rumsfeld on turning

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41 More generally, Burns later mentioned that he was "assisted by the US Military in Europe, by General Ralston, who has – who was dual hatted". SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Burns" (see note 10), 29.

42 SIGAR, "Interview of Ambassador Burns" (see note 10), 21. See documenting his efforts: Testimony by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "On the Future of NATO to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 1 Apr 2003, 19, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BurnsTestimony030401.pdf> (last retrieved on 30 Jun 2023).

43 SIGAR, Interview of [former US National Security Council staffer], October 21, 2014 [excised], [3], <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/documents/background_ll_01_xx_washington_10212014.pdf?v= 26> (last retrieved on 30 Jun 2023). See the evidence presented on this by historian Gareth Porter: Porter, Gareth. "How Afghanistan Became a War for NATO," in *Inter Press Service*, 3 Jan 2011, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54020> (last retrieved on 25 Jul 2011).

44 SIGAR, Interview of [senior US DoS official], 8 Oct 2014 [excised], [3], <https://www.washingtonpost. com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/documents/background_ll_01_xx_arlington_10082014.pdf?v= 26> (last retrieved on 22 Mar 2021).

45 See the official biography of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Frank Miller, <https://policy.defense.gov/ OUSDP-Offices/Defense-Policy-Board/Frank-Miller/> (last retrieved on 22 Mar 2021).

46 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Snowflake Memorandum, "Talk to Doug Feith", 3 Jan 2003, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/1523/2003-01-03%20re%20Talk%20to%20Doug%20Feith.pdf#search=% 22talk% 20to% 20doug% 20feith%22> (last retrieved on 30 Jun 2023); Rumsfeld to Feith, "NATO and ISAF".

47 See the testimony of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc I. Grossman. "The Future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)". Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 108th Congress, First Session, 27 Mar 2003, 5.

Afghanistan over to NATO".[48] Eventually, the numerous position-takings of the seconded representatives and administrative cadre created the necessary momentum to make major national representatives of all member states agree on 16 April 2003 to assume command of ISAF by 11 August.

IV. Expansion without shared political goals

My detailed analysis of the initial decisions that paved the way for NATO in Afghanistan has demonstrated that some of the most common explanations in political science, those that argue from an aggregated state or international organisation perspective, miss the point in many respects. Looking at the practice of the very actors who constitute NATO, it becomes evident that it was not only the "unilateralist" major US representatives who were initially reluctant to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Rather, this reluctance was shared by representatives of most member states.

In fact, only the seconded representatives and NATO's administrative cadre clearly pushed the issue. My analysis of NATO policy-making after the assumption of ISAF command shows that, even though there was no agreed upon political goal, seconded representatives and the administrative cadre pushed for an intensification of the mission.

These insights provide evidence to answer the research question of why NATO became so intensively engaged in Afghanistan without concrete political goals. The immediate reason for this political deficit certainly originated in major national representatives' lack of political ideas for Afghanistan or disagreement among them on which ideas to follow; this is in line with the findings produced by most detailed studies on the national policies of ISAF contributors.[49] However, one also has to consider an important prerequisite that made it possible not to perceive the lack of shared political goals as an impediment to ISAF. This prerequisite was the unquestioned common sense that had evolved since "9/11", according to which NATO had to be engaged in Afghanistan as intensely as possible – even without clearly defined political goals. This common sense was, first and foremost, created by the actions of seconded representatives and NATO's administrative cadre, who worked towards getting the alliance as intensely involved as possible.

These position-takings were successful in steering NATO's course in the desired direction only with the (temporary) support of major representatives of important member states. Yet, while these major representatives were only occasionally interested in enhancing NATO's role in Afghanistan, namely, when this stance supported their national policies, the seconded representatives' and administrative cadre's

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48 Porter, *How Afghanistan Became a War for NATO* (see note 43 above).

49 See for Britain, the US, Germany and Norway: Farrell, *Unwinnable* (see note 5), 422; Irwin, Lewis G. *Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means. Learning from America's Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation* (Carlisle, PA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012; Strategic Studies Institute Book), 127; Münch, Philipp. *Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Militärische Handlungslogik in internationalen Interventionen* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Romberg, 2015), 165–169; Berdal and Suhrke, *A Good Ally* (see note 5), 51.

position-takings created the necessary consistency to get the alliance more intensely involved.

II.

Means and Ends – The Interaction of Political Thinking and Military Planning

Morgane Barey

After the defeat: Which army for French Forces? (1940–1942)

Abstract

The French defeat of June 1940 remolded its military forces greatly. Reduced by the armistice conventions, this rebuilding comes with new missions: a new army is now in order and must strongly support the new regime lead by Marshall Philippe Pétain, as well as show the path of recovery to a French population traumatized by the recent defeat. Moral recovery becomes the main, and, for some, the only, mission dedicated to this army. To reach this goal, French Forces refocus around a small number of officers, from now on, selected due to their attachment to the regime and its leader. However, by doing so, the Vichy regime fails to reform military thinking and its outdated doctrine. This armistice army will not be able to rebuild or reform French society according to the views of *Révolution Nationale*.

I. Introduction

On the evening of the cease-fire between French and German forces on 17 June 1940, General Maxime Weygand, commander in chief of the French army, broadcast to his troops proclaiming: "Wherever you are, your mission is not over. Purest expression of the Motherland, you remain its armature. Its moral and material recovery will be your task for tomorrow.[1]" Yet, the armistice conventions imposed by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on 22 and 24 June 1940, disrupted the French Army and changed its missions greatly. Reduced to 100,000 men, robbed of its modern weapons, cut off from its aviation, what kind of role could it play for a traumatized population?

Marshal Philippe Pétain, head of the French State (*État Français*) since 11 July, expected that the military forces would become the spearhead for his policy of *Révolution nationale*. First introduced as a moral and intellectual recovery, it was said that this revolution was perceived to fight an outdated political order.[2] It was both

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1 Quoted by Masson, Philippe. *Histoire de l'armée française de 1914 à nos jours,* (Paris: Perrin, 1999), 276.

2 Pétain's declaration to the American press, 22 Aug 1940, cited by Rousso, Henri. *Le régime de Vichy*, (Paris: PUF, 2012), 24.

a doctrine and a call for public action.[3] It established a set of virtues as the central importance of traditional elites, intermediary bodies and a corporatist organization of the society; many of these items were praised by officers themselves.[4] Therefore, these officers were now asked to actively support the new regime, by their actions and in their speeches, breaking from the army's apolitical tradition. To achieve this goal, the entire army was restructured, while the officer corps was reconfigured in the light of new objectives of the moral, spiritual and physical improvement required by the regime. But, beyond the speeches, this rebirth is hard to perceive. By emphasizing the necessary moral recovery of the entire army, the regime failed to offer a new path for its officers, while increasing its control over them.

II. Rebuilding the French Forces

Initially reduced by the armistice convention to 100,000 men, including 8,000 officers, theses oppressive restrictions on the French Army were, in fact, never enforced after the attacks on the French fleet anchored in Mers-El Kebir (3 July 1940) by British forces, and the attempted landing at Dakar (23−25 September) by the Gaullists. The German and Italian authorities were pleasantly surprised by the military resistance of Vichy against what was seen by the regime as acts of aggression, and agreed to rethink the terms of their respective armistice. Troops were progressively increased to accompany the new missions assigned along with this restructuring. From now on, the Armistice Army would ensure domestic order and defend both the metropole and the Empire against any foreign aggression. Thus, maintenance of order gradually became the principal justification for the Armistice Army.[5] This new army had a new purpose:

> This new army, small by the number, we will make it a living model of quality to keep it, not outside, but integrated to the regenerated Nation. It will maintain the cult of the Motherland. Its purified and vibrant soul will lead toward the future, through the dark present. It will show the example to the country, waiting to become its image ...[6]

A new soldier must be created for this new army. The soldier would demonstrate to the country a clear path to follow and the way to achieve it. The military values such as honor, self-sacrifice, strength, comradery, subordination to hierarchy and love of country were elevated.[7] Military forces become the vehicle for national reconstruction. For Vichy, the army was not responsible for the defeat, but it became one of the most important institutions for national recovery.

All soldiers, and especially officers, were required to embrace an irreproachable behavior to achieve this mission. The regime and its military authorities insisted on

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3 Rousso, *Le régime de Vichy,* (see note 2), 25.

4 d'Abzac-Épezy, Claude, "L'armée de l'air de l'armistice et la Révolution Nationale, 1940-1942," in *Revue Historique des Armées,* 179, Jun 1990, 111.

5 Directives d'activité, Secrétariat d'État à l'aviation, EMAA, 3e bureau, no. 11.778-3/1 EMAA, Vichy, 14 Dec 1940, SHD AI 3 D 20.

6 Général Huntziger, "Ordre Général n° 1" (see note 5).

7 Capdevila, Luc, "La quête du masculin dans la France de la défaite (1940−1945)," in *Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest*, 117/2, 2010.

the importance of good moral conduct, which become the major element of the military system's reconstruction. According to the regime, a purified army, aware of its moral value and duty toward the country, must be opposed to those things that led to the collapse of the former one. In Vichy's conception, the Third Republic was indeed the real culprit, and responsible for this defeat. The "*esprit de jouissance,*" combined with the pacificism of French society, led to decline and defeat, and an awakening was necessary to encourage a moral recovery of the country. Even though the French army was not shackled with the responsibility of the defeat by the new regime, the period was still seen as opportune in order to entirely remold and rethink its missions and objectives in conjunction with the *Révolution nationale*. "In the reconstruction and purifying task undertaken, the army has a role to play, a civic role: total dedication to the Chief of State, to his person, total adhesion to his action,"[8] proclaimed a press article. This new orientation led to a reformation of the army and the reshaping of its officer corps.

III. Officers with high value?

The executives of the French army were overrepresented on 25 June 1940, the day the armistice went into effect, even when counting the officer prisoners of war. At the time of the German offensive, there were 130,000 officers in the army, including 35,000 active officers, the Navy had 8,220, with 5,200 active, and the Air Force had 8,700 men, with 3,946 active. After the defeat, 25,000 officers had become prisoners of war.[9] The army sent all reserve officers home in order to professionalize the army to fulfill the articles of the armistice. But, even with this done, the dismissal of 20,000 more officers was necessary.[10] Their demobilization became a subject of preoccupation for the high command, and an opportunity for the new government to seize in order to recompose this corpse as it wanted[11].

In a directive in August 1940, General Colson, Minister of War proclaimed:

> As the future army will be very reduced, it is important that it is composed from elements with the maximum of value in every aspect, military spirit, intellectual and physical qualities …. In consequence, I require that those of the officers or NCOs who happen to be thick, tired, or even doubtful and who, in a general way, would not represent the entire moral and professional qualities expected from executives, be the object of mandatory and quick reports, either disciplinary ones, medical ones or administrative ones … in order to eventually dismiss them from the army.[12]

Several measures to help facilitate the departure of officers was adopted. On 20 August 1940, General Weygand lowered the maximum age limit in the active army in order to "rejuvenate the officer corps." The retirement age was lowered, and some

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8 Anonymous, "L'Armée de l'Armistice," in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Feb 1941, 356–361.

9 d'Abzac-Épezy, Claude, "La rénovation de la formation militaire dans l'armée de l'armistice," in *Revue Historique des Armées*, 2, 2001, 20.

10 Masson, *Histoire de l'armée* (see note 1), 274.

11 Paxton, Robert O., *L'armée de Vichy, Le corps des officiers français 1940–1944.* (Paris, Tallandier, 2004), 58.

12 Général Colson, note of 1 Aug 1940, SHD AI 3 D 300.

services were demilitarized.[13] Lastly, an "armistice leave" was offered, which accorded officers a special position with reduced pay, but without compromising their retirement or promotion.[14] In the meantime, those who did not present "the entire guarantees required, physical, moral and professional" were automatically retired.[15] Nonetheless, these drastic measures remained insufficient. The law creating the armistice leave allowed General Huntziger to choose the officers who would benefit from this statute in case there were insufficient volunteers to leave active duty. Ranking commissions studied the unit journals and sought to maintain only the best officers under the flag.[16] Rubrics were established, based on officers' training, military spirit, physical and psychological qualities as well as behavior during the war. In doing so, historian Robert Paxton underlined the links between the reduction of the army and the political intentions of the Vichy regime. If the main task of the commission was to establish a grading of the executives based on their merits "with the highest impartiality," a press article said otherwise. The newspaper *Trait d'Union*, an Air Force publication, explained clearly that the commission received instructions to eliminate dissidents and incompetents.[17] Concomitant with the new racial views of the regime, Jews and Freemasons were excluded from the French Army.[18] Robert Paxton concluded that:

> Like the German Army in 1919, the Armistice Army seems to have used the necessity for retrenchment as an opportunity to enhance the club-like intimacy of a homogeneous officer corps, largely drawn from the *grandes écoles*, freed of ethnic minorities and political mavericks, a tighter family circle than the old mass army could ever be, at a time when the officer corps was already beginning to grow in upon itself and draw more young officers from officers' sons.[19]

More than reducing elitists, the regeneration of the French army, according to Vichy, was to transform the identity of the executive officers who had not been molded by military education and had not totally embodied what was considered and promoted as values and moral codes. They were later eliminated from military forces.[20] In the meantime, those who demonstrated and embodied the best of these precepts were, thus, allowed to stay in the Armistice Army, and required to demonstrate their complete faith and loyalty to the regime and its leader.

IV. A required loyalty

From the beginning of the installation of the Vichy regime, the entire, and now reorganized, French army was required to participate in the moral renewal of the

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13 Masson, *Histoire de l'armée* (see note 1), 274.
14 Paxton, *L'armée de Vichy* (see note 11), 58.
15 Masson, *Histoire de l'armée* (see note 1), 274.
16 Paxton, *L'armée de Vichy* (see note 11), 60.
17 Paxton, *L'armée de Vichy* (see note 11), 61.
18 Recrutement pour l'armée, la marine et l'aviation française, France Libre, État-major particulier du Général de Gaulle, London, 27 Dec 1941, SHD MV TTC 37.
19 Paxton, *L'armée de Vichy* (see note 11), 62.
20 d'Abzac-Épezy, "La rénovation de la formation militaire" (see note 9).

country and, at the same time, support Marshal Pétain and his *Révolution nationale* with zeal. General Huntziger proclaimed in early 1941 that all soldiers and officers were "ardent servants of the marshal's ideal" and, as such, required to obey his orders in a strict, absolute and total way, without doubt, tepidity or reluctance "from the heart or the mind," and with fervor.[21] As such, these prescriptions were not a novelty but integral to the operations of military forces: the importance of total obedience and submission to hierarchy and orders. The campaign in Syria constituted a breaking point. From 8 June to 14 July 1941, the Free French Forces of General de Gaulle and the Vichy Army of General Dentz, both French, fought against each other, leading to the victory of the former. The defeat of Vichy forces was a humiliation. The Armistice army failed to achieve a military victory. The regime, thus, focused on introducing a renewal based upon moral recovery. The regime demanded the absolute loyalty of its military forces.

Constitutional Act number 8, dated 14 August 1941, required a loyalty oath to Marshal Pétain from all soldiers: "I swear loyalty to the person of the Head of State, swearing to obey him in all he orders for the good of the service and the success of French arms." No one could serve without taking this oath.[22] Loyalty toward the Republic was replaced by a personal and nominative faith in Pétain. This solemn engagement was the object of a specific ceremony, where the subjects were asked, before taking the oath, to "penetrate themselves from the value of this oath." It came also with imperatives. It imposed, on the one hand, a strict loyalty toward the country, that "they commit to defend the unity since the Head of the State, in its supreme authority, embodies national unity"; and, on the other hand, a duty towards themselves: "By their vocation to the service of France, they take the solemn engagement to be forever worthy of the high mission dedicated to them."[23] This compulsory loyalty was reinforced by sanctions for those soldiers who refused swear it. Reluctant soldiers had to present their resignations, or they would be forced to submit their resignation and dismissed from the army. In a word, those who were not ready to follow "in the path of a total obedience" were put aside.[24]

V. Officers, tools of Vichy politics

The dissolution of the French Third Republic and its transformation to the French State on 10 July 1940 modified the mission of the military forces and ended the apoliticism required until then. General Huntziger, War Ministry, declared that the Armistice Army must now embrace and publicly demonstrate its total attachment to the regime.

Much as the French forces ought until now, by dignity, to be kept aside from the petty politics that the *Révolution nationale* had rightly repudiated; it now must man-

[21] Bulletin d'Information no. 1, (see note 20).
[22] Serment de fidélité au Chef de l'État, Secrétariat d'État à la Marine, no. 57 CAB.O, Vichy, 24 Sep 1941, SHD MV TTB 154.
[23] Serment de fidélité au Chef de l'État (see note 22).
[24] Inspection du secrétaire d'État à l'aviation en A.O.F., en A.F.N. et au Levant, 10–26 May, Vichy, without date, SHD AI 3 D 124.

ifest its total attachment to the new regime. All executives and men from the New Army have the strict obligation to become "partisans," in the noblest meaning of the term, which is, ardent servants of a common and same ideal: renovation of France. … Each and every soldier of the new army, whatever his rank, now has the right and the duty to highly expresses their total attachment to the regime, established by the greatest of its chiefs, under the sign of honor and national virtues.[25]

All military men were invited to break from their professional discretion and express themselves freely in newspapers and magazines newly published by the regime.[26] This evolution was facilitated by army officers such as General Huntziger or General de Lattre and with the support of General Weygand and Marshal Pétain. Their objectives were to create an effective 'Nation in Arms,' patriotic and confident of its officers.[27] Officers became "schoolmasters" and desired to reestablish the prestige of an army soiled by the recent defeat through reeducating the nation. They found help in their mission in many educational reforms led by the regime, aiming at deeply restructuring the French education system.[28]

Therefore, officers threw themselves with enthusiasm into the politics of public instruction.[29]Although excluded from the process of educating the French population under the Third Republic, they never renounced their educational role. The interwar period and the educational reforms in France and Europe were favorable to an "educative militantism" from some senior officers, such as Maxime Weygand, René Madelin or Edouard de Castelnau.[30] These officers embraced, once again, a natural role from one they had been deprived for a long time. This mission of education was not a novelty of the Vichy regime, but was an idea taken from Marshal Lyautey and his readers since 1891. Lyautey promoted a "social role" for officers,[31] recommending they be close to their men and aware of their needs. The main difference resided in the purpose of this mission. With the Vichy regime, officers were convinced by the need for educational reform, where the republican school system was blamed for the military, social and politic failures culminating in the defeat of June 1940. This would be introduced largely by ministers and politicians who could express their ideas of educating the population freely, like the *Chantiers de la Jeunesse*. Yet, these experiments failed to inspire the regeneration desired by the regime and were soon rejected by the French population as Vichy's collaboration with occupation forces increased.

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25 Conduite morale et pratique de l'armée, Secrétariat d'État à la guerre, Cabinet, no. 7381/3/CAB, Vichy, 25 Oct 1940, SHD AI 1 P 31.

26 Secrétariat d'État à la guerre, 3e bureau, no. 1.572/EMA-3-1, Vichy, 26 Nov 1940, SHD GR 3 P 129.

27 d'Abzac-Épezy, Claude, "Les militaires en politique, l'exemple de la France de Vichy," in *Armée et pouvoir en France et en Allemagne aux XIX esiècle et XX esiècle* (Cahierdu CEHD no. 26, Vincennes, CEHD, 2006).

28 Barreau, Jean-Michel, Vichy contre l'école de la République, Théoriciens et théories scolaires de la "Révolution nationale" (Paris: Flammarion, 2000), 334.

29 Paxton, *L'armée de Vichy* (see note 11), 207.

30 Barreau, *Vichy contre l'école* (see note 28), 51–57.

31 Lyautey, Hubert, "Du rôle social de l'officier," in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Mar 1891, 443–459.

The entire official publications broadcast by the Vichy regime concerning the role and action expected from military leadership and officers underlines the weakness of the pure military aspects. In fact, until 1941, under the influence of Generals Weygand and Huntziger, the Armistice Army emphasized that officers should be youth leaders capable of inspiring the entire population through its education mission instead of soldiers with martial values. Yet, this representation is inseparable from the ideas of conscription and patriotism, deeply criticized at the beginning of 1941. The indolence of the population, whose conscripts from 1938 and 1939 were still serving under the flag despite the demobilization of military forces, was exacerbated by deplorable material conditions and deep contrasts with the idyllic descriptions seen in the propaganda. All of this led to the dissatisfaction and disillusion of both officers and conscripts. By the end of 1941, the regime decided to initiate a deep remilitarization of troop training. This occurred specifically after the death of General Huntziger on 12 November. The instruction of 25 November, signed by Admiral Darlan revealed this change in direction. He explained that if moral and physical education used to be the highest preoccupation of the command, it aimed mostly to rebuild trust, while proclaiming that the time had passed. "The necessity to drive the army in different directions should not result in forgetting that its essential mission remains in the training of fighters."[32] Military training should return to a primary position. However, this proclamation was difficult to perceive in the light of the armistice army's mission. The government struggled to introduce the spiritual and intellectual renewal of its troops, as it sought external signs of rebirth in order to rid itself of martial faults.[33] The amount of propaganda was such that it gave the illusion of a profound change. Press articles and reports insisted on the renewal demanded by the *Révolution nationale*. But, lacking materials and modern equipment, and failing to present a tactical transformation and a doctrine for the utilization of troops, the Armistice Army was, in fact, merely a disguised continuation of the past.

VI. Conclusion

The defeat of the French forces and the German and Italian armistice conventions required a total reconstruction of French military forces. The Vichy regime took advantage of this situation and anticipated a complete reconstruction and reformation of its army, according to the *Révolution nationale*. Drastically reduced to 8,000 officers, this decrease became an opportunity for the regime to handpick men by their devotion to the regime and its leader, Marshal Pétain. All officers had to embody the new ideals of the regime. At the same time, new missions were given to officers: to actively participate in the moral recovery and reconstruction of the country. But, by doing so, military factors were forgotten. The lack of materials and the inability to rethink an outdated military doctrine, which had led to the defeat, contributed to

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[32] Instruction des cadres et de la troupe, Secrétariat d'État à la guerre, EMA, 3e bureau, 6166/EMA 3-1, Vichy, 25 Nov 1941, SHD AI 1 P 20.

[33] Paxton, *L'armée de Vichy* (see note 11), 65.

the regime's failure to reform and reconstruct the officer corps despite propaganda emphasizing the renewal.

The breaking point was reached on the 27 November 1942, when the French Armistice Army was officially dissolved by the German authorities after the invasion of southern France, which underlined the failure of Vichy military reorganization and put to an end the mission of national recovery embodied in their officers.

Boyan Zhekov

In the Aftermath of the Moscow Armistice of 28 October 1944: The Allied Control Commission and the Bulgarian Armed Forces

Abstract

Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, on the other, signed the Moscow armistice on 28 October 1944. It put an end to the state of war which existed between the government in Sofia and the Allies. The agreement provided for the establishment of an Allied Control Commission (ACC) in Bulgaria. As the armistice agreement contained a number of articles in the military sphere, quite a lot of ACC's work was linked directly to the Bulgarian armed forces. The present paper aims to present some information about the way the ACC functioned and its activities regarding the Bulgarian army in the period 1944–1947. It is based on a number of newly available documents from the Bulgarian and primarily Russian archives.

I. The Moscow Armistice and the Bulgarian armed forces

The government of the Fatherland Front came to power in Bulgaria on 9 September 1944. The new cabinet incorporated representatives of four political powers, including the Bulgarian communists. The change in power occurred only a day after the Red Army entered the country. One of the primary tasks the Fatherland Front's government had to handle was the termination of the state of war which existed between Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, on the other. The problem was finally resolved with the signing of the Moscow Armistice on 28 October 1944.[1]

The armistice agreement consisted of nineteen articles. They settled different political, military, legal and financial issues. Article 1 had a direct relation to the Bulgarian armed forces. Paragraph (C) reads: "The Government of Bulgaria undertakes to maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be speci-

[1] For the negotiations that led to the signing of the Moscow armistice, see the documents published in *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 1. Primirieto* [The Great Powers and Bulgaria 1944–1947. Volume 1. The Armistice] (Sofia, 2014) and in *FRUS*, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, the British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III, Documents no. 219–416.

fied for service under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Such forces must not be used on Allied territory except with the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned." Paragraph (D) states: "On the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Bulgarian armed forces must be demobilized and put on a peace footing under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission." Article 6 which compelled the cabinet in Sofia to "cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes" and Article 7 which called for defascization of the state were indirectly related to the Bulgarian army. The Moscow Armistice also provided for the establishment of an Allied Control Commission (ACC) in Bulgaria with the errand to "regulate and supervise the execution" of its terms.[2] This paper, which is based on a number of newly available documents from the Bulgarian and primarily Russian archives, aims to present some information about the way the ACC functioned and its activities regarding the Bulgarian army in the period 1944–1947.

II. Establishment and functioning of the Allied Control Commission, 1944–1947: a brief overview

The ACC in Bulgaria was established in the fall of 1944 pursuant to Article 18 of the Moscow Armistice.[3] It was not a unique institution. By this time, such commissions already operated in Italy, Rumania and Finland.[4] The ACC in Bulgaria officially functioned until 15 September 1947 when the Paris Peace Treaty came into force.[5] Less than three weeks later, the commission's personnel left the country.

The control machinery in Bulgaria included Soviet, British and American representatives. The commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (later commander of the Southern Group Forces), Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin, was appointed chairmen with General Sergey Biryuzov as his deputy. General Aleksandr Cherepanov and Rear Admiral Nikolay Abramov held the positions of Marshal Tolbukhin's assistants. There was also a political advisor to the chairman, namely, the Soviet diplomat Aleksandr Lavrishev. Because Marshal Tolbukhin was, first and foremost, occupied with his military obligations and rarely visited Sofia, the management of the ACC lay virtually on General Biryuzov's shoulders.[6] General Walter Oxley headed the British mili-

[2] The full text of the Moscow Armistice is available in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XI, no. 279, 29 Oct, 1944, 492–494.

[3] The Soviet leadership accepted a decision for the creation of the ACC on 13 November 1944. Lavrenov, S. and I. Shinkarev. "Nekotorje osobennosti sovetsko-bolgarskih otnoshenii na zavershayuem etape voinji protiv Germanii (9 sentyabrya 1944 g. – mai 1945 g.)" [SomeFeatures of the Soviet-Bulgarian Relations in the Final Stage of the War against Germany (9 September 1944 – May 1945], in *Balgaro-savetski politicheski i voenni otnosheniya (1941–1947)* [Bulgarian-Soviet Political and Military Relations (1941–1947)] (Sofia, 1999), 83.

[4] Afterwards, in 1945, an ACC was also created in Hungary. "Allied Control Commissions and Councils," *International Organization*, 1, 1947, 164.

[5] *Rabotnichesko delo* [Worker's Deed], 215, 16 September 1947.

[6] Revyakina, L. "Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya (noemvri 1944 – dekemvri 1947)" [The Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria (November 1944 – December 1947], in *Velikite sili i Balgariya prez Vtorata svetovna voina* [The Great Powers and Bulgaria in the Second World War] (Sofia, 2016), 45.

tary mission in the body and General John Crane stood at the head of the American delegation. Subsequently, the latter was replaced by General Walter Robertson.[7]

The ACC in Bulgaria was comprised of a number of services in structural terms: for example, staff, Administrative Department, group of the political advisor, Economic Department, Military Department, Naval Department, Air Force Department, Transport Department, Liaison Unit with the Soviet Government. Furthermore, the ACC had proxies in all nine Bulgarian districts, the three river bases and the two naval bases.[8] General Sergey Biryuzov informed the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev that "the Allied Control Commission got to work" on 29 November 1944. Two days later, the district proxies of the commission also commenced business.[9]

Dealing with all problems related to the armistice's terms on the Bulgarian side was entrusted to the purposive Commissariat for the Implementation of the Armistice Agreement (CIAA). This body was established under Decree no. 1 of the Council of Ministers, dated 9 November 1944. The CIAA was an integral part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was designated the chairman of the CIAA, and the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry became vice-chairman. The CIAA also included representatives of the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Railways, the Bulgarian National Bank and the Directorate of Civilian Mobilization.[10] Initially, General Georgy Popov was appointed the delegate of the War Ministry.[11] He was actively supported in his work as a member of the Commissariat by Section VI of the Bulgarian Army Headquarters – a special office for liaison with the peregrine military missions in the state, founded as early as September 1944.[12] At the beginning of December 1944, the Bulgarian Minister of War General Damyan Velchev ordered: "All questions that the Army Headquarters addresses to the Allied Control Commission have to be referred to General of the Artillery G. Popov who will report them to the ACC."[13]

Considering the activity of the ACC in Bulgaria between 1944 and 1947, two distinct periods in its work can be defined. The first one of them covered the months

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7 Biryuzov, S. *Savetskiyat voinik na Balkanite* [The Soviet Soldier on the Balkans] (Sofia, 1964), 198; *The American Military Mission in the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria 1944–1947*, ed. by Michael Boll (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 3, 22.

8 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya. chast* [The Great Powers and Bulgaria 1944–1947. Volume 2. The Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. Part one] (Sofia, 2018), 53–54.

9 Central State Archive (*TsDA*), Fond 1483, Opis 1, A. E. 151, l. 91; Dimitrova, Sv. "Deinostta na Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Starozagorska oblast" [The Activity of the Allied Control Commission in Stara Zagora District], in *Vtorata svetovna voina i Balgariya 1939–1947* [The Second World War and Bulgaria 1939–1947] (Sliven, 2006), 197.

10 *Darzhaven vestnik* [State Gazette], 254, 16 November 1944; *TsDA*, Fond 1485, Opis 1, A. E. 14, l. 9–10.

11 Stefanov, St. *General-gubernatorat na Yuzhna Dobrudzha* [The Governor-General of Southern Dobrudzha] (Sofia, 2002), 343.

12 Military State Archive (*DVIA*), Fond 38, Opis 1, A. E. 1, l. 1; *Istoriya na Otechestvenata voina na Balgariya 1944–1945. Tom parvi* [History of the Patriotic War of Bulgaria 1944–1945. Volume one] (Sofia, 1981), 290–291.

13 *DVIA*, Fond 061, Opis 1, A. E. 13, l. 166.

from November 1944 to the summer of 1945. The second phase started after the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three (17 July – 2 August 1945) and lasted until September 1947.

The initial stage had two main features. Firstly, there was almost no influence of the Anglo-American representatives. In fact, this state of affairs was enshrined in the very text of Article 18 of the armistice, which ruled that "during the period between coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command." General Biryuzov instructed the Bulgarian Government on 29 November 1944 that any direct contacts with the Anglo-American missions were forbidden.[14] It was no coincidence that Georges Hateau, the representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic in Sofia, observed in December 1944 that the influence of Moscow "significantly dominates" the control machinery.[15] In second place, from November 1944 until August 1945, the ACC in Bulgaria did not turn out to be a working body at all. At this time, the commission held only three meetings – on 29 November, 7 December and 28 December 1944. Indeed, at the meeting on 28 December, the ACC discussed and accepted a schedule for its sessions in the first three months of 1945. However, not a single meeting took place until August 1945. The protests of the Anglo-American missions were not very helpful for improving the situation.[16]

At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States agreed to revise "the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions" in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, so that the role of the Anglo-American representatives increased.[17] The effect of this decision could be felt immediately. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, dispatched to General Sergey Biryuzov a document on 11 August 1945 entitled "A Statute for the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria." It defined: "During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Bulgaria the chairman (or vice-chairman) of the ACC regularly convenes meetings with the British and the American representatives for discussing important issues concerning the ACC's work." Such sittings had to be held once in every ten days and, more often, if needed. In addition, the Anglo-American representatives would have the right to receive oral or written information from the Soviet officials in the commission about any matters related to the implementation of the armistice agreement and submit proposals from their governments for consideration in the body.[18] General Biryuzov sent the document to General Crane and to General Oxley on 14 August 1945. As a result, the functioning

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[14] *TsDA*, Fond 1483, Opis 1, A. E. 151, l. 91. The CIAA issued an order to the ministries on 22 December 1944 regarding the procedure for providing information to Soviet and other foreign military and civilian personnel. *TsDA*, Fond 1485, Opis 2, A. E. 935, l. 119.

[15] *Romen Gari i frenskata diplomaticheska poshta* [Romain Gary and the French Diplomatic Mail] (Sofia, 2016), 28.

[16] Revyakina, L. "Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya" (see note 6), 47.

[17] *FRUS*, Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II, Document no. 1384.

[18] *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947* (see note 8), Document no. 27.

of the commission became more orderly. Thus, the ACC held 24 whole meetings from September 1945 until the beginning of 1947.

Nevertheless, the change in the control machinery's way of working did not dramatically affect the Soviet dominance, characteristic of the first period of its existence. The authentic documentation available shows that during the sittings of the ACC, the representatives of Moscow simply communicated information to the Western delegates on the fulfillment of various terms of the armistice agreement. In practice, this functional model did not create particularly great opportunities for intervention by the British or American delegates.

III. The ACC and the Bulgarian armed forces, November 1944 – May 1945

The ACC in Bulgaria was tasked with numerous activities from the moment of its creation. They were set by a special instruction approved by Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin in November 1944.[19] Indisputably, one of the immediate tasks of the ACC was related to the fulfillment of Article 1, Paragraph (C) of the armistice, which obliged Bulgaria to participate in the hostilities against Germany. By the time the Moscow agreement was concluded, however, the Bulgarian army had already started fighting the Wehrmacht. As early as 8 September 1944, the Sofia government declared war on the Third Reich, and a month later, Bulgarian troops undertook an offensive against the German units in Yugoslavia under the operational command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The fall offensive of the Bulgarian armed forces lasted until the end of November 1944.[20] The fact that Bulgaria had fulfilled the requirement of Article 1, Paragraph (C) in advance was emphasized in a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the ACC, dated 23 November 1944.[21] Six days earlier, however, Marshal Tolbukhin informed the cabinet in Sofia that the Bulgarian military efforts in the war against Germany must continue. As a result, on 28 November 1944, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers adopted a decree for the creation of a special detachment called the First Bulgarian Army. It was "to take part in the subsequent military actions" against the Third Reich.[22] Thus, at the beginning of December 1944, the Bulgarian contribution to the war continued. It ended in May 1945 with the First Bulgarian Army having reached Austria.

The authentic documents available show that the ACC had strictly monitored the Bulgarian participation in the war from late 1944. On 5 December 1944, for

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19 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya* (see note 18), Document no. 2.

20 See *Otechestvenata voina na Balgariya 1944–1945. Dokumenti, materiali.Tom vtori* [The Patriotic War of Bulgaria 1944–1945. Documents, Materials. Volume two] (Sofia, 1980).

21 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya. Parva chast*, Document no. 187.

22 *Istoriya na Otechestvenata voina na Balgariya 1944–1945. Tom treti* [History of the Patriotic War of Bulgaria 1944–1945. Volume three] (Sofia, 1983), 13–14; *Otechestvenata voina na Balgariya 1944–1945. Dokumenti, materiali. Tom treti* [The Patriotic War of Bulgaria 1944–1945. Documents, Materials. Volume three] (Sofia, 1980), Document no. 15.

example, General Biryuzov criticized the Bulgarian High Command that the deployment of the First Bulgarian Army was not occurring within the time required.[23] A commission's report from 27 December 1944 sent to Vyacheslav Molotov provided information about the initial actions of the First Bulgarian Army against the German forces. The conclusion was that "in general, the Bulgarian government is loyally fulfilling" the demands included in Article 1, Paragraph (C) of the armistice agreement.[24] For its part, the Bulgarian state demonstrated a desire to provide detailed information on the First Bulgarian Army's contribution in the Allied military efforts. At the very first sitting of the CIAA on 16 November 1944, for instance, General Georgy Popov was charged to draw the attention of the ACC to the actions of the Bulgarian army.[25] Along with that, the Bulgarian High Command issued regular notices on the progress of the hostilities.[26] Moreover, the CIAA regularly dispatched information to the control commission regarding the Bulgarian participation in military actions against the Wehrmacht.

Although the Bulgarian participation in the war against the Third Reich was an obligation included in the text of the Moscow armistice, the government in Sofia made efforts to derive diplomatic benefits from it, so it could ease the state's future fate. As early as 21 November 1944, the cabinet appealed to the Allies to recognize the Bulgarian army as a cobelligerent.[27] There was no answer in the next few weeks, but this did not discourage the Bulgarian government. On 13 December 1944, Petko Stainov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed a note to the ACC. In it, he pointed out that the Bulgarian servicemen were already fighting on Hungarian territory and would probably go further. For this reason, it was necessary the status of the Bulgarian forces to be determined. According to the Foreign Minister, this would bring "tremendous satisfaction" to the Bulgarian officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers fighting far from their homeland and the confidence that they were no longer in the position of "poor relatives," but were struggling "equally for one cause, common to all freedom-loving humanity."[28] As the hostilities progressed, Bulgarian demands increased. Petko Stainov sent another note to the ACC on 1 March 1945 asking not the Bulgarian army but the Bulgarian state to be recognized as a cobelligerent.[29] At the end of the same month, the Sofia government prepared detailed material entitled "The Right of Bulgaria to be a cobelligerent state."[30]

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23 *DVIA*, Fond 24, Opis 3, A. E. 266, l. 117.

24 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 21), Document no. 203.

25 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 21), Document no. 184.

26 See *DVIA*, Fond 24, Opis 3, A. E. 269, l. 8, 85, 135; *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 207, 21 May 1945; *Vsichko za fronta, vsichko za pobedata* [All for the Front, All for the Victory] (Sofia, 1971), 112–113, 116, 119.

27 Kalinova, E. "Pobeditelite i balgarskiyat voenen prinos sreshtu Germaniya" [The Victors and the Bulgarian Military Contribution against Germany], in *Vtorata svetovna voina, Balgariya i sledvoenniyat svyat* [The Second World War, Bulgaria and the Postwar World] (Sofia, 2005), 86.

28 *Sovetsko-bolgarskie otnosheniya 1944–1948 gg.* [Soviet-Bulgarian Relations 1944–1949] (Moskva, 1969), Document no. 34.

29 Baeva, I. and E. Kalinova. *Sledvoennoto desetiletie na Balgarskata vanshna politika (1944–1955)* [The Postwar Decade of the Bulgarian Foreign Policy 1944–1955] (Sofia, 2013), 57–58.

30 *TsDA*, Fond 1484, Opis 1, A. E. 82, l. 1–2.

However, none of the inquiries led to a positive Soviet response. The reason behind this was the compliance of the Soviet Union with the negative British position on the topic. The Foreign Office was of the opinion that granting Bulgaria a cobelligerent status in any form "would shock public opinion and is likely to cause serious difficulties with the Greek and the Yugoslav government." As early as late November 1944, General Oxley made the British stance plain to General Biryuzov.[31]

Under the instruction from November 1944, the ACC had the task to supervise the fulfillment of Articles 6 and 7 of the Moscow armistice. As has already been mentioned, the former referred to the punishment of war criminals and the latter touched on the issue of defascization of the country. From January until June 1945, the group of the political advisor in the commission prepared and sent to Moscow no less than four extensive reports regarding the trials which were organized in accordance with the People's Court Act, adopted by the Bulgarian government in October 1944. They contained detailed information on the course of the lawsuits, including those regarding the military. It was mentioned, for instance, in a report on the penal policy of the Sofia cabinet covering the period up to 1 May 1945 that more than 80 military personnel received death or life sentences in Sofia district alone. In addition, 92 servicemen were sentenced to various prison terms.[32]

At the same time, the ACC requested comprehensive data from the Bulgarian side on the measures taken for the defascization of the country. On 19 March 1945, for example, the control commission demanded information regarding the number of people dismissed from the state apparatus for fascist acts.[33] After receiving the data, the ACC sent a report on the subject to Moscow. The document stated that as of 1 May 1945, 1,334 people had been dismissed from the Bulgarian armed forces. Nine hundred of them were fired for fascist activity.[34]

The archival materials unequivocally reveal that the ACC in Bulgaria played a decisive role during the first crisis in the Fatherland Front's rule that occurred in the fall of 1944. The brunt was borne directly by the Bulgarian army. The reason for that was the attempt made by General Damyan Velchev, the Minister of War, to protect the military from the People's Court Act. On his initiative, the Council of Ministers adopted a decree on 23 November 1944 according to which the servicemen who showed courage at the front would not be judged or would get light sentences.[35] However, the Bulgarian communists disapproved the act and turned to the Soviet representatives in the ACC for support. General Cherepanov wrote to Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev on 4 December 1944 insisting that the decree be

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31 *Balgariya – nepriznatiyat protivnik na Tretiya Raih* [Bulgaria – the Unrecognized Adversary of the Third Reich] (Sofia, 1995), Documents no. 16, 139

32 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya* (see note 18) Document no. 87.

33 *DVIA*, Fond 22, Opis 1, A. E. 222, l. 198.

34 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya* (see note 18), Document no. 86.

35 *TsDA*, Fond 136, Opis 1, A. E. 69, l. 32.

annulled because it contradicted Article 6 of the Moscow armistice.[36] The request predetermined the act's future destiny. A few days later the decree was cancelled.[37] Nevertheless, the incident led to some criticism of the commission's work. A notice prepared by Department IV of the Soviet Foreign Ministry at the beginning of 1945 stated that the ACC exercised insufficient control over the implementation of Article 6. It was the incident with the decree from 23 November 1944 that was pointed out as the clearest example in support of this allegation.[38]

IV. The ACC and the Bulgarian armed forces, June 1945 – September 1947

The German capitulation in May 1945 put an end to the war in Europe, and to the participation of the Bulgarian armed forces in the hostilities. Pursuant to Article 1, Paragraph (D), the Bulgarian army was to be demobilized and put on a peace footing. The CIAA informed General Biryuzov in mid-June 1945 that the demobilization process has started.[39] In the following months, the Bulgarian government sent a number of memorandums to the ACC claiming that it was strictly executing the obligation set in Article 1, Paragraph (D) of the armistice.

The postwar years were a time for an extensive reorganization of the Bulgarian armed forces. It is clear from the authentic documents available that the Soviet Union played a substantial role in the process through the ACC. Soon after the war's end, the Bulgarian peacetime army was organized into 12 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 2 armored brigades. In accordance with instructions from the control body, 5 infantry divisions were to be stationed in Northern Bulgaria and the rest would be in the southern part of the country.[40] In the months following the Potsdam conference, the Minister of War General Velchev proposed that the Bulgarian army to be reduced to 90,000 soldiers. The idea was approved by the Soviet military representatives in the control commission. However, a subsequent examination clearly shows that if the peace army was to be organized into 9 infantry divisions, no less than 107,000 people would be necessary. Apparently, these estimates had been taken into account, because, after several reductions, the Bulgarian armed forces included exactly 106,830 people as of 1 January 1946.[41] The reorganization of the Bulgarian army continued under the control of the ACC in 1946–1947. The main feature of the organizational changes was the reduction of the army. This was due to the expectation that military restrictions would be imposed on Bulgaria by virtue of the peace

[36] *Iz lichniya arhiv na Kimon Georgiev. Tom III* [From the Personal Archive of Kimon Georgiev. Volume III] (Sofia, 2009), Document no. 176.
[37] *TsDA*, Fond 136, Opis 1, A. E. 69, l. 59–60.
[38] *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 21), Document no. 24.
[39] *TsDA*, Fond 1485, Opis 1, A. E. 1135, l. 5.
[40] *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya. Vtora chast* [The Great Powers and Bulgaria 1944–1947.Volume 2. The Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. Part two] (Sofia, 2018), Document no. 669.
[41] Baev, J. "Voennite klauzi na Parishkiya miren dogovor i balgarskata armiya" [The Military Clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty and the Bulgarian Army], in *Izvestiya na Instituta za voenna istoriya* [Materials of the Military History Institute], 61, 1997, 221.

treaty. Thus, as of 1 July 1947, the Bulgarian armed forces included only a few more than 65,000 people.[42]

A number of newly available documents reveal that the Bulgarian military authorities supplied the Soviet representatives in the ACC with thorough information on various aspects of the development of the Bulgarian armed forces in the postwar period. The head of Department VI, for instance, sent a request to the Army Staff in July 1945 for the monthly reports prepared for the ACC to include extensive information on the numerical strength of the different military units.[43] On the insistence of the control commission at the end of 1945, the Bulgarian military leadership sent a detailed report on four important matters: 1) measures taken for bringing the armed forces to a peace footing; 2) the composition of the armed forces as of 1 November 1945; 3) the armament available; and the 4) condition of the officer corps.[44] The Political Department of the Bulgarian Ministry of War furnished the commission in January 1946 with a paper entitled "On the political and moral condition of the Bulgarian army." The document contained facts and figures regarding, for example, the measures taken for purging the army, the influence of the different political forces in the Fatherland Front coalition among the military, the participation of the servicemen as voters in the parliamentary elections from November 1945, and the attitude of the officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers towards the Soviet Union. At about the same time, the ACC received a report on the combat training of the Bulgarian armed forces in 1945.[45] Quite naturally, all the information gathered by the Soviet representatives in the body was promptly forwarded to Moscow. The reports were usually dispatched to Vyacheslav Molotov as well as to the Soviet General Staff.

The Soviet representatives in the ACC provided various assistance to the Bulgarian state in the military field in the postwar period. On the initiative of the commission, for example, a number of Soviet military advisors were appointed to the Bulgarian armed forces. They aided in the transmission of the Soviet combat experience to the Bulgarian army. Bulgarian units conducted several command and staff exercises in the field in June and July 1947, under the guidance of the advisors and with the involvement of some Soviet officers from the ACC.[46] A number of military events were held "with the closest assistance of the ACC and the advisors": the Bulgarian Army Staff was reorganized; new schemes for the organization and new staff tables for all branches of the army were developed; and some new normative army documents were prepared, among other things. In the meantime, the ACC carried out lots of activities in connection with the study of Bulgaria as a theater for military action. Among them was the preparation of military-geographical descriptions of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav, the Bulgarian-Greek, the Bulgarian-Turkish and the Bulgarian-Romanian directions of military action.[47]

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42 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2 (see note 40)*, Document no. 669.
43 *DVIA*, Fond 25, Opis 5, A. E. 3, l. 207.
44 *DVIA*, Fond 22, Opis 1, A. E. 322, l. 117; Fond 25, Opis 5, A. E. 3, l. 92 et seq.
45 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 40), Documents no. 308–309.
46 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 40), Document no. 669.
47 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 40), Document no. 669.

A key moment in the postwar development of the Bulgarian armed forces was the purge of the officer's corps initiated by the Soviet government in 1946. On 19 June 1946, the Soviet representatives in the ACC, Marshal Tolbukhin and General Biryuzov, received a directive from Moscow to take measures to "restrict the powers" of the Bulgarian Minister of War General Velchev and to remove the "reactionary officers and generals from the Bulgarian armed forces."[48] In less than two months, nearly 2,000 Bulgarian officers were dismissed from the army and General Velchev was replaced as minister. A report on the ACC's activities dated 31 July 1947 stated: "In the process of purging the army of fascist and anti-democratic elements, the ACC did a great job and naturally influenced the course of the purge."[49]

The change introduced in the ACC's working procedure at the Potsdam Conference created some opportunities for the Anglo-American military representatives to gain knowledge of the postwar development of the Bulgarian army. On their initiative, the reorganization of the armed forces was discussed on several occasions from 1945 to 1946. During a meeting of the ACC on 2 October 1945, for instance, Soviet Colonel Sergey Zotov acquainted General Oxley and General Crane with the postwar organizational changes in the Bulgarian army. He presented brief information on the army's structure and numerical strength to the Western officers. In turn, General Oxley demanded further details regarding the Bulgarian Air Force, but received none. He also wanted to know whether the figure of 188,257 people, mentioned by Colonel Zotov for the peacetime army, would be final. Again, there was no satisfactory answer from the Soviet military representatives. It was agreed that copies of all the documents presented by the Bulgarian military leadership to the ACC would be submitted to the Anglo-American military missions. Apparently, the latter did not happen, because in a meeting on 3 January 1946, General Oxley complained that he had not received any further information on the topic.[50] The issue with the Bulgarian army's postwar reorganization was discussed again in March 1946, this time with Colonel Leonid Sereda reporting. The Soviet officer shared data on the current state of the Bulgarian army. He gave detailed figures on the armed forces' demobilization process, which had been ongoing since the capitulation of Germany. According to his exposition, the Bulgarian army consisted of 97,845 soldiers as of 1 February 1946. General Oxley shared the opinion that "a considerable reduction had taken place." Yet, the British representative added that he "was not in a position to say that the figure was a suitable one for the Bulgarian Armed Forces."[51] This was a hint that Great Britain was going to insist on a further reduction of the Bulgarian army at the upcoming peace conference.

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48 Baev, J, "Stalinist Terror in Bulgaria, 1944–1956," in *Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe. Elite Purges and Mass Repression*, ed. by Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 181.

49 *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 40), Document no. 669.

50 *The American Military Mission* (see note 7), 135–136, 182; *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2* (see note 21), Document no. 44.

51 *The American Military Mission*, 213–216; *Velikite Sili i Balgariya 1944–1947 g. Tom 2. Sayuznata kontrolna komisiya v Balgariya. Parva chast*, Document no. 55.

V. Conclusion

The ACC was an international institution that existed in Bulgaria in the period 1944–1947. It was established pursuant to the Moscow armistice, signed between Bulgaria and the Allies on 28 October 1944. The ACC included Soviet, British and American representatives, but was dominated by the former. The task of the body was to supervise the implementation of the terms of the armistice. Because some of these terms had a military character, the ACC played an important role in the development of the Bulgarian armed forces from 1944 until 1947. The main features of the commission's activities regarding the army were connected with the Bulgarian armed forces' participation in the war against Germany and their post-war demobilization and reorganization. Yet, the ACC's work also concerned other issues related to the army, such as the punishment of Bulgarian war criminals and the defascization of the country.

Paul Lenormand

Rebuilding the Officer Corps after the Disaster: Retribution and Recruitment in the Czechoslovak Postwar Military (1945–1948)

Abstract

Czechoslovakia was finished with more than six years of occupation and war by May 1945. Yet, the Army immediately faced a new challenge: to get rid of disloyal or unqualified cadres and recruit new reliable and competent officers. This paper will explore the difficulties and contradiction of postwar human resources in the Czechoslovak military by focusing on the cleansing process, the nationality policy and the integration of new army members. It will offer an overview of the legal and practical retribution process and its quantitative and qualitative consequences for the officer corps, with a special interest in the categories of repressed personnel. The research is based mostly on material from the Czech and Slovak archives, including individual records of military officers.

I. Introduction

Even though Czechoslovak national leaders looked for the creation of a regenerated military immune of ideological weaknesses and professional shortcomings, the army could never fully escape the shadow of the Second World War: collaboration(s), resistance(s) and deprofessionalization under occupation. When the country was finally liberated from the Nazi domination, almost nothing was ready to proceed with the reshaping of the army. On the one hand, prewar officers had to be identified, screened and reintegrated – or not. On the other hand, newcomers in the arms profession, from abroad or within the country, had to be encouraged to join, but many refused, as peace was synonymous with demobilization, even more for wartime volunteers without a calling to serve in uniform. On the top of that, Czechoslovak decision-makers reviewed their hierarchy of nationalities, excluding non-Slavs and promoting Slovaks to higher ranks and functions. This was the cement of a renewed binational contract designed to ensure a minimum of goodwill from the Slovak side, while many Czechs perceived their Eastern brothers as excessively privileged in a time of intense job competition and resource scarcity. Who were the unfortunates of the transition? Save a few radical collaborators of Nazi Germany, most of

the ex-Czechoslovak officers had been slowly demoted and often persecuted by the Germans, though a large majority managed to survive the war. However, even without collaborationist records or an objective inclination for Germany, prewar military leaders looked old and unfit for modern warfare in the second half of the 1940s. The high-ranking commanders were particularly targeted by postwar purges – as the country elite was deemed responsible for the failure of Munich and the occupation. Meanwhile, the army leadership under General Ludvík Svoboda hoped to enlist war veterans who had fought under Allied – notably Soviet – command or in the home resistance. Unfortunately, many lacked the minimal education and military training, joined other state organs or favored retirement from military life. By 1948, the officer corps was still in relatively bad shape, the army being understaffed, underpaid and struggling with scarce resources and equipment – and a new episode of the military transformation was about to start, under the post-February communist monopoly.

II. Broken Czechoslovakia and the "New People's Army"

Military human resources in postwar contexts

Every postwar context following either victory or defeat constrains decision-makers to reform, sometimes radically, their military organization, often with a stress on human resources.[1] The army plays a core role in not only the war itself, but also the coming out of the conflict, as soldiers frequently perform security or economic tasks, such as guarding the border, repairing destroyed infrastructures, or supporting agricultural and industrial companies. Additionally, military leaders face new threats and ending a war always means preparing for the next. As a result, they have to secure financial, material and human resources in both soldiers and cadres. This article focuses on how Czechoslovak leaders environed the future of their army through the lens of the officer corps, its problems and new shape after 1945. This research brings together archival material from the former Czechoslovak Republic, including both top-level ministerial papers and bottom-up reports or individual records from the military.[2]

War can prove noxious for the stability of state institutions, and kills a number of leaders and cadres. This phenomenon is specific in the military, as any army anticipates a certain rate of loss in wartime. This depletion in officers comes from a number of causes. First of all, combat can kill a high number of – mostly – junior officers, notably from the professional army. Such a drain happened to the French army in the summer of 1914, prompting the posting of more reserve officers as replacements. The situation was no better during the Second World War, and both the German and Soviet armies, for instance, had to promote an increasing number of noncommis-

1 Abrams, Bradley. "The Second World War and the East European Revolution," in *East European Politics and Societies*, 16/3, 2002, 623–664; Case, Holly. "Reconstruction in East-Central Europe: Clearing the Rubble of Cold War Politics," in *Past & Present*, 210, 2011, 71–102.

2 This paper is based on doctoral research in which the results are developed and exemplified: Lenormand, Paul. "Vers l'armée du peuple: autorité, pouvoir et culture militaire en Tchécoslovaquie de Munich à la fin du stalinisme" (PhD diss., Sciences Po, Paris, 2019).

sioned officers (NCOs) in order to fill the void left by fallen officers.[3] Furthermore, in addition to combat, frontline conditions are conducive to road or plane accidents and diseases or sickness, killing additional cadres, including high-ranking military leaders. These losses leave a void in the officer corps. Moreover, occupations contribute to disqualify the men who collaborated with the enemy. They can be excluded from the army, and that happened in several countries following the Second World War. Beyond collaboration or disloyalty, war can reveal mediocrity in the conduct of operations at all levels (from strategic command to tactical leadership). Some officers are simply not good enough for command and have to be retired. If war lasts too long, others reach the age limit and can be pensioned or ask for a pension. Naturally, all these considerations – disloyalty, mediocrity and aging – are deeply subjective, depending on the postwar leaders' preferences.[4] An excellent officer in good health reaching the age limit can be retained in service, while another one whose loyalty has been questioned can reasonably be exonerated from his responsibility if necessary. Decision-makers have to make an arbitration between retaining skilled officers with a shady past and promoting a moral order that could drill holes in the military organization. Personal animosities within the military and the competition for jobs partly explains the sometimes heterogeneous treatment of cadres during retribution or the reform of the army after a conflict. Moreover, political struggles add to the complexity of these policies, as traditionally *neutral* military officers can be required to either express their ideological preferences or maintain a distance vis-à-vis political parties and leaders. Behind the curtain, or even in public, political affiliation plays a role in the management of human resources. The coming out of the Second World War was no exception, and the start of the Cold War only reinforced the sensitive nature of ideological strife within military organizations. In a postwar context, broader changes also affect the army's human resources: the period following the Second World War was not a time of conciliation but more a climax of revenge and ethnic retribution.[5] Consequently, the national, racial or religious *label* of the individual created or suppressed rights, including military service and state employment. This was particularly true of multinational countries, where a process of homogenization had started even before the weapons had fallen silent. Officers with an unfavorable ascendance could be expelled from the army, regardless of their wartime background.

Overall, putting aside notable exceptions, such as the armed forces of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union, which suffered massive casualties, the armies from the Second World War reached V-Day with a majority of their officers surviving the war – it was true for both undisputable victors, such as the United States, or for losers-winners, such as France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, reforming the army and reviewing the cadres policy was not just a demographic necessity: it was

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3 Stone, David. "The Red Army," in *The Soviet Union at War 1941–1945*, ed. by David Stone (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010), 149; Bartov, Omer. *The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986).

4 On age as a subjective issue, see Caradec, Vincent. *Sociologie de la vieillesse et du vieillissement* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008).

5 *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War II and Its Aftermath*, ed. by István Deák, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

a question of opportunity. The postwar context created new narratives, new legitimacies and redistributed power, allowing for radical change. If someone wanted to enforce a massive and brutal reform of the military and its leadership, a wartime and postwar moment made it possible. How did Czechoslovak decision-makers achieve the postwar transformation of their army?

The Czechoslovak exceptionalism

Czechoslovakia was an almost unique case in occupied Europe, for several reasons. Firstly, the country suffered annexations approximatively one year before the beginning of the Second World War, and was dismantled six months before the outbreak of the conflict. Out of the territory of the Czechoslovak First Republic (1918–1938), border territories were ceded to Nazi Germany, authoritarian Hungary and Poland (not only the so-called Sudetenland, but also Southern Slovakia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia and parts of Silesia). The rest was divided between two highly differentiated parts: the central Czech lands was made a German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, while remaining Slovakia became a theoretically independent country, the Slovak State, under the leadership of the priest-president Jozef Tiso.[6] The occupation/satellization lasted an unusual period of almost six years (and even more for some territories). Only Austria spent more time under Nazi German domination, but the support for the Pan-German project was much greater in the former heart of the Habsburg Empire. Long occupation far from the front naturally means more compromises and sometimes a weakening of the resilience of the society submitted to the pressure of the new order. This potential resignation to occupation could only be reinforced by the geographically unfavorable position of the Czech lands, surrounded by German-speaking areas or hostile populations, and far from Allied support, be it sea landings or airdrops.

The second major specificity of wartime Czechoslovakia is related to combat. Similar to most European countries at the time, Czechoslovak society was highly militarized. Every adult male did his military service, including members of national minorities, and mobilization efforts (in May and September 1938) proved successful.[7] The Czechoslovak armament industry provided modern weapons to its soldiers – though not enough fighting aircraft – while a powerful system of fortifications was built along the borders, a not-so-absurd defensive doctrine for a small-size country facing a big army.[8] Additionally, the republic relied on two sets of allies: France and Great Britain in the West, threatening the Reich in case of any aggression; the Little Entente and possibly Poland in the East, to counterbalance the strategic weakness of Czechoslovakia, and deter Hungary from joining the Germans in an attack. The "Appeasement" and the German divide and rule policy in Eastern Europe ruined this

6 Bryant, Chad. *Prague in Black. Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Ward, James Mace. *Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

7 Zückert, Martin. *Zwischen Nationsidee und staatlicher Realität. Die tschechoslowakische Armee und ihre Nationalitätenpolitik 1918–1938* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006).

8 *Vojenské dějiny Československa, 1918–1939*, vol. 3 (Prague: Naše vojsko, 1986).

defense strategy and Czechoslovakia faced the threat of a double (or even triple, if we include Poland) invasion from virtually all sides. President Edvard Beneš and his close collaborators, including most of the top general officers, made a very difficult decision: they surrendered their borderlands in October 1938. It equated with a capitulation, as the military situation became untenable without the fortifications and the already insufficient strategic depth. The subsequent occupation/satellization was simply a natural consequence of this renouncement of active defense. As a result, no military resistance took place in March 1939 – it would have been a hopeless fight and cost many lives in the eyes of the Czech leaders. Military professionals were, therefore, deprived of their mission, duty and chance to fight.[9] This was quite exceptional in Europe, as even comparatively weak armies – Danish, Belgian, Dutch or Norwegian – shot a few rounds or more at the invading Germans, emphasizing their legitimacy as defenders of the motherland. After occupying Bohemia and Moravia, the Reich authorities immediately dissolved the army and pensioned Czech cadres – not only 13,500 professional officers, but also about 15,000 career NCOs – who became civilian workers in various administrative and business positions. The few non-Czech cadres joined their new national armies more or less enthusiastically: German, Slovak and Hungarian. When the war broke out, Czech military organization no longer existed and no significant military resistance seemed to emerge.[10] The front remained far away from the Czechs until April or May 1945, while central Slovakia was the theatre of an unsuccessful uprising in August 1944, igniting unrest until the next spring. Consequently, ex-officers and -NCOs residing in occupied Czechoslovakia (mainly in the Czech part) had few opportunities to take part in military action, as no battle took place and even minor skirmishes were extremely rare before the last weeks or days of the war. This *passivity* was the fruit of the prewar occupation and lack of external support, but it proved detrimental to the reputation of the Czechoslovak armed forces of the First Republic. It made a postwar reform inevitable.

The only glimmer of hope came from the outside of occupied/satellized Czechoslovakia, i.e. from the exiles and their military units. In a nutshell, Beneš left Czechoslovakia, bitterly negotiated with France and Great Britain, later with the United States and the Soviet Union, finally succeeding in restoring Czechoslovakia to its prewar borders (with only the loss of Ruthenia). In order to support their claims, exiled leaders created military units abroad, similar to Polish, French and other patriots refusing to accept the occupation and to deal with the Germans. These units helped the Czechoslovak propaganda immensely, as only combat gives legitimacy in wartime. Some 35,000 volunteers and conscripts joined altogether until the summer of 1944 (more than 50,000 were drafted after liberation began), including

[9] In addition to Czechoslovak soldiers fighting back Hungarian units invading Ruthenia, only one garrison resisted German troops for a few hours in the Czech lands. Majer, Petr. "Životní osud jednoho z posledních obránců Czajánkových kasáren. Vězeň číslo 89821 Miroslav Šolc," in *Vojenské Rozhledy*, 4, 2011, 172–177.

[10] The main resistance group made up of former soldiers did not prove very threatening and was soon weakened by Nazi repression. *Obrana národa v dokumentech: 1939–1942*, ed. by Stanislav Kokoška (Prague: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2018).

about 1,000 ex-professional soldiers. They participated in a series of land and air battles: Battle of France 1940, Battle of Britain 1940, Siege of Tobruk 1941, Battles of Sokolovo, Kiev, Bila Cerkva and Žaškov (1943–1944), Dukla (1944), the liberation of Slovakia (1944–1945), and the Siege of Dunkirk (1944–1945), not mentioning various minor engagements or special operations, such as the assassination of Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich (1942). By the end of the war, most of the patriotic legitimacy rested on the shoulders of a few dozens of thousands of exiles, who played a key role in the reshaping of the military from 1945 onwards. The new Minister of National Defense (General Ludvík Svoboda) and the Head of the General Staff (General Bohumil Boček) were both members of the army abroad.

All these peculiarities – a very long occupation in the heart of Europe, an initial lack of combat records to repel the enemy and powerful military exiles abroad – significantly affected the postwar experience of Czechoslovak soldiers.

Reform patterns in the military after the Second World War

Postwar military organizations can be the result of three dynamics: continuity, restoration or revolution. In the first case, the country keeps fighting and, despite casualties and wartime changes, it preserves the general shape of its victorious army, only adjusting its size and technology to new contexts. This is the case, to a certain extent, of Great Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union: victory fuels continuity rather than radical change. Restoration is an option for some occupied or defeated countries: the army was dismantled but when the enemy has finally been vanquished, rebuilding a military organization quite similar to its predecessor can be envisioned. Such a choice requires strong traditions and social cohesion within the military leadership. It also supposes ascribing defeat to external factors (powerful or perfidious enemy, political treason, geopolitical conditions) and usually to a few scapegoats. France, Greece or Italy somehow chose to reshape their army without changing the men within, trying or moving only a minority of disloyal military leaders and high-ranking officers. The later Cold War military buildup obviously contributed to further change in both leadership and organization. Finally, revolution means changing most of the cadres and altering the professional culture of the organization. Such a transformation usually goes hand by hand with political radicalism. It affected countries with new regimes, such as communist Poland or Titoist Yugoslavia.

In all these situations, the management of human resources involves neither total conservation nor total elimination of prewar cadres: new men join a resolutely conservative army, while older cadres stay within a revolutionary military. Consequently, the kind of trajectory a military organization follows is a question of both professional culture (how new do we want the army?) and demographics (how many personnel do we want to replace?). We will focus mainly on the demographic aspect of postwar change.

As we will see, Czechoslovak leaders faced a dilemma. Some expected to restore the *ante bellum* army with only minor amendments to the organization and men,

while others pushed for a more radical way. Reality constrained both groups, as resources were actually limited, and a few demographic facts challenged either restoration or revolution, while continuity was not an option for an army dismantled before the war that had not worked normally for such a long time.

III. Missing officers: how war and collaboration depleted the army

Casualties: combat and German repression

Czechoslovak units abroad never faced annihilation, though they suffered a high level of casualties, notably on the Eastern front, where they lost thousands of men in combat. Out of 6,700 men killed in action, most were rank and file or NCOs, plus about 300 junior officers, primarily reservists. Combat, accidents and diseases, nevertheless, killed 3 generals, 5 colonels and lieutenant-colonels, 9 majors and 22 staff captains, all prewar active soldiers.[11] Yet, this drain was minimal compared to what suffered ex-officers in occupied Czechoslovakia. About a thousand of them had been killed or died in German custody, including 21.6 percent of generals, 13.9 percent of colonels, and the rates go on, clearly showing how the prewar military elite had been severely hit by Nazi repression.[12] Numerous talented Czech military leaders did not survive the war, being hunted down, starved or simply murdered, such as Major General Vojtěch Luža, one of the leaders of the resistance network *Obrana národa*. After years of underground life, he finally fell in October 1944 with a follower in a countryside inn, where Protectorate Czech gendarmes shot him dead.[13] Many other important military leaders of the Resistance died between 1939 and 1945, as the Nazi security apparatus remained efficient until the very end. If less than 10 percent of the prewar officers died because of their participation in resistance at home or abroad, the loss was significant, even more among young and promising high-ranking officers.

The shadow of Munich and collaboration

If combat casualties or repression records accounted for a relatively clear number of lost officers and NCOs, collaboration took its share in a more blurred way. Indeed, various shades of what contemporaries or historians call "collaboration" existed. The most radical commitment to Nazi Germany, often labelled collaborationism, involved very few professional soldiers. Among them, the most prominent figure was former Colonel Emanuel Moravec, who became a Protectorate Minister for Youth and Education. He pushed for a Nazification of Czech society, along with members of fascist organizations (mainly civilians). Other officers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel

[11] Rank at the time of death. Most had a lower rank in 1938, <http://www.vuapraha.cz/fallensoldier database> (in Czech; last retrieved on 15 Oct 2020).

[12] VÚA, MNO45, box 117, file 64334; NROS meeting, 25 Jun 1947 and report, 5 Jul 1948, VÚA, MNO48, box 5, file 11035.

[13] Luža, Radomír, and Christina Vella. *The Hitler Kiss: A Memoir of the Czech Resistance* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002).

Josef Suchánek, published articles supporting Germany, typically anticommunist or anti-Semitic libels.[14] However, the military community and its thousands of former officers did not provide a significant number of Nazi supporters. The only notable move towards a general mobilization in favor of the Reich came from a group of already retired officers and soldiers. These men, who had not joined the anti-Habsburg legions during the First World War, created the Czech Union of Veterans (Český *svaz válečniků* or ČSV) in 1941. Up to 16,000 Czechs joined the organization, including about 600 former officers (among them 18 generals and 20 colonels). However, the Germans never agreed to grant power and consideration to these collaborators. Most of them were too old for military service and ČSV members were simply a source of ideological support for the Reich.[15] Overall, active collaboration with Nazi Germany remained marginal within the prewar officer corps. Those concerned could not be reintegrated into the postwar military. Others, such as Moravec, preferred to commit suicide before being captured by revengeful Czechs.

Another issue for the postwar army was the relatively high number of Czechs serving in the German armed forces, directly or in the so-called "Government Army" (*Vládní vojsko*). Hitler did not trust the Czechs and constantly refused their mass conscription during the war. Yet, up to 100,000 people of Czech descent might have served in the German army: Czech-speaking inhabitants of territories annexed to the Reich (Sudeten, Hlučínsko and Těšínsko) or born in Austria and Germany (notably in Vienna), and Czechs of mixed descent (with one German parent), educated in German schools or having switched nationality. As a rule, these men were not considered Czech by the Germans and were dispersed in the German armed forces. After 1945, their experience was largely overlooked by Czechoslovak authorities – military collaboration with the Germans was minimized anyway. As these men were, for the most part, rank and file or, at best, NCOs, the question of their integration into the professional army did not arise.

Another group of soldiers raised much more concern: if the Germans dissolved the Czechoslovak army in 1939, they kept a small number of cadres in uniform by drafting them into the newly created Government Army. This organization was made up of former officers and NCOs, 500 and 5,500, respectively. It represented about 5 and 30 percent of prewar professional officers and NCOs, respectively, quite a significant number of men. They mainly performed police duties in the Protectorate and for some of them, in Northern Italy (where hundreds deserted to the partisans). The Prague garrison also took part in the May 1945 uprising against the Germans. The main interest for the Reich was to keep a certain number of Czech cadres under German control, without much risk, as they were not fighting at the front, and were only armed with old rifles. Despite some resistance credits, many of the Government Army members remained submissive to German orders until the end, partly due to economic security, and partly fear of reprisals against their families. By 1945, the Czechoslovak government decided to exclude the top of the hierarchy, i.e. the 12 general officers of the Government Army. Yet, only a handful of cadres faced a

[14] Verdict, Prague extraordinary people's court, 11 Oct 1946, VÚA, MNO46, box 44, file 35/2.
[15] Pejčoch, Ivo. "Český svaz válečníků," in *Historie a vojenství* 56, 2007, 16–29.

trial, leading to few sentences.[16] The rest of the officers and NCOs lost the benefit of wartime promotions but reintegrated into the Czechoslovak army. Some were even considered particularly skilled: to give just one example, *vrchní strážmistr* (warrant officer) Karel Křehlík, a gunsmith, was promoted twice after the war, reaching the rank of Captain by 1948.[17]

What about the majority of Czech ex-officers and -NCOs? Not so many could convincingly produce evidence of their participation in the resistance. Moreover, they all had to make small compromises with the occupier. Firstly, almost all the pensioned officers found a job in the administration or industry, i.e. under German control and serving the Reich interests. Some even worked for the armament industry (in companies such as Zbrojovka, Škoda or Junkers). Ex-officers sometimes asked for allowances because they had children or at Christmas time. They were also required to join some of the Protectorate organizations (*Národní souručenství*) or trade unions. Years of life under occupation left them vulnerable to accusations or unfavorable testimonies. As a result, real or perceived collaboration – or simply lack of active resistance – threatened the postwar management of human resources. Too few officers could be considered exemplary and a cleansing process had to start once the country was freed of occupation.

Preservation through mass reintegration

The basic dilemma Czechoslovak leaders faced can be summed up as follows: if we ask for indisputable loyalty and participation in the resistance, we will lose many skilled officers, while if we reintegrate liberally former cadres, we will be criticized and considered too lenient. The majority of the officer corps favored clemency, considering that active resistance was virtually impossible and that only a very small minority of cadres had betrayed the country. Conversely, organizations of former resistance fighters and veterans, as well as several political parties (notably on the left), asked for a harsher retribution. The cleansing process reveals that decision-makers found a way to punish the most compromised officers while retaining a majority of prewar cadres in the army.

Several decrees created people's courts in the Czech lands and in Slovakia, as well as specific provisions for the military personnel. The most important text – 72/1946 – stipulated that collaboration, inaction or age could lead to an exclusion from the army. Special commissions comprised of former resistance fighters and veterans (mostly people back from exile and camps) selected the officers. The applicants had to fill in a form, which contained not only a questionnaire (11 pages!) but also testimonies, often from colleagues, a certificate of "national loyalty" delivered by the local administration, and various expressions of support from resistance organizations or evidence of patriotism. Some even wrote their autobiography, long before the communist model became the norm in Czechoslovakia. Selection was highly subjective,

16 Veselý, Martin. "Retardace, kolaborace a aktivismus armádních elit v Protektorátu Čechy a Morava" (PhD diss., Charles University, Prague, 2013), 406–407, 511.

17 Karel Křehlík (personnel file), VÚA, KL, box 50.

as the men reintegrated had very different profiles, from the most dedicated resistance fighter to quite inactive individuals.

Overall, about 90 percent of applicants were accepted by 1947, including those who had appealed against the initial negative decision of the commission. This high reintegration rate does not take into account the about 1,200 officers who preferred to keep their civilian job and, therefore, did not apply. Moreover, a provision excluded some of the reintegrated officer from any future promotion or position of command. Junior officers were generally the main beneficiaries of this relatively benevolent process, while higher ranks and older cadres struggled to keep their jobs.

Gerontophobia – a veiled purge of the prewar military elite

Indeed, the most striking feature of the cleansing process was probably that most high-ranking officers excluded from the army were not traitors, but deemed too old. Out of 190 generals and colonels excluded from the military after 1945, only 26 percent were accused of collaboration or passivity, while 73 percent had reached the age limit.[18] Retirement was established at 55 in the Czechoslovak military, which does not appear to target the elderly, even at the standard of the time. Truly, some officers had suffered so much from the conditions in concentration camps or from the life under occupation that even men under 55 could look old and be considered unfit for military life. However, it was not the rule, and many officers in their fifties were healthy and willing to continue their career. Consequently, selecting or excluding aging officers was not only a question of resources in skilled cadres, but also a political choice. Prewar top military leaders were associated with the failure of Munich and the capitulation without combat, even in the eyes of many of their peers. The communists viewed them as too conservative and hostile to their plans. Commissions were created to discuss the future of these officers. Some, especially in the technical or medical branches, retained their jobs, because nobody could take their place. Others, typically in the infantry or the cavalry, had to leave. The Minister of Defense, General Svoboda (himself born in 1895), asked in 1947 that more than 850 aging officers should be pensioned off. The generation of men born in the 1880s resisted this evolution but slowly lost its influence to the benefit of officers five or ten years younger.[19] By 1947, the average age of the top 130 military leaders in Czechoslovakia was around 51, with only 21 officers above 55, the oldest being 60-year-old General Rudolf Hošek (pensioned that same year). Similar to most of his aging peers who remained in office (not for long in most cases), he had spent the war in a concentration camp, the others having been in the resistance at home or abroad – which not all officers of his generation could claim.[20] Hence, the number of officers above 55 shrank – a form of gerontophobia resulting in a purge from leadership of the prewar elite. This phenomenon does not seem to have been that common in Europe and

[18] Hanzlík, František. *Diskriminace a perzekuce vojáků v Československu v letech 1945–1955* (Prague: Powerprint, 2015), 31.
[19] Letter from Svoboda to Beneš, 18 Nov 1947, ÚTGM, EBIII, box 33, file 3.
[20] VÚA, KL.

North America, where most military leaders remained in service, sometimes far in their sixties – later on, some countries, such as the Soviet Union, were even shown as military gerontocracies.

The massive reintegration of officers prevented a social crisis and a shortage of staff – also allowing for a mass screening of the officer corps by the army intelligence, which later proved very useful to the communists, who monitored this department. However, representatives of the resistance, the press and the public opinion asked for revenge against traitors. It came in the form of public trials and national cleansing.

Show trials?

Czechoslovakia is characterized by its harsh retribution after 1945, with more than 700 legal executions in the Czech lands.[21] The most striking moments were the trials of Jozef Tiso and the government of the Protectorate. In the army, several military figures faced this harsh transitional justice: patented collaborators, such as the ČSV leader Robert Rychtrmoc, a pensioned general, were executed. Yet, other officers without a clear collaborationist record were also targeted: Jan Syrový and Ludvík Krejčí, at the head of the army in 1938−1939, were blamed for the consequences of the Munich Agreement, including the subsequent occupation. The first was tried and sentenced to 20 years in prison, while the second was pensioned off. These two generals and a couple of other prewar leaders embodied renouncement, compromise and a lack of heroism. It was also a way to discredit the prewar officer corps as a whole, and make every officer suspect, as many had shared a wartime trajectory similar to Syrový or Krejčí. Out of 46 generals in top positions in 1938, only 5 retained a command at the eve of the Coup in February 1948. The others had been killed by the Germans or were pensioned off either immediately or soon after their reintegration, while a few others were sent to diplomatic missions abroad.

National cleansing: pan-Slavism and paradoxes

Retribution did not stop at the elite and prominent collaborators. It also rested on ethnic grounds. Czechoslovakia was originally a multinational state allowing minority members to retain their culture and language, under quite liberal conditions. But this coexistence ended with the Second World War, which fueled ethnic hatreds. By 1945, non-Slavic minorities – Germans and Hungarians – were excluded from citizenship, and millions were expelled. The handful of professional soldiers of German or Hungarian nationality was not reintegrated, whatever their wartime records. A certain level of anti-Semitism also discouraged people of Jewish origin from staying in the army.

This rejection of non-Slavs went hand by hand with a constant promotion of anything Czech and Slovak, in a context of Pan-Slavic "brotherhood" (which included Soviet Russia as the senior partner). The new binational project radically favored the

[21] Frommer, Benjamin. *National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

titular nationalities. For the Slovaks, this was a crucial move towards a complete exoneration from wartime collaboration. Indeed, if a few soldiers of Slovak nationality (General Rudolf Viest or Major Ján Ambruš) had left their country to join the Czech exiles, most of the prewar Slovak officers stayed in the new Slovak State, and benefited from multiple promotions. Almost all of them later fought on the Eastern front against the Soviet Union, which, in the meantime, had become Czechoslovakia's best friend. However, the survival of the postwar Czechoslovak state depended on the Slovak goodwill. As a result, all participants in the Slovak National Uprising (1944) were granted a form of amnesty and considered full-fledged resistance fighters, even if they had clearly collaborated with the Axis previously. Former Slovak State officers, such as Mikuláš Ferjenčík (Secretary of State for Defense, number two of the Ministry, in 1945) made sure that Slovaks would not be excluded from the military or forgotten in the promotion process. Out of 1,521 Slovaks who applied for reintegration, a small minority (180 men) were rejected by the commission (made of Slovaks), less than 12 percent of the total.[22] Only a few cadres who had opposed the Uprising were tried, some being sentenced to death and executed, such as lieutenant-colonel Ján Šmigovský.[23] By 1947, the army had four times more Slovak officers than in 1938, and about 15 percent of top functions were held by Slovaks, including the head of the Slovak Military Region. Though such clemency and generosity met with Czech criticism or indignation, Slovak officers were, on average, younger and more experienced than most of the Czech cadres who had stayed home, making them good recruits for the postwar army.

Once the retribution process ended, the army leadership faced an obvious demographic problem: about 10 percent of the prewar officer corps had died, another 10 percent was unwilling to rejoin the army, and an additional 10 percent was excluded for collaboration, passivity or age, while the war had not allowed for the normal recruitment and training of officers and NCOs. To fill the gap, volunteers had to be found, and the resistances were the most obvious resource for the military.

IV. New men to regenerate the military

Divided resistances: a human reservoir for the army

Recruitment for the armed services started in exile or in partisan groups, but most of the ranks conferred to soldiers were temporary. The real integration into the military as a career officer or NCO required "activation," i.e. turning the wartime volunteer into a postwar professional soldier.

It must be noted that the Czechoslovak resistance was plural and divided. About 300,000 people were registered in an organization representing a branch of the resistance: the exiles (Czechs and Slovaks together), the Czech home resistance and

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[22] Meeting of the Defense Committee of the National Assembly, 20 Feb 1947, VÚA, MNO47, box 14, file 10669.

[23] *Vojenské osobnosti dejín Slovenska, 1939–1945*, ed. by František Cséfalvay (Bratislava: Vojenský Historický *Ústav,* 2013), 238, 251.

the Czech political prisoners, while on the Slovak side, the soldiers of the 1944 Uprising, the partisans and the political prisoners had separate organizations. Every group pushed for promotions and appointments of its members. This competition was economically, nationally and politically motivated: the Communist Party, for instance, dominated the partisans' organizations, and expected some of its leaders to rise quickly within the ranks of the army. For their part, prewar professional soldiers opposed the integration of too many officers without a professional background in the army. Newcomers were considered to be uneducated, having not followed the courses of a military academy or even of a civilian secondary school. However, reforming the educational system of the army proved necessary as well as lessening the admission criteria in military schools. In 1945 alone, 1,140 cadets joined the Hranice military academy, including hundreds of veterans from the resistance in exile and at home. Typically, 75 percent of the Slovak recruits had an incomplete secondary education.[24] Though this influx of young cadres was welcomed, their training took time and would not compensate for the deficit in officers until years later.

Unwilling new men?

Contrary to revolutionary military organizations favoring war experience or Communist Party membership over training and education, such as communist Poland and Yugoslavia (where former partisans completely dominated the military hierarchy), the Czechoslovak army failed to retain or attract resistance veterans. "New men" of the "good" type did exist, but proved reluctant to pursue a military career: the Communist Party, for instance, could – in theory – rely on hundreds, if not thousands, of dedicated activists with precious combat or underground experience. However, a military career with its conservative officers and formal discipline was not attractive to all. Moreover, most of the Communist Party members were, at best, NCOs or junior officers. It would take years to get promoted and reach key positions, even more as prewar experience, such as fighting during the Spanish Civil War, was not taken into consideration by the military administration. Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior, the postwar industry and the borderlands offered good opportunities to fight for the Communist Party or to make a career. Consequently, only a few communist activists found a place in the army, mainly in the intelligence and education departments, headed by two rising stars of the Communist Party, Bedřich Reicin and Jaroslav Procházka. The problem was similar for former partisans: they only had a brief experience of combat (except in Slovakia) and were looked upon with distrust by the military hierarchy. Only 241 of them became career officers.[25] Reserve officers with combat experience were more successful, with about 1,300 recruits for the army after 1945, more than half of them coming from exiled

[24] Hanzlík, František, and Václav Vondrášek. *Armáda v zápase o politickou moc v letech 1945–1948* (Prague: Ministerstvo obrany ČR – AVIS, 2006), 188, 254.

[25] *Vojenské dějiny* Československa, 1945–1955, vol. V, ed. by Petr Klucina (Prague: Naše vojsko, 1989), 71.

units.[26] Better educated, the reservists had, nevertheless, more opportunities in the civilian sector, as engineers or medical doctors, and the army struggled to attract specialists. More than 2,000 NCOs were promoted, but it was only a temporary solution, as these men were much older than the average junior officer just out the military academy, and considered unfit for top positions.[27]

Preservation or revolution: a new officer corps?

Out of 13,000 officers in early 1947, between 3,300 and 4,500 were "newcomers," at least newly nominated, activated or promoted officers. Among them, some already had a long experience of the military, as either reservists or NCOs. Even if the political and military leadership aimed at creating a "new people's army" immune to defeatism and fascism, the situation was more complex: true, the percentage of resistance fighters in the officer corps was higher in Czechoslovakia than, for instance, in France, where the new men were only 10 percent by 1947, at best.[28] However, the prewar career officers strongly maintained their domination over top positions: only 3 percent of the postwar key army offices were held by recently activated civilians (including only one general). By contrast, in Yugoslavia, 65 percent of all generals in office during the first postwar decade were former partisans, the prewar and Croatian State officers being a minority at this level of command.[29]

Interestingly, the communist strategy in 1945–1948 did not rest on a revolutionary project. The Communist Party leaders did their best to infiltrate the army, targeting key positions and high commands, but they quickly realized they lacked the resources in replacements, and that being too aggressive would alienate the moderate officers, i.e. a majority of the army cadres. Yet, what the communists achieved was still significant. They were able to exclude many of the clearly anti-communist officers, using the legal cleansing process to do so, as well as illegal or disloyal methods (e.g. campaigns in the press, forged evidence of plots or collaboration). In addition to fear and resentment, communist leaders in the army also developed a cultural and educational offer to promote a leftist agenda and a strong alliance with the Soviet Union. After years of occupation and in the midst of a difficult economic and material situation, such a line proved rather successful. As regards the military elite, a mix of threats, career promises and ideology allowed for the steady "conversion" of 25 percent of the general staff and ministry top officials between 1945 and 1948. More joined the Communist Party after February 1948 and the training of thousands of junior officers, as well as the draft of communist activists without military education, would later change the face of the Czechoslovak army. The People's Army would become very similar to other East European armies in the mid-1950s and demonstrate

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[26] Letter from Minister Svoboda, 21 Dec 1946, VÚA, MNO46, box 10, file 2161.

[27] Hanzlík and Vondrášek, *Armáda v zápase* (see note 24), 93.

[28] d'Abzac-Epezy, Claude. "Épuration, dégagements, exclusions. Les réductions d'effectifs dans l'armée française (1940–1947)," in *Vingtième, Siècle* 59, 1998, 62–75.

[29] Dimitrijević, Bojan B. *Jugoslovenska armija 1945–1954: nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 222–231.

its allegiance to the Soviet Union within the framework of the newly established Warsaw Pact organization.

V. Conclusion: a pre-Stalinist management of human resources?

The management of human resources in the postwar Czechoslovak army was definitively hybrid: on the one hand, a legal and regular process was enforced to exclude and include officers and NCOs from and into the military, following democratic standards. It allowed for the reintegration of a majority of the cadres, even without resistance records. On the other hand, the whole process was highly politicized, turning the officer corps into a battlefield for decision-makers. Between show trials, press campaigns and fear of denunciations, army members could feel vulnerable and threatened. Nevertheless, retrospectively, the transition period between 1945 and 1948 almost appeared to be an easy time compared to the Stalinist moment that followed the Coup.

III.

War Mortgage – After Old and New Wars Have Ended

Blaž Torkar

The End of the Second World War in Slovenian Territory and the Challenges of Peace

Abstract

The Slovene Partisan Army, with some 37,000 fighters, under the leadership of the Liberation Front, in which the Communist Party had the most important role, was part of the Yugoslav Partisan Resistance Movement and an integral section of the Anti-Fascist Coalition. Cooperation on the side of the Anti-Fascist Coalition is seen as the decisive contribution to the fact that Slovenia, as a part of Socialist Yugoslav Federal Republic, received the greater part of Slovene Littoral and exit to the sea. This contributed to one of the biggest social transformations in recent history, and the establishment of statehood in the form of the Socialist Yugoslav Federal Republic with its own Assembly, Government and the constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination, including the right to secession.

I. Introduction

The aim of my article is to examine the military situation on Slovene territory at the end of the Second World War. The war had terrible consequences, probably the most severe in Slovenian history, and brought great political, territorial and social changes to Slovenes. The Yugoslav liberation movement was one of the strongest movements in Europe, with very distinctive political characteristics, which were given a dominant tone by the Communists. Owing to their illegal organisation, they were the only group who maintained a political network across the entire divided Yugoslav territory after the occupation, organised resistance, were the most prominent in it, and used their endeavours, which engaged people in a mass movement, to carry out a revolution. They succeeded in doing this mostly because the pre-war political forces – as in some other occupied European countries – were unable to cope with the situation at hand. The majority of the government and leaders of political parties fled, while those who stayed wanted to maintain at least an appearance of their authority by collaborating with the occupiers, or passively waited for more favourable circumstances or liberation from the outside. Since Yugoslavia had suffered a severe economic and political crisis before the war, and individual nations and minorities had

been oppressed, people saw the resistance movement as a guarantee for a different political order after the war and for the correction of national and social injustices.[1]

II. The situation in Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War: the military aspect and final operations

Notions of what the post-war regime of Yugoslavia after a victory over Fascism and Nazism would be like were very different. Nevertheless, the goals – in addition to liberation – on which the liberation movement founded a common strategy during the first two years of the war could generally be grouped into the following demands: the restoration of Yugoslavia within the pre-war borders with certain corrections (the annexation of the Slovene Littoral, Istria and part of Dalmatia, which fell under Italy in accordance with the Treaty of London; part of Carinthia; and the Raba Valley); national equality and a federal form of government; and a plebiscite on the internal state arrangement (a monarchy or a republic). In addition, the Communists' objective was to carry out a communist revolution. The Yugoslav liberation movement was very diverse and marked by the specifics of individual regions, different occupation systems, and various different interests of individual nations and social groups, thus, it is impossible to speak of any common characteristics. It was difficult to mount joint resistance where international conflicts grew into a bloody ethnic war, for example, between Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The liberation movement there promoted the motto of brotherhood and unity, which meant recognition of the equality of all nations. During the Second World War, a civil war raged in certain parts of Yugoslavia, the most prominent being the war in Serbia between the royalist Chetniks, led by Draža Mihailović, who collaborated with the occupiers despite their Anglophilism, and Tito's Partisans. The situation was similar in Montenegro. Combat took place in nearly all Yugoslav territory. In addition to ethnic clashes and settling the score, the main reasons for the conflicts were collaboration, on the one hand, and Communist aspirations to pummel class enemies before the end of the war under the auspices of the national liberation movement, on the other. It is difficult to determine who was the first to start in individual cases; however, generally speaking, collaboration began before the liberation movement. In principle, the roots of the conflicts lay in the pre-war political divisions, and only escalated into armed conflict under war conditions.[2]

The decision to establish a common liberation movement and the restoration of Yugoslavia was not taken by all nations simultaneously or uniformly. There was trouble not only in Bosnia, which was burdened by the Ustashe's genocide against the Serbs and the Jews (with the Muslims participating in the massacre), but also in Croatia, where many people in the Independent State of Croatia saw an embryo of their own state in spite of the Ustashe regime. There were also problems in

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1 Repe, Božo. "Priprave na konec vojne in osvoboditev Slovenije," in *Studia Historica Slovenica*, 16/2, 2016, 289–323, 529, here 293.

2 Borak, Neven et al. *Slovenska novejša zgodovina: od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije 1848–1992, 1* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 2005), 622–623.

Macedonia, where people rejected any Yugoslavism due to their negative experience in the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bulgarian propaganda about "liberation" had significant success. In Kosovo, where only the Serbs resisted initially, the National Liberation Committee in power saw the realisation of the Albanians' right to self-determination in annexing Kosovo to Albania as late as 1944 (the Bujan Conference, named after the village near the Kosovo border in Albania where it took place). The first to decide to include Slovenian Partisan units in a common Yugoslav movement was the Supreme Plenum of the Liberation Front in Slovenia in mid-September 1941.[3]

Only during the second half of the war did the equal relationship between the centre of the Yugoslav movement and individual regions begin to change, and the resistance movement began to become centralised. In this process, the role of Secretary General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Partisans, Josip Broz Tito, grew increasingly important. With the exception of the core circle of leadership, he was not known to the public at first (rumours spread that he did not even exist as a real person, that he was a man sent from Moscow, and so on), but later, his personality reached legendary proportions and gradually, through uncritical adoration, grew into a personality cult. Military centralisation was completed in the spring of 1945 with the inclusion of the independent national Partisan armies into a unified Yugoslav Army, and political centralisation with the establishment and operation of central authority bodies (the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia and the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia) and especially with international recognition of the new (second) Yugoslavia.[4]

The Communist Party did not acknowledge the division of Yugoslavia and, during the first months of occupation, collected weapons and prepared the organisation for war conditions. Politically, the leadership followed the Comintern's assessment that the Second World War was an "imperialist war", and called for an uprising, firstly, on the day of the attack on the Soviet Union, and, secondly, on 4 July 1941. Due to the Ustashe violence towards the Serbs, considerable resistance before the attack on the Soviet Union was only put up in parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leadership considered the attack on the Soviet Union as an opportunity for the imperialist war to change into a revolutionary war; however, as early as 1941, the revolutionary goal was pushed into the background, while the liberation character of the national liberation movement was emphasised.[5]

A decisive year for the Yugoslav Partisans was 1943. In the fierce Battle of the Neretva in the spring of 1943, they managed to break the Chetniks' squads brought over by the Italians, and break through to Herzegovina, Montenegro, Sandžak and eastern Bosnia by mid-May 1943. A third of approximately 20,000 Partisans (mostly

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3 *Dokumenti ljudske revolucije v Sloveniji, Knjiga 1, marec 1941–marec 1942*, ed. by Miroslav Luštek (Ljubljana: Inštitut za zgodovino delavskega gibanja, 1962), dokument 109, 121.

4 Petranović, Branko and Momčilo Zečević. *Jugoslavija 1918–1984: zbirka dokumenata* (Beograd: Rad, 1985), 543.

5 Borak et al., *Slovenska novejša zgodovina* (see note 2), 621–623.

Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats and Muslims, but also other nationalities) fell in the Battle of Sutjeska (June 1943). After these battles, the strategic initiative gradually passed to the Partisan side, which no longer just adapted their operations to enemy pressure. This was fuelled by the formation of new centres of resistance in the south of Serbia and Macedonia, and also in Kosovo and Metohija.[6]

After the capitulation of Italy, the units of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia disarmed the majority of Italian units and acquired a large amount of weaponry, ammunition and equipment. By this time, the Partisan Army counted over 300,000 soldiers, and the Germans could no longer hinder it effectively. The first larger motorised units were being established, and also the National Liberation Army's navy. Even though the imbalance in power was reduced significantly and adversaries, occupiers and various quisling units were still large in number (approximately 650,000), they were forced to defend the most important strategic points, especially the Adriatic coast and access to it, transport connections and industrial centres. They were incapable of setting up an occupying system over a substantial part of Yugoslav territory again anew, even though they had reconquered part of the liberated territory, particularly along the Adriatic coast and its immediate hinterland, in the autumn of 1943 and the winter of 1944. The development of military operations in the final two years of the war in Yugoslavia was most affected by Hitler's decision to defend "Fortress Europe" in the Balkans as well. He kept the strong Army Group E in Greece, and wanted to retain transport connections through Yugoslavia and renew control over the Yugoslav coast at any cost. In the spring of 1944 he tried to decisively defeat the liberation movement in Yugoslavia one last time. On 25 May 1944, he tried to destroy Tito and the leadership of the National Liberation Movement with a combined airborne, motorised and infantry operation, the Raid on Drvar. After several days of combat and severe losses on both sides, the operation failed and the Supreme Headquarters retreated via Bari to the island of Vis. The planning of the final operations was impacted by military strategic and political factors; the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia transferred the centre of gravity of military operations to Serbia (as support to the advancing Red Army and due to the destruction of the Chetniks movement, so as to disable the influence of the pre-war ruling leaders). The other objective was Dalmatia; its liberation would eliminate all reasons for the disembarkation of the British and American troops there. Through co-ordinated operations of the central units of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and Montenegro, eastern Bosnia and Serbia, and in cooperation with the Red Army (from September 1944), most of Serbia, including Vojvodina and Belgrade, was liberated, and also Macedonia, Kosovo, Metohija and Montenegro by the end of 1944. The Chetniks' leader, Draža Mihailović, withdrew to eastern Bosnia with approximately 15,000 men. In December 1944, Dalmatia was liberated, and the National

[6] Anić, Nikola, Sekula Joksimović and Mirko Gutić, *Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije: pregled razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta 1941–1945* (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1982), 237–240.

Liberation Army units counted 600,000 soldiers. The main body of their force was transformed into armies.[7]

The Partisan Army was renamed the Yugoslav Army on 1 March 1945. Over the winter, it had transitioned to the frontal method of warfare from the river Drava, across Srem (the central part of the front) to Bosnia and the northern Adriatic Sea. Due to their lack of experience with position warfare, the Syrmian Front claimed many casualties. Slovenian and Croatian units in the non-liberated part mostly attacked transport connections and expanded the liberated area. They engaged in combat with Army Group E units, which were retreating from Greece (approximately 400,000 soldiers), and quisling squads (200,000 soldiers). The German and quisling units were defeated in the last Yugoslav Army offensive in the spring of 1945, and by 15 May, the entire pre-war Yugoslav territory, Istria with Trieste, the Slovene Littoral and parts of Carinthia were liberated.[8]

The Yugoslav national liberation movement tied to itself an average of over 30 occupying divisions during the war, and, in this way, significantly contributed to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. Over 300,000 members of the national liberation movement lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands survived the war in concentration and prisoner of war camps. Tito and the Yugoslav political leadership spoke of 1,700,000 victims, a number then also adopted by historiography. However, this number has raised legitimate doubts, especially considering the high numbers of people killed in certain camps (the infamous Jasenovac, Ustashe-run camp was attributed to up to 700,000 casualties). Regardless of different opinions and counts, the death toll was enormous. This number was considerably increased by the civil war raging in Yugoslavia, during which many of the civilian population were killed for political (class), religious or national reasons. The objective was to create "ethnically clean" national states or, at least, areas: the Independent State of Croatia without the Serbs; Greater Albania without the Serbs; and Greater Serbia without the Croats, Muslims and other national minorities. The Muslim religious and political leaderships in Bosnia were divided into those who recognised the Independent State of Croatia and accepted the thesis about the "Muslim Croats," and others who strove for an autonomous Bosnia and Herzegovina under a German protectorate, which they compared to the situation in Austria-Hungary where the government in Vienna relied largely on the Muslims to achieve its objectives in Bosnia. They also demanded special Muslim military units. For the most part, Germany did not accede to their demands, with the exception of a special SS mountain division, the Handschar, which consisted mostly of Muslims.

The political, military, ethnic and religious groups and organisations involved in the conflicts were numerous and diverse, and often had opposing goals within themselves. The most important were the Chetniks and the Ustashe. Of all the various groups, the Chetniks were the closest to becoming a liberation movement parallel to the Partisans. They had the firm support of the Western Allies almost

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7 Repe, "Priprave na konec vojne" (see note 1), 297–299.

8 Kostić, Uroš. *Oslobođenje Istre, Slovenačkog primorja i Trsta 1945* (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1978), 4–35; Cox, Geoffrey. *Race for Trieste* (London: Kimber, 1977), 150–169.

until the end of 1943. Their strategy was focused on the predominance of Serbia in restored Yugoslavia; a confrontation with the Croats and national minorities as the chief culprits of the defeat of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the suffering of the Serbian population; and the ideology of ethnically clean Greater Serbia with access to the sea, with Kordun, Banija, Slavonija, Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia to Šibenik, and Lika, with borders up to Karlovac and Ogulin and corrected borders with Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary. The Serbs were to become a lead nation in the Balkans, even though the Chetniks allowed for a federal union with a reduced Croatia in Yugoslavia. Their leader was Dragoljub Mihailović, a Colonel before the war, then a Brigade and Division General, Minister of War in the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Initially, the Chetniks and the Partisans cooperated, but a schism was created between them in the autumn of 1941 and they began fighting each other. The Chetniks, like the Ustashe, were well-known for their cruel treatment of the civilian population and prisoners of war.[9]

Various forms of violence – killing, torture, pogroms of the civilian population, concentration camps, banishment, deportations, genocide – took on terrifying dimensions in Yugoslavia during the war. The occupiers behaved criminally, with their attitude based on the belief that the population was "second class", so the Germans would, for instance, shoot tens of or even a hundred hostages for one missing soldier and fifty for one wounded soldier. They wanted to prevent any resistance with reprisals. Individual and mass executions of hostages, the burning down of villages, the rape of women, the killing of the civilian population during war campaigns, and the executions of the wounded and prisoners of war who were denied military status were amongst the planned tactics ordered by German generals. Other occupiers did not differ significantly from the Germans, and encouraged local quisling authorities to partake in the crimes. Approximately three and a half million members of different nations from Yugoslav territory were sent to different camps across Europe, many of which went to concentration camps and prisons in Yugoslavia. The appalling conditions in them were not much different from the widely known German concentration camps, except that the method of execution was not as "perfected".

The occupiers' reprisals and the ethnic and religious conflicts caused the greatest suffering for the civilian population. Compared to the Chetniks, the Ustashe and others, the Partisans were much more disciplined; ethics and strict observation of Partisan norms and laws were instilled in them. Nevertheless, they were not devoid of revenge, score settling, torture and the killing of civilians. However, these were not, unlike their adversaries, their established methods of "warfare". There were also many inadvertent casualties as a result of attempts to usher in the second phase of the revolution and related class sectarianism. The reputation of the national liberation movement was tarnished by the mass out-of-court pummelling of the members of quisling formations after the war.[10]

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9 Tomasevich, Jozo. *Četnici u drugom svetskom ratu 1941–1945* (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1979), 191–210, 259–270, 302–319, 383–386; Repe, "Priprave na konec vojne" (see note 1), 300.

10 Repe, "Priprave na konec vojne" (see note 1), 300.

III. The end of the war in Slovenia

After the capitulation of Italy, the Germans occupied the entire Slovenian territory, except that which was controlled by the Partisans. They administered approximately half of it (Styria, Carinthia and Carniola) themselves, and the other half through subordinate administrative bodies, Italian (the Slovene Littoral, Slavia Friulan, Resia and Istria), Slovenian (the Province of Ljubljana) and Hungarian (Prekmurje and Medjimurje). All these subordinate bodies had very little competence, and the fundamental denationalising objectives were no different; only the tactics in Carinthia changed partly. Regarding the annexation of the Slovene Littoral to the Reich, the Germans had to take Mussolini into account (so the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral was established as a military administrative unit). In anticipation of the Allied disembarkation in Istria and Dalmatia, they began building fortified defence systems in Istria between Trieste, Rijeka and Postojna, and in northern Italy, with the help of a, enforced labour force. They fortified individual cities in the rear area (Maribor, Celje, Ljubljana and others). Regarding the retreat, which they also planned, they prepared everything to blow up important industrial and other installations in accordance with a "scorched-earth" plan. In 1945, they began transporting machines and other devices, goods, stocks, food and other things to Austrian lands. From the late autumn of 1944, when it had become clear that the disembarkation was not going to take place, they commenced preparations for the withdrawal of the German Army from the Balkans. They recaptured the liberated territories and, for one final time, attempted to destroy the Partisan movement with a series of offensives. They endangered White Carniola with an offensive at Kočevski Rog, and Partisan institutions had to retreat to Gorski Kotar just before the end of the war. They concentrated the units of the Serbian State Guard (Nedićevci) and the Serbian Volunteer Corps (Ljotićevci), and the Chetniks from Dalmatia, Lika and Bosnia in the Slovene Littoral. A total of 25,000 members of these units and just under 7,500 members of the German Army saw final combat with the Yugoslav Army and the Slovenian Partisans here.

In April 1945, Slovenian territory became the rear area of the Eastern (the penetration of the Red Army into Prekmurje) and Western Fronts. The border was the river Drava. The defence concept of the ardent, but weakened, German forces and quisling units was poorly formulated. The majority of the rear area was in the Partisan, "Bandengebiet" area, so the German Army Group E, which was retreating from the Balkans, got stuck in Slovenian territory and was forced to surrender to the much weaker Slovenian Partisans.[11]

Both the Partisan and the anti-Partisan camps began to systematically prepare for the end of the war. These preparations were both military and political. In the summer of 1944, when the expectations of the Allied disembarkation had become

[11] Ferenc, Tone. *Ljudska oblast na Slovenskem: 1941–1945. 2, Narod si bo pisal sodbo sam* (Ljubljana: Borec, 1985), 287–321; Ferenc, Tone. *Kapitulacija Italije in narodnoosvobodilna borba v Sloveniji jeseni 1943* (Maribor: Obzorja, 1967), 352–374; Stuhlpfarrer, Karl. *Die Operationszonen "Alpenvorland" und "Adriatisches Küstenland" 1943–1945* (Wien: Brüder Hollinek, 1969), 32–71.

general, the anti-Partisan camp tried to strengthen the Chetnik units as much as possible at the expense of the Home Guard. Pro-German Leon Rupnik was against this, and the Germans also reacted harshly. Several arrests were made among the Home Guard, and some officers were sent to concentration camps. Attempts to make the anti-Partisan camp under the Germans equal to the Liberation Front were feeble, even leaving aside the Yugoslav and global development of events. Disunity still remained characteristic of the anti-Partisan camp, and the split between it and politicians in London was deepening. The chasm was to be bridged by the National Committee as a non-party body, which was supposed to commence the procedure for achieving tactical cooperation with the Liberation Front, and a secret national army under a single command was to be organised, comprised of the Chetniks and the Home Guard. Regardless of the talks with the Liberation Front, the Allies were to be sent an urgent message saying that all units had been issued an order for a joint fight with Tito's Partisans against the occupiers. Even though pre-war politicians were convinced that this was impossible to accomplish in the field, they no longer dared to resist verbal consent to tactical cooperation with the Liberation Front. The National Committee for Slovenia convened for the first time as late as 15 January 1945, and the Presidency even later, on 21 February. On 3 May 1945, the National Committee for Slovenia met in the Sokol hall at Tabor in Ljubljana. It proclaimed itself the Slovenian parliament, elected a Slovenian national representation (the National Government of Slovenia), and adopted a manifesto saying that a national state of Slovenia would be established as part of democratic and federal Yugoslavia for all territory inhabited by Slovenians. The meeting was only a political manifestation without significant effect, and an expression of a completely wrong assessment of the situation (the expectations of the Anglo-American occupation of Slovenian territory, the collapse of the anti-Fascist coalition during the war and a potential armed conflict between the Allies). The attempt to assume authority had no chance of success due to the power of the national liberation camp. Moreover, in March 1945, following an agreement at the Yugoslav level between the representatives of the Partisan government and the royal government (the Tito-Šubašić Agreement), a common government was formed and the newly established Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was recognised by the Allies.[12]

In spite of the agreements, the plan for the Home Guard, together with quislings who had fled from other parts of Yugoslavia, to fight against the Yugoslav Army and to subordinate certain Yugoslav units from Serbia (Ljotićevci, Nedić's State Guard) failed in the end. The envisaged Slovenian national army never came to fruition. The Germans handed over authority to the National Committee as late as 5 May, following Friedrich Rainer's permission. At that time, resurgent Austrian parties in Klagenfurt were already calling for Rainer's resignation. The members of the National Committee gathered in the Casino Building with Erwin Rösener. Rösener told them that he had decided to annex Upper Carniola to the Province of Ljubljana. All this

[12] Repe, "Priprave na konec vojne" (see note 1), 316; Ferenc, Tone. "Priprave na konec vojne," in *Slovenija v letu 1945: zbornik referatov*, ed. by Aleš Gabrič (Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 1996), 7–36.

took place during the time when the Home Guard and the anti-Partisan camp had already begun to withdraw to Carinthia. The Home Guard did not manage to separate from the Germans by the end of the war. Neither the Home Guard not the Chetniks were capable of defending themselves against the advance of the Yugoslav Army, so they retreated, partly to Friuli and mostly to Carinthia, together with the Germans, where they surrendered to the British on 12 May. The entire political leadership and approximately 6,000 civilians also fled. In anticipation of an armed conflict between the British Army and the Yugoslav Army, they carried out military reorganisation in the Vetrinjsko polje camps, and also recruited refugees to the units. They expected to return with British units and assume power; however, in reality and under the pretence of taking them to Italy, the British led them from Carinthia (but not – with a few exceptions – from Friuli) and returned them as prisoners of war. Mass killings and other forms of taking revenge followed.[13]

The Partisan camp began preparing for the end of the war in co-ordination with the Yugoslav leadership, but it continued to determine offensive objectives on its own throughout 1944 (with the exception of actions co-ordinated with the Allies). Military organisation had practically remained unchanged since the late-autumn of 1943, except that the Slovenian Partisan army was formally integrated into the Yugoslav Army. The anticipated Allied disembarkation in Istria in 1944 (initial expectations of it had appeared the year before) accelerated Partisan preparations for the end of the war in all areas. After the landing in Normandy, this possibility was reduced. It was opposed by the Americans, and also by part of the British military and political leadership, while it was strongly supported by Churchill personally for political reasons. Nevertheless, it was never completely ruled out. It came to attention again on 12 August 1944 by Churchill in his meeting with Tito, when he asked whether the Partisans would help the Allies if they disembarked in Istria, to which Tito gave a positive reply. It is unclear whether this was simply a "test", seeing as the Allied army landed in Southern France as part of Operation Anvil a few day later. In any case, the Yugoslav leadership counted on it, since Tito made Churchill aware in his letter, sent before their second meeting, that a national liberation army was operating and a civil Partisan administration was organised in Istria and Slovenia. Churchill's position in the talks was that an Allied military administration would have to be established in Istria after the disembarkation, which would also temporarily abolish the sovereignty of the Italian state.[14]

After Tito's return from Italy, preparations for a potential development of events commenced immediately. The Slovenian leadership estimated that the Slovenian Littoral required its own authority body again, which would carry considerable weight, especially in the event of the Allied disembarkation and the occupation of the Littoral. On 15 September, the Regional National Liberation Committee for the Slovenian Littoral was elected, which operated until the conclusion of the Paris

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[13] Grum, France et al. *Vetrinjska tragedija: v spomin nesmrtnim junakom, izdanim v Vetrinju od 27.−31. maja 1945 in pomorjenim za velike ideje svobode* (Ljubljana: Magnolija, 1991), 15−25.

[14] *Tito–Churchill, strogo tajno*, ed. by Dušan Biber (Zagreb, Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, ČGP Delo, Oour Globus, 1981), 274−275.

Peace Treaty in February 1947. Overall, the preparations for the end of the war were broader: military, political, economic and diplomatic. The military objective was to liberate the entire Slovenian national territory, including the Slovenian Littoral, Slavia Friulana, Resia and Carinthia. The Partisans would cooperate with the Allies as much as possible while maintaining their independence, and, most importantly, demonstrate that this territory was part of Yugoslavia through authority bodies and manifestations. The Partisans in the Slovenian Littoral, and Italian units, were included in operational and rear units out of fear that the Allies would not recognise them as part of the national liberation army.

The political preparations encompassed the takeover of power and were carried out through an accelerated development of people power after the capitulation of Italy. The main event was the Assembly of the Delegates of the Slovenian Nation in Kočevje and its elections, which were held not only in Inner Carniola and Lower Carniola, but also in the Slovenian Littoral, Istria and elsewhere. The Assembly expressed its trust in the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front and adopted a decision on a general mobilisation of all people's forces and material resources for liberation. It also elected a 42-member delegation to be sent to the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), and decided that the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front would enter AVNOJ on behalf of the sovereign Slovenian nation. The Assembly adopted a declaration which, among other things, said:

> As the first freely-elected delegates, gathered amidst the fiercest fight for national survival, we declare on behalf of the struggling people that the Slovenian nation finally validly stepped into the circle of sovereign nations today. (Resolution adopted at the Assembly of the Delegates of the Slovenian Nation, and Declaration of the Assembly of the Delegates of the Slovenian Nation).

The Slovenian National Liberation Committee was renamed the Slovenian National Liberation Council at its first session, held in Črnomelj on 19 February 1944. In this session, it adopted the Resolution of the Slovenian National Liberation Council on the Fundamental Rights and Obligations of the Citizen. As the Slovenian parliament, the Council was active until its second session and dissolution in Ljubljana on 9–10 September 1946. (From then until the election of the Constituent Assembly of the People's Republic of Slovenia on 18 November 1946, the Presidium of the Council acted on its behalf.) The executive body issuing ordinances was the Presidency of the Council (simultaneously the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front). The Slovenian liberation movement kept the composition of authority formed in this way and did not, unlike other nations in Yugoslavia, establish an anti-Fascist council. On 5 May 1945 in Ajdovščina, the Presidency of the Slovenian National Liberation Council appointed the National Government of Slovenia, headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia, Boris Kidrič, and comprising the representatives of all the founding groups and a few former pre-war politicians.[15]

[15] Repe, "Priprave na konec vojne" (see note 1), 319–320.

With the established political structure of authority, concrete preparations began for the takeover of cities, ensuring law and order and providing supplies and other pragmatic measures related to living, as well as taking over the banking system and industry, and insuring against capital flight. Systematic detailed expert studies for the post-war period were published by the Scientific Institute at the Presidency of the Slovenian National Liberation Council. These included the questions of borders and minorities. The German minority was to be deported (this was also the position of the anti-Partisan camp, making it one of the few things, if not the only one, concerning the post-war period on which both camps agreed). Other bodies of the Presidency of the Slovenian National Liberation Council also prepared approximately 115 detailed expert studies on the post-war period. Based on these, specific plans were developed for each region and each settlement. The first assumption of power and the organisation of post-war living began in Prekmurje, which was liberated by the Red Army in cooperation with weak Slovenian Partisan units. The new authority structure came to Murska Sobota via Belgrade behind the front line.

In addition to the military and political segments, the third important aspect was the establishment of a federal Slovenia. This was carried out after the second AVNOJ session, in the context of the contradictory legal and political formation of republic statehood, a strong Slovenian representation in AVNOJ, the unified government of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and simultaneous centralisation processes (first in security bodies – the Department for People's Protection (OZNA) and the army – and then in other bodies).[16]

IV. The consequences of the war

The end of the war was carefully planned in the victorious Partisan camp, with only a few matters left to chance or uncontrollable development. Taking into account their small number, the territory and the situation in which they found themselves, the Slovenians definitely contributed more to the victory of the anti-Fascist coalition than its forces could have expected. Slovenia also saw total war, which affected the whole population and the entire territory. It had devastating consequences, probably the most far-reaching in history. In addition to 98,723 fatalities (including the post-war killings), 39,129 men and 11,058 women, or a total of 50,187 people, suffered damage to their health and physical injuries. Dozens of settlements were completely demolished or burnt down, and a large part of the industry and public infrastructure was destroyed. The war damage caused by the Germans, Austrians, Italians, Hungarians and Croats (the Independent State of Croatia) was only partially repaid in the decades after the war or not at all. All the consequences of the war are impossible to fully assess either through numbers or in the psychosocial sense. Among other things, the war changed the demographic and national structure of

[16] Godeša, Bojan. "Dileme glede državnopravnega položaja med drugo svetovno vojno," in *Historični seminar 6*, ed. by Katarina Keber and Katarina Šter (Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 2008), 139–156; Godeša, Bojan. "Osvobodilna fronta slovenskega naroda in Jugoslavija (1941–1945)," in *Slovenci v Jugoslaviji*, ed. by Zdenko Čepič (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2015), 51–71.

the Slovenian population. The German minority, approximately 25,000 people, left Slovenian territory during and after the war. Regarding the western border, both international border agreements, the Treaty of Peace with Italy (1947) and the London Memorandum (1954), acknowledged the right to choose citizenship. Accordingly, people who lived in this area could freely opt for Yugoslav or Italian citizenship; 21,323 people (mostly Italian) decided to emigrate for reasons of a political and economic nature. A further 17,000 people emigrated from Slovenia for political reasons. For this reason, the end of the Second World War in Slovenia signalled the beginning of forming a nearly "pure" national state with numerically weak Hungarian and Italian minorities.

The Liberation Front set the foundations for the Slovene republic during the Second World War. Slovenia was a state with the constitutionally granted right to self-determination and secession in the Yugoslav Federation. The constitution of 1974 especially reiterated the right of the Yugoslav nations to self-determination and recognised the precedence of republican over the federal laws as a prerequisite for consensual decision-making on common issues.[17]

[17] Troha, Nevenka. *Nasilje vojnih in povojnih dni* (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2014), 11–46; Žnidaršič, Ivica. *Nemčija še ni plačala vojne škode: vojna škoda in vojne odškodnine* (Ljubljana: Društvo izgnancev Slovenije 1941–1945, 2015); Repe, "Priprave na konec vojne" (see note 1), 320–321.

Erin R. McCoy

The Echoing Whimper: The United States' Slow Exit from Viet Nam and the Legacy of the "American War"

Abstract

This paper will argue that collective memory, which writer Susan Sontag defines as "not a remembering but a stipulating: that *this* is important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the pictures that lock the story in our minds,"[1] keeps the war alive. Furthermore, I will argue that there are unreconciled wounds from the Viet Nam War, in Viet Nam and in the United States. These battle scars shaped the current and wildly polarized American political sphere. America's slow – not a bang, but a whimper – 1975 exit from Viet Nam was marred by political shadowboxing and spurred by social and cultural protest. While the bloodshed may have stopped, did the war actually ever end?

I. Introduction

In January 1973, United States (US) President Nixon announced that American troops would withdraw from Viet Nam, leaving the combat arena with "peace and honor." By March of that same year, the last soldier left Viet Nam, which ultimately fell to the Northern forces in April of 1975. In the years following the war, Viet Nam continued policies favoring those who had remained loyal to the Communist Party; Vietnamese who collaborated with the Americans were subject to time in brutal "reeducation" camps, their sentence indefinite. This period of Vietnamese history – roughly from 1979–1990 – is rendered as a blank space at the Viet Nam Museum of Revolution in Ha Noi. The US only appears again in the Museum's historical timeline in 2000, marking Bill Clinton's visit. Tourists traveling through Viet Nam today see not only the visible footprints of the "American War" (such as bomb craters or nongovernmental organizations for those affected by Agent Orange[2]) but also the obvious signs of the current relationship status between the US and Viet Nam (such as Starbucks and Taylor Swift songs). Cultural reverberations of the war continue: Northern (communist) Vietnamese veterans are socially venerated. When they die, they receive burial as martyrs in state-run cemeteries. The remains of "South

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1 Sontag, Susan. *Regarding the Pain of Others* (London: Picador, 2003), 76.

2 A toxic chemical defoliant used by the US during the Viet Nam War.

Vietnamese" (ARVN[3]) veterans are given no recognition. Contemporary Viet Nam peddles strong "war tourism" experiences, which range from day tours centered around the My Lai Massacre site (in an authentic American Jeep!) to the traumatic War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City.

Viet Nam War remnants are also evident in the US. Not only does a large *ViệtKiều* (overseas Vietnamese) population live in the US, but many of these US citizens were refugees from the War. Alarmingly, the South Vietnamese flag (banned in Viet Nam) was seen flying during the Capitol Hill insurrection on 6 January 2021. American Viet Nam Veterans are finally receiving some recognition for their service, due in part to the popularity of Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's 2017 PBS documentary *The Vietnam War*.[4] Vietnamese-American writers, such as Ocean Voung and Viet Thanh Nguyen, have gained critical acclaim for their books about the War, while Viet Nam veteran authors' works, such as Tim O'Brien and Karl Marlantes, can be found in college textbooks. This paper will argue that collective memory, which writer Susan Sontag defines as "not a remembering but a stipulating: that *this* is important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the pictures that lock the story in our minds,"[5] keeps the war alive. Furthermore, I will argue that there are unreconciled wounds from the Viet Nam War, in Viet Nam and in the US. These battle scars shaped the current and wildly polarized American political sphere. America's slow – not a bang, but a whimper – 1975 exit from Viet Nam was marred by political shadowboxing and spurred by social and cultural protest. While the bloodshed may have stopped, did the war actually ever end?

II. Exit Strategy

The Viet Nam War "ended" officially on 7 January 1973, at least by the standards of international diplomacy and official documents were signed by parties involved. The Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam represented a truce achieved "eight years after the massive American combat build up in South Vietnam had begun and 28 years after America had become involved in the Indochina struggle," and included "the United States, DRV, ARVN, and PRG."[6] But the Paris Peace Agreement was a hard one. It required compromise between egos jockeying for international acclaim, and, in the US, the whittling down of President Nixon's legendary impatient fury. Nixon ousted former President Lyndon Johnson from the White House partly through back-channel deal brokering with Viet Nam, which Johnson knew about due to his own network of political spies. Long before the Paris Peace Agreement, Nixon felt his grip on Viet Nam was tenuous, and despite ramped up bombing campaigns and tough-guy television addresses, by 1971, Nixon did not feel as confident about his hardline stance about ending the war with as much bombast (and the appearance of an American victory) as he had hoped.

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3 Army of the Republic of Viet Nam, allied with the US during the war.
4 "The Vietnam War", documentary by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick (PBS, 2017).
5 Sontag, *Regarding the Pain* (see note 1), 76.
6 Kimball, Jeffrey. *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 368.

Historian Jeffrey Kimball noted that the antiwar movement, which many felt peaked in the late 1960s, was still a thorn in Nixon's side:

> Despite Nixon's brave front, the combined effect of demonstrations, congressional resolutions, and polls was to remind the president that he missed in the war sooner rather than later. Because he had not given up on his aim of saving the Saigon regime, he needed to play for time. Thus, he walked a tightrope between having to strengthen [South Viet Nam President] Thieu's position and having to withdraw American troops from South Vietnam before the 1972 elections … In late April [1971] as he worried about the antiwar demonstrations in Washington and complained about the impatience of the American people, he lectured himself and others about the need for patience and persistence …[7]

Aside from domestic unrest in the US, Nixon was also growing frustrated with the lack of progress in Viet Nam. The President used Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as his dealmaker, and Nixon began to chafe at what he perceived as Kissinger softening to the peace demands of the North Vietnamese. On 12 December1972, a little more than a month before the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, Le Duc Tho, the late Ho Chi Minh's successor and a prominent North Vietnamese revolutionary, interrupted what looked to be progressive peace talks. Acting as a North Vietnamese diplomat, Tho "informed Kissinger that he would have to return to Hanoi to consult with his government, citing disagreement within the Politburo concerning the changes demanded by the United States."[8] Kissinger recalls

> the instructions he received from Nixon from December 5 to 12 were erratic and contradictory. The President wanted [him] to stay as long as there was any hope of the settlement; To return for consultations if I judge the deadlock to be unbreakable; to recess but not to adjourn the talks; and to brief the press if he decided to resume bombing.[9]

To expedite the Peace Talks, Nixon started making speeches about Viet Nam, making two in January, one merely days before the Peace Talks were signed, in order to pressure the Vietnamese. The President viewed his "lifting the veil of secrecy from the private talks in Paris [as a means] to 'lay out the record of negotiations' and 'break the deadlock.'"[10] Fortunately for him, it worked, though Nixon held bombing over the head of the North Vietnamese, and continued to support the South with materiel and supplies.

In April of 1975, however, Nixon was no longer the president of the US and North Viet Nam did not have to worry about bombing retaliation from their tempestuous foe. While American troops may have been out of Viet Nam, other military installments guarded the embassy and had some modicum of a presence in South Viet Nam. With Nixon gone, the North decided they preferred *no* presence of Americans in Viet Nam. Simultaneously comprehensive and succinct, director Rory Kennedy's award-winning documentary *Last Days in Vietnam* (2014)[11] explores the "second end" of the war in Viet Nam. In the documentary, Kissinger admits that the

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7 Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (see note 6), 259.
8 Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (see note 6), 360.
9 Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (see note 6), 361
10 Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (see note 6), 290.
11 "Last Days in Vietnam," directed by Rory Kennedy (Moxie Firecracker Films, 2014).

1973 Peace Accord would not "be the beginning peace in the American sense, but a beginning of a period of coexistence, which might devolve like it did in Korea … Reconciliation between North and South Viet Nam we knew would be extremely difficult. But I was hopeful."[12] By 1974, however, Nixon had resigned as president amid the Watergate scandal, so the North seized on an opportunity to strike while the US government's overseeing eye was otherwise occupied. CIA Analyst Frank Snepp learned at the beginning of April 1975 via Vietnamese intelligence officers that the northern forces planned to advance past the faux North-South divide – the Demilitarized Zone – and arrive to take Saigon, the Southern capitol, by Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 18 May 1975. The symbolism of Viet Nam "united" on the birthday of the country's beloved leader, who died in 1969, represented the realized vision of "Uncle Ho's" dream of an independent Viet Nam. The rush of 500,000 refugees to Southern Viet Nam, however, who were ahead of and running from Communists in hopes of asylum in the South, belied some of the unity implied in the North's impending victory.

Kiem Do, who was a captain in the South Vietnamese Navy, recalls that supplies for embittered ARVN troops in Da Nang ran thin in April 1975. "We tried our best and didn't think about the future. We couldn't repair or replace equipment. Field hospitals had to reuse soiled bandages," he recalled, echoing many South Vietnamese troops who felt abandoned by their American military counterparts.[13] While the situation in Saigon in April of 1975 was clearly chaotic – materiel for ARVN troops going missing, ARVN casualties mounting, lines of civilians applying for amnesty at the US embassy, an influx of refugees from the North, and Vietnamese people allied with the US leaving on foot, by boat and by plane *en masse* – the US Ambassador, Graham Martin, famously refused to even consider planning for an embassy evacuation. He certainly did not think to help the Vietnamese people who were employees of the US government and, thus, prime targets for the incoming communist forces. By the time President Gerald Ford appealed to Congress on 10 April, asking for $722 million "for emergency military assistance," everyone in the US government knew that their Vietnamese counterparts "lives [were] in grave danger."[14] Congress refused, and by 18 April further declined to supply Viet Nam with *any* aid – military or otherwise, eliciting President Ford to condemn the body as "those sons of bitches" for abandoning the Vietnamese.[15] The US government and most of its people were tired of Viet Nam and did not see any value in helping their South Vietnamese allies. Americans in Viet Nam began to go behind the ambassador's back (an act known as Black Ops, which would have ended the careers of those involved) and evacuated their Vietnamese friends and family. On 29 April, the ambassador allowed "Operation Frequent Wind" to deploy, and Americans in Viet Nam were evacuated by helicopter from the roof of the US Embassy. Departing Americans (and some Vietnamese) looking back at the embassy courtyards from the sky would have seen hundreds of

12 "Last Days in Vietnam," Kennedy, (see note 11).
13 "Last Days in Vietnam," Kennedy, (see note 11).
14 "Last Days in Vietnam," Kennedy, (see note 11).
15 "Last Days in Vietnam," Kennedy, (see note 11).

Vietnamese huddled on the grounds. All the Americans had left Viet Nam by the early morning of 30 April, and by lunch, South Vietnamese President Duong Van Minh surrendered to Colonel Bui Tin. The war – and American involvement in Viet Nam – was finally *over*. What happened next was not, as Kissinger predicted, a joining of hands of the Vietnamese people in joyous unity.

III. The Joyful & Victorious

In Joseph Woodruff's World War I anthem, "After the War is Over,"[16] the song lyrics include the lines: "After the war is over when the battle's done/ Everyone's heart will be joyful after the victory's won" – this song, of course, was written about a different war, a war that arguably placed the US in a more glorious light. But it could apply to any war *and* any victor. The North Vietnamese were joyful; Viet Nam was united. And closed off to the rest of the world as the country attempted to reshape itself into a sovereign nation for the first time in centuries. After getting briefly locked into a short but bitter border war with China in 1979, Viet Nam set out to build itself upon the blueprint laid out by the Communist Party. Those loyal to the Party received privileges and favor, while those who had allied with the US faced fierce punishment in the form of brutal reeducation camps. Designed to break the spirit and silence any goodwill toward democracy (and, sometimes, brotherhood), reeducation could be a short period of time or several years, and the families of those sent to the camps were rarely assisted in finding their family members who had been taken. Food shortages and poverty were not uncommon, and throughout the 1970s, many Vietnamese people left Viet Nam, unable to cope under the new régime. Author Andrew Lam, in an interview with Việt Lê, noted that Vietnamese refugees, while generally a "silenced" group of people regarding their Viet Nam War experience, were rendered into political "pawns" for the continued anti-Communist rhetoric of the West. Lam remarks: "… after 1989, when the Cold War ended, refugees that poured out from Vietnam were labeled as political refugees. During that time, the West perceived anyone from the bamboo curtain as a kind of political pawn they could use to say, 'Look, these people fled from terrible authoritarian governments …'."[17] This mindset allows the Western powers allied in the war – the US, Australia, France – to continue to see their involvement in the war as an ideological victory, even if, at face value, neither France nor the US can claim a military victory in the Indochina Wars and Viet Nam War, respectively.

The story of the Viet Nam War is unabashedly told in Viet Nam from the point of view of the joyful victors. Over the past decade, I have visited Viet Nam several times, in part to see how the Vietnamese portray the memory of the war. Most of the sites have similar aesthetics, which I call "Communist Bloc"; every site with art has

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16 "After the War Is Over," music by Harry Andrieu, lyrics by Joseph Woodruff, E. J. Pourman and Andrew B. Stirling (Tucson, AZ: Joe Morris Music Co., 1918).

17 Troeung, Y. Dang, and Việt Lê. "Refugee Crossings on the Fortieth Anniversary of the Vietnam War: An Interview with Andrew Lam," in *MELUS: Refugee Cultures: Forty Years after the Vietnam War*, 41/3, 2016, 8–17.

the same art, be it painting or sculpture, and every placard in the museums repeatedly reminds visitors that the US were "imperialist aggressors." The French do not get remembered fondly either – they are the "colonizers. " This is most clearly seen at the Museum of Vietnamese Revolution, which I revisit every time I am in Ha Noi. The initial time I visited in 2012, I noticed two things. The first was an exhaustive exhibit on the ground floor detailing global protest against the American War, which, while extremely educational, seemed to invoke a particular message: look how unpopular this war was, look how bad it was, look how everyone knew what a terrible idea it was *except* the "American imperialists" and their "puppet government" in Sài Gòn. The second was the nearly entire absence of a decade in Vietnamese history – the 1980s.

Viet Thanh Nguyen, preeminent Viet Nam War scholar and Pulitzer prize-winning author, noted that the "memory industry" in Viet Nam has a specific goal in telling its side of the story of war. When Nguyen visited public memorial spaces in Viet Nam, he noted that "[The Vietnamese] have portrayed the war as a heroic struggle of a unified people against foreign occupation, but in terms ranging from the elegiac (the Fine Arts Museum of Ha Noi) to the brutal (the War Remnants Museum in Saigon). Even within a society many Americans see as ideologically monolithic, memory is textured intentions exist."[18] The need to keep the story of the war as "a heroic struggle" underscores themes of nationalism and the general commodification of memory. Noting that both the US and Viet Nam have ethical problems regarding how they remember the events of the war – both are entrenched in telling their own stories, whilst leaving out voices that might run against the popular narrative – Nguyen notes that Viet Nam, in particular, requires remembrance to be performative, in that it must support the ideologies and narratives of the Communist party:

> [S]ince Vietnam does not seem free to many, memorializing the struggle for independence as a necessary war is crucial for the communist party. In both [the US and Viet Nam], citizens still flock to war memorial; artists and scholars still produce a constant stream of work about the war; and most of the memory work is about each nation's own suffering …
>
> Of course, forgetting his key to individual memory, as many have argued, while selective memory is fundamentally nationalism. The 'always remembering' and 'never forgetting' of supposedly unspeakable historical traumas in fact always require something else that is uncomfortable to be forgotten and rendered literally unspeakable. Haunted by the inevitability of forgetting something, as a goal remembering constantly tries to recall what might be overlooked.[19]

Nguyen's work on memory underscores the importance of seeing public collective memory as incomplete. As he works through Paul Ricoeur's *Memory, History, Forgetting*,[20] Nguyen calls on those remembering the war to look beyond their own stories and remembrance methods. Voices integral to a war's story, for example, are

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[18] Nguyen, Viet Thanh. "Just Memory: War and the Ethics of Remembrance," in *American Literary History*, 25/1, 2013, 144–163.

[19] Nguyen, "Just Memory" (see note 18), 151–154.

[20] Ricouer, Paul. *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

left out in favor of supporting a nationalist telling of the War by dulling the sharpness of individual memory. Nguyen admonishes scholars to broaden their work, stating: "Ethically recalling our own is not enough to work through the past, and neither is the less common phenomenon of ethically recalling others."[21] Both Lam and Nguyen, for example, make individual pushes for the inclusion of refugee voices in the international telling of the Viet Nam War. In Viet Nam, however, the refugees (and those who fought with the US) are notably silenced.

The French remain the most despised in public commemorations of the War, as the descriptive placards in the Museum of Vietnamese Revolution are written in Vietnamese, French and English. This is all detailed on the top floor of the museum (you begin by going upstairs in a beautiful old building, with expansive windows and polished wood floors that contrast sharply against bamboo paneling and portable air conditioners). The American War begins on the second floor; you must physically go *down* to see the effects of this conflict. The atrocities against the Vietnamese people at the hands of the US and its allies are detailed a little less enthusiastically than the War Remnants Museum in Sài Gòn, but that is probably due to the heavy-handed message the government likes to portray when it comes to the South.

After the 1975 liberations of, for example, Hue, Da Nang and Hai Phong, the museum dedicates a whole wall of the museum to the rebuilding of Viet Nam. The room prior to this part of the story, as of 2019, includes a display devoted to global antiwar baubles and trinkets, such as mugs and pins, underscoring global support for peace in Viet Nam. The Sài Gòn government's "violation" of the Geneva accords in 1975 interrupts this narrative of progress, whereupon the North must go south to liberate its people from the "puppets" once again. Again, the 1980s remain conspicuously absent. There are two direct mentions of the decade: a bridge built with Soviet assistance and a bridge built by Vietnamese engineers, both in 1985. Above are examples of ration books and other ephemera, a photo captioned "Inhabitants stood in line to purchase good and foodstuff by their ration tickets in the subsidized period prior 1986 [sic]." Some books are on display, noted as "Some National Assembly laws passed during 1988−1990 period." Two newspapers published "from 1986−1990" can be found, but then, all of a sudden, we are in 1992. And then in the next room you see a smattering of gifts given to Ho Chi Minh (who died in 1969, making this part of the museum a bit anachronistic), and you are done. Well, not entirely; the global antiwar exhibit I had seen in 2012 has been replaced by "Ho Chi Minh: Portrait of a Great Man" in 2019. But what happened in Viet Nam in the 1980s besides food rations, laws, and newspapers?

Perhaps, since there is no revolution present, it does not make sense to include it in the museum. But simply leaving out nearly an entire decade of history does not mean there is no history to speak of; quite the opposite, but that is why it is not there. War history museums in Viet Nam take great pains to emphasize the forced labor and appalling treatment the Vietnamese faced during the country's various occupations and invasions, but it will not tell on itself in a public-facing way. I have no interest in belittling or discounting the suffering of the Vietnamese under French

[21] Nguyen, "Just Memory" (see note 18), 161.

and American occupation – the facts are indisputable. Survivor accounts and military testimony of the atrocities of the My Lai massacre site, the notorious photo of an American tank dragging a Vietnamese corpse behind it, the infamous and horrifying photo of a young girl running naked and burning from US bombs, and US veterans' own accounts of how they treated enemy corpses (removing ears was popular) and villages (lighting up thatched roofs with Zippos) stand as testament. But why will Viet Nam not address what it did to its own people? What of the "reeducation" camps, where anyone remotely involved with the US went to repent for their sins against the government?

Viet Thanh Nguyen, a Pulitzer prize-winning author and the Aerol Arnold Chair of English and Professor of English and American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California, wrote extensively on how Viet Nam remembers the War in his 2016 book *Nothing Ever Dies*.[22] He writes that there are differences in cultural memories, and that

> [The ethics of remembering] has national variations, with the Vietnamese more willing to remember women and civilians than the Americans are, the Americans more willing than the Vietnamese to remember the enemy, and neither side showing any inclination for remembering the southern Vietnamese, who stink of loss, melancholy, bitterness, and rage.[23]

Dr. Nguyen's fictional work, like his 2016 novel *The Sympathizer*,[24] delves more deeply than most literature into the plight of the Southern Vietnamese. His critical eye on the cultural and political rendering of Viet Nam's public memorials to the war is extremely astute. He details, for example, the surplus of military equipment used in public memorials all across Viet Nam, and argues that the "weaponized memory" is purposefully on display because it is more powerful, valuable and far-reaching than any person's individual experience of the war:

> If the heroic people's collective humanity is only a façade, end it is no surprise that the nation's revolutionary industry of memory also gives life to things that are not human … Inhuman weapons [are] affixed to the landscape and given central place in many museums, notably cannons, tanks, airplanes, helicopters, and missile launchers. These assembly line industrial products hint of the economy of scale for weaponized memory. No matter how powerful an individual's memory may be, that memory will not move outside of a small circle unless it enters a mode of pneumonic reproduction.[25]

It is curious that Viet Nam might be as equally inclined as the US to use weapons as crucial historical artifacts to memorialize war; perhaps this is one of the legacies of the war, the US passing on its obsession with military symbolism? But then again, Viet Nam shares a continent with Russia, China and North Korea, all of which are countries who use military parades and weapons as tools to boost nationalism and display bravado. One Viet Nam War site that stands out regarding "pneumonic re-

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22 Nguyen, Viet Thanh. *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
23 Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies* (see note 22), 9.
24 Nguyen, Viet Thanh. *The Sympathizer* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2016).
25 Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies* (see note 22), 162.

production" is the Cu Chi Tunnel site outside of Sài Gòn. Dug (at first, by hand) by nationalists in the 1940s, the tunnels eventually traversed over 250 km, from the edges of Sài Gòn to the Cambodian border. Their selling point is that you can get into the tunnels, something I did years before in Vinh Moc, near the Demilitarized Zone. You see a lot more tunnel at Vinh Moc than at Cu Chi; the great expansive network of cunning tunnel warfare is only a brief part of the tour. Furthermore, the Cu Chi Tunnels did not protect a village forced to live underground, but served more as a supply route and guerrilla war-style ambush route. These tunnels told a far more combative story than those near the Demilitarized Zone.

My Cu Chi tour group included a couple from New Zealand, two American backpacker gals, a German couple and an American family of four. The New Zealand couple were most kind to me; they wondered why I was travelling alone, and when I told them about my research, they immediately noted New Zealand's involvement in the war: "Our hands aren't entirely clean either." As we went further into the Cu Chi area and learned about American atrocities during the war, the New Zealand couple kept looking over at me to gauge my reaction. I remained impassive; it is hard to travel in a space where you are continually being told how terrible your country once was to another country, but this was my third trip to Viet Nam, and I was sort of used to it.

After watching a short video in an open-air enclosure (as most tours in Viet Nam begin), we began walking through the site. The first thing we got to "try" was walking through a short bit of tunnel, which, our guide pointed out, had been enlarged to accommodate "tourists." The guide was the same height as me – around 5'5" – and probably weighed 100 pounds soaking wet; I wondered if tourists just meant "non-Vietnamese people," but then I thought about other statistically "smaller" nationalities, such as Peruvians or Italians. I only know this because in those countries, my t-shirt size suddenly went from a small or medium to "XXL." I also figured the tunnels might be enlarged and fortified with concrete, similar to the tunnels in Vinh Moc, which I had been to years ago; you could pretty much stand up (I could) and find your way around via lanterns on the walls.

No such luck in the tiny portion of the Cu Chi tunnels. I am a little claustrophobic, and as soon as I descended into the Cu Chi tunnel, I wanted out. The corpse of an abnormally large spider next to the entrance had a lot to do with the sudden rush of fear. Following the rump of one of the Germans, I sped through. At the end, our guide gave us a hand out of the tunnel, and the group tittered about the enclosed space. While I find the Vietnamese use of tunnels ingenious, I do not need to keep going in them; what the tunnels show you is how engineering efficient and self-sacrificing the North Vietnamese people were, especially regarding utilizing the land they knew so well. The US knew tunnels existed and bombed the Vinh Moc area heavily; the Cu Chi tunnels, due to their proximity to Sài Gòn, did not get as much shelling.

We were guided into an area where we could all look at a bomb crater, which was about 5 x 5 feet in diameter and rendered into a fuzzy, grass-covered divot thanks to nature and time. I was distracted, however, by the repeated sounds of gunfire close by. It turns out you can shoot almost any Viet Nam War era weapon at a firing range

that is included in the Cu Chi experience. Looking into the jungle surroundings against the backdrop of barking AK-47s (four shots for a dollar!) I blocked out the group and focused on the sound and scenery. Is this what it sounded like, being in the thick of the war? We often see, at least in films, soldiers walking carefully on jungle trails or amid rice paddies, but we get to see depictions of people hacking their way through a jungle, like the one I was standing in, while gunfire cracks around them. I know that you cannot transport in time (yet) but I took note of what I was feeling: I was hot (a given), annoyed (the gun range noises drilled into my nerves) and a bit bored. We had passed a diorama, another common piece of Vietnamese tourist sites, of waxen Vietnamese soldiers making booby traps and laboring to make uniforms – the famed black pajamas – for North Vietnamese soldiers who had made it south. As our tour guide praised the soldiers who made the difficult trek to South Viet Nam to help the people there "rise up" against the "puppet government," I stared at one of the laboring diorama figures, who was categorizing ammunition "liberated" from the American troops. Juxtaposed next to punji sticks, which are bits of wood whittled to a point (which is usually urinated on or laced with some sort of substance that increases infection) and deployed into someone once they step on a booby trap, I found a familiar rise of American patriotism swell in my stomach.

Again, and I think this bears repeating at least once: it is not easy to visit a country that beat *your* country in a war that was, from everything I have seen, a pretty avoidable mess, at least from an American point of view. Prof. Viet Thanh Nguyen noted sagely that in "any postwar American encounters with Vietnamese memories in Vietnam, Americans find themselves shown in ways that [bruise] them. They no longer have the comfort of sitting inside their war machine, protected from the recoil of its weaponry by a suspension system of ideology and fantasy."[26] But at Cu Chi, one can still reenter the war machine. Half of our Cu Chi tour group tottered happily over to check out the gun range, while the rest of us meandered through the souvenir and food area nearby. The American family made a beeline to the shooting range. I was a little perturbed with them for doing that – We are *Americans*! How does it look for us to go to Viet Nam and immediately go play with firearms? Does that not send a message that is a little, I dunno, *typical* in the worst way? But they had a young son who was begging to fire "an old gun," and, really, who am I to tell someone how to amuse their child on a hot jungle tour in a former warzone? He got to shoot an M-16, the standard issue weapon for most of the American infantry troops, and he did not like it. The AK was a much more satisfying toy, and he spent more time admiring it. I found that funny; many Viet Nam War veterans I know do not have really good things to say about the M-16 either, though my pal George Utter (Army) maintains that the performance of the rifle hinged on simply keeping it rifle clean. Jazzed by his time at the range, the American son babbled on about the AK for at least the first half hour of our way back to Sài Gòn. It would be a fool's errand to expect an 11- to 13-year-old boy, travelling in Viet Nam with his parents, to be more interested in the 30-year-old war history of a site than the site's offering of guns to be fired. I wondered why his parents were even taking him and his younger,

[26] Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies* (see note 22), 113.

more subdued brother, to Viet Nam in the first place. What was the allure for them? What did they learn, if anything at all, about War? That the toys are fun?

IV. Always Torn

While the story of the average post-American War Vietnamese citizen is absent from museums and books in Vietnam, there are refugee stories to contend with in other countries and continents. Australia, which fought alongside the US in the Viet Nam War, received many refugees after the war. Partly out of humanitarian benevolence and partly due to geography (Sydney is only an eight-hour flight from Sài Gòn), Australia is home to many Vietnamese refugees from the Viet Nam War. Dr. Nathalie Nguyen, a war scholar and Professor at the School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, in Australia, has been collecting oral histories from Vietnamese refugees in Australia for years. In her seminal 2016 book, *South Vietnamese Soldiers: Memories of the Vietnam War and After*,[27] Dr. Nguyen details the difficulties of Vietnamese people who were displaced and re-homed after fighting for a country and a cause that were essentially abandoned. Hai, a Vietnamese refugee whose father worked for the South Vietnamese government and, thus, was subject to cruel treatment postwar, fled Viet Nam by boat for Australia in 1981, aged 21. In his interviews with Dr. Nathalie Nguyen, he notes:

> I've never felt I have truly integrated to live in Australia. I always feel there's a distance. I am very conscious of this. I came here too late and let my life. I didn't go back to high school. I tend to be introverted, in the state of my health affects my emotions. Living in Australia, I don't feel it is. I feel a sense of gratitude towards them for providing us with a place to live, and I am extremely grateful for their social welfare – I would be in dire straits otherwise. I can't live over there where I was born and grew up, I cannot live in my own country, and I can't feel it peace in the place where I live so I'm always torn.[28]

Dr. Nguyen's book is filled with stories of people who feel suspended between identities and cultures, Viet Nam and Australia. In another oral history, Thy, who was a year old when her family "escaped from Vietnam by boat in 1980, " also expresses feelings of distance from her home in Australia, which Dr. Nguyen describes as "the secondary trauma that she was subjected to as a result of her parent's harrowing experiences in the postwar years … she lost her mother to leukemia when she was 17 and was diagnosed with depression at the age of 20."[29] Dr. Nguyen's purposeful mention of "secondary trauma … as a result of her parent's harrowing experiences in the postwar years" is particularly important when studying the legacy of war: the pain of the previous generation passes on to the next. Perhaps a bit distilled or removed, but the trauma of war bears out much longer than the actual war itself. And not just in Australian refugees – the Vietnamese who remained in Viet Nam, those who fled to Australia and America and Germany – the damage of the Viet Nam War

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27 Nguyen, Nathalie Huynh Chau. *South Vietnamese Soldiers: Memories of the Vietnam War and After* (Westport: Praeger Press, 2016).

28 Nguyen, *South Vietnamese Soldiers* (see note 27), 187.

29 Nguyen, *South Vietnamese Soldiers* (see note 27), 195.

reverberates at a cellular level not just to those who experienced it directly but also to those born of the people who survived it. They cannot find peace, because, as Hai articulated earlier, they are perpetually "torn." And they are, as both Hai and Thy note, acutely aware of their otherness, their pain, and how these embedded traumas separate them from others.

One of my first acquaintances in Australia was a Viet Nam War veteran named Rick Butler. Rick, to whom I was introduced to via Thomas Trang, a tour operator in Sài Gòn, had been working with Thomas to take Viet Nam War veterans back to Viet Nam for the purpose of helping to heal wounds of war. I was familiar with the journey: my dear friend Jim McGarrah, poet and author of his own Viet Nam War memoir *A Temporary Sort of Peace*,[30] wherein he returns to Viet Nam as the coda of his book. Jim meets with a poet and participates in a peace ceremony, which Jim lauds as a very important part of his process of reckoning with the war (he served in the US Marine Corps and was wounded – Purple Heart – during the 1968 Tet Offensive). My friend Ted Engelmann (US Air Force), who I would meet after I had been to Australia, has been photographing Viet Nam (and returning annually) since the 1990s; many veterans see a return to their sites of trauma as a method of reconciling their wounds of war. Rick told me a story of a man who had agreed to come to Viet Nam, flew up to Sài Gòn, only to be ready to fly back the next morning. The hushed whispers of the Vietnamese hotel staff had spooked him; he remained and ended up having a wonderful time, but his experience definitely underscores how *un*-easy it is for those affected by the war to return to its country of origin.

It is perhaps even more difficult for the Vietnamese Viet Nam War Veterans. In *South Vietnamese Soldiers: Memories of the Vietnam War and After*, the story of a former South Vietnamese medic, Thah, is punctuated by her multiple return trips to Viet Nam as a resource for coping with her personal legacy of war. Her military service did not end with the war, per Thanh's narrative:

> When I receive the bodies of soldiers [during the war], they were often not complete [missing body parts]. I had to take the families there to identify the remains. These things sadden me to this day. That's why, even now, each year, I return to Vietnam to visit invalid soldier brothers that have and are still living in extreme hardship in our home country. There are people who have lost a part of their bodies on the battlefield. They are deserving of receiving aid from us …
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> [My son asks], 'Mother why do you want to keep wanting to go back to Vietnam? Each time you come back here in pieces, thin. Why do you torment yourself like this?' It is the pain that makes you remember. More than half my life was spent in my native country. So the memories, happy, sad, small, big are all etched into my subconscious, nothing can be forgotten.[31]

In Thanh's story, her son, who witnesses and absorbs his mother's pain, implores her to stop going back to Viet Nam because every time she returns, she's "in pieces"; he sees her desire to return as an exercise in self "torment." But Thanh articulates that "it is the pain that makes you remember … nothing can be forgotten" – she needs the

[30] McGarrah, Jim. *A Temporary Sort of Peace* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 2007).
[31] Nguyen, *South Vietnamese Soldiers* (see note 27), 107.

memories of the war to sustain her, and her return visits to Viet Nam continue her quest to tend to the needs of her brothers in arms, even if they are no longer "at war." For her, and many other Vietnamese people and countless Viet Nam War veterans, the war never really ended.

Mai Der Vang, is "a writer of the second generation, raised in America, [who] speaks of another population of the war's losers, the exiled Hmong who fled Laos and came to an America intent on ignoring their existence, their hurt, and their sacrifice." Viet Thanh Nguyen, another (Vietnamese-American) writer of the second generation, commiserates with her thesis: "While a person can be evacuated from his war-torn country, he can never be evacuated from the trauma. Many of us are innately tied to this trauma as if it were strong into our DNA… This war is my inheritance."[32] What worlds we make for ourselves when *war* is something to inherit.

V. Conclusion

Part of the reason one could argue that the Viet Nam War continues is that there is often conflict, especially in the US, about how to remember the war or honor those who fell during the conflict. American Viet Nam veterans are finally receiving some recognition for their service, due in part to the popularity of Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's 2017 PBS documentary *The Vietnam War*.[33] Prior to the film, many Americans were happily unaware of the Viet Nam Veterans walking among them, or otherwise told not to talk about Viet Nam. There were certainly no ticker-tape parades when Viet Nam War veterans returned to the US; several recall being treated poorly for their involvement, however slight, in the war. The dashing uniforms no longer held the same social currency state-side, as they had in the past. Even today, over 30 years after the war's end, many of my undergraduate students know very little about it, as the Viet Nam War is usually taught in high school (if at all) as part of a blur in US history, where the Civil Rights Movement, Women's Rights Movement, Chicano Rights Movement and a visible AntiWar Movement intersected. They might be aware of the war through popular films such as *Forest Gump*,[34] which was filmed, in part, in my current city of Savannah, GA and in the swampy South Carolina Lowcountry where I teach.

Memory also sustains the war. Vietnamese-American writers, such as Ocean Voung and Eric Nguyen, have gained critical acclaim for their books that focus on second-generation trauma from the war, while Viet Nam Veteran authors' works, such as Tim O'Brien and Karl Marlantes, can be found in textbook collections of literature. Perhaps America could not reconcile itself with the Viet Nam War until a certain period of time has passed, or maybe a certain amount of pain from the memories faded away. As I write this, the American War in Afghanistan is in its final throes, and they are painful for everyone involved. What has made them more pain-

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[32] Mai Der Vang quoted in: Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies* (see note 22), 281.
[33] "The Vietnam War", Burns and Novick (see note 4).
[34] "Forest Gump", directed by Robert Zemeckis and written by Eric Roth (Los Angeles, CA: Paramount Pictures, 1994).

ful is how similar the images of the "fall of Kabul" are – or at least appear – to the "fall of Sài Gòn. " Our memories, now aided by the internet perpetually at our fingertips, become simultaneously jolted and distorted; we have to remember the rushed evacuation of Sài Gòn because it *looks like* the rushed evacuation in Kabul; they are, to paraphrase a statement heard from merchants across Southeast Asia, "same same but different." In an opinion column for the *New York Times,* Viet Thanh Nguyen insisted that we focus on the "same":

> Americans also like to think that wars end when they are declared to end. But the aftereffects of war continue for years … History is happening again, and again as tragedy and farce. The wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan happened as a result of American hubris, and in both cases Americans mostly focused on the political costs of war for them.[35]

To say that the war in Viet Nam is over is not entirely untrue; the bloodshed has stopped, the helicopters are silent. But soft wars, such as economic and trading favoritism, continue – Starbucks and Apple products are hugely popular in Viet Nam, and the 45th President of the US used Ha Noi as a neutral staging ground for a meeting with Kim Jong-un, Supreme Leader of North Korea, creating international headlines that positioned Viet Nam as a peacekeeper between two warring nations. Unexploded ordinance still litters the countryside of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, representing deadly residuals of the war just waiting to be discovered by an innocent child or farmer, someone who undoubtedly is already coping with multigenerational war trauma. In some areas of Laos, at least in places I saw outside of Luang Prabang in 2015, people are living in homes built from bits of metal wreckage and debris from the war. The Viet Nam War is physically and psychically present, and the newest "end" of another long American war casts the US in an unflattering light because the US did not, it appears, learn very much from its time in Viet Nam. That is why wars continue: their mistakes are repeated, blindly and repeatedly, at an immeasurable human cost and with an everlasting legacy.

[35] Nguyen, Viet Thanh. "I Can't Forget the Lessons of Vietnam. Neither Should You," in *New York Times*, 19 Aug 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/19/opinion/afghanistan-vietnam-war-refugees.html> (last retrieved on 28 June 2023).

IV.

The Picture in the Mind – Imagined Wars

Matej Medvecký

Czechoslovak Military Intelligence and Germany 1945–1946

Abstract

Czechoslovak military intelligence underwent vast changes after the end of World War II. Due to political reasons, the original unified intelligence service was divided into two separate institutions – one focused on counter intelligence that very soon became involved in domestic political intrigues, while the other concentrated on intelligence gathering information abroad and was underestimated by the leaders and ministry of the country. The paper aims to introduce the interests of the Czechoslovak military intelligence in recently defeated Germany that varied from verifying information on the activities of illegal Nazi regime remnants, non-German units active in western occupation zones and gathering information on effects of various weapons used on German soil to collecting Wehrmacht or SS training manuals concerning massive agent recruitments in Czechoslovakia within the German population that had to leave in post-war years.

I. Introduction

The end of the World War II (WW2) brought great changes for Czechoslovakia as a country and for its military. The country considered itself to be on the winning side and with the withdrawal and capitulation of German forces, celebrated its reunification, although much had changed. Despite the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance signed in December 1943, Prague soon had to cede Subcarpathian Ruthenia to its new eastern neighbour.[1] Other Soviet interests advocated by the communist party and activities of communist-controlled security forces soon started to cast shadows over Czechoslovak freedom and independence. Nevertheless, contrary to our neighbours (Poland, Hungary, Austria and of course the Soviet occupation zone in Germany), Soviet troops had left the country by end of the 1945.

Regarding the military point of view, Czechoslovakia had to face the difficult task of forging a united army out of very different components. There were different

[1] For more information, see e.g. Rychlík, Jan, and Magdalena Rychlíková. *Podkarpatská Rus v dějináchČeskoslovenska 1918–1946* (Bratislava: Albatros Media, 2016); Švorc, Peter. *Zakletázem: Podkarpatská Rus 1918–1946* (Praha: NakladatelstvíLidovénoviny, 2007).

groups of soldiers and officers available: those who had fought in the West (most of them as airmen or members of the Czechoslovak armoured brigade), those who fought in the East with the Red Army (1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR), those who did not fight and were or were not active in the resistance at home, often well-educated but lacking real fighting experience, (mostly in Czechia), and those who had fighting experience from the Slovak participation in the German campaign against USSR (two divisions) and, later on, from the anti-German Slovak national uprising (1944, mostly from Slovakia). Finally, there were guerrilla fighters (partisans) who, in many cases, lacked basic military training or sufficient education for the ranks and posts they were allowed to gain due to recent combat experience and participation in guerrilla warfare. Such different war-time experiences engendered great antagonism between these groups which soon affected the army itself. Other significant changes in the sphere of defence included direct "Sovietization measures" as a commitment to train armed forces according to Soviet standards, increased cooperation with the Red Army (the Soviet Army from 1946), and the invitation of Soviet officers into the military education or other facilities. The appointment of the pro-Soviet Gen. Ludvík Svoboda as the Minister of National Defence, the establishment of the "education and edification" staff within the army, the discrimination of certain soldiers and officers for political reasons through the investigation of the newly established Defence Intelligence and other measures were also significant.[2]

The year 1945 also brought many changes for the Czechoslovak military intelligence service.[3] Apart from changes resulting from the end of the war and return from the exile in Great Britain, the service itself was divided into two separate institutions.[4] Firstly, Defence Intelligence, which was founded within the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR by a simple order of the commander of the corps, Gen. L. Svoboda, after the Soviet intervention, without any consent from the Ministry of National Defence in London.[5] The other body was the original military intelligence founded according to the French example shortly after World War 1, the 2nd Department (2nd Dept.) of the Main Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, which was under new conditions only responsible for the gathering of military intelligence abroad. After the German capitulation in May 1945, it started to adapt to peacetime tasks, thought this process was not an easy one. The topic of this paper is to give an overview of the development of the Czechoslovak military intelligence agency (*vojenské výzvedné spravodajstvo*) oriented abroad in the post-war years. It is my goal to provide a general overview of the Czechoslovak experience of the intelligence gathering process after the defeat of the major adversary. Since the topic has not been dealt

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2 For more information, see: Hanzlík, František. *Diskriminace a perzekucevojáků v Československu v letech 1945–1955* (Praha: Powerprint, 2015), 6–41.

3 See Šolc, Jiří. *Po bokuprezidenta. František Moravec a jehozpravodajskéslužbavesvětlearchivníchdokumentů* (Praha: Naševojsko, 2007).

4 Czechoslovakia at that time also had two non-military-related intelligence services attached to the Ministry of the Interior.

5 For more information, see: Hanzlík, František. *Vojenskéobrannézpravodajství* v *zápasu* o *politickoumoc 1945–1950* (Praha: Úřaddokumentace a vyšetřovánízločinůkomunismu 2003); Hanzlík, František. *Bez milosti* a *slitování. B. Reicin – fanatikrudéhoteroru* (Praha: Ostrov, 2011).

with by historians previously, except for brief mentions,[6] the paper is based on my original research on the topic.

II. Post-WW2 Czechoslovak Military Intelligence in Germany

In summer 1945, the service was reorganized into six groups: group A (study), B (search),[7] C (foreign, responsible for military attachés), D (organisational), E (training) and F (auxiliary).[8] The reason for the reorganisation is not explained in the documentation, and I presume that it was seen as necessary on the premise that the previous organisation structure was known to other countries (especially Great Britain). The Czechoslovak military intelligence structure in 1945 was, to a great extent, following the pre-war pattern. Apart from the headquarters in Prague, the 2nd Dept. worked attached to the staff of all four military districts, subordinated to the commander of the military district and, in vocational issues, to the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff in Prague. At the same time, the 2nd Dept. worked within the staff of every division and one intelligence officer was attached to the command of every regiment.[9] In the summer of 1945, military commands of all four military districts were ordered to establish Forward Intelligence Centres[10] (later renamed as Forward Agent-handling Centres), usually consisting of one or two intelligence officers responsible for cross-border intelligence operations and local research. These were soon subordinated directly to the centre.[11] Activities of Forward Agency Centres were to be focused on the depth of territory of interest, not the border areas.[12] In the post-war period, intelligence officers of individual divisions were responsible for the re-

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6 See the memoires of Rašla, Anton. *Zastupoval som československý štát. Vyznanie* (Prešov: Privatpress, 2000); unpublished paper: Titl, Zdeněk, Vývoj organisace a personálií československého vojenského zpravodajství v prvním roce po 2. světové válce (1945). Studijní pomůcka. Praha 1996; or paper by Štajgl, Jan. "Organizácia a hlavné smery činnosti čs. vojenského výzvedného spravodajstva (rozviedky) v rokoch 1945−1967," In *Historie a vojenství*, 2, 2001, 410−436. The paper is based on research I conducted while writing the following book: Medvecký, Matej: *Na prahu studenej vojny. Československé vojenské výzvedné spravodajstvo v rokoch 1945−1946* (Bratislava: Institute for Military History, 2020). At the same time, I consider it necessary to claim that the paper was prepared for the CSWG 2020 conference only, it has never been published before in any language and is not part of the book mentioned above. The book does not contain a chapter specifically dealing with Czechoslovak intelligence in Germany.

7 The term "*pátrač*" (searcher) in Czechoslovak military intelligence terminology was used for operatives.

8 Security Services Archives Prague (further on SSA), f. 2. oddelenie Hlavného štábu (2nd Dept. of the Main Staff), box No. 29, Vnitřní chod služby 2. odděl. hl. štábu – směrnice (Internal Organisation of the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff – Guidelines).

9 SSA, f. 2. oddelenieHlavnéhoštábu, box No. 28, Organisace 2. oddělení /zpravodajského/ u vyššíchvelitelství a zpravodajskýchdůstojníků u útvarů (Organisation of the 2nd Dept. / Intelligence/ by the Higher Commands and of Intelligence Officers at Units).

10 SSA, f. 2. oddelenie Hlavného štábu, box No. 28, Organizácia zpravodajského oddelenia u veliteľstva oblasti a nižších jednotiek – stručné smernice (Organisation of the Intelligence Department by the Command of the Military District and Subordinated Units – Short Guidelines), 14 Jun 1945.

11 SSA, f. 2. oddelenie Hlavnéhoštábu, box No. 31, PZU Plzeň, zriadenie (PZU Plzeň, Establishment).

12 SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 6571−6655, Zájmový prostor – vymezení (Area of Interest – Specification),2 Jun 1946.

cruiting or planting of agents in specified cities in Germany and six Forward Agency Centres were operating against German territory.[13]

In general terms, Czechoslovak military intelligence activities abroad had a very limited scope of activities at this time. Apart from the work of military attachés in allied countries, it was mostly targeting surrounding countries with a special focus on central Europe with two main objectives: Germany and the area of Austria and Hungary. An internal document from summer 1945 stated:

> In case these countries or group of countries were demilitarized, it is still possible that armed forces could be reorganised under the umbrella of other organisations: police, gendarmerie, airways, financial guard … and, therefore, the need to monitor economic, social and cultural development in those countries, not mentioning the search for people hiding: war and political criminals, and hidden weapon and military material stashes. It would be necessary to search for traces of political orientation targeted against basic lines of our foreign policy,[14] the obvious possibility that, for instance, Germany is at any time willing to accept all concepts targeted against USSR. It will be a close and I presume welcome cooperation and help that we will provide to the bodies of the USSR. For the same reason, the USSR or republics standing in legal community with USSR would not be subject to our offensive operations.[15]

The document quoted mirrors the basic line of contemporary Czechoslovak military planning, where planners expected that, sooner or later, the 1938 threat of a possible war on two fronts against Germany and Hungary would reoccur. They saw the alliance with the USSR as the only way out of this insoluble situation. Following this line of thinking, the intelligence officers considered their tasks to secure pieces of intelligence related to the forming of a possible anti-Soviet alliance of any kind where Germany would be involved as a major objective.

At the same time, despite all the "Sovietization measures" mentioned above, there is no evidence of direct Soviet interventions into the operations of the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff in 1945–1946. It was certainly not in the post-war period workplans of the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff to consult with Soviet advisors as became usual only a few years later. Most Soviet-related documents deal with requests from the Soviet military attaché to Prague that were eagerly settled. We may only presume that all sensitive matters might had been dealt with on a less formal basis.

The guidelines to the subordinate elements issued by the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff ordered them to focus intelligence gathering on the search for remnants of the German and Hungarian Army (both groups and individuals) as well as saboteurs, sleeper agents, stocks of military material, information on mine fields, stocks of artillery ammunition or German or Hungarian associations that were supporting Nazi, Horthy or Szalasi regimes. They were encouraged to cooperate on those issues

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[13] SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 6571–6655, Zpravodajské prostory – přidělení (Territory of Intelligence Interest – Appointment), 13 Jun 1946.

[14] Based on the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty from December 1943, the Czechoslovak government in April 1945 in Košice declared its will to adjust its foreign policy as closely as possible to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

[15] SSA, f. 2. oddelenieHlavnéhoštábu, box No. 28, Poznámky k pracovněorganisačnímu seskupení (Notes to the Work-Organisation Cluster).

with Allied armies deployed at that time on Czechoslovak territory as well as with other state bodies. At the same time, the guidelines ordered an immediate and systematic build-up of new networks of agents.[16] Czechoslovak military intelligence simultaneously concentrated on the search for Axis countries' documents, especially German documentation and personnel that could provide insights into Germany's fighting experience evaluation or training manuals for various weapons. The documentation of political bodies, such as the NSDAP, SS or Hitlerjugend was also considered to be important. Due to the newly founded WW2 paratrooper units tradition, Czechoslovak authorities paid special attention to the interrogation of former members of the Abwehr subordinated division *Brandenburg*[17] or intensive searches for facilities where parts for newly developed weapons were produced. These activities soon lead to a struggle for competences with the recently established Military Defence Intelligence.

As early as the autumn of 1945, the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff started to operate on German territory. But not only via its agents in place, as sending experienced intelligence officers often proved more beneficial. Such "research trips" had many advantages as officers were often more competent to evaluate information on the spot than were quickly recruited agents. The trip of Staff Captain Karel Vaněk, for example, that took place on 10–17 October 1945 to the area of Nürnberg – Munich – Wiesbaden – Frankfurt was fruitful. In his report, Vaněk brought information back on border security done by American soldiers, the work of German institutions (police) as well as the economic situation, the situation of German POWs and the state of the "general morale" of Germans. In the end, Vaněk verified several reports regarding suspected activities of SS units and the recruitment of former SS men or army specialists by the Americans that turned out to be false.[18] During another trip, a Czechoslovak intelligence officer visited several battlefields and made extensive photographic documentation of damage done by various types of weapons, bombs or explosives to different types of facilities (mostly communication networks or fortifications).

The agency network was, at that time, considered to be one of the most productive means of intelligence gathering (not only) in peacetime. The 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff divided its informal collaborators into two categories: confidents (motivated by patriotism) and agents (motivated by benefits), and these confidents/agents were divided according to their function into residents, walkers, couriers or talent scouts.[19] The guidelines recommended the enrolment of "patriotic Czechs" as agents

16 SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. 28, Organizácia zpravodajského oddelenia u veliteľstva oblasti a nižších jednotiek – stručné smernice, (Organisation of the Intelligence Department by the Command of the Military District and Subordinated Units – Short Guidelines), 14 Jun 1945.

17 SSA, f. 2. odd HŠ, box No. 36, Spec. škola býv. něm. divise „Brandenburg" – organisace (Special Training Facility of the Former German Division "Brandenburg" – Organisation), 17 Sep 1945.

18 SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. 37, Zápis o služební cestě škpt. Vaňka Karla, hl.št. 2. odděl., vykonané ve dnech 10–17 října do prostoru Norimberk, Mnichov, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Německo (Minutes from the Work Trip of Staff Capt. Vaněk Karel, 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff Done on 10–17 Oct to the Area Nurnberg, Munich, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Germany).

19 SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. 28, Pokyny pro vybudováni důvěrnické /agentůrní/ sítě (Instructions regarding the Establishment of the network of confidents, 9 Jun 1945.

and to use the services of German communists or social democrats who suffered under the Nazi rule only if there were a lack of such Czech agents.

Nevertheless, praxis showed that Czechoslovak intelligence officers did not pay enough attention to training their agents. There were many cases when agents confessed during routine interrogation at the police station or personal identification checks occurred and errors were identified within the internal evidence at the centre or at territorial branches.[20] Therefore, officers were instructed to change communication lines, plan meeting dates and places in advance or establish and use drop boxes. Despite all the effort, there were many logistical and similar difficulties, for example, officers often lacked cigarettes (sometimes also sugar or other goods) that were frequently used to pay agents as a substitute for money, especially in Germany. Despite all the setbacks, the recruiting of agents seems to have been very good, at least when speaking about quantities. There were operatives who handled more than 40 agents within five years (1945–1950) of service with the 2nd Dept.[21]

To give an idea of what the operations in Germany looked like, how Czechoslovak intelligence operatives worked as well as the quality of agents, may be illustrated by the example of the work of Staff Captain Otakar Fejfar and his agent František Adolf Rejzek,[22] code-named "BAKALÁŘ," who was tasked to gather intelligence on industry in post-WW2 Germany.

Rejzek was arrested together with Rudolf Khaur, codenamed "FÍZL" while crossing the border and both men were investigated for smuggling and illegal intelligence activities. Policemen (national security) found several documents relating to his intelligence activities. An example was a questionnaire prepared by Staff Captain Fejfar to guide the agent concerning what information regarding the industrial facilities were required, tasks in the British zone of Germany that the agent put down for himself, the diary of the agent with copies of the reports submitted to his handler and other written material not connected to his intelligence activities.[23] During the subsequent investigation, the operative officer was blamed, apart from mistakes and failures, for operating within the Soviet zone, and this fact was judged very strictly by the military counterintelligence personnel who investigated the matter. Especially since information on the production of sugar factories was acquired by intelligence means directly from Soviet commanders in Karlshorst.[24] The investigation proved,

[20] SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 6333-6567, Zpravodajské poznatky (Intelligence Information), 2 May 1946.

[21] SSA, f. Zpravodajská správa Generálního štábu (Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, further on ZSGŠ), operatívne zväzky (operational files), archival No. 2264, Komenda Antonín.

[22] SSA, f. ZSGŠ, operational files, archival No. 2946, František Adolf Rejzek, untitled document page 2, reference No. 807/taj.1946.

[23] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 9823-10000, Rejzek – zpravodajský deník – šetření (Rejzek – Intelligence Diary – Investigation), 22 Nov 1946.

[24] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 9823-10000, Rezek a spol. (Rejzek and Accomplices), 8 Nov 1946. The yellow card (used for commands) of this operation states: "... in his report from 9 August of this year he reported on sugar factories in the Russian occupation zone. In case it is possible, the confident should locate places where sugar factories are still working. At the same time, we are interested to learn about places in Thüringen where companies for the production of goods from Jablonec are located." SSA, f. Intelligence Department of the General Staff, operational files, archival No. 2946, František Adolf Rejzek, Yellow card, 2 Sep 1946.

not surprisingly, that Rejzek and Khaur were intelligence agents and smugglers at the same time. Fejfar stopped using Rejzek as his agent for the reasons mentioned above. Nevertheless, within a year he was visited by another officer in his flat in Berlin and his cooperation with Czechoslovak military intelligence lasted until 1949.[25]

Due to the reoccurring problems with handling agents, the head of the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff issued s to prepare a general overview of all networks and prepare new evidence. These were prepared as a graphic overview of the network handled depicting information such as the category (resident, walker, talent scout or connection), actual condition of the network and emergency action in case of mobilisation. All officers were ordered to evaluate their own networks, give an overview of the talent-scouting they had done personally and give percentages of successful recruitments and prepare analyses of the means used during successful recruitment processes.[26] Just to give a very general overview of cases I have seen during my research, I will provide some brief facts. The average officer handled about 10 to 20 agents, and most agents usually worked in a network for a period of several months up to four years. When talking about agents who were Czechoslovak nationals, many of them cooperated with more than one agency, as noted by officer J. Krátký:

> Within detached groups, such as the military mission, guard unit, group of clerks responsible for recovery claims, there it is usually possible to find a person or several people who are interested in intelligence, for whatever reason. As a general rule, everybody from home who travels there turns to those people. All reports then come from a single source as such people with initiative are willing to be recruited by several officers, for example, from 2nd and 5th Department, Ministry of the Interior, and I don't know by who else. Possibly, different intelligence agencies compete.[27]

The turn of 1945/1946 brought many changes to the Czechoslovak military intelligence abroad. In October 1945, its head Lieutenant Colonel Anton Rašla was dismissed. The step was based on personal and ideological reasons: Rašla was not willing to accept "advices" from the influential head of the Defence Intelligence, Bedřich Reicin. At the same time – despite being a firm communist – Rašla cultivated personal ties to several officers (especially Col. Karel Paleček) who were considered to be unreliable by the Defence Intelligence. Such behaviour ended in a conflict between Rašla and Reicin, who succeeded in his efforts to undermine Rašla's position at the

[25] SSA, f. ZSGŠ, operational files, archival No. 2946, František Adolf Rejzek, untitled document, response to the yellow card, 3 Dec 1946. The final evaluation of this agent done in 1958 was even stricter: "He is a confident – cheat who used the cooperation to gain personal profit. To such activities, it is possible to say, he was directed at that time by handlers (including the Main Centre) who approved his activities. The confident provided low value information obtained from the press or by observation. With the help of emigrants from Czechoslovakia he was in touch with the British CIC [sic!] and his handler fled to the West in 1946 [1948, corrected by M. M.]. The confident was arrested three times, the last time in Germany where he gave himself in to the German police. He smuggled letters from emigrants to Czechoslovakia with the approval of the Main Centre." Ibidem, BAKALÁŘ, 16 June 1958.

[26] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 9823-10000, Přehled důvěrnické sítě – předloha (Overview of the Networks of Confidents), 11 Nov 1946.

[27] SSA, f. Intelligence Department of the General Staff, personal files, archival No. 2292 (Krátký Jindřich), Záznam o kurírní cestě do Německa ve dnech 20.–26. ledna 1947 (Minutes from the Courier Trip to Germany on 20–26 Jan 1947.

ministry and replace him with one of his subordinate officers, Col. Karel Hanus. Broader personal changes followed[28] together with staff reduction and a general change of priorities by taking more political issues into consideration: " … our task is to work offensively abroad in the neighbouring countries, in the area occupied by the American army, notice all scrap formations, notice activities of supporters of former Gen. Prchala; regarding Poland, we will work there up to the time when Poland gets rid of reactionary elements."[29] Additional staff reductions followed in March 1946 when the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff was limited to 55 officers with an additional 15 abroad (offices of the military attaché).[30] These numbers show not only the marginal position of the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff within the Ministry of Defence or within the Czechoslovak intelligence community but, at the same time, incomprehensible underestimation of intelligence gathering, representation and the use of soft power abroad by Czechoslovak executive bodies.

In the summer of 1946, military intelligence abroad prepared rules for operations in Germany. Right at the beginning, it states that despite the defeat, Germany will still be among the most important objectives of the military intelligence activities. It indicates the necessity of establishing a network of agent-residents as the post-war expulsion of Germans provided good grounds for the recruitment of people who were soon to experience materially worse conditions. The document puts emphasis on the fact that a stable income from Czechoslovak intelligence could be of great interest to these people:

> Recruitment of the agents in fact does not mean anything else but finding intelligent and willing people, giving them a promise of part-time income and providing them with a cover address (mailbox) to allow them to contact us even after a long period of time in case we would not be able to recruit them immediately … While working on this action, it is not necessary to recruit only antifascists as Nazis could be recruited as agents as well.[31]

Once settled, agents were instructed to join political parties (any), associations (especially compatriotic) and participate in public life.

I already stressed the importance of the action and I am stressing its importance once again despite the fact I am aware of the work already done. Until the transfer ends, much may be done if every single officer keeps in mind the fact that

– he is working for the sake of the institution and – even though he will not handle the agent in case he does not operate against Germany – he had done meritorious work,

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[28] According to <http://vojenstvi.cz/vasedotazy_48.htm> (last retrieved on 27 July 2021).

[29] SSA, f. 2. oddelenie Hlavného štábu,box No. 32, Zápis o jednání při zpravodajské schůzce u 2. oddělení hl. štábu dne 30. října 1945 (Minutes from Negotiations of the Intelligence Meeting at the 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff at 30 Oct 1945).

[30] SSA, f. 2. odd. HŠ, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 4284-4498, Systematisovaný počet důstojnických míst (Systematisation of Work Posts for Officers).

[31] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 6781-6869, Výzvědné zpravodajství – pokyny (Offensive Intelligence – Instructions), 26 Jun 1946.

– the effect of the work will provide its benefits in years' time, but if it is not done today, it will have to be carried out years later under much more difficult conditions.[32]

Therefore, all officers were instructed to focus on the recruitment of Germans who were to be expelled from Czechoslovakia. The document stressed that it was not necessary to give new recruits important tasks, they were to be tasked only to provide report on their living conditions in new homes and once the contact was established, they were to be taken over by handlers from the intelligence department of the Second Military District. Despite being rejected in many cases, it seems that the operation succeeded in recruiting large numbers of possible information sources. Looking at lists of agents from 1948 and 1949, it is clear that a good number of collaborators of Czechoslovak military intelligence were people with German names living in Germany or Austria. There were even cases when pre-war collaborators contacted the Czechoslovak army of their own volition and declared their interest in re-establishing the cooperation.

The averted side of this "project" was that many people had to be disengaged from the network later (often very soon) as they were not able to provide the information required by their handlers because they lacked subjective or objective capabilities to deal with the tasks of their handlers. With the creation of the Iron Curtain, border-line agents became of less use or even useless. The communist power takeover also proved to be a complication since there were many desertions of intelligence officers (e.g. O. Fejfar mentioned above even testified against his agents in a military court in Germany).

When talking about the products provided by the service, these may be divided into two general categories: periodical and ad hoc reports. Periodical records were prepared by military attachés, military missions and the Centre who prepared regular reports summarising information from ten-day summaries forwarded by the 2nd Depts of the staff of individual military districts. These provided information on events of military, political or economic importance as well as events related to denazification and demilitarisation of Germany, expellees, displaced persons, the security situation in the country and information on the non-military formations (e.g. border guards). In 1946, another type of periodical report emerged: daily maps of the American army, prepared by the 2nd Military District's intelligence personnel. Ad hoc reports dealt with concrete issues of interest, including reports on secret stocks of German weapons, ammunition, documentation, regarding resistance and terrorist organisations, activities of associations of former Nazis, such as ODESSA[33] and even rumours of Adolf Hitler's hideout in the Alps or the spotting of Martin Borman in a train in Switzerland.

A special part of the Czechoslovak intelligence establishment in post-war Germany were liaison officers and military missions to Allied armies. Czechoslovakia kept its representatives in all four occupational zones at first, but the mission to the

[32] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj (see note 31).

[33] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 9823-10000, Illegální organisace ODESSA – prověření (Illegal organisation ODESSA – vetting).

French zone in Baden Baden was soon withdrawn and its tasks were taken over by the Czechoslovak military attaché to France.[34] Apart from other tasks, they were to provide information on the attitude of respective Allied military bodies towards "German problems," monitor demilitarisation, search for information regarding new superweapons and, last but not least, monitor activities of units consisting of different nationals who were fighting alongside Allied forces in the war but stayed in Germany after the armistice.[35] Their intelligence was mostly dealing with the situation in the zone and repatriation of Allied forces. On the other hand, there were cases when members of a mission were forced to act against (suspiciously behaving) agents send by intelligence officers from Czechoslovak territory.[36] Here again, any activity targeting Soviet zones or forces was considered undesirable.[37] Nevertheless, the work of the missions was limited by a lack of staff and their intelligence gathering processes were considered as only improvised with a need to be built up, as stated in November 1946 by Staff Col. V. T. Podhora, commander of the Czechoslovak military mission to the American zone. Meanwhile, Podhora added, that the major intelligence task of his office was to obtain military-political information on the intentions of the Allies, political information on the activities of Sudet Germans ("It will very soon became, in my opinion, main subject of our interest."),[38] economic intelligence, the monitoring of the internal situation in Germany and surveillance of "anti-state elements" (followers of Gen. Lev Prchala and representatives or sympathizers of Hlinka's former Slovak Peoples Party regime in war-time Slovakia). However, it could only be possible once the office had sufficient personnel and financial sources as the mission lacked personnel even for reading the press (open source intelligence). His reasoning was not successful and all offices of the Czechoslovak army abroad were reduced even more.

III. Conclusion

Germany, together with Austria and Hungary, remained the major target for Czechoslovak military intelligence in the two post-war years. This was based on the pre-war geopolitical patterns as declared in the first post-WW2 general strategy of the army. In 1945, Czechoslovak military planners expected that, at some point, Germany would be able to rise to arms again and – together with Hungary – threaten Czechoslovak sovereignty once more. Simply, the country would have, sooner or

[34] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. 34, Zpravodajské úkoly pro čs. vojenské styčné mise v jednotlivých pásmechNěmecka (Intelligence tasks of the Czechoslovak military liaison missions in individual zones of the Germany), 12 Dec 1945.

[35] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. 34, Zpravodajské úkoly pro čs. vojenské mise v jednotlivých okupačních pásmechNěmecka (Intelligence tasks of the Czechoslovak military liaison missions in individual zones of the Germany), 25 Dec 1945.

[36] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. 32, Hlášení čís. 2 (Report No. 2), 19 Oct 1945.

[37] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 9546-9636, Souhrnná zpráva čs. voj. mise u SKR v Berlíně za měsíc červen – srpen 1946 (Summary report of the Czechoslovak military mission to the Allied control council), 23 Nov 1946.

[38] SSA, f. 2nd Dept. Of the Main Staff, box No. MNO Taj. 1946 čj. 9823-10000, Zpravodajství – organisace (Intelligence – organisation), 9 Nov 1946.

later, to face the 1938 dilemma once again. Additional military and political reasons were connected with the rising interest in displaced persons, expellees and political emigrants who were considered a security threat to the country and were allowed to stay on German territory. A new trend also appeared, to gather intelligence on Western Allied armies, especially the American army. Legitimate at first, as intelligence agencies should be counting all possible options and developments.

From the documentation, it seems clear that – apart from the general strategy prepared by planners of the Ministry of National Defence – Czechoslovak policymakers in the post-WW2 period did not set clear guidelines for both parts of the military intelligence community. This was a result of the contemporary political situation. Ministers of non-communist parties were responsible for other ministries and denied influence over intelligence agencies. Communists, on the other hand, focused mostly on the internal intelligence bodies with the clear intention of misusing them for their own goals. The military Defence Intelligence initially turned itself into a detective agency responsible for providing its communist masters with shady services for possible political machinations and cleansing. At the same time, the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff was left on its own with limited resources and a very general assignment. The reason for the lack of interest seems clear: representatives of the Czechoslovak communist party expected to be responsible for internal intelligence, while operations abroad would – in their opinion – be sufficiently covered by Soviet intelligence services. However, at the same time, nobody really wanted to dissolve the service. The 2nd Dept. of the Main staff, thus, turned to what it considered as natural. Its officers carried out their usual duties, hoping that their efforts would prove beneficial in the future. New targets – such as following the deployment changes of the American army in Germany – became valid only cautiously since 1946. Nevertheless, it did not save the agency from vast budget cuts. Therefore, the operatives had to face demanding and very time-consuming Monday to Saturday (and very often even on Sunday) work while often lacking the basic tools for their work, such as a means of transport or proper funding. The underestimation of the work of military attachés and generally representation abroad was clearly a setback for the country itself. While saving and budget cuts were understandable in the complicated economic situation of post-WW2 Czechoslovakia, financing a costly intelligence apparatus while there was no real interest in its products surely does not seem to be the right option. This trend escalated in 1948, when the 2nd Dept. of the Main Staff, with approximately 30 officers, most of them without sufficient language skills, became practically non-operational. However, the Cold War changed the situation very quickly and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (the office carried the name after 1951) had to adapt to new demands of the Soviet bloc. Although decisions taken in 1945–1946, together with the very specific manner in which personal issues were dealt with under the communist regime, affected the situation, the new intelligence apparatus had to be rebuilt almost from zero with much more effort.

Prokop Tomek

Czechoslovak Participation on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee in Korea 1953–1992[1]

Abstract

The Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have sent their employees to the Neutral States Supervisory Commission (NSSC) on the Korean peninsula over the last forty years. This very numerous mission had a rather military nature for the first short period. The NSSC inspectional groups carried out checks of arms and troops in many places of both parts of the peninsula. This joint diplomatic and military nature changed to a diplomatic mission in 1956 and significantly reduced its quantity. The commission did not have any really significant power. Nevertheless, its existence has undoubtedly helped to keep the fragile armistice on the Korean Peninsula since 1953. The development of the Czechoslovak delegation has been researched only in a small scope.

I. Introduction

War on the Korean Peninsula broke out on 27 June 1950. At that time, North Korean troops attacked the south with the intention of forcibly uniting two divided states under communist rule. The United States (US) was able to obtain a completely unprecedented condemnation from the United Nations (UN) Security Council due to a mistake of the Soviet delegation, and, under US leadership, launched a huge military action by UN troops to help the invaded Republic of Korea (RoK). The war froze in the spring of 1951 after bloody fighting around the places where it began, on the 38th parallel of latitude. This situation was finally concluded by an armistice agreement, signed after two years of difficult negotiations on 27 July 1953. The next phase of conflict resolution should be peace talks. These never took place. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) leadership always sought to unite

[1] The topic of my paper is devoted to the participation of the Czechoslovak People's Army on a peacekeeping mission on the Korean Peninsula in the long period from 1953 to 1992; Tomek, Prokop. "Čtyřicet let čs. delegace v Dozorčí komisi neutrálních států v Koreji," in *Historie a vojenství*, 2, 2018, 22–45; also see: *Korean Security and the 65 Year Search for Peace International Conference*, ed. by Georg Hays II and Milada Polišenská (Prague, Conference Proceedings, 26–27 Apr 2018). <https://www.aauni.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/proceedings-korean-security-and-the-65-year-search-for-peace.pdf> (last retrieved on 1 Jul 2023).

the whole of Korean lands under its dominance. The RoK worked towards achieving the "status quo ante bellum."

Following the signing of the Armistice Agreement between the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers Forces (CPVF), on the one hand, and the UN Forces (UNF), on the other hand, on 27 July 1953 in Panmunjon (on the 38th parallel of latitude), a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was set up under Articles 36 to 50 of the Armistice Agreement. The task of the NNSC was to oversee the compliance with the signed armistice. Two of the delegations to the NNSC were nominated by the UN Command, the other two jointly by representatives of the KPA and CPVF. States whose armies did not take part in the conflict in Korea were considered neutral regardless of their attitude to the sides fighting. The UNF asked the governments of Switzerland and Sweden for their participation in the NNSC work. The KPA and the CPVF asked Czechoslovakia and Poland.

In addition, a Military Ceasefire Commission was formed at the same time, consisting of representatives of both warring parties, with the task of supervising the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and settling its violations. It consisted of five senior army officials from each of the warring parties, of whom at least three were generals or admirals. There was always an auxiliary staff on both sides.[2]

In addition, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was established based on the Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War signed on 8 June 1953 in Panmunjon. Pursuant to Article I, paragraph 1, of the Guidelines for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, this body was composed of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and India. According to Article I, paragraph 2, a representative of each of the first four of these countries could have a staff of a maximum of fifty. India had a different position, with its armed forces guarding and ordering service in camps for prisoners of war in the demilitarized zone in Panmunjon, and whose representative was, simultaneously, an arbitrator, chairman and executive body of the NNRC. The Commission oversaw the camps and had tasks in the so-called explanatory work, which allowed the warring parties to inform their prisoners of war of their right to repatriation and of any return issues. The Commission decided by a majority vote on the request of any prisoner who wished to exercise his right to repatriation. The activities of the NNRC were planned for a period of seven months after the signing of the armistice. At the request of the governments of the DPRK, the People's Republic of China and the US, the Czechoslovak government formally agreed on 12 June 1953 to send a representative to this commission as well. Social security and other requirements were adjusted in the same way as for members of the NNSC according to the resolution of the Czechoslovak government of 3 June 1953. In particular, it was a matter of creating the most favorable conditions for explaining (here, rather persuading) prisoners to repatriate. The first part of the group left for Korea on 18 August 1953, and

[2] *The Korean Peninsula after the Armistice as Seen by Czechoslovak Delegates to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commision 1953–1956*, ed. by Jongmin Sa, Seungju Hong and Jaroslav Olša Jr. (Seoul: Seoul Museum of History, 2013).

the entire NNRC ceased operations, according to plan, on 21 February 1954. Most members of the Czechoslovak delegation were civilians from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff with a lent military rank. The Czechoslovak delegation in the NNRC was led by Colonel Ladislav Šimovič, PhD, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Representative of the Czechoslovak Republic in the NNRC.[3]

In the following, I will look into how the interests of the political system in Czechoslovakia collided with the demand for impartial peacekeeping in Korea. Another issue will be the confrontation of political constraints and daily routine during the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, this paper is also devoted to researching the whole development of the Czechoslovak representation in the NNSC.

Thus, I will, at first, describe the circumstances of the establishment of the NNSC and its composition. Then follows the introductory period from 1953 to 1956. The 1960s represent a different time in the existence of the NNSC. And finally, the last twenty years meant the return to ideological strengthening and constancy.

II. First period 1953–1956

The Czechoslovak government sent its diplomats and military personnel into generally unknown and distant regions. The preliminary agreement about the participation of Czechoslovakia on the proposed NNSC was signed in April 1952. The Czechoslovak side did not envisage its participation as a peaceful mission of a neutral state in a generally understood sense. The main goal was to provide help and ensure that the North Korean and Chinese Communists' interests were fulfilled. Czechoslovak official policy and propaganda, together with the Moscow line, unconditionally presented the conflict with apparent discord with reality as an imperialistic aggression committed against the DPRK. Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation's activities would have performed literally "a combat task" on the Korean peninsula as a part of the long-term anti-imperialistic struggle. The mission would also be a valuable experience for the Czechoslovak People's Army for any similar missions in the future. The staff dispatched were well equipped with a huge amount of supplies and weapons. The Czechoslovaks expected a hostile reception in the south part of the Korean Peninsula and they would not create material troubles for their North Korean comrades.[4]

Due to the postponing of an armistice agreement, the first group was dissolved in June 1952 and assembled again in April 1953. A planned number of members was set to as many as 384 people. Only six were skilled employees of the MFA with lent military ranks. The mission owned 102 cars and 25 motorcycles, appropriate spare parts and supplies, and mobile signals equipment. Each member was armed with a pistol and a submachine gun. Additional armament consisted of five light machine guns and 600 hand grenades. The Polish group was of a similar size and had sim-

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3 "Aktivity československých institucí v jihovýchodní Asii v době korejské a vietnamské války," in *Securitas Imperii*, 2, 2002, 9–10.

4 Pilát, Vladimír. "Příprava takzvané Zvláštní skupiny čs. armády k činnosti na linii příměří v Koreji," in *Historie a vojenství*, 6, 1998, 58–83.

ilar equipment to the Czechoslovak one. On the other hand, the Swiss delegation consisted of only eighty people, equipped with basic necessities and armed with pistols. Eventually, however, 300 people left Czechoslovakia. As a result of the next reduction of the inspection groups, the size of the Czechoslovak delegation rapidly decreased in the next years. After two more years, there were 72 people, only 17 in 1956, 12 in 1957 and, finally, 8 in the 1960s. This small quantity remained till 1992.

The delegates of both Poland and Czechoslovakia maintained daily contact and coordination with the KPA and CPVF representatives.[5] The deployment of the inspection groups for checking the fulfillment of the armistice was intended not to disrupt KPA and CPVF interests. In fact, there were many cases of violations of the declared neutrality.[6]

Reaching a consensus with four delegations, in fact, divided into two equally strong groups, was very difficult. The Czechoslovak and Polish delegations were instructed by the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai in Beijing on 26 and 27 August 1954. They were assigned to keep the NNSC in work as long as possible. Their task was to improve relations with the Swedish and Swiss delegations and the atmosphere of negotiations with UNF representatives.[7]

It is notable that Czechoslovak members of control groups could keep normal daily contact with US soldiers, visit the US Army bases and buy western goods. At the same time, a huge anti-American propaganda wave took place in Czechoslovakia.

The delegation recorded relatively few incidents of indiscipline. Paradoxically, the first commander of the Czechoslovak delegation, Divisional General František Bureš, became the most troublesome element. This long-serving army officer and former Nazi regime prisoner considered himself a direct representative of the Czechoslovak government in Korea. He only seldom took part in the NNSC negotiations and left all his duties to the diplomatic staff. He was also uncritically taking over and promoting the unsustainable views and demands of the representatives of the Chinese and Korean representatives. Bureš organized expensive trips and hunts. The Korean people gave him a nickname, "Lord and Ruler of both Koreas." He was compromised by huge shopping sessions at US military stores, having photographs taken together with the Americans and letting them host him. The case was later negotiated by the political bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Czechoslovakia.

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5 Gnoinska, Margaret K. "Czechoslovakia and Poland: Supervising Peace on the Korean Peninsula," in *Journal for the History of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Slovanský přehled)*, 98/3–4, 2012, 293–320.

6 *The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (PDF) (Report).* U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Aug 1970. OCLC 50820200. ACDA/WEC/FO 69–65. Retrieved 3 May 2013.

7 Mohn, P. and E. Gross. "Memorandum of the Swedish and Swiss Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to the Military Armistice Commission of 4 May 1954," Attachment "B", 5 [148 in pdf file], <https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nationsarchives/9/3/c/93c33f1e71d9bc94d1139936749f4de456b83f15c13f642a68ebd9fad0161191/S0846-0002-06-00001.pdf>.

Bureš was punished as a party member. He even lost his commanding position and was finally deployed to the army reserve.[8]

The experienced diplomat Dr. Oldřich Chýle, with a lent rank of general, arrived as a next Czechoslovak representative in September 1956. Since that time, the original character of the NNSC (half military and half diplomatic activity) changed definitively to a diplomatic nature. There was a total of fourteen heads, ten Czechs and four Slovaks, in the history of the Czechoslovak participation on the NNSC. Many of them were meritorious soldiers with a remarkable war record, but only three were diplomats. The professional competence for performing such a task was doubtful because only a few had sufficient foreign language skills. Most of them only knew Russian.[9]

Dissatisfaction with the NNSC grew relatively quickly, especially in the south of the Korean Peninsula. The Czechoslovak and Polish delegations demonstrably and practically openly supported the KPA and the CPVF. Members of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations were blatantly accused by the South of committing espionage in favor of the North. Demonstrations and occasional intimidating attacks had been repeatedly held in the RoK since the summer of 1954 and over the following two years. The delegation camps had to be guarded by the UNF Forces. With a few interruptions, the protests lasted until the middle of 1956. Finally, at the initiative of the UN side, inspection groups in the South were stopped and limited to the demilitarized zone, to the NNSC headquarters in Panmunjon and to the border between the two opposing parties. As a result, inspection groups in the North also ceased operations. These changes ended the first period of the NNSC's existence. The following decades were very different. The NNSC limited its activities to studying weekly written reports of movements of arms and soldiers to and out of both parts of the peninsula.[10] Nevertheless, the work of the commission carried on.

III. Changes in the 1960s

The Czechoslovak MFA took over the organizational role of the delegation from 1 April 1957. The staff was selected from both the Ministry of National Defence and the MFA. The period of the individual deployment was one year with the possibility of prolongation.

The connection of the Czechoslovak delegation with the world and homeland represented the DPRK territory almost exclusively. Although Czechoslovak and Polish delegations were formally allied countries, the DPRK had shown ill-concealed distrust regarding them. The DPRK firmly concealed its weakness. In the autumn of 1958, for example, an epidemic of the "black death disease" spread in North Korea. Koreans had not been informed about it at all. Diplomats found out about this dan-

8 Tomek, Prokop. "Generál František Bureš, pán obou Korejí," in *Historie a vojenství*, 1, 2020, 89–95.

9 Tomek, "Čtyřicet let čs. Delegace" (see note 1), 22–45.

10 Vojenský ústřední archiv – Vojenský historický archiv (VÚA-VHA) Praha, fond. Ministry of the Ministry of National Defence 1954, sekretariát náčelníka generálního štábu, sign. 1 2/6-105, kart. 436.

ger only by chance and quickly ordered the necessary vaccines from Prague. The KPA also concealed its illegal minefields located in and around the demilitarized zone. At the end of 1958, such an illegally laid land mine seriously wounded a member of the Polish delegation. The delegation suffered from very poor accommodation, with faulty wiring, dampness and fire hazards, during the 1950s and the 1960s.[11]

Representatives of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations asked in vain for the possibility of calling a helicopter in case of emergency medical need. The Swiss and Swedish delegations could use such a service from the UNF. Therefore, the members of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations had to hope that nothing serious would happen to them. Major General Václav Tauš arrived in Korea in 1963 as the head of the delegation for the second time, regardless of his serious health problems. He suffered a heart attack almost immediately upon his arrival. There was no ECG available at the Guesong Hospital and the doctor of the Czechoslovak embassy in Pyongyang refused a transfer to the Seoul Hospital! General Tauš returned back to Czechoslovakia in May 1964 and died, aged 55, the following year in November after another heart attack.[12]

Life in complete isolation in a very limited territory significantly affected the psychological condition of the little group of diplomats and soldiers. Rare cultural events organized for the delegations in North Korea could not bring enough distraction, since such performances consisted mostly of boring ideology and military propaganda. The Soviet-Chinese controversy, which started in 1963, had a significant impact on the work of the delegation. The reports of the Czechoslovak delegates from the 1960s appear less ideologically burdened and more credible. This period also reinforced the importance of the delegation's existence for the Soviet Union. The head of the delegation kept in close contact with the soviet embassy in Pchongjang.[13] There was a consistently high number of KPA provocations against UNF. Many such clashes ended with casualties mostly on the side of the RoK and the UNF. The KPA and the CPVF representatives tried to use Czechoslovak and Polish delegations to put forward accusations against the UNF. Czechoslovak delegates started carefully to refuse to participate in such actions.[14]

The Czechoslovaks appreciated the good relations with their Polish colleagues. The real attitude to the Polish colleagues was quite warm, except for some reservations about the views of some heads of the Polish delegation. There was only a noticeable cooling period of the relations after five Warsaw Pact member armies had participated in the military intervention into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The Polish delegation allegedly unreservedly supported unrealistic proposals of the North Korean side and criticized political developments in Czechoslovakia. Members of

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11 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí (AMZV) Praha, fond Teritoriální odbor 1955–1959, Korea T, kart. 2 č. j. 012/0S-DKNS/1959, 18 Jan 1959, Bezpečnostní opatření v demilitarizovaném pásmu. (Security measures made in demilitarized zone).

12 Administrative Archive of the Army of the Czech Republic, military personal files, file Václav Tau.

13 AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor, 1965–1969 Korea a DKNS T, kart. 5, č. j. 046/65-DKNS, Informace o situaci v DKNS, 29 Jul 1965. (Information about situation in the NNSC).

14 AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor, 1965–1969 Korea a DKNS T, kart. 5, č. j. 011/68-DKNS, DKNS v dubnu 1968, 30 Apr 1968. (NNSC in April 1968).

the Polish delegation in those months could keep in contact with Czechoslovak colleagues only with the permission of the head of their delegation.[15]

Czechoslovak representation on the NNSC had gradually become a kind of substitute diplomatic mission to the RoK. Czechoslovak diplomats wrote regular reports on the state of South Korea's foreign policy, and the military, domestic and economic situation for the MFA in Prague.

The exceptional position of the DKNS was confirmed by the course of events after the incident, which took place at sea near the North Korean coast on 23 January 1968. The USSR navy attacked and captured the USS Pueblo. As usual, there was a dispute about whether the captured ship was attacked in international or North Korean territorial waters. The crew of the Pueblo tried to escape before capture, and destroyed classified materials, but the ship was hit by North Korean fire. Several crew members were injured. The entire crew of 83 men was taken to Pyongyang and charged with espionage. The sailors were physically and mentally abused in captivity.

Clear and comprehensive information from the initial negotiations on the incident in the Military Ceasefire Commission and NNSC was provided by individual delegations to their diplomatic leadership at home. The Czechoslovak and Polish delegations played a role in attempts to mediate informal contacts between the opposing parties in the Military Ceasefire Commission. Specifically, after the NNSC meeting on 26 January 1968, the Swiss delegate, General Pierre Barbey, explained to the head of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations the contents of his conversation with the Chief of Staff of the US 8th Army in Korea. He conveyed a threat from the South, that major weapons, including nuclear, could be used to free the USS Pueblo crew, and that American interest in this matter did not diminish the current US involvement in the Vietnam War. The representatives of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations passed this message on to the main representatives of the KPA and CPVF side, General Pak Joon-gok, and also their headquarters. This happened the same day. All NNSC members then received a letter from Senior UNF Rear Admiral Smith asking the US government to find out the health of the USS Pueblo crew, and the names of the dead and missing crew members. The American ambassador to Prague also asked for the mediation of the Czechoslovak delegation to the NNSC on this matter. However, according to the MFA in Prague, the effort to activate the NNSC in this matter was not desirable due to the DPRK's efforts to hold direct talks with the US about it. The problem was the fact that the representatives of the KPA and CPVF, as usual, did not trust and did not communicate information to the delegation of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the event confirmed the usefulness of the DKNS, which could provide "good services" in diplomatic talks, even though it did not bring a concrete result.[16] On 23 December 1968, 82 men were released (one of the wounded sailors died) in the demilitarized zone in Panmunjon.

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[15] AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor, 1965–1969 Korea a DKNS T, kart. 6, č. j. 013/68-DKNS, DKNS ve II. čtvrtletí 1968, 25 Jun 1968 (NNSC in the second quarter 1968).

[16] AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor, 1965–1969 Korea a DKNS T, kart. 5, č. j. 02/68-DKNS, DKNS – leden 1968, 29 Jan 1968 (NNSC – January 1968).

IV. Last twenty years

A directive on the activities of the Czechoslovak delegation at the NNSC of 20 June 1974 shows its role in the 1970s. In addition to the main original task, it also fulfilled an intelligence function. The new directives emphasized coordination with the Czechoslovak embassy in Pyongyang and cooperation with the Polish delegation. A conclusion stated: the NNSC is an asset for peace in the area. It helps parties to comply with the ceasefire agreement, while respecting both the interests and opinions of the KPA and CPVF and especially the interests of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the community of socialist states.[17]

A minimum of security incidents occurred within the Czechoslovak delegation over 40 years. Surprisingly, no case of emigration occurred during the time of numerous delegations in 1953−1956. This was true until 30 October 1981. The compulsory service soldier, private first class Robert Országh, the delegation's cook, escaped to South Korean territory in the conference area in Panmunjon. He refused to return back, even after talking with members of the Czechoslovak delegation, mediated by UN troops headquarters.[18]

The main reason for the end of the Czechoslovak presence in the NNSC was the gradual convergence of Czechoslovakia with the RoK in the 1980s based on economic interests. The first signals can be found in 1987, but until 1990, these relations involved only unofficial business and cultural exchange. During the Velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989, the MFA prepared a proposal for establishing normal diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and the RoK.[19]

In 1992, the DPRK asked Czechoslovakia and Poland to stop sending new delegation chairs to NNSC. Both countries rejected the request. Although DPRK recognized the Czech Republic on 1 January 1993, it did not grant the right for the representative of the Czech Army to act as a delegate to the NNSC. The Czech flag was pulled from the flagpole in Panmunjon on 3 April 1993. Since then, one place in NNSC has remained unoccupied.[20]

It is questionable whether the Czechoslovak (Czech) participation in the NNSC has legally ended. This break happened almost exactly forty years after the establishment of the NNSC. The NNSC met over 2200 times with Czechoslovak participation. Over the course of the years, approximately one thousand soldiers and diplomats from Czechoslovakia served in the delegation.

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17 AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor 1970−1974 DKNS, kart. 7, obal 3, 155/413, č. j. 011 958/74-3 Návrh směrnice pro činnost čs. delegace v DKNS, 29 Apr 1974 (Draft of guidance for activity of the Czechoslovak delegation in NNSC).

18 AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor 1980−1989 DKNS T, č. j. 016.523/81-3, Jižní Korea – emigrace čs. občana – čs. opatření (South Korea – emigration of Czechoslovak citizen – Czechoslovak measures).

19 AMZV, fond teritoriální odbor, 1980−1989 T DKNS, č. j. 010.712/89-2 Jižní Korea – návrh usnesení vlády ČSSR k přístupu ČSSR k stykům s Jižní Koreou. (South Korea – draft of Czechoslovak government's decision for the access of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to relations with South Korea).

20 Smetánka, Tomáš. "Neutrální Československo. Čtyřicet let v komisi pro dohled nad příměřím v Koreji," in *Mezinárodní politika*, 6, 2010, 11−12.

V. Conclusion

The initial and secret intention of the Czechoslovak delegation to the NNSC to help the KPA and the CPVF to win the conflict in Korea had changed after the cooling of the People's Republic of China's relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Regarding the Soviet Union, Czechoslovaks together with the Polish delegation became a valuable tool in an otherwise closed region. Neutrality was understood as a mere nonparticipation in a particular conflict. On the other hand, the delegations sent by Sweden and Switzerland were well prepared for their task. There were two models of attitude to a problem in the NNCS.

The NNSC was a limited tool for attempts to influence a dangerous environment. The development of the attitudes of Czechoslovak soldiers and diplomats in the delegation is also interesting. While these attitudes reflected official policy for most of the time, in the latter half of the 1960s, the view of Czechoslovak representatives was more realistic. The renewal of the police and the bureaucratic communistic regime in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s also meant a renewal of loyalty to the DPRK, although an ideological distance remained. The fall of the Communist Bloc in Europe and the convergence of Czechoslovakia with the RoK led to the growth of the DPRK's mistrust, and then to the lack of interest for the continuation of the Czechoslovak (Czech) presence.

Upon closer examination, it turns out that the role of the NNSC and the Czechoslovak delegation in the commission was perhaps more important than it might look at first sight. Sixty-eight years after the signing of the armistice, the Korean peninsula is still divided. Thanks to historical research about the NNSC, it is apparent that the crisis has been a daily routine at the provisional borders in Korea. The NNSC, despite its formal weak competence, has been one of the few mechanisms acting as a brake on violence and war. Against the background of foreign policy development, a small group of Czechoslovak soldiers and diplomats played an exceptional, interesting role. An initially dubious mission had turned out in retrospect into a positive participation in foreign policy and peace.

Jordan Baev

War Scare Psychosis and Operation VRYaN: New Evidence from Bulgarian Military and Intelligence Archives

Abstract

The proposed paper aims to discuss the new archival data from Bulgarian military and intelligence records, which made it possible to add some new clarifications and interpretations of the last Cold War wave during the first part of the 1980s. It deals with the origins, frames and results of a joint Warsaw Pact intelligence operation "VRYaN" for the detection of the basic indicators of the beginning of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the Soviet bloc. The striving of the military leaders inside the autocratic rule in the Kremlin for more power and domination at the beginning of the 1980s compared to the new hard policy of the White House against "the evil empire" resulted in a strong political crisis in the fall of 1983, known as "the War Scare" psychosis.

I. Introduction

The US intelligence "station" in Moscow urgently reported to Washington in late 1983 that there was an indication of a strong military psychosis in the Kremlin for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. According to signals from Moscow, the Soviet state and military leadership perceived NATO's planned nuclear exercise ABLE ARCHER-83 in early November 1983 as a preparation and prelude to real military action with preemptive nuclear strikes. This prompted the announcement of the increased high-level combat readiness of the Soviet strategic aviation.

Washington did not assess the seriousness of the "war scare" psychosis that pervaded the other superpower, as could be seen by the CIA's special intelligence analyses in 1984. Only a year later, the British intelligence services received (and shared with their US partners) the first authentic information about the large-scale *Komitet gosudarstuvennoī bezopasnosti* (KGB; Committee for State Security) and *Glavnoe razvedyvatel'-noe upravlenie* (GRU; Chief Intelligence Directorate) intelligence operation "RYaN / VRYaN,"[1] after the defection of Oleg Gordievsky, the deputy head

[1] The Soviet intelligence documents used both abbreviations "PRH" and "BPRH," while the Bulgarian intelligence reports and correspondence mentioned only "BPRH" (VRYaN). The Czechoslovak State Security (StB) intelligence and counterintelligence directorates used the ab-

of the Soviet intelligence group in London. According to this information, Soviet intelligence services started a large-scale operation in 1981 for the early warning detection of basic indicators of a secret preparation for a NATO preemptive "sudden nuclear missiles attack" (*VnezapnoeRaketno-YadernoeNapadenie*). Gordievsky claimed that this operation had been gradually abandoned after the death of Yuri Andropov, former KGB Chairman and Soviet Communist leader, in 1984.[2] This statement was obviously induced by the fact that after Gordievsky's defection in London in 1985 he no longer had access to any authentic information regarding KGB activities. Gordievsky's testimonies were misinterpreted in the first specialized Western analyses after the end of the Cold War, which claimed that the Warsaw Pact intelligence operation VRYaN was terminated after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in Moscow in 1985.[3]

A decade after the political changes in Eastern Europe, many of the diplomatic and political archives in those countries became accessible. This made it possible, as early as 2001–2002, in my research study at the Nobel Institute in Oslo, to propose some adjustments to the beginning and end of this intelligence operation.[4] New important documents were published a decade later from the Stasi archives which supplemented and expanded our knowledge of Operation VRYaN.[5] New detailed monographic studies on the "war scare" psychosis have also appeared in recent years.[6]

The proposed paper aims to discuss the new archival data from Bulgarian military (and foreign intelligence records) which made possible to add some new clarifications and interpretations of the last Cold War wave during the first part of the 1980s. It deals with the origins, frames and results of the joint Warsaw Pact intelligence

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breviation "NRJAN" – Rendek, Peter. "Operation ALAN," in: *The NKVD/KGB Activities and Its Cooperation with Other Secret Services in Central and Eastern Europe 1945–1989* (Bratislava: NRI, 2008), 223.

2 Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *Instructions from the Centre. Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975–1985* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1992), 68–90.

3 *The Soviet "War Scare*," Washington DC: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 15 Feb 1990 – Declassified in Part 14 Oct 2015; Fischer, Benjamin. *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997).

4 Baev, Jordan. *The Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services Collaboration against the USA and NATO in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean: 1967–1989* (Oslo: Nobel Institute Research Seminar Paper, 2002). See also: Baev, Jordan. *KGB v Bulgaria 1944–1991* [KGB in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2009), 216–219; Baev, Jordan. "Von der Entspannung zur Kriegspsychose. Die bulgarischen Sicherheitsdienst und der letze Hohepunkt des Kalten Krieges 1975–1985," in *Militar und Staatssicherheit im Sicherheitskonzept der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten*, ed. by Torsten Diedrich and Walter Süß (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2010), 347–349. Ben Fischer, former director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, cited my Oslo paper as a proof of the continuation of the VRYaN operation after 1985: Fischer, Benjamin. "The Soviet-American War Scare of the 1980s," in *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 3, 2006, 480–518.

5 Süß, Walter, and Douglas Selvage. *KGB/Stasi Cooperation* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, CWIHP e-Dossier, No. 37, 2012); *Forecasting Nuclear War: Stasi/KGB Intelligence Cooperation under Project RYaN*, ed. by Bernd Schaefer, Nate Jones and Benjamin Fischer, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/forecasting-nuclear-war> (last retrieved on 27 Aug 2021).

6 Jones, Nate. *Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War* (New York, NY: The New Press, 2016); Downing, Taylor. *1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink* (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 2018); Ambinder, Mark. *The Brink. President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2018).

operation "VRYaN" for the detection of the basic indicators of the beginning of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the Soviet bloc. The striving of the military leaders inside the autocratic rule in Kremlin for more power and domination at the beginning of the 1980s compared to the new, hard White House policy against "the Evil Empire" resulted in a strong political crisis, known as "the War Scare" psychosis.

The paper also reveals some typical intelligence estimates delivered to the policymakers. The situation in those years describes well the gradual escalation of the bipolar confrontation and the long way of its de-escalation over the next couple of years at the end of the Cold War.

II. The Euro-missile crisis

The two confronting military blocs launched their propaganda theses in the midst of the so-called "Euro-missile crisis" in the early 1980s in order to not so much prove their own right as to discredit the enemy. The Warsaw Pact leaders claimed that the sharp deterioration in the international situation was due to the NATO Council's decision of December 1979 to deploy new US ballistic missiles in Western Europe, which disturbed the "military balance" between the two blocs. In Washington and Western Europe, they insisted that this decision was just a response to a similar previous action regarding the deployment of Soviet missile systems in Warsaw Pact countries. In fact, both positions have their own background and were driven by the real need to modernize and replace obsolete weapons systems every 15–20 years. It was in the mid-to-late 1970s that the objective possibility of replacing the Pershing-1 ballistic missiles provided to NATO allies and the R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) missiles used in the Warsaw Pact countries with similar next-generation weapon systems Pershing-2 and RT-21M Pioneer (SS-20), respectively, appeared. These types of ballistic missiles were not the subject of the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of troops and armaments in Central Europe, or of the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic armaments under the SALT-2 treaty, signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter on 18 June 1979.[7]

The Warsaw Pact Military Committee discussed the issue of the modernization of the missile systems, delivered to Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1960s, as early as in 1973–1974. In that sense, on 7 May 1976, Marshal Dmitry Ustinov, the Soviet defense minister, proposed the delivery of new air defense missiles to all East European allied armies, except Romania. According to the document, Bulgarian armed forces received the new anti-aircraft missiles 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4), 2K12 *Cub* (SA-6), and 9K32 *Strela-2* in the period 1976–1980.[8] Exactly in those years (1974–1976), the Bulgarian army replaced its older tactical missiles, R-11 and R-170 (BK11), with the newest R-300 (9K72) and *Luna-M* (9K52), known to the West as *Scud-B* and *Frog-7*, respectively. In accordance with the Soviet defense minister's resolution from 11 March 1976, disposition of the new intermediate range

[7] Following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the US Congress blocked the ratification process of the bilateral treaty and, therefore, SALT-2 did not enter into force.

[8] Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (*RGANI),* Moscow, Fond 89, Opis 27, Delo 14.

Pioneer ballistic missiles, known to the West as *SS-20*, started at the Western Soviet borders in May. At the end of 1976, eight *SS-20* missile complexes were delivered to Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, and, a year later, some more to Poland and Bulgaria.

The new ballistic systems were promptly identified by US military intelligence. An evaluation study by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was sent to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in November 1976 commenting on the deployment of Soviet SS-20s in the territory of the Warsaw Pact states.[9] In April 1978, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group reached a consensual decision to recommend the modernization of their tactical nuclear weapons. NATO's position was influenced by the conclusions and recommendations of two analytical studies on the "collective response to the Soviet military threat," conducted in 1976–1977 on the initiative of the Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Alexander Haig: Long-Term Defense Planning (LTDP) and Allied Defense in the 1980s (AD-80).[10] In his statement, Gen. Haig described previous years (1964–1974) as a "lost decade" for NATO.[11]

An analysis of Moscow's position shows that Soviet leaders considered their decisions to deploy new missile systems near the territory of NATO countries to be routine actions that do not undermine "military parity" between the two blocs. Among the leading motives for the Soviet position was the adoption of a new strategic doctrine for conducting offensive and defensive operations in Europe, in which the role of operational and tactical weapons, such as the *SS-20* missile systems, was particularly important. The new Soviet military leaders, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, Chief of General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov and Warsaw Pact Allied Forces Commander-in-Chief Viktor Kulikov, were strong supporters of such a concept. The lack of an adequate and flexible reaction was exacerbated by the strong influence of the representatives of the military-industrial complex and the supremacy of the "conservative triumvirate" (Ustinov, Gromiko and Andropov) inside the Kremlin leadership.

Some of the Soviet expert intelligence and military analyses of the time saw the development and deployment of "precision tactical weapons" (including the new Pershing-2 tactical missiles) as a "destabilizing factor" due to the "increased strike force of the NATO bloc" and increasing the likelihood of local military conflicts.[12] When the NATO allies confirmed their previous decision to dispose 108 *Pershing-II* ballistic missiles and 464 cruise missiles in five West European countries in November 1982 and in March 1983, the hardliner leadership in the Kremlin decided to deliver additional new tactical missiles to Eastern Europe. An extraordinary Warsaw Pact summit was convoked in Moscow in June 1983, where the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov pressed Erich Honecker and Gustav Husák to accept "respective missile systems" in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, respectively, as a "countermeasure" to

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9 *COSMIC-TOP Secret* – NARA, College Park, MD, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff, 1969–1977, Box 367, Rumsfeld Briefing on Nuclear Balance, 10 Nov 1976.

10 Duffield, John. *Power Rules. The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 205–218.

11 Isby, David, and Charles Kamps. *Armies of NATO's Central Front* (London: Jane's Publishers, 1985), 15–16.

12 *RGANI,* Moscow, Fond 89, Opis 37, Delo 30, 32–34.

the NATO *Euromissiles* decision.[13] The issue had been discussed once again during a Committee of Foreign Ministers meeting in Sofia on 13–14 October 1983.[14] The disposition of the newer Soviet R-400 *Oka* (SS-23) missiles in Czechoslovak and East German territories started in the spring of 1984.[15] A year later, a new bilateral agreement was signed between the USSR and Bulgaria for the sale of eight SS-23 missiles to the smaller Balkan ally.

III. VRyAN Operation

Though operation VRYaN was proposed for the first time at a KGB "all-Soviet" annual session in May 1981, the main tasks in that direction had existed among the leading intelligence purposes years before. In the Perspective Plan for cooperation between Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence services for the period 1972–1975, signed in April 1972, the first section of the document clearly affirmed the task: "The two intelligence services will work together to determine indicators of the maturing global and regional war situation."[16] The same task was formulated in the next three-year Perspective Plan for 1975–1978, signed in June 1975 in Moscow, where among the leading priorities of the bilateral intelligence collaboration: "Obtaining information for possible preparation of the enemy for a nuclear missile attack on the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community"[17] was underlined. During the discussions between the Chairman of the KGB and Bulgarian Interior Minister Dimitar Stoyanov in June 1975, Yuri Andropov specifically stated: "The main task of intelligence is to avoid the surprise of creating new weapons that would upset the balance of power and create a real danger to world peace and security."

The Bulgarian military intelligence service, in view of the main goal of reconnaissance of strategic and operational plans, military potential, deployment and mobilization capabilities of NATO armies (focusing on NATO's southern flank) in the period before, during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, drew the attention of its representatives abroad mainly to the disclosure of the location and technical characteristics of "enemy nuclear weapons." This was a priority goal, also discussed at the multilateral meetings of the Warsaw Pact heads of military intelligence directorates and at working groups' sessions on strategic and operational intelligence, radio and radio-technical intelligence, and intelligence analysis, which had been held annually since October 1964. The main task in the concept of the most important directions in the activity of the Intelligence Directorate of the Bulgarian

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13 *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*, ed. by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 2005), 483.

14 Central State Archive (*TsDA),* Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 67, a.e. 2365, 5–15.

15 Open Society Archive (*OSA),* Budapest, Fond 300, Subfond 8 – Asmus, Ronald. "Soviet Countermeasures to NATO's Dual-Track Decision?," in RAD Background Report (BR) 250/25 Oct 1983; "Soviets to Deploy Additional Missiles in the GDR," in RAD BR, 84/17 May 1984; Socor, Vladimir. "INF Negotiations and Soviet Nuclear Missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia," in RAD BR 148/21 Oct 1986.

16 Centralized Archive of the Commission for State Security and Military Intelligence Dossiers (*Archive COMDOS)*, Sofia, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 2, A.E. 816, 3.

17 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 3, A.E. 435, 37.

General Staff (RU-GSt), proposed in January 1974, was: "to acquire intelligence information for the preparation of our probable opponents for a sudden attack by means of mass destruction against our country."[18]

As early as January 1977, the Bulgarian Interior Minister Dimitar Stoyanov signed Order I-7 for obtaining intelligence and counterintelligence information on "indications for possible preparation of the enemy for a sudden nuclear missile attack." The order prescribed each State Security directorate to adopt its specific "operational measures" for the implementation of that task. The circular of 19 January 1977 showed very well that the announcement of Operation VRYaN was not a totally new direction and had a prehistory in the time of the Cold War nuclear war thinking.

The primary task in the new long-term Perspective Plan for cooperation between the foreign intelligence services of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in the period 1981–1985, approved by Yuri Andropov and Dimitar Stoyanov in August 1981, was defined for "obtaining information on possible preparation of the enemy for nuclear-missile attack."[19] After the talks between Stoyanov and Andropov in Moscow, the leadership of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior approved a special program in this direction.

The question of coordinating the actions of the Warsaw Pact intelligence services regarding Operation VRYaN was considered at the multilateral meeting of the heads of the intelligence services from the member states in Moscow in May 1982. Although this task was not explicitly stated in the final protocol of the meeting, it was specifically emphasized by Yuri Andropov in his meeting with the chiefs of the East European intelligence services.[20]

The Chief of the Bulgarian Foreign Intelligence Directorate (PGU-DS), Lt. Gen. Vasil Kotsev sent a proposal to the Minister of the Interior on 3 September 1982 aiming at an "improvement of the system for detecting signs of preparation for a surprise attack" against Bulgaria. The proposal contained nine items, which required the preparation of new regulations and instructions, presentation of "guidelines assignments" for operational units in the country and residencies abroad, preparation of "situational analyses" and the use of new electronic equipment for the "analysis of incoming information."

New secret cables were sent to intelligence residencies in Western Europe and North America at the end of 1982/beginning of 1983, on behalf of the head of PGU-DS Gen. Kotsev, specifying the indicators of preparing for a "sudden nuclear attack" in five main areas. Gen. Kotsev issued the special Order No. 273 on 12 April 1983 for the establishment of an "Information and Operational staff" to coordinate the work of the operational and analytical foreign intelligence departments involved in Operation VRYaN. At the same time, a Plan of Organizational Measures for Operation VRYAN was approved, which envisaged the heads of intelligence residencies in NATO countries to intensify work with the "agents networks available" and, if necessary, to send intelligence officers and agents "to strengthen visual sur-

[18] *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "VR," Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1070, 9.
[19] *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 89, 129, 131.
[20] *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 90, 123–129.

veillance and acquisition of information." In a letter dated 20 June 1983, the head of the Bulgarian foreign intelligence service Gen. Vasil Kotsev (code name "Kondov") obliged the heads of residencies to report regularly with encrypted correspondence on the implementation of the approved measures. The cable once again explicitly drew attention to the "extreme importance" and "permanent nature" of the task at hand.[21] The foreign intelligence structures received a detailed list in 1983 with 194 clarified "indicators" for the "preparation of a sudden nuclear attack," elaborated in cooperation with the military intelligence service. The list specified 15 indicators in the political area, 36 in the economic field, 14 for civil defense, 81 in the military area, 22 in the intelligence area, 19 in the counterintelligence area and 7 in the diplomatic area. In addition, 49 specific features were listed, which included reconnaissance surveillance of strategic missile bases, strategic aviation, nuclear depots and other secret sites of NATO armies.[22]

IV. War Scare Psychosis

As has already been mentioned, the NATO exercise ABLE ARCHER-83, with its scenario of the "realistic use of nuclear weapons," caused extremely strong anxiety, which turned into a "war scare" psychosis in the Kremlin. There is no direct evidence in the Bulgarian military intelligence documentation specifically regarding this exercise, but it showed a strange peculiarity in the behavior of the Soviet military command at that time. As early as 27 January 1983, the Chief of Bulgarian General Staff Col. Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev sent a written proposal to his Soviet counterpart, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, to convene an extraordinary meeting of Warsaw Pact intelligence chiefs to discuss the "deteriorating political and military situation" in Europe.[23] Until the end of 1983, however, not even the regular annual meeting of military intelligence chiefs was held in the Warsaw Pact member states. No documentary evidence is available for any multifaceted discussion of the results of the November 1983 ABLE ARCHER-83 exercise. The next meeting after April 1982 was held only on 2 February 1984 in Moscow, which surprisingly lasted less than a day. In his report for the meeting to the Chief of General Staff, the chief of Bulgarian military intelligence service Col. Gen. Vasil Zikulov expressed his and his colleagues' surprise that after the speech of the GRU Chief Army Gen. Pyotr Ivashutin, the meeting was closed without the usual discussion of the issues raised. At the same time, Gen. Ivashutin repeatedly stressed the Soviet military leadership's concern about the "growing nuclear threat" and described the deployment of a large number of new US nuclear missiles in Western Europe as a "means of launching a first nuclear strike." The chief of the GRU especially underlined that the likelihood and threat of NATO aggression under the guise of major military exercises had increased, and called on East European military intelligence services to continue to

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21 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 382, 34–40, 87–93, 106–107, 128–131, 147–149, 161, 170–171.

22 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 382, 220–245.

23 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "VR," Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 1278, 4.

carry out the primary task of uncovering immediate US and NATO preparations for a sudden nuclear attack.[24]

An analysis of the results of the Bulgarian electronic ("Radio-Technical") intelligence units activities during the NATO AUTUMN FORGE-83 series of exercises (August−November 1983) pointed out that an additional 129 reconnaissance posts had been deployed, increasing R&D forces and resources to a total of 244 posts. The Bulgarian Navy's R&D team organized a radio reconnaissance maneuver group based on a hydrographic ship that was navigating the northeastern Mediterranean area. The airborne reconnaissance forces of the 26th Reconnaissance Air Regiment made 12 take-offs during the NATO autumn exercises. As a result, data from eight radar centers on the territory of Turkey and Greece were confirmed. A total of 4152 data were intercepted for the preparation and conduct of the DISPLAY DETERMINATION-83 exercise within the AUTUMN FORGE series, on the basis of which, a detailed operational report was prepared, which received a rating of "relatively valuable" from the RU-GSt Information-Analytical department.

It is interesting to note that the summary analysis cited did not mention the final exercise of this series, ABLE ARCHER-83, which was announced in the draft scenario as a "realistic command and staff exercise with simulation in conditions of transition to a massive nuclear war."[25] The Bulgarian military intelligence service and its operational units probably did not have the necessary capacity to obtain data on the overall scenario of the series of exercises AUTUMN FORGE-83 and focused its attention mainly on the actions in the South European theater of war, which was their priority. The following report on the preparation of the next strategic command and staff exercise DISPLAY DETERMINATION-84, prepared by Col. Mikhail Gigov, the chief of the RU-GSt Second Department (Radio Electronic Intelligence), quoted "information about certain disagreements between Turkey and the United States in the preparation of the exercise" based on intercepted talks between officers from the headquarters of the United States Air Force Logistics Group in Ankara (HQ TUSLOG).[26] As for the analysis of the results of the AUTUMN FORGE-83 exercises conducted and the forthcoming AUTUMN FORGE-84 exercises, the heads of Warsaw Pact intelligence directorates agreed to discuss them at a special expert working meeting in Sofia in January 1985.

A new instruction was discussed at a PGU-DS meeting on 17 February 1984 to be sent to all intelligence stations (*rezidenturi*) abroad, where VRYaN was defined as a "principal task." How important that task was considered was proven by the fact that a special ministerial order No. 380 was issued on 9 March 1984 which included a list of the main indications of "VRYaN." The principal targets of the joint PGU-DS-RU-GSt operational measures were the "dangerous political and military

[24] *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "VR," Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 1278, 84−85.

[25] *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "VR," Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1189, 105−117.

[26] *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "VR," Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1189, 231−236. For more authentic data regarding Bulgarian military intelligence reconnaissance on NATO annual staff exercises, see: Baev, Jordan. "Warsaw Pact Multilateral Military Intelligence Estimates on NATO's War Plans and Military Exercises," in *ACTA. Joint and Combined Operations in the History of Warfare*, ed. by P. Crociani and Annalisa Bifolchi (Rome: Ministerio de Difesa, 2013), 624−634.

preparation" in the USA, Turkey, Greece, West Germany, Italy and Great Britain. Later on, the collegium at the Ministry of Interior discussed especially an instruction for creating a "more precise system for the apprehension of VRYaN indications."[27] During a meeting with a Bulgarian delegation in September 1984, Lt. Gen. Vadim Kirpichenko, the Deputy Chief of the PGU-KGB, explicitly emphasized: "At all meetings we stated that the main issue before us is related to the organization of our work in this area [RYaN]."[28]

The peak of the "war scare" psychosis in Bulgaria was in 1984–1985. The Foreign Ministry even initiated an interagency evaluation on the matter. Following urgent requests by Lyuben Gotzev, a Deputy Foreign Minister (and a former deputy chief of Bulgarian Foreign Intelligence), both the PGU-DS and RU-GSt estimated the possibilities of a "break of US-Bulgarian relations" and of "US intentions to use direct military force" against Bulgaria. It was categorically urged in a military intelligence estimate of 28 May 1985, signed by Col. Gen. Vasil Zikulov:

> We do not have any information about US intentions to issue threats of military force or directly to use military force against Bulgaria … Further attempts of air reconnaissance flights with AWACS planes along the border can be expected … Under the current political circumstances … the assumption of a direct military attack on our land border … must be considered out of question.[29]

The information provided during a visit by the head of the Soviet foreign intelligence "RI" (Intelligence Information) Directorate, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Hrenov to Sofia in April 1985 was of particular interest. According to him, the work on detecting signs of RYAN was greatly intensified in 1981 in connection with NATO's decision to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe by December 1983. This activity was a continuation of the long-term intelligence goal of assessing the "military-political situation." There was full coordination and distribution of the respective tasks between the Soviet special services: while the PGU-KGB was responsible for the "strategic warning," the GRU turned its attention to the "tactical warning." According to Mag. Gen. Vladimir Hrenov, the "Center" (Moscow) ordered 24 of their residencies abroad to carry out intelligence activities to detect indicators of VRYaN, and 16 of them were equipped with new operational equipment for radio eavesdropping[30].

V. The last Cold War years

A leading delegation of the Ministry of Interior, led by Gen. Dimitar Stoyanov, paid an official visit to Moscow from 16–20 December 1985. The Bulgarian representatives were informed by the KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov about the changes in the KGB's activities in accordance with the new foreign policy course of Mikhail Gorbachev. The KGB chairman stressed, however, the need to gather "more military strategic information." The next Perspective Plan for bilateral cooperation between

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27 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "M," Fond 1, Opis 12, A.E. 533, 553.
28 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 92, 162.
29 Diplomatic Archive (*DA MVnR*), Sofia, Opis 49-P, A.E. 17, 7–12; Opis 52-P, A.E. 11, 6–20.
30 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 93, 21–25.

the PGU-KGB and PGU-DS for 1986–1990 again had as a priority task to continue the operational measures and to maintain regular intelligence exchange on VRYaN.[31]

Related parallel tasks were also discussed at the annual military intelligence sessions. The necessity, for instance, "of constant surveillance for the detection of the earliest stage of preparation of the probable adversary for military attack, including the form of preparation for a major military exercise" was underlined as an important goal of the coordinated intelligence activities during the Warsaw Pact multilateral meeting of the military intelligence chiefs held in Sofia in June 1986.[32]

Similar to the prepared regular monthly reports of the East German Foreign Intelligence directorate (HV A) in the period 1986–1989, the Bulgarian Foreign Intelligence directorate also prepared summary monthly reports, which were additionally sent to the KGB in Moscow. Separate important messages were sent from the residencies in Washington, London, Paris and other capitals of NATO countries in some emergencies. These reports typically included between 10 and 15 major messages received from the respective Western capitals.[33] In a number of cases, these reports received further appropriate assessments from the KGB's analytical departments. A letter, for example, from the PGU-KGB dated 29 August 1986 assessed 23 messages received from Sofia as "valuable," especially those dealing with the situation in the Southern European theater of war (Turkey, Greece and Italy).[34]

At the same time, the leadership of the Bulgarian military intelligence did not miss its critical remarks on the activity of some of the residencies in the western countries in the implementation of Operation VRYaN. A report from 30 December 1986, for example, stated that since the summer of 1986, and especially after the meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, there had been a decline in the work on VRYaN and some of the residencies had become "disinterested" in this "main task."[35]

A delegation of the Bulgarian State Security led by Col. Todor Boyadzhiev, the deputy chief of the Foreign Intelligence directorate visited the PGU-KGB "RI" (Intelligence Information) Directorate in Moscow in November 1986. During a meeting with the Bulgarian delegation, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Grushko, the first deputy chief of the PGU-KGB, paid special attention to the issue of continuing the intelligence work "on revealing the signs of VRYAN." In his information after returning to Sofia, Col. Boyadzhiev reported that during the talks, "some of our shortcomings were pointed out in a critical spirit" by the "Soviet comrades." One of the main recommendations of the KGB leadership was "to improve the direct connection and shorten the time for information in crisis situations in different areas of tension."[36]

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31 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 40, 3.
32 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "VR," Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 1358, 262; A.E. 1379, 220.
33 The records of the Bulgarian foreign intelligence service stored about ten archival files with more than 2000 pages of summary reports on VRYaN for 1986–1989 – *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 394–401, Opis 4a, A.E. 276.
34 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 394, 70–71.
35 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 394, 162–167.
36 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 94, 92–96.

As an example of the latter, the trial of antinuclear alarms in a number of NATO countries „were pointed out, i.e. on 1 June in the Hague, on 10 June in Oslo, on 17 June in Washington, on 17–19 June in Ottawa and on 23 June in Copenhagen"[37] in a "VRYAN indications" information message sent to Sofia by the KGB in July 1987.

The second paragraph of the last long-term cooperation agreement between Soviet and Bulgarian foreign intelligence services of 6 December 1988 continued to lay emphasis on Operation VRYAN with a mutual exchange of intelligence on signs of US- and NATO-led preparations for nuclear attack against the countries of the socialist community."[38] Six months later, during a visit to Sofia in June 1989, Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, the new head of the Soviet foreign intelligence service, reiterated the issue of continuing Operation VRYaN, noting in particular: "We still have no reason to fully trust our American opponents."[39] However, while revealing the intelligence reports in the second half of 1989, for instance, from the head of foreign intelligence *rezidentura* (station) in Washington DC (code name "Bogorov"), it became clear that the definition of VRYaN ("sudden missile nuclear attack") had been changed to "increased military-political activity" since September 1989.[40]

It was only during the visit of Maj. Gen. Vladimir Hrenov, the head of the PGU-KGB "RI" directorate, to Bulgaria in May 1990 that he informed his Bulgarian hosts that a decision had been made to suspend the operational work on Operation VRYaN. Moscow came to the conclusion that "at the actual moment it is pointless and unnecessary for the United States to launch a nuclear missile strike against the USSR."[41] This information can certainly be considered completely reliable evidence that after a decade of "military psychosis," Moscow finally terminated one of its largest Cold War intelligence operations.

The last PGU-DS summary reports about the "data on the military-political activity of NATO countries" acquired were from March and April 1990. However, the last available cable from the chief of the Bulgarian intelligence group in Washington (code name "Sheinov") on the task "VRYaN" was dated "25 July 1990."[42] This was obviously a result of the slow inertial processes inside highly hierarchical systems, such as intelligence agencies, during the first months of the radical political transition in Bulgaria.

More serious changes began to appear in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (RU-GSt) in the second half of 1990. To a certain extent, this was related to the change of Bulgaria's geopolitical orientation "from East to West" with the election of the anti-Communist parliamentary leader Dr. Zheliu Zhelev as President of Bulgaria in August 1990. In the first half of 1990, the organizational structure and staff of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff did not change significantly, except for the transformation of the Political Department in accordance with the de-

37 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "M," Fond 1, Opis 11a, A.E. 345, 20.
38 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "M," Fond 1, Opis 13, A.E. 84, 3.
39 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4a, A.E. 69a, 160.
40 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 212, 225.
41 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 196, 26.
42 *Archive COMDOS*, Record Group "R," Fond 9, Opis 4, A.E. 431. The intelligence reports and information regarding "the task VRYaN" in Jan–Jul 1990 exceeded 200 pages.

politicization of the Armed Forces. An illustrative example was the "Instruction for the Work of the Intelligence Directorate for the Study of the Operational Situation" approved on 14 April 1990. The document only specified the previous instructions for the preparation of information-analytical reports and the criteria for the evaluation of the intelligence reports obtained. The guidelines for the main intelligence departments and residencies abroad during these months continued to focus on information about NATO, the US, Turkey and Greece.[43]

The Bulgarian government adopted in April – May 1991 a decree to radically reduce the presence of foreign and military intelligence officers in developed Western European countries, the US and Japan in accordance with new political priorities only after the termination of the Warsaw Pact military structures. Among the proposals made was to leave only one military representative in the United States and NATO member states in Western Europe to coordinate with the relevant Ministries of Defense and General Staffs. This was probably the moment when the Bulgarian state and military leadership ceased special intelligence activities against the leading Western countries in NATO, with the exception of the neighborhood in the "Balkan direction."

VI. Conclusion

The "Soviet War Scare" case of 1983 was a typical example how the gradual escalation of the military confrontation and arms race between the leading adversary world powers during the bipolar Cold War era could lead to wrong estimates and decision making on the brink to a real war. The large-scale long-term Warsaw Pact military and intelligence operation "VRyAN", however, represented another subsequent example of self-suggested fictional threat response of an allied network of East European secret services dominated by the Soviet Union. The newly available Bulgarian archival sources, discussed in the paper, contributed in some way for more precise clarification and confirmation of some aspects and revealing of other new details on that dramatic story in the contemporary security history of Europe.

[43] Baev, Jordan. *Istoria na balgarskoto voenno razuznavane* [History of Bulgarian Military Intelligence], Vol. 2, 1955–2018 (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad Publishing House, 2019), 174–188.

V.

Non-military Factors – The Domestic Dimension of Conflicts

Daniela Șișcanu

Public Opinion in Romania during the Period of Neutrality in the First World War (1914–1916). The Ententophiles *vs.* the Germanophiles

Abstract

The Great War broke out on 28 July 1914. Romania's participation in the war was perceived as a chance to accomplish the historical goal of its national unification with the provinces inhabited by Romanians: Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. It generated a major dilemma not only for the Romanian political elite but also for public opinion: an alliance with Austria-Hungary would have meant the loss of Transylvania and Bukovina, while an alliance with Russia would have prevented the reunification with Bessarabia. Two movements emerged around the issue of which side to join in the war – the Ententophiles or the Germanophiles. The paper aims at presenting and analyzing how the national interest was perceived by public opinion and the political and cultural elite, and how both Ententophiles and Germanophiles tried to influence public opinion in order to gain an upper hand in the internal political confrontation concerning Romania's entry into the war.

Romania's participation in the First World War was perceived as a chance to accomplish the historical goal of its national unification with the provinces inhabited by Romanians: Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. It generated a major dilemma: an alliance with Austria-Hungary would have meant the loss of Transylvania and Bukovina, while an alliance with Russia would have prevented the reunification of Bessarabia. For the Romanian government, the decision to enter the global conflagration was subordinated to a series of geopolitical, economic and political considerations.

The decision-makers from Bucharest agreed as undisputable fact that this conflagration was the expression of a competition for a new balance of power in Europe and that Russia's main war goal was to reach Constantinople.[1] In this context, it was considered that Romania would have to face two major dangers. First of all, there was the danger of being transformed into a satellite state by the Russian Empire, since the only way to connect Russia with Constantinople was through Romania

[1] *Românii în Marele Război. Anul 1916* [Romanians in the Great War 1916] ed. by Mihail E. Ionescu (București: Editura militară, 2017), 13.

and this would bring Bucharest under a heavy political control.[2] Thus, the geopolitical rationalities that shaped the political debates in Bucharest were dominated especially by a fear of Russia's expansion to the South and its ambitions to reach the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits.

Secondly, from an economic point of view, if the Russian empire gained control over the Black Sea and maritime commercial routes, it would have meant the economic vassalization of Romania.

And thirdly, the political rationales were obvious and were connected with the long-term goal of achieving the national territorial unification. However, having territories divided between the competing empires – Russia and Austria-Hungary – the Romanian leadership had to face a major political dilemma. The eventual victory of the Entente would have meant the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, according to Bucharest's calculations, it represented a chance to reunite with Transylvania. Although a potential victory of the Central Powers, with potential benefits for Romania[3] (the reunification with Bessarabia), was taken into account, the Romanian government, after calculating the country's options, in the end, reached the conclusion that Transylvania was a more important and less challenging strategic target. In fact, Bucharest acknowledged the risk of confronting Russia by taking Bessarabia and, given the past experiences, Russia's comeback could not be ruled out, despite the outcome of the war. Moreover, the prospects of fighting alongside the Austro-Hungarians against the Western powers provoked very strong opposition within the political class and public opinion.

A compromise was reached on 3 August 1914 when Bucharest declared its neutrality in the ongoing conflict. During neutrality, Romania sought to negotiate a better deal aiming at securing approval for Bucharest's territorial demands. Through well-articulated diplomatic demarches, Romania reached a secret agreement with Russia (Sazonov-Diamandy Agreement, signed on 18 September/1 October 1914) that recognized, in exchange for Bucharest neutrality, the unification of the territories of Transylvania and Bukovina at the end of the war. However, it became increasingly difficult to stay neutral during the following period due to pressures exerted by the belligerent parties and disputes within the country's political class and public opinion regarding which side should Romania choose to join.

Two movements emerged around this issue – the Ententophiles and the Germanophiles. The paper aims at presenting and analyzing how the Romanian elite and public opinion perceived the national interest and how the pro-Entente and pro-German movements tried to influence public opinion in order to gain an upper hand in the internal political confrontation concerning Romania's entry into the war.

It is important to mention that on the eve of the First World War, Romania was part of the Triple Alliance being aligned with Germany and Austria-Hungary based on the Treaty signed in 1883. After the war of 1877–1878, Russia was perceived by

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[2] Kirițescu, Constantin. *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României* [The History of the War for Romanian Unification], vol. I (Ploiești: Editura KartaGraphic, 2014), 129.

[3] Cazan, Gheorghe and Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță, 1878–1914* [Romania and the Triple Alliance] (București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1979).

the Romanian state as a threat. Thus, caught between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia, the only solution for Bucharest was to join the Triple Alliance. Under the terms of the 1883 treaty, Romania was committed to a security alliance with Germany, which was seen as the only power to provide a counterweight against Russia's aggressive ambitions. It was well understood by King Carol I of Romania that such a treaty would generate a harsh public reaction since the vast majority of the political class and public opinion remained closely attached to the cause of the Romanians from Transylvania and favored an alliance with the Western powers, especially France, against Austria-Hungary. This is why the Treaty with the Triple Alliance was kept secret and was not ratified by the Parliament, the implementations of its provision being the responsibility of the king alone. Aside from providing security, this alliance implicitly ensured the progress of the country and, although the situation of the Romanians in Transylvania brought complications in Bucharest's relations with Austria-Hungary, it was not considered to be a motive to terminate an alliance on which Romania's national security depended.

However, once the war broke out, the situation changed rapidly. In 1914, Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, consequently, Romania was not under any obligation to join the war because the treaty of 1883 stipulated such an obligation only in the event that Austria-Hungary was under attack. In addition to that, Romania no longer had to choose between Russia and the Central Powers, but between France, Great Britain and Russia, on one side, and the Central Powers on the other. This was to become a powerful argument for the Ententophiles against the opposing Germanophiles supporters. Apart from the concern and sympathy for the difficult fate of the Romanians who lived in Transylvania, it was the main argument of the Entente supporters who were convinced that Russia's geopolitical appetite would be restrained by its allies. It is important to emphasize that the Ententophiles conceptualized their aspirations – namely unification with the provinces that were part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy – Transylvania, Banat, Crișana, Maramureș and Bucovina – into a statement called the "national project/cause."[4]

Their opponents continued to put an emphasis on the Russian threat and insist on the very tough situation of the Romanians from Bessarabia, who, unlike the Transylvanians, were totally deprived of their national rights. From their perspective, the priority concern of Romania should have been the fate of the Bessarabian Romanians, therefore, an alliance with the Central Powers against Russia was a necessity.[5]

Thus, Romania had three options at the beginning of the war: to enter the war joining the Entente, align with the Central Powers or stay neutral. And each one of these three options was considered viable by the representatives of the political elite of the country. At that time, Romania had three important political parties and each one had to choose between these three options.

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4 Otu, Petre. *România în Primul Război Mondial. Neutralitatea 1914–1916* [Romania in the First World War. Neutrality 1914–1916] (București: Editura Litera, 2017), 100.

5 Otu, *România în Primul Război Mondial* (see note 4), 103.

The ruling Liberal Party, under the leadership of Ion I.C. Brătianu, chose the path of neutrality, considered to be more in accordance with the responsibilities of a government. In fact, this was rather a strategy to negotiate a better deal for entering the war. It was well acknowledged that neutrality could not be supported in the long term and it would be only a transitory phase. Under the policy of neutrality, Ion I.C. Bratianu entered into negotiations with the representatives of the Entente powers, while, at the same time, vigorously opposed the actions of the "interventionists." The agreement was reached in August 1916 when France and Great Britain agreed with all the Romanian demands, meaning the unification of the territories inhabited by the Romanians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Under these circumstances and under the pressures exerted by the Entente, it was finally decided that Romania would enter the war.

The other two opposition parties insisted that Romania should enter the war. The Conservative-Democratic Party, led by Take Ionescu, pleaded for the immediate entry of Romania into the war, to fight against Austria-Hungary and liberate Transylvania.

The Conservatives were left with the pro-German option. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasize that, compared to the Conservative-Democratic Party and the Liberals, the Conservative Party was considerably divided. Some of the party leaders favored the Central Powers, but in a different manner. Petre P. Carp[6], for instance, with a few followers, considered that Romania should join the war on the side of the Central Powers.[7] A large group, led by Titu Maiorescu[8] and by Alexandru Marghiloman, the president of the party, considered that a more rational solution was to stay neutral, but with a favorable approach towards Austria-Hungary and Germany. From their point of view, it was complicated to join the war on the side of the Central Powers, firstly, due to the Transylvanian problem, considering the fact that public opinion was completely against such an option, and secondly, they really feared that Russia could retaliate with an invasion. But the internal disputes did not end there. The pro-Entente group formed within the party, led by Nicolae Filipescu, was gaining more strength and became very active in their intensions to dissociate from Marghiloman's policy in order to promote a policy favorable to the Entente. The unity of the Conservative Party could no longer be preserved. Under these conditions, the Conservative Party split into two parts in May 1915.

The other two parties were more unanimous in choosing sides. There were only a few exceptions. A prominent member of the Liberal Party, Constantin Stere, born in Bessarabia and a convinced anti-Russian, dissociated himself from Brătianu's policy and pleaded, like P. P. Carp, for an entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, against Russia. In the case of the Conservative-Democrats, Alexandru Bădărău, one of the party's leaders and former minister in Titu Maiorescu's govern-

6 Petre P. Carp was a Romanian statesman, political scientist and culture critic, one of the major representatives of Romanian liberal conservatism. Served twice as the country's Prime Minister.

7 Hitchins, Keith. *România 1866–1947*, [Romania 1866–1947] (București: Editura Humanitas, 1996), 278.

8 Titu Maiorescu was a Romanian literary critic and politician, founder of the Junimea Society. Served as Foreign Minister (1910–1914) and Prime-Minister (1912–1913

ment from 1912–1914, joined the Germanophiles. But neither Stere nor Bădărău managed to convince other members of their parties to follow them.

In comparison with Romania's political elite, Romania's public opinion was more cohesive and overwhelmingly in favor of entering the war on the side of the Allied powers. But before further presenting how public opinion positioned itself in this matter, it is important to underline a few very important aspects of Romanian society at that time.

According to the 1912 census, 60.7 % of Romanians were illiterate and 84.8 % of them were living in villages.[9] Due to the lack of education, the idea of the "national cause" was an incomprehensible concept for the majority of the Romanian population. The number of those who had at least some degree of political culture was quite small. The linguist Iorgu Iordan, for instance, emphasized the distinction between public opinion and the country's population:

> It can be said that the vast majority of Romanian public opinion was in favor of a war on the side of the Allied Powers. I have to specify here what I mean by public opinion. Compared to the entire population of the country, even excluding children and adolescents, the number of the supporters of these policies was quite small. For, apart from the peasantry, which was almost nonexistent from this point of view, and the organized workers, who voiced their antiwar position through their authorized representatives, those who were left to manifest themselves, in one way or another, were the intellectuals.[10]

Consequently, Romanian public opinion was formed by educated citizens who were interested in politics and capable of comprehending such concepts as national interest and the national project. These were mainly university students, journalists, clerks, professors, officers, and so on.

As has been stated previously, Romanian public opinion was in favor of the Entente and very sympathetic toward the complicated situation of the Romanians who lived in Transylvania and fought for their national rights against the oppression and denationalization promoted by the Hungarian authorities. The situation was similar in the army. Dr. Vasile Sion, professor at the University of Bucharest, for instance, wrote in his memoires: "… I went to a rural town where an army regiment was passing by. Although it was not in my duties, I went to inquire about the health of the soldiers …. Several groups told me that they were preparing for war. Against whom? Against the Hungarians. And then a lot of terrible swearing followed."[11]

General Radu. R. Rosetti also wrote about the state of mind of the military:

> Except for the few military leaders, who had different opinions or chose not to show them, all the officers, starting with the rank of lieutenant colonel and going to the inferior

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9 Ungureanu, Constantin. *Știința de carte în teritoriile populate de români la începutul secolului XX* [Literacy in the Territories Inhabited by Romanians at the Beginning of the 20th Century], <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44797260_Stiinta_de_carte_in_teritoriile_populate_de_romani_la_inceputul_secolului_XX/fulltext/00b0c49a0cf2d1b85502fa02/Stiinta-de-carte-in-teritoriile-populate-de-romani-la-inceputul-secolului-XX.pdf>, 6 (last retrieved on 11 Oct 2021).

10 Iordan, Iorgu. *Memorii* [Memoirs], vol. 1 (București: Editura Eminescu, 1976), 276–277.

11 Sion, Vasile. *Patria mai presus de tot* [The Motherland above All] (București, 1919), 25–26.

ranks (with small exceptions), were openly in favor of a war against Austria-Hungary, in order to free Transylvania from the Hungarian oppression.[12]

These very strong pro-Entente sentiments of Romanian public opinion were inspired by two motives: the first was, of course, Transylvania; the second was France. The modernization of Romanian society during the 19th century was heavily influenced by French culture and the Romanians developed a very strong sense of attachment towards France. Almost all educated Romanians spoke French, and French literature was the most popular literature amongst Romanians.

In addition to that, Romanians were very proud of their Latin roots and shared a sense of a Latin solidarity, which was also in favor of France, since it was considered to be the strongest and most influential of the Latin nations. For them, in 1914, things were simple right from the beginning of war – the French were right, while the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians were wrong and were to blame for the war.[13]

Important figures of the Romanian elite were Ententophiles: Take Ionescu[14], Octavian Goga[15], Nicolae Iorga[16], etc.[17] The most important and fervent supporter of the pro-Entente movement was Queen Marie, who, due to her blood relation with British and Russian royal families, could not accept that Romania would enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. Moreover, during neutrality, Marie's connections with the Russian and British royal houses were used by both King Ferdinand and Prime Minister Ion I. C. Brătianu. At their request, the Queen sent a series of unofficial letters to King George V and Tsar Nicholas II about Romania's wishes to achieve its national unity. Queen Maria, thus, represented an important diplomatic resource for the Romanian political leadership, being able to avoid the constraints imposed by neutrality.[18]

Indeed, it was hard to resist "the calling" of both Transylvania and France, yet, a few Romanians chose the opposite.

It was a fairly small group of highly educated people. Some of them considered that neutrality was the most sensible solution, while others pleaded for Romania's entry into the war. Those who favored the Central Powers were less visible due to the reluctance, or even hostilities, manifested by public opinion.

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12 Rosetti, Radu R. *Mărturii (1914–1919)* [Testimonies (1914–1919)] (București: Editura Modelism, 1997), 49.

13 Otu, *România în Primul Război Mondial* (see note 4), 100.

14 Take Ionescu was a prominent Romanian politician, journalist, lawyer and a brilliant diplomat. He was one of the politicians who manoeuvred Romania's entrance into the First World War on the Entente's side. His main achievement was the creation of the Little Entente, a mutual defence agreement between Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

15 Octavian Goga was a Romanian politician, poet, playwright, journalist, and translator. He was an active member in the Romanian emancipation movement in Transylvania Served as Prime-Minister in 1937–1938.

16 Nicolae Iorga was politician, scholar and Romania's greatest national historian. He served as a Member of Parliament, President of the Deputies' Assembly and Senate, cabinet minister and briefly as Prime Minister (1931–1932).

17 Otu, *România în Primul Război Mondial* (see note 4), 98.

18 Mandache, Diana. *Viva Regina Maria!, Un destinn fabulous în întregirea României* [Viva Queen Marie! A Fabulous Destiny in the Making of Romania] (București: Editura Corint, 2015), 13.

Among the Germanophiles were found important representatives of the Romanian cultural elite and political leaders such as: Petre P. Carp, Titu Maiorescu, Vasile Pârvan[19], etc.[20]

It is interesting that the Francophile group was very consistent in their pleadings for France, Transylvania and war, while the Germanophiles were divided into those who were in favor of a pro-German neutrality and those who insisted that Romania should enter on the side of the Central Powers. Moreover, some of them did not share a very strong attachment to Germany or Austria-Hungary, in comparison to the Francophiles, but, instead, they shared very strong anti-Russia sentiments.

It is important to underline that the perceptions and position of public opinion were shaped by the coexistence of French and German models. The representatives of the upper class benefited from education received in Vienna and Berlin. During the 19th century, the "German model" was competing with the 'French model." An example was the most influential cultural organization *Junimea* (The Youth), founded in 1863; although it had a French-educated majority, its most prominent members – Titu Maiorescu, Petre P. Carp, Mihai Eminescu and Iacob Negruzzi – had received a German education.

The second reason was of a historical and geopolitical nature referring to Romania's security. In this regard, Russia was considered a greater danger compared Germany or Austria-Hungary. The territorial expansion of Romania was perceived as useless as long as a Russian victory in the war would transform this empire into a dominant power in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

Another interesting fact about the Germanophiles was that they were more numerous in the historical region of Moldova. In contrast to their peers from Muntenia, many members of the Moldovan elite were more concerned about their own province than Transylvania, including the other Moldova – Bessarabia, which was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812, partially recovered in 1856 and lost again in 1878. The Moldovans were more sensitive regarding Russia. The Russian Empire represented a threat to Romania as a whole, but Moldova was "first in line" in case Russia continued to annex more territories.

Consequently, for many Moldovans, entering the war alongside Russia was not an option. Romania was in an alliance with Russia in 1877–1878, and yet, this empire had annexed Romanian territories, and there were no guarantees that it could not be repeated.

For those who feared a Russian invasion, the solution was neutrality, and for those who feared less and hoped to see Bessarabia liberated and Russia pushed further to the East, the solution was an alliance with the Central Powers.

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[19] Vasile Pârvan was a Romanian historian and archaeologist. Served as director of the National Museum of Antiquities and had a major role in the creation of the new Romanian school of archeology.

[20] Simbeteanu, Iulian. "Between the Entente and Germany: Romania during the period of neutrality in the First World War," *Europe Centenary*, 26 Sep 2018, <https://europecentenary.eu/between-the-entente-and-germany-romania-during-the-period-of-neutrality-in-the-first-world-war/> (last retrieved on 11 Oct 2021).

Thus, while Brătianu's government was using the neutrality period to negotiate a better deal with the Entente powers, public opinion and the representatives of the cultural and political elite voiced their beliefs, using all instruments at their disposal. Despite the government's efforts to keep the public debate in line with the state of neutrality, the pressures exerted by the opposition (mainly represented by the Conservative-Democratic Party) urging openly to enter the war on the side of the Entente became stronger.[21]

The opposition parties were very active during neutrality. The peak of the pro-Entente manifestations was the foundation of the National Action Committee on 26 October 1914. It included Constantin I. Istrati, the president of the Romanian Academy, Dr. Thoma Ionescu, Octavian Goga, Nicolae Filipescu, Barbu Ștefănescu-Delavrancea, Vasile Lucaciu, Dr. Ion Cantacuzino and Simion Mândrescu. The purpose of the Committee was to organize various manifestations and demonstrations in order to force the government to decide in favor of Romania's entry into war on the side of the Entente. Though the victories of the Central Powers on the eastern front diminished enthusiasm, the Committee remained very active.

A large pro-Entente demonstration took place in Bucharest on the occasion of Italy's entry into the war on 19 May 1915. It was attended by about 20,000 people and a number of organizations: the National Action Committee, the Latin Association, the Transylvanian Legion and the Macedonian-Romania Culture Society among them. The protesters demanded that the government should follow Italy's example.

In the autumn of 1915, the pro-Entente political leaders founded the Unionist Federation, which included the Conservative Party led by Nicolae Filipescu, the Conservative-Democratic Party led by Take Ionescu and the group of Transylvanian Romanians who relocated to the Kingdom of Romania.

The Federation proved to be very active in promoting the idea of entering the war together with the Entente for the liberation of Transylvania. The Congress of Romanians who relocated to Romania from abroad was organized on 15 March 1915. The participants adopted a motion demanding that the authorities start acting in order to achieve national unity.

Additionally, in October and November 1915, the Unionist Federation organized demonstrations in Bucharest and other cities in favor of entering the war alongside the Entente. Approximately 15,000 people participated in the demonstration in Bucharest on 11 October. Violent clashes took place between protesters and law enforcement, killing one person and injuring several others.[22]

The Romanian press was also transformed into a battlefield. The newspapers and magazines that were issued in Romania during the years of neutrality reflected the distinction between the almost unanimous Ententophile public opinion and a more divided political elite. The most widely circulated newspapers, such as *Adevărul* (The Truth), with its morning edition *Dimineața* (The Morning), and *Universul* (The

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[21] Berindei, Dan, Gheorghe Platon, Gheorghe Cliveti and Gheorghe Iacob, *Istoria Românilor*, [The History of Romanians] vol.VII, *De la independență la Marea Unire*, [From Independence to the Great Union] (București: Editura Enciclopedica, 2015), 252.

[22] Otu, Petre. *Neutralitatea 1914–1916* [Neutrality 1914–1916] (Bucharest: Litera, 2017), 103.

Universe), had a very strong pro-Entente orientation.[23] The content of the articles published in *Adevărul* was more militant compared to articles published in *Universul,* but overall, both newspapers contributed to the pro-Entente propaganda. However, the most active and assertive newspaper, run by Victor Ionescu, Take Ionescu's brother, was *Acțiunea* (The Action).

The Germanophiles had also set up a number of propaganda newspapers to support the alliance with the Central Powers, but these were less popular and often boycotted by the public and could not have survived without the infusion of German money.[24] A pro-German newspaper *Ziua* (The Day) was founded on 21 July 1914. It was owned by Ottokar Schlawe, a German subject, who served as a teacher at the School of Bridges and Roads and was the president of the evangelical community in Bucharest. Ioan Slavici, an acknowledged Romanian writer and journalist from Transylvania, a convinced Germanophile, wrote for *Ziua*.[25]

More pro-German newspapers were issued and bought, with the financial support of the Central Powers, in 1915: *Minevra, Seara* (The Evening), *Bukarester Taglebatt* and *Libertatea* (The Freedom) were among them. There were also attempts to purchase *Adevărul* and *Universul*. In the case of *Adevărul*, the attempt failed because the director of the newspaper, Constatin Mille, a fervent Ententophile, rejected the proposal to sell. However, in the case of *Universul*, an entire scandal broke out. The purchase almost succeeded, but the authorities intervened and General Grigore Crăiniceanu, Minister of War between 1909 and 1910, became the new director of the newspaper.[26]

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that, regardless of the political affiliation of the aforementioned publications, all of them shared the same goal – the liberation of the territories inhabited by Romanians and their unification with Romania.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is important to underline that this overall picture of public opinion was not a static one. It changed in accordance with the course of events. Some opinions have become more nuanced and others have even changed. But despite the dif-

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[23] Turliuc, Cătălin. "Naționalism și propagandă în preajma războiului reîntregirii [Nationalism and Propaganda on the Eve of the Reunification war]," in *100 de ani de la deschiderea frontului românesc în Primul Război Mondial (1916–2016),* [A 100 Years since the Opening of the Romanian Front (1916–2016)], (conference) 22–23 Mar 2016, ed. by Daniela Șișcanu (București: Editura Militară, 2017), 136.

[24] Otu, *România în Primul Război Mondial* (see note 16), 104–105.

[25] Docea, Vasile. "Biserica lui Ioan Slavici: Un episod din istoria relațiilor româno-germane [The Church of Ion Slavici: An Episode Regarding the History of the Romanian-German Relations]," in *Analele Banatului, S.N., Arheologie – Istorie*, XXI, 2013, 456, <https://www.academia.edu/6784113/Biserica_lui_Ioan_Slavici_un_episod_din_istoria_rela%C8%9Biilor_rom%C3%A2no-germane_The_Church_of_Ioan_Slavici_An_episode_regarding_the_history_of_Romanian-German_relations_._In_Analele_Banatului_Serie_nou%C4%83_Arheologie-Istorie_vol._XXI_2013_p._455-463> (last retrieved on 11 Oct 2021).

[26] Otu, *Românii în Marele Război* (see note 4), 47.

ferences of opinion, both Ententophiles and Germanophiles had one ultimate goal – national unity. What differed was the manner in which this goal was to be achieved.

In the end, Romania's decision to enter the war was a result of its desire to fulfill her historical goal of national reunification. According to Bucharest's calculations, an alliance with the Entente could secure Romania's aspirations. It was decided that Transylvania must join the homeland after centuries of imperial domination and public opinion overwhelmingly supported the alliance with the Western powers, perceived as the country's natural allies.[27] Thus, the public debate regarding Romania's entry into war ended on 27 August 1916 and all disagreements were put aside.

Besides the project of national unification that highly shaped the overall position and thinking of the public opinion and the political elite alike, geopolitical considerations were also to play an important role. A major factor to be considered is the fear of Russia that significantly influenced public perceptions and the positions within the political elites. The Russian threat was introduced in the political debates by the Germanophiles, who rightly argued that a victory of the Entente powers would bring Russia to the Straits, a dynamic that would put Romania's independence into jeopardy. The statement made by Petre P. Carp, one of the most prominent Germanophile politicians, is revealing; he argued during the Crown Council in 1916 that "in case Romania enters the war alongside the Entente powers, he will sent his sons to fight for the country while hoping in a final victory of Germany."[28] On the Entente side, it was argued that in such a case, the Western powers would be able to use their influence to moderate Russian ambitions and secure Romania's interests at the Black Sea and Danube.

In the end, Romania's decision to enter the war answered to clear political considerations, namely, the cause of the Romanians in Transylvania. Romania's war plan, known as Hypothesis Z or Plan Z, launched in 1916, was also the result of political considerations – the main front being directed to Transylvania, the secondary front towards Bulgaria. The message was to be crucial – Romania enters the war to liberate their Romanian brothers from Transylvania. This was a powerful message, which, despite some opposing voices, generated an overwhelming enthusiasm throughout the country. The general and public support for the national cause and the deep confidence in the victory of France acted as a critically important engine in driving the country towards the Entente and gave the Romanian government the national support needed to pursue its pro-Entente agenda.

And finally, regarding importance of public opinion for the political leadership's decision to use military force, the following conclusion emerged – although public opinion is not the only factor influencing leaders' decision to go to war, democratically elected leaders, in particular, rarely go to war without the having the backing of the public. If the political leadership that was democratically elected does not pay close attention to public opinion, it should expect some serious political costs for

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[27] Preda, Dumitru. *România și Antanta: avatarurile unei mici puteri într-un război de coaliție: 1916–1917*, [Romania and the Entente: The Avatars of a Small Power in a Coalition War: 1916–1917] (Iași: Institutul European, 1998).

[28] *Românii în Marele Război* (see note 1), 124.

contradicting the public on matters of war. In democracies, leaders will be penalized domestically for both fighting wars the public opposes and failing to fight wars the public supports. When a government loses public support, the ruling party will lose seats in the legislature, find it difficult to pass policies and even fall from power. Given these concerns, democratic leaders should always have powerful incentives to respect public opinion.

Petr Janoušek

Czechoslovak President Václav Havel and the End of the East-West Conflict

Abstract

This paper is focused on the point of view of Czechoslovak president Václav Havel towards the end of East-West conflict. It follows, among others, key milestones or guiding points of President Havel's security policy. The paper is built on the idea that the Cold War really came to an end for Czechoslovakia only after the former East-West divide stopped playing a role in the international arena. President Havel's values closely aligned to those of Western democracies; the fact that NATO was and would continue to be an organisation defending democratic values, a fact in which it differed from the Warsaw Pact, had always been clear to Havel.

I. Introduction

This paper examines President Václav Havel's security policy following his assumption of the role of Czechoslovakia's president in December 1989. It focuses on the ensuing period of dramatic changes within Europe, which included the symbolic conclusion of the East-West conflict at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe summit in Paris in November 1990. Given the comprehensive, complex and multidimensional nature of President Havel's security policy during this period of time, it is impossible to provide a full overview within the limited scope of this paper. Rather, the paper focuses on the key milestones or guiding points of President Havel's security policy, which can be explored further in future research or critical reviews. The paper is built on the idea that the Cold War really came to an end for Czechoslovakia only after the former East-West divide stopped playing a role in the international arena. Naturally, Havel was not the only force behind Czechoslovakia's security policy of the time – a key role fell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was headed by Jiří Dienstbier, and to Dienstbier's close colleague, Jaroslav Šedivý. (We must also mention Havel's advisor Alexander Vondra, who was oriented towards the Atlantic). But as Dienstbier himself acknowledged in his memoirs, President Havel had played a key role in setting the tone of the country's foreign policy.[1]

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[1] Dienstbier, Jiří. *Od snění k realitě: vzpomínky z let 1989–1999.* (Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1999), 7.

Was it possible for Czechoslovakia to pursue an independent security policy already before the Velvet Revolution? When reflecting on this question years later, Luboš Dobrovský – the former dissident and later Minister of Defence – felt certain that it was not.[2] While the core relations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR changed after Michael Gorbachev had assumed the role of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Czechoslovakia remained dependent on Moscow, and this dependence precluded the possibility of an independent security policy. After all, the East-West divide prevailed even during Gorbachev's era, setting the framework for dialogues on disarmament or other security issues that were emerging between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.[3]

The situation changed after the Velvet Revolution, as newly democratic Czechoslovakia desired to anchor its security to a new foundation. The main ideological and practical driver of this change in the years immediately following the Velvet Revolution was President Václav Havel. One of the first tasks of the post-revolution political leadership was to wrestle Czechoslovakia from the grip of the Warsaw Pact. In practical terms, this took some time and naturally depended on more than Czechoslovakia's foreign policy.

The East-West framework shaped the dialogue on security issues in the international arena until November 1990 when the 34 signatories to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) met at a summit in Paris. It was only in the next phase – after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact – that the former Soviet satellites found more room to explore their own truly independent security policies, no longer encumbered by the past.

The Paris summit presided over the end of a Europe divided into two blocs and served, many contemporaries felt, as a symbolic mark of the end of the Cold War. This critical milestone came to be reflected in Czechoslovakia's security policy, including President Havel's views. And so this paper also illustrates President Havel's thinking on anchoring Czechoslovakia within Europe at a time when the new democracy was working to overcome the burdens of the former East-West split and, subsequently, (and partly even in parallel) beginning to develop relations with NATO, thus, signalling a new era for the country's security policy.

II. Strasbourg, Moscow

The evolution of President Havel's views on security issues between the years 1990 and 1991 – the period covering the Paris CSCE summit and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact – can be gleaned through a comparison of two of Havel's international speeches. The first was his address to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, which he delivered on 10 May 1990, and the second was his speech delivered at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 21 March 1991. Havel's

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2 Luboš Dobrovský, interview led by Petr Janoušek on 24 Sep 2018; transcript stored in author's archive.

3 Janoušek, Petr. "Od Gorbačova ke 'Gorbymu'. Správa zahraničních vztahů Generálního štábu ČSLA/ČSA v letech 1989–1992," in *Historie a vojenství* 702, 2021, 50–69.

opinions naturally evolved over time, even in the period between the two speeches, as will be addressed later. (Havel's views were shaped by his long-term vision – prior to delivering his speech in Strasbourg, for example, Havel shared his thinking with the UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who visited Czechoslovakia in May 1990.)[4]

In May 1990, Havel felt that although NATO was more meaningful and democratic than the Warsaw Pact, and although it functioned better, it too would have to transform and change – not only in its military doctrine, but also in name. "The present name is linked to such an extent to the Cold War era, that uniting Europe under the NATO banner would communicate a misunderstanding of current developments," proclaimed Havel in his Strasbourg address.[5] Conversely, he referred to the Warsaw Pact as an organisation that would lose meaning and cease to exist after it concluded its role, among others, of serving as a political tool of European disarmament.

During this time, Havel also placed faith in the Helsinki process, in which he saw the potential for creating a broad framework for European political unity.[6] He imagined that in the long term, after the creation of the European Confederation project promoted by the French President François Mitterrand, the Helsinki security process would begin to lose its meaning, with Europe potentially able to provide for its own security. That is when the last American soldier could leave European soil.

President Havel presented these ideas further at the ordinary session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee held in Moscow on 7 June 1990. Among other points, he repeated and further expanded on his previously expressed ideas about the institutionalisation of the Helsinki process:

> Within the framework of the recommended Council for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministers of Defence would meet twice per year and ambassadors every month. They would examine current issues relating to the strengthening of European security and the development of cooperation and contacts. These meetings would be organised by a small secretariat, which we recommend to be based in Prague. Specialised centres would be created concurrently; for example, a Berlin-based centre focused on strengthening trust and monitoring and verifying disarmament, and another centre focussed on conflict prevention. Other Europe-wide institutions could also be established, focussing on environmental protection, the human dimension of security, and other areas.[7]

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4 Secretary General meets with President of Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 7 May 1990, UNA, S-1024-160-I.

5 Dobrovský, Luboš, ed. *NATO, Evropa a bezpečnost demokracie: Václav Havel. Výběr z projevů,* článků *a rozhovorů 1990–2002.* (Pardubice: Theo, 2002), 18.

6 For a review of the discussions and meetings that followed the signing of the Helsinki Accords at the conclusion of the first CSCE, held in Helsinki in 1975, see Thomas, Daniel C. *Helsinský efekt: mezinárodní zásady, lidská práva a zánik komunismu*. (Prague: Academia, 2007).

7 Report on the progress and results of an ordinary session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, FMNO KM 1990, Box 16, Ref. No. 574090 – 17, Speech delivered by Václav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact (Moscow, 7 Jun 1990), annex III, 12 Jun 1990. FMNO KM 1990, Box 16, Ref. No.100.757/90 – KBSE, Central Military Archive, Prague, Czech Republic; Janoušek, "Od Gorbačovake 'Gorbymu'" (see note 3).

The institutionalisation of the Helsinki process was to be secured by the recommendation to create a European security commission, which was to serve as a kind of a security council for Europe – beyond (or above) existing military pacts. Conceived by Jaroslav Šedivý, the idea offered a way to overcome the East-West divide to Czechoslovakia and the other countries of the region and gradually integrate with Western European institutions.[8] But the recommendation to create a European security commission was not received with great enthusiasm.

III. Paris, Brussels

The Paris summit in November 1990 served as a symbolic end of the Cold War. President Havel spoke at the summit and shared his perspective, which projected his optimistic view of future developments. In addition to announcing that the Warsaw Pact was *de facto* heading for dissolution, Havel repeated his belief that it was important for Europe as a whole to aim towards unification (as a confederation), and that the CSCE should serve, in his opinion, as a framework for such a process. This was one of the reasons why Havel worked towards the institutionalisation of the CSCE.[9]

Havel also affirmed, however, that he respected the values that NATO symbolised, which he saw as guarantees of freedom and democracy. By contrast, he considered the Warsaw Pact to be a historical tool of the member states' subservience to the Soviet Union.

When Havel spoke in Brussels on 21 March 1991 during his historic visit to NATO, his ideas reflected a notable shift from his speech in Strasbourg. Immediately at the start of his address, Havel conceded that the developments he had outlined in Strasbourg represented a certain ideal, with the reality being much more complicated – be it due to the complex developments taking place in the Soviet Union or to growing nationalism, xenophobia and ethnic hatred, manifestations of the long-lasting suppression of central and eastern European nations' desire for independence.[10]

The Czechoslovak army was also expected to adapt to the country's new security orientation. In his speech in Brussels, Havel presented a vision that reflected a new reality, one built on the idea that the country could potentially be threatened from any direction, even if there was no clearly defined enemy. At the same time, the army was expected to protect not only the country's territory, but, first and foremost, its democracy and freedom – principles on which Havel's policies were based.[11]

In Brussels, Havel began to talk about Czechoslovakia's membership of NATO, though only in broad terms, demonstrating that there had been a shift in his vision since Strasbourg. "We know that for many different reasons we cannot become full NATO members as yet. At the same time, we believe that an alliance of countries united by a commitment to the ideals of freedom and democracy should not be per-

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8 Šedivý, Jaroslav. *Zpátky do Evropy aneb Černínský palác v roce nula* (Praha: Mladá fronta, 2019), 96–106.

9 Janoušek, "Od Gorbačova ke 'Gorbymu'" (see note 3).

10 Dobrovský, *NATO, Evropa* (see note 5), 24–29.

11 Dobrovský, *NATO, Evropa* (see note 5), 24–29.

manently closed to neighbouring countries that are pursuing the same goals," noted Havel in his address.[12]

The president also stated that Czechoslovakia would welcome the creation of a solid system of cooperation and information sharing between Czechoslovakia and NATO at various levels. This became a reality in November 1991, when a NATO meeting in Rome presided over the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, enabling a broader dialogue between NATO and Central and Eastern Europe. Václav Havel was the first head of a newly democratic state to be welcomed as such at NATO, signalling a positive shift in relations.[13] However, expansion of NATO was not on the table at this time. Even when speaking in Brussels, Havel had not fully given up the idea that Europe's future would be linked to the developing Helsinki process. But even his words made it clear that the situation in Europe had changed.

Havel finished his address with an appreciation directed towards the West – a civilisation built on universal values – for the fact that the West had for many years sympathized with democratic forces in Soviet bloc countries. Yet, he also noted that the West could not be indifferent to what was happening in countries that had rid themselves of a totalitarian system.[14]

IV. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact

In addition to overseeing the departure of Soviet forces from its territory, it was key for Czechoslovakia to be involved in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern Bloc's military alliance. This became a reality at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee held in Prague on 1 July 1991. Václav Havel saw the dissolution as an opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation and announced that Czechoslovakia intended to join Western European integration. According to Havel, bilateral agreements between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would contribute to the stability of the entire continent. More broadly, Havel assumed that the expansion of Western European systems into Central and Eastern Europe would move in parallel to the reinforcement of the whole-of-Europe process.

Somewhat serendipitously, Havel signed the protocol about the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with a pen that Jiří Dienstbier, Czechoslovakia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought as a souvenir from a meeting at NATO's headquarters. The pen was inscribed with the NATO acronym. Representatives of the participating countries agreed that the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact was in line with "the needs of the times". The only person highlighting positive aspects of the Warsaw Pact was the USSR's Vice-president Gennady Yanayev, who also questioned the continued existence of NATO. Other speeches focused on the necessity of building whole-of-Europe structures and the importance of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which had been signed at the summit in Paris mentioned earlier.

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12 Dobrovský, *NATO, Evropa* (see note 5), 24–29.
13 Dienstbier, *Od snění k realitě* (see note 1), 323.
14 Dobrovský, *NATO, Evropa* (see note 5), 24–29.

V. Conclusion

The fact that President Václav Havel gradually reached the opinion that NATO could, or indeed had to, find a new role for a new era, and that its role was irreplaceable, led to a schism with some of the former heads of the army whose values remained entrenched in the period before 1989.

One of these was the first post-revolution Minister of Defence General Miroslav Vacek (who was replaced by Luboš Dobrovský in the autumn of 1990), who had spent his entire army career serving the totalitarian Czechoslovak state and had even become the Chief of the Army's General Staff. He also continued to support the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the revolution, becoming a member of the Czech Parliament under the Communist Party's banner. Vacek referred critically to Havel's alleged change of position in his 2012 memoir, writing that the former president had first lobbied for the end of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, before "he radically changed his view and came to unambiguously promote entry into NATO."[15] Vacek was somewhat less critical in his 1991 memoir when presenting his position on President Havel's supposedly changed view of NATO's role.[16] Vacek did not want to, could not or was unable to grasp the full context of President Václav Havel's thinking about NATO. As this paper has already discussed, Havel's position evolved in line with changes in the overall political situation in Europe. In its essence, NATO was and would continue to be an organisation defending democratic values, a fact in which it differed from the Warsaw Pact, and this had always been clear to Havel. His view stood in contrast to a dogmatic position – one unencumbered by values – that would see NATO and the Warsaw Pact as much the same. Havel's evolving position on NATO was in line with the reality of the era.

His values aligned closely to those of Western democracies; Václav Havel saw the end of the conflict between the East and the West (the Cold War) as a hopeful sign of a new beginning. However, he did not want to see Russia excluded from the international community, being well aware of Russia's role and importance. This stance became clear, among other actions, when he visited Russia in an official capacity between 31 March and 1 April 1992 and on the last day, signed the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and the Russian Federation. Havel stressed the importance of the two sides having become equal partners in their relationship and of doors having been opened for new types of contacts in his comments during the visit. He emphasised the importance of the whole world coming to the aid of Russian democrats as they worked to transform Russia into a democratic state. He felt that Czechoslovakia could help with its own experience, as it had made greater strides in reforming the old system.[17] This

[15] Vacek, Miroslav. *Nejen z vojenského kufru*. (Prague: Futura, Epocha, 2012), 200.
[16] Vacek, Miroslav. *Proč bych měl mlčet ...*. (Prague: Nadas, 1991), 58.
[17] Information about the official state visit of the President of CSFR in the Russian Federation on 31 Mar – 1 Apr 1992, 20 May 1992, FMO KM 1992, Box 21, Ref. No. 91.610/92 – 1, Information about the visit of the President of CSFR V. Havel to the Russian Federation /31 Mar – 1 Apr 1992/, Annex I, Box 21, FMO KM 1992, Box 21, Ref. No. 91.610/9 – 1, Central Military Archive, Prague, Czech Republic.

approach was well-received in NATO, which had been concerned about long-term instability in post-communist Europe.

Václav Havel was a democratic politician to the core – also one of the reasons why he gradually embraced a NATO-oriented security policy, which offered a concrete framework for further democratic reforms after the dissolution of the East-West divide. A whole-of-Europe security structure became less and less viable after the end of the Cold War, as it gradually became clear that its stabilising role would have been limited. In essence, a Europe-wide security structure could not have played the same role for the states of Central and Eastern Europe as the later-reformed NATO ended up playing within the region. Václav Havel and his close colleagues (e.g. Alexandr Vondra) played an invaluable part in growing an awareness of this reality in Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic. Their abilities and determination shaped the beginning of a democratic era that earned the respect, among others, of the country's international partners.

Orit Miller Katav

The Discourse that Did Not Take Place – The Return of the Tzofar and Naharayim Enclaves to Jordan after Half a Century, a Political Failure, or an Existing Reality?

Abstract

The peace agreement signed between Israel and Jordan in 1994 led to a status quo of a promising reality involving regional cooperation between two countries. The agreement was preceded by many confrontations that led both countries' leaders to decide on a peace agreement with the intention of establishing good neighborly relations. Subsequently, the two Jordanian enclaves, Tzofar and Naharayim, remained in Israel's possession on a twenty-five-year lease, after which King Abdullah of Jordan had to decide whether to renew or terminate the lease. As stated, he decided to reclaim the two enclaves. This closed the door on Israeli farmers in the continued cultivation of agricultural land. Perhaps with closer relations, maintaining a status quo of agricultural collaboration or more regular courtesy and security visits between the countries' leaders, a different outcome could have been achieved.

Openings Words

Political events have been occurring for time immemorial. It is not always possible to pinpoint the start and end of a period because events start before the occurrence and continue thereafter. The dream of peace in the Middle East sometimes entraps its dreamers in melancholy contemplation and sometimes in horror. The word *shalom*, peace in Hebrew, is based on the root: S.L.M. The word can mean "a whole, finished and absolute thing" or – it can mean "pay." The meaning is that in order to receive something, each party has a joint responsibility – to give and take, or, in other words – to negotiate. The reputation of the merchants in the desert goes back to the time of the Silk Road and the Spice Road. Every peddler knew what was in his wares and what he could deliver. Even the restrictions were known, mainly those that could put the convoy in danger and bring its members to conflict following breaches of agreement. The desert honor code was the name of the game.

Another thing that blows in the desert winds is the infinite value of time. The power of the sand mountains that change their color and hue depending on the position of the sun and moon are evidence of the continuity of existence. Many

legends are associated with desert stories, including ancient copper utensils shaped like an oil lamp and adorned with engravings and precious gems. Whoever was fortunate enough witnessed a genie rising from the lamp, declared: "Your wish is my command!" Every child in the desert already knows that the genie does indeed make the asker's wish come true – but the genie seeks something in return. The scope of the request equals the scope of the exchange. Legend has it that anyone who tried to shirk their debt to a genie remained haunted on the desert dunes or became trapped in a lamp from which escape was impossible.

The word *desert* can also mean to abandon. Whenever you want to describe something dry, isolated and abandoned, you talk about the desert. But the desert is a bustling place, vibrant and full of creation. Some confuse the meaning of the word desert with dessert. For dessert you need to add another s, because like any dessert – it is in addition. So, what is a desert's dessert? A date. It also means meeting or date. Palm trees provide the ultimate desert food. The date is sweet, succulent and contains many minerals that are extracted from the depths of the earth. The desert fruit is the main food for desert dwellers, and this is the sweet dessert at the end of every meal. But the date's sweetness manifests fully when it is served to guests in a meeting for honor.

The desert was a major meeting place for Israeli and Arab delegations. Dates were served on silver and copper trays by both parties. Steaming black coffee, ground fresh and fine and seasoned with cardamom, was poured into delicate earthenware cups with arabesque-decorated saucers that were passed from hand to hand. Warm winds caressed the faces of the delegates and hardened their skin and sometimes their hearts as well. It was Faisal and Weizmann, King Abdullah I of Jordan and Golda Meir who began talks even before the establishment of the State of Israel. They continued in the fifties and into the following decades, the next millennium and its decades. The desert also blew in the winds of war. In the Middle East, war is not a curse word. It is a word that symbolizes strength, survival, resilience and holding on to the land, the earth and the homeland. The Hebrew word war contains the element of life, which is salt. Just as the concept of the "salt of the earth" symbolizes the existence of man – the best among people – it connects this good to the earth and to war. But a person's soul seeks to be free and to sing what its spirit desires.[1]

The establishment of the State of Israel brought many wars upon it. The need for survival and to hold on to the only homeland of the Jewish people led the latter and their leaders to fight for their existence. After several bloody wars between Israel and neighboring Arab countries, a different reality emerged. The Yom Kippur War that broke out in October 1973 changed the political perception in the war-ridden region, in favor of a new word in the lexicon – peace. Or more accurately – peace negotiations. King Hussein of Jordan conducted continuous overtures with officials in Israel and had been advocating for the return of the West Bank to Jordanian ownership since the end of the Six Day War in 1967. Hussein rebuffed any Israeli-American initiative for compromise. For him, the West Bank was part of the Hashemite Kingdom

[1] Tuqan, Fadwa. "Behind the Walls." In: Tuqan, Fadwa, *A Mountainous Journey Fadwa Tuqan Poetry Autobiography,* (Minnesota: Gray Wolf: 1990), p. 107.

and the home of the Palestinian people. The king felt a political responsibility for their fate. Hussein abstained from war with Israel and secretly met with Israeli representatives to promote these initiatives.

While the Jordanian king conducted cautious and clandestine diplomatic meetings with Israel, it was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who stepped out on the White House lawn in Washington in 1979 with US President Jimmy Carter and signed a peace agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The peace agreement was based on the Camp David Accords that preceded it, which were, in turn, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 224, 338 and paved the way for mutual agreements. Israel paid for it with the Sinai Peninsula, Taba coast and the evacuation of the city of Yamit. The people of Yamit called Prime Minister Begin a "traitor" for the evacuation. Egypt paid the price of the cold shoulder it received from the other neighboring Arab countries, and Sadat paid for it with his life. The peace between Israel and Egypt has been steady and stable for over forty years.

It seemed that Jordan and Israel needed to proceed quickly and sign a peace agreement, since talks between the two neighbors had been going on for a long time and they share Israel's longest border. However, other events flooded the Middle East and prevented this from happening. The 1980s erupted in a series of violent struggles between Israel and terrorist organizations and forced the Israeli government to deal with ongoing security issues: the Lebanon War, the Iran-Iraq War and the Intifada, after which, the Jordanian king declared a unilateral disengagement from the West Bank in the summer of 1988. Other events flooded the arena, such as the 1987 London Agreement and the 1991 Gulf War.

Although the Gulf War was not waged within Israel's borders, there was Israeli involvement. When the Iraqi dictator realized that the coalition armies were closing in on him, he threatened to harm Israel, claiming it was on the basis of the alleged crimes Israel had been committing against the Palestinian population in the territories. Saddam claimed he was fighting for the liberation of the Palestinian people. The concern in Israel was that missiles with unconventional warheads would rain down, which caused widespread panic in the population. US President George W. Bush was quick to ensure Israel's peace and security with an umbrella of security protection measures that included, among other things, Patriot missile batteries and additional military assistance as long as Israel promised not to respond to Saddam's hostility and provocations. While rocket fire landed in Israel, Prime Minister Shamir exhibited restraint and refrained from retaliating.

The Jordanian king also expressed his deep concern about Israeli involvement in the campaign, which would drag the kingdom into becoming a bloody battlefield, and its borders on both sides would potentially collapse due to the invasion of Palestinian infiltrators on the one hand and Iraqi refugees on the other. The Palestinian celebrations on the roofs of refugee camps in the West Bank whenever an Iraqi missile landed in Israel reflected the plausibility of this reality. Talks to restore order were crucial. At the end of the Gulf War, talks began between Israel and the Palestinians, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1992, the talks moved from Madrid to Oslo, this time unaccompanied by Jordan. During this pe-

riod, elections were also held in Israel and the government changed. Yitzhak Rabin was elected Prime Minister and the pace of talks led Israel and the PLO to sign the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn in 1993.

In 1994, about a year after the Oslo Accords were signed, Israel and Jordan signed a peace agreement against the backdrop of the endless desert landscape, and it received the respect it deserved. This was the natural culmination of a decades-long journey in which representatives of the two countries had met covertly and discussed options for establishing peaceful relations. King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin agreed on political cooperation and normalization. The thirty-clause agreement entails a commitment to normalize the lives of neighbors who share a common landscape, two seas, one river and two riverbanks.[2]

I. Introduction

This study traces the bilateral relations between Israel and Jordan, which for many decades has experienced ups and downs, wars and ceasefires, cooperation and reciprocity. It is said that "two mountains can never meet, but two people can," which was the case. Behind the spotlight and smiles for the cameras are numerous hours of discussions, correspondence and secret meetings between representatives of the two countries' leaders. These are the trustees who have been entrusted with negotiating and promoting the agreement. Thanks to their loyalty and dedication, the overtures took place and matured into the official peace agreements. So why, after so many agreements and a jubilee of peace, did Jordanian King Abdullah decide to reclaim the two enclaves of Tzofar and Naharayim?

This article will attempt to explain the complexity that led to the agreement that left the two enclaves in Israel's temporary possession and the circumstances that led to their return to Jordan. Farmers play the most important role in human life by growing crops that provide food. They know how to appreciate the land and its bounty. Returning the two enclaves sadly struck the local farmers. Perhaps things could have been different if the decision-makers in Israel had complied with all the clauses of the peace agreement and kept up their end of the meetings. Perhaps is a very broad word in research, and this article will attempt to provide answers on that as well.

II. The 1991 Madrid Conference and onwards

The end of the Gulf War once again focused the spotlight on the West Bank and the fate of the territories there. Arab states, especially Egypt and Syria, which supported coalition forces during the war, demanded that US President George W. Bush put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and fully recognize the Palestinians' rights. In the spirit of a well-publicized multinational symposium, the Americans decided to hold an international conference on the Israeli-Arab conflict with a focus on the Palestinian problem, on the basis of resolutions 242, 338 and

[2] See Israel's border line map in the appendix.

mainly based on the principle of "land for peace." Secretary of State James Baker suggested that the conference serve as a diplomatic umbrella under whose auspices Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations would hold discussions on the future of the territories and future peace arrangements.

Conducting direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians was clearly premature at the time, so Jordan was to be the agreed-upon go-between. It was agreed that the Palestinian delegation would, in fact, be a delegation of Jordanian and Palestinian representatives who were not PLO members. Jordan suffered a severe blow as a result of the West's punishment for its alleged involvement in Iraq. This was an opportunity for Jordan, and King Hussein, to gain some political and diplomatic credit in the Middle East arena.[3]

The king of Jordan saw this as an opportunity to advance his initiative for comprehensive peace. The king said in a speech to the Kingdom: "Peace demands no less courage than war. It is the courage to meet the adversary, to know his attitudes and arguments, the courage to face obstacles, the courage to engage in dialogue to bring down the walls of fear and suspicion. It is the courage to face reality."[4] Hussein set out for the talks tired after a decades-long journey in which he fought for his people's right to live in peace. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir also went into the talks with concerns that heavy international pressure would be exerted on him to make decisions for which he was not prepared, and would be forced to resist.

On October 30, 1991, an international conference was held at the Royal Palace in Madrid in the presence of world leaders President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union,[5] US President George W. Bush, US Secretary of State James Baker and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. The Israeli delegation was led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[6] Additional Likud members were added to the delegation. The joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation consisted of 28 members with equal representation from each side. The Palestinian representatives in the talks were residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, academics, and even those who were clearly identified with the PLO, such as Haidar Abdel-Shafi and Saeb Erekat.

In practice, dialogue between the parties again raised the question of Jordan as an option, as a confederation for the Palestinians, something that was not entirely

3 Halevi, Ephraim. *A Man in the Shadow: The Crisis in the Middle East Through the Eyes of the Head of the Mossad* (Tel Aviv: Matar, 2006), 64–70; Nevo, Josef. *Jordan The Search for Identity* (Raanana: The Open University, 2005), 291–296.

4 Shlaim, Avi. *King Hussein: Political Biography*, (Or Yehuda: Dvir Publishing, 2009), 440.

5 That year, the Soviet Union effectively disintegrated and of the lengthy Cold War between the world's powers officially ended. Mikhail Gorbachev led the Soviet Union to a perceptual change and encouraged a significant wave of immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to come and settle in the Land of Israel. Due to the Soviet Union's weakness and the separations of its member states into independent units, its position in the world weakened significantly at this point and the United States was in fact the significant force at the conference.

6 The current foreign minister was David Levy. Since the president of Syria did not attend the conference and sent his foreign minister, David Levy also wanted to represent Israel, but Shamir's insistence on leading the delegation made him feel distrustful and, therefore, gave up the trip in advance. The act of protest left the spot open to his deputy, Benjamin Netanyahu, whose fluent English led him straight into the spotlight, leaving Levy behind.

acceptable to Jordan. The conference put the Kingdom on the path to being recognized by the world as a separate entity from the Palestinians, and that future peace with Israel depends only on two states without Palestinian involvement. "Jordan is not Palestine."[7] This was the right time for Hussein: both to receive political and economic support from the United States and promote direct talks with Israel. The success of the conference was measured by the fact that this was the first time that a proactive dialogue had been held between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and Jordan, despite the fact that the delegation was mixed. Hence, many conferences were held directly or indirectly in attempts to reach understandings and breakthroughs.

III. Breakthrough in overtures

About a year later, in late 1992,[8] another secret channel opened between Israel and the Palestinians in Oslo, the capital of Norway. The talks took place in secret, parallel to the talks with Jordan in Washington and without the Jordanians' knowledge. On 13 September 1993, an agreement of the principles[9] was signed between the Israeli government and the Palestinian delegation. After the signing, a historic handshake was held between Arafat and Rabin.[10] When the secret talks between Israel and the PLO were revealed, Hussein was astonished to discover that all this had taken place under his nose and unbeknownst to him. Hussein felt hurt for being left out of the picture.

Some reports or rumors reached King Hussein... He asked if he would be surprised by an Israeli-Palestinian agreement that would adversely affect his country, where more than half of its residents were of Palestinian descent. Because he held secret talks with Israel about the possibility of reaching a peace agreement, he believed that he should be informed about developments that have a direct impact on his vital interests.[11]

Arafat presented his position that the Palestinian people were in charge of their own destiny at a meeting between Arafat and Hussein in late August in Jordan. Hussein was furious that he was left in the dark about the talks between the PLO and

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7 Shlaim, *King Hussein* (see note 4), 488–450.

8 There were changes in the Israeli government this year. Yitzhak Rabin was elected prime minister and Shimon Peres served as foreign minister. Rabin was determined to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict, including being willing to negotiate with the PLO, as long as they would officially recognize the State of Israel and its right to exist as a sovereign Jewish state.

9 This agreement was later renamed Oslo A. In 1995, a continuation of the agreement was signed, which was called Oslo B, and dealt with managing the land according to administrative division defined as areas A, B and C.

10 The handshake between Rabin and Arafat was very surprising and even difficult to watch for Israelis and Arabs alike. Each leader was perceived by the other as an enemy and Arafat was given the nickname "hands redeemed by the blood of Israelis." This difficulty can be seen in Yitzhak Rabin's hesitation before the handshake.

11 Halevi, *A Man* (see note 3), 64–70; Ehrlich, Hagai. *The Middle East: The Great Depression Since Muhammad,* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Publishing, Hemed Books, 2017), 242, 249–250; Levy, Eyal. "Example Border: Architects of the Peace Agreement with Jordan Reveal the Secrets Behind the Scenes," in *Maariv,* 21 Oct 2019.

Israel, and realized that now was the time to focus on his own people and capitalize on the moment when the deals are closed and for Jordan to be a part of the deal. The Jordanian king's concerns about the integrity of his kingdom were understood by Yitzhak Rabin, who was quick to reassure and secure the Jordanian interest and the long-standing and respectable relationship between the two countries. None of the leaders was willing to take the risk of blowing up peace talks in favor of a third party. Now was the time to reach common understandings and each side wanted to maximize the timing in its favor. However, the agreement between Israel and the PLO paved the way for an agreement between the two countries. Now that the agreements were signed, this was only a natural continuation of steps that had already been recognized by the public.

Talks between the Israeli and Jordanian delegations migrated from Madrid to Washington,[12] which lasted about two years until September 1993. One of the most important talks was after the agreement between Israel and the PLO. Prime Minister Rabin visited the king's house in Aqaba with representatives who were close to the decision-makers. The talks between Israel and Jordan led to an in-depth understanding based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, particularly issues related to the normalization between the two countries regarding water arrangements, refugees, border crossings and regional cooperation in the context of Dead Sea development, environmental issues, water desalination, human resources and manpower, tourism, transportation and border crossings. The king insisted that understandings and agreements should first be reached on the content of the agreement and only then to sign it, contrary to the Israeli position presented by Rabin, which must first be to sign and then to discuss the details. The king's position prevailed, and discussions began.

IV. Signing the agreement

The peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed in the Arava on 26 October 1994. The ceremony was attended by King Hussein of Jordan, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and US President Bill Clinton. Both sides emphasized the desire

> for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East… based on freedom, equality, justice, and respect for basic human rights, peace that guarantees the right and duty of the two countries to live in peace with each other… within safe and recognized

[12] Secret talks between Israeli and Jordanian representatives continued on a regular basis, each time in a different way: crossing the Red Sea by boat towards Aqaba or through the bridges, with the regular players who crossed into Jordan, such as Eliakim Rubinstein and Ephraim Halevi on the Israeli side with Jordanian Prince Hassan, Nasser Judeh, and his son-in-law Ali Shukri. Halevi, *A Man* (see note 3), 41–52; Shlaim, *King Hussein* (see note 4), 440–455; Ehrlich, *The Middle East* (see note 11), 242, 249–250; Sasson, Moshe. *Without a Round Table: Negotiations for Peace Testimony and Lessons*, (Jerusalem: Maariv Library, 2004), 283–284.

> borders, to develop friendly relations and cooperation and ensure sustainable security for the two countries.[13]

Thirty clauses and five detailed appendices define the agreement between the states. The first appendix deals with the Tzofar and Naharayim areas. The eight subsections detail how the Jordanian territory will be managed under Israeli supervision for 25 years, after which the territory's lease will be renewed automatically for the same period, unless one year's notice of expiration is given by one of the parties, and, in such a case, at the request of either party, consultations will begin.

More than fifty years of secret talks and overtures resulted in an open agreement in broad daylight for the world to see. Numerous decades of conversations, meetings, letters and messages culminated in this moment. A warm and courageous handshake between two leaders who once led their armies to war, now led their countries to peace. On the hot Arava land, surrounded by the Judean mountains and views of the two countries spread out before them, the Jordan River symbolized only the geographic and the physical border while everything merged to a shared destiny. Normalization was no longer a far-fetched word but a reality that had begun to take form. Recognition of the other side's life and dignity was a desert code. But it was also the result of a long-lasting yearning, maturity and willingness to agree and compromise in order to fulfill an old longing for a secure reality. Jordanian King Hussein spoke about hope for the future of the two nations, the sons of Abraham:

> This is our gift to our nations and the generations to come… To remember this day as long as we live and for future generations of Jordanians, Israelis, Arabs, Palestinians, all children of Abraham; to remember it as the dawning of a new era of peace, mutual respect between us all, tolerance and the coming together of people of generations to come beyond this time to build and achieve what is worthy of them.[14]

Rabin addressed the King, saying that peace belongs to the nations and the brave:

> Your Majesty, peace between states is peace between people. It is an expression of trust and esteem. I have learned to know and admire the quiet and smiling power with which you guard your nation and the courage with which you lead your people. It is not only our states that are making peace with each other today, not only our nations that are

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13 https://web.archive.org/web/20041011092134/http://www.jmcc.org/research/series/dop.html (last retrieved on October, 4, 2023); Nevo, *Jordan The Search* (see note 3); Halevi, *A Man* (see note 3), 64–70; Shlaim, *King Hussein* (see note 4), 437–468; Zak, Moshe. *Hussein Makes Peace: Thirty Years and Another Year on the Road to Peace* (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan, 1994), 289–298, 319–346; Document "Washington Israel-Jordan Declaration July 25, 1994," Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, 1994; Document "Peace Treaty between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom, October 26, 1994," Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, 1994; Wolfsfeld, Gadi, Rami Khoury and Yoram Perry. *The Israeli and Jordanian Media: Has Peace Changed the Image of the "Other"?* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Haim Herzog Institute, 2003); Zak, Moshe. "Rabin and Hussein – From War to Peace," in *Neighbors in the Maze: Israel-Jordan Relations Before and After the Peace Agreement*, ed. by Yosef Nevo (Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies, 2004), 93–129; Sasson, *Without a Round Table* (see note 12).

14 The Israeli – Palestinian Conflict, King Hussein's Speech. https://ecf.org.il/media_items/841/(last retrieved October, 4, 2023).


Locations of Tzofar and Naharayim Enclaves in Israel
LEBANON
Tyros
Kirjat Schmona
Naharija
Akkon
Golan Heights (Israeli occupied)
SYRIA
Haifa
Sea of Galilee
Tiberias
Nazareth
Jarmuk
Naharayim
Dar'ā
Irbid
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Netanja
Gerasa
Al-Mafraq
Nablus
Jordan River
Tel Aviv-Jaffa
West Bank
Salt
Zarqa
AMMAN
ISRAEL
Ramallah
Aschdod
JERUSALEM
Madaba
Aschkelon
Bethlehem
Dead Sea
Gaza-City
Gaza Strip
Rafah
JORDAN
Be'er Scheva
Kerak
EGYPT
Mitzpe Ramon
Ein Yahav
Tzofar
Shobak
international boundaries
other boundaries
0 10 20 30 40 50 km
©ZMSBw 09547-02

shaking hands in peace here in the Arava. You and I, your Majesty, are making peace here, our own peace, the peace of soldiers and the peace of friends.[15]

V. Returning Tzofar and Naharayim to Jordan

The enclaved area of Naharayim covers about one thousand dunams and also includes the Island of Peace Park, which was established after the agreement with Jordan.[16] The island is bordered by the Jordan River and the Yarmouk River, hence, its name, Naharayim (two rivers). This is where Pinchas Rotenberg set up the hydroelectric plant in the early 1930s, which supplied electricity to the northern part of the Land of Israel. The Yarmouk Dam that Rotenberg built also created an artificial lake and a spectacular waterfall. The local farmers cultivated the land. The Island of Peace was established in 1997 in memory of seven schoolgirls who were killed there while on a school trip by a Jordanian soldier in March of that year. Flowers were planted in the name of each girl. The event shook the two nations. King Hussein was quick to condemn the case, expressed his condolences, and even came to Israel to console and support the bereaved families.[17] The flower-decorated garden has become a symbol of peace.[18]

His Majesty King Hussein passed away on 7 February 1999. His son Abdullah assumed his constitutional role as king of the Hashemite Kingdom and was appointed on the same day.[19] Abdullah is the 43rd generation direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammed. "He is committed to building on the legacy left by his father the late King Hussein to further Jordan's democratic institutionalization and political pluralism, while working for a just and comprehensive peace in a climate of openness and tolerance."[20] Just like his father, Abdullah is committed to the peace agreement with Israel and continue to pursue that vision.

The Tzofar enclave is located near Moshav Tzofar in the Arava, hence its name. It contains 4,500 dunams, 1,500 of which are cultivated as agricultural land. There are agricultural greenhouses there with crops from the Moshav Tzofar farmers. In practice, this was a demilitarized zone that allowed the residents of Moshav Tzofar to farm and stay there from dawn until dusk. During Abdullah's speech in parliament in Jordan, he stressed that Jordan had never given up on these lands. "I announce the

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15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rabin's Speech, https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/pm-rabin-s-address-at-the-signing-ceremony-of-israel-jordan-peace-treaty-26-oct-1994/ (last retrieved October, 4, 2023).

16 See map of Tzofar and Naharayin enclaves in Israel in the appendix.

17 Moskowitz, Israel, "Israel Bid Farewell to an Island of Peace." (October, 10, 2019), https://www.ynetnews.com/ (last retrieved October, 4, 2013).

18 Ahron, Raphael, Rasgon, Adam,Colder than Ever." (October, 25, 2019),https://www.timesofisrael.com/ (last retrieded October, 4, 2023).

19 Al Abed Al Haq, Fawwaz, and Mahmoud Al Sleibi Nazek. "A Critical Discourse Analysis of Three Speeches of King Abdullah II," in *US – China Foreign Language*, 13/140, 2015; http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/55823dfe54f29.pdf, (last retrieved October, 4, 2023).

20 "His Majesty King Abdullah II. Profile" https://kingabdullah.jo/en/page/profile, (last retrieved October, 4, 2023).

termination of the annexation of Tzofar and Naharayim from the peace agreement and the application of full Jordanian sovereignty over every inch of these lands." Abdullah added that "our national stance on the Palestinian issue and support for our Palestinian brothers will remain as it is: support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital."[21] Twenty-five years after the agreement between Hussein and Rabin was signed, these two enclaves were returned to full Jordanian possession, without any Israeli presence there.

VI. Conclusion

Wars are not necessarily the end result of a process. They can definitely be an opening for the next move or tier to a previous event. The Yom Kippur War changed the political perception in the area that advocated war for the sake of progress. The message changed to one of peace. King Hussein of Jordan conducted continuous overtures with officials in Israel and advocated for the return of the West Bank to Jordanian ownership. Hussein rebuffed any Israeli-American initiative for compromise. For him, the West Bank was part of the Hashemite Kingdom and the home of the Palestinian people. The King felt a political responsibility. Hussein abstained from war with Israel and secretly met with Israeli representatives to promote these initiatives.

Ties between Israel and Jordan were conducted under a cloak of secrecy and ambiguity. Only a few people in Israel knew about and even fewer took an active part in the meetings with the Jordanians. On the Jordanian side, this was even more secretive and, apart from the King, only close associates and covert agents took part in the meetings with the Israelis. King Hussein observed what was happening and realized that the spotlight was on Egypt. It appeared to be the time for the Kingdom of Jordan to move forward and sign a peace treaty with Israel and enjoy the full range of generous American benefits, just as Egypt and Israel had done. Although the talks between the two neighbors lasted longer, additional events flooded the Middle East and prevented it from happening. The King was fearful for the peace of his kingdom and any reckless move could upset the delicate balance between the two banks of the Jordan.

In 1987, the Intifada (uprising) broke out.[22] The fear of an uprising spilled across the Jordan River into the Hashemite Kingdom. The Jordanian king realized that the PLO was in charge of the West Bank and in a somewhat surprising unilateral move,

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[21] "Jordan King Says rule over boarder enclaves restored as Israeli least expires" in *Israel Today*, 10 Nov 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/jordans-king-says-rule-over-border-enclaves-restored-as-israels-lease-expires/, (last retrieved October, 4, 2013), ; Hendriz, Steve, Tailor Luck and Ruth Eglash. "After 25 Years Jordan Declines to Return Israel's Access to the 'Island of Peace'," *Washington Post*, 11 Nov 2019. https://res.cloudinary.com/sabrainstitute/image/upload/v1580471462/Sabra%20Report/November_15th_2019_-_Issue_164_-_Reclaimed_Land_Grapes_of_Wrath_Encapsulating_ea2bim.pdf, (last retrieved October, 4, 2023).

[22] Karsh, Efraim, and P. R. Kumaraswamy. *Israel the Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle* (London: Routledge, 2003).

the king declared a unilateral disengagement from the West Bank in the summer of 1988. This act led to increased unrest in the West Bank, which perceived this move as a victory for the policy of terrorism. The Palestinian people felt that it was time to demand that the world recognize it as a nation like all other nations striving for national political independence in Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital. Although Hussein declared that Jordan would always be on the side of the Palestinian people, he quickly severed all political and economic ties with the West Bank. The East Bank breathed a sigh of relief since that move led to economic and civil relief. While the PLO fired in all directions, Israel and Jordan were in the line of fire. This was supposedly the right time to embark on the path to a peace treaty.[23] The London Agreement was supposed to be the right framework for tying up loose ends, but the conditions were not quite right for either party to sign the agreement.

After the Gulf War, overtures began between Israel and the Palestinians led by the PLO, with Jordanian support and American mediation.[24] The talks began in Madrid in the form of an international convention. Elections were held in Israel and the regime changed. Rabin was elected prime minister and the pace of talks led Israel and the PLO to sign the Oslo Accords. An agreement was signed between Arafat and Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, mediated by President Clinton. King Hussein was stunned. Arafat managed to seduce the king and "pull out of the hat not a little rabbit, but a damned camel."[25]

The nations of the world were comfortable recognizing Jordan as the home of the Palestinian people, but the king was quick to say that "Jordan is not Palestine." This statement contains his entire doctrine. All ideas of federation, confederation, sponsorship and partnership were completely unacceptable to the king. Jordan is the land of the Jordanians. The definition of his state as the national home of the Palestinian people was a death sentence for him and the Hashemite Kingdom. King Abdullah's grandfather, his namesake, was murdered by a Palestinian at the foot of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in the 1950s. Even then, the king swore to himself that he would not fall to the same fate.

Why did King Hussein give up the West Bank? After all, he did what he could to maintain the integrity of his kingdom and return the West Bank to Jordan. Every possible Israeli proposal he was given, such as the Alon Plan and the Galili Plan, was

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[23] The meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and Jordanian King Hussein in London, mediated by Lord Mishcon, was a real step forward. A sort of preliminary letter of agreement was drafted but the agreement was shelved before the ink had dried. Each side was suspicious of the other's hidden intentions and the Shultz Peace Plan at this point was too eager to promote hasty arrangements at the expense of the Israeli government. Again, the idea of a peace settlement between Israel and Jordan was dropped.

[24] Ryan, Curtis, R. "Jordan First: Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy under King Abdullah II," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 26/3, 2004, 43–62; Shamir, Uri. "Water Agreements between Israel and Its Neighbors," in *Transformation of Middle Eastern Natural Environment: Legacies and Lessons*, ed. Jeff Albert, Magnus Bernhardsson, and Roger Kenna (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 274–297.

[25] Boustany, Nora. "King Hussein Fears Prospects for Peace Could Raise Premature Hope in Jordan," in *International Herald Tribune,* 18–19 Sep 1993; Shlaim, Avi. "The Oslo Accords," in *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 23/3, 1994.

rejected outright. His plan for a confederation with the Palestinians also fell through. The King invested millions in the West Bank: he built, founded, financed and initiated educational and medical development in the West Bank, funded workers and became the main employer of the West Bank residents. So how is it that the one person who clings the most to hope and the desire to return the West Bank is the one who gave it up? The king saw himself as the patron of the Palestinians and felt regal paternal concern for them. This is the reason he felt responsible for their future, and realized that standing in the Palestinians' way would be a mistake, and the right way to gain their trust is to let them go. It is not inconceivable that the Jordanian king made a calculated move and sacrificed the territories in the West Bank in exchange for peace with the locals, and perhaps it would be even more accurate to say that he sacrificed the western side of the West Bank for the security of his own kingdom.

Henry Kissinger[26] goes on to describe in his book the political "sacrifice of the altar" that leaders are forced to observe. Peace between Israel and Jordan was honored on the international stage in 1994. The peace agreements started off as a signed declaration on the lawn of the White House in Washington. The two leaders signed a peace agreement at the Arava terminal, facing the endless desert landscape with the Judean Mountains spread out before them, with the Gulf of Eilat waters twinkling in the distance. A decades-long journey came to an end. This was a necessary continuation of a bond of respect and mutual appreciation between enemies who became friends. Two nations sharing a destiny and an agreement that promised cooperation, making the desert and the Dead Sea bloom, water desalination, tourism, agriculture and industry.

Twenty-five years after the agreement, the two enclaves of Tzofar and Naharayim were returned to Jordan, despite the wishes of the Israeli farmers who cultivated the land the entire time. King Abdullah's decision expressed his overall doctrine towards the agreement, meaning agreements must be respected. Reciprocity and respect are the essence of existence and if they are not present, the agreement is also absent accordingly. It is interesting to say that as expensive as wars are, or rather the most expensive thing a country has, it always prefers to spend less on peace. If the decision-makers in Israel had invested in cultivating reciprocity with their neighbor Jordan, the reality might have been different. In the future, there is room for hope, because perhaps "All is foreseen, but the freedom of choice is given."[27]

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[26] Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy* (Jerusalem: Shalem Publishing, 2007).

[27] Rabbi Akiba in: Hultgren, Stephan, "Rabbi Akiba on Divine Providence and Human Freedom, 'Abot 3: 15–16 and 'Abot de Rabbi Nathen (B) 22:15–15", Jewish Studies Quarterly, (Volume 18, 2011), p. 107–143.

VI.

Who Is the Enemy? – Changing Typologies of War

Peter A. Kiss

Kashmir, 1947 – a Modern Hybrid War

Abstract

Modern technology has made hybrid warfare a very effective way to advance national interests. However, some operations launched when technology was much more primitive than it is today can also be classified as hybrid. Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir in 1947 is one example. Pakistan was determined to use force to acquire Kashmir, but could not afford the risk of Indian intervention. In order to create a *fait accompli*, it launched a campaign that bore all the hallmark of hybrid warfare. Pakistan's ambitions were frustrated at the last minute by the very Indian intervention it wanted to avoid. Nevertheless, its operation was a partial success.

I. By Way of Introduction – Hybrid War

Hybrid war became part of security policy discourse in 2014, following Russia's seizure of the Crimean peninsula. Although the definitions in general use define hybrid warfare (i.e. a particular type of conflict) by describing hybrid threat (i.e. the actions of an adversary), they do convey the general characteristics of hybrid war.

NATO's first definition was a "... wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary and civilian measures … employed in a highly integrated design. The adversary tries to influence ... policy-makers and key decision makers by combining kinetic operations with subversive effort [and] ... resorts to clandestine actions, to avoid attribution or retribution."[1] Subsequently, that definition was simplified (perhaps oversimplified) to "A type of threat that combines conventional, irregular and asymmetric activities in time and space."[2]

The European Union's definition is more detailed:

> … mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods ..., which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There

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1 Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 Sep 2014, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm> (last retrieved on 22 Jun 2023).

2 NATO Term – The Official NATO Terminology Database. Record No. 37938, <https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc> (last retrieved on 22 Jun 2023).

> is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats.[3]

There is a good reason for seeking a precise definition: modern nations make a clear distinction between war and peace, and grant greater freedom of action to their military only in wartime. However, creating a precise definition can be self-limiting. The hybrid operator adapts to the political, strategic and operational environment and executes his attacks in unexpected ways, thereby, frustrating the desire for clarity. Describing and analyzing hybrid war is far more useful than trying to define it.[4] NATO has adopted two analytical tools (DIME and PMESII) to model conflict and the operational environment. These tools help to describe and analyze – and, thereby, understand – hybrid warfare as well.

DIME stands for the diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of national power. These are the tools and resources a state deploys to protect and advance its interests in the international environment, influence the world, and coerce or incentivize other nations. Whatever the state does can be squeezed into one of these four categories. Sometimes the fit is not very comfortable, sometimes it requires a little effort, but it can be done.[5]

PMESII stands for the political, military, economic, societal, infrastructure and information subsystems that make up a state.[6] The hybrid actor seeks the vulnerabilities in these subsystems and targets them with their instruments of national power. Even the best governed societies with a robust economy, and the best justice system have vulnerabilities in some of these sectors. The PMESII concept helps to identify key strengths and weaknesses, and estimate the effects various actions will have in these areas.

A basic attribute of hybrid warfare is that the attacker seeks to achieve warlike objectives without the risk of war. He achieves this by synchronizing his actions: parallel operations, using various DIME instruments, targeting various PMESII vulnerabilities are timed and sequenced to support and reinforce each other and achieve synergistic effects. By these means, the hybrid actor remains below the threshold of war, yet creates conditions that compel the targeted state to accept a disadvantageous settlement, and the international community to consent to it.[7]

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3 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response. Brussels, 6 Ap 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018>.

4 Frier, Nathan. "Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe ... Don't Define." in *Small Wars Journal,* <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/343-freier.pdf> (last retrieved on 22 Jun 2023).

5 Carr, Edward H. *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1939), 102–169; *AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine.* NATO Standardization Office, 2017, 1–3, 1–4.

6 *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).* Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 2021, 1-13-1-14.

7 Cullen, Patrick J., and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud. *Understanding Hybrid Warfare* (Norfolk, UK: MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, 2017).

It is modern technology that makes hybrid operations so effective today: cyber-attacks reach across state borders anonymously; disinformation influences millions and sows distrust in government; quick, reliable and secure communications allow real-time situational awareness and close control and coordination of operations. However, as the example of Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir shows, contrary to those who argue that hybrid warfare is an entirely new way of waging war,[8] hybrid operations had been carried out long before technology made them so effective. Although the DIME and PMESII analytical tools did not exist at the time of the Pakistani-Kashmir-India conflict in 1947, they will be used in this paper because they make up a useful analytical framework that helps us to understand hybrid conflict.

II. Kashmir, 1947 – the historical background

Maintaining a colonial empire became a huge burden for Great Britain after World War II, and in 1945, the Labour government set about transforming it into a Commonwealth of independent, but closely associated states. The first colony to become independent was India.

Since India's Muslims were not willing to live as a permanent minority under Hindu domination, their major mass organization, the All-India Muslim League, demanded the division of the subcontinent, creating a separate, independent Muslim state.[9] The British government and the Indian National Congress (the major non-Muslim Indian political organization) objected, but the Muslims were adamant, and emphasized their determination through rallies and demonstrations that degenerated into bloody riots.[10] Britain and the Indian National Congress finally agreed to the creation of two independent states (dominions) within the British Commonwealth: secular India in the center, governed by the National Congress, and Pakistan to the east and west, governed by the Muslim League.

Even before the boundaries between the dominions were drawn, Muslims had already begun to migrate to the future Pakistan, while Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Christians, Buddhists and other non-Muslims were moving to India. Sectarian hatred soon boiled to the surface, law and order broke down, and unbridled violence engulfed not only the border regions but the interior of the two states as well. Fifteen million

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8 See, for example: Hoffman, Frank G. "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," in *Joint Force Quarterly,* 52, 2009, 34–40; Hoffman, Frank G. *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), http://www.potomacinstitute.org/publications/Potomac_HybridWar_0108.pdf; Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012).

9 Resolution of the Lahore Session of the Muslim League, 26 Mar 1940, <https://www.punjnud.com/ViewPage.aspx?BookID=13811&BookPageID=318761&BookPageTitle=Lahore%20Session%20of%20the%20Muslim%20League%201940>.

10 Mahajan, Mehr Chand. *Looking Back: The Autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan Former Chief Justice of India* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), 112–113; Khan, Abdul Wali. *Facts Are Facts: The Untold Story of India's Partition* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1988), 114.

people were displaced, and the death toll (never reliably established) was somewhere between 200,000 and two million.[11]

Dividing British India (the provinces directly governed by the Crown) was a relatively straightforward matter, but there were also 565 princely states – semi-independent states bound to the British Crown by treaty. Their accession to India or Pakistan was more problematic (see Fig. 1.) The Indian Independence Act assigned to the rulers the sole authority to decide whether to join one or the other, or remain independent.[12] Geography and demographics determined accession for most rulers, but the case of Kashmir was more complicated.[13]

Kashmir's location, where the borders of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia and China met, made it a strategically important place. Both India and Pakistan courted – and sometimes pressured – the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, to secure his realm's accession. The logical choice was Pakistan: the maharaja was Hindu, but 77 percent of his subjects were Muslims, and the state's economy and infrastructure depended on Pakistan. However, even many Muslims rejected accession to Pakistan. The maharaja preferred independence, or, failing that, accession to India.

The Pakistani government was ready to settle the matter by force, but that would have risked Indian intervention and the Pakistani armed forces were nowhere near strong enough to withstand a conflict with India. Another constraint was the large number of British officers still serving in the Pakistani armed forces – even the commander in chief was a British General. A way had to be found to achieve the desired result without the knowledge of the British officers, and without provoking India into decisive action, at least until a *fait accompli* could be created.

III. DIME and PMESII analysis

Since Pakistan has not released any documents on its involvement in the Kashmir conflict, there is no reliable information available on what analytical tools the leadership relied on to formulate its plans. (Actually, some evidence exists that assumptions, wishful thinking, pride and self-interest informed Pakistani planning as much as thorough and realistic analysis.[14]) However, the DIME and PMESII analytical tools provide a deeper insight than would be possible based only on a chronology of the events.

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11 Talbot, Ian. "Partition of India: The Human Dimension," In *Cultural and Social History*, 6/4, 2009, 403–410.

12 Khanam, Attiya. "An Historical Overview of the Accession of Princely States," in *Journal of Historical Studies*, II/I,2016, 84–103.

13 The official name of the state since the time of its creation in the 19th century has been "Jammu and Kashmir," but the colloquial term has always been simply "Kashmir." Even some official British India documents (e.g. the Census of India) refer to the state as simply "Kashmir."

14 Khan, Muhammad Akbar. *Raiders in Kashmir* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), 14, 17–36; Hyat-Khan, Sirdar Shaukat. *The Nation That Lost Its Soul: Memoirs of a Freedom Fighter* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1995) 213–217.

Pakistani DIME

Diplomacy. Pakistan was a newly independent state and, thus, had the goodwill of the rest of the world. It also had strong British support: Pakistan was expected to be an important future strategic partner – more important than India. The British government had the means to apply strong political and economic pressure on all parties to refrain from aggression, but when the conflict broke out, it chose to apply them only against India, ignored all Kashmiri requests for support, and disregarded all overt and covert Pakistani actions.[15]

Information. Pakistan had the means to reach international public opinion, as well as the population in the target area. It had a strong influence over the Kashmiri Muslims through the state's Muslim organizations and clandestine operatives. It could even exert some influence on Indian policies through the sizeable Muslim minority that remained in India. The Muslim refugees flowing in from other parts of India had suffered unspeakable atrocities on the way, and their stories were a particularly powerful source of propaganda. Pakistan also had a nearly complete stranglehold on Kashmir's communications and could choke off any reports that were detrimental to Pakistan.

Military. Pakistan inherited one-third of the personnel and materiel resources of the British Indian Army, Air Force and Navy. The armed forces were still in the process of reorganization, but were far stronger than those of Kashmir (although much weaker than India's). The flow of Pakistan's share of equipment from India was uncertain, but alternative sources were available. Due to the morphology of the region, Pakistani forces had relatively unimpeded access to Kashmiri territory throughout the year, while the lack of adequate roads, as well as heavy snows in winter restricted access from India.

Economy. Pakistan's economy was none too robust, and the Muslim refugees flooding into the state were crushing burden. It could not offer Kashmir economic inducements, but could apply coercive measures: it sat astride all practicable commercial routes into Kashmir, and controlled all its communications with the outside world. It could delay or stop the flow of Kashmir's external trade entirely and could render all but the simplest financial transactions impossible.

Kashmiri PMESII

Political. With the withdrawal of Great Britain, the maharaja suddenly lost the guarantor of his power, and he had to maneuver among several actors in the new, unstable external and internal conditions. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments pressed him to accede to their dominion. The Muslims in Jammu province were ardently pro-Pakistan, and made it clear that nothing less than accession to Pakistan would be acceptable. The majority of Muslims in Kashmir province rejected accession to

[15] Bajwa, Kuldip Singh. *Jammu and Kashmir War, 1947–1948: Political and Military Perspective,* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publication Pvt Ltd, 2003), 73–74, 77; Jha, Prem Shankar. *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 83–91.

Pakistan and preferred independence or accession to India. Most Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists favored joining India.[16] There was no best-case scenario, and the least bad one was not very clear, either.

Military. The Kashmir Army (about 12,000 men) consisted of eight infantry battalions (some with WW II combat experience[17]) deployed throughout the state, six garrison police companies (in effect a gendarmerie) and a cavalry regiment deployed in Kashmir and Jammu, as well as a constabulary battalion in Gilgit. The Army had some serious weaknesses: it had no artillery, armor or aircraft, since these had been unnecessary under the Crown's protection; a quarter of the personnel were Muslims, whose loyalty was divided between their oath to the maharaja and the idea of Pakistan,[18] and it depended on arsenals in Pakistan for all military supplies.

Economy. Kashmir's economy was hostage to Pakistani goodwill. All commercial traffic had to go through Pakistani territory, and financial transactions had to go through Pakistani institutions. Pakistan could cause severe shortages and hardship within a few weeks by closing its border.

Societal. Mountain ranges compartmented the state into clear-cut geographical regions: Jammu (south and west), Kashmir (center and west), and the high mountain region of Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh (north and east) (see Figure 2.) There were extreme differences in environment, economy, social organization, language, culture and religion among the regions,[19] but one trait was common: the religious divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. This division was not sharp in the Kashmir valley, but the intercommunal relationship was less ideal in the other provinces, particularly in Jammu.[20] Nevertheless, Kashmir was spared the violent upheaval of Partition until early October 1947.

Infrastructure. The only all-weather road ran along the Kashmir valley from Rawalpindi to Srinagar (the summer capital). A seasonal road (closed during the winter) connected Srinagar to Jammu city (the winter capital). The rest of the road network consisted of fair-weather roads, dirt tracks and caravan trails. There was only a single railroad line, from Sialkot to Jammu. All motorable roads, the major rivers and the single rail line led through Pakistani territory. The only road link to India was a fair-weather road between Pathankot and Jammu. There was one fully equipped airfield at Srinagar. All telephone and telegraph traffic went through Pakistani facilities, and the mail service was operated by Pakistan.

Information. The government controlled all media, but its reach was limited, due to the undeveloped state of communications within the state. Pakistan controlled all information coming out of the state through its control of all communication channels between Kashmir and the outside world, it could disseminate Pakistani

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16 Snedden, Christopher. *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir* (London, Hurst & Company, 2012), 17–32.

17 Singh, K. Brahma. *History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (1820–1956): The State Force Background* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989), 170–203.

18 Singh, *History of Jammu* (see note 17), 220.

19 Prasad, S. N., and Dharm Pal. *History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947–48)* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, 1987), 3.

20 Snedden, *Untold Story* (see note 16), 18.

propaganda and could interfere with the dissemination of Kashmiri government information.

IV. The Pakistani Operation

As has been mentioned earlier, official documents are not available on how the Pakistani leadership formulated its plans to force Kashmir's accession. Pakistani sources generally claim that there was no such plan: the political figures, military officers and civilians who were involved were either rogue elements or idealists motivated by a desire to assist oppressed Muslims; they were acting without the approval, or even knowledge, of the Pakistani government.

Indian sources, on the contrary, insist that Pakistan executed a thoroughly developed plan that had been approved at the highest government levels. The accounts of key participants, and such official documents as are available in various archives, tend to support the Indian version. An overview of the sequence and timing of the key events also suggests that a sound plan did exist, and the Pakistani government was indeed involved at the highest levels. The operation rested on four pillars: a strategic information operation, economic blockade, subversion and armed force.

Strategic information operation

Pakistan deployed its information instrument along three channels of communication: radio broadcasts (Pakistan Broadcasting Service and underground stations in Kashmir),[21] the press, and word of mouth. It had a cadre of skilled propagandists in the Muslim League, as well as a network of sympathizers already in place in the most important target area, Kashmir. The information operations were targeted against Kashmir's political, military and societal subsystems. The diplomatic instrument supplemented the information instrument in foreign capitals.

The target audiences were the Kashmiri Muslims, in order to turn them against the government; the Pakistani population, in order to elicit their support for the operation; the government of Great Britain, in order to secure its support against India; and world public opinion, in order to gather international acceptance of Pakistani actions. The narrative was based on the tropes of the injustice, exploitation and oppression that Muslims had to endure all over the world, wherever they were in a minority:[22]

– Kashmir had a significant Muslim majority that had been oppressed, treated as inferior subjects, taxed unfairly, drafted for *corvée,* excluded from the administration, and suffered many other indignities. They would continue to suffer under

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21 Bhat, Rajesh. "Fighting Wars through Radio Broadcasts," in *Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism*, 28 Jan 2013 <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9683/0b1c47ec21389494688b53ed29e7d79a8156.pdf> (last retrieved on 22 Jun 2023).

22 Pakistani authors continue to repeat these themes. See, for example, Khan, Sardar M. Ibrahim. *Kashmir Saga* (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press Ltd, 1965), 41–48; Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf. *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom vol. 2* (Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, 1979), 78–135.

Hindu oppression if the state acceded to India. Only Pakistan could guarantee their security and prosperity.
– The Maharaja deployed his Army along the Pakistan border, armed Hindu and Sikh militias, and incited sectarian hatreds in order to execute a secret plan to kill or expel his Muslim subjects and accede to India. The plan was already being executed: the Army and the militias were committing atrocities against the Muslims, who now had to defend themselves.

Further themes were added as the operation progressed:
– The Kashmiri Muslims rose up against violent oppression. Muslims elsewhere had an obligation to assist them.
– The Kashmiri Army was conducting cross-border raids, looting and burning Pakistani villages, and killing their inhabitants.[23]
– Pakistan had no role in the disturbances in Kashmir, but could not prevent its citizens taking the initiative to defend fellow Muslims. Pakistani soldiers who fought to protect fellow Muslims were on furlough and did not have the blessing of the Pakistani state.

Economic blockade

In early September 1947 Pakistan deployed its economic instrument of power: it closed its border with Kashmir to all commercial traffic. This brought all Kashmiri external trade to a halt, and also paralyzed commercial activities within Kashmir, because the truck fleets that provided intra-state transport services were immobilized due to a shortage of gasoline. The postal service (operated by Pakistan) refused to cash postal money orders, accept checks, or operate the postal savings accounts. Inter-bank money transfers were stopped, and the Lahore Mint refused to supply banknotes and coins to Kashmiri banks. The economic blockade exacerbated the food shortages and high prices the unusually harsh winter of 1946–47 had caused.[24]

Subversion and rebellion

The information and military instruments of power were deployed to orchestrate subversion and rebellion among Kashmiri subjects. Even before Partition, Muslim League operatives had been active throughout Kashmir. They spread pro-Pakistan

[23] "Kashmir Exposes Pakistan's Propaganda: Border Clashes Already Reported," *Indian Daily Mail*, 18 Oct 1947, 1; "Kashmir's Warning To Pakistan." *Indian Daily Mail*, 22 Oct 1947, 1; "Kashmir Ruler's Rebuff to Pakistan's Allegations," *Indian Daily Mail*, 18 Oct 1947, 4, <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed 15 Aug 2021.

[24] Jha, *Kashmir* (see note 15), 2, 16; Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad. *Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1993), 87; Prasad and Pal, *History of Operations* (see note 19), 14–15; "Kashmir's warning to Pakistan," *Indian Daily Mail*, 22 Oct 1947, 1; "Kashmir Exposes Pakistan's Propaganda: Border Clashes Already Reported," *Indian Daily Mail*, 18 Oct 1947, 1, <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed 15 Aug 2021.

propaganda, subverted Muslims in the civil service and army, and generally incited communal tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims.[25]

The western districts of Jammu province were particularly fertile ground for subversion. The genuine grievances of Muslim population had not been addressed for some time, and the people grew restive. Pakistani agents and local politicians were inciting dissatisfaction, fear of the Maharaja's intentions, fear of the Army, and hatred towards non-Muslims. The state's response – increasing the size of the local army garrisons, heavy-handed suppression of even lawful and peaceful protest, abuse of detainees, imprisonment of opposition politicians – only exacerbated the situation.[26] In late August, small rebellions broke out all over Jammu,[27] and by mid-October they coalesced into full-scale armed revolt, whose center was in the Jammu-Poonch-Mirpur area. In the affected areas the civil administration all but collapsed, taxes were not collected, the work of the courts come to a standstill, and the Army had to withdraw its garrisons from several towns. Non-Muslims were abandoning their homes for shelter in the larger towns that still had Army garrisons. The rebels liberated several districts along the Pakistani border and begun to organize themselves into a state: the Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) government was declared on October 24. Its armed force developed into a small, but fairly effective army.[28]

In the far north, in Gilgit there was no need for Pakistani operatives: two British officers in the Maharaja's service organized a *coup d'etat* and delivered the region to Pakistan.[29] The military force in the province (about 1,200 men) consisted of the Gilgit Scouts (a locally raised all-Muslim constabulary battalion), and an infantry battalion that consisted of three companies, one Muslim, one Sikh, and one Hindu.[30] On October 31 the Scouts, led by their British officers, cut off all communications with the outside world, locked down the town of Gilgit, and arrested the governor and the commander of the infantry battalion. Next the Muslim company and a Scout contingent attacked the Sikh and Hindu companies, killed many and captured the rest.

Gilgit was soon integrated into Pakistan: the Pakistani flag was raised over the Scouts' cantonment, a governor was installed, regular air service was established, military personnel arrived, arms and equipment were shipped in, and a recruitment

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25 Palit, D. K. *Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J&K Rifles* (Dehra Dun: Palit & Dutt, Publishers, 1972), 155, 160; Singh, *History of Jammu* (see note 17), 214; Khan, *The Kashmir Saga* (see note 22), 60–61; Saraf. *Kashmiris* (see note 19), 85.

26 Khan, *Kashmir Saga* (see note 22), 52–53.

27 Saraf. *Kashmiris* (see note 19), 151–152.

28 Saraf, *Kashmiris* (see note 19), 152–174; Khan, *Kashmir Saga* (see note 22), 68–74.

29 Brown, William A. *The Gilgit Rebellion 1947* (London: Ibex, 1998), 104, 115–121, 145–218; Cheema, Amar. *The Crimson Chinar – The Kashmir Conflict: A Politico Military Perspective* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2014), 42–43; Ahlawat, Dalbir and Kedar Thaakar. "Kashmir Imbroglio Resolved: Strategic Options for Pakistan," in *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, 4/2, 2021, 137–151; Bajwa, *Jammu and Kashmir War* (see note 15), 76–100.

30 Brown, *Rebellion* (see note 26), 20. Other sources state that there were only two companies, one Muslim, one Hindu. William Brown was the commandant of the Gilgit Scouts and had extensive local knowledge, his information is likely correct.

drive yielded some 2,000 locals. Gilgit became the springboard for the operation to take Baltistan and Ladakh.[31]

The March on Srinagar and Jammu

The centerpiece of the operation was the overt use of the military instrument of power. In order to conceal Pakistan's role, irregular forces were raised among the tribes in the Northwest Frontier Province.[32] The tribes fielded 1000-man *lascars;* the Pakistani armed forces provided them with rations, transportation, some equipment and ammunition, and assigned regular officers, non-commissioned officers, and veterans of the Indian National Army[33] to lead them and to operate the mortars, radios, and other equipment that was unfamiliar to the tribesmen.

In early September heavily armed bands begun to raid Hindu and Sikh villages along the border, and fled back to Pakistan when Kashmiri forces responded.[34] The Pakistani government feigned ignorance of the incidents, while its propaganda arm kept accusing the Kashmiri government of atrocities against the Muslim population.[35] Responding to the raids, securing the most vulnerable locations, patrolling to prevent incursions, while at the same time trying to suppress the rebellion in Jammu paralyzed the army: its forces became so widely dispersed as to be incapable of coordinated action.

On 22 October 1947 a two-pronged general offensive commenced. The main thrust was delivered in the Kashmir valley, where five *lascars* attacked along the Rawalpindi-Srinagar road, with Srinagar as their objective. The Army battalion deployed along the border to block infiltration was destroyed by its own Muslim soldiers, who killed their non-Muslim officers and comrades and joined the raiders.[36] An Army detachment – rushed up from Srinagar – managed to destroy the bridge over the Uri river. For disciplined troops this would have been only a temporary setback: the river was easy to cross on foot, and the distance to Srinagar was about 100 km – with light equipment a matter of three days' march. But the *lascars* were tribal militia, not disciplined regulars. Obedience to orders was not their strong point

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31 Palit, *Arms* (see note 22), 224–244.

32 Abdullah, *Flames* (see note 21), 93.

33 "Ex-INA Officers Leading Kashmir Raiders?" in *Indian Daily Mail,* 31 Oct 1947, 1; "Former INA Commander Kiani Leading Rebels Against Kashmir," in *Indian Daily Mail*, 1 Nov 1947, 4, <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021. The Indian National Army (INA – Hindi name: Azad Hind Fauj – Free Indian Army) was a 40,000-man force the Japanese raised among the Indian prisoners of war. The INA fought against the Allies in Burma.

34 "Tribesmen Massing on Kashmir Border: Sporadic Raids on Villages Reported, India Govt. Watching Situation," in *Indian Daily Mail*, 8 Oct 1947, 1, <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.

35 Prasad and Pal, *History of Operations* (see note 19), 13; Bajwa, *Jammu and Kashmir War* (see note 15), 77.

36 Prasad and Pal, *History of Operations* (see note 19), 21; Singh, *History of Jammu* (see note 17), 228–229; Palit, Arms (see note 22), 178–180; "Explosive Situation in Kashmir," in *Indian Daily Mail*, 27 Oct 1947, 1; "Undeclared" War against Kashmir?" in *Indian Daily Mail*, 27 Oct 1947, 2, <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.

– strategic sense even less so. They refused to give up their vehicles (that they needed to carry their plunder), and thus they delayed the advance for nearly four days.[37]

They finally reached Baramula, the next large town, on 26 October. Srinagar was only 30 km away, and the road was open and undefended. The situation required a fast, determined advance, before the state forces could react or receive reinforcements. However, instead of making a dash for Srinagar, the Pathans halted again and spent two days looting Baramula.[38] Due to their lack of discipline they failed to reach their objective in time: the delay allowed the Maharaja to sign the instrument of accession to India (night, 26–27 October).

The secondary attack was launched in Jammu province by the Azad Kashmir Army forces and several *lascars*. They broke out of the areas already under their control, occupied the undefended towns and surrounded those that had army garrisons. They cut the Poonch-Jammu road, and tried, but failed, to take the towns of Poonch and Jammu. Both remained in the government's hands, and Jammu became a major Indian base throughout the rest of the war.

V. Indian Intervention

Once it received the instrument of accession, the Indian government reacted quickly. Within a few hours it airlifted an infantry battalion to Srinagar, which held up the raiders' advance long enough to build up sufficient strength at the airfield. After several days of skirmishing around the city and the airfield the Indian force routed the *lascars* with heavy losses on 7 November. The *lascars* quickly withdrew nearly all the way to the Pakistani border.[39]

The Azad Kashmir Army units and *lascars* in the Jammu area were somewhat more successful. They not only held onto several towns that they had occupied in September and early October, but also maintained the siege of Poonch and several other towns, and forced some smaller Kashmir Army garrisons to surrender or withdraw. They even managed to repulse several relief operations, in spite of superior Indian firepower and mobility.

Indian strength eventually grew to two infantry divisions, supported by fighter-bomber and transport squadrons. With their limited resources and military skills, neither the *lascars* nor the Azad Kashmir forces could stand against the Indian regular forces for long.[40] As the first Pakistani battalions were deployed and took the lead in combat operations in the spring of 1948, the conflict turned into an international

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37 Palit, Arms (see note 22), 192–193; Sen, L.P. *Slender was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation, 1947–48* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1969), 37–38.

38 Abdullah, *Flames* (see note 21), 92–93; Hyat-Khan, *The Nation that Lost Its Soul* (see note 14) 216.

39 Sen, *Slender* (see note 34), 78–100; Sinha, S.K. *Operation Rescue: Military operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947–49* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1977), 11–30.

40 Khan, *Kashmir Saga* (see note 19), 117–118; "Military Situation in Kashmir," in *Indian Daily Mail*, 29 Oct 1947, 1; "Tribal Raids on Kashmir Halted," in *Indian Daily Mail*, 29 Oct 1947, 3, <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/> accessed Aug 15 2021.

war.[41] Combat operations ended in a ceasefire (1 January 1948), and the ceasefire line (Line of Control) divides Kashmir to this day.

VI. Assessment of the Operation

Hybrid operations are tailored to the operational environment, the targeted state's vulnerabilities and the international situation. Nevertheless, some conditions are generally applicable for success.[42] Pakistan satisfied some of these conditions well, others – less so. The Pakistani successes are even more remarkable when the generally underdeveloped communication infrastructure of the region is taken into consideration.

1. Possess strong political leadership that sets objectives, directs operations and deals with reverses.
   The Pakistani government's control of the operations was hampered by the need to keep the operation secret from the British officers. In addition, the leadership was not unified due to pride, personal ambitions and the Muslim League's function as a parallel government.[43]
2. Possess and select instruments of national power that are suitable for hybrid operations, and match them to the vulnerabilities identified in the target state.
   The Pathans were an asset in the initial cross-border raids, but due to their lack of discipline, they turned into a liability on the march to Srinagar. Moreover, the armed forces were not strong enough to either deter the Indian intervention or defeat it, once it took place.
3. Maintain tight control over all state and some private resources and instruments to achieve synchronization and coordination.
   Control over the military instrument was weak, as the indiscipline of the *lascars* shows. Aside from the *lascars*' failure, synchronization and coordination was adequate, as the timing of the major actions shows.
4. Possess robust intelligence capability to identify vulnerabilities and maintain real-time situational awareness.
   Pakistan had no difficulty identifying the vulnerabilities of Kashmiri society: Muslims in the Kashmiri civil service, the Army, the political organizations and the general population were ready sources of information. The underdeveloped communications systems of the region made timely situational awareness more a future concept than a reality.
5. Achieve surprise through orchestration of the instruments in unexpected ways and diversion and deception tactics.
   Pakistan was successful in achieving operational surprise. Even though the Kashmiri and Indian governments were aware of Pakistani intentions and preparations, the unfolding events caught them by surprise.

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41 Khan, *Raiders* (see note 12), 82–84.

42 Cederberg, Aapo, and Pasi Eronen. *How can Societies be Defended against Hybrid Threats?* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2015); Rácz, *Hybrid War* (see note 6).

43 Khan, *Raiders* (see note 12), 22–24; Jha, *Kashmir* (see note 15), 25–26.

6. Execute strong political follow-up to protect the gains and end state achieved.
   Pakistan achieved what was possible in the given international environment. It has not obtained full international recognition for its territorial gains, but, with the passage of time, the international community has moved on to other concerns.
7. Control the information environment to project the narrative to all key audiences.
   Considering the technology constraints, Pakistan did remarkably well, at least initially, until the Indian intervention. Relying on all available means it managed to incite a sizeable portion of the Muslim population against Hindu rule, and also motivated many Pakistanis to participate in the conflict. It has managed to cast doubt on the legitimacy of India's claim to Kashmir for over seven decades.
8. Neutralize the armed forces of the state targeted.
   Pakistan achieved complete success. Subversion of Muslim officers and men reduced the forces available. The dispersal of units in penny packets due to rebellion in Jammu province, raids along the border and unrest in the towns paralyzed the security forces by the time the *lascars*' invasion commenced.
9. Maintain unimpeded access to the operational area to support operatives, local allies and deployed forces.
   Pakistan had no difficulty supporting the *lascars*, the Azad Kashmir Army and, subsequently, its regular forces with all their logistics requirements, even when Indian forces entered the conflict.

VII. Conclusion

The Pakistani operation to seize Kashmir bears out this paper's thesis: hybrid operations had a good chance of success long before modern technology turned them into the instrument of choice for forcefully advancing national interests without going to war. Pakistan failed to realize all its territorial ambitions, and could not prevent India's intervention. The failure was due to imperfect leadership, inadequate instruments of national power and underdeveloped technology. Nevertheless, Pakistan's partial success was impressive: it retained the Muslim-majority areas of the Kashmir and Jammu provinces, as well as Gilgit and Baltistan.

Pakistan has persisted with below-the-threshold operations against India in the past seven decades. Although these were far less successful than the attempt to seize Kashmir (especially because some of them led to major high intensity wars). Nevertheless, they did achieve results that served Pakistan's interests. The Muslim population of the state is far more restive than it was in 1947, and India must maintain a very large force there to keep an insurgency within manageable limits. The insurgency has cast doubt on the legitimacy of India's claim to Kashmir and has prevented Kashmir's full integration into the Union of India.

Ruth Amir

The Plight of Child Soldiers and Conflict Termination: Implications for Policymakers

Abstract

The conscription and enlistment of child soldiers have become a tactical military innovation adopted by governments and insurgent groups in the poorest, conflict-torn countries in the Global South. This paper engages with the tactical use of child soldiers mainly by non-state armed groups and the normative framework of the prohibition and criminalization of child soldiering. I analyze prominent international criminal case law concerning child soldiers (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, *Norman*, *Lubanga*, and *Ongwen*). My main argument is that criminalization has failed child soldiers generally and girl soldiers particularly. I further argue that there is a need to address the tactical use of child soldiers through prevention, demobilization, disarmament and deterrence throughout the conflict and not only after the termination of hostilities.

I. Introduction

Child soldiering has become a tactical military innovation adopted by governments and insurgent groups in the poorest, conflict-torn countries in the Global South. About 300,000 children globally serve as soldiers in state and non-state armed groups (SAGs and NSAGs, respectively).[1] The United Nations (UN) Security Council 2020 Report on *Children and Armed Conflict* referred to *verified* cases of conscription and enlistment of child soldiers in twenty countries.[2] Fourteen are on the Security Council agenda, and the remaining six are not on the agenda or classified as "other situations."[3]

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1 Tynes, Robert, and Brian R. Early. "Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflict: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007," in *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 21/1, 2015, 79–110.

2 The United Nations General Assembly Security Council. *Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Document A/75/873–S/2021/437, 6 May 2021.

3 Situations on the agenda are: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Situations not on the agenda are: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, India, Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria and the Philippines.

The UN has successfully implemented *Action Plans* with state actors to reduce grave violations against children in armed conflicts in recent years, including the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers.[4] Nevertheless, similar engagements with NSAGs has yielded scant progress.[5] Subsequently, about 90 percent of the cases of conscription and enlistment of child soldiers, sexual violence and abductions involved NSAGs.[6] The exacerbated use of child soldiers by NSAGs emanates from the tactical advantage the latter gain in their power relations with the state.

This paper engages with the international legal tools prohibiting the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers. At its present state, the use of child soldiers seems to be independent, not to say oblivious, of the cogent norm of the responsibility to protect children, on the one hand, and the actual remedies available for child soldiers, on the other hand.

Focusing on implementing these tools in the context of conflict termination, I argue that the criminalization of the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers has failed to address their particular vulnerabilities adequately. I further argue that the tactical use of child soldiers requires policies for the prevention, demobilization, disarmament and deterrence of conscription and enlistment of child soldiers throughout the conflict's duration and not only upon its termination. Moreover, understanding the antecedents of the tactical use of child soldiers is the key to prevention.

International law and various transitional justice instruments have failed child soldiers generally and girl soldiers particularly.[7] This inadequacy is twofold; firstly, by setting the age limit at 15 rather than 18 years in the International Criminal Court (ICC) *Rome Statute* as per the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child*. Secondly, in ICC jurisprudence, the prosecutor must establish that the tasks performed by child soldiers involved combat. Consequently, neither domestic housework nor the sexual slavery of girl soldiers qualifies as "active use." Based on ICC case law, the lengthy procedures and the reparations regime, I propose mechanisms for dealing with the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers throughout the conflict rather than after its termination.

II. The Tactical Use of Children in War

Whereas the militarization of children and adolescents is millennia old, the exacerbated use of child soldiers *in battle* emerged as a new warfare doctrine in the

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4 The UN General Assembly Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict (see note 2).

5 Mc Hugh, Gerard, and Manuel Bessler. *Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners* (New York: The United Nations, 2006), <www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/humanitariannegotiationswarmedgroups-manual.pdf> (last retrieved on 30 May 2023); Galvanek, Janel B. and Yvonne Kemper. "Testing the Paradigms of Humanitarian Dialogue with Non-state Armed Groups: The Unique Challenges of Ending the Use of Child Soldiers," in *Security and Peace*, 31/1, 2013, 28–35.

6 The United Nations, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict.

7 Amir, Ruth. "Intersectionality in the International Criminal Court? The Case of Girl Soldiers," in *Migdar: An Academic Interdisciplinary Journal for Gender and Feminism*, 6, 2020, 1–34 (in Hebrew).

21s century.[8] Children never took an integral or essential part of the limited forces they served before the late 20th century. The difference between militarization and the tactical use of child soldiers is best illustrated by comparing the Nazi Youth Movement, *Hitlerjugend,* and *Deutsches Jungvolk in der Hitler Jugend* (for children between 14 and 18 and 10 and 14, respectively) with NSAGs such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the RFA. The *Hitlerjugend* was established as a paramilitary movement for the militarization and indoctrination of children. The movement was transformed into an auxiliary force in late 1940, and only in 1943 and after did children replace depleted soldiers in battle.[9] Although ISIS, the LRA and other NSAGs indoctrinated the children associated with the group, their pervasive use of child soldiers was a tactic employed to their advantage in their power relations with the state.

Currently, about ninety percent of child soldiering, sexual violence and abduction of children involved NSAGs.[10] The latter vary according to their primary objective. Some aim to overthrow the government, and others seek to secede. Challengers are more likely to rely on child soldiering as a means of demonstrating massive, brute force in their war against the government. Secessionists depend on the support and legitimation of the international community and are concerned by the impact of grave violations on the international community.[11]

There are at least six incentives for the use of child soldiers. Firstly, from the point of view of states, child soldiering is highly disruptive because it undermines the regime's legitimacy in the international community. Terrorist organizations purposely recruit children due to the moral shock invoked by such use.[12] Although the prohibition on child soldiering is binding for both states and NSAGs, the latter have fewer constraints on the use of child soldiers than states. All member states in the 2005 UN World Summit formally accepted the principle of the "Responsibility to Protect."[13] The latter recognizes the responsibility of each state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The responsibility to protect is one of the normative standards set by the international community. Failure to protect shifts the responsibility to the broader international community. However, with the lack of actual leverage, the UN Reports on Children in War have become a means for naming, shaming and blaming. The US State Department has taken a more operative approach by restricting certain security assistance to countries

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8 Singer, Peter W. *Children at War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006).

9 McNab, Chris. *Hitler's Elite: The SS 1939–45*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013); Butler, Rupert. *Hitler's Young Tigers: The Chilling True Story of the Hitler Youth* (London: Arrow Books, 1986).

10 The United Nations, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict.

11 Lasleym, Trace, and Clayton Thyne. "Secession, Legitimacy and the Use of Child Soldiers," in *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 32/3, 2015, 289–308.

12 Dallaire, Roméo A. *They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children: The Global Quest to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers* (New York, NY: Walker and Company, 2011); Singer, *Children at War* (see note 8); Tynes and Early, "Governments, Rebels" (see note 1).

13 The United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome Document* No. A/RES/60/1 of 24 Oct 2005, paras. 138–139, <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf>.

that recruit or use child soldiers under the *Child Soldiers Prevention Act* of 2008.[14] Under the latter act, states listed for child soldiering are subject to the divestment of some types of US military aid in the following fiscal year. Thus, NSAGs' tactical use of child soldiers could not only represent a state's government and leadership as noncompliant with international normative standards but also prove quite costly if, indeed, the *Child Soldiers Prevention Act* is applied. The lesser vulnerability of NSAGs to international pressure and sanctions is set against the heightened vulnerability of states.[15] Hence, implicating a state with grave violations against children could become beneficial to NSAGs challengers.

A second significant antecedent of child soldier use is demography. The proportion of children under the age of fifteen is higher in Africa (40 %), Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia (24 %) compared to North America (18 %) and Europe (14 %). The under-18 age cohorts in developing, conflict-torn countries provide a reservoir of potential troops for replacing those demobilized, killed, wounded or depleted combatants.[16] The NSAGs can inflate their size and gain more visibility and significance in the eyes of the state, society or other groups.

In such countries, children are pushed to join an armed group as a means to escape poverty and "get rich."[17] About two-thirds of the conscriptions and enlistments of child soldiers involve some form of voluntary recruitment, sometimes even initiated by parents.[18] Hence, NSAGs control areas in the Great Lakes region of the Democratic Republic of Congo that are rich with minerals, such as coltan (short for columbite-tantalite used in manufacturing electronic circuit boards), diamonds and gold, and this acts as an incentive for those joining these organizations.

Thirdly, children are particularly sought-after by armed groups because they are cheaper to sustain; they can be easily indoctrinated, manipulated and intimidated. The *Special Court for Sierra Leone* (SCSL) and ICC case law discussed later in this chapter unfold the violence and coercion experienced by child soldiers. Children are less costly for the organizations than adult recruits and perform various support roles for free. Children's lower risk and threat perception and dependence on adults enable NSAGs to use them for missions that adults are reluctant to perform.[19] Having experienced war, they may be trigger-happy, vengeful or emulate their adult peers. These

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14 *The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2007–2008*, S. 1175, 110th Cong. § 5, (*Child Soldiers Prevention Act*, Title IV of P.L. 110–457). See the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2021, <www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-the-release-of-the-2021-trafficking-in-persons-tip-report/> (last retrieved on 30 May 2023). These countries are Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela and Yemen.

15 Beber, Bernd, and Christopher Blattman. "The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion," in *International Organization*, 67/1, 2013, 65–104.

16 Statista, Proportion of Selected Age Groups of World Population in 2021, by Region, <www.statista.com/statistics/265759/world-population-by-age-and-region/> (last retrieved on 30 May 2023).

17 Blattman, Christopher, and Annan Jeannie. "The Consequences of Child Soldiering," in *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92/4, 2010, 882–898. Beber and Blattman, "The Logic of Child Soldiering" (see note 15).

18 Singer, *Children at War* (see note 8).

19 *The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao*, SCSL, Trial Chamber I, Judgement 2 Mar 2009.

characteristics make them excellent candidates for terror attacks, suicide bombings and guerilla fighting.[20]

Fourthly, the widespread and global proliferation of small arms – mainly AK-47 assault rifles – enables child soldiers to take part in combat. The technological improvements in small arms allow children as young as ten to be almost as effective as adults in combat.[21]

Fifthly, some armed groups consider child recruitment to be an act of social inclusion that enhances the universal character of their cause.[22] Children's participation is a moral and political victory for NSAGs that validates the group's capacity to incorporate new social layers.[23] Finally, the ICC has no jurisdiction over children under 18 years. This immunity is an incentive for NSAGs to use child soldiers to perpetrate heinous crimes.

The following section analyzes the normative framework of the prohibition on the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers. The structural characteristics of this prohibition can also account for some of the tactical uses of children by NSAGs.

III. Conscription and Enlistment of Child Soldiers: The Normative Framework

As noted previously, child soldiering is a new phenomenon. A general norm has been held against child soldiers in war during the last 4,000 years.[24] Ample evidence within psychology, public health research and case law highlight the harms affecting child soldiers and their communities.[25] These studies note the disruption of the child's development, health and well-being. Military training often breaks down the children psychologically until they obey commands without question. Children are more prone than adults to hazing, harassment and widespread abuse, which can be commonplace in the military and armed groups.

The criminalization of child soldiering is part of the post-World War I tradition of protecting children in international law, the human rights culture and the notion of children's rights. The restrictive assumption that children's roles in armed conflict are mainly combat-related is implicit in the term "child soldiers." The *Rome Statute* criminalizes the conscription and enlistment of child soldiers as a war crime.

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20 Amir, Ruth. *Twentieth Century Forcible Child Transfers: Probing the Boundaries of the Genocide Convention* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019); Haer, Roos. "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," in *Third World Quarterly*, 40/1, 2019, 74–91; Tynes and Early, "Governments, Rebels" (see note 1).

21 Singer, *Children at War* (see note 8), 95.

22 Gutiérrez-Sanín, Francisco. "Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States," in *Organizing Minors: The Case of Colombia*, ed. by Scott Gates and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 121–140.

23 Gutiérrez-Sanín, "Child Soldiers" (see note 8).

24 Singer, *Children at War* (see note 8).

25 Wainryb, Cecilia. "'And So They Ordered Me to Kill a Person': Conceptualizing the Impacts of Child Soldiering on the Development of Moral Agency," in *Human Development*, 54/5, 2011, 273–300; Child Soldiers International, "How is Recruiting Children Harmful?" <www.child-soldiers.org/how-is-recruiting-children-harmful> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

Articles 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and 8 (2) (e) vii) for armed conflicts of an international and non-international character, respectively, prohibit the conscription and enlistment of children *under fifteen* into the national armed forces or NSAGs or using them to *participate actively* in hostilities.[26]

The 2007 *Paris Commitments and Paris Principles* refer to "a child associated with an armed force or armed group."[27] The *Paris Commitments and Principles*, as soft law instruments, comprise aspirational goals that are politically unviable. Hence, their definition is more inclusive than that in the *Rome Statute* of the ICC.

The prohibition on child soldiering diverges from the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC), which is the most authoritative source of children's rights and the most widely and rapidly ratified UN treaty. The *CRC* uses the age of eighteen as the transition point from childhood to adulthood. It defines a child as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless majority is attained earlier under the law applicable to the child."[28]

The difficulty of determining a child's age in regions where birth registration rates are low is added to the inconsistencies above. Only 45 percent of children under five, for example, are registered in West and Central Africa.[29]

The age of fifteen as a transition point in the context of child soldiering is also inconsistent with other international law treaties. Article 2 of the *African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child* defines childhood as below the age of eighteen. The Charter discards the proviso about an earlier majority under the law applicable to the child. It provides in Article 22(2) that "States Parties to the present Charter shall … refrain, in particular, from recruiting any child."[30] Similarly, the International Labour Organization *Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour*, lists in Article 3(a) the "forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict" among slavery or practices similar to slavery.[31] In addition, the *Optional Protocol to the CRC* sets the age threshold to eighteen, urging NSAGs to avoid recruiting or using children. It requires state parties to take all feasible measures to criminalize such practices.[32]

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26 *Rome Statute*, Articles 8(b)(xxvi) and 8(e)(vii).

27 The Paris Commitments and Principles are two connected nonbinding instruments endorsed by 108 states. UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007, <www.refworld.org/docid/465198442.html> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

28 The United Nations General Assembly, "Convention on the Rights of the Child," 1989, <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

29 UNICEF Website, <www.unicef.org/wca/birth-registration> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

30 The African Union, "African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child," 1990, <www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/achpr_instr_charterchild_eng.pdf> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

31 The International Labour Organization, "Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour," (adopted on 17 Jun 1999, entered into force: 19 Nov 2000), Article 3(A). The Convention may be denounced: 19 Nov 2020−19 Nov 2021.

32 The United Nations, "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict." Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000; entry into force 12 Feb

Another anomaly surrounds *Rome Statute* Article 26, which excludes the ICC jurisdiction over persons under eighteen when allegedly committed the crime.[33] This loophole may reflect a certain ambivalence of the *Rome Statute* regarding age. Whereas the *Statute* prohibits the use of children younger than fifteen, it acknowledges, apparently, the decision-making competence of children over fifteen. Nevertheless, Article 26 does not hold children over 15 and under eighteen criminally responsible for crimes they have allegedly committed. Thus, the *Rome Statute* created a three-year gap in which child soldiers between fifteen and eighteen are neither criminally liable nor recognized as victims.[34]

This three-year gap can become an incentive for SAGs and NSAGs to use children older than fifteen and younger than eighteen or those who claim to be within this age group. The following section engages with applying and interpreting the prohibition on child soldiering in the SCSL and ICC jurisprudence of child soldier cases.

IV. Child Soldier Cases in International Criminal Case Law

International criminal tribunals exercise their jurisdiction over persons for the most severe crimes of international concern. Trials are typically held after the conflict has terminated, sometimes a long time afterward. The SCSL was the first international tribunal to try and convict persons for using child soldiers (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Trial).[35] Whereas the SCSL *Statute* Article 4(c) prohibits "Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years *into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities*," and confers upon the SCSL jurisdiction over people between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.[36] Article 7, thus, states: "The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime."[37] Should such a person come before the court, they "shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child."[38] The SCSL, thus, reaffirms the CRC Article 40.

2002. As of Sep 2020, 170 states are party to the protocol. A further 10 states have signed but not ratified it and 17 states have not signed it.

33 *Rome Statute*, Article 26.

34 Grover, Sonja C. *Humanity's Children: ICC Jurisprudence and the Failure to Address the Genocidal Forcible Transfer of Children* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012).

35 The SCSL was established as a special court. It was a hybrid tribunal court of both international and national creation and jurisdiction. The SCSL was established before the *Rome Statute* of the ICC went into force on 1 Jul 2002. "Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone" (adopted on 16 Jan 2002); see "Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone," pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) (adopted on 14 Aug 2000) (SCSL Statute).

36 *SCSL Statute*, Article 4(c) [emphasis added].

37 *SCSL Statute*, Article 7 [emphasis added].

38 *SCSL Statute*, Article 7.

The tactical use of children by NSAGs is evident in SCSL jurisprudence. The University of Toronto International Human Rights Clinic and "Interested Human Rights Organizations" submitted an *amicus curiae* (literally, a friend of the court) brief to the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the *Sam Hinga Norman* case. The brief addressed the fourth "Defence Preliminary Motion Based on the Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment)."[39] The brief states that "Children were specifically recruited because rebel and government commanders considered them to be compliant and believed them to be aggressive fighters."[40]

The SCSL interpreted active participation in hostilities in Article 4(c) of the *SCSL Statute* inclusively as "not limited to participation in combat."[41] Active participation, thus, included "any labour or support that gives effect to, or helps maintain, operations in a conflict ... [such as] carrying loads for the fighting faction, finding and acquiring food, ammunition or equipment, acting as decoys, carrying messages, making trails or finding routes, manning checkpoints or acting as human shields."[42] The SCSL also concluded that an armed force requires logistical support to maintain its operations, including any labor or support that affects or helps maintain operations in a conflict.[43]

The ICC began its operations on 1 July 2002, as the *Rome Statute* went into effect. The ICC scrutinized the SCSL child soldier cases, and observers within the ICC suggested that these convictions "will have a major impact on upcoming prosecutions at the International Criminal Court."[44]

The ICC's first verdict in the matter of *the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo* was unanimously decided on 14 March 2012.[45] Lubanga, a Congolese businessman and Democratic Republic of Congo national, was found guilty of conscripting and enlisting child soldiers. Determining the age of child soldiers was crucial at the very beginning of investigations in late 2004.[46] The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) sought to rely on objective evidence to confirm that Lubanga used child soldiers under fifteen. It was, therefore, necessary to establish the reported age by factual evidence. Thus, various processes of external verification were utilized to determine the victims' ages. The OTP avoided consulting with families, village chiefs or requesting school records, all of which could compromise the children's security. Moreover, X-rays were principally developed to measure biological rather than chronological

39 *The Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman* SCSL-2003-08-PT, Amicus Curiae Brief of University of Toronto International Human Rights Clinic and Interested International Human Rights Organizations (31 Oct 2003), (Amicus Curiae Brief). Sam Hinga Norman had died while in custody on 22 Feb 2007 after the closing arguments and before the verdict.

40 *Amicus Curiae Brief*, 5 (see note 39).

41 *SCSL Statute*, Article 4(c).

42 *Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu*, Judgement, SCSL-04-16-T, (20 Jul 2007), 737 (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Judgement).

43 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Judgement, 737.

44 Clifford, Lisa. "ICC Examines Child Soldier Convictions," in Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 25 Jun 2007, 118, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-examines-child-soldier-convictions> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

45 *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 ,14 Mar 2012 (Lubanga).

46 *Lubanga*, 176.

age and are less precise after fifteen.[47] Another difficulty in *Lubanga* was that some of the prosecution witnesses lied about their age and identity.[48]

Although Lubanga denied he was aware that some children conscripted and enlisted to the UPC/FPLC were under fifteen, he conceded that these children were orphans in need of protection.[49] The Trial Chamber sided with the prosecution that "…the accused agreed with others to gain power in Ituri through the recruitment of 'young persons'."[50] The prosecution noted that the witnesses "alleged they were beaten, whipped, imprisoned and inadequately fed, and young girls were raped. They were encouraged to drink alcohol and to take drugs, leading to frequent intoxication."[51] The chamber upheld the prosecution's argument that "Lubanga either knew that children under 15 years of age were being conscripted or enlisted or he was at least aware that this was an inevitable consequence of what was occurring."[52]

The prosecution's closing brief notes the tactical use of child soldiers by the armed group *Union des Patriotes congolais* (UPC: Union of Congolese Patriots)/*Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du Congo* (FPLC: Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo):

> The need for a more substantial army led to increased recruitment of young people – regardless of age – by targeting schools and the general public, and through coercive campaigns in the villages. It is suggested that during the relevant period this inevitably led to the conscription, enlistment and use of children below 15 years of age, even if they were not specifically targeted.[53]

The conscription and enlistment of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo escalated as the fighting became intense. The OTP submitted that "the accused issued false demobilization orders, while, in reality, the position remained unchanged"[54] to dispel the concerns of the international community about the use of child soldiers. Hence, Lubanga continued using child soldiers, although he knew it was prohibited. As a challenger group, the UPC/FPLC was more concerned with toppling the government than international legitimacy.

The Trial Chamber did not provide a comprehensive legal definition of what is meant by "conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities in conflicts, not of an international character," in Article the *Rome Statute*. The OTP excluded sexual violence and enslavement at the relevant procedural stages, and, thus, the chamber was not in the position to close this gap.[55] Therefore, the chamber could not consider whether sexual violence

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47 *Lubanga*, 250, 650–654.
48 *Lubanga*, 83–89, 290–325.
49 *Lubanga,* 169–177.
50 *Lubanga*, 22, 38.
51 *Lubanga*, 32.
52 *Lubanga*, 33.
53 *Lubanga*, Prosecution Closing Brief, ICC-01/04-01/06-2748-Red, 10.
54 *Lubanga,* 34.
55 *Rome Statute* Article 74(2) does not allow a Trial Chamber to go beyond what the OTP had brought before the it. See Lubanga, 629. See Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the 'Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterization of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court,' 12 Aug 2009,

against children affiliated with armed groups, such as sexual slavery and forced marriages, constitutes "active participation in hostilities." Chamber I thus determined "active participation" on a case-by-case basis.[56] The implication was that children who did not participate actively in combat but were used by armed groups were not considered child soldiers and, therefore, diluted the charges against the defendant. Moreover, this decision was gender-biased to the detriment of girl soldiers.

The ICC case of the *Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen* highlights the tactical use of indoctrination and manipulation that child soldiers undergo in certain NSAGs.[57] The LRA kidnapped Dominic Ongwen at the age of nine years on his way to school. Ongwen underwent military training and was forced to commit atrocities. He was gradually promoted and became one of five senior leaders of the LRA in Uganda.

Ongwen was the first former child soldier prosecuted before an international tribunal for committing the same crimes to which he fell victim. Furthermore, Ongwen was also the first defendant in an international tribunal to use an affirmative defense, one that is founded on a set of facts that differ from those of the prosecution. Ongwen's case drew a lot of media attention because it reflected the gaps between Western notions of justice and adjudication and non-Western notions of duress, human agency and responsibility amid spirits and supernatural powers.

On 18 September 2018, Defense Counsel Krispus Ayena Odongo noted in his opening statement that Ongwen "was just a child when he was abducted, brutalized and made in the bush with no mind of his own."[58] *Ongwen* offers a glimpse into the strategic role of the LRA spiritual order in ensuring internal cohesion through motivating, legitimating and coercing group members.[59] Kristof Titeca, an expert witness for the defense on the LRA and spirituality in Northern Uganda, has argued that the spiritual order of the LRA created a complex system of control over its members, wherein the transcendental character of the rules are authoritative incentives for compliance.[60] Odongo claimed that Ongwen's indoctrination into the LRA, under threats of imminent violence and death, led him to believe that Joseph Kony (founder of the LRA) possessed supernatural and spiritual powers above and beyond reproach and question. The defense, thus, argued for excluding Ongwen's criminal

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ICC-01/04-01/06-2074, 22 and 23. See also the prosecution's 'Further Observations Regarding the Legal Representatives' Joint Request Made Pursuant to Regulation 55,' 12 Jun 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-1966. The OPT included charges of sexual violence in subsequent child soldier cases (Ongwen, Ntaganda).

56 *Lubanga,* 399, 915.

57 *The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen*, ICC-02/04-01/15. Trial Judgement, 4 Feb 2021. Available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01026.PDF> (Ongwen) (last retrieved on 31 May 2023).

58 *Ongwen*, 4, 6.

59 Ogora, Lino Owor. "Spiritualism in the Trial of Dominic Ongwen: Myth or Reality?," in *International Justice Monitor*, 17 Oct 2018, <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/10/spiritualism-in-the-trial-of-dominic-ongwen-myth-or-reality/> (last retrieved on 31 May 2023); Titeca, Kristof. "The Spiritual Order of the LRA," in *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, ed. by Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), 59–73.

60 Titeca, "The Spiritual Order" (see note 59).

responsibility because he acted out of duress. These arguments were dismissed at the various stages of the trial and judgement.[61]

The analysis of SCSL and ICC case law suggests that the criminalization of child soldiering has further failed to address the particular vulnerabilities of children due to the lengthy legal procedures. The SCSL Armed Forces Revolutionary Council indictments in 2003 for violations perpetrated in 1997, trial judgment and sentence were decided in 2007, and the appeal was dismissed in 2008. The ICC convicted and sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years in prison in 2012 for war crimes committed between September 2002 and 13 August 2003. In 2014, his appeal confirmed the charges and sentence. On 4 March 2021, Trial Chamber II issued a public redacted version of its decision dated 14 December 2020, which approved the implementation of collective service-based reparations to recognized victims. Hence, children younger than fifteen in 2002 or 2003 were already in their mid-thirties when the negotiations over the reparations ended. The case of Ongwen was decided in June 2021 and is pending appeal for war crimes he committed between 2002-2005 and the reparations procedure.

V. Conclusion

The previous section unfolded the inadequacies of the current criminalization of the use of child soldiers. The SCSL and ICC case law suggests that impeding the tactical use of child soldiers requires more effort than currently invested in preventing the use of child soldiers. Given the projected gains from the tactical use of child soldiers discussed earlier, the UN, UNICEF, and international nongovernmental organizations should also address the structural factors contributing to the use of child soldiers, namely, poverty and ethnic conflicts in the Global South. There is a need to recognize and address the global impact and risks associated with the use of child soldiers. These are mainly the lingering impact of the trans-generational transmission of trauma, the duty to rehabilitate child soldiers and the migration of former child soldiers to the Global North.

The criminalization of child soldiering in the *Rome Statute* might act as an incentive for the tactical use of boys and girls over 15 and under 18 in battle and other forms that are not considered "active participation in hostilities." Furthermore, the narrow definition of the crime suffers from a gender bias that needs to be addressed. Although this gender bias is beyond the scope of this paper, the implication is that girl soldiers used as sex slaves, cooks and homemakers are not recognized as victims of child soldiering even if they undergo military training upon entry to the group.[62] The OTP excluded gender-based violence from the indictment in *Lubanga*. The implication of this exclusion was the misrecognition and official ineligibility to reparations. I propose the following mechanisms to correct these deficiencies:

1. To close the three-year gap between the Rome Statute and CRC and criminalize the conscription and enlistment of children under 18.

[61] Ongwen, 85–90.
[62] Amir, "Intersectionality" (see note 7).

2. To include in the incidence of conscription and enlistment all the activities, not only combat or combat-related, to address the situation of girl soldiers often excluded as victims.

Whereas the engagement with SAGs on child soldiering proved successful due to continued engagement and humanitarian negotiations, naming, shaming, blaming, denial of certain types of US aid and the principle of the responsibility to protect, NSAGs are often less sensitive to such measures. Hence, I propose to tackle the root cause of the tactical use of child soldiers, mainly power relations with the state.

3. Continue engaging with NSAGs on the termination of the use of child soldiers and negotiating with states to resolve claims for power-sharing by NSAGs, particularly those that administer services to the population.[63]
4. Alternate sticks (prosecution, naming and shaming, asset freezes, travel restrictions and arms embargos) with carrots (advocacy for legitimacy and power-sharing with the state).[64] Such an approach requires a more complicated understanding of the complex functions of armed groups.

To address violations when the conflict is ongoing or in remission, to enable actual submission of complaints by children, families, and community members, and inquiries to promptly address child soldiering.

5. Apply a communications procedure to allow individuals and groups the right to file a complaint before the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict in case of violations.
6. Establish a rapid inquiry procedure to enable the UN Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict inquiries into parties using child soldiers.

The proliferation of ethnic conflicts and civil wars during the late 20th and 21st centuries has a lot to do with politico-economic rivalries. Whereas the particular rivalries are outside the scope of the present paper, the international community must be more attentive and proactive in addressing these problems in the Global South that constitute significant global risks and rivalries.

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63 Clements, Ashley Jonathan. *Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: The Frontlines of Diplomacy* (Abbington, Oxon: Routledge, 2020).

64 Clements, *Humanitarian Negotiations* (see note 63).

VII.

Lessons Learned

Slávka Otčenášová

Teaching the War, Learning the Stereotypes: Challenges of History Education on Military Conflicts

Abstract

The paper discusses the ways of presenting WWI in school history textbooks published in Slovakia throughout the 20th century, focusing on images of enemies, which might have led to the creation of the negative stereotypes of the *Other*. History lessons curricula and the narratives in the official history textbooks are an organic part of historiography, firmly linked to the agenda and values at that time, stemming from normative ideals promoted by the state power and contemporary elites. An important part of history didactics is the cultural context in which the teaching process takes place, because the aim of teaching history is not only to give lessons about how it actually was, but also to culturally integrate students within their society. Therefore, next to family education, media, public spaces and public ceremonies, narratives in history textbooks are an important tool in shaping how we look at the outside world and help us build relationships with our environment.

I. Introduction

The paper aims at showing ways of presenting armed conflicts and related images of enemies, which might lead to the creation of negative stereotypes of the *Other* through a case study on interpreting World War I (WWI) in history textbooks published in Slovakia in four different political regimes. Looking at the narratives about the war from a historiographical perspective and tracing the changing image of the enemy, I would like to discuss the challenges of teaching about the war, depending on the current political context. World War I, one of the most crucial events in the history of the 20th century that triggered the reorganisation of the world, has been a contested subject of memory and memorialisation. Competing master narratives have been produced by different national historiographies, depending on the current political situation and the character of political regimes in particular countries, as well as on contemporary international relations. As the paper further explores, Slovak official mainstream historiography on WWI has been displaying different narratives over the past hundred years, depending on the current political needs and agendas of ruling elites. History lessons curricula and the narratives in the official

history textbooks are an organic part of historiography, firmly linked to the agendas and values at that time, stemming from normative ideals promoted by the state power and contemporary elites. History textbooks are considered to be the best-known form of historiography, the most widespread medium of conveying historical knowledge, and one of the most important forms of creating historical consciousness, collective memory and collective identity. Furthermore, the textbooks used in primary and secondary schools provide a very simplified picture of history, due to the lack of time devoted to teaching history and the intellectual capacities of pupils.

Teaching about war in schools is important. Through understanding armed conflicts, students can learn about conflict prevention and conflict resolution, as well as universal values and humanity. Yet, it is often rather demanding to introduce complex social and political contexts and reasons for wars to young students, considering, again, the limited time devoted to history education in schools and the mental capacities of students. The narratives presented to students about WWI are often significantly reduced, and their authors frequently hold back from explaining the complexities of the war. However, what is significantly well-provided, is the image of the enemy, the culprit of the war, with the general aim of highlighting the moral *us* and the immoral *Other*. This paper seeks to explore the ways of interpreting WWI and the image of the *Other* in school history textbooks used in Slovakia since 1918 until today, during different political regimes. The narratives presented in school history textbooks have often been quite influenced by stereotypes – generally shared impressions, images, or thoughts existing within certain groups of people about the character of other particular groups of people and their representations. Stereotypes are common social phenomena; they help us in orienting ourselves in the society in which we live, and save our time and energy when trying to establish the mental map of the world around us. In times of conflict, however, stereotyping and labelling the *Other* can become especially prevalent and harmful.[1] The dissemination of stereotypes can be politically motivated, and one of the ways of spreading auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes is through public state education. In this respect, history education and textbooks are instrumental in creating the image of the us/self (in-group) and the *Other* (out-group). In this paper, we will look at how the interpretations of WWI have developed over time and how the images of us and the *Other* have changed in different political contexts.

II. Interwar History Textbooks

World War I brought about significant geopolitical changes. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the establishment of the successor states after its end was the key moment in the interpretation of the war in both Czech and Slovak historiography. Since the very first moment of the existence of Czechoslovakia, the narrative of WWI was officially presented as a story of a victory – as a significant landmark in the history of both Czechs and Slovaks, when they finally reached in-

[1] Bar-Tal, Daniel. *Intractable Conflicts: Socio-psychological Foundations and Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 21.

dependence in their own democratic nation-state.[2] The need to present the establishment of Czechoslovakia, a joint state of Czechs and Slovaks, as the overall desire of both nations was widely pursued by the Czech and some Slovak political elites, and the contemporary interpretations of WWI were also used for these purposes. Historical narratives were produced at the time mainly as the testimonies of heroic deeds of Czech and Slovak politicians who had merit in the establishment of the new state. Significant attention was paid to the activities of volunteer armed forces composed of Czechs and Slovaks operating together with the Entente powers during WWI (later, after the end of WWI, they were named *Czechoslovak legions*).

World War I was represented as a clash of civilizations in the interwar history textbooks published in Czechoslovakia. It was portrayed as a fight between *us* (the in-group) and the *Other* (the out-group). The in-group was composed of Czechs and Slovaks, in a narrow sense, and all the Triple Entente powers and their supporters in a broader sense – "all of the educated world".[3] They were described as superior in civilization, culture and moral sense. The *Other* were Germans and Hungarians, who were depicted as villainous, immoral and wrongful:

> Austria-Hungary and Germany were later also aided by Turkey and Bulgaria. Otherwise, almost all the world stood up against them, against the German lust for the control of the world … The truth wins. Germany had big successes in the battlefields, since it had been long preparing for the war. But justice was not on its side.[4]

The beginning of the war attributed the origins of the conflict to German imperialism and Austro-Hungarian sycophancy toward Germany. Significant attention was devoted to portraying the hopeless situation and persecution of non-German and -Hungarian nations in Austria-Hungary prior to and during WWI:

> Austria-Hungary was increasingly becoming just a pendant to Germany, carrying out the wishes of Germany, though half of its 52 million population were Slavs – and they felt the burden of Germany and Hungary on their shoulders and were calling in vain for equality in the empire they themselves supported by their work and blood (as soldiers).[5]

The textbooks did not pay much attention to the political and social reasons for the war. The main point of the narratives was to represent the whole conflict as the triumphant historical victory of Czechs and Slovaks, their path from the "prison of the nations" to their righteously deserved independent and democratic state. The break-up of Austria-Hungary was represented as the key result of the war: "The World War became the right moment for Czechs and Slovaks to accomplish their independence. For that, they worked at home as well as abroad … Austria-Hungary

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2 Dudeková, Gabriela. "Stratégie prežitia v mimoriadnej situácii. Vplyv Veľkej vojny na rodinu na území Slovenska," in *Forum Historiae* 1, 2009, 1, <http://www.forumhistoriae.sk/FH1_2009/texty_1_2009/dudekova.pdf> (last retrieved on 31 Aug 2021).

3 Hlavinka, Karol. *Stručné dejiny národa* československého *pre nižšie triedy slovenských stredných* škôl (Košice: Tlačou Slovenskej kníhtlačiarne, 1922), 100.

4 Reitler, Antonín and Josef Touc. *Dejepis pre meštianske* školy. *Diel* (Praha: Komenium, 1933), 40–41.

5 Hlavinka, *Stručné dejiny národa* československého (see note 3), 96–97.

cruelly persecuted Czechs and Slovaks already from the beginning of the war, mainly their national leaders".[6]

The image of the in-group, i.e. Czechs and Slovaks, was also created by descriptions of the character of their newly established state, referring to it as an extraordinary achievement. The interwar Czechoslovak republic was depicted as a personification of its citizens (Czechs and Slovaks), reflecting their moral qualities and pioneering spirit:

> Our state is democratic. All its citizens are equal; all have the same rights and duties, there are no privileges based on origin or wealth, and everybody, according to their own talents and skills, can achieve the highest positions … The head of the state is not a hereditary king, but a democratically elected president, chosen because of his deeds and skills. The state is us, the citizens, old and young, poor and rich; the state looks like we do. Our state is a peaceful state; our army serves to defend our country … our army will never attack others and usurp from them, but it will not allow the others to take from ours. Our state is fair and impartial towards the rich and the poor alike, towards the small and the big, towards Germans and Hungarians; it protects the rights of everybody, but it deserves their loyalty.[7]

When looking at the war from the military perspective, it was the achievements of the Czechoslovak Legions – units made up from Czech and Slovak prisoners of war or deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army – and their impact during WWI that were paid the most attention in the textbooks. This was a particularly important aspect since the interpretation of these activities would help in creating the image that Czechs and Slovaks actually stood in the conflict on the right side: "From the beginning, the foreign operatives showed that Czechoslovaks wanted to fight for their freedom, and they devoted a lot of energy into building their own military units, which could support these efforts by concrete acts".[8] When describing the acts of these armed forces, the authors of the textbooks would often employ references to the heroic Czech Hussite past and draw parallels between the two movements as the two righteous fights for freedom against foreign oppressors:

> World War made it clear that the Germans had decided to conquer the world with arms and to forever silence our resistance and our calls for freedom and equality. Thus, we had no other chance than taking up guns and fighting against the violence with violence. Our common soldiers were the first to understand this, when they deserted the Austrian army on the battlefield and let Russians, in whom they saw their Slavic brothers, capture them … However, the prisoners of war were not allowed by the Russian government to join the army and to fight against the enemy. Only after the fall of the Tsar's reign did they achieve more freedom and a number of Czechoslovak regiments were established, bearing the names of famous men from our past: Jan Hus, John Žižka of Trocnov, Prokop the Great, George of Poděbrady.[9] An independent Czechoslovak army was formed, famous legions,

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6 Reitler and Touc, *Dejepis pre meštianske* školy (see note 4), 40.

7 Hlavinka, *Stručné dejiny národa* československého (see note 3), 107–108.

8 Pekař, Josef. *Dějiny československé. Pro nejvyšší třídy* škol *středních* (Praha: Historický klub, 1921), 149.

9 John Žižka of Trocnov, Prokop the Great and George of Poděbrady were leading figures in the Hussite movement, a 15th century political, social and military campaign based on the teachings of

> which achieved a great victory on 2 July 1917 in the Battle of Zborov, and they drew the attention of the whole world to their valour. Old Czech brethren spirit and Hussite discipline ruled the legions.[10]

History textbooks published in interwar Czechoslovakia were utilised mainly to provide such an interpretation of the WWI, which portrayed it as a step of Czechs and Slovaks towards their joint nation-state. Those aspects of the war were highlighted which showed that Czechs and Slovaks were standing on the right side in this battle of civilizations, such as the deeds of the émigré intellectuals and efforts of the volunteer armed forces. The in-group was pictured in a narrow sense as Czechs and Slovaks, described as wrongfully oppressed martyrs, yet, people of strong morals and pioneering spirit; and, in a broader sense, the in-group was composed of all Entente powers, characterised as the civilized world. On the other hand, the out-groups were represented by the Germans and Hungarians, depicted as wrongful expansionists and aggressors, which was the reflection of both the international diplomatic relations Czechoslovakia pursued during the interwar period, as well as its internal domestic situation, where it needed to cope with high numbers of national minorities of Germans and Hungarians.

III. World War II History Textbooks

Czechoslovakia was dissolved on the eve of World War II (WWII). A significant internal change occurred on the Slovak political scene: previously dominant Slovak Lutheran and pro-Czech-oriented intelligentsia leading the state were replaced by a rival political elite, partly coming from the Catholic clergy and promoting a radical, communitarian nationalism, easily reconciled with Fascist or Nazi ideas too.[11] Within this political context, the official historiography took a new course, and new history textbooks were written, reflecting the current political agenda of the newly formed state, dominantly promoting independent Slovak statehood and Catholicism as opposed to the atheism and anticlericalism of the Czechs. The *Slovakization* of the official schooling was an important aspect in this political and social context that influenced the development of history education policies. It meant removing the Czech teachers and professors from Slovak schools, withdrawing Czech history textbooks that had previously been used in Slovak schools along with the Slovak ones, and publishing new textbooks, which would "reflect and apply Slovak attitudes in the best possible manner".[12] An attempt was made to create stronger links between

Czech reformer Jan Hus, often described as a forerunner of the Protestant Reformation. Apart from its religious aspects (challenging papal authority and asserting national autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs), Hussitism has been often interpreted as a Czech national movement, and it acquired anti-imperial and anti-German associations (e.g. in the works of Palacký), and became an important symbol frequently employed during the times of Czech nation-building.

10 Hlavinka, *Stručné dejiny národa* československého (see note 3), 101–102.

11 Ward, James. *Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 15.

12 Neupauer, František "*Školská* politika v období Slovenskej republiky 1939–1945," in *Slovenská republika 1939–1945 očami mladých historikov IV*, ed. By Michal Šmigeľ and Peter Mičko (Banská Bystrica: Katedra histórie FHV UMB – Ústav vedy a výskumu, 2005), 74–88.

official education and the Church, as there was an increase of schools founded by the Church, and the religious aspect of secondary education was formally embedded in the characteristics of the function of the schooling.[13]

Contrary to the interwar history textbooks, which openly described German imperialism as the reason for the conflict, the origins of the war in the WWII history textbooks were addressed only very generally and vaguely. This resulted from the contemporary international relations and strong dependence of Slovakia on Germany. The textbooks avoided any negative references to German politics, whether in the past or the present:

> World War was the outcome of a general international tension, which had already been dividing big European states into two hostile blocks that were competing for the political power in Europe and the economic superiority in the whole world for a couple of decades. This tension, accompanied by a feverish arms race on both sides, was growing every year, so only a tiny spark was needed to cause a huge fire. This spark was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo.[14]

The textbooks did not employ narratives on the progress of WWI nor on its outcomes and consequences in the international context, but focused on using the WWI exclusively for framing the national master narrative, emphasising the Slovak political and military activities leading towards independence from Austria-Hungary. The role of the Slovak diaspora in the United States in their state-building efforts aiming for the establishment of future Czechoslovakia was highlighted.[15]

There was also a shift in the in-group and out-group representation paradigm. Now, the in-group was exclusively made up of Slovaks (no Czechs), who had retained the qualities of martyrs and heroes:

> The Slovak nation, whose only aim was to live freely and in peace under the Tatra Mountains, became involved in the whirl of war. Slovaks were leaving their families, so that they would fight in the Austro-Hungarian army for a king who did not recognise them. Tens of thousands of healthy Slovak men went to the front to fight and die for the interests of others, for the power interests of their persecutors. And they fought and died bravely, since their oath of enlistment bound them and they did not want to break it; and because they were convinced that they were fighting mainly for their villages and for their Slovak families, who were praying for their homecoming.[16]

Changes also occurred in constructing the out-group, which was the outcome of the contemporary political demands and the values promoted. Germans and German politics were treated with great respect in history narratives produced during WWII. Hungarians and Hungary remained depicted, similar to before in the interwar textbooks, as wrongful powers preventing Slovaks from exercising their right to an independent national life. A new interpretative approach was applied in the rep-

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13 Law no. 244/1941 Sl., *§ 32.* Neupauer, "Školská politika" (see note 12), 84.

14 Hrušovský, František, *Slovenské dejiny.Učebnica pre IV. triedu slovenských stredných* škôl (Turčiansky sv. Martin: Matica slovenská, 1940), 354–355.

15 Hrušovský, *Slovenské dejiny* (see note 14), 357–358.

16 Hrušovský, *Slovenské dejiny* (see note 14), 354–355.

resentation of the Czechs, who from the previously "fraternal nation" became also an out-group. This was the reflection of the formerly accumulated frustration of (mainly Catholic) Slovak political elites stemming from the interwar centralism and Czechoslovakism. Thus, the narratives regarding the Czech–Slovak relations were marked by emphasising the images of mutual mistrust existing between Slovaks and Czechs in their joint efforts during WWI, and the representations of Czechs in Hrušovký's textbook employed the messages showing them as acting with a sense of superiority towards Slovaks and preventing them from achieving and fully exercising their nation-building efforts.[17]

Narratives on WWI presented to students in Slovak schools during the period 1939–1945 were fulfilling the same social tasks as was the case in the history textbooks presented in the interwar period. The international context of the war was hardly explored at all, and all the attention was paid to presenting it as a milestone in the historical development of Slovaks on their way towards reaching their own independent state. The apologetic narratives on the unfortunate fate of Slovaks in Austria-Hungary remained a frequently repeated topos. The Czech–Slovak relations during WWI were depicted as damaging for the Slovak national identity. The in-group (exclusively Slovaks and preferably those of Catholic denomination) was represented as stout-hearted, loyal, determined people fighting for their historical right to independent political development. The out-group comprised the forces preventing them from accomplishing their historical rights: Hungarians and Czechs.

IV. Socialist History Textbooks

The construction of narratives on WWI in history textbooks produced during the rule of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was fully in line with the Marxist approach to the interpretation of historical development. The authors centred the WWI narratives around the revolution and class conflicts as the moving forces in history, and employed a romanticising concept of a rightful fight of the oppressed nationalities against the aggressors:

> In this period, the conflicts sharpened especially regarding the two political-military blocs: the class struggle of the workers against the ruling classes, and the nation liberation struggles of enslaved nations against their oppressors. It was the German imperialist and military circles that had the biggest interest in starting the war, since they believed it would bring them power all over the world. Except for Serbia, which was defending itself, all the other participating countries were leading an unjust imperialist war.[18]

One of the most elaborated topic in the textbooks was the critique of the contemporary reactionary imperialistic and colonial policies of the countries in general, which were described as the main cause of the war: "colonialism and imperialism of everybody (of small and big, of those who had enough as well as of those who did not

[17] Hrušovský, *Slovenské dejiny* (see note 14), 364–365.

[18] Čapek, Vratislav et al. *Dějepis II. Pro druhý ročník gymnázia* (Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1986), 317.

have anything)".[19] Germany was guilty, especially its aristocracy and bourgeoisie (the out-group), and German nationalism was depicted as the main cause of the war:

> The most aggressive imperialism was the German one. German imperialists planned to capture all the colonies, to annex Belgium and the Netherlands and border zones of France. They even wanted to attach Austria-Hungary to the German Empire. It had even more daring plans in the east. Germany wanted to divide Russia, seize the Baltic region, Ukraine and the Caucasus, and from there, it wanted to expand through Iran to India. In collaboration with the *Junkers* (aristocratic class that was mainly winning recognition in the army and high offices) the German capitalists and their monopolies were the main initiators of these aggressive plans. They would spread them through the press, army and schools and they tried to educate the whole nation in line with this spirit.[20]

Contrary to history textbooks used in the schools during the interwar period and WWII, textbooks published after 1948 paid a lot of attention to the history of the everyday life of the masses and unprivileged segments of society during the war, thus, fulfilling the Marxist demand to interpret the past as the "history of the masses". These narratives would cover mainly the economic aspects of the war and their impact on the everyday lives of common people, as well as the hardships of war, poverty and material shortages which enhanced the revolutionary potential of societies. Their main purpose, however, was to develop and maintain the image of the dialectical nature of the relation between the in- and the out-group: "World War I was, from its very beginnings, imperialistic and wrongful. It brought immense profit for capitalists, and it gave nothing but poverty and misery to working people".[21]

The pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak politics penetrated into the official interpretations of the past, promoting such explanations of history that were produced by the mainstream Soviet historiography. This was manifested in the official Czechoslovak historiography, as well as in school history textbooks, and the interpretations of WWI were no exception to this trend:

> The Bolshevik Party in Russia led by V. I. Lenin was the only workers' party in European countries which remained loyal to the idea of the socialist revolution during the World War I. It did not betray the revolutionary programme, and it did not subordinate the revolutionary interests of workers to the imperialist war adventure, such as did the right-wing leaders of social-democratic parties in Austria and Germany.[22]

The Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 was portrayed in all the history textbooks published between 1948 and 1989 as an important event and a milestone in the development of WWI, and it often overshadowed the history of the war itself.

The textbooks published between 1948 and1989 also interpreted WWI in connection with the establishment of Czechoslovakia, as was the case during the previ-

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[19] Joza, Jaroslav, J. Butvin and F. Červinka. *Dejepis pre 8. ročník základnej devätročnej* školy (Bratislava: Slovenské pedagogické nakladateľstvo, 1963), 217.

[20] Kopáč, Jaroslav, Miroslav Kropilák, Alois Sosík, Emil Stračár and Alice Teichová. *Dějiny doby nové a nejnovější. Dějepis pro 8. postupný ročník všeobecně vzdělávacích* škol (Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1955), 46–47.

[21] Dohnal, Miloň. *Dějepis pro 9. ročník zákaldní devítileté* školy (Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1975), 12.

[22] Dohnal, *Dějepis pro 9. ročník* (see note 21), 17.

ous regimes. Some narratives remained similar to the narratives constructed before 1948, such as the representations of WWI related to the image of Czechs and Slovaks as oppressed nationalities in the monarchy:

> The First World War affected the population of the Czech lands and Slovakia very heavily. When the general mobilization was declared on 28 July 1914, hundreds of thousands of men were forced to take part in the war, where they were supposed to fight for the Austro-Hungarian emperor. Immediately after the beginning of the war, the government introduced censorship in the Czech lands; it restricted personal freedom and each manifestation of national sentiments of non-German nations was punished as high treason.[23]

Similarly: "Brutal persecution was commenced against the Czech and Slovak nation, connected with the national oppression".[24]

Significant changes occurred in constructing the narratives representing the Allied Powers, previously described as "all the civilized world":

> The representatives of the imperialist Allied Powers wanted to solve only their own interests through the war and they had no understanding of the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks. Therefore, they did not consider the break-up of Austria-Hungary even in case of their victory. It was possible to attract the Allied Powers statesmen to this idea only by involving Czechs and Slovaks in the frontline fights against the Central Powers, as a growing shortage of soldiers had been felt since 1916. With this in mind, Czechoslovak emigration started to build army units called the legions. These were supposed to actively participate in the fight again Austria-Hungary and act as the army of the future Czechoslovak state. By their active participation in the fight, they were supposed to create a prerequisite for the future establishment of the state.[25]

The acts of the Czechoslovak legions that were portrayed as the flagship of the Czechoslovak resistance movement prior to 1948 were interpreted as follows:

> And so the legions were, from the very beginnings of their existence, incorporated into the fight for the interests of the imperialist powers. The misuse of the legions was fully visible after the Great October Socialist Revolution when the representatives of the foreign resistance movement agreed that the legions would be used in the intervention war against Soviet Russia and its Red Arm.[26]

In line with the formerly established tradition of representing WWI within the framework of national history, the textbooks published after 1948 interpreted the war as an important milestone in achieving the independence of Czechs and Slovaks. However, the national aspect was combined with the concept of the class struggle, which made a significant shift in the interpretation of the establishment of Czechoslovakia as a product of WWI:

> Gaining their independence, Czech and Slovak nations made a significant leap forward in their historical development. After several hundreds of years of enslavement, an independent state of Czechs and Slovaks was established. Both brotherly nations had their natural base of development in it. The fall of the monarchy and the establishment of a

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23 Dohnal, *Dějepis pro 9. ročník* (see note 21), 25–26.
24 Čapek et al., *Dějepis II* (see note 18), 317.
25 Dohnal, *Dějepis pro 9. ročník* (see note 21), 27.
26 Dohnal, *Dějepis pro 9. ročník* (see note 21), 27.

> democratic republic meant the fulfilment of one of the significant demands of the bourgeois democratic revolution. However, capitalists remained in power. The representatives of the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie claimed private property to be untouchable … The working people of our lands were able by their vital movement to subvert the Habsburg monarchy; however, they did not succeed – without the leadership of a revolutionary Marxist party – to take over the power in the new state.[27]

Unlike school history textbooks used during the interwar period and WWI, textbooks published in Czechoslovakia in 1948–1989 centred their narratives significantly on economic history. The second difference to the formerly published textbooks was emphasising the dialectical relation between the classes (the in-group: working people vs. the out-group: the bourgeoisie) as moving forces in the events of WWI. Another in-/out-group construction was based on juxtaposing imperialist countries, described as wrongful capitalist expansionists, and virtuous Soviet Russia, held up as the only moral bastion not only as a general supporter of the values and ideals of working people but also as a patron of Slavic nations in Austria-Hungary. There was a removal of great men from the narratives of WWI, as promoting "bourgeoisie" politicians was not in accord with the Marxist demand for representing the history "from below". One more changed paradigm in the interpretation of WWI was related to the activities of the Czechoslovak legions that were portrayed as a misguided venture. A shift occurred in the in-/out-group representation: in the narratives produced after 1948, they were not constructed mainly on a national (or partially on religious) basis, as it was in the textbooks published earlier, but predominantly on the idea of the class division of society.

V. History Textbooks Published after 1989

The mainstream trend of the development in historiography in the changed social and political context after 1989/1993 has been focusing on the implementation of new methods and theories in historical research, and, thus, trying to overcome long-term isolation from worldwide developments in historical writing. When coming to the narratives in the history textbooks regarding WWI, the authors representing this stream would opt for creating a rather neutral narrative, focusing on political, diplomatic and military history, as well as social history and history of every-day life.[28] There had been a certain impact of narratives that had been visible in previous

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27 Dohnal, *Dějepis pro 9. ročník* (see note 21), 36.

28 For example: Kováč, Dušan and Ľubomír Lipták. *Kapitoly z dejín pre stredné* školy (Bratislava: Slovenské pedagogické nakladateľstvo, 1990); Kováč, Dušan et al. *Dejepis 4. Svet v novom tisícročí* (Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana, 1995); Kamenec, Ivan et al. *Dejepis 4. Slovensko v novom storočí* (Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana, 1997); Kováč, Dušan. *Dejepis 4. Svet v 20. storočí* (Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana, 2001); Chylová, Eva et al. *Dejepis pre stredné odborné* školy a *stredné odborné učilištia III. Slovensko* a *svet* v *rokoch 1849–1939* (Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana, 2003); Bednárová, Marcela et al. *Dejepis pre 8. ročník základnej* školy a 3. *ročník gymnázia* s *osemročným* štúdiom (Martin: Vydavateľstvo Matice slovenskej, 2011); Hlava, Bohuslav and Viliam Kratochvíl. *Dejepis 4. Pohrajme sa* s *históriou*. (Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana, 2002); Bartlová, Alena and Róbert Letz. *Dejepis pre 3. ročník gymnázií – národné dejiny* (Bratislava: Slovenské pedagogické nakladateľstvo 2005).

regimes: the focus on the achievements of the Czechoslovak legions and the presentation of narratives on great men. A novel approach was a gradual introduction of more segments from the history of everyday life. Yet, comparing these textbooks to those produced in previous regimes, it is possible to see the trend signalling that WWI narratives in school history textbooks have been becoming less instrumental in constructing collective identities of students. The stories about WWI presented to students in history textbooks published after 1989 have been less utilised in creating the image of us (the ethical bearers of civilization) and the *Other* (the immoral traitors). However, it is still possible to trace negative connotations regarding the image of the monarchy and Hungarians.[29] On the other hand, the establishment of Czechoslovakia lost its previous role of funding myth. Nevertheless, there has been a general trend of a gradual marginalisation and disappearance of WWI from the public memory, historiography and school history education, as it has been largely overshadowed by other topics, such as WWII, the Shoah, the Cold War or the overthrow of Communism.

VI. Conclusion

For a long time, the history of the WWI has been interpreted in school history education primarily from the national perspective. It was represented within the framework of sentimentality and war propaganda, and patriotic certainties, such as battle, glory, hallowed dead, great men and conventional romanticism. The representations of WWI in history textbooks used in Slovakia since 1918 always also included a significantly positive aspect: it has been depicted as a milestone in the historical development of the nation (be it Czechoslovak or Slovak), as a transition which helped in achieving independence from the others (or at least as a step towards it). As such, it has been interpreted in terms of a system of international relations in which the national and imperial levels of conflict and cooperation were important and the in-group vs. out-group relations were the most significant parts of the WWI narratives.

The textbooks in all four regimes focused greatly on the image of an enemy, always looking at the past from the contemporary perspective, and, thus, the image of the enemy was changing – as required by the current political needs. These narratives were not only about neighbours, but had a direct impact on the formation of relations with citizens of the state – members of certain national minorities or social classes. Such an interpretation of the past can sometimes lead to a resurgence of conflicts with the Other, and may lead to the exclusion of some groups from the process of commemorating the past.

However, the trend seems to be positive. The emotional intensity of earlier interpretations has declined due to the greater temporal distance, and the focus of contemporary history has been directed to issues that are more recent. Yet, it is necessary to develop such an approach to interpreting WWI which would consider multiple

[29] Vajda, Barnabás. "Az első világháború a szlovákiai történelemtankönyvekben," in *Az első világháború a szomszédos országok* és *hazánk történelemtankönyveiben,* ed. by Tamás Peregi (Budapest: Oktatáskutató és Fejlesztő Intézet, 2015), 96–113.

levels of historical experience, levels which are both below and above the national level. The globalisation, or at least the "Europeanization", of WWI history remains a mandatory and challenging project for both historians and educators.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are purely those of the author and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission.

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