COVID-19, Multinational Security Cooperation, and the PfPC.

Since the completion of this report, COVID-19 has dramatically challenged the business and operational models of institutions engaged in security cooperation—especially those engaged in multinational educational programs. In this regard, there will likely be a lasting, long-term change to operational modalities.

In response, the PfPC is aggressively using this opportunity to reform its former operational vivendi to become more relevant, robust, and resilient. Emphasis is shifting to hybrid delivery methods that utilize technology, new pedagogical methods, and increased written content.

One cannot predict the future security landscape, but robust and dynamic multinational cooperative education programs can better prepare us to respond to it.
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DEAR COLLEAGUES,

This year, the Partnership for Peace Consortium marked 20 years of security cooperation. The environment in which the Consortium was conceived was a very different one, where Europe was still in the early stages of adjusting to the political and security changes of the 1990s. Many of the original goals were accomplished. Despite this, the PfPC remains a remarkable organization. It continues to allow a unique approach to multinational collaboration—one that demonstrates successes which, quite frankly, other organizations wish to emulate.

At the same time, it is amazing to think that the Consortium’s activities are sustained through a model of volunteer experts, coming from world-class defense and security institutes, each with their unique strengths and invaluable perspectives.

The result is a network of motivated experts, exhibiting both a breadth and depth of professional expertise not easily duplicated. As the world’s security environment continues to change in unexpected ways, these expert networks—and the perspectives that can be shared through them—help to sustain security and mitigate threats for both stakeholder nations and partners.

As the Chairman of the PfPC Senior Advisory Council for the last nine years, I can attest that security cooperation through education works. The lessons shared generate mutual understanding and trust, develop lasting relationships in which partners can operate together, and strengthen a shared foundation for peace and stability.

Sincerely,

LTG (ret.) Keith W. Dayton
Director, George C. Marshall Center
Chairman Senior Advisory Council PfPC
DEAR COLLEAGUES,

Since 1999, the Austrian Ministry of Defence as one of the PfPC’s stakeholders has been contributing actively to the success of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes. As Commandant of the Austrian National Defence Academy and Austrian member of the Consortium’s Senior Advisory Council, it has always been of great importance to me to support the various activities and projects, including the printing of the annual reports.

2019 was a very busy year for the PfPC and also saw intensive Austrian contributions to PfPC activities. As is traditional, a strong focus was put on the improvement of the security environment in the still troubled regions of the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. Additionally, Austria is a strong partner within the PfP Consortium’s and NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). Here, we focused our contribution on the DEEP Serbia, which saw a change in its academic lead, the new chair coming from the Austrian National Defence Academy’s Institute for Higher Military Command. Of course we continued to expand as well as utilize the Consortium’s network of experts, which secures a unique interdisciplinary approach to defence institution building, institutional capacity-building measures, defence education, and academic research.

A special highlight in the 2019 calendar was the joint meeting of the Senior Advisory Council and the Consortium Steering Committee in November at the Austrian National Defence Academy in Vienna. Here, we had the chance to observe the results and the successes of the PfPC’s Study and Working Groups and to convince ourselves that they are aligned with the stakeholders’ priorities. There is always room for improvement, but the Consortium is on a good way in accordance with its mission. It represents an invaluable tool and network of volunteers whose work and – more importantly – output and results deserve to be promoted and shared: curricula, policy advice, academic papers from the entire PfP community, modern learning technologies, and many more – they all are designed and provided by a dedicated group of experts and scholars who deserve our gratitude and praise.

I hope that you will find this report interesting.
DEAR COLLEAGUES,

The Partnership for Peace Consortium (PiPC) of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes is proud to present its annual report for 2019. Each of our eight working groups and the editorial board of our Connections journal shares information on their mission, goals, and accomplishments for the 2019 calendar year, as well as their plans and priorities for the future.

The year 2019 opened strongly in terms of Consortium activities resulting in over 50 Defense Education Enhancement (DEEP) events, and over 20 conference events allowing the PiPC to re-validate the breadth and depth of its network and ability to engage with partners. From our Swiss-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) group that works on the parliamentarian level, to our Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) group that brings together computer experts, the PiPC developed security-enhancing partnership activities at both working and policy levels.

Looking to the future, as changes in the security landscape accelerate and become more difficult to predict, multinational, cooperative institutions like the PiPC have much to offer. While some might scrutinize the multinational approach, citing concerns about effectiveness, cost, relevance to national policies, or difficulties about reaching consensus, the multinational approach retains a unique position to address particular issues that involve multiple states or regions.

Key to the challenge facing us is to accurately analyze complex multinational issues, and then correctly apply the appropriate multinational approach—with full honesty about what things can and cannot be changed. The PiP Consortium aims to continue to excel, by applying its network of experts in a way that brings added value to nations that participate.

Dr. Raphael Perl  
Executive Director
MISSION AND GOALS — The Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)/Technical Standards Working Group’s mission, as defined in the Strategic Vision for Further Development of the PfP Consortium, is to leverage education technologies as a tool to support and promote a collaborative network of defense academies and to facilitate defense education interoperability. The Group has been working to accomplish its specific tasks:

1. Implement partner nation use of technology and communication capabilities in both education and training
2. Support and develop national ADL capabilities and skills
3. Investigate and support the use of modern classroom training, to include virtual classrooms and “blended” learning solutions

In terms of goals, the ADL/Technical Standards Working Group seeks to ensure that all interested PfPC countries and institutions know and understand the benefits of using ADL as an alternative/supplementary approach to both education and training; that they have access to free content that focuses on defense and security policy education; that they have access to free open source tools to support content production and distribution; and that they have the opportunity to collaborate in the fields of content production and tool development, primarily with a view to lowering the individual investments they have to make.

Finally, the efforts of the ADL/Technical Standards Working Group are specifically focused on “ADL capability building” in countries and organizations for whom this area of knowledge is new. Providing the required infrastructure and expertise is a prerequisite to spreading e-learning and mobile learning content to meet PfPC and partner learning objectives.
Highlights of 2019

The PfPC Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)/ Technical Standards Working Group conducted two workshops in 2019 to facilitate networking, the exchange of best practices, and engagement on agreed community projects. Organized under the framework of the PfPC ADL Working Group, the spring workshop occurred from 23-25 April 2019 in Skopje, North Macedonia, hosted by the Ministry of Defense and Military Academy “M. Apostolski.” This workshop attracted approximately 40 participants representing organizations from 20 countries, including Ghana and Kazakhstan for the first time. Experts in ADL from various security and defense institutions across Europe, Eurasia, and North America team-up to review state-of-the-art learning technologies as part of an ongoing effort to assist partner nations in their ADL implementation. E-learning has transformed the traditional learning environment by utilizing blended teaching and learning methodologies.

The second ADL WG event was a purely technical workshop organized from 4-6 November 2019 at NATO School, Oberammergau. Agenda topics included tools to extend the effectiveness of ADL technologies, such as an overview of xAPI to enable teachers to better adjust educational material to learning objectives, SCORM conversion to create online educational content, Artificial and Virtual Reality (AR/VR), and Authoring Tools for online courses, among others.

In 2019, the PfPC ADL WG extended its outreach program to Central Asia. Scoping visits were organized to two United States Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Wales Initiative Fund (WIF) priority countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The workshops at the National Defense University in Nur-Sultan and the Armed Forces Academy in Tashkent supported common objectives in education capacity building and Institution Capacity Building. The purpose was to brief leaderships concerning the possibility to leverage technology into domestic, regional, and international distance learning programs, as well as to utilize modern teaching methods in the classroom. Kazakh NDU leadership and Uzbek AFA leadership showed high interest in developing their national ADL capabilities and skills, and explicitly expressed their willingness to continue to cooperate with PfPC in the area of ADL.

Apart from the specificity of the subject, cooperation with PfPC is perceived as a bridge for building and maintaining partnerships, achieving interoperability, and implementing multi-polar foreign policy.

The PfPC ADL/ Technical Standards Working Group also supports a 10-day Advanced Distributed Learning “Design, Develop, Deploy” course hosted at the NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany. NATO School Oberammergau offered the ADL Working Group-instructed course twice in 2019 and hosted 24 students per iteration. The course will continue with constant review and improvements based on student and SME feedback. The course covers all aspects of ADL generation from initial review meetings to loading onto a server for deployment. The course is offered to all NATO Allies and Partner nations and cooperates with the NATO Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP).

Besides the key events mentioned, members of the ADL Working Group participated in the iFEST in Alexandria, Virginia in conjunction with their annual planning meeting to discuss the way ahead with introducing/improving the use of state-of-the-art training technologies.
The mission of the ADL/Technical Standards Working Group is to assist partner nations to incorporate modern technologies and ways of delivering education. It is encouraging to see the progress that Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and other partners continue to make in implementing such technologies. Online learning technologies are becoming cost effective to the point where defense education institutes can readily adapt technologies into their classrooms and transform their entire approach to defense education. Some of the participating nations have developed robust ADL capabilities, established their own ADL centers and are now assisting new ADL nations.

The overlapping lines of effort pursued by ADL communities of practice have become more visible and strengthened over the course of 2019. Cooperation with NATO Training Group for Individual Training & Education Development (NTG IT & ED) is maturing based on common goals, common projects and synergy for the benefit of both parties. One such project is, for example, the ADL Handbook, available through NATO ACT.

The PfPC ADL WG has fully moved into the existing GlobalNet Learning Management System (LMS). With the support of the US-led team and the adoption of the LMS Ilias into GlobalNet, it fits the purpose and supports both the ADL WG and other PfPC groups. This is a step forward since the US expressed a desire to see the entire PfP Consortium use the GlobalNet web platform more effectively.

Cooperation with the NATO International Staff in Brussels continues to grow. PfPC ADL WG experts are involved as tutors in NATO DEEP ADL-related workshops with Partner nations. A number of events were conducted in Krakow and Gdynia, as well as in Kiev and Skopje with trainees from Azerbaijan, Armenia, North Macedonia, and Ukraine. Feedback from the attendees praised the fruitful discussions, professionalism of the ADL experts, and the friendly, collaborative atmosphere during the workshops.
The Way Ahead

The PfPC ADL Working Group was established in 1999 and will continue to work with NATO and Partner nations to:

1. Discuss best practices, pedagogical standards, and future classroom paradigms
2. Integrate Partner use of LMSs and technology for education and training
3. Discuss policy approaches to align international standards for delivery of ADL

A strategic goal for 2020 will be to get more integrated with DEEP and expand the outreach program with new nations; to integrate interested members and Partner nations into the ADL community of practice, and to help them develop and expand their own national e-learning capabilities.

The PfPC ADL WG is part of a five-year Roadmap for implementing and improving blended learning across a series of multinational exercises – Maturing ADL Exercises FY 19-22.

The PfPC ADL/ Technical Standards Working Group will celebrate its 20th anniversary next year. The Jubilee event is planned to take place 21-23 April 2020 in Austria, where senior PfP Consortium leaders, former ADL WG Chairs and members will gather to celebrate the success stories of this community of practice.

PfPC ADL WG supports interoperability with NATO, and cooperation in the arena of ADL provides a medium through which to develop strategic outreach to developing nations in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The ADL WG also cooperates with the US ADL Initiative and continues to disseminate new developments, as well as to promote innovation through the fresh approaches of its diverse members, resulting in benefits for the entire community of practice.

The ADL WG is chaired by Dr. Greta Keremidchieva (Rakovski National Defense College, Bulgaria) and Mr. Paul Thurkettle (NATO ACT).

Priorities for 2020 and Beyond

1. Continued ADL security and defense product output in collaboration with NATO and Partner countries
2. Support to the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) with ADL expertise
3. Execute two CDTI Training courses and organize two ADL/ Technical Standards Working Group workshops per year
4. Involvement in multinational exercises within the five-year Roadmap for implementing blended learning
5. Continue ADL capability building efforts in more countries and organizations
6. Collaboration with other PfPC Working Groups

APPENDICES

KEY INSTITUTIONS PARTNERED WITH IN 2019
MISSION AND GOALS — Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) was created in 1999 to establish, maintain, and enhance a regular, multilateral, and open exchange of knowledge between official military history and defense institutions. This is done through annual thematic conferences that examine historical determinants of military strategy, policy, and objectives, as well as the historical context of current strategic affairs.

CSWG improves defense and military education and research by strengthening cooperation between institutions and nations. The result is a multinational network of historians, who collectively provide professional historical analysis of common issues and practices.

The CSWG also contributes to the production of generic academic curricula, which aim to support partner nation development of national Professional Military Education (PME) courses. CSWG has directly contributed to the NATO-approved generic Reference Curriculum series, which supports educational interoperability between NATO and PfP countries.

Military historians, as well as experts on foreign affairs from participating nations, come together to share ideas concerning important events, while simultaneously gaining an appreciation of differences in national perspectives. This open sharing of opinion and historical research assists even competing nations to build trust, move away from confrontation, and to develop towards a lasting stability and peace.

As a Central Europe representative wrote in 2003, CSWG played “a pioneering role of driving the Central Europeans back to a multilateral forum, facing their own controversial military and political history. I think that if this working group does not do it, nobody will do it.”
Highlights of 2019

The CSWG successfully held its 19th annual conference in Budapest, Hungary, May 27 –31, 2019 with the main topic: The Role of Territorial Defense Forces in Peace and War. The conference was organized jointly by Sweden and Hungary. The Swedish Defence University, as well as the Education, Science and Cultural Affairs Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, the Hungarian National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, and Scientific Research Center of the Hungarian Defense Forces General Staff all worked together to create a very successful event.

The conference brought together 35 participants—including military historians, experts, and specialists on strategic affairs—from 18 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, and United States of America.

This 19th conference of the Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group proposed a research concept focused on several key scientific goals: (1) To analyse the role of alliance/non-alliance policy in shaping the national defense doctrines, with a special focus on the concept of territorial defense forces (TDF) under the impact of the current military dynamics; (2) To present specific historical case studies to get better knowledge on the evolution of TDF, their organization, structure, and practical contribution to national defense efforts; (3) To explain in what extent the TDF are still relevant today and how they can be better adapt to deal with the changing nature of war; (4) To analyze the contribution of TDF to security and societal resilience in peacetime and in crises, and to investigate the role they are likely to play in future conflicts (hybrid war, cyber warfare, and internal disturbances).

From a historical perspective, the territorial defense forces played a critical part of each country’s national defense system, with the core mission to protect and defend the national territory against potential external threats. After the end of the Cold War, the changing nature of security threats came to challenge the main assumption about what the territorial forces are for, how they should be organized, and in what way their missions have to be refocused as to answer to the changing security dynamics. However, the rapid security and military shifts emerging in the recent years, and the changing nature of warfare, generated a broad reassessment and a revival of the traditional pattern focused on national-territorial defense model and a new doctrinal conceptualization of the role of the TDF.

The conference program included 23 papers which addressed national experiences and discussed future prospects of development as regards to the role and potential contribution of TDF as a key component of national defense systems.

The main questions are: (1) What can we understand from past and present defense doctrinal approaches that can inform soldiers and policy makers for future paradigms of warfare; and (2) How can national force structures be best adapted to meet the changing typology of military threats and challenges?

What are the main features that define the role of TDF in peace and war? How do TDF contribute to national defense efforts in order to strengthen societal cohesion and national resilience? What factors are important in motivating states to determine a specific national defense concept or military doctrine approach and, by this logic, why might TDF still be relevant today? What role are TDF likely to play in future conflicts (hybrid war, cyber warfare, and internal disturbances)?

These were some of the key research questions which shaped the conference and guided the debates among the participating experts and military historians.

THE CONFERENCE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING SUB-THEMES:

- The change of territorial defense posture in peace and war: main characteristics, international political and strategic conditions, domestic political forces, organizational structures, typology of actions
- The great wars of the 20th century and their impact on shaping the national defense systems, and the role and functions of territorial defense forces—analysis, experiences and lessons learned
- Post-war transformation of defense establishments
- Civil defense and concepts of total defense
- The role of alliance/non-alliance policy in shaping the national defense doctrines
- Weapons systems, defense industry, strategies, and methods of military organization in 20th and 21st centuries
- The role of territorial defense forces in building/maintaining societal cohesion and their contribution to a national war effort
- The contribution of territorial forces to security and societal resilience in peacetime and in crises
- The role the defense forces are likely to play in future conflicts (hybrid war, cyber warfare, and internal disturbances)
- Territorial defense forces as a bridge between the main battle forces and the civil defense system
- The evolving character of national defense systems: engagement on overseas missions vs. territorial defense

TWENTY-THREE PAPERS IN TOTAL WERE PRESENTED:

- Prof. Gunnar Åselius (Sweden) – General Sköld’s Missile Militia: the Swedish Army in the SHADOW of the Yom Kippur War
- Orit Miller Katav (Israel) – Federation, Confederation, Alon’s Plan and Other Territorial Options Between the Israeli and Jordanian Regimes
- Maj. Zoltan Somodi (Hungary) – Cyber-reserve as a New Addition to Territorial Defence Forces
- Prof. Jan Hoffenaar (Netherlands) – Territorial Defense Forces’ and its Development over Time
- Rasmus Dahlberg (Denmark) – Sector-Convergence: Constabularization and Militarization
- Dr. Peter A. Kiss (Hungary) – Rebuilding Hungary’s Territorial Defense Forces
- LTC Robert Reczkowski (Poland) – Polish Territorial Defense Forces – Current Status and Way Ahead
- Dr. Vladimir Prebicil and Dr. Damjan Gustin (Slovenia) – The Territorial Component – An Advantage or Obstacle to the Development of Modern Armed Forces: The Example of the Slovenian Armed Forces
- Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen and Thomas Damgaard Kamp (Denmark) – The Territorial Component – An Advantage or Obstacle to the Development of Modern Armed Forces: The Example of the Slovenian Armed Forces
- Dr. Efpraxia Paschalidou (Greece) – Structural Organizational Elements of the Hellenic Army in the Eve of the Great Wars of the 20th Century
- Dr. Mihály Krámli (Hungary) – The Development of the Hungarian Arms Industry, Especially the Naval Industry 1900–1914
The papers presented at the conference will be published in a collective volume under the aegis of the two co-organizing institutions/countries in 2020.

COOPERATIVE BURDEN-SHARING / FINANCIAL REPORT

As a self-financed group, the overall costs of the 19th annual conference of the CSWG were covered by the participants/sending institutions (international transportation and accommodation) and the co-organizing countries. The financial contribution provided by Swedish Defense University was 3881 Euro, while the National University of Public Service of Hungary contributed 2920 Euro. The Swedish Defense University will also cover the publication costs of the conference volume worth 1800 Euro.

According to the existing procedures within the CSWG, each participant paid a 100 EUR registration fee, which was used to cover additional conference costs.
The group’s activities help strengthen cooperation among NATO and partner countries.

The target audience includes representatives of both NATO and partner countries. It has the unique ability to connect broad groups of countries from the Euro-Atlantic area: Western Europe, Northern Europe, Central Europe, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the United States. A number of 21 countries are formally members of the CSWG. The participants are representatives of governmental institutions (MoD, MFA, General Staff, NDU, Police Academies, etc.), NGOs, academia, and security studies institutes. The main nucleus of the group is made up of the institutes of military history affiliated to the Ministries of Defense, General Staff, or National Defense Universities. Initially focused on the countries that were members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, CSWG extended its geographical area to also integrate countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet sphere.

RESULTS: The proceedings of the annual conferences are published in a collective volume and circulated among military research institutions and specialized agencies. Each volume addresses a specific topic by integrating various national views and perspectives, and providing a platform of knowledge and information. This is an important dimension in fostering transatlantic research/scientific dialogue, and provides a forum of open discussions and exchange of views on specific issues of strategic relevance (nature of war, the role of alliances, typology of states’ behavior, ways of conduct, impact of shifting ideologies, crisis management, etc.).

The group extended its area of engagement with the PFPC by supporting professional military education efforts, through academic curriculum development. In 2017, the COIN Curriculum was finalized. Another important project of the CSWG is to collaborate with the Emerging Security Challenges Working Group (ESC WG) to develop a hybrid warfare reference curriculum.

WORKING WITH OTHER WORKING GROUPS. The CSWG remains interested in cooperating with other WGs of the PFPC on developing common projects/events. Members of the CSWG can contribute with expertise to other WG’s conferences/events. The cooperation with Education Development Working Group (EDWG) and the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) helps implement the COIN Curriculum. Cooperation with the ESC WG to advance a Hybrid Curriculum are important cooperative achievements.

INCREASED CAPACITY OF SELF-SUSTAINABILITY. The CSWG is a self-funded group. The overall costs of the participation at the group’s activities are covered by both the participants and their sponsoring institutions, as well as the co-partner countries that are responsible for organizing the annual conferences. The fact that each year participants from over 20 countries are willing to pay in order to attend and contribute to the CSWG’s conferences is an important indicator of the increasing relevance of the group and of the commitment of the participating countries to remain engaged in supporting this platform of regional scientific dialogue.

IMPACT: Provide inputs to help decision-making process. We are witnessing the emergence of developments which, until recently, were considered a thing of the past: nationalism, extremism, populism, radicalism. At the same time, the systemic changes are accelerating against the background of shifting hegemonic agendas and geopolitical alignments. The topics approached as general themes of the annual conferences—from both historical and current perspectives—help decipher trends/patterns of behavior that shape the current security dynamics, and provide relevant analysis/insights on the strategic conduct of the main states/actors.
CONTRIBUTION TO MEETING PARTNER REQUIREMENTS AND GOALS. Contribution to Professional Military Education through developing academic curriculum on strategic relevant areas. The adoption of the COIN Curriculum into existing course curricula developed by individual partner PME institutions is an objective to be further completed in line with NATO/PfP military education needs and goals.

The CSWG gained increased relevance as one of the most representative and longstanding fora of regional cooperation and dialogue in place for 20 years. Its broad and diverse participation and geographical representation make it unique as a tool of advancing trust and bringing people together to discuss military history and address strategic relevant issues. The CSWG offers a venue to discuss controversial topics in an open and cooperative framework, to overcome past grievances, and strengthen the bonds between individuals and institutions.

In addition to its annual flagship conference, the CSWG’s member institutions regularly engage in smaller formats of cooperation—at bilateral or multilateral levels—and work to further extend the existing group’s networking by convening high-profile events (bilateral seminars, conferences, workshops, working meetings, etc.). From this perspective, the CSWG provides opportunities for all NATO and partner countries to get access to a large network of specialists and to engage in intensive debates on common issues of interest.
The Way Ahead

**CSWG 2020 Annual conference:** The 20th CSWG annual conference will take place on 18-22 May 2020, in Košice, Slovakia. The theme of the conference is: Peace to War, from War to Peace: Conflict Initiation and Termination—Implications for Policy Makers.

**Draft concept:** The conference research goal is to look deeper into the dynamics that influence decisions for entering and quitting armed conflict. Both military and non-military factors are to be considered (societal culture, propaganda, military traditions, resilience capacity, etc). Historical experiences can provide relevant examples and lessons that may help to better adapt the national defense systems to cope with current and future challenges.

Recent military developments have highlighted new trends in warfare that requires new perspectives and approaches, which may help to get a better understating of the nature of war, its features, and its management prospects. Looking back at the last two centuries, the key questions are: Is war terminated or just prolonged with other means, tactics and strategies? To what extent can war be prevented and how can it be terminated in order to generate peace? How can peace be managed to avoid war?

**The key thematic areas to be addressed will include the following and other connected topics:**

- Great Power Competition as a driver of war. Why do wars start and why do they end?
- The role of alliances and coalition warfare in the initiation and termination of war
- The impact of non-military factors in shaping the decisions of policy makers concerning war and peace: propaganda and disinformation; role of archetypes in conflict initiation; the role of public opinion, national resilience, etc.
- Public support for war - how does society influence the political and military decisions? The impact of military culture and societal approaches to war and peace
- Economy and war – forecast vs reality
- Changing typologies of war, reshaping peace and building resilience (e.g. hybrid war, cyber warfare, internal disturbances, etc.)
- War endings and challenges of peace: from the major 20th century conflicts to current military interventions. Factors to be considered: army demobilization, post-conflict reconstruction (military and non-military factors), re-integration of the military, etc.
- Resources, damages, population changes, migration, and ecology

**Co-organizing institutions/countries:**
- Center of Military History and Social Science from Potsdam, Germany
- Institute of Military History, Ministry of Defense, Slovakia

**Financial arrangements:**
- The overall costs of the conference will be covered by Germany and Slovakia, as co-organizing countries. The two partner institutions will also be responsible with coordinating the administrative/logistical arrangements of the conference.
- As with the previous conferences, there will be also a registration fee of 100 EUR to be paid by all participants. This will be used to cover additional conference costs.
- The costs of international transportation and accommodation will be covered by the participants/sending institutions.
- For participants from partner countries, support will be provided on a case-by-case basis.

The CSWG considers the possibility to work with the ESC WG to help develop a Hybrid warfare reference curriculum. Its main contribution will be focused on providing historical case studies/background connected to hybrid warfare and its historical dynamic.

The CSWG may also work, on a case-by-case basis, with other working groups to develop academic curricula. CSWG is the primary group to provide case-studies on subject areas.
APPENDICES

EVENTS

The 19th CSWG annual conference on “Territorial Defense Forces in Peace and War”. The event was organized in partnership by the Swedish Defense University, Education, Science and Cultural Affairs Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, and Scientific Research Center of the Hungarian Defense Forces General Staff. It was held in Budapest, Serbia, May 27-31, 2019.

KEY INSTITUTIONS PARTNERED WITH IN 2019

Museum & Institute of Military History, Vienna, Austria • Defense Advanced Research Institute, Military History Section, “G.S. Rakovski” National Defense Academy, Bulgaria • Military History Institute, Prague, Czech Republic • Institute of Military History, Culture and War Studies, Royal Defence College, Denmark • Defense Historical Service, Ministry of Defense, France • History Office to the War College, France • Defense Policy and Development Department, Ministry of Defense, Georgia • Centre of Military History and Social Sciences, Potsdam, Germany • Historical Archives Service, Army General Staff, Greece • Hellenic Naval Academy, Greece • Education, Science and Cultural Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense, Hungary • National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, Hungary • Scientific Research Center of the Hungarian Defense Forces General Staff. • Military History Institute and Museum, Ministry of Defense, Hungary • Bar Ilan University, Israel • Institute of Military History, Ministry of Defense, Netherlands • Territorial Arm Forces Command, Poland • War Studies University of Polish Naval Academy, Poland • Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Ministry of National Defense, Romania • Strategic Research Institute, Ministry of Defense, Serbia • Institute of Military History, Slovakia • University of Ljubljana, Slovenia • Institute of Contemporary History, Slovenia • National Defense University, Sweden • Baskent University, Turkey • U.S. European Command, United States of America
MISSION AND GOALS — The Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) focuses on developing policies and strategies to build Defense Capacity Building (DCB) in partner countries and offer suggested directions for countering terrorist threats. As terrorism is dynamic, the CTWG demonstrates agility in addressing contemporary trends through a combination of targeted exercises and programs. The CTWG operates through two strands, Table-Top Exercises (TTX) and the Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum (CTRC).

The TTX is a hands-on applied learning tool for Professional Military Education (PME), serves as a vehicle to teach the CTRC, and enables a comprehensive counter-terrorism defense capacity building (DCB) operational approach. The aim is to identify an ideal operational end-state, desired conditions that would characterize the end-state, and established objectives that drive specified lines of efforts. The long-term goal is to foster the intellectual interoperability among partner nations and ensure the CTRC functions as a model and template for training and defense educational program development.
OUTCOMES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS/ ACHIEVEMENTS

2019

COMBATING TERRORISM REFERENCE CURRICULUM (CTRC)

In December 2019, the CTWG formally finished and submitted the final draft of the CTRC. The CTRC is the result of a collaborative multinational team of volunteers drawn from Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia. As part of the Partnership for Peace Consortium's (PFPC) CTWG, academics and researchers, as well as practitioners from governmental bodies, law enforcement, and the armed forces combined to create this document. The aim was to produce a nuanced and broad approach to understanding the concepts of terrorism and counter-terrorism by looking at past problems in order to understand the current dilemmas with the intention to try and anticipate future challenges.

This document aims to address terrorism and counter-terrorism with sufficient depth that will enable all learners in NATO member states and partner countries or organizations, regardless of experience, to develop a complete picture of the issues and challenges that exist—past, present and potentially future. It takes into full consideration the national, regional, and international security and defense policy implications. The Reference curriculum provides a multidisciplinary approach that helps learners develop the knowledge and skills needed to understand terrorism and counter-terrorism in order to anticipate and mitigate potential threats successfully.

Despite its prominence, terrorism remains an emergent issue. There are still significant debates in the field regarding what terrorism is, how it should be studied, and what are the best methods to counter it. Thus, the creation of this reference curriculum is, in part, a means of identifying and securing a useful common ground in order to gain a better understanding of holistic counter-terrorism strategies. Additionally, this curriculum identifies gaps and areas which cut across disciplinary and practical boundaries, particularly those between civilian, law enforcement, and military institutions. As a reference document, this curriculum can serve to increase greater intellectual and professional interoperability within and between partner countries and NATO alliance members.

This curriculum is composed of open-source information and therefore does not operate at the classified level that some may prefer or require. However, even in those cases, it can still serve as a set of guidelines under which that information can be categorized and collated. Furthermore, the curriculum identifies some sources which should be accessed with caution, as they are texts written and used by extremists that could be flagged by national and international agencies when accessed.

Finally, it is important to reiterate that this reference curriculum should be used as a starting point, which provides an outline of core issues and topics across terrorism and counter-terrorism. The wide-ranging nature of the curriculum is explicitly designed to allow engagement at different levels of seniority and experience to bridge disciplinary and professional boundaries. The variety of potential learners will entail differing levels of information and detail, and the precise nature of the learning requirements and exercises will vary based on local, national, and regional priorities. Thus, most of the modules in this curriculum can be treated for stand-alone teaching purposes or part of other modules, entire blocks, as well as complete themes.

NORTH AFRICA TABLE-TOP EXERCISE (TTX)

The CTWG hosted a North Africa regional tabletop exercise (TTX) on “Foreign Terrorist Fighter Networks: Threats, Challenges, and Responses” at the Polish Naval Academy in Gdynia, Poland from July 15–17, 2019. The TTX developed actionable and practical insights into efforts that addressed national, regional, and international threats related to FTF networks in North Africa.

The workshop brought together over 60 counter-terrorism (CT) and international security experts to discuss challenges related to foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) networks. Security briefings related to asymmetric maritime threats, FTF travel, emerging terrorist networks, and regional dynamics in North Africa and the Sahel were provided by representatives of the Polish Naval Academy, the Asia-Pacific Foundation, Penn State University, and INTERPOL. Participants then broke into three task forces for an interactive, simulated TTX. Each task force included representatives from relevant government departments, including military, law enforcement, and intelligence professionals. As the TTX unfolded, participants encountered numerous simulated threats and intelligence updates based on current trends and projected developments in the terrorist threat landscape. Participants were then asked to develop operational and strategic responses to these threats from the perspective of a notional North African military headquarters staff.

The TTX is a hands-on applied learning tool for Professional Military Education (PME) and serves as a vehicle to teach the Counterterrorism Reference Curriculum (CTRC) which the CTWG is producing on behalf of NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP).

TTX OVERVIEW

The TTX simulated a series of terrorist attacks in a fictitious country, Saharo, located in North Africa. The TTX’s goals were first, to challenge the participants to respond to attacks in a timely manner; second, identify follow-on training requirements, and third, exercise participants’ operational planning skills by requiring that each Task Force develop a clear, decisive operational plan based on current joint military planning doctrine. The participants were divided into three task forces, each representing the Saharan Joint Counterterrorism Task Force and charged to coordinate national responses to current and future terrorist threats in that country. Using an interactive and visual scenario, TTX moderators presented the timing and location of attacks and available intelligence on suspects just as it would occur in a real-world scenario. This approach encouraged real-time engagement and fresh thinking from participants.

The TTX began with a background
briefing on Saharo’s demographic, socioeconomic, and political conditions, including information on the country’s capital, Tanith, where three consecutive attacks targeting a military base, a Western embassy, and a hotel occurred. Throughout the TTX simulation, participants considered overall security issues, the interrogation of captured suspects, terrorist financing, border security, government strategic communications, the role of the media, and general public safety and well-being. The hotel attack involved the kidnapping of five foreign civilians and broached the question of how to respond to a multinational hostage crisis and coordinate rescue operations.

In addition to hostage recovery options, other themes included methods for extracting intelligence from detained suspects, processing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence, preserving chain-of-custody for captured enemy material, and multinational cooperation. A unique feature of the TTX were multiple, real-time intelligence injects that challenged participants with conflicting information and the need to validate sources. As the events unfolded, the task forces were exposed to new intelligence, forcing them to revise their response plans to maximize effectiveness and address new threats.

RESULTS & KEY FINDINGS

Each task force developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism operational approach that identified an ideal operational end-state, desired conditions that would characterize the end-state, and established objectives that drove the specified lines of efforts.

All three task forces agreed that the ideal end-state was the degradation and disruption of terrorist activities in Saharo. While all also focused on al-Qa’ida affiliates in the region, Daesh and local armed groups were included by some task forces to encompass all potential threats. Four primary, strategic objectives included: 1) to maintain Saharo territorial integrity; 2) to enhance security in the country, including in border areas; 3) to disrupt terrorists’ ability to finance future attacks, and 4) to strengthen public resilience to terrorism.

Task forces then outlined the desired conditions that their plans aimed to achieve. At the end-state, terrorist elements within the region—specifically al-Qa’ida affiliates, and Daesh—would first be isolated and inhibited from recruiting, planning, and executing attacks. Another desired condition was a legitimate Saharan government that was trusted to protect national and regional interests. The need for strong multilateral coordination to counter-terrorism in the region and build Saharo’s local capacity to conduct unilateral operations were also identified. Improving Saharan civil-military relations was also raised as a critical component of building local capacity to provide effective and enduring security.

Participants noted that measures must encompass legislating processes for the arrest and prosecution of terrorists to ensure a transparent and stable security environment. Finally, a coordinated strategic communications response would need to be established to assist stakeholders and citizens to prevent and respond to terrorist threats.

Given the desired conditions delineated above, lines of efforts (LOEs) and associated tasks based on operational imperatives were proposed, which importantly are directly tied to Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and drawn from the CTRC:

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOEs)

MOEs that were agreed at the TTX are designed to assess changes in system behavior, capability, and operational environment for North African allied partners that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state and achievement of an objective. There is a four phase process to assess the MOEs.

1. Identification of intended effects associated with the objectives of each LOE.
2. Brainstorming sessions that considers a wide variety of possible MOEs.
3. MOEs are evaluated for inclusion based on their relevance and direct link with the activities of that LOE, measurability and malleability
4. Identifying data that can be used for measuring change in that MOE and the selection of appropriate indicators for tracking progress.

Hostage Rescue
1. Formulate a unified approach by leveraging any offers to pay ransom for hostages to buy time to plan rescue operations.
2. Strengthen intelligence parameters, collection, and analysis to ensure effectiveness in planning hostage rescue operations.
3. Conduct a ground operation, ideally multilateral, with adequate ISR, QRF, and CASEVAC support to recover hostages and capture or kill terrorists.

Counter-Threat Finance
1. Monitor large financial transactions in Saharo to flag suspicious/illicit financial activity.
2. Increase salaries for Saharan police/security forces and recruit...
retired officers to fight corruption and black markets.

3. Establish a counter-threat finance cell in Sahara that connects to the Edgemont Group.

Border Security & Law Enforcement

1. Increase border security, including the use of surveillance and biometric collection at ports of entry.

2. Improve the hardening of soft targets and infrastructure, including heightening security measures around areas of high population density.

3. Establish an alert system with all law enforcement agencies in the country.


5. Build integrity and capacity through modernization and enhancement of equipment and training for counter-terrorism personnel, and recruit trusted retired law enforcement officials to provide guidance and support.

Multinational Cooperation

1. Formulate a unified regional approach to dealing with terrorist threats.

2. Conduct combined border patrols with neighboring countries.

3. Enhance partnership with NATO’s Building Integrity Program and professional military education.

4. Establish a regional intelligence fusion center.

5. Establish and/or reinforce intelligence information-sharing agreements.

6. Exchange best practices and lessons learned at the regional level and in international fora.

Strategic Communications

1. Establish a single, whole-of-government approach to strategic communications following terrorist attacks.

2. Broadcast timely emergency warnings after an attack have occurred.

3. Ensure timely release of government statements to the public following terrorist attacks.

SECURITY BRIEFINGS

Representative from the Polish Naval Academy opened the event. Dr. Katarzyna Wardin, Associate Professor from the Command and Naval Operations at the Polish Naval Academy, provided an overview of maritime threats in the Baltic Sea, which remains vulnerable to fatal attacks. Dr. Wardin identified the major risks, including chemical dumping, fast motorboats, and hijacking of and cyberattacks on ship computer systems. She specified Daesh, al-Qa’ida affiliates, and Chechen Separatists – who have been active in the region since 1990 – as primary threats to the Baltic Sea. Admiral (ret.) Czeslaw Dyracz, from the Institute of Navigation and Maritime Hydrography at the Polish Naval Academy, expanded on measures to counter threats by emphasizing maritime piracy. Dyracz discussed the role of the EU Naval Forces (NAVFOR) and their counter-piracy operations.

Dr. Sajjan Gohel, International Security Director of the Asia Pacific Foundation and CTWG Co-Chairman, introduced the Global Terrorism Landscape, specifically current and potential threats imposed by returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Dr. Gohel argued that returnees pose three types of threats: direct violent instigation, non-violent via radicalization or recruitment, and no imminent threat but could later evolve as a problem. He added that a remaining challenge was how to use battlefield evidence against FTFs in court cases. Dr. Gohel also stressed the regrowth of al-Qa’ida and its proximity to the Taliban.

Dr. Peter Forster, Professor at Penn State University’s College of Information Sciences and Technology and CTWG Co-Chairman, contextualized the Global Terrorism Landscape within a technologically driven world. Counter-terrorism operations must adapt to emerging threats and constantly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures. Dr. Forster referenced the potential for connectivity among FTFs, homegrown terrorists, and the growing number of jihadi’s who have served their prison terms and are being released in West. He argued that access to information expands knowledge bases thus improving terrorists’ capabilities.

Mr. David Winston, Senior Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, elaborated on terrorist dynamics in North Africa. Winston emphasized that the main threat does not concern violent attacks in the region, but rather stems from local populations traveling to take up arms in Iraq and Syria. Principal organizational threats include Daesh, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

Mr. Alain Di Nicola, of INTERPOL’s Counter Terrorism Directorate, discussed Project Vennlig, where global law enforcement agencies share intelligence concerning wanted terrorists and criminals. Project Vennlig proposed the idea of utilizing militaries for law enforcement purposes, specifically in Iraq and Syria. Its strength lies in comprehensive databases, such as 2018 Operation Neptune, that provide biographic data so that countries are alerted if terrorists are released from detainment or have communicated suspicious information, given that FTFs do not necessarily return to their home countries to perform operations.

PANELS

A Global Security Challenges Panel consisted of: Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Professor of international security at Sciences Po Paris, Chief Superintendent Claude Castonguay, Criminal Operations Officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Mr. Stephen Harley, Consultant Advisor to the British Embassy Mogadishu, Somalia. Discussions focused on law enforcement and military counter-terrorism strategies, as well as combating the violent ideologies that fuel terrorism.

A Youth Panel covered comprising of five Master’s graduates from the London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) covered a range of CT issues: Ms. Sophie Drake and Ms. Victoria Jones began the session by discussing women in Daesh, specifically internal gender dynamics and ways in which women are employed as jihadists. Mr. Michael
Hendricks then shifted the conversation to the evolution of Boko Haram based in Nigeria and how as Lake Chad basin continues to shrink, increasing water insecurity fuels intra-state conflict which, in turn, may strengthen the terrorist group. Lastly, Ms. Barbara Keleman and Ms. Terra Schroeder presented on current peace talks with the Taliban regarding Afghanistan. As a result of Taliban authority in a substantial portion of the country as well as Daesh and al-Qa’ida strongholds, they argued that western withdrawal from Afghanistan would be detrimental for regional security and would eventually have global repercussions.

APPENDICES
CTWG POINTS OF CONTACT
Sajjan Gohel, CTWG Co-Chair, Asia-Pacific Foundation, sm@apfoundation.org • Peter Forster, CTWG Co-Chair, Pennsylvania State University, pkf1@psu.edu • Tyler Zurisko, CTWG Deputy Senior Advisor, U.S. Department of State, ZuriskoTJ@state.gov
Partnership for Peace Consortium Editorial Board

Prof. Sean S. Costigan, Editor-In-Chief

MISSION AND GOALS — The mission of the PfPC Editorial Board (EB) is to produce high quality scholarly, policy-relevant publications that represent and inform members of the PfPC and its partner nations. To meet that end, the EB’s goal is to publish the best research from and for the Consortium through our quarterly journal, Connections.

Connections is the most widely circulated physical product of the Consortium. Additionally, Connections is also available in digital form via https://Connections-qj.org and other online presences. Usage of the journal’s website has stayed at the same high level as the years before. Returning site visitors hail from over 130 countries. The Russian edition of the journal is downloaded at roughly half the rate of the English version, which is an excellent indication of how well the EB and the PfPC are reaching key target audiences. Online has increased in China, which now has the second-largest national readership of Connections. India has also seen a marked increase in its readership.

Each print run of Connections produces 1,600 copies of the journal (1,200 in English, 400 in Russian), which in turn are sent to over 800 institutions in 58 countries.
The PfP Consortium Editorial Board is a working board comprised of the following members:

Sean Costigan, Executive Editor
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Tamara Pataaraia, Civil Council of Defense and Security, Georgia
Todor Tagarev, Bulgarian Academy of Science, Bulgaria
Eneken Tikk, Cyber Policy Institute, Finland
LTC Thomas E. Wood, US EUCOM
Highlights of 2019

The following list demonstrates the success of the Editorial Board’s efforts.

• A new Managing Editor joined the PfPC Operational Staff in July 2019.
• The Editorial Board convened to meet with the Managing Editor and chart a path forward, to include themes and assignment of editorial responsibilities.
• Connections was maintained in SCOPUS, JSTOR, and CIAO, placing it among the best security journals in the field.
• Despite an ongoing series of challenges stemming from a funding and legal review of another, completely separate publication, planning for Connections continued along with submissions from authors.
• The Editorial Board plans to publish at least four editions, with a further plan to produce one special edition in 2020.
• Begun in 2019 and continuing into 2020 is the movement of Connections content to PfPC’s main website.

The Way Ahead

• The Special Edition on National Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense Policy (with contributions by the cybersecurity chiefs of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Estonia, Israel, United Kingdom and the United States will be published early in the 2020 calendar year.
• Regular editions of the journal will be published in a compressed timeline to make up for previous delays. A themed edition on Resilience is planned for 2020.

Priorities for 2020 include:

• Make up time with the ongoing delay in publishing quarterly
• Promote the increased use of the journal for teaching purposes
• Increase participation of GCMC Alumni
• Extend the reach of the journal through improved academic citation
• Promotion of Connections at international security conferences and to research libraries
Education Development Working Group

Dr. Alan Stolberg, Chair

MISSION AND GOALS — Education Development Working Group (EDWG) contributes to the professionalization of the officer corps, NCO corps and civilian defense officials of NATO Partner countries with the intent to make their defense education institutions compatible with Euro-Atlantic standards and values. The EDWG currently supports sixteen nations. The Working Group’s efforts are framed within the context of NATO’s Partnership Cooperation Plans Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), Annual National Programs (ANP), Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs (IPCP), the Education and Training for Defence Reform Initiative (EfR) and the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense’s priorities for Building Partner Capacity and Institution Capacity Building.

The Working Group focuses on three core elements of partner needs in defence education:

1. Development of curricula utilized in the education and training of modern armed forces.
2. Teaching and learning methods that match best practices in use in Euro-Atlantic defense education and training institutions, as well as a third additional element in some cases.
3. The organization and administration of military education institutions and systems.
The EDWG conducts three programs within the framework of the country-specific Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) for the defense education institutions in each supported country to execute these elements:

1. Defense Educator Workshops to assist faculty development.
2. The crafting of Reference Curricula that can be utilized by any of the defense education institutions.
3. NCO education support specifically designed to assist the implementation of the NCO reference curriculum and other associated NCO professional development activity.

For each participating country currently supported by the PfP Consortium (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, North Macedonia, Serbia, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), the Working Group has established a Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) composed of NATO and Partner nation defense educators. Each DEEP program strives to respond to validated, demand-driven requirements from the partner nation and not on supply-driven availability of subject matter experts. At the same time, the DEEP program will endeavor through dialogue and encouragement to influence supported educators in the direction of the following DEEP objectives:

- Guide and mentor reforms in professional and military education, both in individual defense education institutions and in a defense-wide holistic approach to professional military education.
- Promote learner-centered education to support critical thinking skills and innovative use of instructional technologies.
- Encourage and enable the use of modern learning methods that promote both depth of learning and ready application through practice and experience.
- Assist in the development of curricula where these methods can be employed in support of partner objectives contained in their Partnership Cooperation Plans with NATO or bilateral arrangements with the U.S.
- Support administrative and managerial reform in partner schools.

...the DEEP program will endeavor through dialogue and encouragement to influence supported educators...

### Highlights of 2019

The following list demonstrates the success of the EDWG’s efforts.

A recently published Cyber Security reference curriculum is being fully introduced in Morocco, North Macedonia, Poland, Tunisia, and Ukraine. A new Counterterrorism reference curriculum was published at the end of 2019. Decisions also were made to draft two new reference curricula components, one complete reference curriculum on Leadership and Ethics, and a module on Officer/NCO Relations, both to begin work in 2020.

The Defense Educator faculty development effort remains the most requested component of DEEP; the Master Instructor Program - designed to develop DEEP-partner school pedagogy specialists that will have the ability to train their own incoming faculty with the most modern teaching methodologies - is being developed or has been requested in a number of DEEP countries (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, North Macedonia, Tunisia, and Ukraine).

Partner nation defense education institutions are continuing to request DEEP support for the creation or expansion of entire new DEEP-supported courses oriented on specific subjects. These multi-hour courses are either being taught for the first time or newly under development in 2018: Strategic Leadership and Strategic Planning (Afghanistan); Building Integrity, Defense Planning and Management and Strategic Leadership (Armenia); Information Warfare and Cyber Security (Georgia); Civil-Military Relations, Leadership and Ethics, Logistics, Strategic Planning, and Western

Operational Art (Kazakhstan); Counterinsurgency (North Macedonia); Operational Planning (Mauritania); Cyber Security, Counterterrorism, and Leadership (Serbia); Cyber Security, Leadership, and Peacekeeping (Tunisia); Cyber Security, Leadership, and Logistics (Ukraine); Leadership (Uzbekistan).

The DEEP NCO Education support program continues to expand with the development of new courses and faculty development in Afghanistan, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Mongolia, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine. A Non-Commissioned Officer Corps Professional Development Reference Guidance has been distributed in English. Other languages to follow.

Additional PME faculty personnel from partner countries (e.g., Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine) are continuing to serve as DEEP activity providers in greater numbers.

The eighth NATO Defense Education Clearing House was executed in 2019 in Budapest, Hungary and the long-term clearing house process remains fully institutionalized.

All DEEP country measures of effectiveness analysis and country Strategic Plans continue to be updated and published on an annual basis.
AFGHANISTAN: A new Civilian Oversight of the Armed Forces (COAF) Course being taught. Strategic Leadership and Strategic and Defense Planning Courses being developed for the National Defense University; new Strategic Course master’s degree program near completion and intended to begin in 2020/21 after national accreditation process concluded; Basic Faculty Development complete; new Master Instructor Program (MIP) ongoing; NCO program initiated.

IMPACT: Supports the transition of the Afghan Armed Forces to a military framed by NATO standards

ARMENIA: Master Instructor Program (MIP) nearing completion. Now developing a new Public Administration Course with a significant Building Integrity (BI) component – four schools (National Defense Research University, Military Institute, Aviation Military Institute, NCO School) - first DEEP BI curriculum program. Also supporting development of Defense Planning and Management and Strategic Leadership Courses. Four-month strategic-level Military Security of the State Course for colonels now being delivered. New DEEP support begun for the Military Medical Institute. Major initiatives for NCO Corps transformation being worked.

IMPACT: Supports policy to shift Armenia from a total Russian reliance towards Euro-Atlantic standards and support

AZERBAIJAN: Master Instructor Program nearing completion for Military College of the Armed Forces (MCAF – war and staff college). Basic Faculty Development to be complete in early 2020 for the Military Institute (pre-commissioning).

IMPACT: Reinforces efforts to align the Azerbaijani Armed Forces with Euro-Atlantic doctrine and processes, to include the concept of critical thinking

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: New program initiated. DEEP to support three officer courses, NCO course, English Language Training (ELT) training.

IMPACT: Supports the policy goal to professionalize the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Hercegovina (AFBiH) and catalyze the three factions to work closer together

GEORGIA: NATO distance learning course delivered. Curriculum advice provided for Information Warfare and Cyber Security. Basic Faculty Development program began. Benchmarking of the National Defense Academy (NDA – pre-commissioning) master’s degree program was completed. DEEP workshops on establishing appropriate policies for instructor identification, training, evaluating and rewarding; Mission Command; and on Critical Thinking were delivered for the NDA. The Georgian Joint Staff J7 is in the final stages of approving a new instructor certification policy which will help establish more continuity in training and education institutions. The Georgian Armed Forces leadership are more prepared to establish mission command as a leadership approach in the command and control of their forces. At the NDA, a better understanding of critical thinking is leading to more effective integration of the subject in their bachelor's degree and staff college programs.

IMPACT: New curriculum implementations reinforce efforts to align the Georgian Armed Forces with Euro-Atlantic doctrine and processes


IMPACT: Supports the policy goal to make the Iraqi military interoperable and move them closer to NATO standards

KAZAKHSTAN: New multi-hour NDU courses being taught (Western Operational Art/Logistics/Civil-Military Relations); new Leadership and Ethics course to be complete in 2020. Expansion of Logistics and Civil-Military Relations courses have begun. PHC ADL working group created potential for NDU distance learning program.

IMPACT: New curriculum supports efforts to align Kazakhstani Armed Forces with Euro-Atlantic doctrine and processes; reinforces democratic principles, and supports capacity to deploy on UN peacekeeping missions

KUWAIT: New program initiated for NCO Corps advancement. DEEP support for a multi-hour Operational Planning Course. DEEP developed an English Language Diploma and Continuing Education and Training Program.

IMPACT: New curriculum supports desire for Kuwaiti Armed Forces to adhere to NATO standards and greater ability to counter regional insurgent threats

MONGOLIA: Capacity declared in 2017; sustained phase started in 2019 for further development of the five-week Staff Officer Course and faculty development; and faculty development to prepare Mongolian NDU faculty to emphasize active learning approaches in the classroom. New NCO program requested; scoping visit initiated.

IMPACT: Support Mongolian Armed Forces transition to a military framed by NATO standards

MOROCCO: New program initiated for NCO education and Cyber Security curriculum support.

IMPACT: Supports desire for Moroccan Armed Forces adherence to NATO standards

NORTH MACEDONIA: Detailed curriculum evaluation of the Staff College, Company Commander, Logistics Courses, Staff Officer Course, and NCO Academy. Master Instructor Program nearing completion.

IMPACT: Supports professionalization of the Macedonian PME system prior to formal NATO accession

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: Ph.D. program near complete. New comprehensive NCO education program begun.

IMPACT: Continued utilization of transformed curriculum and intent to professionalize the NCO Corps advances Euro-Atlantic standards for the Armed Forces
NATO-standard intermediate-level NCO Battle Staff Course being taught. DEEP support confirmed for Cyber Security curriculum development and Administrative and Management support.

**IMPACT:** Continued professionalization of the NCO Corps and other PME processes furthers adaptation of Euro-Atlantic standards in the Serbian Armed Forces

**TUNISIA:** DEEP-supported Peacekeeping Course taught twice per year at the Staff College. War College curriculum development support continues for Cyber Security, Leadership, Post Conflict Rebuilding, and Geo-Strategic/International Relations Courses. Basic Faculty Development near complete; Master Instructor Program (MIP) planned for initiation in late 2020. Distance learning capability being developed for the War College.

**IMPACT:** Will contribute to adaptation of NATO doctrine and procedures for the Tunisian Armed Forces

**UKRAINE:** Remains the largest of all DEEP; to varying degrees involves multiple Ukraine PME institutions, possesses strong MOD support, and significant funding from NATO. Ukraine Tank Academy (pre-commissioning) added for DEEP support in 2019.

**National Defense University (NDU), Kyiv (war college/staff college)**

Nearly 75% of the faculty now have recent combat experience from the ATO. At a minimum, all have graduated from the course they are currently teaching. DEEP-supported courses on Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Strategic Communications, and Leadership now being taught. Support for a new Logistics Course near completion. Master Instructor Program (MIP) near complete. NDU decided to transform all war college/staff college curriculum to the NATO-standard Baltic Defence College model with DEEP support. DEEP supporting new Defense Management School for all interagency security sector ministries. Multiple distance learning courses created for the NDU.

**National Air Force Academy, Kharkiv (pre-commissioning)**

The Master Instructor Program (MIP) to be complete in 2020. NATO-standard Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) being taught to all cadets.

**Land Forces Academy, L’viv (pre-commissioning)**

The Master Instructor Program (MIP) is in full process. NATO-standard Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) being taught to all cadets. With DEEP support, a new Leadership course has been designed and implemented to address NATO standard leadership approaches. New Leadership curriculum to be formally reviewed by the DEEP program in 2020. An internal Academy working group was created in February 2019 to restructure the current Academy curriculum to be in accordance with the NATO/PPPC Generic Officer Reference Curriculum. As part of Battalion Staff Training delivered by the Tactics Department, every 4th year cadet receives 30 hours of classroom instruction on the NATO Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) process. They must also demonstrate knowledge of MDMP in an additional associated exercise. Also, MDMP is being taught to all personnel in a NATO assignment and will be included in a new course for Captains. A new course on Officer-NCO Relations has been created. English Language Training (ELT) has expanded 15% in the past year with a new graduation requirement increasing from 600 to 690 hours for each student. This includes 450 hours in the classroom and 240 hours in self-study.

**Odessa Military Academy (pre-commissioning)**

Tactical Logistics course in accordance with NATO standards now being taught. English Language Training: taken very seriously at the Academy. As part of the ELT curriculum, the faculty has created an 85-page book in English titled “Leadership.” This book has a dual purpose: conduct ELT and teach the cadets modern leadership traits such as Duty, Respect, Honor, Integrity, Emotional Attributes, Character Development, and People, the Team, and the Institution.

**Odessa Naval Institute at the National University “Odessa Maritime Academy (pre-commissioning)**

Leadership is now being taught as a separate subject. A DEEP-supported Leadership Reaction Course became a permanent component of the overall Naval Academy Leadership course curriculum. Communication with the Navy Staff has been improved and a flexible curriculum along with the material base development has been introduced. English Language training has been extended to 600 hours (300 in a classroom) in a 5-year course with the possibility of an option of an additional two (2) hours per week. Two language labs have been opened and two additional instructors have been hired to support the qualified training of military specialists.

**Tank Academy, Kharkiv (pre-commissioning)**

New DEEP program initiated in support of a Master Instructor Program (MIP), review of Logistics and NBC curriculum to ensure compliance with NATO standards, curriculum development for NATO battalion staff procedures, Leadership course curriculum development, development of a NATO Logistics Planning Process course (similar to one in at the Odessa Military Academy), and development of a curriculum on NATO tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as applicable to a Tank Battalion.

**Zhytomyr Military Institute (pre-commissioning)**

Basic Faculty Development program is complete. Development of a Cyber Security course is ongoing. Overall Faculty Development: Over time, several DEEP teams have directly observed classroom instruction at the Odessa Military Academy, Air Force University in Kharkiv and the NDU. In each case, it was apparent that the resident instructors conducted modern classroom instruction, as evidenced by lecturing techniques (not reading from written material), significant effort to question individual students and articulating openness to any questions/comments from the students, catalyzing as many as possible to participate in the lessons, and continuously offering assistance to any students that may not have understood individual issues.

NCO Training Center Development: 4-level NCO leadership-focused education system (Basic, Intermediate, Advanced and Senior NCO courses), a 2-level instructor development and recognition program (Basic and Advanced NCO Instructor courses), further development of the 197 NCO Training Center (TC), and creation of two service NCO centers/schools (202 AIR, 203 NAVY) are all ongoing. Impact: Will contribute to adaptation of NATO doctrine and procedures for the Ukraine Armed Forces.

**UZBEKISTAN:** New Leadership course near completion for the Armed Forces Academy (AFA - war college/staff college-equivalent).

**IMPACT:** The willingness to request Leadership curriculum development support provides the most significant opportunity to date to support reducing reliance on Russian education approaches and expanding Uzbek adaptation of NATO doctrine and procedures.
The Way Ahead

As with previous years, the DEEP concept is continuing to mature and expand its appeal throughout Europe and Eurasia, and beyond into additional parts of North Africa. Modernization compatible with Euro-Atlantic defense education standards remains a long term, ongoing goal. The management and orchestration of sixteen different DEEP programs must be conducted very carefully to ensure that strategic objectives combined with analysis of measures of effectiveness will continue to drive the direction of each program of cooperation as it matures. As the number of DEEPs increases, so too does the administrative burden. In this time of more austere resources, each of the more mature programs must be constantly monitored for determination when it is time to begin reduction or elimination – based on when a particular PME institution has absorbed all that it can from the DEEP process and demonstrates an ability to be self-sufficient for its own faculty and curriculum development.
MISSION AND GOALS — The mission of the Emerging Security Challenges Working Group (ESC WG) is to provide a collective professional framework to assess new and complex developments that may impact the security environment. A key objective is to enhance the capacity of decision-makers and policy shapers to identify and respond to emerging security challenges.

In terms of goals, the ESC Working Group pursues:

Awareness Raising: Enhancing the awareness and understanding of the character of “emerging security challenges” among NATO nations and partner countries so that commonly perceived threats can be jointly addressed.

Networking: Fostering engagement between NATO nations and partner countries to arrive at common analyses of the challenges and collaborative policies to address them, thereby enabling the exchange of ideas leading to an academic-political ESC network.

Outreach: Developing products such as policy papers and modules for curricula of education of military and civilian leadership.
OUTCOMES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

2019

WORKSHOP

“Emerging Security Aspects of Contemporary Hybrid Threats and Online Radicalization”

1-2 May 2019, Abu Dhabi

The event was planned, and its implementation in cooperation with the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi was agreed and approved by the country’s highest authorities.

Due to a retroactively more restrictive interpretation of WIF funding rules, the event could, unfortunately, finally not be implemented.

MEETING

Meeting with PfPC Stakeholder Deputy NATO Ambassadors and the Deputy Assistant General of the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

9 May 2019, Brussels

The meetings arranged at the German Delegation to NATO and chaired by the German Deputy Ambassador Heiko Thoms brought together the PfPC Deputy Executive Director, Olaf Garlich, as well as the PfPC ESC WG Program Manager, and the two ESC-WG Co-Chairs with Allied and Partner nations Deputy Ambassadors and representatives as well as members of NATO’s International Staff. It coincided with the 20th anniversary of the creation of the PfPC.

The participants agreed that the vision regarding the creation of the PfPC to strengthen defense and military education through enhanced national, institutional cooperation maybe today even more important than ever before.

Even if the international security landscape has changed dramatically, the organizing principles of the PfPC have not — collective defense and projecting stability. A great advantage of the Consortium is that it is a highly networked and flexible entity in the NATO toolkit for projecting stability, available for members of the Alliance and partners alike.

Furthermore, Participants underscored the potential of the PfPC to efficiently further the Alliance’s partnership activities. There was also agreement that the thematic areas such as regional stability, security sector reform, counter terrorism, emerging security challenges, conflict studies, and the cooperation with NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme Program supplement NATO’s agenda in an efficient and cost effective way. They encouraged the PfPC to continue to become more visible at the Alliance through more proactive public diplomacy activities, such as the participation in the PTEC exhibition.

DASG ESC Division emphasized that the activities of the PfPC’s ESC-WG ideally match the priorities of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, in particular with regard to cyber defense, hybrid threats, and emerging technologies end encouraged the co-chairs to continue along those lines.

He further underscored the importance of the development of a hybrid threat curriculum and urged the chairs to implement this project as a priority.

CONFERENCE

“Hybrid Threats: Recognize, Adjust and Respond”

26-27 September, 2019, KYIV, Ukraine

The Partnership for Peace Consortium’s (PfPC) Emerging Security Challenges Working Group in cooperation with the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare, the Ukrainian Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, NATO, and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy co-organized a conference entitled, “Hybrid Threats: Recognize, Adjust and Respond.”

The Co-Chairs of the PfPC Emerging Security Challenges Working Group Mr. Michael Gaul and Dr. Jean-Marc Rickli welcomed the participants and outlined the importance of addressing hybrid threats in cooperation with Ukraine. Michael Gaul also reminded the audience of the PfPC’s long standing cooperation with Ukraine, the work already undertaken and planned by the Working Group in this important field, including the development of a Hybrid Threat Curriculum. He reiterated that deterring hybrid threats requires close cooperation between Allies, partners, and international organizations.

Mr. Alexander Vinnikov, the Head of the NATO Representation and Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine emphasized during his welcoming remarks the strong support the Alliance is providing to Ukraine and said “the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare has an outstanding potential as a tool for knowledge-sharing to provide policymakers with practical recommendations and advice on how to respond to hybrid threats. No state, organization, or alliance can counter hybrid threats effectively only on its own - therefore, international cooperation is vital.”

Mr. Yehor Bozhok, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, addressed the session with the objective to provide a new perspective on Hybrid threats in the case of Ukraine and presented the term “Hybration” a combination of “hybrid” and “conventional” as to describe the difficulty to place the blurred line between these two conflict methods. He also underscored that “no states can achieve their goals on their own, without contribution and advice.”

Mr. Dmytro Kuleba, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, described in his opening remarks hybrid warfare as a military strategy employing a wide range of means from conventional, to irregular warfare, arguing that “we may call it as we want, but it is still ‘warfare’.” Moreover Mr. Kuleba mentioned that a system of resilience must be built in Ukraine, which can flexibly adapt to reality and that this should be jointly built together with partners from NATO.

Ms. Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, MP, Chair, Ukrainian Parliament Committee on Integration to the EU highlighted during her opening remarks that the biggest difficulty within hybrid attacks is enemy identification because the enemies can be countries as well as non-governmental institutions. She added, “when we have silence at the frontline, less fire shooting, and fewer casualties, we see very often an aggravation on the other fronts of hybrid warfare.”
Major General Timothy Bevis, Director Operations and Planning, NATO International Military Staff in Brussels, presented in his keynote speech tools to increase awareness and indicators of warning and emphasized that training and exercises should be implemented on policy-making and military levels. He argued that “even non-state civilians and commercial businesses need to put emphasis on the right aspects in order to mitigate threats.”

Five discussion panels led by different moderators (Mikhailo Samus, Centre for Army Conversion and Disarmament Studies, Dr. Jean-Marc Rickli and Michael Gaul, Ms. Liubov Tsybulsk, Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, and Dr. Hanna Shelest, “Ukrainian "Prism”) addressed the status of hybrid threat research, the grand strategy behind it, regional developments, the risk of escalation in military conflict as well as building national resilience and mitigation measures. Experts provided a detailed analysis of current and prospective hybrid threats across different regions and domains in order to understand and determine means to recognize, adjust, and respond to such threats. All discussions proactively included participants’ questions and inputs.

The candidates and speakers of the conference were able to use all the optimal aids and receive the full scope and apparatus for the key to resist hybrid threats. Resilience to the threat is not only achieved through a better institutional structure but also through strengthening and building communities to protect democracy, the rule of law, and public safety.

In his concluding remarks Mr. Oleksiy Genchev, Head, NATO Department, Government Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, expressed his gratitude to all the speakers and organizers for conducting such an important event, even against very short timelines. He emphasized that there are many experts in the sphere of fighting hybrid warfare, but while preparing the conference, the best professionals were invited. “Though the conference is over, our mission is not accomplished/finished. We will continue our cooperation and I can assure that many recommendations will find their implementation in everyday activities.”

Michael Gaul echoed Mr. Genchev’s remarks on the very successful and smooth organization of the event and said, “it is one lesson that we tend to be too centric on one actor, but we need to keep all state and non-state actors in mind. To adjust to hybrid threats means to learn from others: both from their experience and their response and mitigation measures.”

Regarding the way forward he outlined “it was like a red line throughout our whole Conference that education and training are key to better address hybrid threats – this lesson encourages the Emerging Security Challenges Working Group to pursue our plan to develop a Hybrid Threat Curriculum as a priority.”

The event was very widely covered in social and mainstream media, NATO and government webpages and achieved very high visibility for the PfPC.
**WORKSHOPS**

**ESC-WG DEEP Cybersecurity Reference Curriculum and Education Workshops**

Over the course of 2019, the ESC WG supported proactively cybersecurity course development in Morocco and Tunisia.

**Report on The Deep Morocco Scoping Visit, Rabat And Meknes**

30 September - 3 October 2019

- The aim of the scoping visit was to develop a comprehensive understanding of the academic support requirements of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR), with a focus on the Cavalry School and the Direction Générale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (DGSSI). The scoping team also addressed their organizational structures, curriculum, teaching methodologies, equipment, resources, and infrastructure.

- The scoping team sought to identify and recommend opportunities to bridge existing gaps and improve areas of faculty development and curriculum development in line with the requirements and priorities indicated by the evaluated institutions and in accordance with the objective of fostering professional, self-sustainable PME institutions.

**AAR Visit To Tunis**

14–17 APRIL 2019

- **Situation**: A DEEP-PfPC sponsored team consisting of Professor Michael A. Hennessy, Professor Sylvan Leblanc (both from the Royal Military College of Canada), and Dr. Dinos A. Kerigan-Kyrou (Republic of Ireland), with material provided by Mr. Sean Costigen (USA), completed a recent site visit to the Tunisian Ecole de Guerre. This team delivered lectures in and observed the delivery by local subject matter experts on cybersecurity. This brief after action report captures some important observations on this experience.

- **Mission**: This visit marked a significant culmination of the DEEP/PfPC’s effort to support the Tunisian War College senior joint staff course. Previous visits had agreed the scope and detail of the cybersecurity education the College thought appropriate for their students, and this final visit executed that plan.

The next step is for the Ecole de Guerre to fully support their own delivery on this subject when they run the next serial of their course. The DEEP-PfPC team will be asked to attend that delivery, scheduled for January 2020.

- **Execution** of the effort on site was generally seamless with our team and the local SMEs coordinating our activities well. The hosts changed the final delivery plan schedule, but we were not aware until shortly before we commenced teaching. Delivery went largely according to plan, with only a few changes to the time allocations which compressed the activities of the first day (due to an unforecast talk from the head of the Tunisian Air Force).

Future cybersecurity development efforts are planned for Tunisia, Serbia, and co-organized by Moldova and a broad range of national, international, and private sector institutions. The event addressed the challenge of accelerated growth of the inclusive digital society and of the economy based on IT knowledge and competencies and how to counter cyber threats in this area.

**Hybrid Threat Reference Curriculum**

In line with the guidance received by the CSC in early 2018 and pending final approval, the ESC Working Group has been actively pursuing preparatory work for the creation of a Hybrid Threat Reference Curriculum. The events held in 2018 and 2019 have been used to further the knowledge of the group and to expand the network of experts in this area.

The group has experienced substantial offers of support from key stakeholders, and the high visibility events on Hybrid in Skopje (Sept. 2018) and Kyiv (Sept. 2019) which show the broad interest and need in developing the curriculum.

Letters of Support on the implementation of the curriculum have been received from the National Defence University of Ukraine, the Hybrid Centre of Excellence, Helsinki, and the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. Equally, other PfPC WGs have expressed their interest and offered their support.

Furthermore, Georgia has offered to host a workshop to further the knowledge base on this important issue and intends to proactively contribute to the curriculum development.

It is intended to launch the work on the curriculum in the second half of 2020 – the content team is in place and ready to begin.

**FURTHER DEEP CONTRIBUTIONS**

Jean-Marc Rickli remained part of the DEEP delegation for Tunisia. He advised the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre (ESG) on their curriculum on strategy and geopolitics. He was supposed to give a lecture on emerging technology and warfare in April 2019, but his flight was canceled on the day of his trip. The lecture could not be postponed.

**Support to the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme**

Co-Chair Michael Gaul participated and supported a Senior Leadership Roundtable on Information-Related Hybrid Threats in South-East Europe on 6 – 12 October in Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia. The event was organized under the auspices of the NATO SPS Programme and co-sponsored by the US Department of Defense, assessing and sharing best practices on the information-related elements of hybrid threats, in South-East Europe (SEE). The event specifically focused on threats that impact the political, territorial, or economic aspects of a country or the Alliance via kinetic, non-kinetic, or mixed means using information campaigns – misinformation, disinformation, non-information, and media (traditional or social).

**Support to the Government of the Republic of Moldova on Cyber Resilience**

Chairman Michael Gaul further supported the Regional Cyber Resilience Forum, 19 – 20 November, in Chisinau, Moldova, by addressing the most urgent cybersecurity deficits and how cooperation with international organizations can assist in closing them. The event was opened by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova H.E Maia Sandu and Republic of Moldova H.E Maia Sandu.
As noted by the PfP Consortium Steering Committee and senior stakeholders, there is a wide understanding that full-spectrum hybrid warfare is currently underway, with apparent negative effects for the security fabric of Europe, NATO Allies and NATO partner nations. These full-spectrum challenges run the gamut of security risks, with particular effects felt through technologies and the exposure of systemic insecurity in democracies. With the ESC Working Group’s enhanced focus on hybrid warfare, resilience, and cybersecurity, it is positioned to address the most relevant issues on NATO’s agenda and the challenge of the expanding impacts stemming from the mix of conventional and unconventional challenges.

At the Kyiv conference, a NATO standards based Results-Based Self-Assessment Questionnaire has been filled in by the participants. The results of the evaluation of the questionnaire were outstanding in all categories such as relevance, speaker quality, programme, mix of participants, quality of discussions, and overall organisation. All events were co-organized with major stakeholders and achieved multiplier effects with regard to outcomes, outreach, visibility, and the pooling of resources.

As perhaps the only fully free and comprehensive cybersecurity curriculum, the ESC Working Group’s Generic Reference Curriculum on Cybersecurity gained wide exposure. In addition, at least eight countries are integrating a module or more into their respective national cyber training.
The ESC-WG is planning to implement the following activities in the future:

2020 - Workshop: “Hybrid Challenges and Surrogate Warfare” Georgia.
2020 - Launch of the development of a Hybrid Threats Generic Curriculum
2020 - Special Issue of Connections on Emerging Security Challenges
2021 - Workshop: “The Changing Global Polarity – Consequences and Responses for Partner Countries”
2020 - Athena Paper from one or more of our group members
2021 - Workshop: “Drones and Swarming – the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Conflicts”
2022 - Workshop: “Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) and the Future Implications for Soldiers”
2022 - Hybrid Threats Generic Reference Curriculum to be finalized
2022 - Launch of the update to the Cybersecurity Curriculum

APPENDICES

KEY INSTITUTIONS ENGAGED WITH IN 2019

NATO, Brussels, Belgium • Stakeholder Delegations and Missions to NATO • German Federal Ministry of Defence, Bonn, Germany • Austrian Ministry of Defence, Vienna, Austria • Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, Sofia, Bulgaria • US Department of Defense, Washington, DC, United States • Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Germany • Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland • George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany • Kings College, London, United Kingdom • National Security Council, Kyiv, Ukraine • National Defence Academy, Vienna, Austria • NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia • PfP-C Education Development Working Group • PfP-C Combating Terrorism Working Group • The George Washington University, Washington D.C., United States • Centre for Military Studies, Copenhagen • Digital Ethics Lab Oxford • RAND Cooperation • Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security and Defence, Kyiv • Centre of Excellence for countering Hybrid Threats, Helsinki • George Mason University, Manassas, USA • Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway • NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, Belgium • George Marshall Centre, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany • Defence Reform Advisory Board for Ukraine Member, Poland • Department of Technical Sciences and Informatics, University of Žilina, Slovakia • Northeastern University, Boston, US • Bundeswehr General Staff and Command College, Hamburg, Germany • Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, National University of Public Service, Hungary • Stockholm Free World Forum, Sweden • Ministry of Education, Paris, France • NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence, Latvia • NATO Integration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia • Office of the Prime-Minister Maia Sandu, Chisinau, Moldova • European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Helsinki, Finland • Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany • NATO Representation to Ukraine & Director, NATO Liaison Office, Ukraine • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine • Ministry for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine • Parliament Committee on Integration to the EU, Chairman, Ukraine • Strategic and Security Studies Group the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” Kyiv, Ukraine • National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine • Centre for International Security, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine • Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, Kyiv, Ukraine • National Defence University of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group

Mr. Frederic Labarre, Co-Chair and Mr. George Niculescu, Co-Chair

MISSION AND GOALS — The South Caucasus remains a region of acute interest to the PfP Consortium. The region’s conflicts, however, are highly challenging because of ethnic, economic, and energy considerations resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union almost thirty years ago. The Austrian Ministry of Defence and the Austrian National Defence Academy have risen to the challenge of positively influencing security decision-making in the South Caucasus within the PfP Consortium mission by re-establishing the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group (RSSC SG) in 2012.

The RSSC SG operates on a two-meeting schedule per year, based on the agenda developed by its two co-chairs. The RSSC SG brings together twice yearly some 35 participants per workshop from South Caucasus countries, from neighbouring Russia, and Turkey, from interested EU and NATO countries as well as from International Organisations. Representatives of the civil society from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have also participated in most cases. Since 2012, workshops have taken place in Reichenau/Rax, Austria, as well as in Tbilisi, Istanbul, Kyiv, Chisinau, Varna, Minsk, and Berlin.

The co-chairs, in consultation with the Austrian members of the PfP Consortium, have drawn up the following intermediate and long-term tasks for the RSSC SG aiming at South Caucasus-relevant goals:

1. Inclusive multinational and multidisciplinary participation, building on experts from all dimensions of the political-security spectrum of the core countries; Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, with the addition of Russia and Turkey. In parallel, attract international experts on regional stability from the main partner countries and institutions
(the EU, NATO, OSCE, UN, the US, and civil society agencies, as well as think tanks). The goal is to build local and regional ownership and trust within the RSSC SG, which can then radiate throughout the South Caucasus via common projects.

2. Building a virtual image of an integrated South Caucasus, as a strategic “persona” able to make collective decisions regarding regional security and economic development free from external pressure.

3. Support policy action and decision-making by Allied, Partner and South Caucasus officialdom.

4. Establish a core group of experts willing and able to work together on cooperative projects.

5. Development of trust among workshop participants, as well as in sponsors and moderators.

The RSSC SG in Numbers

Over the years, the RSSC SG has built an impressive network, uniting organizations, institutions, and individuals. Their numbers are ever increasing, because of the Study Group’s attractiveness and relevance.

Some 95 policy agencies, think tanks, and academies represented since the RSSC SG has resumed its activities. Below are some of the more prestigious names:

Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Policies, Yerevan
Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku
Carnegie Moscow Centre
Centre for International and Regional Policy, Saint-Petersburg
Chatham House, London
Diplomatic Academy, Moscow
Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels
European Geopolitical Forum, Brussels
Georgian Institute of Public Administration, Tbilisi
Goettingen University
Independent Centre for National and International Studies, Baku
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Yerevan
National Defence Research University, Yerevan
Middle East Technical University, Ankara
NATO Liaison Office, Tbilisi
Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow
Saint-Petersburg University
1. Extra funding generated thanks to the Dialogue of Civilizations’ Research Institute (DOC/RI, Berlin), supporting RSSC SG workshops. DOC/RI also generously provided a venue for the 19th RSSC SG workshop, held in Berlin, in April 2019.

2. A tenfold increase in participants; from 25 to 250 between 2012 and 2019. An increased roster augments the chances of the RSSC SG’s message being heard where it matters.

3. One former participant is now a close advisor to Armenian President Armen Sargsyan.

4. One former participant has been recently elected as member of the Azerbaijani Parliament.

OUTPUT

Two annual workshops bringing together a combined 74 experts on the South Caucasus in Berlin and in Reichenau. The topics of these workshops so far provided the opportunity for experts to present and develop creative ideas across the spectrum of regional stability, including peace-building and confidence-building measures in (post) conflict areas, such as: developing a sample media narrative and campaign that could prepare public opinion for the difficult decisions that South Caucasus political elite have to make regarding status and cooperation; explore a particular and strategic aspect of business in the South Caucasus, such as the role of energy in bringing about cooperation in the region; develop cooperatively an embryonic regional organization to manage and resolve issues related to energy politics and security as well as a workable model of institutional cooperation to mitigate and manage issues related to regional energy security; the changing role of Defence Institution Building in reshaping the current South Caucasus strategic context. The audience of the RSSC SG is composed of current South Caucasus strategic context.

The first goal was to generate inclusiveness in participation. This has been achieved already by 2015, with the addition of participants hailing from regions that are seeking formal independence from their parent states. Throughout most workshops, we have been able to ensure such representativeness, although this has not come without discomfort.

Another goal is to generate trust among participants and towards workshop organizers, co-chairs, and sponsors. This trust is in great part purchased thanks to Austria’s policy of neutrality and arms-length relationship with NATO. Participants have learned to rely on the co-chairs quick and impartial management of interactive discussions. Such trust enabled the RSSC SG to move towards another intermediate goal; to collaboratively produce seminal academic sources for use in South Caucasus academia. In 2017, RSSC SG participants resolved to develop a Reference Curriculum pertaining to Media Literacy, in the wake of the very successful 16th RSSC SG workshop “Between Fact and Fakery.” This demonstrates the level of trust and commitment of participants of the RSSC SG irrespective of origin. The hosting of these workshops should have taken place in 2019, but had to be postponed due to budgetary reasons. In addition, it was decided to move towards a “Best Practices Manual on Political/Strategic Communications and Information,” i.e., the production of a seminal textbook. The launch of this project will occur in 2020.

The long-term goal of the RSSC SG is to bring the conflicting parties together to establish the South Caucasus as a sui generis strategic counterpart. The anticipated utility of this outcome would be to enable all PfP Consortium stakeholders to conduct business with a larger integrated market and bring more predictability to policy, as well as more coherence by having established a comprehensive network responsive to their needs. From a track-two diplomacy perspective, the ability of the co-chairs to generate this outcome is limited. However, they have been able to leverage recent geo-political changes both within and around the South Caucasus. This confirms the transformation of the RSSC SG from Study Group to bona fide track-two diplomacy platform. This had been a trend that was palpable for several years already.

As was reported last year, for example, a “crisis hotline” now links Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to manage crises. It has been reliably validated that the RSSC SG may have inspired this move. The last PPFC Annual Report stated that this represented a paradigm shift in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. In 2019, multiple references to this hotline have been made by workshop participants, who credit it for the general improvement in relations.

...The first goal was to generate inclusiveness in participation...
Independent reporting has calculated that 2019 was the most peaceful year in 25 years between the two countries. Furthermore, the co-chairs have noted that officials from Armenia and Azerbaijan have been meeting with increasing frequency, and for longer periods, both bilaterally and in the OSCE Minsk Group format. On January 30, 2020, a Joint Statement from the OSCE Minsk Group stated that the parties were actively looking for ways to “prepare their populations for peace”, once again lifting wording used during the 14th and 16th RSSC SG workshops. This is further evidence that the narrative promoted within the RSSC SG network is reaching official ears.

Again this year, however, the RSSC SG has been the target of sharp criticism by one country party to the Study Group when a leak caused by an invitee – in contravention to Chatham House rules, of which that person had been informed – reached his parent country’s government. This criticism has reached PfP Consortium and Austrian decision spheres prompting the application of a swift response and remedy in the form of the disinvitation of that individual, and they are being striken from the roster. The co-chairs have agreed to mitigate eventual future controversies by ensuring that non-parent country points of view could be delivered by experts who do not hail from the South Caucasus.

Participants and organizational partners are continuously keen to provide further contacts to increase the RSSC SG network and to provide services to facilitate the work of the RSSC SG. This is how the Study Group got formally introduced to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in November 2019.

The Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group’s activities are strategically relevant because the region finds itself at the intersection of powerful geopolitical contenders; the European Union, Russia, and Turkey. Iran plays an increasing role. The United States also has powerful interests at stake in the region, not least energy-related, but also geopolitically, as it struggles to maintain its dwindling credibility as an honest broker and credible deterrent against Russian and Turkish pretensions in the region.

The activities of the RSSC SG are linked to statements of interests as expressed by repeated NATO Summit communiqués, particularly regarding NATO’s Open Door policy. The RSSC SG is also linked to the EU through the External Action Service’s policy on the South Caucasus. Finally, the RSSC SG maintains linkage with United States policy documentation pertaining in particular to institutional capacity building (formerly defence institution building).
The 19th RSSC SG workshop on “Geopolitical Challenges of European Security in the South Caucasus and Ukraine” was held on 11-14 April 2019, at the Head-office of the “Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute” in Berlin (Germany). It picked up from where the 17th RSSC SG workshop in Minsk (Belarus) left off in discussing the geopolitical pressures on the South Caucasus. Whereas in Minsk the discussion focused on what kind of European security architecture could be engendered by geopolitical challenges. In Berlin the role of external actors in stabilizing (or not) the South Caucasus was debated.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS WORKSHOP WAS TWO FOLD:

• To widen the scope for appreciation of new actors (or competitors) who may have entered the geopolitical scene in the South Caucasus. What would be the situation when other actors started competing for influence in what was for centuries Russia’s and Turkey’s battle-ground, and Europe’s and the US’ most recent ambition for reforms to “Westernization”? Since not every influence was beneficial, the potential for further regional destabilization was also considered. In particular, the workshop attempted at tracing links between the efforts for conflict resolution in Ukraine and in the South Caucasus, thereby assessing recent, and aiming to forecast future, developments in European security.

At the end of the day, there was a broad agreement shared by most workshop participants that conflict management and resolution in the South Caucasus and in Ukraine were increasingly difficult due to the currently worsening shape of European and global security, and due to the absence of clear signs for their prospective recovery. In this changing global and European context, external actors could hardly play a significant role or exert major influence on the South Caucasus states and Ukraine in their efforts to respond to geopolitical challenges to (global and) European security.

• To assess developments in European security since the previous (April 2018) workshop in Minsk, and to discuss steps towards building a new regional order in the Eastern European neighbourhood. The initial assumption around which the workshop discussion was built, pointed to a new regional order underpinning a joint Russian-Western commitment to respecting the current membership of existing institutions, and joint efforts to define a framework for the regional integration of non-member states, as well as a template for how both Russia and the West can relate to such a state without producing conflict.

The first two panels of this workshop looked in detail at external actors (who entered the scene besides Russia, Turkey, and the West) and at how individual regional states could respond the in-roads made by those external actors. Looking at the same topics from a different perspective, the last panel was actually meant to trace links between the attempts at conflict resolution in Ukraine and in the South Caucasus, thereby assessing recent, and aiming to forecast future, developments in European security.

NEVERTHELESS, THE FOLLOWING TARGETED RECOMMENDATIONS WERE UNANIMOUSLY AGREED UPON:

• Establish a dedicated (preferably OSCE-based) platform where regional experts operating in a track-2 capacity can discuss the more difficult features of the conflict, examine scenarios for resolution and stabilization, and propose options to official circles.

• Pay closer attention to the humanitarian situations in conflict zones.

• Stimulate foreign direct investment across dividing lines, especially concerning infrastructure and energy projects.

• De-ethnicize the conflict, de-escalate hatred by countering aggressive language and hate speech in the media.

• Accentuate step-by-step demilitarization processes and other confidence-building measures.

The 20th RSSC Workshop on “Concrete Steps to Break the Deadlocks in the South Caucasus” was held on 07-10 November 2019, at Chateau Rothschild in Reichenau/Rax (Austria). It was meant to resume the program initiated under the guidance of the Austrian National Defence Academy, which aimed at opening up space for dialogue on ever-narrowing subjects that pose a challenge to constructive conflict resolution. This workshop examined several aspects of each regional conflict and leveraged the good relationships built over the last several years among core RSSC SG participants to push original conflict resolution ideas further. It was expected that by exploring particular aspects of conflict resolution, such as the commitment of all parties to the non-use of force and good neighbourly relations, conditions might be created to tackle thorny issues, such as that of status definition, and thereby breaking the current deadlocks. To that end, the co-chairs have invited speakers to describe existing peace proposals or elic-
The panels have demonstrated that participants were not short of ideas for building scenarios leading to breaking the deadlocks towards regional stability and peace in the South Caucasus. Speakers have put forward a number of drivers of change, which might be used in planning strategies leading the various regional actors from now towards a peaceful future in the South Caucasus region. They have also highlighted the constraints preventing the achievement of the desired outcomes.

THE FOLLOWING TARGETED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS WERE CONSENSUALLY AGREED AMONG PARTICIPANTS TO THE WORKSHOP:

- Update, renew, or create the institutional, legal, and doctrinal parameters for conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. Regional networks and platforms for exchange should be promoted, or created, for example, Women’s Associations, South Caucasus Public Chambers, etc. and should remain apolitical and project based.
- Focus on commonly-agreed status-free risks and threats, which can be tackled technically and administratively, without identity-based impediments.
- Commit to seeing proposals through (including older ones), focusing on inclusive (grass roots and gender sensitive) track 2, and track 3 approaches.
- De-link administrative and technical dialogue and concerns from identity markers.
- Ensure that international organizations review their modus operandi to reinforce local ownership of the peace process and remain engaged until trust is assured among parties.

In 2020 the RSSC SG will focus its policy and research orientation on two workshops:

- The 21st RSSC SG workshop to the title “Peacebuilding through Economic and Infrastructure Integration in the South Caucasus” will take place August 2020, in Tbilisi, Georgia.
- The 22nd RSSC Workshop from November 2020 in Reichenau/Rax, Austria, will focus on “Hybrid Warfare Resilience as Key to South Caucasus Stability.”

As hinted above, 2020 will see the launch of the Best Practices Manual in Strategic Communications (BPM StratCom) project (described above) June 2020, and 3-5 November 2020 (provisionally). The aim is to get this project completed by the end of calendar year 2021.

Finally, the co-chairs and sponsors of the RSSC SG will consider carefully the long-standing objectives of the RSSC SG, such as gradually managing the identification and transfer of partial chairmanship responsibilities to South Caucasus nationals.
MISSION AND GOALS — In December 1999, Austria initiated the establishment of the Working Group ‘Crisis Management in South East Europe (SEE)’ during the second Annual Conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes held in Sofia. The study group, conceptually conceived within the Austrian National Defence Academy, was co-sponsored by the Austrian Ministry of Defence with the aim to create a confidence-building platform that will facilitate the exchange of different views in a sensitive post-conflict environment. While in the first two years, the group was in the process of soul searching, it acquired its current name and shape in 2002. The change reflected wider developments in the region and the birth of a nascent security community in the Western Balkans (WB). The term ‘crisis management’ was replaced with ‘regional stability’ because the risk of military crises was minimized if not entirely overcome.

Participants, Partner Institutions and Topics

Since 2000, the Study Group organized 39 workshops, two per year, one of which traditionally takes place in Reichenau/Rax in Austria and one in the region. Over the years, the study group gathered more than 500 scholars, policy makers from state institutions, EU, NATO, OSCE and UN representatives, media professionals, and civil society activists. The Study Group has three co-chairs, one from Austria and two from the region, Serbia and Croatia, thus increasing the sense of regional ownership.
intervention to EU accession. Geographically, the interest narrowed down from wider SEE to the WB region, tied by security-political interdependence related to the unresolved issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as well as burdened intra-regional relations. Like Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia joined NATO, and the EU, the only remaining part of the Balkan Peninsula which has not been completely integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security community is the WB (Albania and Montenegro are NATO members).

Topics of the workshops cover the widest scope of issues relevant for security-community building including democratization, multi-ethnicity, institution building (defence sector and others), state weakness, regional cooperation, conflict transformation and peace-building, organized crime, economic security, reconciliation, international presence, transformation of armed forces, human trafficking, security sector reform, NATO and EU accession, post-conflict reconstruction, best practices & lessons learned (intra-regional processes and international support), security challenges and threats, open political issues that have a security dimension, geopolitical influences, frozen conflicts, transitional justice mechanisms and many others. Over the years, the focus of discussions within the study group gradually switched from NATO

Core partner institutions that contribute permanently and/or act as co-organizers of workshops are:

Institute for Development and International Relations (Zagreb, Croatian co-chair)
Faculty of Political Sciences/University of Belgrade (Serbian co-chair)
Austrian National Defence Academy (Vienna, Austrian co-chair)
Albanian Institute for International Studies (Tirana)
Centre for Security Studies (Sarajevo)
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Institute for Security and International Studies (Sofia)
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (Pristina)
Institute for Development Policy (Pristina)
NGO Aktiv (Kosovska Mitrovica)
EUROTHINK (Skopje)
Analytica (Skopje)
Atlantic Council of Montenegro (Podgorica)
Bahcesehir University (Istanbul)

OUTCOME

The study group produces two types of publications: longer conference proceedings and shorter policy papers with recommendations consensually reached during the workshops. The Austrian Ministry of Defence publishes all the conference proceedings and conclusions within its Study Group Information series (www.bundesheer.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/doktyp.php?id=7). The aim of publications is to diffuse the ideas produced within the study group and influence policy making.

Workshops are attended by approximately 35 to 45 participants, out of whom at least around one third is always new to the Consortium and the study group. Approximately one third of the participants are state or international organization officials, one third are scholars, and one third work for CSOs. Each meeting ends with the drafting of policy recommendations that are being published shortly afterwards. Workshops are held under the Chatham House Rule. They are structured in a similar way with keynote lectures at the beginning, followed by panel discussions and ending with interactive debate on policy recommendations.

ADDED VALUE, INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

The Study Group makes a unique added value to regional stability in a number of important ways. To begin with, it provides the Euro-Atlantic defence and security policy community with a continuous source of expert insight into the region of strategic importance through regular meetings, reports, policy papers, publications and personal contact. The Study Group is a forum in which high-ranking representatives of state institutions stemming from all Western Balkan states, as well as burdened intra-regional relations. Like Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia joined NATO, and the EU, the only remaining part of the Balkan Peninsula which has not been completely integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security community is the WB (Albania and Montenegro are NATO members).

Against the background of the recent deterioration in intra-regional relations, a second aspect, the maintenance of good contacts between governmental and non-governmental institutions stemming from all Western Balkan states remains equally important.

Thirdly, the Study Group has served as a very flexible and inclusive track-two diplomacy mechanism. To give an example: since its foundation in 2000, the Study Group has served as a meeting place for politicians from Kosovo and Serbia who are open to discourse, as well as for representatives of think tanks from these two countries, who are often active in political consulting for both their governments and international actors. The continuous presence of representatives from Belgrade, Pristina and also moderate representatives of the Kosovo Serbs at the meetings of the Study Group
makes it possible to explore the possibilities for win-win situations in this still difficult conflict constellation in 2020.

This insider knowledge of social developments and moods also enables the Study Group to make profound assessments of proposals towards decision makers and to submit its proposals to international stakeholders. For example, the Study Group, including its representatives from Belgrade and Pristina as well as Serbian representatives from Kosovo, has been very critical of “solution proposals” of recent years, which believe that the normalization of relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians could be achieved by territorial exchange and ethnic shifts. Instead, the Study Group argues for a European solution with strong measures to bring Serbia and Kosovo closer to the EU, including a profound economic development plan, in order to prevent discrimination and further uprooting of individuals and national communities.

Additionally, the Study Group has also served as an instrument of promoting young and coming decision makers, activists and academics from the region sharing liberal values and “Western” security policy views. Beside many others, one of the most recent examples has been Dane Taleski, a longstanding core partner of the Study Group from North Macedonia, who has been appointed the foreign policy advisor of the former Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in spring 2017, who achieved an agreement with his Greek counterpart that terminated the longstanding “name dispute” of the two neighbouring countries in 2018.
SEE, and in particular, the semi-consolidated WB has become a region of different geopolitical influences and interests. They can be recognized in the political, cultural, religious, economic and security area. The European Union (EU), which has made her mark on regional transition during the last twenty years, is not the only relevant international player in the field anymore. In addition to the “Western” actors – the EU, U.S. and NATO – Russia, Turkey, China and the Gulf states seem have reinforced their presence in SEE.

Against this background, it seems that Russia and China are competing strategically with the West for political and economic influence in SEE with only partly overlapping motives among themselves. While Russia seeks to preserve and increase its “great political power” status in SEE, China is perceived to be a rising economic power in the region, keen to be acknowledged and respected as a major global player in an area, where it has never played a significant role.

Thru its engagements in the Balkan region, Russia seems to pursue a politically hostile strategy against the West in general. The prospect of narrowing the gaps between the West and Russia in regard to their policies towards SEE primarily depends on achieving substantial progress in terminating the Ukraine conflict and its consequences in a wider international environment. However, such a positive development is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future.

Unlike Russia, China officially emphasizes its policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Yet, it has not been clear whether it plans to stipulate conditions to its involvement in South East Europe which may result in a long-term political and financial dependency on China.

Notwithstanding its political frictions with the US and the EU, Turkey still supports the integration of WB countries into NATO and EU. However, for nationalistic and conservative circles in the Islamic communities of the WB, President Recep Erdoğan’s authoritarian political style signals Neo-Ottoman ambitions which they find attractive.

While Arab investments are mainly welcome in the region, even in countries with a non-Muslim majority population such as Serbia, concerns exist in relation to possible negative long-term impacts on the cultural and religious identity of WB Muslims. A majority of the latter follow tolerant interpretations of Islam and co-exist peacefully with non-Muslims.

The opportunities to support consolidation policies toward the WB countries amid a dynamic inter-national environment were discussed in this workshop.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED BY THE PARTICIPANTS ADDRESSED AMONG OTHERS THE FOLLOWING PLAYERS:

- EU and US government: Accentuate the strategic alliance in SEE and the WB.
- EU and US government: Offer adequate funding possibilities to WB states for strategic infrastructure projects in order to avoid suspicious Chinese investments.
- EU and US government: Proactively use public diplomacy tools for communicating western investments and donations in the WB.
- EU: Include the US in the relevant EU-driven formats for the WB (Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the “Berlin-Process”).
- EU: Impose “smart sanctions” to tackle corrupt politicians in the WB.
- EU and WB: Reinforce the “Energy Community” as an active player.
- EU and WB governments: Establish monitoring mechanisms to review the legal, economic and environmental compatibility of external investments and loans with the “Aquis Communautaire”.
- WB governments: Diversify FDIs and energy supply sources.
- WB governments: Implement strict guidelines for asset management in strategic sectors.

The 39th RSSEE Workshop on “Croatia’s Upcoming EU Presidency – A Catalyst for South East Europe?” was convened from 26 to 29 September 2019 in Split, Croatia. The Republic of Croatia was about to assume its first Presidency of the EU Council in January 2020. It has been an extraordinary opportunity for the EU’s youngest member state to substantially contribute to various EU policies by setting adequate and implementable priorities for this period. Beside dealing with overall challenges important for the EU (e.g. consequences of the Brexit, etc.), it has been expected that the Croatian Presidency of the EU Council will undoubtedly invest an additional effort in improving the recently deteriorating enlargement perspectives of its Western Balkan neighbours which still face large challenges in regard to fulfilling “Copenhagen Criteria” and reaching constructive intra-regional relations in SEE/the WB.

THE WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS ANALYZED AND DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING GUIDING QUESTIONS:

- To what extent can the Croatian Presidency of the EU Council be a catalyst for the further reform process in the region that could potentially foster the EU integration process and lead to the resolution of pending issues and long-term consolidation of this part of Europe.
- What are potential opportunities and challenges for Croatia in the first half of 2020, and how can its efforts help yielding concrete results in reform processes in the WB?
- How can Croatia advocate within the EU for a stronger commitment to further enlargement towards the WB?
- What are realistic perspectives for the process to regain pace in post-election EU, which is
burdened with geopolitical competition and decreasing relevance of its normative power in the region?

- How do political decision makers and representatives of relevant civil society organizations in SEE perceive the opportunities and challenges for the forthcoming Croatian Presidency of the EU Council?

- What are the experiences of those who presided the Council recently, especially when it comes to challenges in the WB?

Following this topical outline, the 31 workshop participants drafted concrete recommendations to regional and international decision makers, e.g.:

**CROATIAN PRESIDENCY:**

- Reinvigorate EU’s key role as supporter of consolidation in South East Europe (SEE) before and at the Zagreb Summit 2020.

- Approach the SEE region as a group (Western Balkans6 /WB6), coach them on their way towards accession.

- Start a dialogue with skeptical EU members on further enlargement.

- Stress the importance of rule of law and democratic criteria inside the EU and toward SEE candidate countries.

- Use the Presidency to improve relations with the countries in the region.

- Fix a balanced approach between humanitarian and security aspects of migration and promote reform of the asylum system.

- Have a continuous public communication about the priorities and measures of your Presidency.

**SEE COUNTRIES:**

- Pursue a possible group strategy towards accession, addressing EU national parliaments.

**EU:**

- Re-evaluate the enlargement process in favour of the EU and the WB6.

- Offer a ‘membership-lite’ option to SEE before full membership will be reached.

- Invest in coaching SEE countries and extend candidacy status to all WB6.

- Quickly open negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, as well as Serbia’s and Montenegro’s remaining chapters.

- Strictly observe the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria.

**US:**

- Revitalize ‘the NATO Quint’ and harmonize the Balkan policies with the EU to move SEE forward.

- Encourage SEE countries to cooperate before their chances of accession fade away.
The Way Ahead

In 2020, the RSSEE SG will focus its policy and research orientation on “South East Europe and European Integration 4.0 – Fragility vs. Chances” in its 40th Austrian-based workshop from 7 to 10 May 2020 in Reichenau/Rax.

At the 41st RSSEE regional workshop in September 2020 in Skopje, North Macedonia, the Study Group in cooperation with a local partner will focus on “Regional Security Cooperation in South East Europe in View of North Macedonia’s NATO Accession.”
CORE OBJECTIVE AND MAIN GOAL — The Security Sector Working Group (SSR WG) is guided by the core objective to strengthen the governance of national security sectors in accordance with international norms and good practices, and in response to local contexts and challenges, with the final goal to improve the security for the states and its peoples within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. To this end, the SSR WG contributes to achieving the overall vision of the Partnership for Peace Consortium to empower partner nations’ capacity to assess, prevent and address common transnational threats and challenges, recognizing that a sustainable strengthening of the effectiveness and accountability of security, as well as defense sectors, contributes to common stability and the prevention of conflict.

In order to strengthen the governance of national security sectors, the SSR WG contributes to efforts of the international assistance community to empower national key stakeholders to effectively implement and/or support inclusive and participatory security sector reforms.

To this end, the SSR WG facilitates cooperation in joint research, outreach, and expert training initiatives; encourages collaboration among international information networks and enhances the exchange of ideas, insights, expertise, knowledge and best practices of security sector reform processes between consolidating and consolidated democracies in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The SSR WG is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, and chaired by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.

How does the SSR WG contribute to achieving the core objective?

In order to strengthen the governance of national security sectors, the SSR WG contributes to efforts of the international assistance community to empower national key stakeholders to effectively implement and/or support inclusive and participatory security sector reforms.

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The SSR WG is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, and chaired by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.
Target Groups
The SSR WG works with members and staff of National Parliaments, executive branches, security sector institutions, independent oversight institutions, and civil society organizations.

SSR WG programming: Addressing needs and conditions for sustainable reforms
What needs to happen in order for key national stakeholders to move forward with reforming their security sectors in line with international norms and standards? The SSR WG identified the following needs as basis for its programming:

• Key stakeholders for reform need to develop their capacities and skills in order to contribute to reform processes within their institutions.

• Security sector institutions and their line ministries need to be governed and coordinated in a way that they can undertake or support enhanced efforts to improve security sector governance.

• Civil society, media, the private sector, and other non-governmental bodies need to be empowered in order to contribute, in a well-informed manner, efforts dedicated to reform domestic security sectors.

• Key stakeholders for reform – including security sector and oversight actors need to be empowered to develop their legal and policy frameworks, and take policy decisions in line with guiding norms and good practices for improving security sector governance.

• Key stakeholders for reform need to get access to, and actively draw on, internationally recognized research and guidance products when they engage in and/or support activities aimed at improving security sector governance.

• In order to ensure a wide-spread societal buy into international norms and standards for security sector reform on local, regional and international level, key stakeholders for reform need to be empowered to actively engage in the promotion of norms, standards and good practice for improving security sector governance and by doing so contribute to confidence-building.

SSR WG - Main Activity Lines, Outputs and expected long-term outcome
What does the SSR Working Group (separately and/or in cooperation with other PfPC Working Groups) do to address the above described needs?

• The SSR WG provides capacity building on individual, institutional, and societal level. As a result of SSR WG activities, security sector and oversight actors have enhanced capacities and skills to contribute to reform processes. Activities also address institutional structures and processes as framework conditions for reform. A dedicated strand of SSR WG activities provides civil society, including non-governmental organizations and research outlets, with access to independent expertise and information.

• The SSR WG provides within its activities legal and policy advice. As a result, policy makers have enhanced knowledge and expertise in order to develop their legal and policy frameworks and take policy decisions in line with guiding norms and good practices for improving security sector governance.

• The SSR WG develops research products and guidance material which fill knowledge gaps and inform conceptual debates. Research and guidance products are openly accessible and translated into various languages as relevant. As a result, key stakeholders for reform have access to independent information and guidance for engagement in reform processes.
• SSR WG activities facilitate the transfer of norms and good practices. As a result, key stakeholders have increased awareness of guiding norms and good practices and higher appreciation of the importance of democratic security sector governance. They are enabled to engage in norms promotion and can perform as multipliers on national, regional, and international levels. By doing so, they contribute to confidence-building (towards national stakeholders as well as regional counterparts).

The above described outputs are meant to contribute to achieving the following expected long-term outcome: the effective implementation by national stakeholders of inclusive and participatory security sector reforms in line with international norms and standards.

Use of Synergies - Cooperation with PPIC Working Groups

The SSR WG closely cooperates with other PPIC Working Groups, most of all the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus (RSSC WG) and the Regional Stability in Southeast Europe Working Groups (RSSE WG) to address needs and achieve results as described above.

Approach and Methodology

The SSR WG applies the following approach:

• Local ownership
Beneficiaries are contributing to needs assessment, conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of activities.

• Coordination and synergy
Dialogue and cooperation with other assistance providers to make use of synergies and avoid overlap.

• Provide long-term sustainability
Inclusion of civil society organizations, parliamentary staff, and independent organizations ensures sustainability of knowledge-transfer.

• Mainstreaming gender equality
Input provided in a gender sensitive way, putting gender-specific issues and implications onto the agenda.

• Co-Learning Approach
Peer development and transfer of knowledge among counterparts from consolidating and achieved democracies in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Achievements, remaining deficits, and needs for continued support:

Achievements
We have witnessed among key stakeholders for reform, participating in SSR WG activities:

• Increased awareness of guiding norms and good practices
• Increased levels of expertise in security sector legislation and oversight
• Increased participation in regional exchange and norms promotion
• Increased focus on oversight in committee deliberations and in the use of oversight tools
• Enhanced capacities on the part of civil society organizations to participate in policy debates relating to the security sector

Increased access to, and drawing on, customized guidance material and knowledge-products

Needs for continued support
There is a clear need for continued support in the following areas:

• Need for continued capacity development of key security sector and oversight actors
• Need for continued support to parliaments in the frame of law drafting and review processes, as well as oversight processes
• Need to encourage political will and commitment to move forward with reforms
• Need to involve sector and oversight actors in regional and international exchange and knowledge-transfer
• Need to empower civil society organizations further to engage in an informed exchange with security sector actors
• Need to support gender mainstreaming in the security sector
• Need to support integrity building in the security sector

not sufficiently developed (most often linked to narratives of national security priorities).

• Post-soviet legal frameworks are prevailing. Need to further harmonize legal frameworks with international norms and standards.

• High turnover of members and staff of parliamentary committees after elections, entailing loss of expertise.

• No systematic approach to integrity building in the security sector in place yet.

• Limited career development for women in security sector institutions.

• Involvement of civil society organizations in policy debates, law drafting, and oversight processes still limited. CSOs focus on sectorial elements rather than on SSR in a holistic way.

Strand One
Empowering civil society organizations to foster an informed exchange between security sector actors and citizens at the national and regional level

This support strand addresses one of the key needs as described in the “Remaining deficits” and “Needs for support” sections above and foresees multi-year assistance dedicated to informal oversight actors, with a particular focus on civil society organizations.

From 2-4 July 2019, the SSR WG organized a seminar entitled: “Strengthening Civil Society in the Context of Defence and Security Transparency.” The event took place in Kyiv, Ukraine, and addressed 24 representatives of leading CSOs working on Security Sector Reform and Governance in the post-soviet space. The main purpose of the seminar was to enhance knowledge on SSR/G and to provide a platform for regional exchange on best practices in addressing security sector reform and for mapping constraints, entry-points, and challenges for CSOs working on SSR. The seminar furthermore provided an opportunity to network and build trust among the participants.

Outputs and expected longer-term outcome of support strand 1)

The seminar, as well as follow-on activities planned within this assistance strand, produce
the following outputs:

- Enhance capacities of CSOs to advocate for and support SSR processes
- Enable CSOs to identify entry points for SSR programming in their countries and to identify challenges to SSR in the territory of the former Soviet Union
- Enable CSOs to build a network of like-minded institutions for future regional cooperation in the field of SSR/G
- Enhance understanding on behalf of the SSR WG on the needs and constraints of CSOs working on SSR in the post-soviet space as a basis for prospective activity planning

The expected outcome in the frame of long-term engagement with this target group is to enable CSOs to foster an informed exchange between security sector actors and citizens with quality research and advocacy at national and regional levels.

Results from the needs mapping

The exchange with the target group revealed the following main needs, which are planned to be addressed in future joint activities:

- The need to move away from sectorial approaches to SSR, and towards whole-of-sector approaches
- The need to better institutionalize SSR into educational programs and facilities across the post-soviet space
- The need for enhancing regional dialogue on SSR (with the help of regional CSO / multi-stakeholder platforms)
- The need for knowledge-transfer on SSR, particularly as regards intelligence reform

Event evaluation, progress monitoring, and follow-up exchanges

The seminar was evaluated with the help of a questionnaire. At the scale of 10 (the best) and 1 (the worst) grade, the participants evaluated the implementation of objectives of the workshop with an average grade of 9. The SSR WG conducts progress monitoring with the help of a follow-up questionnaire. Through informal exchanges, in order to establish whether the CSOs applied the knowledge, skills, and techniques they learned during the seminar in their professional capacity. In the meantime, several CSOs have engaged in joint follow-on projects with DCAF, relating to security sector governance and oversight in their specific country contexts (e.g., in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Armenia).

Strand Two

Empowering parliaments to play a more effective role in the democratic oversight of their security sectors and to engage in regional exchange and knowledge-transfer

This support strand addresses another major need as described in the “Remaining deficits” and “Needs for support” sections above and foresees multi-year assistance dedicated to members and staff of parliamentary defense and security committees.

On 17-18 September 2019, the SSR WG launched a Regional Parliamentary Dialogue on the “Role of Parliament in Security Sector Governance and Oversight.” About 20 representatives of parliamentary defense and security committees from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan participated in the event that took place in Geneva, Switzerland. The main purpose was to create a platform that allows for the exchange of norms, standards, and best practices in the field of parliamentary security sector oversight and to facilitate knowledge transfer, and exchange of lessons learned on topics of particular relevance for parliaments in the target countries.

The seminar covered a broad array of topics related to the mandates of defense and secu-
rity parliamentary committees, including i) the conceptual and practical elements of Parliamentary Oversight, as well as strategies to improve it; ii) Intelligence Governance and Access to Classified Information; iii) the role of Parliaments in Overseeing Measures to Counter and Prevent Violent Extremism; iv) the role of Parliaments in Security Sector Budgeting and v) Human Rights Protection in the Armed Forces, and the role of Ombudsman Institutions.

Given the diverse regions and countries represented during the conference, the co-learning approach helped to introduce some delegations to the concept of democratic security sector governance, while others, who had been already familiar with respective norms and standards, could deepen and apply their knowledge in the plenary discussions. Efforts were also made to facilitate exchanges on practical challenges faced in overseeing the security sector in order to identify common needs and possible avenues for assistance.

**Outputs and expected longer-term outcome of support strand 2**

The seminar, as well as follow-on activities planned within this assistance strand, produce the following outputs:

- Familiarise parliamentary delegations with the concept of democratic security sector governance
- Enhance knowledge of the key target group on norms, standards and good practices for parliamentary security sector oversight
- Increase knowledge on topics of particular relevance for the target countries: in particular intelligence governance, human rights in the security sector, prevention of violent extremism, regulation of information classification, etc.
- Provide access to guidance material produced by DCAF and the PfPC, from which the target group can draw when undertaking or supporting activities to improve security sector governance
- Increase trust and confidence among parliamentary delegations from states currently in conflict (i.e., Armenia and Azerbaijan; or Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)

The expected outcome in the frame of longer-term engagement with this target group is to enable parliaments to play a more effective role in the democratic oversight of their security sectors by harmonizing relevant legislation with international norms and standards, by applying best practices in security sector oversight and by monitoring implementation of legal and policy frameworks, and to facilitate regional parliamentary dialogue through knowledge-transfer across parliaments and by doing so, contribute to confidence and peace-building.

**Progress monitoring and follow-up exchanges**

In order to monitor progress, the SSR WG undertakes regular exchanges with members and staff of parliamentary delegations in the frame of existing DCAF assistance projects. All parliamentary delegations expressed their wish to continue the cooperation under the PfPC format and underscored the need to discuss various topics, in particular, access to classified information, and oversight of intelligence services in the frame of future exchanges.

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**Highlights of 2019**

The following list demonstrates the success of the SSR WG’s efforts.

Way ahead

**In 2020 and beyond**, the SSR WG will continue supporting security sector reform and good governance programming in NATO Partner states, mainly by capitalizing on the platforms created in 2019. The SSR WG will continue supporting regional parliamentary dialogue and empower CSOs as informal oversight actors by addressing priority topics for each target group as defined at the 2019 launch events (see above) and, by doing so, work towards the achievement of outputs and long-term outcomes as listed above.

The SSR WG intends to closely cooperate with the RSSC Working Group in 2020 and beyond, in particular in the frame of support strand 1) dedicated to empowering civil society organizations. In the spirit of the PfPC, the SSR WG will continue to consolidate its community of practice, build networks, foster regional dialogue, and build institutional and societal resilience, thereby contributing to the preservation of peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

At the time of report drafting, SSR WG activity planning for 2020 has been considerably affected by Covid-19. The 2nd regional parliamentary platform event (as part of strand 2 as described above), originally foreseen for March 2020, had to be postponed. At the time of writing, it is not clear when activity implementation can resume. The SSR WG hopes to be able to implement the regional parliamentary platform event in the 2nd half of 2020. A follow-on activity for civil society organizations from the Eastern Neighbourhood region (as part of strand 1 as described above) shall be organized jointly with the RSSC WG in November 2020. The seminar shall focus on “Achievements, Needs, and Challenges for the Future” with a topical focus on “Human Rights in the Armed Forces.”

In 2021, the SSR WG intends to contribute to the Women Peace and Security Agenda in target countries within the support strands, as described above.

**APPENDICES**

**MEETINGS IN 2019**

- PfPC SSR WG seminar: “Strengthening Civil Society in the Context of Defence and Security Transparency”, Kyiv, Ukraine
- PfPC SSR WG Regional Parliamentary Dialogue on the “Role of Parliament in Security Sector Governance and Oversight”, Geneva, Switzerland
- CSC Meeting in February in Sofia, Bulgaria
- CSC/SAC Meeting in November in Vienna, Austria

**KEY INSTITUTIONS PARTNERED WITH IN 2019**

- Committee on Defence and Security, National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia
- Committee on Defence and Security, National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia
- Milli Majlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan
- Committee on Defense and Security, Parliament of Georgia
- Committee on Defence and Law Enforcement, Hungarian National Assembly
- Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic
- Committee on National Security and Defence, Parliament of Lithuania
- Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of Romania
- Committee on the Rule of Law, Defense and Security of the Majlisi Oli of Republic of Tajikistan
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (CACDS), Ukraine
- Center for Innovations in Open Governance, Armenia
- Civil Council on Defence and Security (CCDS), Georgia
- EMC Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center, Georgia
- European Private University EWSIE, Warsaw
- Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), Georgia
- Human Rights Matter (HMR), Germany
- Information and Documentation Center on NATO in Moldova
- Institute for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, National Defence Academy, Austria
- Institute for Public Policy (IPP), Moldova
- International University of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan
- Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
- Office for Civil Freedoms, Tajikistan
- Peace and Conflict Resolution Center, Azerbaijan
- Peace Dialogue, Armenia
- Statewatch, Ukraine
- The Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO), Ukraine
- Ukrainian Association of Women in Law Enforcement (UAWLE)
**PIP CONSORTIUM OPERATIONAL STAFF 2019**

Dr. Raphael Perl  
**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

Olaf Garlich  
**DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

Marcel Szalai  
**INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER**

Zoltan Homonnay  
**INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER**

Juergen Eise  
**PROGRAM MANAGER ASSISTANT**

Elena Danilov  
**OPERATIONS SPECIALIST**

**Maria Donnelly**  
**INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER**

**Stefan Sprenger**  
**EVENT COORDINATOR**

**Olaf Garlich**  
**DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

**Marcel Szalai**  
**INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER**

**Juergen Eise**  
**PROGRAM MANAGER ASSISTANT**

**Elena Danilov**  
**OPERATIONS SPECIALIST**

**Maria Donnelly**  
**INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER**

**Stefan Sprenger**  
**EVENT COORDINATOR**

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**PIP BUDGET 2019 (US FISCAL YEAR)**

- **DEEP** $871,648.46 56%
- **Conferences** $464,468.41 30%
- **Staff** $22,640.00 14%

**US WIF MONEY AND STAKEHOLDER IN KIND CONTRIBUTIONS**

- **Austria** $247,950
- **Bulgaria** $11,200
- **Germany** $500,000
- **Switzerland** $135,500
- **USA** $1,562,500
- **Canada, Denmark, Poland, NATO IS** $500,000