END OF EMPIRES:
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY
AND STATEHOOD IN FLUX

Papers from the 9th Annual Conference of the
Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group

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# End of Empires: Challenges to Security and Statehood in Flux

## Contents

**Preface to the Conference Anthology**, by Dr. Hans-Hubertus Mack, Colonel (GS) and Deputy Director, Military History Research Institute, Potsdam, Germany  ... vi

**Part One: End of Empires and Map Changes -- Birth of New States**

Two Crumbling Empires – One Balkan Region: Ottoman Empire’s and Austro-Hungary’s Military Presence in Sandzak Novi Pazar/Plevlje, 1879-1908, by Tamara Scheer  ... 1

New State and the Issue of Defense: The Army of the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians in the Autumn of 1918, by Damijan Gustin and Vladimir Prebilic  ... 13

The End of Empires and State Building in East and Central Europe: Prolegomena for a Discussion, by Sergiu Iosipescu  ... 21

Polish Radio Intelligence, 1918-1920: Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German Empires’ Heritage, by Grzegorz Nowik  ... 35

**Part Two: End of Wars -- Military Transformation**

Rising and Significance of the Austrian Public Militia (*Volkswehr*) in 1918 and 1919, by M. Christian Ortner  ... 43

Missed Opportunities? The Failure to Build Up Reliable Armed Forces after the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918, by Michael Epkenhans  ... 46

Foreign Influence on the Development of Yugoslav Military Doctrine on Armored Units, 1918-1941, by Dalibor Denda  ... 53

The Call of Duty? German Soldiers, POWs, and Women in the Last Year of the Second World War, by John Zimmermann  ... 66
### Part Three: Military Transformation, National Identity, and Security Interests

Slovakia’s Military Identity in the Twentieth Century, by Marek Mesko, Frantisek Csefalvay, and Jan Staigl . . . . 79
Collective Security: National Egotism, by Kjeld Hald Galster . . 93

### Part Four: Resistance Movements, Military Interventions, and Peace Operations

Anglo-American Strategic Bombardment in South East Europe: Strategy and Politics, by Richard G. Davis . . . . . 107
The Role of the Military in Peace Operations: The UN Mission in Congo, 1960-1964, by Lars Ericson Wolke . . . . . . . 122

### Part Five: Inside and Between the Two Systems Poles

Total Defense in Total War: The Swedish Military and the Non-military Defense during the Cold War, by Per Iko . . . . . . . 156

### Part Six: Post-Cold War -- Statehood in Flux and Security

Russian Proposal on European Security Treaty (EST) and the Future of Collective Security System in Europe, by Tatyana Parkhalina . 163
After the Cold War: End of States; Birth of States, by Major General (R) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu . . . . . . . . . . 167
French Forces’ Tasks during the 2004 Stabilization of Cote D’Ivoire, by Olivier Liberge . . . . . . . . . . 178
Polish Military Contingents in International Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations between 1973 and 2009, by Dariusz Kozerawski . 183
Conference Concluding Remarks, by Major General (R) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu, Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Ministry of National Defense, Romania . 195

Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . 198

Appendix B. Conference Participants . . . . . 203

Appendix C. Conference Program . . . . . . 210

Preface to the Conference Anthology

by

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Dear Participants of the 9th Annual Conference of the Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Group,

As a co-organizer of this conference, I am very pleased that we have again succeeded in assembling such a large number of participants in one of the European capitals to address a topic which has become important to us over the last two decades either indirectly or directly. The topic “End of Empires: Challenges to Security and Statehood in Flux” is more relevant than ever.

This topic of a transnational view of history, which always should and must be regarded in a large overall context, vividly reflects the relationship between nation states and empires. While the empire is an invention of early high cultures and civilizations, the nation state is a secondary phenomenon whose character was formed in the late modern period. Only few nation-states are the result of congregations of smaller sovereign parts; we may consider, for instance, Italy, Germany or, to a certain degree, Switzerland to be such. It is more often a case of new nation-states emerging from a collapsing empire, and there are also many examples of this in Europe. The problems that may arise in this situation are emphatically revealed in the individual panels of this year’s conference.

In addition to the historical considerations that play a role in this process, the security perspective is above all of vital importance to our conference. In my opinion, the socialization of security -- as is the case in the European Union -- is a third way besides the nation-state and the empire. Although nation states continue to exist formally in this alliance, they have organized themselves on a supranational scale and have ceded parts of their sovereignty. Sometimes, the European Union has been referred to as a “benevolent empire” because of its peace effect. For decades, the European Union has continued along the path of expansion and consolidation. Although some voices can be heard saying that sight should not be lost of the pace of expansion, there can be no doubt that the integration of Europe is a cornerstone in the peaceful coexistence of the peoples in this region.

By meeting at this venue, we should each remember that dealing with all topics of our common history offers us a great opportunity. To address current and security-related topics among friends and like-minded people from the Euro-Atlantic nations and to present and take note of their different national interpretations offers us the chance to study history together and to jointly remember events that must not be forgotten. It is this which gives us all the competence to shape our common future with responsibility. Regular fora that may help to develop common basic ideas are of great internal benefit.
The form of our meeting can help us to find an innovative way to deal with the topics raised, even under difficult conditions. We should pay particular attention to allowing young academics from our countries to speak at such events and to encouraging them to get involved in the work of this plenum. In my opinion, we have succeeded very well in doing so this time in particular, and the results are promising. In times of financial restrictions, we should make special efforts in researching and teaching military history. It helps us to appropriately put our behavior in a larger context, is an “educational power” and yields us at least an indirect benefit. It helps us to understand ourselves and the events going on around us better, and it enables us to make our own judgments. In the current discussion of interpretations and the tendency to also apply economic criteria to educational activities, we should not lose sight of what efforts in education produce: a mature and independent human being.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, you have seen the host of references that can be drawn from this topic. We have spent stimulating days in academic debate; we have met; and I am sure that our hosts have done their best to make this stay in Bucharest an unforgettable experience. Our Romanian hosts have done a tremendous job. I would like to express my gratitude on behalf of myself and the Germans and wish you all the best for the future.
Two Crumbling Empires – One Balkan Region:
Ottoman Empire’s and Austro-Hungary’s Military Presence
in Sandžak Novi Pazar/Plevlje, 1879-1908

by
Tamara Scheer

1. Introduction

Fifty years ago the Bosnian historian Kasim Isović wrote that the history of Sandžak had hitherto “remained in the shadow of major historical events,” and this remark has not lost any of its validity since then. However, in the time concerned the political status and society of Sandžak was a topic of many surveys and travelogues. Actually, most of the time the Sandžak is mentioned only as an “appendix” of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s history under the Austro-Hungarian regime, although it gained a separate political and cultural process, not only due to its Ottoman administration during the entire period. Austria-Hungary was not in the position to change any law or administration as in Bosnia. Beside, Sandžak reflected the main problems of two multi-ethnic empires situated in an area of rising national conflicts on a micro-level, within a nutshell, so to speak. From the retrospective view the situation can be assessed as unstable and turbulent. The word “crumbling,” chosen for the title, is therefore justifiable. However, in my opinion it was the period between 1879-1908 which permanently influenced the region and its inhabitants. During this period a regional identity developed and the main town Plevlje got its two (still visible) faces, the oriental and the European, the latter as a result of the Austro-Hungarian presence.

When Austro-Hungarian troops arrived in the autumn of 1879, newspapers reported and the articles reflected contemporary images (and prejudices) about this area and the people living there. The Neue Freie Presse stipulated that the future will be “uncertain,” influenced by an “avalanche from the Albanese mountains.” The same magazine wrote a cover article about the rising costs for the military presence and expressed their wish that the Austro-Hungarian “Oriental expedition” had come to an end. In addition, official documents are taken into consideration mainly to


2 Original quote in German language: „Was die Zukunft bringt, ist allerdings ungewiss, und die Lawine, die von den albanesischen Bergen herabzurollen droht, hat noch kein Strahl der Versöhnung geschmolzen.” Neue Freie Presse, Morgenblatt, 14.9.1879.

3 Original quote in German language: „Die Occupation von Novi-Bazar wird, auch wenn, wie wir hoffen, dieselbe ohne Blutvergießen abläuft, eine neue Erhöhung der gemeinsamen Lasten zur Folge haben. Sei es drum, wenn nur jetzt endlich die Sicherheit vorhanden wäre, dass wir am Ende der orientalischen Expedition angekommen sind.” Neue Freie Presse, Morgenblatt, 7.9.1879.
reconstruct strategies and administrative structures as well as the composition of Sandžak’s multi-ethnic and -denominational society (including the soldiers). Last but not least, the permanently growing public interest from outside, in particular Western European countries, will also be a focus of this paper.

2. Strategic Moments and Tactical Environment

At the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the European Great Powers authorized the Danube Monarchy to set up roads and railways in an area located in the south of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1879, it was stipulated between the Ottoman Empire, to whose territory Sandžak continued to belong, and Austria-Hungary that the latter may support a military presence in the area around the River Lim (the northern part of Sandžak, with the main towns of Prijepolje, Plevlje, and Priboj) and that this presence should not exceed 5,000 men. Shortly before the Austro-Hungarian invasion into Sandžak, during the summer of 1879 military and political officials from the Ottoman Empire and the Double Monarchy met in recently-occupied Sarajevo. During the ensuing discussions, Husni Pasha, the Ottoman ministerial delegate, stipulated that the Porte did not plan to station troops in the later main town of Plevlje. From a military point of view, Wilhelm von Württemberg, commander of occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, labelled the result of the Sarajevoer Protokoll as a defensive alliance (“Defensivallianz”) and the allied troops should be located where they are able to support each other.⁴ Contemporaries assessed the political situation of the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Monarchy during the late nineteenth century as similar. Both had to keep a firm hold on heterogeneous inhabitants who “struggled for supremacy.”⁵

Although Austria-Hungary had encountered fierce resistance from the inhabitants during the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the invasion of Sandžak was quite peaceful. The Ottoman administration had appealed for moderation, and there were almost no violent clashes. The Austro-Hungarian population at home read in the newspapers that the head of the Muslim community in Constantinople, Sheik ul-Islam, “had sent a letter to the clergy in the Paschalik of Novi-Bazar, in which he ordered [them] to calm their communities, and that they should fulfil the Muslim obligation of hospitality.”⁶

Prior to 1878, the Ottoman Empire had paid less attention to Sandžak in military terms. This was to change quickly under the altered circumstances. Once Austria-Hungary had set up a garrison in Plevlje, the Porte stationed more troops at the opposite end of the town. For the population this situation implied an expanded

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⁴ ÖStA/KA/Nachlässe, B/92, 6-8, Wolfgang Heller, Sarajevoer Protokoll mit Husni Pascha, 28.7.-20.9.1878.


⁶ Original quote in German language: „Der Scheik-ul-Islam hat ein Rundschreiben an die geistlichen Behörden des Paschaliks von Novi-Bazar erlassen, in welchem die letzteren aufgefordert werden, in der Gemeinde dahin zu wirken, dass den österreichischen Truppen gegenüber die Pflichten der Gastfreundschaft, die den Muslims heilig sind, redlich erfüllt werden.“ Wiener Sonn- und Montagszeitung, 8.9.1879, Feuilleton, „Kreuz und Quer“.
military presence of two empires -- two empires to which many Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian inhabitants did not want to belong.\(^7\)

Nevertheless, the two multinational and -denominational players developed opposite and sometimes changing strategies for the Sandžak Plevlje. The overall strategy of Constantinople was to maintain the status quo and to limit the Austro-Hungarian impact on the region as much as possible. The first important action of the Ottoman Empire was splitting up the Sandžak Novi Pazar and establishing the Sandžak Plevlje. In the course of the reorganization the Ottoman head, Suleiman Hakki Pasha, became a civil and military leader (comparable with a governor of an occupied territory). Although the Double Monarchy held the right to station troops in all of the former Sandžak Novi Pazar, they were then confronted with new orders.\(^8\) From that moment on Hakki Pasha tried to make every effort to limit those rights. The Austro-Hungarian Army had to ask for permission if it wanted to march to Prijepolje in the south, because the street (the Eastern bank of the river Lim) was part of the neighboring Sandžak Novi Pazar. (It would be interesting for future research to determine if this resulted from unofficial tactics directly ordered by the Porte or if it was caused by disorganization at the sandžak’s or vilayet’s level.) Maybe Suleiman Hakki Pasha was the initiator, because in the beginning he opposed the Austro-Hungarian presence. In such situations the Austro-Hungarian commanders had to request further instructions from the brigade commander, who then tried to find an agreement with governor Hakki Pasha. At best, the latter gave an order to his troops; in the worst case, this became a diplomatic affair which went from Plevlje to the corps commander in Sarajevo, from there to Vienna and Constantinople, and then back again to the Sandžak. Another problem was the construction of camps in the places which had been chosen before, because the Ottoman troops always put (small, but troublesome) obstacles in the soldiers’ way.\(^9\) The Ottoman leadership had to cope with their dissatisfied soldiers. The Austro-Hungarian soldiers were also paid regularly, in contrast to their fellow soldiers in the rest of the Empire.\(^10\)

For the Double Monarchy the Sandžak region was of strategic importance in many respects. On the one hand they hoped for a new market for their products, while on the other the army tried to prevent uprisings and unrest already outside Bosnia. Economic plans aimed at cutting off the trade of products from Germany via Saloniki before they arrived in Prijepolje.\(^11\) In addition the Montenegrin and Serbian national influence would need to be curbed or prevented. The general staff assessed that the region’s strategic importance was the result of the necessity of a separation between the “national-youngsters,” Serbia and Montenegro.\(^12\) In the eyes of the Austro-

\(^7\) Cp. footnote 1.

\(^8\) ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 177, Fasz. Varia 1901, Bericht Konsul Joannovics, 1907, p. 2.

\(^9\) ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 177, Fasz. Varia 1901, Bericht Konsul Joannovics, 1907, pp. 9–12.


\(^11\) ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 177, Fasz. Varia 1901, Bericht Joannovics, 1907, p. 9.

\(^12\) Hanns Dieter Schanderl, Die Albanienpolitik Österreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877-1908. Wiesbaden 1971, p. 65.
Hungarian war minister the latter was the “most dangerous.”  

Two years later, in 1897, a minister’s conference decided that if the situation came to a “partition of European Turkey beside the occupied provinces,” Austria-Hungary would have to “absorb” (“einverleiben”) Sandžak. Other questions of strategic importance up to 1908 were how to deal with Bosnian refugees who tried to return; the implementation of a consulate in Plevlje (in addition to the vilayet’s capitol); handling outside influence like the activities of the Albanian League, the Young Turks, and the Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists; internal questions like the legal status of the Austro-Hungarian colony and soldiers; and how to deal with fraternization when Austro-Hungarian officials favored particular local groups.

After a short period, however, the army tried to calm the population by buying all military equipment from the region and local traders. Mahmud Aga Bajrović, who had at first been hostile, became head of a consortium which supplied the troops. In a survey he was characterized thus: “his greed for money surpassed his scruples.”

“Cultivation,” “modernization,” and “Europeanization” were catchwords for personal engagement, but also part of the interest of Austro-Hungarian officials working in the Foreign Ministry. Also official orders of the brigade’s command in Plevlje referring to mentions included phrases like: “delicate issue of common garrison with Ottoman troops,” they “did cultural mission” and “bear strains depending on the region’s peculiarity.”

Since 1880, the Ottoman Empire had held the position that after the reorganization Austria-Hungary had only the right to keep troops in Sandžak Plevlje, the Double Monarchy until 1908 officially maintained this presence, as in Sandžak Novi Pazar. The staff officer Wolfgang Heller commented on a decree of the war ministry from 1902 that for the first time the term “Sandschak Plevlje” was used officially, “which does not exist administratively [administratively] and should not come into use.”

In this constellation the presence lasted until October 1908, when the Austro-Hungarian soldiers left due to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the

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13 ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 1895, Kt. 681, 18-29, Vortrag des Reichskriegsministers bei der MKSM, 2.12.1895.

14 Schanderl refers to a conference held in April 1897: Schanderl, Die Albanienpolitik Österreich-Ungarns, p. 67.

15 ÖStA/HHStA/PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 177, Geschichte des Sandschaks von Novibazar, p. 10.


17 ÖStA/KA/Nachlässe, B/92, 16-18, Wolfgang Heller, Die militärische und politische Situation der Besatzungstruppen im Limgebiete, Vortrag gehalten im Jänner 1907 im mil. wissensch. Vereine in Plevlje.
Monarchy and the emergence of the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire. In those years operational aims changed about-face. At the beginning, the Austro-Hungarian troops focused on common operations to ensure peace in Sandžak, but the governor refused. In 1886, this was replaced by an order, which stipulated only actions in case the Turkish governor asked for cooperation, e.g., against Montenegrin gangs who passed through to Serbia. In 1904, the brigade’s command in Plevlje reported that the Turkish Governor Suleiman Pasha asked for military assistance in the case Serbian gangs would appear in the spring. The answer was that the Austro-Hungarian troops could only react in cases of self-defense, or if the Bosnian borders, state property, or Austro-Hungarian citizens were threatened. What a difference to Württemberg’s conclusion of a defensive alliance between Ottoman Empire and the Double Monarchy, as he mentioned after the Sarajevo protocol was stipulated in summer 1879.

The right to commit soldiers was ceded in spring 1909. The entire region had been without peace for thirty years, but contemporary sources stated that it had been more quiet in Sandžak Plevlje than in the rest of the former Sandžak Novi Pazar.

3. Society, Culture, and Daily Life

Though it had been an area of transition for ethnic groups, cultures, and religions for centuries, the society of Sandžak changed constantly after the autumn of 1879. The indigenous population of Sandžak Plevlje numbered about 40,000 inhabitants, and they were faced by around 10,000 to 12,000 Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian soldiers and civil personnel. This meant there was a minimum of four native residents for every foreigner. The Austro-Hungarian garrisons were located in three main towns: Plevlje, Prijepolje, and Priboj. In Plevlje, the Christian and Muslim populations were evenly balanced, while in Prijepolje and Priboj there were more Christians than Muslims. After the first Austro-Hungarian soldiers (mostly Romanians and Hungarians) had arrived, they were followed in particular by Muslim refugees from Montenegro and different propagandists from outside (e.g., teachers from Serbia or Albanian Notables). Austro-Hungarian soldiers (in most cases staff officers) took their families with them, although this was forbidden officially and as

18 ÖStA/KA/Nachlässe, B/92, 6-8, Heller, Zusammenstellung 1904.


20 Cp. footnote 1.

21 Heuberger, Der Sandschak von Novi Pazar, p. 823f.


23 Many of the engaged regiments came from the Hungarian part of the Double Monarchy. Regimental stories are useful to reconstruct daily duty, e.g. Julius Kreipner, Geschichte des k. u. k. Infanterieregiments 34. Kaschau 1900.
Heinrich Renner wrote, “normally not popular.” All of these “newcomers” brought personal experiences, interests, dislikes, and prejudices with them. Some left the Sandžak after a short period, others settled there permanently -- refugees from Bosnia as well as Austro-Hungarian civilians.

Rogers Brubaker stated that changing tendencies and current animosities characterize social groups inside society. In the Sandžak’s case, we must not speak of the “Muslims” or “Orthodox,” “soldiers and the population,” or “peasants and intelligentsia.” The soldiers were as different as the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire -- from the Hungarian peasant to the Croatian nobleman, from the Albanian officer to the Anatolian recruit. Günther Kronenbitter added that the spectrum of behaviour depended on the heterogeneity of the relevant occupied society. Furthermore, he stated that the relationship between the population and the foreign army depended on the course of invasion. Circumstances were more complex when the invasion was bloody, which was not the case for Sandžak but was part of experience of some of its inhabitants, in particular those who fought under the Mufti of Plevlje in Bosnia or were Bosnian refugees of 1878. As additional motivators for revolts or toleration Kronenbitter mentioned the acceptance of the (restricted) local administration, expectations of personal, political, economic, and social benefits, and denominational, ideological, or ethnical misgivings over the foreign military presence. In this case the Ottoman Empire’s administration remained, but most inhabitants aimed at something different. At the same time the whole society was in a permanent state of crisis. The use of force, typical for every military presence, should not be underestimated.

In this article the inhabitants’ opinions can only be mentioned in an oversimplified manner and from the foreigner’s point of view. In 1879, according to Wolfgang Heller, Muslim and Serb looked at the foreigner, the “Schwaba, half astonished, half furtive, as an intruder in their homeland, ill disposed towards any change for centuries.” The Ottoman administration came into conflict with the Muslim population when it tried to extend the rights of Christians. The Muslims, Turks, and Albanians were increasingly influenced by the ideas of the Young Turks and Albanian League movement with its tendency of animosity towards the West.

24 Renner, Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina kreuz und quer, p. 169.


while most of the Orthodox people were interested in a future within Serbia and Montenegro. Many people from Austria-Hungary regarded the local population as culturally backward and in need of modernization. As a result of these hostile circumstances, the Austria-Hungarian soldiers left in autumn 1908. At the same time the civilian colony had to pack their bags, too. In despair, the merchant Julius Goldberger asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna in September 1909, how he should protect his family, two houses, and his shop in the future.  

In addition many Sandžak inhabitants asked for “Wohlverhaltens-Zeugnisse” (good conduct certificates), which they needed for emigration to Bosnia. The remaining population only lived for a few years under Ottoman rule. In the course of the First Balkan War (1912), the region was divided between Montenegro and Serbia and never returned under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.  

A military presence was often used for showing force, which led to friction. A German tourist noticed: “Wondering, an Anatolian recruit looked at the neat Hungarians of the 2nd regiment, who were marching with oompah-music through the bumpy streets.”  

Both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman troops laid down white stones in all garrisons depicting the initials “FJI” for Francis Joseph, illuminated on his birthday, and the crescent or the name of the Sultan in a size more than “100 steps long.” But interaction had already taken place. During these thirty years cooperation had taken place and clashes had occurred in the heterogeneous society. Animosities, however, had completely changed. When Austria-Hungary sent troops for the first time the Muslim population was more hostile, whereas the attitudes of the orthodox Christians ranged from indifference to acceptance. Most preconceived opinions certainly depended on the respective national or cultural background of the individual. The contemporary “tourist” Heinrich Renner observed that although Austro-Hungarian soldiers saluted Ottoman officers, the other side did not do the same: “They were used to not saluting their own officers, because they didn’t want to disturb them.”  

A lack of language competence on either side rounded off the situation.

At the turn of the century a survey conducted by Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry concluded that, “although the Porte ordered an invasion of the Austro-Hungarian troops without frictions, it certainly ordered strictly from the very first on

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29 ÖStA/HHStA/ PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 348, Telegramm Julius Goldberger, 22.9.1908.

30 ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. Militärbericht, 24.10.1908.


34 Renner, Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina, p. 173.
to resist any foreign influence." During his 1880 visit to Plevlje, the Vali of Kosovo criticized the permission given to the Austro-Hungarian soldiers to build their barracks close to the town. And he gave the further instruction: “Muslims and Christians were similarly enjoined from communicating [with] Austro-Hungarian soldiers.” Certainly, this order demonstrated that a lively contact must have taken place, but more than one report described daily life as running side by side rather than with each other. Franz Nopcsa diagnosed an absence of contact and stated that the foreign culture remained unknown to Austria-Hungary during all those years. Heinrich Renner made similar remarks about the behavior of the Turks, although they attended Austro-Hungarian officers’ clubs. The opposite can be said about the governor of Plevlje, Suleiman Hakki Pascha, who preferred to drink a good glass of wine after the Austro-Hungarian officer Joseph Stürgkh invited him to Prijepolje. At the same time Renner reported good “comradeship” between officers. He concluded that the Muslim and Serbian population “were reserved.”

Senior Ottoman officers may have come in contact only with members of the upper class, for example, when they attended dinners hosted by brigade commander Eduard Ritter von Steinitz’s wife. It is worth noting that research has only shown contacts on a private level between Austro-Hungarian men and women with Muslim men only. Nevertheless, although different groups living in Sandžak tried to avoid contact, they were influenced by and influenced each other permanently. Normally, daily life activities would result in constant mutual influence. The longer the occupation lasted and the more spheres of life were affected, the more permanent those social consequences might become. Heinrich Renner, a German traveller, reported in 1897 that he had heard many locals speaking German, Hungarian, or Romanian and that “the houses and the way of life began to show European influence.” Many European newspapers, as well as other goods, especially from

35 The original quote in German language: „Wenn die Pforte ihren Organen auch den Befehl gegeben haben mochte, den Einmarsch der k.u.k. Truppen möglichst reibungslos vor sich gehen zu lassen, so hatte sie ihnen doch gewiss auch die strikten Weisungen erteilt, ein Umschweifen des fremden Einflusses von allem Anfang an zu bekämpfen.” ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII Türkei, Kt. 177. [ca. 1900/1901], Geschichte des Sandschaks von Novibazar und der angrenzenden Gebiete vom Einmarsche der k.u.k. Truppen (September 1879) angefangen bis auf die Gegenwart”, p. 9.


37 Elsie, Reisen in den Balkan.

38 Renner, Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina, p. 173.


40 Original quote in German: „Hierher werden die türkischen Offiziere geladen, mit denen ein gut kameradschaftliches Verhältnis besteht, während die moslemische Bevölkerung sich geradezu wie die serbische sehr zurückhaltend benimmt.” Renner, Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina, p. 180.

41 Kronenbitter, Besatzung, p. 11.

42 Renner, Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina, p. 168f.
Austria-Hungary, were available in the Sandžak. Some of them arrived via the daily post from Sarajevo.

Maybe this already was the attractiveness of what is perceived as foreign, according to Aleida Assmann, and to Josef Graf Stürgkh, who wrote: “What found our main interest in Prijepolje, was the typical Turkish.” However, the attractiveness of the foreign could quickly turn into new rejection caused by the clash of different cultures. Ulrike Freitag calls the woman’s position in Western society a typical topic for a “symbolic demarcation between those cultures.” For the Muslims, and also for the Orthodox, it must have been strange when the strict order was given to ban all dogs from army camps, or they would be put to death. The reason for this order had been a dog molesting a general’s wife when she was taking a walk through the garrison. Clashes could also be the result of daily duty’s boredom. Surveys reported many disputes and conflicts between Austro-Hungarian and Turkish soldiers or the local population.

Viewed historically, the majority of the resident population rejected the establishment of garrisons in its town or community if the poorly-paid soldiers were confined to their barracks, as this would not enhance the local economy. Only once military personnel were no longer billeted exclusively in army quarters did the opportunity arise to earn money by leasing accommodation. Additional consumable goods and equipment were purchased locally. Also, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian soldiers in Sandžak Plevlje put substantial amounts of money into circulation. As a result, the indigenous population (together with the soldiers and their families) became increasingly powerful customers. As a result, a broader market, especially with novel shopping goods, emerged. At the same time existing associations, cultural events, and periodicals were augmented by new ones. The historian Rüdiger Ritter entitled his article in WerkstattGeschichte “Cultural exchange


44 Stürgkh, Politische und militärische Erinnerungen, p. 57.


50 Gräf, Militarisierung der Stadt oder Urbanisierung des Militärs, pp. 89–108.
at the bar counter.”

For the Sandžak Plevlje the impact of contacts in coffee houses should not be underestimated. Renner found it important enough to point out the fact that “Dreher’sches Flaschenbier” was already available in Serbian shops in 1879. After the Austro-Hungarian colony had arrived, a new brewery was set up in Plevlje as was a German-style beer garden. Not only because Plevlje became the central town, the soldiers’ need for infrastructure seemed limitless and no communication line remained “untouched.” The historian Holger Gräf has traced the influence of the garrison even further to a process of beginning urbanization. The new garrison structure not exclusively in cities was useful for the soldiers as well as the population and visitors from outside. Renner explained: “Where once there had been a lone border station, there now is an entire small border village with wooden houses in which merchants live who take care of all the needs of both troops as well as of travellers.”

4. The View from Outside

In 1879, an Austrian satirical magazine, Die Bombe (“The Bomb”), published a joke that an effective punishment for Austro-Hungarian soldiers who had committed a serious offense was to repeat the names Prijepolje and Bjelopolje very quickly for a long time -- which is very difficult to pronounce in the German language. However, the situation was more complex and gained more and more interest not only in Austria-Hungary, but also in the rest of Western Europe after 1879. Together with occupied Bosnia, it became a stylish object of public interest. Heinrich Renner’s travel book, Durch Bosnien-Hercegovina kreuz und quer (Criss-crossing through Bosnia and Hercegovina), published in 1896, was followed by a second edition only one year later with additional routes through Sandžak.

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54 ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 177, Fasz. Varia 1901, Bericht Konsul Joannovics, 1907, III, p. 9.

55 N.N., Adventures among the Austrians in Bosnia (1883). In: Omer Hadžiselimović (ed.), At the Gates to the East: British Travel Writers on Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century (= East European Monographs, No. DL XXII). New York 2001, p. 211.

56 Gräf, Militarisierung der Stadt oder Urbanisierung des Militärs, p. 97.

57 Original quote in German: „Hier, wo einst eine einsame Grenzkaraula stand, ist jetzt ein ganzes Grenzdörfchen mit niedrigen Holzhäusern entstanden, in denen Geschäftsleute hausen, die für alle Bedürfnisse der beiderseitigen Truppen und auch der Reisenden sorgen.“ Renner, Durch Bosnien-Hercegovina, p. 166.

58 Die Bombe, 7.9.1879.

European countries reported about this region. Two common and interesting themes can be found in their descriptions: first, how they described the political situation, and second, comments on local society and the impact of the garrisons on local culture.

As an example for the first point mentioned, an Englishmen wrote about the Sandžak’s situation that, “it is therefore, perhaps, the most anomalously governed part of Europe,” maybe only comparable with the European military presence on Crete. This traveller added proudly that, “the road from Sarajevo to the Sandžak is probably the least frequented by foreigners . . . and no journalist had visited it for years.” More satirically, journalist William Miller wrote about crossing the borders in 1898: “Two lieutenants, in the temporary absence of their captain, did the honours. These two are known among their acquaintances as der schönste, und der zweitschönste Lieutenant von Metalka [the most beautiful and the second most beautiful lieutenant of Metalka].” This Oxford graduate mentioned that “togetherness and good comradeship” were demonstrated in the daily activities of the two different armies, especially visible when “the lieutenant and a Turkish soldier marched off arm in arm when we departed.”60 Other travellers reported “xenophobia” of the Austrian administration and “its paranoid officers and policemen” who rapidly imprisoned a Bosnian citizen with a Serbian background who was engaged as their travel guide. They continued their journey, but without the interpreter.61 Mister Miller also speculated about Sandžak’s future. He affirmed that it “will play an important role in the future.” “But under whose auspices,” many of them asked themselves, “those of Austro-Hungarian or of the two Serb states on either side of it? But that the Turk will ever recover his full and exclusive overlordship over the . . . district,” he did not believe.62 No one considered the present situation as final.

The second item mentioned in contemporary articles was the local culture, society, and daily life. Sometimes these topics were addressed satirically. Most of the time the clothing and behavior of Muslim women were mentioned, including remarks about their differences from the Christian ladies. The German-style beer gardens and the so-called Habsburgwarte, which was no fortress, but the shop of the officers’ mess located in Prijepolje, received remarkable interest. Also the Austrian press reported about the Austro-Hungarian troops, sometimes satirically. Reports referred to the possibilities to travel from Sarajevo to the Sandžak: the military post, which needed only two days, and the private carriage, which took a little longer. Also the options for accommodation in Plevlje had been commented upon -- the official one was the Han in a typical oriental style, and the other was the officers’ guest rooms inside the Austro-Hungarian garrison. For the latter an invitation was necessary, which sometimes included an examination by the police, who interrogated the travellers about their opinion on the Double Monarchy and the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.63


62 Miller, Travels and Politics in the Near East, p. 449.

5. Conclusion

One year after the bloody invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary marched into Sandžak Novi Pazar, as it was stipulated during the Berlin Congress. However, the army never used the right of marching to the town of Novi Pazar: it remained in the northern parts next to the river Lim. Shortly after the bloodless invasion, troops marched to Plevlje, Prijepeolje, Priboj, and some small guard houses next to the borders, and the Ottoman Empire augmented its forces, reorganized the region, and gave the local head a governor’s position. During the thirty years of Austro-Hungarian presence, the composition of Sandžak’s society changed as well as their favors and antipathies. The political situation consisted of a mixture of rising Serbian and Montenegrin nationalist movements, influenced by the Young Turks and Albanian League, living together. Due to the remaining Ottoman administration the Double Monarchy never held the possibility to change laws as in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After 1879, the “European Orient” became stylish, and many travellers from Western European countries wrote about their experience there. Sandžak, and the image of the “orient,” were part of their travelogues. After the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, the situation became hostile enough and forced the Austro-Hungarian troops to depart, with the right to station troops being ceded a few months later. To this day, the former military presence is still visible in Plevlje.
New State and the Issue of Defense: 
The Army of the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians 
in the Autumn of 1918

by

Damijan Guštin and Vladimir Prebilič

1. Introduction

In the spring of 1918 the political elites of the Slavic nations (Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians) in the south of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy radicalized the demand for the transformation of the Austro-Hungarian state into a triple federal form, where the South Slavic unit of Croats and Slovenians, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, would constitute its own political entity, and demanded the establishment of an independent state, which would unite with Serbia. The realization of this concept was far from simple, since the Austro-Hungarian state authorities persisted and operated -- and the politicians would by no means risk any revolutionary gestures. Furthermore, among the Entente states the idea of a South Slavic state did not enjoy much support, even though the so-called Yugoslav Committee in Exile lobbied for the idea of the establishment of a South Slavic state with the important Entente forces, especially France, the United States, and Italy. Thus the great military defeats in the autumn of 1918 and the accelerated dissolution of Austro-Hungary caught the South Slavic political elite at home quite unprepared; politically it was burdened by the still unspecified manner of unification with Serbia, and it was also unprepared for the grave security challenges and destabilization brought about by the disintegration of Austro-Hungary and the simultaneous end of World War I.

2. Armed Forces of the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians

On 29 October 1918, a day after Czechoslovakia and Poland declared their independence, independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire was solemnly declared in Zagreb and a new state, called the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians (hereafter the State of SHS), was established. This new state included what was at that time Croatia; the ethnically Slovenian parts of the provinces of Carniola, Styria, Gorizia, Trieste, and Carinthia; the Croatian Istria and Dalmatia; and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The State of SHS, on the day of its solemn proclamation of independence, did not have its own armed forces. The plans or measures of the political forces, resulting in the attainment of independence of the South Slavic nations in the context of Austro-Hungary, in regard to the military aspect of the national independence, did not lead directly to the establishment of the State of SHS’s own armed forces (disregarding the paramilitary local units of the National Defense, which were supposed to simply maintain law and order). These plans were hindered by the circumstances in which the new state was born. When independence was declared on 29 October 1918, the population and the territory of the new state was still in the context of Austro-Hungary, which still retained the full and sovereign authority. And
it was still involved in the war, although it already tried to negotiate a truce. Those military units, mostly consisting of South Slavic troops that the new state elites counted on, were still on the frontlines or stationed outside of the territory of the new state: Slovenian and Bosnian units were mostly stationed at the "southwest" Italian front, and the Croat units were also stationed at the eastern front. It could only be demanded quite naively that the government should recall the "Slovenian regiments" from the frontlines, the same as the Czech political elite demanded. These demands, made by several national organizations, were refused by the Austrian government. Only on 31 October did it allow that the officers could subordinate themselves to the National Councils on their own demand. Despite this the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Army with regard to nationality was unstoppable, and the first Czech regiments started retreating from the Italian front.

But at the same time its own armed forces did not seem as important to the South Slavic political elite due to the trust in the principle of the national self-determination, proclaimed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. The independence movement of the South Slavs was also under the influence of anti-war peace propaganda, which had quite a destructive effect together with the general weariness of the soldiers in the fifth year of the war.

Despite this the political elite found the institution of the state army so self-evident and urgent that it hastened to at least establish it. The National Council, which took over the provisional executive and legislative branch of power in the state, explicitly thought of the armed forces of the State of SHS as a single entity. The responsibilities in regard to leading the army were conferred upon the Commissioner for National Defense, Dr. Mate Drinković. Already on the day of proclamation of the new state on 29 October 1918, the National Council appointed the highest military commanders of the new state, and the cadre was selected among the generals who had expressed loyalty and publicly supported the formation of the armed forces of the State of SHS the day before. Field Marshal Mihaljević became Chief of the operative department of the Commission for National Defense and thus the commander of the army. Individual operational army headquarters and military districts were established in each of the integral parts of the state. Croatia was in District I, the territory of Slovenia and initially Istria was under the jurisdiction of Military District II, Bosnia III, and Herzegovina IV, while Military District V was supposedly to contain naval forces. However, political wishes did not entail the actual establishment of the army, and even to a lesser degree did they mean that the army would function as a single organism. The differences between the integral parts of the state were simply too vast -- also in the military field, and not only in the political sense. It is a paradox that these parts had been brought together by a uniform foundation -- the very affiliation to what had until then been the Austro-Hungarian Army -- which at least provided for a common level of military expertise and doctrine origins, even though it is a fact that the Austro-Hungarian Army also consisted of three basic integral parts. Therefore, it is not surprising that the establishment of the army was left to each of the provincial political authorities, instead of being formed by uniform guidelines and the energetic command of the Zagreb headquarters.

The most pressing issue in regard to the military organization was how to recruit the men to fill out the units. The National Council Commissioner for Defense immediately released a decree on mobilization, but without the power and support of the state authorities, the response was minimal. The appeals that "in the decisive moment" soldiers should join the units that would guarantee national independence were thus not met with much enthusiasm.
Many high military commanders were available in Croatia who were willing to cooperate in the command and organization of the army, because up to that time Croatia had been the only province among those making up the State of SHS which boasted a partly autonomous military unit, the Croatian Home Guard. However, those troops were more hesitant to even join the army. This is largely due to the fact that since the autumn of 1917, Croatia had seen mass anti-war protests of the soldiers, the result of mass desertions from the army (the so-called Green Cadre). All of this resulted in a slow and difficult staffing of the preserved regiment cores whose soldiers were formerly drafted at the territory of the new state.

In Slovenia the situation was quite the opposite: the feeling of the nation being threatened resulted in a number of reserve officers coming forward on their own initiative, taking over the power in individual cities and in fact protecting the establishment of the political bodies of the new state. Major Rudolf Maister was the most famous of them: on his own initiative (later with the support of the local Slovenian authorities) he established military control in Maribor on 1 November 1918. This was a city with generally German-oriented city authorities close to the Slovenian-German ethnic border. The situation in Ljubljana and Celje was similar, but these cities were in the interior of the national territory and were not as nationally disputable as Maribor. This feeling of endangerment also resulted in the soldiers becoming more responsive to joining the new units, organized in accordance with the same traditionally territorial principle as the previous Austrian units. Thus these units were built on the highest Croat commanding cadre, Slovenian officers and traditional military units -- the so-called "Slovenian regiments" based on the Austro-Hungarian military organization -- which were filled as early as on 18 November with the first mobilization or draft. In fact the new mobilization only filled the cores of four regiments: the Maribor, Celje, and Ljubljana regiments as well as the Slovenian Mountain Regiment. In the Slovenian-Italian recruitment area of the Trieste Regiment, only a single dislocated battalion was formed. The core of the Maribor cavalry regiment also made up a part of it. On the other hand, a lot of heavy artillery, removed from the Piave front, had been made available. Therefore it was possible to establish three artillery units within the battalion. The problem, however, was the supply of ammunition, since the new troops could only be supplied from the extant Austrian storehouses in the hinterlands. In only a few days all of these units were reinforced with officers of Slovenian nationality returning from the Austro-Hungarian formations, so that as soon as in the end of November these units were able to carry out the first operations on their own. The Commission for National Defense of Slovenia managed to assemble around 6,000 soldiers in four regiments by the end of November 1918.

However, even before the end of November 1918 the central military command in the State of SHS remained on paper only, which was the consequence of the rearrangement of the state system of authority. Namely, in accordance with the Decree on Transitional Administration of 19 November 1918, the Slovenian part of the state received a confederate status or even a status of a real union. This rearrangement of the state affected the military immediately. In the second half of November 1918, Military District II almost became independent, or at least, the Slovenian National Government (which since 19 November also directly enforced the military authority in accordance with the national legal arrangement and through the commissioner for national defense in the National Government of SHS for Slovenia), had an increasingly significant influence over it.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the formation of the army was most deficient; there was a lack of officers, and the population, which still felt the Austro-Hungarian authorities as a new constraint, was not responsive to the idea. Besides, the proximity of the Serbian Army impeded the efforts to establish Bosnian military units. The fact that locally the army was not necessary, since there was no immediate military danger, was also a significant obstacle. This resulted in the army existing on paper rather than in the barracks. Naval military forces were subject to a similar situation; these forces received a severe blow in the initial stages of their formation when the Entente demanded that the State of SHS hand over all military ships it had inherited from Austro-Hungary.

The question of the strength of the army of the State of SHS in November 1918 remains a difficult one for historians. Sources do not allow for its might to be precisely enumerated. However, from partial and diverse information it is possible to conclude that this army consisted of less than 20,000 troops, divided into fifteen infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments, which indicates that these were relatively weak units, consisting largely of cores of those soldiers who were most nationally aware and who kept wearing their uniforms simply at their own initiative as an obligation to the new national state. In Slovenia, where the regiments were filled out by means of mobilization, each of the four infantry regiments consisted of around 1,000 to a maximum of 1,200 troops. As many as half of the soldiers, around 9,100, were indeed stationed in the units of Military District II -- in Slovenia.

3. Security Situation and the Use of the Army

The new national state -- the State of Slovenians, Croats and Serbians -- was fragile, built on the zeal of a favorable moment. However, the establishment of an army takes time. Many aspects of the army were opportunistic at first -- it was necessary to establish an army, and nationally aware officers were seen as a normal integral part of the state elite.

At the same time the question of the army was related to the issue of the security dimension. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire opened a huge Pandora's box, since despite the proclamation of the new state this territory remained unstable. The Entente states did not recognise the State of SHS. The Italian Army advanced in order to occupy the territories promised to it by the 1915 Treaty of London, while a part of the political elite and population (especially of the Serbian nationality in Bosnia, Dalmatia and Croatia), kept persuading the Serbian Army to march into the country, provide assistance, and ensure the survival of the new South Slavic state. In certain parts of Bosnia and Slavonia the Serbian population expected direct integration into the Serbian state. Many parts of the borders of the new state were unclear, and as soon as a few weeks, they were also disputed, since the State of SHS was, through the conflict of the ethnic and administrative-political arguments, struggling against the German Austria and Hungary. Furthermore, the state-political elite worried about the internal political circumstances, since similarly as other elites it was afraid of mounting internal tensions and revolutionary attitudes of the population, which had already been the case in Germany, Vienna, and Hungary shortly thereafter.

However, besides setting the borders on the basis of the ethnic principle, the argument of military assurance of the disputed territory became dominant in this conflict already in the second half of November -- from the temporary demarcation after a few skirmishes at the Styrian border between Maribor and Graz, to the struggle
for the South Carinthia, which developed into one of the small Central European border wars in the first two years after the Great War, and to the conquest of MeĎimurje -- the triangle between the rivers Drava and Mura. This was the realistic capability of the new army, since here it encountered the German, Austrian, and Hungarian military units of similar structure and strength with the same if not inferior legitimacy. However, not once during that time did the political or military elites consider standing up to any of the Entente forces or the Italian Army, even though the authorities protested to the best of their abilities the Italian advance and presence in the West of Slovenia and in Dalmatia. Several violent demonstrations even took place in Dalmatia. Meanwhile, another Entente army -- the Serbian one -- was deemed as friendly, regarding the expectations about the formation of the new South Slavic state. After all, on 9 November at the negotiations in Geneva, where the Serbian government was still located at that time, a fundamental agreement on unification was reached; however, the Serbian government rejected it immediately after its return to Belgrade. Therefore, due to the expectations with regard to the Serbian Army entering the territory of the State of SHS and the negotiations about the unification of both states, the military units created from Serbian prisoners of war were presented as an allied Entente army. With these troops as representatives of the Entente forces, the State of SHS even tried to block the advance of the Italian Army towards Ljubljana -- the attempt seemed successful, because the Italian Army retreated a few kilometers towards the dividing line between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, which was deemed as a demarcation established by the 1915 London Agreement. However, the Serbian Army as an Entente army could only dispatch the minimum number of troops to the important port of Rijeka / Fiume and the eastern part of the state. It also sent a military delegation with the intent of establishing a new military organization of the state of SHS compatible with the organization of the Serbian Army. Thus the Serbian Army only entered the State of SHS after 1 December 1918, when the immediate unification of the State of SHS with the Kingdom of Serbia into a unified Kingdom of Serbians, Croats, and Slovenians had already been signed -- not as an Entente army, but as an army of this new unified state. This took place gradually. Due to outstanding issues of security and the mounting tension at the northern border with the German Austria, it is remarkable that the units of the former State of SHS were even functional. They even carried out independent military operations in the Carinthian combat zone until April 1919.

4. The Army and the Political Authorities in the State of SHS

The question of the army, however, was also the question of a new army, which would need to accommodate and reflect the "national feelings," as the new political reality was described in contrast to the Austro-Hungarian Army, seen by the affected South Slavic nations as an alienated tool of the Emperor as well as the ruling Germans and Hungarians. The army established in the first weeks after attaining independence had a twofold position in public as well as among the political elite. On one hand it was deemed a national army -- the expression of new national sovereignty -- while on the other hand it was seen as Austrian-oriented due to the Austrian origins of the military organization as well as of the officers leading it. This was the case especially because the officers of this army suddenly showed that during their military service to the Austro-Hungarian Empire they had clearly been estranged from their nationality in the sense of national and linguistic aspects. Despite this, this new army was seen as a reliable part of the national state among the Slovenian population.
However, the intrinsically distrustful attitude to officers and the troops was mostly displayed by the Serbian side during the unification negotiations. The Serbian side saw these troops as Austro-Hungarian officers and soldiers, occupying the invaded Serbia only a short time earlier. But of course, in these perspectives we might also see a pragmatic interest of the Serbian Army in automatically becoming the army of the new unified state, which would significantly improve the Serbian positions. Pursuant to the agreement between the National Council, government of Serbia, and the Supreme Command of the Serbian Army, a "new young national army" would be established in the territory of the State of SHS "instead of the former Austrian Army, which will be disbanded." On 29 November 1918, the Serbian Military Mission arrived to Zagreb, and it was to assist in the formation of six regiments (five in Croatia and one in Slovenia) in cooperation with the defense commission of the National Council. However, the establishment of the new units was hindered by the disbanding of the units of Military District I, following the revolt of the Croat 25th and 53rd Regiments in Zagreb on 5 December 1918, by the opposition of the Commissioner for Defense Dr. Drinković, and especially by the lack of military materiel and the warning of the Entente that it would not allow any military mobilization in the former Austro-Hungarian territory.

A part of the political elite more favorably inclined towards Serbia saw the Serbian assistance in the establishment of the new army as the factor that would not only strengthen the state, but also provide an important foundation for the South Slavic national state. But this very plan simultaneously became the reason for political conflict, since it started dividing the Croat political elite. Meanwhile, the Slovenian part of the state self-organized, anyway, as it was forced to do so if it wanted to establish its demands in regard to the borders on the national and ethnic grounds in opposition to the German Austria. So the plan of organizing a new army in the territory of the State of SHS was only realized a half year later when new regiments of the Yugoslav Army were established in the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats, and Slovenians.

Soon after attaining independence, the weaknesses and especially the feeling of being threatened started manifesting themselves in the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians. The political elites were still fragile, and the army itself was one of its strongest competitors. Military commanders, with few exceptions, of course, were not national enthusiasts, but they expressed a more or less honest loyalty to the new state. The political elites, however, soon started doubting this loyalty. Was this justified or not? A few facts confirmed the doubts. Generals had real power, even though they had a quite insubordinate and weak military force at their disposal. The Slovenian government even suspected General Maister, who never expressed any political aspirations apart from insisting that the Slovenian ethnic territory to the northern ethnic border should be occupied. The atmosphere in Zagreb was significantly more tense, as Zagreb was the most radical advocate of two demands: the demand for a federal unit in case of unification with Serbia, and the demand for a republican state regime instead of the Serbian monarchy. The uprising of the Croat soldiers on 5 December 1918, led by General Lipoščak, depressed the political elite. Fifteen dead and twenty wounded during the shoot-out on the streets were only an external reason for this disappointment. The political elite turned away from the army, and since then it no longer resisted the principle that the army should be established anew, which meant that it would be formed in accordance with the Serbian example. We should also note that simultaneously the integration into a new state was taking place -- the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats, and Slovenians, which was formally established with
the political Declaration of 1 December 1918. Independent military development thus ended, and the new army was established until the spring of 1919.

Sources


The End of Empires and State Building in East and Central Europe: Prolegomena for a Discussion

by

Sergiu Iosipescu

On 11 September 1697 at Senta, on the eastern bank of the Tisza River, the Imperial Army in Hungary, commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy, won the battle against the Ottoman forces of Mustafa II. More than the earlier defeat of Kahlenberg-Vienna in 1683, the disaster of 1697 remains enshrined in Turkish annals as “the Year of Senta.” Among the followers of the Great Turk who escaped from the battlefield was a young man who would be a connection between the Romanian Principalities with the Ottoman and Russian Empires, the Kingdom of Prussia, the United Kingdom, and a link between the Greek, Turkish, and Romanian cultures. The young man who escaped from Senta was the Romanian Prince Demetrius Cantemir and from this infamous day of September 1697 dates the idea of his famous Latin work *Historia Incrementorum atque Decrementorum Aulae Othomanicae* (*The History of the Rise and Decline of Ottoman Porte*).\(^1\) The victory of Senta was also essential for the conclusion of the Peace of Carlowitz (1699)\(^2\) and the beginning of building the new state, but in the frame of the Habsburg Monarchy. Emperor Leopold I became king of a new kingdom of Hungary, and the Principality of Transylvania joined the Holy Roman German Empire as a hereditary possession of the Habsburg House, which evicted its former autonomous princes.

The Battle of Senta, however, had only a decisive, and perhaps a psychologically decisive, impact upon the Grand Turk to conclude the peace, because the strategic and even geopolitical turning point of the war took place some years earlier. Indeed, in 1690 two seemingly independent events produced long-term historical effects.

The severe defeats on the Middle Danube in the 1680s induced the Great Vizier Fazil Mustafa Köprüli to prepare in cooperation with a Tatar army under Khan Selim Quiray I and Qalgay (heir prince) Devlet Quiray\(^3\) an offensive to restore the situation. Tatar participation in a distant expedition was possible after the failure of two Russian

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campaigns against the Crimea (1687 and 1689). In the summer of 1690 the joint
Ottoman-Tartar armies rejected the Roman-German Imperial forces from Kosovo to
Skopje, Niš, Semendere, and Passarowitz (Pojarevač), the principal result finally being
the reconquest of Belgrade after a short siege (8-14 October 1690).

Simultaneously, the Sublime Porte tried to change the status of Transylvania,
already subjugated by the Habsburgs. A joint force composed of expeditionary corps of
Constantin Brâncoveanu, Prince of Walachia; the serasker Cerkez Ahmed pasha,
Beylerbey of Özi (Očakow); Kučuk Gazi Quiray, Sultan of Crimean Tatars and Imre
Tőkőly -- appointed by the Porte prince of Transylvania -- passed the South Carpathian
mountains and caught the Habsburg Army completely off guard, winning a victory at
Zărneşti (21 August 1690). Although this was a drastic defeat for the Imperials, it was
not sufficient for establish the reign of the new prince Tőkőly, who retired after few
weeks.

But the two victories -- of Zărneşti and Belgrade -- fixed the frontiers from the
Adriatic Sea to Galicia for nearly two centuries

Explanations can be found in the contemporary events in the West -- the Nine
Years’ War of the Augsburg League (1688-1697) absorbed an important part of
Habsburg forces -- and also in the strategy crisis. Prince Eugene of Savoy could not be
everywhere at the same time and only he had the capacity to conceive a coherent strategy
from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. At the same time, the offensive nerve and the
resources of the Holy Roman-German Empire and Poland were exhausted after seventeen
years of struggles.

Only the Grand Duchy of Muscovy under Peter I later entered in the war against
the Ottomans, captured the Azaq fortress (1698), and obtained by the Istanbul Treaty
(1702) a short corridor to the Sea of Azov. Diverted by the beginning of the Northern
War (1700-1721) and the hope to conquer the Baltic possessions of Sweden, the great
Duke Peter I again returned against the Ottoman Empire after his decisive victory over
Charles XII’s army at Poltava, 8 July 1709.

The Muscovite leader’s aim was without doubt the conquest of Constantinople
and of the former countries belonging to the Byzantine Empire. By consequence Peter I
hoped to break in the same time the Ottoman-Polish couple, a West barrier for his rising
empire, and also to establish his domination over the Black Sea as one of the
intermediary phases in the Russian expansion to the warm seas. 7

4 Under the regent princess Sophia and her principal councillor kniaz Vassily Vassyljevič Galytsyne the
great dukedom of Muscovy entered in the Holly League (1686), with the purpose to block the Tatar
Khanate forces in Crimea.

5 The basic study about the campaign is only in Romanian: Constantin Rezachevici, Constantin

Historica”, 16, 1970.

7 Concerning the so called “Testament of Peter the Great”, the recent literature try to prove that the
document was forged during the French Revolution in the Polish circles (see Elena Jourdan, Le testament
At the climax of his Turkish stage, Cantemir was appointed by the Sublime Porte Prince, an ephemeral prince of Moldavia (1710-1711). Cantemir’s reign coincided with the new Russian-Turkish War, and his hope for a new international status for his country and also for establishing a dynasty caused the Romanian prince to join the tsar. Only a small faction of Romanian elites (boyards = landlords) followed Dimitrie Cantemir’s option. Too far from his communications lines, with many of his troops in Polish garrisons, Peter I underestimated the Ottoman power. The tsar’s expectation for Wallachian support vanished: measuring the real balance of powers, Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu with his forces and provisions remained neutral, and was really for a time the empire of the strategic issue of the conflict. After a short battle at Stănilești on the lower Prut River the tsar’s encircled army was forced to capitulate (July 1711). The peace signed here obliged the Russians to evacuate Poland and leave Azov.

The chance for significant Russian expansion to the lower Danube River and consequently on the whole north and northeast coast of the Black Sea was lost for nearly a century, and when this was militarily possible again, the new European balance of power prohibited the Russian territorial achievement.

Peter I understood that very well and, blaming his disaster on the Romanian prince, followed Constantin Brâncoveanu with an all-consuming hatred, until the latter’s atrocious beheading in Istanbul (16 August 1714), by order of the Sublime Porte.  

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\* apocryphe de Pierre le Grand. Universalité d’un texte (1794-1836), in “Bulletin de l’Institut Pierre Renouvin”, No. 18, spring 2004 (online edition). For the Soviet point of view see E. N. Danilova, Zaveščanje Petra Velikogo, in Trudy istoriko-archivnogo instituta, 2, 1946, pp.205-270: a different opinion at Simone Blanc, Histoire d’une phobie: Le Testament de Pierre le Grand, in « Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique », 9, 3(1968), pp. 265-293. But if the Testament was forged by someone else than the Tsar, the most probably the author must be finding in the members or survivors of Peter’s 1st team (Lefort, Šafirov, Šeremetjev etc) who expressed the ideas and dreams of their late master. Incidentally, a memoir of chevalier d’Éon (agent of the French Secret du Roi), to Choiseul, from 1760 (Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, vol. 1, M.D. 7, after the classification of 1888) concerning this will was published by Alexandru Odobescu in Eudoxiu baron de Hurmuzaki, Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor, Suplement I, Bucharest, 1888, p.15. Only this memoir explains the instructions of Choiseul to Breteuil, French ambassador in Russia, in the same year 1760 : “la Cour de Petersbourg a depuis longtemps un plan politique bien formé don’t elle ne s’écarte pas et qui paraît bien lié dans toutes ses parties, mais qu’elle ne développe que successivement et à mesure que les événements et les circonstances lui en fournissent l’occasion” (Recueil des instructions données aux Ambassadeurs.2.Russie, Paris, 1890, p. 130, underlined by me). The substance of Peter I’s will – from the reminiscences of the tsar’s team - was delivered by Field Marshall Jakob Burkhardt Műnich in his conversations with Empress Catherine II in the years 1762-1767.

\* J. Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens, t. VIII, Amsterdam, La Haye, 1730, p. 275.

9 The Kantakuzenos family of Wallachia, devoted to the tsar, was the instrument for the condemnation and execution of Constantin Brâncoveanu and his sons, by revealing to the Porte the secret correspondence of the former prince with Russia and the Holy Roman-German Empire.
After the Russian-Ottoman War, Dimitrie Cantemir escaped to Moscow, and became kniaz and councillor of Peter the Great, and a member of Royal Academy of Prussia. His manuscript of the history of the Ottoman Empire was sent to England and published in English in 1756 -- just at the beginning of the Seven Years' War -- by the Reverend Nicolas Tindal.

The Cantemirian theory of the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, inspired by a number of Ottoman scholars such as Haği Qhalfa, was also applied by Edward Gibbon in his monumental History of Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. It was also developed by our contemporary, Professor Neagu Djuvara, into a historical philosophy, in his fundamental work Civilizations and Historical Patterns. An Approach to Comparative Study of History (1975), which was recognized by the French Academy.10

Curiously, Cantemir did not recognize the importance of the Battles of Belgrade and Zărneşti in 1690 and Stănileşti in 1711 as turning points in the geopolitical history of southeast Europe, which postponed the end of the Ottoman Empire in Europe for two centuries. But of course, the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire11 and state building in east and central Europe associated with the so called “Oriental” or “Eastern Question”12 remains in this part of Europe on the first plan for our subject.

But contrary to this manner of view, I consider that essential even for the Ottoman Empire was the abrupt decline of the influence of the French Monarchy in Levant after the middle of the eighteenth century and especially after the reversal of alliances in 1756.13 Before this “diplomatic revolution,” due perhaps in principal to von Kaunitz and Madame de Pompadour, the traditional alliance of France with the Great Turk, and subsequently with Poland and Sweden against the Holy Roman Empire, erected equally a barrier to Muscovy. This was perfectly expressed in the instructions of Louis XV appointing his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count de Broglie, in 1752: "Mettre un frein au despotisme de la Russie en Pologne et diminuer dans ce royaume l’influence de la Cour de Vienne [...] Unir défensivement sous l’autorité de la France, la Suède, la Prusse, la Pologne et la Turquie [...] et par cette union former une barrière impénétrable entre la Russie et le reste de l’Europe.”14 Unfortunately for the Versailles Court, Prussia avoided

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10 It is interesting to observe that ambassador Trandafir Djuvara (1856-1935), the grandfather of Neagu Djuvara, is the author of an important study Cent projets de partage de la Turquie. 1281-1913, Félix Alcan, 1914, which deals just with the problem of Ottoman Empire death.


the French system and chose the British alliance (Westminster Convention, January 1756). This step hurried the diplomatic negotiations between Versailles and Vienna, but when Louis XV signed the alliance with the Holy Roman Empire (1 May 1756, Versailles) and afterwards with Russia (31 December 1756, Versailles), France officially abandoned Poland and the Ottoman Empire to Russian expansion in east central and southeast Europe.

Immediately after the “diplomatic revolution,” the prince of Wallachia, Constantin Mavrocordato (1756-1758), a former representative of the Versailles Court at the Porte, tried to obtain Prussian support to resist to Russian pressure, and consequently at the Porte he was an architect of the new alliance between Frederic II and the Great Turk. But confronted with a great European coalition in 1756-1760, Frederic II was not able to become a responsible ally for the failing Ottoman Empire.

What followed was not an act of state building but of the death of states. After the internal consolidation of her reign, Empress Catherine II of Russia and her councillors planned the end of the Ottoman Empire and its partition. They made an alliance with the Kingdom of Poland. Two victorious wars (1768-1774 and 1787-1792) made Russia able to decide the fate of a considerable part of east Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Under these circumstances, from 1772 to 1795, numerous states disappeared, including the Kingdom of Poland (really the Union of Poland and Lithuania), the Tatar Khanate of Crimea (1783), and the Duchy of Courland (i.e., Leetonia, 28 March 1795).

There are significant differences between the deaths of these states. The partition of Poland was a result of the corruption of the European equilibrium principle by equivalent and compensatory annexations, an invention of Frederic the Great. Isolated after the war of 1768-1774 by the treaty of Kuciuk Kainardja (21 July 1774) and the Convention of Aynaly Kavak (1779), the Crimean Khanate was easy prey for Russian imperialism. The disappearance of the Tatar Khanate of Crimea and Poland cannot be explained by their position as a buffer between the two empires, Russian and Ottoman. The logistical capabilities of that time exclude this interpretation.

The Russian annexation of Crimea gave this empire a dominant position in the Black Sea basin. As a consequence of this new situation of Russia, the eastern part of Georgia was forced to accept the protectorate of the tsarina (Georgievsk Treaty, 4 August 1784).

Under the new reign in France of Louis XVI, the abandonment of the Ottoman

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16 John P. LeDonne write consistently about this kingdom as “the Empire of Poland” (John P. LeDonne, *op.cit.* p.94), probably to justify the Russian politics and annexations over a decadent and, of course, multiethnic “empire.”


Empire and Poland to the appetite of Russia was highly resented. In a Mémoire adressé à Louis XVI pour sa justification, the Count of Broglie wrote about Louis XV: “Ce monarque n'avait abandonné qu'avec le plus grand regret les anciennes vues de former et de soutenir, depuis le Pôle jusqu'à l'Archipel, une barrière impénétrable entre la Russie et le reste de l'Europe.”

The accession of King Louis XVI in 1774, coupled with the war Great Britain was fighting to prevent the independence of their North American colonies, prevented France from acting for the Ottoman Empire. When the news about the imminent annexation of Crimean Khanate in 1783 arrived in France, the Versailles Cabinet discussed very seriously the opportunity to launch a military expedition in the Black Sea, but only the ruined finances of the kingdom after six years of war impeded the action.

The Poland, Lithuania, and Courland annexations and their transformation into Russian governments (gubernija) showed that between the growing empire of Russia and the declining Ottoman Empire there were no possibilities for state building, a reality observed a century earlier by Romanian politicians like Constantin Brâncoveanu.

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The French Revolution and the accelerated decline of French influence in the Near and Middle East gave Russia new opportunities for an aggressive policy in the Balkans. During the Egyptian expedition of Bonaparte (1798-1799), Tsar Paul I, actually acting as a friend of the Grand Turk, even obtained naval bases in the Ionian Islands. In the first years of Alexander I’s reign, Russia established her protectorate over Montenegro and annexed Georgia (12 December 1801).

Profiting from the decline of Ottoman forces, the Serbians began building their state (1804) – which turned out to be a new occasion for the Saint Petersburg Cabinet to interfere in the Balkans, acting for an oppressed Slavic nation.

The Battle of Austerlitz (2 December 1805) completely changed the situation. The Sublime Porte refused to ratify the new treaty with Russia that officially recognized her position in the Ionian Islands and enabled Russian warships to pass through the Straits. After Austria’s collapse in 1805, Russian forces occupied Cattaro in Dalmatia with the assistance of Admiral Sniavin’s naval squadron in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Petersburg Cabinet also decided immediately to prepare the occupation of the Romanian Principalities, and Alexander I wrote to his minister at Constantinople, Count Italinski, that his troops would occupy Moldavia if the Ottoman Divan would show any pro-Napoleonic favoritism (March 1806). In May, Tsar Alexander I proposed to the Cabinet of St. James a plan of partition of the Ottoman Empire by which Egypt would be

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20 Eudoxiu baron de Hurmuzaki, Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor, Suplement I, Alexandru Odobescu ed. p. 35.

21 Alexander Moruzi, the prince of Moldavia, a creature of Russia, was also informed about the project for the occupation of his principality in May (Report of the Austrian consul in Iași to Foreign minister, Stadion, 10 March 1806, in Hurmuzaki/Nistor, vol. XIX, Cernăuți, 1938, p. 283, doc.no.CCCLXXXI).
English and the Principalities annexed by Russia.\textsuperscript{22} Those facts are a decisive negation of the assertion that the war was incidental and Russia did not have at that time a partition plan for the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{23}

On the contrary, the Russian plan for the new war (1806-1812) with the Ottoman Empire was highly ambitious. In a note to the tsar, the Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Adam Czartoryski wrote in 11 January 1806: "Il semble donc que le seul plan convenable à suivre pour la Russie sur un changement future dans l’Empire ottoman serait d’y établir des États séparés" -- which apparently means a veritable end of an empire and state building. The friend and confidant of Alexander I continued, “des États séparés jouissant des formes d’indépendance quant à leur régime intérieur, mais sous la souveraineté de la Russie et sous l’égide de sa protection; on exécuterait du nombre de ces États les pays que la cour impériale croirait à sa convenance de s’approprier entièrement, tel que la Moldavie, la Valachie et la Bessarabie; outre les ressources de tout genre qu’offiraient ces provinces à la Russie par la nature, la richesse et l’abondance de leurs productions, le Danube, qui les borde dans toute leurs étendue, deviendrait une frontière infiniment plus solide que n’est actuellement le Dniesrtr ».\textsuperscript{24}

This was the framework by which the tsar and his Cabinet aspired to assure the Russian domination over the Black Sea and the Balkans, Constantinople, and the Straits, to obtain an imperial issue to the Mediterranean Sea, and so to realize the complete program of Catherine II and kniaz Potemkine. It surely meant the end of the Ottoman Empire, but not the building of new national and independent states in its place.

The anarchy in the Danubian border provinces (villayets) of the Ottoman Empire was secretly sustained by Petersburg’s agents, and the caution of the Porte caused the French ambassador General Sebastiani to dismiss the pro-Russian princes of the Romanian Principalities\textsuperscript{25} offered Russia a new casus belli – the desire to occupy the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (November-December 1806). For Tsar Alexander I it was also an opportunity to give a gloss to his prestige, which had been highly tarnished by the defeat at Austerlitz (2 December 1805) and the withdrawal and abandonment of Prussia. Of course, the Russian-Ottoman war facilitated the task of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[24] “Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoričestva obščestva”, LXXXII, p. 254. The idea that this war was a great strategic movement against a Napoleonic plan to occupy the Romanian Principalities and to attack Russia by an army send from Dalmatia is a phantasmagoria: there were not evidence of such preparative in Dalmatia and during all the war the principal military effort of Russia was against the Ottoman forces in the East Balkans and not opposed to an imaginary attack from Dalmatia.
\item[25] Prince Constantin Ypsilanti of Wallachia actively prepared the war: he procured for the Russian Cabinet a copy of Napoleon’s instruction to general Sebastiani and prepare magazines for provisioning the necessary Russian troops, esteemed by him at 50 000 men( P. P. Panaitescu, \textit{Corespondaţia lui Constantin Ypsilanti cu guvernul rusesc. 1806-1810}. Pregătirea Eteriei şi a renăserek politice româneşti, Bucureşti, 1933, pp. 28-29, 32-39 (correspondence in French from July-August 1806).
\end{footnotes}
Karagheorghe and his followers for the unification of an autonomous Serbia.\textsuperscript{26}

The fate of the Balkans was highly influenced by the decline and fall of the great Napoleonic Empire. In spite of the Tilsit and Erfurt Treaties and their secret clauses, Emperor Napoleon was very reluctant to admit a foreign, Russian, control over the Low Danube, i.e., over the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The appointment in the Principalities of a diplomat such as Reinhardt -- his former ambassador to the Rhine Confederation -- revealed his real intentions concerning the position of this states, to create here a barrier against Russia.\textsuperscript{27} Finally just before the beginning of his Russian campaign, in the spring of 1812, the French Emperor enjoined the Ottoman Divan to reject all territorial claims of the Saint Petersburg Court. It was the great strength of Stratford-Canning, the British charge d’affaires in Constantinople, to realize the peace between the Porte and Russia, just before the passage of the Niemen River by Napoleon’s army, which contained contingents from twenty nations.

The Peace of Bucharest (28 May 1812)\textsuperscript{28} mandated the autonomy of Serbia but imposed the dismemberment of a state - the Romanian Principality of Moldavia. Its eastern part was annexed by Russia and renamed Bessarabia in 1813.

The complete disappearance of Napoleonic rule in Europe by the provisions of Vienna’s treaty produced three new so-called states: in central and eastern Europe the Kingdom of Poland, incorporated in the Russian Empire; the town, Republic of Krakow; and the Republic of Ionian Islands, under British protection.

In the period of military insurrections, the Greek Hetairia (Brotherhood) provoked an uprising in 1821 in the Romanian Principalities and Peloponnese. Obliged at the Sainte Alliance’ congress in Laybach (Ljubljana) to disavow the Greek movement, the tsar’s ultimatum to the Porte in 19 July 1821 for ceasing the Christian persecution was completely ignored by the sultan.\textsuperscript{29}

Curiously, even the Russian influence in Europe increased enormously after the fall of Napoleon. Its position at the Porte became more and more difficult immediately after 1815, as it was confronted with the strong English presence in the Ottoman Empire, with Lord Strangford. The naval intervention of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the war engaged by the last against the Ottoman Empire, produced the independence of the small Kingdom of Greece and the occupation (1828-1834), followed by a imposition of a protectorate of the Tsar Nicholas I on the Romanian Principalties by the Treaty of Adrianople (14 September 1829).\textsuperscript{30} Russia annexed also by this treaty the Danube Delta


\textsuperscript{27} For his mission see Maria Holban, \textit{Autour des deux rapports rapports inédits sur Caragea et Callimachy}, Bucarest, 1942.


and the Serpent Island, the year 1829 being the climax of the Russian territorial expansion on the West Black Sea shores. Profiting from the war and consequent to his system, the tsar suppressed the autonomy of Bessarabia and transformed it into a plain imperial gubernja. If Serbia escaped from the Russian pressure it was only because of its geopolitical location, located between the Austrian and Ottoman empires.

Concerning the state building of Greece, it is necessary to underline the importance of Moreea (Peloponnese) as a strong part of the new Kingdom, due to the old tradition of separation from the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, and of the vigorous participation of the Walachian inhabitants of the state to the revolutionary movement for independence. Unfortunately, the internal development of Greece was limited because of the financial constraints and the political struggles between the parties, each looking for the help of the three great powers (England, Russia, and France).

The victorious war against Turkey and the repression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831 permitted Tsar Nicholas I to also suppress the Kingdom of Poland.

Profiting from the Egyptian threat to the Sublime Porte after the defeat of the Ottoman forces at Konya (21 December 1832) and the hesitation of England and France to interfere, Nicholas I sent a naval squadron from Sevastopol to Constantinople (February 1833), and shortly thereafter, Russian troops. At this time, in a conversation with Count Ficquelmont, Austrian ambassador in St Petersburg, the tsar tried to obtain Viennese cooperation to transform the occupation of the Romanian Principalities into a definitive annexation.

On 8 July 1833, after tortuous negotiations, a Russian-Ottoman treaty of alliance was signed at Unkiar Skelessy. In this treaty, the tsar promised military support to the sultan and obtained the free navigation for his naval fleet through the Straits, which at Petersburg’s request had to be closed to all another powers. But the unfavorable impression of the Unkiar Skelessi treaty obliged the tsar to sign with the Sublime Porte the convention of Sankt Petersburg (20 January 1834) for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Romanian Principalities.

The new Egyptian crisis of 1839-1840, resolved by England and Russia against France, required Nicholas I to renounce a renewal of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessy. In exchange, the concert of powers adopted the Straits Convention, which assured the security of Russia in the Black Sea. The tsar considered the positive relationship with the St. James Cabinet during the crisis an opportunity to reopen the Oriental Question to prepare for the eventual demise of the Ottoman Empire and its partition on terms favourable to Russia. In September 1843, Tsar Nicholas I held four discussions in Warsaw with Count Ficquelmont, a confidant of Prince Metternich, about his

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31 It is remarkable as historical explanation that John P. LeDonne, op.cit. p. 3 places this maximum only in 1830-1831 after the bloody suppression of the Polish uprising.

32 G.H. Bolsover, Nicholas I and the partition of Turkey, in “The Slavonic and East European Review”, XXVII, 68, 1948, pp.115-120.

33 This convention also provided a substantial reduction of the Ottoman financial debt to Russia, but retained the occupation of Silistria and a military communication line through the Principalities.
propositions of partition; in every case Russia reserved the annexation of Romanian Principalities. Confronted with Metternich’s negative responses to his propositions, the Russian emperor visited England in July 1844 and discussed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, and Lord Aberdeen. A memorandum of these discussions was signed and was accepted by the tsar as an accord of partition and this misunderstanding explains his excessive confidence some years later.  

The repressive regime of the tsar was able by its military forces to vanquish the Hungarians’ state-building aspirations and the Romanians’ national emancipation during the 1848-1849 revolutions. 

Concerning the so-called “Spring of the Peoples,” it is necessary to emphasize that the Romanian Principalities Moldavia and Wallachia, and also the Romanians from Transylvania and Hungary, were the last bastion in the east of the revolutionary movement in 1848-1849. Face-to-face with Russian imperialism and confronted by the tsar’s forces, the revolutionary leaders fled to the Ottoman Empire. The tsar’s Cabinet’s attempts to obtain their extradition from the Porte were blocked by the Anglo-French threat to introduce their fleets in the Black Sea. This little-known episode at the end of the European revolutions was produced by an agreement between Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, then the French president, the British Cabinet and, of course, the great “Elchi,” Ambassador Sir Stratford-Canning. This was a neglected advertisement for the St. Petersburg Court and a harbinger of the future Crimean War. 

The Tsar’s plans for the end of the Ottoman Empire and its partition provoked in 1853-1854 a quasi-European war. The study of British, French, Austrian, Russian, Italian, Romanian, and Turkish sources demonstrate the admirable skill of the French Emperor Napoleon III in destroying the treaties of 1814-1815 and the success of his brilliant idea to attack the Russians in the Black Sea, especially in the Crimea. The long siege of Sebastopol provoked the economic and military collapse of the Nicholas I’s Russia. By the Peace Treaty of Paris (18 March 1856), the Black Sea was declared neutral, Russia was expelled from the mouth of the Danube River, and, for the first time since the Middle Ages, a state -- other than Russia or Turkey -- the Romanian Principalities, obtained a maritime access, a little part of Bessarabia.  

Insignificant at the first view, this was essential to destroy forever Peter I’s dominance of the Black Sea. In less than twenty years, a national state with a hereditary dynasty, related to the Hohenzollerns of ascendant Prussia, developed at

34 G.H. Bolsover, op.cit., pp. 120-145 278-280. Nicholas I was ready to offer to Austria even the Straits for its accord. 


36 For this episode see Stanley Lane-Poole, The life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, London, 1890, p. 243-250. 

37 Actes et documents relatifs à l’histoire de la régénération de la Roumanie, D.A. Sturdza, D. C Sturdza, Ghenadie Petrescu, Bucureşti, 1889, p. 1075.
the Danube mouth, disrupting Russia’s potential route to Constantinople and the Straits.

The Congress of 1856, and the later 1858 Conference of Paris, opened the way for the 1859-1861 unification of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia into a single state – Romania. To summarize the period of 1853-1858, I believe the Crimean War can be renamed the “War of the Romanian Unification,” in the same way the Austro-Piedmont-French war was the war of Italian Unity.

After the beginning of a forced modernization imposed during the administration of Prince Alexandru Cuza, during the long reign (1866-1914) of prince, afterward King Carol I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (a nephew of Napoleon III), Romania -- with around 130,000 square kilometers and 5.4 million inhabitants in 1881 -- became the principal and most stable state of eastern Europe between the empires of Austria, Russia, and Turkey.

The fall of the French Empire in September 1870 and the victory of Prussia and the North German Confederation again changed the situation in eastern Europe. Due to its benevolent attitude to Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War, Russia obtained the suppression of the Treaty of Paris provisions concerning the neutralization of the Black Sea. The restoration of the Russian fleet and naval bases changed the geopolitical context in south eastern Europe. Without French financial assistance, the Ottoman Empire became practically bankrupt in 1876, when the Christian populations of its European provinces were in revolt. This was a favorable time for the St. Petersburg Court to restore its Balkan influence, which it had lost in 1856.

But the war of 1877-1878 began with considerable difficulties, especially because of the Ottoman forces in fortified Plevna, in the northwest of the Balkans. Only by the reinforcement by the Romanian Army under Prince Carol I was the Plevna camp captured after a long siege. By audacious attacks directed at Adrianople, the Russian Headquarters obtained the Peace of San Stefano (3 March 1878). Its principal goal was the establishment of a Greater Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Aegean Sea, supposedly to become a Russian outpost to the Straits and Mediterranean Sea. By the same treaty, and contrary to the earlier agreement with Russia, Romania again lost the part of Bessarabia that had been restored to it in 1856, and received central and north Dobrudja.

The Berlin Peace Treaty (13 July 1878) revised San Stefano. It reduced Bulgaria to the territory between the Danube and the Balkans as a principality vassal to the Porte and created Oriental Rumelia as an autonomous province. These complications had been overtaken by the Bulgarian movement for unity, and in 1885 Oriental Rumelia was incorporated into the principality of Bulgaria, the great power signers of Berlin treaty


39 For the role of Napoleon III in the establishment of a hereditary dynasty, see Paul Henry, L’Abdication du prince Cuza et l’avènement de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trône de Roumanie, Paris, 1930.

being obliged to admit this accomplishment. The stability of the principality under the Russian pressure was realized only under Prince Ferdinand of Saxony-Cobourg (1887-1918), who established special relations with Austro-Hungary and relaxed those with the Azov. Nicholas II and was able to proclaim in 1908 the full independence of Bulgaria and to took the title of tsar.

Independent by the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin and transformed into a Kingdom (1882), Serbia’s aspirations were blocked by Austria-Hungary, which received at Berlin the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sanzaq of Novi-Pazar. In addition, independent Montenegro became a kingdom in 1910. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin had promised a rectification of the northern frontiers of Greece, but only in 1881 did the Hellenic Kingdom receive Thessaly.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Balkan state building was unfinished and Russia could easily forge an alliance of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece with the declared purpose to complete their national unity. Romania, a southeast European monarchy, was not directly involved in the Balkan affairs; it was interested only to preserve the Vlachs minority, special in Macedonia, where schools and a modest autonomy were conceded by Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 -- the first conducted by Christian allies against the Ottoman Empire, and the second between Bulgaria and its former allies and the Ottoman Empire -- ended with the intervention of Romania and the Peace of Bucharest (10 August 1913). This peace marked the last period of Balkan state building and it established, as far as possible, the ethnic frontiers between the Balkan states partially existing even today. The attempt of Romanian secret diplomacy to realize a greater Albania and a fatter hand for Albanians and Vlachos, failed, and the principality of Albania, under Prince Wilhelm I of Wied (nephew of Queen Elisabeth of Romania), remained a small state of 23,000 square kilometers.

The First World War and the fall of all the European empires changed the map of central and eastern Europe. By a strange coincidence the operations of German and British intelligence services in Russia, however with divergent aims, provoked the collapse of the monarchy, probably just before the launch of a decisive offensive by the tsar’s army that was reinforced by Allied equipment (spring 1917). Fortunately, the heroic resistance of the Romanian Army, reorganised by a French military mission (under General Berthelot) and reinforced by Russian forces the seemingly decisive German offensive (led by Field Marshal Mackensen) to south Russia at the gates of Moldavia (July-September 1917). When the German forces finally arrived in the rich plains north of the Black Sea and near the Caspian oil fields (summer of 1918), it was too late; the war was lost.

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires, the Paris peace negotiations and the treaties of Versailles in 1919-1920 established a new world. A difficult state building established a Hungarian Republic, afterward a monarchy; Czechoslovakia; and the Kingdom of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian. Romania obtained its state national sovereignty by the union of Bessarabia (3 April 1918),

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Bucovina (27 November 1918), and Transylvania, Banat, Crişana, and Maramureş (1 December 1918). The right to self-determination, proclaimed by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, was transposed on the maps by the expert teams at the Paris Congress. For example, the Romanian boundaries in the west were established with the expertise of Emmanuel de Martonne, the famous French geographer. Of course, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Wilson were in a difficult position between Italy and Serbia’s claims concerning the Adriatic shores and islands, but generally the ethnic frontiers prevailed.

The end of the Russian Empire in 1917 permitted the emergence of new states: Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The revival of Russian imperialism under Bolshevik and Soviet suits dismantled the independent Caucasian state building in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and also in Ukraine. Only Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia resisted the Red Army offensives with western (especially French) aid. In the Caucasus, the Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey re-established their former frontier.

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At an attentive regard of the Balkan and east and central European state building of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even after the Paris-Versailles Peace of 1919-1924, historians are impressed by a pregnant national frustration. Political thinking and action is deeply penetrated by the nationalistic historical tradition. For the Greeks, there was the Byzantine Empire legacy molded in the Great Idea (Megali idea), or reconstruction of a Greek modern state within Byzantine frontiers. For the Bulgarians, the model was the Bulgarian, or even Vlacho-Bulgarian empires from the seventh-eleventh and twelfth-thirteenth centuries, especially under the Vlach tsar John Asan II (1218-1241). For the Serbians, the huge empire of Stefan Dušan in the middle of the fourteenth century was the surveyor’s pole. The St. Stephen Crown theory, of a veritable empire from Adriatic shores to the lower Danube and North Carpathian was emblematic for the Hungarian national awakening. All these medieval patterns influenced, or more, infested the political and military action of the governments in Budapest, Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade. Even when the small principality of Albania was created in 1912-1914, the national title of Prince Wilhelm I of Wied was “mbret” -- imperator, emperor.

The orthodox Romanians have had a very different historical tradition, considering themselves a part (although a remote part) of the Holy Roman Empire. This strong popular tradition explains their compatibility with the later Roman Catholic Crusades or their alliance with the Holy Roman-German Empire on the eve of modern times. Different from all the peoples of east-central Europe, Romanians have had the chance to preserve their state from the twelfth century to the nineteenth century and to realize step-by-step from 1858 to 1918, like Italy of Germany, its national unification and modernization but not necessarily a state building. The study of international relations has only recently received systematic analysis of state death in the contributions of Karen Ruth Adams from the University of California, Berkeley, and Tanisha M. Fazal,42 from the John Olin Institute for Strategic

Studies. They both focus on the geopolitical situation of the dying states and especially the theory of buffer states. Basically, their extreme vulnerability in Tanisha Fazal’s definition of state death “as a formal less of foreign policy making power to another states” is excessive. If the theory of buffer states can be invoked for the real death of Poland in 1772-1795, the survival of the Romanian Principalities, buffer states between the Ottoman Empire and Hungary or Poland, and after Russia, completely negate the theory.

This brief analysis needs a conclusion: contrary to the politic scientists’ explanations, only a historical analysis for the “long time” in Braudelian’s spirit can explain the end of empires, the death and birth of states, the revival of imperialism, and its present evolutions.
1. Before “Enigma” was Broken

The breaking of the German High Command’s “Enigma” code and the reconstruction of the Enigma machine at end of 1932 is considered one of the greatest achievements of Polish military intelligence. It is one of the most sensational revelations of World War II history.

The names of Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Różycki, and Henryk Zygalski and officers of the Polish Cipher Bureau are cited in all encyclopedias concerning codes and cryptography and in all historical works concerning the intelligence war; they are mentioned in deliberations as an important factor accounting for the Allies’ victory and Germany’s defeat in the Second World War. For indeed the cracking of the Enigma code provided the Allies with an exceptionally powerful weapon. One of the most renowned experts of cryptography, David Kahn, writes: “. . . the Polish-British-American masterful breaking of the German Enigma ciphering machine . . . had a profound influence on the outcome of the Second World War.”

Rejewski, Różycki, and Zygalski were born in this part of Poland, which was until the end of World War I under German occupation. For the latter were from a community that had been subjected to almost one and a half centuries of Germanization and were not only able to read and write in German but were also able to think in that language and use both its literary and colloquial forms. Moreover, they knew all the idioms, the abbreviations, the sayings, and the regional and the technical expressions; they simply knew German history and culture.

Thus, although the breaking of the Enigma code and the reconstruction of the Enigma machine was indeed an extraordinarily important achievement, it was barely the tip of an iceberg, so to say, rising above an ocean of mystery that shrouds the preceding decade of Polish cryptographic service’s history. This service had been established in the autumn of 1918, it was incorporated into the Ciphers Section, and in October 1919 into the Ciphers Office of the Second Department of the General Staff (later High Command) of the Polish Army. The Ciphers Office and especially its Second Department (Foreign Ciphers, Special Ciphers, and Radio Intelligence) had a very profound influence on the course of the 1918-1920 Polish-Bolshevik War.

2. The Origins and Early Development of Polish Radio Intelligence

Cryptography and cryptanalysis have a centuries-old history in Poland marked by notable achievements. And although their development within the structure of a Polish state was halted by the Partitions, it was continued by generation after generation of Polish conspirators working for their state’s restoration from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century.

The collapse of the three European empires: German, Austro-Hungarian, and first of all Russian, as a result of World War I, created conditions to rebuild on their ruins the Republic of Poland. This revival was not only given by the Entente Powers. Polish independence crowned the long fight for it. During World War I, Polish people served in many formations attached to the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and French Armies and the conspiratorial Polish Military Organization. After the German defeat on 11 November 1918, Józef (Joseph) Piłsudski became and held the two positions of Head of State and Commander-in-Chief -- Army and State.

The origins of Polish radio intelligence may be traced to the experiences of Polish officers serving in the radiotelegraphy and military intelligence units of the partitioning emperors' powers before and during the World War I as well as in Polish military organizations formed during that war on the Entente side.

During the early years of the twentieth century, and in particular during the First World War, there was a rapid development in radiotelegraphy, which became widely applied as an excellent means of military communication. Simultaneously, radiogoniometry, i.e., the monitoring of enemy radio communications, and the work of cryptology cells aimed at breaking foreign codes and ciphers led to the development of a new branch of military intelligence, known as radio-intelligence.

In this respect the German Army was the most difficult to penetrate, for it generally would not grant Poles access to posts in intelligence or even radiotelegraphy. At best they were assigned as non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in signals detachments.

Only a small percentage of those serving in Russian military intelligence were Poles, but many did serve in that army’s telegraph and radiotelegraph units as officers or NCOs. On the other hand, the archaic Russian system kept these units subordinate to the engineering corps and their work was undervalued by conservative field officers. Military intelligence was improvised in times of war and traditionally greater importance was attached to spy networks than to the modern techniques of acquiring information, such as radio intelligence and aerial reconnaissance.

Most of the telegraph and radiotelegraph officers and NCOs in the Polish Army founded by General Józef Haller in France were recruited from prisoners of war who had previously served in the Austro-Hungarian Army. Others were Poles from the United States who underwent technical training in France. This training included adopting French Army signals procedures and more particularly radio surveillance procedures as the rudiments of conducting radio intelligence.

The Austro-Hungarian Army posed no national barriers for the recruitment of Poles in its telegraph, radiotelegraph, and intelligence units. What is more, this army had already in 1911, therefore earlier than most other armies, especially European armies, separated signals units (including telephony, telegraphy, and radiotelegraphy) from other army formations and allowed them to operate independently. Similarly, Austrian army intelligence adopted many modern information gathering techniques and radio intelligence very early on -- virtually at the start of the war. Only the French Army had had such units operating before the outbreak of hostilities, which continued developing during the war to proportions similar to those of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

In 1918, the latter not only provided the Polish Army with experienced radiotelegraph officers and NCOs, but also the optimal model of independent signals units (separate from engineers) with signals officers and radiotelegraph officers having their own chains of command all the way up to the Polish Army’s General Staff (SGWP).
Likewise, the command structures of the Information Department (later given the number II) of the SGPW were also being formed since 1918 by experienced officers of Austro-Hungarian intelligence. By directing these services for close to two years these officers introduced into the Polish Army what they had learned earlier, including the running of radio intelligence. The consistent development of Polish cryptographic and radio intelligence is demonstrated by the fact that General Staff Colonel Józef Rybak (who had been head of Austrian Army Intelligence) recruited into Department II General Staff Major Karol Boldeskul (former head of net radio intelligence of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front), who in turn recruited next former cryptology and information officers of the Austrian Army, and Polish professors of mathematics from Lwów and Warsaw University.

The recruiting in December 1918 of General Staff Major Karol Boldeskul at Intelligence initiated the beginnings of Polish radio intelligence, and in March 1919, he began recruiting officers of the former Austro-Hungarian Army who had experience of dealing with ciphers. By April (though officially from May) 1919, a Ciphers Section was also set up in the Information Department. More former Austrian Intelligence officers were recruited to serve in this section.

3. Radio Monitoring and the Beginnings of Cryptanalysis

Polish Army radio monitoring was established fairly quickly. Initially, this was done when the airwaves were free from the Polish Army’s own correspondence, by teams with fixed radio stations that had be taken over from the occupant in Krakow (from 4 November 1918), in Warsaw (19 November 1918), in Poznan (by the end of December 1918), in Przemyśl (from January 1919), and from the spring of 1919 in Lwów. The problems of the lack of staff and equipment were common. In the years 1918-1920, the elite radiotelegraphy units numbered only 143 officers (45% of whom had received their training in the Polish Army) and some three times as many NCOs and specialists (65% of whom the Polish Army had trained). What little equipment had been inherited or captured from the partitioning powers was barely sufficient to maintain communications between the army’s own units. A few items of equipment were purchased from France and individual wireless sets were bought from Austria. In the years 1918-1921, the Polish Army used for both communications and radio monitoring seven fixed wireless stations and 26 portable radiotelegraph sets, as well as three radiogoniometers. At the same time, however, Budyonny's Cavalry Army alone had more wireless sets (inherited from the Tsarist Army) than the entire Polish Army.

The monitoring of foreign communications began in late 1918 and was carried out sporadically in the breaks between the army’s own transmissions (as had been the practice in the Austrian Army at the start of World War I). Development was gradual and from the spring of 1919 it had evolved into the organized monitoring of all neighboring states’ radiotelegraph communications networks and the interception of their messages.

Extant documentation shows that from March 1919 Poland had organized systematic radio monitoring in the form of fixed and portable radiotelegraph sets tapping into the radio stations and networks of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bolshevik Hungary, the West-Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZURL) and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (URL), Kaunas-Lithuania, and above all, Red and White Russia. Moreover, by then the Poles were intercepting correspondence between “Red” Hungary and Bolshevik Russia, the ZURL, and Vienna as well as between Kaunas and Berlin.
However, there is no information as to how the Poles first managed to break the codes of all of these states, but in the spring of 1919, when General Haller’s Army returned to Poland from France, Polish radio intelligence started breaking German “transpositional” and “double devisor” systems of cipher. The earliest cipher keys to be found in the Ciphers Office archive are to the Bolshevik codes called “Mars” and “Mayak,” dating from March and April 1919, respectively.

A breakthrough in the field of cryptanalysis occurred in July 1919 when Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski was recruited by the Intelligence Office of NDWP Department II. As a former reserve officer of the Russian Army Engineers, which included signals units, he was familiar with that army’s rules and regulations. As an officer of the 2nd Corps staff in Ukraine and an officer of the underground Polish Military Organization (POW) command in Ukraine, as well as the head of Gen Zeligowski’s 4th Rifles Division and then, from May 1919, the intelligence chief in Gen Haller’s army command operating in Volhynia (Wolyn) and Podolia (Podole), Kowalewski bestowed upon the Intelligence Office (as a “dowry” of sorts) information concerning the ciphering systems of the Red Army and General Denkin’s Volunteer Army.

Lieutenant Kowalewski, an amateur cryptanalyst, was a man of exceptional intelligence. He possessed great mathematical talent and an imagination acquired from an education at the Łódź school of commerce, and engineering studies (majoring in chemistry) at the Leodium University of Technology. He knew more than one foreign language: German, French, and above all Russian. He also knew the procedures and regulations concerning the issuing of orders and signals within the Russian Army. Kowalewski was born and lived in the Russian part of Poland in a community that had been subjected to almost one and a half centuries of Russification. He was not only able to read and write in Russian, but he was also able to think in that language and use both its literary and colloquial forms. He also knew all the idioms, the abbreviations, the sayings, and the regional and the technical expressions; above all, he knew Russian history and culture.

In August 1919, Kowalewski broke the first Red Army ciphers, thus enabling the reading of Bolshevik correspondence from the frontlines of the civil war in the Ukraine, in Southern Russia, and in the Caucasus. The codes he subsequently broke included those used by the Volunteer Army, the “White” Black Sea Fleet, and the (Dnieper) Ukrainian People’s Army (URL), which allowed the Poles to follow what was happening in vast territories of Russia from Siberia to Petrograd and from Murmansk to the Black Sea. Lieutenant Kowalewski dealt with the deciphering, but he was also an analyst with a deep understanding of the issues of the Russian Civil War and especially the various Russian armies that were engaged in it. He was also an efficient organizer of the Polish radio intelligence service. The fruits of his labors gave Poland’s military and political authorities, and above all the Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief, Jozef Pilsudski, a very special weapon, especially of great use in foreign policy and in times of war. It provided Poles with insight into top secret decisions made by all the sides in the vast territories of the Russian Civil War: the White Russians, the Red Russians, and URL troops. It is also probable that Marshall Pilsudski also had access to deciphered radiograms of the military and political authorities of Poland’s neighbors: Germany, Lithuania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The issue of having access to such a wide range of political, military, and economic data has so far been overlooked by most researchers, an unappreciated fact which has had a negative effect on the way they make assumptions.
4. Uses of information acquired from Polish Radio Intelligence: General Information

Deciphered messages were analyzed in various cells of the Polish Army’s Supreme Command (NDWP). Above all, they went to Records Office Division V (also referred to as Ew.5), which dealt with armies and states to the east of Poland, primarily the Red Army. Information was pieced together as to the types of troops and services, the frontline armies and divisions, their commanders, their weapons and other equipment, the disposition of troops, communications, training, etc. Here attempts were made to assess the potential military developments in each of the states, their plans and intentions, and especially the extent to which they posed a potential danger. The data provided by Polish radio intelligence was, if not the basic source, then at least (on account of its broad range and general reliability), one of the most important ones for piecing together facts.

For example: the Red Army's battle orders, the allocation of commands, and other organizational decisions were known to Polish command centers as they were known to those of the enemy. This is very important because knowledge about the enemy’s organizational structures, troop deployments, and intentions was and still is one of the fundamental bases on which operational decisions are made on all levels of command.

5. Strategic and Political Benefits and Operational Use

The most important deciphered radiograms were personally read by the General Staff Chief and Head of State -- Commander-in-Chief, Marshall Józef Piłsudski. The possibility of confronting both public and confidential information with top secret information (known only to a small group of people) from radio intelligence gave the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of State an essential basis for making political and strategic decisions. It seems that among the region’s newly founded states, only Poland had at its disposal such a well organized radio intelligence system, thanks to which Polish foreign policy was based on the most reliable and the broadest scope of knowledge concerning the political and military issues of Eastern Europe. So far this subject has not been studied and analyzed by either Polish or foreign historians. The importance of diplomatic and military intelligence in the formulating of Polish foreign policy in the years 1918-1921 has also been ignored. The consequence of overlooking these issues is the drawing of many wrong conclusions and the formulation of false assumptions and erroneous theses.

For example, at the start of 1920, when the Polish and foreign press and even the Polish parliament was discussing the Bolsheviks’ peace proposal to Poland, Polish radio intelligence was providing reliable information that from mid-January the situation was quietening down on other Bolshevik fronts, that a reserve army was being formed, and that in the third quarter of that month Red Army units would reposition from the fronts of southern Russia, the Caucasus, Siberia, and Southern Ukraine, and concentrate on the Polish border. Such redeployments are always the consequence of a previously prepared plan – and in this case the plan was war with Poland. If the plan was already accepted, it must have been prepared no later than the beginning of January 1920, therefore at the same time or perhaps even before the Bolsheviks came out with their offer of peace to Poland.

When Marshall Józef Piłsudski received news of the Bolshevik peace proposal, he knew that they must have already prepared a plan of war against Poland and
realized that the decision must have been made at the highest level. Any Bolshevik “peace proposal,” therefore, was just playing for time and a propaganda ploy aimed at their own people as well as at public opinion in Poland and in Europe at large.

We have to bear in mind, that although Marshall Józef Piłsudski had extensive knowledge about the enemy’s true intentions, he was still restricted in that he had to keep his knowledge secret. Therefore when debating with the supporters of making peace with the Bolsheviks, he could not reveal the top secret information provided by Polish intelligence. Like Churchill sacrificed Coventry for the sake of keeping the Enigma (called in Great Britain Ultra) secret, the Polish Commander-in-Chief and Chief of State also had to keep secret evidence that the Russians were planning war.

As a result, Marshall Piłsudski allowed himself to be labelled by part of his government, by a significant part of European public opinion, and even by many from his own political circles a “troublemaker,” “militarist,” and “aggressor” against “peace loving workers and peasants” or a “gambler” recklessly prepared to cast the newly-resurrected Republic into war.

By the start of 1920, Czechoslovak codes had definitely been broken. It would be particularly interesting to know when the Poles might have deciphered messages exchanged between Moscow and Berlin during the Battle for Warsaw in August 1920. The mere fact that such communication was taking place between two states questioning the Versailles agreements was enough reason for the Poles to worry.

A short article does not provide adequate space to present all the ways in which Polish radio intelligence data was used in the period from 1919 to the Riga negotiations at the end of 1920. Suffice it to say that the extant part of the Ciphers Office archive contains several thousand intercepted and deciphered Russian radiograms from the different period Polish-Soviet war alone and over a hundred cracked cipher keys.

6. The Significance of Radio Intelligence during the 1918-1920 War

The war between Poland and Bolshevik Russia was a conflict between states of unequal potential. Red Russia was still an empire, weakened by defeat in the First World War, through which it had suffered vast territorial, material, and human losses. It was then further shaken by civil war, which resulted in not only yet more material losses but also the destruction of the state administration, social order, and economic infrastructure, as well as the systems on which transport, communication, and the army had been based. She was still a colossus in relation to Poland. At the time the Red Army consisted of over 70 infantry divisions and approximately 20 cavalry divisions, as well as various other units. In all, it could feed and arm of almost 5 million men. About 40 percent of its active forces (almost 30 infantry and 8 cavalry divisions) were fighting on the Polish front. Material once belonging to the Tsarist Army was augmented by the capture of vast supplies provided by the Entente powers to the White Russians. (The Entente supply of materiel to the White armies was many times greater than any aid the Polish Army ever received). Despite the above-mentioned internal difficulties, the Russian arms industry was producing rifles, machine guns, and light and heavy artillery, as well as all the required types of ammunition. The Red Army’s staff officer cadre commanding frontline troops had graduated from the General Staff Academy (which incidentally continued to function). They had all been taught the same operational doctrine. And “Red Commander” schools run by former tsarist officers were now producing the next generation of staff officers. The human resources were almost limitless.
At the same time the resurrected Polish Republic was only beginning the process of uniting diverse state structures into one, which meant having to cope with different legal systems, different economies, different transport and communication systems, and the deep-rooted regional differences that were visible even in the army. The country was ruined after four years of the First World War. The Polish Army was formed “out of nothing” by the cadres of former Polish units which had served in the armies of the partitioning powers, by recruiting Polish prisoners of war from the camps of Italy and France, and by former emigrants who had returned from the USA. It was an amalgamation of diverse tactical and operational experiences and of diverse concepts brought out diverse military academies. By mid-1920, the Polish Army had over 600,000 men at arms in 21 infantry divisions and 7 horse brigades. Polish weaponry included over a dozen different types (and calibres) of firearms and artillery that made the supplying of ammunition extremely complicated. The country produced no weapons of its own apart from hand grenades and bayonets. In any other situation many of the weapons left behind by the partitioning powers would have been used as scrap metal. The only significant contribution of materiel (still accounting for only 40-50 percent of what was actually needed) came from France. But from the summer of 1920, even this assistance was hindered by Poland’s enemies in Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Gdańsk as well as by European labor movements and trades unions “intoxicated by the revolutionary myth.”

In these circumstances the conflict escalating between Poland and Russia in the years 1918-1920 resembled the confrontation of David with Goliath in which Goliath’s advantages were clearly visible and real. A comparison of the demographic, economic, material, and military resources of both states indicated a vastly disproportionate ratio of power in Bolshevik Russia’s favor. If in this war which had been waged since 1918 that David, the Polish Army, dared to take up the fight (with Poland’s Independence being at stake) and ultimately, even if not perfectly, come out of it victorious, factors other than those mentioned above must have come into play.

No doubt the most important of these was Polish national awareness, but there were also other moral, intellectual, and organizational aspects. In organizational terms it is significant that the Polish command structure focused on just one man, Józef Piłsudski. He was the Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, and he was able to combine his knowledge acquired from military intelligence (mainly radio-intelligence) with his knowledge regarding foreign policy and thus understand the military threats posed by Poland’s neighbours.

Of all the intelligence sources (also political but especially military), the greatest achievements in the years 1918-1920 were made by radio intelligence. This was one of the significant intellectual and organizational factors that explain the Polish victory.

Polish radio intelligence was a powerful weapon, the product of Polish intellect and cooperation between Polish academics and the Polish Army. Symbolizing this cooperation are the names of officers those who took part and later became university professors: Colonel Kazimierz Drewnowski, who later became the Rector of Warsaw University of Technology; 2nd Lieutenant Janusz Groszkowski, who later became Chairman of the Polish Academy of Sciences; and army clerk Dr. Kazimierz Malarski (later a professor at the Lwów University of Technology) and Warsaw University of Technology Prof. Mieczysław Pożarski, both of whom were outstanding representatives of the Polish Mathematics School. Others included those who later became professors of the universities of Warsaw and Lwów, Stanisław Leśniewski, Stefan Mazurkiewicz (later Vice Rector of Józef Piłsudski University in Warsaw), and
Wacław Sierpiński. These men worked with Polish intelligence officers, many of whom had acquired experience in radio intelligence in the Austro-Hungarian Army and included: General Staff Colonel Karol Boldeskul, Captain Józef Stanslicki, and Lieutenant Jakub Plezia. Among those who had served in the Russian Army one can mention: Major Ignacy Matuszewski as well as the young lieutenants Jan Kowalewski (the most outstanding cryptanalyst of that war), Pawel Misiurewicz, Włodzimierz Rupniewski, and Jerzy Suryn.

The Bolshevik cipher code called “Revolution” has double symbolic value. First, it was broken through the joint effort of Lt. Kowalewski and Prof. Mazurkiewicz. Second, the breaking of Revolution (along with dozens of other Bolshevik cipher codes) was not only the personal success of two Polish cryptanalysts, of an army officer and an academic, it was also an important contribution to the ultimate victory of the Polish Army and of the Polish Republic in a struggle for its survival and for its place in Europe. It was a success of comparable scale to the later cracking of the Enigma code and the reconstruction of the Enigma machine, though perhaps all the greater because it was used in Poland for Poland.

Polish radio-intelligence was the result of the experiences of Polish officers who had served in their enemies’ armies, enemies’ states, and enemies’ empires.
Rising and Significance
of the Austrian Public Militia (Volkswehr) in 1918 and 1919

by

M. Christian Ortner

November 1918 can certainly be regarded as marking a crucial turning point, not only for Austria’s political history, but also for the history of the Austrian armed forces. The end of the Imperial and Royal monarchy of the House of Habsburg also brought about the end of the “old” army, whose senior regiments had a long-lasting tradition of almost 300 years. After an almost four-and-a-half year struggle from which more than a million soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian ranks did not return and of which about 500,000 had died on the battlefields, World War I ended for Austria-Hungary with the armistice of 3 November 1918.

At that time the monarchy was already decaying. The provinces formerly belonging to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy (Kronländer) had declared their independence and had already started to develop primary political structures, including the organization of their respective militaries. For “German Austria,” which was designated to be the successor state for all Germans within the monarchy (and therefore seemed to be doomed to suffer the fate of a “rump state” due to the drift of the developing secession states as early as October and November), a solution to the issue of defense was not only fundamental, but also a question of survival, especially since the borders of the new republic could not be regarded as safe.

However, through the deployment of troops and the occupation of territories, which according to the agreement of the Right of Self-Determination of the Citizens of the Dual Monarchy would have belonged to German Austria, the seceded states tried to establish the fact of their independence.

Preliminary considerations concerning the creation of armed forces for the Republic of German Austria continued into the final stages of World War I. When the German-speaking delegates to the “Reichsrat” (Imperial Council) assembled in Vienna’s Herrengasse on 21 October 1918, basic features of the future administration were established. Only a few days later they were accepted as provisional, but nevertheless binding, guidelines for the new constitution and administration. In place of the former ministries, there would be public offices or Staatsämter, as they were called, which were to be headed by Secretaries of State and Vice-Secretaries of State.¹

The newly created Public Office of Military was headed by the German Nationalist Josef Mayer, to whom the Vice-Secretaries of State Dr. Julius Deutsch (Social Democratic Working Party) and Dr. Erwin Weiss (Christian-Social Party) were assigned. The demand for independent armed forces, especially their raising, structure, and organization, were of major importance immediately following the foundation of the new public office on 1 November 1918; it must not be forgotten that the Austro-Hungarian army was still at war at that time. The Allied offensive of 24 October on the Italian Piave Front, which was led with an enormous force of troops

and material, hit the Imperial army which had already been weakened and was then suffering from difficulties of maintenance and supply. Also the aspirations of separation and the declarations of independence, which had already occurred to a certain extent, must have had an impact on the troops at the front. The old army began to decay under the pressure of their opponent and, to an even greater extent, the domestic political developments.

Concerning the structure and organization of the new army, tangible considerations already existed on the social democratic side. In order to demonstrate the break with the old Royal and Imperial military tradition on the organizational level, the armed forces should be organized like a militia on the basis of a general military draft. These considerations including, all “German” territories, resulted in a plan to organize 20 infantry divisions.²

An immediate introduction of a general military draft seemed hardly promising due to the fact that World War I had just ended and the overall general fatigue from warfare and military. Consequently, an interim arrangement was decided upon, namely the creation of a “Volkswehr” formed by professional soldiers who were committed to a certain length of service. The promotion for these new armed forces started immediately after the armistice of 4 November. In order to reach a certain level of forces promptly, a high pay of six Crowns a day was granted. After a basic agreement upon the guidelines of formation on 8 November, the factual order creating the Volkswehr was issued on 15 November 1918. At that time a commander-in-chief of the Volkswehr had already been appointed, Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Adolf von Boog. In his speech during his “inauguration” ceremony, the president of the Council of State, Karl Seitz, not only outlined the duties of the Volkswehr, but also clarified that there would be no continuity with the old army of the Dual Monarchy, although it had to be conceded that it would not be possible to form without the utilization of trained soldiers of World War I.³ This ambiguity, however, became more than obvious with the appointment of Adolf von Boog, a highly-educated and experienced commissioned officer and a general staff member, who was distinguished as a front commander. Formally, the Volkswehr were to be markedly different from the Royal and Imperial army. Due to the lack of cloth, the old uniforms were retained to a large extent; the ranks, however, were indicated by cloth stripes on the upper arm and the forearm. Additionally, there were badges on the breast bearing the inscription Volkswehr and red-white-red insignia on the caps.⁴

First, the force structure of the Volkswehr was limited to one infantry battalion, which was made up of three companies, one for each political district. According to the federal principle, the commanders-in-chief of each province (including Southern Bohemia, Southern Moravia, German-Bohemia, and Sudetenland) should act as superior authorities with official residences in Vienna,

² Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik, Manuskripte zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Bundesheeres, Fasz. 2/1, AE 1, S. 4.
Graz, Innsbruck, Leitmeritz, and Troppau. The maximum strength of the public militias was precisely defined for each territory and comprised a total of about 50,000 soldiers. The State Secretary of Military, mentioned earlier, functioned temporarily as the supreme political authority: on the one hand it had to supervise the formation and extension of the public militia, and on the other hand it already had to think about the reorganization of the *Volkswehr* into a militia in the near future consisting mainly of squads of soldiers doing mandatory military service. Additionally, a “civic commissioner’s office” (*Zivilkommissariat*) was integrated into the State Secretary of Military, which dealt with the compliance of rules and regulations concerning recruitment, the operation of services, provisions, and accommodation. In addition, it also concerned itself with instructing the men of the public militia about their civic duties and rights as well as with the advancement of the democratic principles within the *Volkswehr*. This can also be regarded as deliberate opposition to the old military traditions of the Imperial and Royal monarchy. Not only the commanding officers, but particularly members of each battalion’s soldier-councils (just like in the Soviet-Union) who were men of confidence, were the links to the civic commissioner’s office. Each company appointed two soldiers and each battalion appointed two officers for these boards. Additionally, distinguished members of the men without school graduation certificates had the possibility to be commissioned as an officer, as so-called *Volkswehrleutnante*. This tradition, however, was very frequently abused, since potential aspirants had to be appointed by a council of soldiers and so political influence was frequently of greater significance than qualifications.

Due to the miserable financial situation of the republic, as well as receiving pressure from the victorious powers, the local militias had to be reduced. At the time they included, among other branches, infantry, artillery, sappers, and train and motorized units, as well as pilots and even a naval *Volkswehr* located on the Danube. The ultimate fate of the *Volkswehr* was sealed through the agreements of the peace treaty of St. Germain, which had been concluded on 10 September 1919 and came into effect on 18 March 1920, as far as the agreements relating to the military law were concerned. Instead of the *Volkswehr*, however, the Federal Army of Austria was established.

In its brief period of existence, the strong, social democratically molded *Volkswehr* successfully endured the difficult political circumstances at the beginning of the first republic. Through the integration of the communist *Rote Garde* into the public militia, a radicalization of domestic affairs could be prevented. This also gave the government the power to use the necessary military resources to quell the communist rioting. This turned out to be a beneficial instrument to encouraging domestic stability. Regarding the defense of the Austrian borders, the public militia in southern Austria were able to impede the territorial aspirations of the southern Slavonic State (Yugoslavia), despite having to assemble the majority of the fighting units locally. The protection of the German-speaking areas in Bohemia, Moravia, and the Sudetenland, in contrast to the initial strategy was satisfactory, but illusory, because of the foreign policy decisions that had already been made.

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5 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik, Manuskripte zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Bundesheeres, Fasz. 2/1, AE 1, S. 26 f.

Missed Opportunities?
The Failure to Build Up Reliable Armed Forces after the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918

by

Michael Epkenhans

On the eve of 20 December 1918, a remarkable, even somewhat strange meeting took place in Berlin. In the rooms of the famous Great General Staff of the Prussian Army, a number of officers convened to discuss the future. In the course of this discussion, a young officer, Major Kurt v. Schleicher, who was to be the last chancellor of the Weimar Republic only fourteen years later, told his fellow officers: "First of all, order has to be restored at home. If we soldiers can help achieve this aim, this may be accomplished soon. On the basis of this restored order, the economy has to recover. On the shoulders of a recovered economy, we will be able to restore our status as a great power after many years of hard work."

There can be no doubt that most of his comrades heartily agreed with Schleicher. Nevertheless, Schleicher's thoughts were astonishing, maybe even somewhat strange, and the biographer of the second chief of the Heeresleitung, General v. Seeckt, still remembered "the self-confident non-chalance" of the way this young officer then put forward his ideas.

This astonishment of his elder comrades was indeed justified, for this almost bold outline of future politics contrasted sharply with the situation of the Reich in general as well as of the army in particular.

At home, it was indeed questionable, if the revolution, which had finally broken out when the so-called "red sailors" of the Emperor's dearest "mechanical toy" had refused to leave port for a final "death sortie" against the British Grand fleet, had already reached its end. On the contrary, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary coups, demonstrations, and strikes took place almost daily. Millions of Germans were starving, for the Allies still refused to lift the blockade of the German coasts in spite of the Armistice. The economy, which had been geared to the need of war for the past four years, had to cope with the problems of conversion and, moreover, the integration of millions of soldiers returning from the frontlines.

With regard to Germany’s position in Europe, the situation also seemed almost helpless. The war had been lost, and after four years of bitter fighting on all fronts and the enormous destruction in France and Belgium, there could be no doubt that the peace would be harsh. Moreover, apart from France, which even before a formal peace treaty had taken away Alsace-Lorraine, this object of French revenge since the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the newly established state of Poland claimed huge parts of Eastern Germany. A war with Poland was therefore a real threat. In short, Germany’s status as a European great power was therefore questioned from many sides, and there was nothing in sight to turn the scales in Germany’s favor.

Last but not least, the army itself, this embodiment of Prussia, was in a bad state. Of course, this army had fought bravely in the four years of war. Contrary to many legends, it had, however, lost this war on the battlefield. After the spring offensive, the soldiers were both exhausted and discouraged, for the victory they had hoped to achieve was still not in sight. Subsequently, the army silently began to dissolve, as the steadily increasing number of deserters clearly indicates. Troop transport had to be guarded, for otherwise up to 20 percent of those on the trains simply disappeared. The rising number of German war prisoners is another example of the fact that the backbone of the army had been broken. In the autumn of 1918 many companies consisted only of 70 men instead of 150 or more men, and regiments often did not have the normal strength of battalions. To sum up, the effective strength of the army, which had begun its offensive against the Western Allies with more than 200 divisions, numbered only about a dozen. Against this background, the “stab-in-the-back” story was simply a lie, which ignored the reality on the battlefield.

Moreover, this army, which returned home to Germany in November and December 1918, dissolved within days. For example, the Imperial Guard, which consisted of nine divisions when it returned to its Berlin barracks, was reduced to a strength of 1,200 men within a month. The ardent desire of most soldiers to return home was underestimated by both the Council of People’s Commissars, which therefore finally had no reliable troops at its disposal, and by the military authorities as well.

Against this background it was almost natural that most officers experienced a serious crisis in these days, weeks, and months. For many, “doomsday” seemed near. The reasons for this crisis include the destruction of the social order. In imperial Germany, officers had ranked high in society and politics, and whether they liked the emperor himself or not, the monarchy as an institution which had offered an ideology to follow as well as the protection of social status -- at court a lieutenant ranked higher than a professor of the University of Berlin -- and prestige, had been thought inviolate and unquestioned. The monarchy, or, as General v. Seeckt later put it, the “royal shield,” had vanished. Instead, officers were now openly attacked and offended in the streets, soldiers’ councils questioned their traditional authority, and the new political and social order differed completely from the one they had fought for during the previous four years.

This experience of being almost outcast, without orientation, and, obviously, without any prospect of a better future lies at the bottom of the deep-seated hatred of the so-called “November criminals.”

This notwithstanding, however, Schleicher’s vision of the future was not completely unfounded. For example, despite military defeat, the army's leadership under General Groener had been able to conclude a secret alliance with Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the majority socialists. While the army promised loyalty towards the leaders of the revolution, the latter pledged to fight bolshevism and to support the
military leadership in its attempt to maintain military discipline. Even Field Marshal von Hindenburg, this living legend of Prussian military history, put himself at the disposal of the Council of People's Commissars. Though by no means responsible for the military collapse of the Empire, the new leadership even took over responsibility for the Armistice, instead of imposing this heavy burden upon the old powers. This was indeed regrettable, and Matthias Erzberger, a bourgeois politician of the Catholic center party who had been asked by the Council of People's Commissars to sign the Armistice to end the war immediately, was even murdered by right-wing officers, allegedly for betraying his country.

From Ebert's point of view this collaboration with the old military elites seemed inevitable, even more so, because he was convinced that this step would by no means impede future decisions about the structure and, moreover, the impact of the army upon both domestic and foreign policy. This hope, however, soon proved an illusion, for it underestimated the intention of the army's leaders to assert their position and their influence in state and society.

How can one explain this underestimation and misunderstanding of the army by the social democratic leadership, which was to soon have deep repercussions?

First, social democrats were neither experienced in army matters nor did they have a military concept apart from rather vague ideas of a people's militia.

Second, the social democratic leadership proved unable, perhaps even unwilling, to develop a positive relationship with the soldiers' councils which had been established by ordinary soldiers to control their superiors in the first days of the revolution. Of course, the democratic potential of these organizations as well as their willingness and their ability to form the core of a new army loyal to the Republic should not be overestimated, as many German historians enthusiastically did in the 1960s and 1970s. This notwithstanding, they were democratic organizations the Council of People's Commissars could have relied on; they were not (as many contemporaries denounced them, and this should be clearly emphasized here) Bolsheviks who wanted to revolutionize Germany along the same undemocratic lines and with the same brutal methods used by Lenin in Russia since his coup d'etat in 1917. In many towns and regions they maintained law and order, organized the provision of a starving population with food and other urgently needed goods, and helped demobilize an army which was still floating back from the fronts.

Third, the underlying motive of the social democratic leadership to act the way it did was the deep-rooted democratic conviction that only a national assembly was entitled to decide fundamental changes in the political, social, and economic structure of the country. From hindsight, one may say that this attitude was an illusionary, though honest miscalculation; nevertheless, it seems difficult to blame the leaders of the majority socialists for their willingness to avoid internal chaos and misery as well as their adherence to democratic principles instead of, in turn, deliberately steering a course which would have effectively smashed the right, controlled the left, and re-educated the bourgeoisie by enforcing thorough reforms on the basis of revolutionary acts. Historical fairness requires that it should be remembered that almost all of those responsible for the future were well aware of the fact that the path into the future would narrow rather than widen quickly, which is not to say that men did not have
reason to hope that a better fate was attainable. But what was a better fate? The essential characteristic of crisis management, however, is the prevention of the worst rather than the attainment of the best, and the majority socialists who had assumed power in November were convinced that the former rather than the latter had to be their goal. Whether they could and should have done more is very difficult to decide, especially if we look upon the difficult tasks they had to perform under extremely difficult circumstances.

As a result, the army's influence quickly increased. The decision of the radical left to embark on a violent course against the majority socialists to push forward the revolution at Christmas 1918, which culminated in the Berlin riots in mid-January 1919 (the so-called “Spartacus” uprising), drove the majority socialists further into the hands of the army. For lack of their own troops, the majority socialists simply had no choice but to rely on the regular troops still commanded by Groener or the Free Corps (Freikorps) quickly established in those days to defend their own authority. Especially the infamous Free Corps, which consisted of the worst elements of the old army, homeless soldiers, young men thirsting for action, and political desperadoes, quickly turned out to be the backbone of all counter-revolutionary forces. Their aim was not to defend the young Republic and its achievements. Apart from a few exceptions they wanted nothing but cleansing Germany of the "November criminals" and their followers.

For the leadership of the majority socialists this reliance upon the old military establishment and openly anti-Republican forces like the Freikorps had the disastrous effect of a deep alienation from its own followers, who detested this form of civil war against their own "brothers." For the future of the Republic, this rift within the political left was to prove fatal in many ways, for a united left would have been a better opponent against the extreme right than a left which until the very end fought each other more than its common enemy. If there is a legacy that the majority socialists can be held responsible for, it is both the deployment as well as the lack of control of these forces. Alluding to this result of the so-called Ebert-Groener Pact as well as the hesitation of the majority socialists to reshape the traditional economic order -- another point of severe criticism in later years -- even Count Kessler, a member of the old establishment, wrote into his diary quite rightly: "The paradox that a republican-Social-Democratic government allows itself and the strong boxes of the capitalists to be defended by paid unemployed and royalist officers is just too crazy for words."

On 19 January 1919 -- only days after the brutal suppression of the so-called Spartacus uprising -- Gustav Noske, the newly appointed member of the Council of People's Commissars and the Prussian Minister of War signed a decree which formed the "Reichswehr" as it was to be called from then on. Generally speaking, in spite of a number of vague compromises on controversial issues such as the role of the Soldiers' Councils or the shoulder straps (which were utterly detested by most ordinary soldiers, who regarded them as symbols of a past they hoped they had overcome), the majority socialists yielded to many of the demands of the officer corps. The National Assembly, which had had been elected in January, but which had convened at Weimar -- thus giving the Republic its name -- for fear of uprisings passed a bill as early as 6 March 1919 which legalized this decree. This bill stipulated that a democratic army had to be built up; however, by allowing the army to recruit its
officers and men itself without any democratic control, this stipulation was hardly more than a mockery. As in other fields, continuity instead of change dominated the political arena in the early days of the Weimar Republic.

The refusal of the Reichswehr leadership to intervene militarily against the Freikorps that tried to overthrow the government in March 1920, however, clearly revealed that the armed forces of the Republic were in fact unreliable, even when right wing groups attacked the legal government. Of course, at least to a certain extent, the social democratic leadership has to be blamed for this development, for it had failed to secure strict political control of the armed forces. Instead of increasing this control, they did indeed give it up by forcing its own Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske, to resign from office. The new Minister of Defense, Otto Gessler, was a left-liberal whose control over the army quickly turned out to be rather ineffective. As a result, the Reichswehr leadership enjoyed a great deal of freedom in pursuing its own political and military aims.

While the domestic situation slowly improved in favor of the Reichswehr, Germany's worsening position among the European Powers in general, as well as the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles in particular, seriously affected the Reichswehr. Though the treaty preserved Germany's unity in the face of French designs on the Rhineland, Alsace, and Lorraine, large portions of the country's former eastern territories, and all her colonies, were lost. Moreover, Germany was to pay an almost incredible sum as reparations for war damages, a stipulation, at least from a psychological point of view, went hand-in-hand with the accusation that Germany alone was guilty of the outbreak of war in 1914. While these terms already reduced Germany's status among the powers, the Treaty of Versailles also stipulated that the army -- once the nation's pride, but from the Allies' point of view, the main instrument of aggression -- had to be reduced to a mere police force, only able to fight internal uprisings, and by no means capable of waging another "real" war. The Reichswehr's strength was limited to 100,000 men, and the navy's to 15,000. This army was to have no heavy guns, no airplanes, and no submarines. Moreover and most humiliating for the Reichswehr, an international military mission was to control the implementation of these harsh stipulations for many years to come.

Hardly astonishing, many generals and other officers preferred military opposition to the signing of the Versailles Treaty, but, as General Groener pointed out in a secret meeting in mid-1919, military action against the Allies would have resulted "in Germany's greatest national catastrophe." Though Groener as well as the politicians who eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles were correct, many members of the Reichswehr regarded this subjection to Allied demands as an unacceptable self-humiliation. Subsequently, their loathing for the Republic and its institutions further increased. In this respect the Treaty of Versailles, which ended a war begun by a government, which had been swept away by the revolutionaries only a few months before, became one of the most horrendous legacies of the old regime placed on the back of the Weimar Republic. No matter what its justice or injustice and no matter how understandable in its historical context, it must be accounted as a disaster of the first rank.

Against the background of these events and structural developments, which deeply affected both the shape and the organization of the Reichswehr as well as its
future position within German politics and society, it seems necessary to sum up its attitude towards the Republic. To do this it seems best to look at General v. Seeckt, the man who deeply influenced the politics of the Reichswehr in the early and mid-1920s. General v. Seeckt was realistic enough to refuse a restoration of the monarchy. His attitude towards the republic was much more positive than that of many other members of the political right. However, this did not mean that he accepted parliamentary government as a fundamental principle of the republic. Instead, he secretly admitted that the constitution contradicted his political conviction and that it was something that he did not regard as untouchable. Subsequently, he always refused to report to parliamentary committees and did not to speak at the Reichstag, the nation's highest sovereign body. He also never attended the official annual festivities at constitution day in August, pretending lack of time or other urgent official obligations. This attitude did, of course, not prevent him from intervening into politics during cabinet meetings or even into party politics. Since the restoration of Germany's great power status was his principal aim, he especially tried to influence German foreign policy. To achieve this aim, he supported a strict anti-western course. As a result, Seeckt secretly collaborated with another international outcast, the Bolshevik Soviet Union, in spite of deep ideological differences. From his point of view, the Soviet Union was an ideal partner for Germany's attempts both to restore the former eastern border by crushing Poland together as well as in a war of liberation against the nation's arch-enemy in the west, France. Moreover, it proved advantageous that the Red Army was as eager as the Reichswehr to test new weaponry like airplanes, tanks, and even poison gas. Thus the Reichswehr was given the chance of circumventing many of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and of preparing for modern warfare. The impact of this training in Russia on the military efficiency of the Reichswehr and of the Wehrmacht cannot be overestimated, as Manfred Zeidler has shown recently in great detail in his Ph.D. dissertation.

Since the republic and its institutions could not replace the "royal shield" mentioned above, Seeckt preferred to refer to the rather abstract idea of the "state" as the superior power the army both had to serve as well as to believe in. This did not, however, mean that the Reichswehr would have remained neutral in domestic affairs. On the contrary, Seeckt's intervention against left-wing governments in 1923, his thoughts of dictatorship, and his refusal to use his troops against right-wing "putschists" which even collaborated with local army units at the same time was a clear indication that he was politically biased.

Against this background his claim that the Reichswehr was neutral for it only served the state was nothing but a carefully hidden lie. The refusal to accept republican symbols such as the republican flag are further examples of this political bias. As late as 1927, it was forbidden to hoist the imperial flag in Reichswehr barracks. The reasons underlying this order, however, deserve mentioning. The Reichswehr leadership did not intend to strengthen republicanism in the army, but simply wanted to soothe the conscience of those who still had difficulties in hoisting the republican flag instead of the imperial one.

Similarly, the Reichswehr had a deep aversion against most political parties, for in Seeckt's eyes, these parties only pursued their own selfish interests instead of serving the state and the common weal. In this respect, only the political right seemed acceptable, while all the left-wing parties were openly denounced as "pacifists, Jews,
and Democrats" who had nothing in mind but the “destruction of Germany," as the later commander-in-chief of the army in the Nazi era, General v. Fritsch, put it in 1924.

Due to Seeckt's attitude towards the republic, the Reichswehr never identified itself with the republic, its constitutional and democratic principles, or its governments elected by the people. Instead, the Reichswehr remained a state within the state and, subsequently, an institution that would sooner or later become an instrument of a counter-revolution.
Foreign Influence on the Development of Yugoslav Military Doctrine on Armored Units, 1918-1941

by

Dalibor Denda

Abstract. This paper is based on documents available from the Military Archive and Yugoslav Archive in Belgrade, the Yugoslav military press, and other literature. It examines the development of the Yugoslav Armed Forces doctrine on armored units during the period 1918-1941. The doctrine's sources included French, British, and German experiences from World War I; experiences from the Spanish Civil War; and Polish and Western Front operations in 1939-1940.

The Serbian Armed Forces (SAF), which formed the core of the Yugoslav Kingdom Armed Forces (YAF), had no experience using tanks, since those weapons, invented during World War I, had not been used on the Macedonian Front during that conflict. After trying unsuccessfully to obtain the first tanks from the French-Hungarian Army during 1919-1920, the YAF acquired them in 1929 thanks to a French war loan. In 1930, the first tank unit -- a company containing eleven Renault Kegress tanks -- was formed in Kragujevac and it became the first tank unit in the YAF. The second company was formed soon after in Belgrade and it contained ten Renault FT 17 tanks. Division General Milan Dj. Nedic, commander of the Third Army Area with its headquarters in Skopje, further spurred the creation of armored units in the YAF in 1932. He suggested a very progressive plan for reorganizing and modernizing the Armed Forces. French officer-instructors who served in Yugoslavia from 1928 to 1936 also influenced the development of this plan. The plan appeared at the same time that the type 32 motorized Cavalry Division was formed within the French Armed Forces. In that plan, which the General Staff continually revised until the beginning of 1934, General Nedic anticipated the existence of motorized troops consisting of one battalion of tanks for each of the six Operative Corps and one

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2 Запади Покраїни, Софія, 25.06.1930; Yugoslav Archive, Belgrade, Fund 38 – Central Press Bureau, folder 364, number 19, further: YA, 38-364-19.

3 Those tanks were transferred to Kalinovik near Sarajevo in 1931 and became part of the Infantry and Artillery School where they were used for training.


5 Ж. Буш, Бронетанковое оружие в войне. Moscow 1956, pgs. 50-51. Those divisions consisted of two Cavalry Brigades with two Cavalry Regiments, motorized and mechanized brigades (armored regiment of four automatic machine-guns squadrons, two motorcycles squadrons and motorized cavalry regiments), motorized artillery, and other elements.
battalion of armored vehicles for each Cavalry Motorized Corps. These troops would be under the same command. The plan was for the Strategic (motorized) Cavalry to have two divisions, which would constitute the fast cavalry (motorized) corps. This plan was the basis for organizing future armored and mechanized YAF units. It also made General Nedic the chief officer in the Yugoslav General Staff (1934-1935), having been selected personally by King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic I.

The military implemented this plan slowly due to the lack of money. Nevertheless, the international crisis caused by the Italian attack on Ethiopia accelerated the formation of armored units in the YAF. A new, more modest, plan was adopted in 1936 and it anticipated the acquisition of thirty-six light and sixty-six medium tanks and eight cavalry mini-tanks. Medium tanks and other motorized vehicles should have been bought in Czechoslovakia from the firms ČKD and Skoda. The first tank battalion, consisting of thirty-six Renault FT 17 tanks, was formed during 1936-1937 from vehicles acquired mostly on loan from the French AF, tanks purchased from Poland, and existing materials. In 1937, one company of eight Czech Skoda SID mini-tanks was delivered for the cavalry, giving the YAF a total of sixty-three tanks. By 1938, a company from Sarajevo entered the Tank Battalion. Headquarters, the First Company, and a supporting company remained in Belgrade, and Third Company in Sarajevo while the Second was transferred to Zagreb. In the meantime, thanks to the French AF, the first Yugoslav tank officers were trained on several occasions: during 1920, 1927-1928, 1929-1930, and in 1936. Nine officers and two NCOs went through the training process. Seven of them continued their careers in armored units of the YAF. When Skoda mini-tanks were purchased for

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6 Archive of the Military-history Institute (AMHI), Fund 17, box 97, folder 1, reg. no. 10, further: AMHI, F-17, B-97, FL-1, r.n. 10; Abstract from the Proposition of the Third Army Area Commander, February 14, 1934.

7 AMHI, F-17, B-130, FL-3, r.n. 50.

8 AMHI, F-17, B-134, FL-4, r.n. 1, paper 12; Preview of the Armament that the Armed Forces will have According to New War Formation, and after Accepted Reductions.


12 AMHI, F-17, B-218, FL-5, r.n. 23; Preview of Military Equipment according to Technical Artillery Branch from 1937.

13 See more in: Denda Dalibor, Motorization of the Yugoslav Armed Forces 1918-1941 (Master thesis -manuscript), pgs. 126 – 132; 221 – 227, (Library of the History Department, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade).

14 Ibid. pgs. 253 – 259.
the cavalry units in 1937, a number of cavalry officers were sent into Moravica, Czechoslovakia, for three-month training courses.\textsuperscript{15}

In mid-1939, shortly before the outbreak of World War II, a new YAF armament program was adopted. In organizing armored and fast units, the plan anticipated the acquisition of one medium-tank battalion and motorized vehicles for equipping three brigades for three cavalry divisions in the first phase (by the end of 1940). The second phase (by the end of 1942) anticipated acquisition of 252 tanks (including thirty-six heavy tanks).\textsuperscript{16} After fulfilling this plan, Yugoslavia should have had one heavy-tank battalion within the High Command reserves, seven medium-tank battalions (one for every army), and three motorized brigades within the cavalry divisions (every division would contain one battalion of thirty-six light tanks). Additionally, there was a plan to use tanks to form armored divisions. When the country entered the war on 6 April 1941, only the first phase of the plan had been partially completed. Fifty-four Renault R35 light tanks were purchased (they formed the second tank battalion centered in Belgrade), as well as part of the equipment needed for partial motorization of one cavalry brigade (just motorcycles, trucks, and small-caliber anti-armor artillery, without tanks, armored cars, or heavy and air-defense artillery). The Yugoslav Armed Forces entered the war with two light tank battalions (one modern), one company of light cavalry mini-tanks, and one partially motorized cavalry brigade.

\textbf{Dominant Foreign Influences on Forming the First Doctrine's Assumptions on Armored Units of the Yugoslav Armed Forces}

Yugoslav doctrine on armored units evolved gradually. Current scholars can track the development of doctrine assumptions in the military press, military literature, and official doctrinal documents as well as the rules guiding training efforts. The military magazine \textit{Ratnik} ("Warrior") is the most important of these sources, as well as the professional arms journals from each branch of the armed services -- they were established along lines similar to the French military press (\textit{Infantry Courier}, \textit{Artillery Courier} [\textit{Infantry-artillery Courier} since 1932], \textit{Cavalry Courier}, \textit{Engineering Courier}, \textit{Air-force Courier} and \textit{Navy Courier}, as well as the private publication \textit{Military Herald}).\textsuperscript{17}

Experience from World War I was very important for forming the first doctrinal assumptions on using armored units. At the end of 1919, the Yugoslav defense attaché in France had sent \textit{Instructions provisoire sur la manoeuvre des unites de chars légers} and \textit{Instructions sur l’emploi des chars d’assaut} from the French AF to the High Command.\textsuperscript{18} The defense attaché in Great Britain also obtained the classified regulations of the British General Staff regarding tanks and their use in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} AMHI, \textit{Personal data of the Yugoslav AF Officers}, B-1482/339, Dusan G. Radovic.
\item \textsuperscript{16} AMHI, F-17, B-85, FL-2, r.n. 22Earth Defense Inspection – for the Chief of the General Staff ; July 18, 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Originally in Serbian: Пешадијски гласник, Артиљеријски гласник (since 1932 Пешадијскоартиљеријски гласник), Коњички гласник, Инжињеријски гласник, Ваздухопловни гласник, Морнарички гласник and private issue Војни вестник.
\item \textsuperscript{18} AMHI, F-3, B-434, FL-1, r.n. 1/1, paper 233/948.
\end{itemize}
combined arms operations. These rules, based on French war experience, were a basis for establishing the Yugoslav military doctrine on using tactical tanks. The sections referring to tanks became a part of the *Infantry Exercising Rule, Temporary Instructions for Infantry Combat in the Trenches* and *Temporary Military Service* from 1921. At the end of July 1921, the General Staff wanted the Yugoslav defense attaché in Paris to obtain information on the formation of French tank units during peacetime as soon as possible so that the YAF would be able to prepare regulations, begin purchasing equipment, and establish units in a timely manner. Soon after that, Major Jevrem Topalovic, who was in France at the time as a tank trainee, started to publish articles in *Warrior*: “Combat Vehicles (Tanks)” (August 1922) and “Tactical Usage of Combat Vehicles” (July 1923). These articles contained the main theories of the Yugoslav military doctrine on tactical tank usage. The Yugoslav defense attaché in France, Colonel Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, obtained the new French rules, *Organization of Tank Units*, published in Versailles in 1923. Guidebooks on tank employment that were based on experience from World War I and published in Versailles in 1922 came to Yugoslavia in the same way. They referred to Allied offensives of 16 April and 20 November 1917, the counter-offensive of the 10th Army from July 1918, and the offensive of 26 September of the same year.

The Doctrine on the Tactical Use of Tanks in the YAF was established under French influence by 1923. In this work, the basic philosophy was that tanks of any type (trailing and breaking) were offensive tools meant to facilitate the infantry’s breakthrough, whether in positional or mobile warfare, and were not to be used in specific inhospitable terrain like hills, mountains, or swamps.

The Doctrine on the Defense against Tanks had also been established according to the most recent trends at the time -- German war experience. The main source was the German manual for defense against tanks published during World War I -- *Verwendung und Bekämpfung der Tanks*. This manual, brought to the Yugoslav AF by former Austrian officers who had been accepted into the YAF, had been also used in the Black-Yellow monarchy armed forces. According to this manual, the

19 AMHI, F-3, B-174, FL-5, r.n. 6/1.
20 AMHI, F-3, B-434, FL-1, r.n. 1/1, paper 233/948.
22 *Organisation des chars de combat*, Versailles 1923.
26 *Exemples d’emploi des chars dans la guerre 1914-1918, III, 26 septembre 1918*, Versailles 1922.
main factor in defense against tanks was the artillery along with the direct cooperation of the infantry.  

Yugoslav officers could track the most current data on tanks through the best world literature. The first foreign book that had been used by them was *Tanks* by R. Kruger, written in German in 1921. Thanks to the first educated Yugoslav tank officer, Lt. Col. Jevrem Topalovic, the journal *Military Herald* (August 1926) published a preview of the book *Taschenbuch der Tank* ("Pocketbook for Tanks") written by Major Fritz Heigl, an Austrian engineer and assistant professor at the Vienna Technical Higher School. The book was published in Munich the same year and Heigl was considered the authority on tanks at the time.

The English book *Tank and Armored Car Training. Volume II: Provisional*, was presented in Yugoslavia through articles in the press in 1929.  

The *Cavalry Courier* presented the first discussions about the future status of the cavalry regarding motorization during this period of time, but the discussions decreased due to the conservative reaction of the editors and the debate became silent by the mid-1930s.

Retired Colonel Milos Dj. Stankovic, a famous professional writer, representative of the old Serbian Guard and First World War hero, published the German point of view on motorization in *Warrior* in September 1931 for the first time.

Italian regulations regarding training and the employment of tank units were published as an addition to the magazine *Warrior* in March 1932. In that way, every YAF officer had a chance to get to know the tactical doctrine of the armored units of the most important potential future enemy -- Italy. By the end of 1933, the editors of *Warrior* published as the first article in the December issue specifically selected opinions regarding the future composition of contemporary divisions written by German authors who had been in favor of motorizing most parts of divisions. It is interesting to mention that the main source for Yugoslav, and especially Serbian, military writers in technical fields and doctrine were the French periodicals *France Militaire* and *Revue de Cavalerie* and the German journals *Militar Wochenblatt* and *Deutche Kavallerie Zeitung*.

In the mid-thirties, the question of motorizing the cavalry became important again. At the beginning of 1935, Cavalry Major M. Čanic presented in the *Cavalry Courier* characteristics of warfare of fast (motorized) units and the cavalry and he emphasized that the issue of replacing the cavalry with motorized units still had not been solved successfully and that therefore the Yugoslav cavalry retained its right to

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28 Ibid, pgs. 132.


33 Савремена дивизија, Ратник, XII/1933, pgs. 1-16 (“Contemporary Division,” *Warrior*, XII/1933).
exist. In the same year, the *Cavalry Courier* published an article by Captain Norbert Wutzbach about the technical impact of mobilization on the cavalry. He presented the German point of view, which was that the horse cavalry had lost the significance it had in the previous war in relation to motorized, or partly motorized, cavalry units. The Soviet *Tactics of Fast Units* was translated from the Russian for the Yugoslav General Staff the same year, but this book was never published for public consumption.

**Final Formation of Doctrine, 1936-1938**

The period 1936-1938 was the right time to pay attention to the organization of armored units and the modernization of troops and training systems. The large-scale engagement of Italian light armored units in Ethiopia was influential because it showed that tanks could be successfully used in hills and mountains. In mid-1936, the *Infantry-Artillery Courier* (July - August issue) published a text by Captain Danilo S. Zobenica entitled “Motorization and Mechanization of Armed Forces” in which he presented the state of motorization of the armed forces of Yugoslavia’s neighbors. Zobenica wrote that the world’s leading opinion had been that contemporary armed forces had been equipped with a large number of armored resources and that armored units had played the main role during maneuvers of all large armies. The same issue published the text of General Staff Artillery Captain Stjepan Korecin entitled “Fast Units.” He presented the structure of the contemporary cavalry division, motorized fast units (motorized brigade and mixed brigade and motorized fast division), and mechanized armored fast units, etc. For the first time in the Yugoslav military press, these two texts finally gave a realistic picture of motorized units in the foreign armed forces and pointed out their future significance in warfare.

At the same time work on the first Yugoslav *Guidebook for Using Armored Units and Defense against Armored Vehicles* began. The fact is that final positions regarding this issue were not clear and that the *Guidebook*, which became a training

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36 Тактика брзих јединица (превод са руског), Београд 1935 (Tactics of Fast Units (translation from Russian), Belgrade 1935), (lithography), Center for Military-Science Documentation, information and library science, Inventory number 76.886, further CMSDIL Inv. No. 76.886.

37 AMHI, F-17, B-130, FL-3, г.п. 50.


manual in the tactical use of tanks and defense against them, was not printed until 1938.40

The origins of the new doctrine were, as before, foreign experiences. Yugoslavia was a member of the Little Entente and it was relying on Czechoslovakia for the purchase of tanks and doctrinal theories on using tanks and fighting against them. Following the 16 October 1936 order of the Chief of the General Staff, the Yugoslav defense attaché at that time, General Staff Colonel Dragoljub M. Mihailovic, made a request to the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defense seeking their official books: Guidebook V: Using Tanks and Defense against Tanks and Guidebook VI: Using Anti-tank Tools. On 31 May 1937, the Czechoslovakian side gave these books to the Yugoslav military.41 While foreign doctrinal documents were collected, Infantry Colonel Pavle Begovic published his article entitled “Using Combat Vehicles in the Mountains” in Warrior (August 1937) where he pointed out French Lieutenant Shazalmartin’s study, which was about using tanks in medium to high mountains in an effective manner. This high-ranking officer thought that these issues were of great importance for the Yugoslav AF due to the characteristics of the Yugoslav terrain and existing conditions.42 The Cavalry Courier from 1937 brought “Preview of Foreign Cavalries” with emphasis on their mechanization. In 1938, Warrior began a special section within the column “News and Notes,” which followed motorization and mechanization in foreign armed forces.

The following fact proves that Yugoslav military press had significant influence on the development of doctrine. In April 1938, Warrior published some lessons-learned from the Spanish Civil War, where, according to the author of the article, Army General Dusan T. Simovic (former commander of professional courses for officers of the main branches of the armed forces, and at that time commander of Yugoslav Air Forces), tanks had performed poorly.43

At the beginning of October 1938, the defense attaché of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in France submitted to the General Staff an elaborate discussion chronicling the experiences of using tanks and anti-tank defenses in the Spanish Civil War. This detailed report examined the use of German light Nürnberg tanks, Italian light Fiat Ansaldo tanks (which were the equipment of the Nationalists), and Russian light T26 and T28 tanks, along with their adaptations made in Spain, in the service of the Spanish Republic. Lessons about the tactical use of tanks were derived from analyses of attacks by the Governmental troops on the Nationalists in Madrid on 29 October 1936, as well as analyses of the use of tanks during the Battle of Guadalajara.
in March 1937. Tank defense was assessed through the efficiency of anti-tank weapons: the Hotchkiss 13mm machine-gun, 20mm Ercison automatic gun, German 20mm Flak automatic gun, Hotchkiss 25mm automatic gun, 37mm P.A.K. (panzer abver kanone), and the Bofors 40mm anti-armored gun, as well as through the use of natural obstacles and passive tools meant for fighting against tanks.\[44\]

The general conclusion was that the tanks used during the Spanish Civil War did not meet expectations. According to this officer, the significant improvement of tanks after World War I and the success they had in it, had created a situation in which they were overrated. The Spanish Civil War did not confirm a doctrine declaring that armored vehicles could decide the outcome of the war.

At the same time, the latest French\[45\] and Italian\[46\] points of view on the use of tanks were acquired for the needs of the Training Department. These documents influenced opinion within the Training Department of the Yugoslav General Staff about warfare using armored units and the development of a tactical doctrine regarding the fight against armored units.

According to the Training Department, the main characteristics of warfare using armored units were unexpected actions, speed, power of impact, and short battle duration, which were all characteristics of the sudden attack. The overall conclusion was that armored units had a greater impact on the morale of the enemy than a material impact on him, that the success of armored units was based on their influence over morale and that in a situation of no morale influence, no success would be achieved at all. It was thought that armored units could not play a crucial role in combat and that the infantry and artillery had the whole fight on their back, no matter the strength of armored units. As a confirmation of that point of view, the fact that armored units in the Spanish Civil War were defeated at the hands of an enemy strong in morale, but badly armed, was emphasized.\[47\]

Soon after adopting these statements at the end of 1938, the Infantry-Artillery Courier published a Serbian translation of the second revised edition of German General Heinz Guderian’s book Achtung Panzer! Which had been published in December 1937. This book criticized the Yugoslav doctrine on armored units, which had been adopted shortly before this book’s publication. In the book, which presented the doctrine of Blitzkrieg (“lightning war”) that was based on the massive use of armored units followed by motorized infantry along with strong support from the air, including parachutist units, the author dealt with the latest combat experiences from the fighting in Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, and the Japanese-Chinese conflict. The conclusion was that tanks in Ethiopia were capable of working in a special

\[44\] AMHI, F-17, B-95e, FL-2, г.п. 4; Cav. Secret, No. 1071 from October 1, 1938.

\[45\] Борна кола и противколска одбрана (по најновијим француским гледиштима), без места издања, 1938 (Combat Vehicle and Anti-vehicles Defense (according to the newest French views), place of publication unknown, 1938), CMSDL Inv. No. 76.907; Борна кола и противавионска одбрана (најновија француска гледишта), Београд 1938 (Combat Vehicle and Anti-aircrafts Defense (the newest French views), Belgrade 1938), CMSDL Inv. No. 1.713.

\[46\] Употреба борних кола у Италији (Београд, Главни генералштаб, Обавештајно одељење 1938 (The Use of Combat Vehicles in Italy (Belgrade, General Staff, Intelligence Department 1938, (manuscript)), CMSDL Inv. No. 76.916.

\[47\] AMHI, F-17, B-130, FL-3, г.п. 26; Secret, G.Tr. No. 2038 from June 28, 1939.
climate and in unusual terrain, and neither high mountains nor deserts had been unconquerable obstacles. “The engine in the air and on the land was,” according to Guderian, “characteristic of the war in Ethiopia.” Although the author agreed with the fact that in Spain tanks did not play an important role, he emphasized the fact that these combat tools were not used in large numbers and that only light tanks were used. Tanks with cannons were more effective than those with machine-guns, and antiarmor guns were a potent weapon. Motorized vehicles helped the Japanese make a fast breakthrough in China through Inner Mongolia. In battles around Shanghai, there were tanks in large numbers -- around 100 vehicles -- that worked successfully in difficult terrain in rice fields.\(^{48}\)

At the beginning of 1939, the editors of the *Infantry-Artillery Courier* published an article by German Colonel Walter Nehring entitled “Defense against Armored Vehicles, Thoughts on Possibilities of Defense Based on Understandings and Steps Taken Abroad.” It presented the newest German views regarding anti-tank defense.\(^{49}\) Both items were translated by retired Brigade General Milorad L. Lazarevic. The editors of the *Infantry-Artillery Courier* continued to publish booklets that presented foreign doctrines and experiences that were unknown to the Yugoslav public before. The article “Contemporary Combat Vehicles”\(^{50}\) was published in the next issue of the *Courier* and it included until that period of time marginalized Soviet opinions on combat vehicles. These booklets illustrated the conflicting opinions within Yugoslav military circles, particularly the conflict between the General Staff Training Department and representatives of the Sarajevo Infantry and Artillery School, who were receptive to new ideas. Nevertheless, German doctrine was not confirmed in practice until the war started in September 1939, while the French doctrine was dominant from World War I and was considered “sacred,” so opinions of the Training Department were understandable. Army General Dusan T. Simovic, the Chief of the General Staff, supported the predominance of French doctrine because he had a negative view of the role of tanks in the Spanish Civil War and his position significantly influenced Yugoslav doctrine and theories.

\(^{48}\) Хајнц Гудеријан, Околни трупе и њихово дејство у заједници са осталим родовима оружја (прево са немачког Милорад Л. Лазаревић, арт. Бриг. Ђенерал), Издани уредништва Пешадијско-артиљеријског гласника, Додатак Пешадијско-артиљеријском гласнику, бр.33, Сарајево 1938 (Heinz Guderian, Armored Troops and Their Warfare Together with Other Kinds of Arms (translated from German by Milorad L. Lazarevic, Artillery Brigade General), *Infantry-artillery Courier* – editorship issue, addition to *Infantry-artillery Courier*, No. 33, Sarajevo 1938).

\(^{49}\) Валтер Неринг, Одбрана од околних возова, Размишљања о њеној могућности на основу схватања и предузетих мера у иностранству, (прево са са немачког Милорад Л. Лазаревић, арт. Бриг. Ђенерал), Друго прерађено и попуњено издание, издани уредништва Пешадијско-артиљеријског гласника, Додатак Пешадијско-артиљеријском гласнику, бр.34, Сарајево 1939 (Walter Nehring, Defense against Armored Vehicles, Thoughts on Possibilities of Defense Based on Understandings and Steps Taken Abroad (translated from German by Milorad L. Lazarevic, Artillery Brigade general), second improved edition, *Infantry-artillery Courier* – editorship issue, addition to *Infantry-artillery Courier*, No. 34, Sarajevo 1939).

New Doctrinal Changes in the Face of the Reality of War, 1939-1941

The reality of World War II, especially the conflict between the Allies and Germany, which included the massive use of mechanized and motorized units, supported the opinions of the so-called “Sarajevo group” and produced changes in the Yugoslav Armed Forces doctrine. In November 1939, immediately after the German-Polish campaign, Captain Milutin S. Milosevic published an article entitled “Fast Units,” which was the leading article in the Warrior. Shortly thereafter, the Cavalry Courier published one text written by Cavalry Major Borislav S. Milosevic with the same title and also as a leading article, and it published German General Heinz Guderian’s theories that the development of the cavalry, which had won battles before, had its continuation in armored divisions. The same magazine also published articles about experiences in the use of motorized and armored units during the German-Polish operations, emphasizing the fact that the German High Command managed to achieve the Blitzkrieg it had planned, thanks to its mechanized divisions. The main resource of articles and information for the Cavalry Courier was the German cavalry journal Deutche Kavaleri Zeitung.

The development of the new Yugoslav doctrine was significantly influenced by reports of the Yugoslav defense attaché in Berlin, Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik. Based on his reports from mid-1940, the Supreme Inspectorate of the Yugoslav Armed Forces produced Instructions on the Organization of Armored and Mechanized Units and the Conduct of Contemporary Defense. This text was published in June 1940 and it wholly supported the Blitzkrieg tactics. According to the Instructions, after the motorized-mechanized units made their breakthrough, aviation followed. The task of aviation was reconnaissance of hostile positions. This information made possible attacks using machineguns, guns, and bombs designed to create panic in the defenders’ lines. Aviation’s next move was to attack every obstacle (following the direction of the breakthrough by the armored and motorized-mechanized units), and this assault would be finished only when the front line was destroyed. During favorable conditions and in those areas containing large hostile positions, transport aviation was used for parachute landings. Parachutists were supposed to create a so-called Fifth Column in attacked areas. The Fifth Column


54 Коњички гласник, III, Земун 1940, pgs. 271 (Cavalry Courier, III, Zemun 1940).

55 AMHI, F-17, B-95v, FL-5, т.p. 19; Observations from the First Period of Operations on the Western Front in May 1940; AMHI, F-17, B-156, FL-2, т.p. 47; Observations from the Second Period of Operations on the western Front in May 1940.
would wait for motorized-mechanized units to arrive and then serve as a base for further operations.

Instructions for defending against tanks were also based on the most contemporary experiences. Doctrine specified that the weaknesses of the tanks were: a narrow field of vision and difficult orientation, difficult maintenance of communication and command, poor results while shooting during movement (they were able to shoot only targets at a range of 400-600 meters, and if they stopped to shoot, they were vulnerable), sensitivity to anti-armor weapons (anti-armor rifles, machineguns and cannons), and close fire of field cannons with panzer bullets, which were the only ones suitable for fighting against heavy tanks (because the former anti-armor weapons were ineffective against heavy tanks). The defense began to rely on combined infantry and artillery actions as its main support. The infantry was supposed to operate against hostile armored units with anti-armor weapons at close range, with automatic weapons and snipers firing into tank openings. Divisional artillery was supposed to use field cannons and panzer bullets against heavily armored tanks, while the rest of the artillery unit was supposed to shoot with heavy, concentrated fire in the direction of the moving armored units. Overall, the basic rule in fighting against hostile armored units was: all arms of service, especially infantry, should unconditionally stay in their positions and persevere in combat with the most energetic devotion of senior staff at all levels to repulse the enemy as much as possible, or destroy him, through the use of armament, even if the price was human lives. If this was not possible, they were expected to let the armored vehicles through, sheltering themselves in the trenches, while allowing the infantry to react.

Infantry (cavalry) and artillery were directed to cooperate more often with tank garrisons in order to learn how to fight against armored units in a practical manner. The Supreme Inspectorate of the YAF tried to assign tank units to those garrisons where tank units did not exist in order to cooperate with the infantry and artillery. Instructions were issued in the middle of the summer training period and their recommendations were implemented during the joint tactical training sessions in September, October, and November 1940, but most Yugoslav officers, NCOs, and soldiers did not have enough time to adapt to them in practice.

On the basis of new experiences during the war, training rules, especially those regarding defensive operations against tanks, were revised. The Guidebook for Using Armored Units and Defense against Armored Vehicles was amended at the suggestion of the Supreme Inspectorate of the YAF, by the Act of the Military and Navy Ministry dated 9 December 1940 in the part referring to the defense against armored vehicles and regarding the production of light trench obstacles. The Military and Navy Ministry also issued the Guidebook for Close Combat against Armored Vehicles on 3 March 1941, but there was not enough time to use it in practice before the German attack started on 6 April 1941.

56 AMHI, F-17, B-356, FL-2, г.п. 3; Top secret, Gs.Tr. No. 478 from June 14, 1940.

57 Official Military Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, pgs. 2972-2973, further OMG 2972-2973/1940; Gs.Dep. No. 3090 from November 27, 1940 and Gs. No. 42938 from December 9, 1940.

58 Упут за блиску борбу против оклопних кола, Београд 1941, Тб. Бр. 10841 од 03. 03. 1941 (Guide-book for Close Combat against Armored Vehicles, Belgrade 1941, Gs. No. 10841 from March 3, 1941).
The last important experiences regarding defense against armored units to be incorporated in the doctrine were presented by Army General Zivko Stanisavljevic in the last edition of *Warrior* (March 1941). General Stanisavljevic pointed out that armored units were able to defeat every kind of unorganized resistance as well as organized opposition if the defenders had artillery meant for normal formations. The organized resistance of well-fortified troops, backed by a considerable amount of artillery, made armored units act methodically. Armored units were able to attack during the night in order to concentrate their fire if the resistance was strong enough to prevent attack during the day. The speed of armored vehicles could be influenced by terrain, especially mud and rivers. Territory conquered by tank units was handed over to motorized infantry, which would otherwise be vulnerable if there had been undefeated hostile combat units in the rear. Zivko Stanisavljevic said that the internal sectors of the position should have extensive fortification centers, which would be capable of fighting against the last echelons of tank units after the front was broken. He also pointed out that march columns had no easy way to fight against armored units on their territory and that they should have left these formations and divided the artillery into several parts within the complement. All those systematized recommendations were adopted too late and fortifications designed to combat tanks inside Yugoslav territory were not built.

The conclusion is that Yugoslav military doctrine on the use of armored units and defense against them was initially based on French concepts. Then it changed significantly and started to adapt to the actual situation in mid-1940. Unfortunately, this adaptation came too late to influence the thinking of most Yugoslav officers and only under the influence of combat in which German armored and motorized units had the main role and gave the war great maneuverability and mobility. The Yugoslav military press and officers were very well informed about all contemporary doctrines and discussions regarding the development of tactics of armored units in the period between the two world wars. The General Staff Headquarters stopped the development of Yugoslav doctrine when Army General Dusan T. Simovic served as chief. In the period when the doctrine and armament plans were created, Simovic held the opinion that the role of armored units in the war to come was overrated. His thinking caused the postponement of the purchase of a large number of tanks for the years 1941-1942. Therefore, Yugoslav troops entered the war with insufficient training and equipped only with weak tank units and antiarmor cannons of small caliber (37 and 47 mm) that were effective only at a distance of 500 meters. At that time, German anti-armor PAK cannons (75 mm), which were used in the war against Yugoslavia, were effective at twice that distance. The Yugoslav Second Tank Battalion was equipped with tanks that had the same or better tactical and technical characteristics as the German PzKpfW I, PzKpfW II, PzKpfW 38t, and partially PzKpfW III (with 37 mm cannons) models, which were used largely during the attack on Yugoslavia, but well trained crews, more armored vehicles, larger anti-armor artillery, and the Germans’ domination in the air, along with the lack of panzer shells in the Yugoslav armored and artillery units, combined with the rebellion of Yugoslav units in Croatia, were crucial for Yugoslavia’s poor performance during the short April War in 1941.

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The “Lesson Learned” from this presentation could be the following sentence: *Tactical innovations maybe cannot always make Victory certain, but too slow doctrinal development always announces defeat!*
1. Introduction

“England expects that every man will do his duty!” That was the flag signal that Admiral Horatio Nelson sent from H.M.S. Victory to his fleet at 11:40 a.m. when the battle against the superior combined French and Spanish forces at Trafalgar began in 1805. In doing so, he avoided appealing to the bravery of the individual or to the judiciousness of fighting a just battle. One did not necessarily have to be brave and courageous, but the need to do one’s job was clear to everybody. There was no pathos calling for enraptured heroism but, instead, a down-to-earth appeal to function as required. It is universally known how the naval battle at Trafalgar ended, namely more fortunately for England than for Nelson himself, who succumbed to a gunshot injury sustained during the battle. He had, incidentally, actually intended to send “Nelson confides,” but his flag officer suggested the “England” variant, which the admiral also immediately accepted. He was obviously aware that it is crucial to whom or to what one feels duty-bound. Because, etymologically, “duty” is defined as “first of all something that someone is required to do for moral reasons, but [duty] is also referred to as being required of someone by a legitimately regarded authority.”¹ Unlike duress, duty is based on a rational or ethical consensus, with the one performing the duty therefore accepting the necessity to do so. For soldiers in whatever era and whatever army this consequently means, first and foremost, obeying and fighting.

This was exactly what the Wehrmacht leadership also demanded when it increasingly reminded its soldiers in the last year of the Second World War to do their duty, as a means of motivating them to carry on. Although in their memoirs the former generals confessed of realizing at an early stage that defeat was coming, they explained that the performance of duty was the main motive for continuing with a lost war.² The book titles already indicate the apologetic tone, because reasons as to why


² The point in time at which each individual claims to have realized this varies, however. Only a few diehards, though, continued to believe in a victorious outcome until the last months of the war: Fretter-Pico and Frießner in early 1945, and Model, Reinhardt, and Schörner until the very end. There are, by comparison, written statements from the majority, between the failure to take Moscow in 1941 and the successful allied landings in Normandy in 1944, that defeat was coming. Most of these, in turn, claim to have been convinced of defeat by late 1942 / early 1943 at the latest; see Paulus, Friedrich, Ich stehe hier auf Befehl. Lebensweg des Generalfeldmarschalls Friedrich Paulus. Mit den Aufzeichnungen aus dem Nachlaß, Briefen und Dokumenten, edited by Walter Görlitz, Frankfurt a.M. 1960, p. 263, Rommel, Erwin, Krieg ohne Hass, 3rd edition, Heidenheim 1950, p. 244, Choltitz, Dietrich von, Soldat unter Soldaten, Zurich 1951, pp. 147 and 166, as well as Westphal, Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln. Aus den
they nevertheless sent their men into hopeless battles are difficult to understand from a rational point of view and incomprehensible militarily. Historical research on the military elite of the “Third Reich” has so far revealed individually differing conflict situations, of course, ranging between loss of reality and self-deception, and between a personal need for recognition and the wish to extend one’s own position of power, in view of the Allied military trials feared in the event of capitulation. What applies to “quite ordinary Germans” is also applicable to simple soldiers, namely that they wanted to get through and survive somehow. The legend of Hitler being an ominous, all-powerful and omnipresent figure, however, can be deemed as disproved. It was not needed at all, with the “Fuhrer’s” military translating his ideas into plans, orders, and operations with the usual obsequiousness. Often enough, it was they who first provided him with the impetus, and continued to do so until the last days of the war. It was not without reason and not only in this context that Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, as the last “Fuhrer,” set the pattern of argumentation, culminating in the statement of how he perceived soldierly duty: “A soldier has to fight; the graver things are, the stronger must be his will to fight. He, therefore, is the last person who can advocate surrender.”

This verdict is to be found throughout retrospective literature, from the top brass, i.e., generals down to the simple private.

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5 Vernehmungsprotokoll: Fragen an Grossadmiral Dönitz im Lager Mondorf (Lux.) 1945; BA-MA N 539/v.31, fol. 12.
This may apply to the Eastern Front, where a consensus prevails concerning the ideologized warfare conducted by the Wehrmacht, with the fear of retaliation by the Red Army being added as a further significant motive. There has so far, though, been a lack of relevant studies regarding the battles against the Western allies. It is hence the objective of this paper to clarify what motivated soldiers throughout the ranks to carry on a pointless war and at the same time want to survive it. The findings of my more extensive study on this subject are described and summarized in the following, so as to be able to present an intersection, as it were, that provides initial indicators. The motives of the soldiers fighting against the Western powers are brought out in a first step and then compared with the motives of those who were already captives of the Western Allies at the time (in other words, unlike their fellow soldiers on the battlefield, they did not face an immediate threat to their health or even their lives), as well as with the motives of women who were completely outside the military construct. Although the latter had already spent long years being subjected to wartime bombing, it was only when the fighting took place on homeland soil that they experienced actual contact with enemy soldiers.


Capitulation was never an option for the military leadership elite of the German Reich, neither at the time nor in retrospect. As the recently appointed Supreme Commander in the northern region, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, made absolutely clear to his Gauleiter officials even on 25 April 1945, that surrender was “exclusively a matter for the state leadership, embodied by the Fuhrer.” He did not depart from this position even after the end of the war, when interviewed by Allied interrogation officers: “To me, intervention was out of the question, based on what I knew. It would have been wrong, in my opinion, to interfere with another department without detailed knowledge. Where would things end if this was generally the practice.” And he was by no means alone in thinking this way: “The political leadership made the decision to venture into war, and it also had to decide whether and when there was a possibility to end it.” Also the reproachful question, asked after the last war, as to “Why did you not stop waging war after you must have known that the war was already lost?” is, for this reason, misdirected. As one of the generals responsible, Hans Friessner, said in 1956 “... Any military commander who would capitulate without the instruction of his government would violate not only every basic military law but also the principle that determines the relationship between politics and the Wehrmacht.”

6 On this and the following see Zimmermann, John, Pflicht zum Untergang. Die deutsche Kriegführung im Westen des Reiches 1944/45. Paderborn 2009 (forthcoming).

7 In view of a lack of relevant studies, it will not be possible in the following, either, to make any general statement about women as such, this being due to the, in some cases, widely differing individual backgrounds and personal situations.

8 Besprechung Dönitz´ mit allen Gauleitern des Nordraumes mit Ausnahme des Hamburgers Kaufmann am 25. April 1945; BA-MA RW 44 I/1 (KTB).


10 Friessner, Hans, Verratene Schlachten. Die Tragödie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumänien und Ungarn. Hamburg 1956, S. 221f. Concerning similar argumentation see also Wagner, Elisabeth (ed.),
Which is why many saw death or perseverance as the only alternative, \(^\text{11}\) and even those close to the resistance thought that the only thing left for them was “the soldierly attitude, which was possibly conducive to sparing the German people and the soldiers entrusted to our leadership from the worst.”\(^\text{12}\) This they had in common with those loyal to the regime, such as General Dietrich von Choltitz, who saw it as an expression of the highest soldierly virtue to prove oneself before the enemy regardless of sacrifices, \(^\text{13}\) or General Alfred Jodl, for whom the greatest achievement in a soldier’s life was “[to fight] to the death, even when already facing it.”\(^\text{14}\) The insipidness of such pathos-filled statements was soon exposed nevertheless, as in the example of Field Marshall Walter Model. He wrote to his wife on 24 March 1945 that it was essential “not to give up hope on any account, but to remain active according to the dictum ‘Continue to fight courageously and prefer to die bravely rather than lose freedom and taint the soul!’”\(^\text{15}\) It is permissible to ask the question in how far the suicide he committed not even a month later can be considered a sign of his bravery. Neither Choltitz nor Jodl, moreover, fought with weapon in hand. They, unlike hundreds of thousands in those days, survived the war, as did General Hermann Balck who similarly believed in having to continue the fight “until the enemy realized the impossibility of bringing us [sic] to our knees.”\(^\text{16}\)

He nevertheless described the predicament of the military leaders at the time during the last phase of the Second World War when he stated: “General Jodl was quite right when he said that Hitler was our destiny, we will either be victorious with him or go under with him. Hitler was in no manner or form replaceable. His person was the cement that insolubly held the people and the Wehrmacht together. All the authority of the commanders at every level, each devotedness of the ordinary man, was rooted in him. If Hitler were removed, the Wehrmacht and state would then collapse.”\(^\text{17}\) The fact is in any case that Hitler had, from the beginning of the war, proclaimed that there would be no repetition of 1918, that for him surrender was out of the question. \(^\text{18}\) It is equally a fact that those who, in their own words, continued to

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\(^\text{11}\) Diary entry by Reinhardt, dated 25.1.1945; BA-MA N 245/3.


\(^\text{13}\) Choltitz, \textit{Soldat}, S. 128f.


\(^\text{15}\) Letter from Model to his wife dated 24.3.1945; BA-MA N 6/1.


\(^\text{17}\) \textit{Ibid}, p. 640.

fight in order to defend their homeland had a very major part in its destruction and were responsible in the last year for almost just as many casualties as in the preceding war years taken together.

Even so, it was not only the German public that for decades followed the lead given by retrospective literature, probably because it seemed logical to do so at first glance. The war was, it was said, continued for a lack of alternatives, and the already inevitable defeat was eventually sealed due to the immense superiority in materiel. The Wehrmacht, on the other hand, stood up to the enemy’s superiority as long as it was in any way within its possibilities to do so.

Closely associated with this is the astonishingly persistent legend concerning an “untarnished” Wehrmacht that had been created to a considerable degree by memoir literature. Some commanders, even while they were in captivity, demanded leadership positions in the new state as well, instead of accepting responsibility.

The military therefore thought beyond the end of the war. In defining themselves as a functional elite they saw the opportunity of being needed again also after the war. It must have been in their thoughts, therefore, to demonstrate their professional skills even under the adverse conditions of the last months of the war. In this context, priority was given not only to preserving power and status or to surviving but also, by combining the two arguments, to continuing to exist as a functional elite beyond the end of the war. Carrying on in a kind of business as usual was also an obvious possible course of action. The military were thus able to remain loyal to their previous principles. They needed neither to surrender nor to desert nor to defect and therefore not expose themselves to the regime’s persecution mechanisms like


20 See in this regard Henke, Klaus-Dietmar, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands. Munich 1995 (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 17) as well as Weinberg, Gerhard L., Eine Welt in Waffen. Die globale Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Stuttgart 1995 and Gruchmann, Lothar, Totaler Krieg. Vom Blitzkrieg zur bedingungslosen Kapitulation. Munich 1991. It has only been recently that doubts regarding this argument have been expressed. Richard Overy, Die Wurzeln des Sieges. Warum die Alliierten den Zweiten Weltkrieg gewannen. Translation from English by Jürgen Charnitzky. Although Reinbek, in Hamburg in 2002, did not prove that the German Reich would have been able to win the war, he drew attention however to the enormous efforts required within the anti-Hitler coalition to defeat the German aggressor. Almost incidentally, he also managed once again to consign the still powerful verdict concerning the Wehrmacht’s professionalism to the realms of fantasy, the closer the end of the war came.


22 See for instance Kdr Division z.b.V. 172, Brief an den Kommandierenden General des Ems-AK, Betr.: Stimmung der Truppe, dated 11 July 1945; BA-MA RH 26-172/7: He demanded that the leading positions in any future German state be assumed by members of the former officer corps, because this “(would be) particularly suited to lead the people in the future, as it had always been educated in an apolitical way and had been best able to observe and understand the value and shame of the National Socialist regime from outside of the party . . . .”

23 General Siegfried Westphal admitted afterwards that there had increasingly been a tendency to “pretend to act” against the Western Allies; Westphal, Siegfried, Erinnerungen. Mainz 1975, p. 333. Concerning this see also: Kunz, Wehrmacht, pp. 248-260.
many ordinary soldiers. Soldiering on, however, posed namely a much greater risk to life and limb for those who actually fought in battles than for the senior and higherranking officers at the headquarters and command posts. The regime and military leadership, moreover, not only threatened to mete out punishments for any such considerations, but also provided “motivation” through a burgeoning system of patronage, promotions, and awards. Many in the military were thus able to accumulate honors and awards also beyond the end of war which, under normal conditions, would have been much more difficult to obtain.

2. Soldiers’ Motives: b. Ordinary Soldiers on the Battlefield and as POWs

The morale and motivation of most of the soldiers was already severely battered in the course of 1944. It improved again for a short time as a result of the Ardennes Offensive in the west, but rapidly collapsed when the attack failed.\(^{24}\) For the vast majority of the soldiers, however, surrender was out of the question. Although desertion and other ways of finishing with the war individually had meanwhile developed into mass phenomena, they remained an option only for a minority. There are reports of soldiers in individual cases who shot themselves in view of the futility of their situation.\(^{25}\) Of course, the growing terror used by the regime and military superiors against their own soldiers must in no case be underestimated in this connection. But for that very reason, ordinary soldiers on the battlefield concentrated on the time to come after the war.\(^{26}\) A certain “L.” summed it up when he wrote to his wife in January 1945: “I don’t care about anything any longer, I have become so indifferent. . . . Don’t lose heart, because soon this fierce struggle for our existence will be at an end. Then we can say we did our duty. . . . You know, those who are best off are the ones six feet under.”\(^{27}\) One’s own actions were hence regarded as pointless at the time; they made sense only in a future after

\(^{24}\) According to Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung*, pp. 798f, the majority actually resigned themselves to defeat only after the Allied armies crossed the Rhine on a broad front. This also remains the only difference to the attitude of the military leadership, who still cherished hopes even at that stage. Only Weinberg, *Eine Welt*, pp. 860f, claims to have found also a split in the military leadership after the division of the Reich, comprising the majority around Goebbels, Bornmann, Steiner, Keitel and Jodl, who wanted to continue at any price, and a minority who had finally admitted defeat, among whom he includes Heinrici. Quite apart from the fact that there is no source evidence of this, any such realisation would have been very late.

\(^{25}\) Richard Baader, *Kriegsende in Reischach*; BA-MA MSg 2/5665, p. 5 tells of three suicides committed by soldiers while their comrades “surrendered in droves”. Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung*, pp. 964f. assumes that, in total, several thousand suicides connected with the end of the war were committed by “people in prominent positions”. Although a larger number cannot be excluded here, it ought hardly make any difference in the overall context. As a rule they were allegedly people known to have been directly involved in crimes, and probably only in exceptional cases were they people who no longer wished to live on because of the downfall of the National Socialist regime.


the war.

This held true even for the soldiers in Western Allied captivity, regardless of their ranks. The range of assessments and opinions regarding the war situation was also the same there as on the battlefield. Only a few conceded the inevitability of defeat, while the majority continued to hope for victory; nobody at any rate put the case for a need to surrender. This consistency between the soldiers in captivity and those on the battlefield demonstrates unambiguously the existence of basic convictions and behavior patterns. The will to soldier on, or at least the unwillingness to surrender, was not, then, determined by the everyday threat to life during the war and can be interpreted even less as a development of the last phase of the war. The comparison with women in the “Third Reich” shows to what extent this can be considered a matter of principle.

2. Soldiers’ Motives: c. Women

The study of basic behavior patterns of German females generally reflects those established for the male perspective. Although, gradually, the Hitler myth also lost its sheen with the women, attachment to the regime eroded and war-weariness increased. The search for alternatives remained limited nevertheless, and resistance the exception. As long as the enemy was impersonal, so to say, and the broader living conditions remained basically untouched, the vast majority of women were not ready to give up the war or even to act against it. The increased terror, particularly in the last few months, must be taken into account in this regard as in the case of the men, but the fear of what was to come later was in both cases an incomparably greater motivating factor for soldiering on. The actual everyday struggle for survival, or what was at least increasingly perceived as such, became ultimately a struggle to survive the National Socialist system, to which the majority did not withdraw their allegiance until the end.

In this context, as in the world of male socialization, the “performance of duty” provided the main source of momentum, both in contemporary argumentation and in hindsight. The only difference between male and female perception in the last phase of the Second World War seemed to be that women understood more easily and

28 In connection with this typical statement, see the relevant forces’ mail reports in the last year of the war, e.g. also Feldpostprüfstelle bei AOK 19: Monatsbericht für November 1944; dated 3 December 1944; BA-MA RH 20-19/285, fol. 22-23.


30 Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma on 12 September 1943; cited in ibid, p. 300.

earlier than men that this war had been lost. They reacted to this in the same way as 
the military, by withdrawing to the “tasks” assigned to them, namely the private 
sphere. The survival of the family beyond the end of the war was seen as the key 
factor. This is additionally demonstrated by the fact that it was often women, 
nonetheless, who assumed responsibility for the task if their locality and, therefore, 
their homes, were faced with destruction in what was seen as a futile situation during 
the last year of the war. By generally showing readiness to do so only when the 
males refused to surrender, they already assumed a role that was quickly 
reinstated in the post-war societies and was to continue for decades. In this respect a 
line of continuity emerged also for women long before the end of the war, enabling 
them to continue with their generally accepted life in the post-war period without any 
far-reaching break with tradition in public. The ambivalences experienced between 
emancipation and subordination, between action and reaction, and between victim and 
deed, however, remained unresolved because they were generally disregarded. This 
was obviously the individual price the women paid for the possibility to withdraw, 
together with the men, to a position as part of a misled and oppressed nation. The 
principle of “doing one’s duty,” which was partly felt to be, and partly put forward as, 
the legitimating argument, served them to that end.

3. Behavior Patterns and Socialization

Toward the end of the war the German population lacked alternative courses 
of action because it had never learned to look for them. Having emerged from an 
empire with its militaristically inflated servile spirit, the majority had no idea about 
republics and ended up in a dictatorship that seemed to offer what most had missed 
since days of the Kaiser: order, straightforward circumstances, and a clear center of 
gravity in the political and social landscape. Hitler and his party promised all that, 

32 Dörr, Durchkommen, p. 383, Dörr, „Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat...“, vol. 3, p. 441. 
Representative of many examples is the removal of antitank obstacles by women in Chemnitz in April 
1945; OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt.(IIIc)/Nr. 4514/45 gKdos., Tagesmeldungen West vom 18.4.1945, dated 
19 April 1945; BA-MA RH 2/495, fol. 94-98, here fol. 96. Regarding the realisation of the futility at 
the end of the war, see also Meves, Christa, Flakhelferin, in: Frauen im Wehrdienst. Erinnerungen von 
die halbe Geschichte, pp. 722f.

zur, ‘Mütter des Herzens. Überlegungen zu einem Frauenbild in der Alltagsliteratur der ersten Jahre 
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in: Insa Schöningh/Agnes Jooster (eds.), So nah beieinander und doch 
so fern. Frauenleben in Ost und West. Pfaffenweiler 1992, pp. 75-90, Bandhauer-Schöffmann, 
Irene/Elia Hornung (eds.), ‘Trümmerfrauen – ein kurzes Heldinnenleben? Nachkriegsgesellschaft als 
Vienna 1990, pp. 93-120, or Dörr, Margarete, „Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat...“, Frauenerfahrungen 

34 In her interviews, Dörr, Durchkommen, pp. 142f., identified the instilled as well as passed-down 
“sense of duty” as being responsible. See also Leck, Ralph M., ‘Conservative Empowerment and the 
Gender of Nazism. Paradigms of Power and Complicity in German Women’s History’, in: Journal of 

35 See e.g. Winkler, Heinrich-August, Der lange Weg nach Westen. First volume: Deutsche Geschichte 
vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Untergang der Weimarer Republik. Munich 2000, esp. pp. 378- 
555.
and it is not least of all because of this that the “Fuhrer” held such great appeal. But if this was the reason for National Socialism being able to gain power nationally, why should there have been any thought in 1945 that self-initiative and moral courage might then be allowed to become possible? The small number of those who put up resistance is proof of that. If there had been a need for a “strong man” in 1933, as there apparently was, why should there no longer be one, especially in the existence-threatening phase of the last year of the war? Was it not, if anything, consistent that the attachment to the “Fuhrer” became ever closer as the threat to people’s personal or material existence grew?

Action to curtail the war was taken only when neither the regime nor the “Fuhrer” was able to assure the protection of personal belongings and lives or to make people soldier on. Such action, though, was generally directed against the war and not against the National Socialist regime, because holding on to what had gone before might have been counterproductive for one’s own survival. The fact that it was often women who then either took the initiative themselves or provided the main impetus for it is similarly retraceable to relevant upbringing- and education-related patterns. Despite diverse twists and inconsistencies in the definition of the woman’s role in National Socialism, she nevertheless remained one thing: the guardian of the family’s existence and responsible for the household. She was, in the war years, also the one who ensured everyday survival as long as the male was not present, due to being a soldier. The NS regime had also propagated this role and prevented any emancipation-related developments, as far as they are at all definable. This explains why often women in particular were not willing to sacrifice their own possessions and belongings in the last phase of the war.

Male behavior patterns were much more schematic and simpler in the last phase of the war. Men had been more deeply integrated into the system hierarchy than women. The “Third Reich” had, besides, been constituted on the basis of perceived male virtues: contest, assertiveness, and the will to lead. Command and absolute obedience defined the relationship among the male population. Each and every one had a place in the existing hierarchy that he had to fill at any cost until he was released from his responsibilities; independence was permissible only to a limited extent. In this way it was possible to place all the blame on obedience to orders. Upbringing and education not only under National Socialism but also in the times prior to that ought to be included in this respect. In the “Third Reich” especially, the duty of obedience and allegiance underpinned by an oath dispelled any ambivalence in understanding the concept. But it also released the perpetrators from the responsibility for their deeds as a result.

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the law . . . , but with identifying their own will with the spirit of the law” and, in particular, with that of the “Fuhrer.” This systematic transvaluation by complying with the “Fuhrer’s will” as the only valid guiding principle between 1933 and 1945 was nowhere more obvious in Germany than in the Wehrmacht. Instilled in citizens as early as the nineteenth century as “crowning all duties towards the state,” compulsory military service escalated into an apparently unquestionable service sui generis.

Ultimately, and this has yet to be taken sufficiently into account by military history research, it was not a special but an everyday behavior pattern that was responsible for people “soldiering on” in German society at the end of the Second World War. The discussion about the ominous “zero hour” manifestly long obscured the view that the behavior of the Germans, in terms of their logic, was plausible. For the majority of the population in the German Reich, the war was lost sometime between September 1944 and May 1945, yet trust in the regime was not simultaneously withdrawn. It was not without reason that a large proportion of Germans did not want to abandon former ideals of “good” National Socialism until far into the post-war period and pinned the responsibility for the “negative” ones on those at the top. As a logical consequence, those who had been involved in the events were the ones to stage the culture of retrospection regarding the Third Reich. Within it the legend concerning “zero hour” provided the dividing line between past and future and hence for the responsibilities for the crimes. The concept of duty forming the focus of all education since the days of the Empire, if not before, which demanded personal sacrifice to the point of self-denial, was not only politically instrumentalized in that period, but also experienced its strongest form of expression through individual duty being bound to the “will of the Fuhrer.” Military service especially, by it being declared a “duty of honor” following the Prussian reforms of the early nineteenth century, became the purest form of doing one’s duty.


much more broadly based study, of course, can determine to what extent the individuals involved actually felt this way. But it is undisputed that the topos intrinsically was the guiding principle.

4. Closing Remarks

The catastrophic situation of the “Third Reich” in the last year of the Second World War did not come about unexpectedly. Strictly speaking, not all too much had changed from a purely military perspective compared with the wartime events after early 1943. Thereafter, the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition continuously pushed the German forces back to the Reich borders and beyond, while the resources of the Wehrmacht dwindled in all areas. In this respect the situation during the last few months of the war was more of a continuous development for the Germans, and all the actions to prolong the war that appear obscure to us today were due to anything but panic-stricken thinking. Germany’s recourse to old men, women, and children, for instance, was nothing new in 1945. By then, if not before, the manning of flak positions with school children during the air war, the messenger services of the Hitler Youth and, in particular, the employment of women within the military represented important developments toward their actual involvement in military action on the ground. For a militarised society such as that of National Socialist Germany, any other behavior would also have been less easy to comprehend in view of the war’s development. Leaving aside the unscrupulousness of the Wehrmacht leadership, what remained is behavior compliant with the system, which is discernible in German society in general until the end.

The phenomenon of apparently holding out heroically to the last man is, furthermore, a century-old motif. Mythically exaggerated events of a similar nature, such as the Spartans’ Battle of Thermopylae or the Texans’ Battle of the Alamo, are to be found in world history. And northern as well as, especially, Germanic mythology is full of tales celebrating or even calling for the hero’s own downfall for the sake of a supposedly higher good. The Nibelung saga, which is the Germans’ national epic, so to speak, is the most powerful example of this. This connection between mythology and the events at the end of the war in Germany is not as far-fetched as might appear at first glance if Göring’s instrumentalization of the

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Thermopylae motif in the context of the Battle of Stalingrad is considered. It would be an interesting approach for future research to study the extent to which, therefore, cultural and sociological conditions of the Germans are reflected in their behavior at the end of the Second World War, because hopeless battles are generally considered the stuff of new myths that create national coherence.

Also, the educational background correlated with the background experience for many involved in this context. The image of the Germans being in the midst of a “world of enemies” had already become a constant in Imperial Germany’s imagination in the First World War and continued to have a broad impact in the interwar years because of the topic of the “shameful peace of Versailles.” This may have nurtured the view in the last phase of the Second World War that it was the duty of every individual not to give up as long as there was any imaginable possibility of continuing the struggle. As a consequence, performing one’s duty thus became a value in itself. The only accusation that could be levelled was of having considered the wrong thing as a duty or having derived the duty on the basis of the wrong underlying conditions, which actually proved to be the case in the post-war period. The German originator of the war promised to improve its ways and proposed to demonstrate this within the framework of democratization. The war victors saw in this an acceptable consensus being achieved because it allowed them, without any loss of face, to integrate the losers of the war into a common network of values and norms, which all were jointly to defend in future. Although this applies primarily to the western part of Germany, which was soon to become the Federal Republic, a corresponding context was to be found in the eastern part, albeit under completely different political conditions. It must not be disregarded in this connection that this behavior was in no way the outcome of any plans made in the last phase of the Second World War that were then gradually implemented. It evolved, rather, from the mixture of authoritarian education and the deference to authority associated with it, on the one hand, and from a knowledge of the crimes committed under a regime to which the people had been loyal, on the other hand (something that is certainly demonstrable for the broad majority). The former had blocked the possibility of alternative action, and the latter had not really allowed the wish to come about.

Those militarily responsible in the West were not ready to give up, therefore, not only because they had allowed themselves to be debased to a mere functional elite or because, through their strict sense of military duty alone, they wanted to remain loyal to the very end to the “Fuhrer” as their head of state, as the person to whom they had pledged their oath, and as supreme commander. The melding of National Socialist ideas with the military mindset had long been completed, relieving such slogans as Perseverence and Struggle of their propagandistic connotations and allowing them to be endowed with meaning until the end. Not only was there to be no repetition of 1918, it was possible to write a heroic story that the generations to come...

could be proud to remember.\textsuperscript{46} This time, unlike at the end of the First World War, evidence had to be provided either that really everything had been attempted to make the impossible still come true or that they had been defeated “with dignity.” Aware of the absurdity of the stab-in-the-back legend, they wanted themselves to become the “heroic role models” for the future generations of soldiers, having been unable to find them in the defeated imperial army. The objective was now the rebirth of the state and, with it, of the army on the ruins of the old. As late as 1961, Friedrich Ruge, who had by then become an admiral in the \textit{Bundesmarine}, explained on the occasion of his retirement: “Soldiers at the front, in the field, were unable to act in any other way than to adhere to their oath and fight.”\textsuperscript{47} Many had already foreseen this at the end of the war. In the spring of 1945, for example, U.S. intelligence officer Saul Padover frustratingly reported to his superiors after diverse interrogations of railway workers in Krefeld, “These people would work for Hitler until the last moment, and then for us with the same unquestioning obedience.”\textsuperscript{48}

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\textsuperscript{46} In this regard, see as a matter of principle Schilling, René, „\textit{Kriegshelden}“. \textit{Deutungsmuster heroischer Männlichkeit in Deutschland 1813-1945}. Paderborn et al. 2002 (\textit{Krieg in der Geschichte}, 15), on the Third Reich in particular pp. 77-95 and pp. 316-374.

\textsuperscript{47} Ruge, Friedrich, \textit{In vier Marinen. Lebenserinnerungen als Beitrag zur Zeitgeschichte}. Incl. 24 pictures and four selected, previously unpublished papers. Munich 1979, p. 429.

\textsuperscript{48} Padover, Saul K.: \textit{Experiment in Germany. The Story of an American Intelligence Officer}. New York 1946, p. 316.
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Military identity belongs among the most important characteristics of the state or elements of the state entity. It adds more to the overall picture of the role the state plays in the system of external and internal relations, of the principal postulates and direction of state policy, and the socio-public and political reality. It arises from the implementation of defense policy, while reflecting the key aspects of international developments, the country’s geographical and geopolitical status and regions, military advances, economic performance, and internal political climate. On a practical level, military identity is documented by the state’s military-political orientation, the character of its military-strategic concepts and operational plans, and the therewith corresponding force generation, territorial deployment, and the Armed Forces’ mission. Among other crucial features associated with the military identity of the state and its regions is the state’s military-economic potential, one which is defined by the structure and concentration of individual types of the manufacturing potential in connection with the existing military-political and military-strategic concepts.

Slovakia forms a part of a sensitive region that has been subject to tempestuous changes in terms of geographical borders and the cultural, political-military, ideological and other content between Germany, standing as a symbol and representative of the West, and Russia, embodying the East.\(^1\)

Slovakia’s military identity in the twentieth century kept changing, depending on the extent of the country’s independence or inclusion into larger state entities, and allied or coalition formations therewith connected. For these reasons, Slovakia’s military identity needs to be studied in light of the following epochs and content dimensions:

1) **The period until 1918**, when Slovakia formed an integral part of former Hungarian kingdom which was a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Slovakia’s geographical borders were not delineated, yet the term referred to an area between the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube River, reaching to the Morava River in the West and Uzhgorod in the East. As a territory of Upper Hungary it was marked by the historic Hungarian-Galician border, which stretched along the Carpathian ranges. However, this was not the Austrian-Hungarian state border, but it only divided Hungary and Galicia, which was made up of parts of Poland gained by Austria and, from 1772, was directly controlled by Vienna. From this standpoint, Slovak territory was an interior region of the Habsburg Monarchy and, in other words, the rear area of the Habsburg army. A military threat was conceivable only in case the Austrian army suffered a defeat in Galicia by Russian Empire, which represented a major menace to Austro-Hungary. After crossing the Carpathians, Russian troops could advance unhindered further into the lowlands of the Danube Basin. This military-strategic assessment of Slovakia, which remained unchanged even with the emergence of the

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two military pacts in Europe, with Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy on the one hand (1882), and Great Britain, France, and Russia on the other (1907) -- was confirmed at the beginning of World War I, when the north-eastern part of Slovak territory became for a while a theatre of operations of the Eastern front opposing armies.

2) The period of 1918-1939 in which Slovakia rose to become, territorially and politically, an integral part of the newly established Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR), albeit without the right to legal state codification of its place in it. In the new power curves in Europe, the strategically located ČSR constituted a barrier against Germany exerting pressure on the East, while at the same time allowing the Western powers, especially France, to forward their interests in this direction. The ČSR maintained a direct contact with allied Romania and, in connection with Sub-Carpathian Russia, it came closer to the world power in the East. Moreover, it territorially separated Hungary from Poland, the states with great objections against the Czechoslovak borders (northern and southern) and a growing interest in undoing Czechoslovakia.

The Army of interwar Czechoslovakia was being built in line with the Western models, especially in the spirit of France’s defense doctrine, while seeking its own face within the Little Entente and the imperfect security system of the League of Nations.²

In the plans for building the country’s defenses, which, in a range of all variants, took account of the threats posed by Germany, Hungary, and Poland, Slovakia represented a rear area as much as an independent operational zone of the Czechoslovak Army. It was envisaged that Slovakia would be an industrial and military base, which was, in the case of a planned withdrawal of Czechoslovak field armies from Bohemia and Moravia, to meet all necessary prerequisites for concentrating forces prior to the arrival of allied troops, and to ensure counter-offensive operations against Germany and Hungary.

3) The period of Slovakia’s first independent statehood in 1939-1945, when the establishment of the Slovak State on 14 March 1939 prompted a marked change in the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Slovakia. As a result, its theretofore “country” border with Moravia and Sub-Carpathian Russia became the official state border, when after the annexation of Austria, the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the military defeat and occupation of Poland, Slovakia bordered, in the north and west, on areas directly controlled by the German Reich. In the south and east it shared a border with Hungary, which also gradually came under German control, raising territorial claims to Slovakia while resorting even to armed aggression.

Following the territorial changes affecting southern Slovakia shortly after the 1st Vienna Arbitration on 2 November 1938, the conditions for providing defenses against “traditional” invasion routes into Slovakia’s interior regions worsened considerably and, with the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Russia (Carpathian Ukraine) by the Hungarian Army in March 1939, opened a new dangerous direction for a strike to be launched from the East, which was exploited by the Hungarian Army in its attack on eastern Slovakia on 23 March 1939.³


The Slovak State, which, according to the Slovak Constitution, carried the official title Slovak Republic, found itself in the sphere of German influence. It follows from the assessment of foreign and domestic policy and the character of the political system and regime in the Slovak State that, from the beginning to the end of its existence, it formed a part of the German Central European power region, since its existence was directly connected with the implementation of Germany’s expansionist policy. Slovakia was, more or less, actively involved in the Nazi bloc of the Axis Powers as a satellite country of Germany. It became firmly embedded in the bloc by adopting a series of contractual obligations, including, notably, the Treaty of Protection of March 1939, Agreement on Wartime Economy of January 1940, and by acceding to the Tripartite Pact in November 1940 and to the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941, participating in a military campaign against Poland in September 1939 and against the USSR in 1941-1945, declaring war on Great Britain and the United States in December 1941, and deploying its troops to help build German defensive lines in Italy and Hungary in 1943-1944.4

The circumstances surrounding the Slovak State’s establishment and geopolitical location limited Slovakia’s international standing and foreign policy options. In fact, none of the states bordering on Slovakia was either supportive of or friendly with it. It was due to a number of internal and external state security reasons that Slovakia was pushed to join with Germany. Among the most significant threats was the threat to its territorial integrity, posed by Hungary. Therefore, the main purpose of Slovakia’s foreign policy was to review the 1st Vienna Arbitration of 2 November 1938. However, its anti-Hungarian foreign policy met with Hungary’s fierce resistance as well as Germany’s reluctance to do so. The Nazis were not willing to tolerate any disputes between their allies, as things could get out of control or contravene Berlin’s premeditated instigation.5

The territory of Slovakia represented a strategic and operational point of departure for German and Slovak troops launching attacks against Poland in September 1939, as well as a rear area of the Slovak Army operating on the German-Soviet Front. However, completely different ideas about Slovakia’s military-political and military-strategic position were present in the anti-Nazi resistance concepts, basing themselves on Slovakia’s pre-war status or aiming to restore or adjust its status slightly. In the end, the military-political targets and interests of the USSR brought Slovakia under its sphere of influence.

The Slovak Republic of this period entered the national memory as a satellite country of the Third Reich and as an authoritarian and totalitarian regime with a number of Nazi elements. Nevertheless, this was a long-term trend in restoring Slovak identity, its self-governing status, and national and state sovereignty. It involved a discontinuity of the democratic system, which was followed by the Communist regime after 1948 with an unfolding of numerous development tendencies in the field of science, culture, and other aspects, ensuring continuity in building the multiple functions of the modern Slovak nation.6

The relationship between politics and the military in the surveyed period of

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1939–1945 was shaped by World War II, especially after Slovakia entered the war against the USSR. Policy priorities were thus modified accordingly, with the ruling government taking measures as the war continued leaving its mark on Slovak society. The army played an important role in establishing the Slovak State and building and consolidating the regime. Even while the Slovak State was being established, Slovak armed formations were already engaged successfully in defending Slovakia’s eastern border with Hungary in March and April 1939. The armed confrontation rallied the Slovak society against Hungary, boosting the army’s popularity. Besides its mission to patriotically provide for home defence, the Slovak Army was later used for political purposes by the pro-Nazi regime, when it was deployed to fight alongside the German Wehrmacht, first in a campaign against Poland and then against the USSR, demonstrating the political will of the Slovak State. The involvement of the Slovak Army in these campaigns was to be exploited later, as Slovakia expected to be rewarded for its merits. Its military engagements provided a plausible argument for a favorable post-war division of the “war loot” (at that time nobody had any doubts about Germany’s victory), which was expected to happen at the expense of Hungary. It was believed that Slovak interests would be given preference over Hungary’s claims and that Slovakia’s territorial losses after the Vienna Arbitration in 1938 and the armed conflict in March 1939 would be negated.

An important milestone in strengthening Slovakia’s military identity was the foundation of the Slovak Army. For the first time in history the Slovak Army thus became a state military force, tasked with building army structures and generating troops. With regard to personnel, material, and structures, the army built upon the remnants of the Czechoslovak Army, but the imposed German control (the system of military advisors) and the occupation of western Slovakia left its mark on its development. Nevertheless, the mindset of the Slovak Army members (especially senior officers) had also been shaped by their earlier training and education in the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Army. So the orientation of the Slovak Army was not unambiguously pro-German. The reputation of the German Army was high only until the war began to affect Slovak territory and population, until Slovak mothers began to cry tears as their sons were leaving for the Eastern Front. It was only after they were faced with the prospect of a long-lasting war and German and their own atrocities that they realized they could not go on fighting alongside the Nazis any more. The only thing that prevented some of them from deserting to the other side was the fear for the lives of their families and relatives back in Slovakia. Their experience and weariness of the long-lasting war, combined with the training they underwent in the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Army,\(^7\) was a catalyst for the anti-Nazi sentiment that surged after 1943.\(^8\)

The years 1939–1945 represent, also from the standpoint of the army’s ethnic make-up, an interesting period in the development of the Slovak Army. Because of the fact that the army was popular with the Slovak public, a large number of Slovaks joined the military on a voluntary basis, with an extra dose of enthusiasm. Many reserve officers, former teachers from the detached southern part of Slovakia, were called up to active duty, as the state could not provide them with teaching positions.

\(^7\) Almost all of the officers involved in the preparations of the armed revolt completed their studies at Czechoslovak military academies before 1938, and some of them even graduated from the higher military academy (VVŠ).

\(^8\) Csefalvay, F. a kol. Vojenské dejiny Slovenska V., p. 260.
As a result, the Slovak element in the Slovak Army was clearly distinct. After 1939, neither Hungarians nor Czechs could become members of the Slovak officers’ corps, and other ethnicities were allowed to join only to a limited extent. Many Czechs re-Slovakized their names and so did some Slovaks and those who wanted to be considered Slovak citizens. Ethnic Germans enjoyed a privileged place in the army and society alike, and did not have to worry about changing their names.9

A special chapter documenting the development of Slovak military identity is represented by the Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské narodné povstanie -- SNP), and then national liberation operations, and liberation operations (aimed to push back the Nazis and the remnants of Hungarian troops from Slovak territory and conducted by the Red Army) which all took place in 1944-1945. The SNP broke out on Slovakia’s formally sovereign soil, still unoccupied by the Nazis, as a prompt response of the Slovak liberation forces against Nazi aggression, which was camouflaged on the outside as assistance against growing resistance, especially the partisan movement. Germany’s major efforts were directed towards maintaining the routes which connected its northern and southern armies, preserving the industrial factories working for the Reich’s war industry, and last but not least suppressing domestic resistance and preventing it from spilling over to Bohemia and Moravia.10 Slovakia, a tool and at the same time a partner of Germany’s aggressive policy, turned into anti-Nazi Slovakia through its own endeavors, finally becoming an ally of the anti-Nazi coalition.

4) The period of 1945-1992. During this period Slovakia became anchored in Czechoslovak statehood in Europe. By being integrated into the sphere of Russian influence, Czechoslovakia became an important element of the Soviet security system in Central and Eastern Europe. Founded on bilateral, allied relations with the countries neighboring the USSR in the west, it performed the role of a buffer zone state in the new cordon sanitaire, should another German offensive against the USSR occur. The place and role of the Czechoslovak Army was determined by Czechoslovakia’s location next to Germany and its geographical location between the northern, so-called “Polish” direction, and the southern strategic direction, which passed through Hungary and Austria. The post-war Soviet scenarios reckoned with a close military-political cooperation between Czechoslovakia and “new democratic” Poland in securing the northern strategic direction of Berlin -- Warsaw, while its cooperation with Yugoslavia was to eliminate the “uncovered” southern strategic direction. Besides the “permanent” German threat reflected in the concepts of Soviet political and military planners, immediately after World War II it was a fictitious option whereby Hungary could probably try to restore its alliance with Germany, should Germany decide to revise the results of the Second World War.11

In considering the military-political character of a possible new conflict, the Czechoslovak Army’s top commanders upheld the thesis whereby the next conflict would, in one way or another, involve a kind of a repetition of World War II, in other words, if the co-operation of the then Anti-Nazi coalition were preserved, the conflict would be a clash between the democratic forces of Europe and the German aggressor

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and its allies. The fear of a new German threat was the key factor behind the political and military drive to provide for the defense of Czechoslovakia. To a great extent, it contributed to the transformation of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy and military orientation, refocusing them on eastern and Slavonic powers. These efforts were anchored in the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 12 December 1943. In the assessment report of Czechoslovakia’s military situation vis-à-vis its neighbors, the Main Staff of the National Ministry of Defense considered relatively safe, besides the newly established border with the USSR, only the border with Poland, since it was expected that Poland would join the military pact with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In connection with Austria, the report emphasized, based on lessons learned from the 1930s that Austria was of exceptional military-strategic significance, given the fact that it could be used as a point of departure for launching attacks against Czechoslovakia. In the context of possible military threats to Czechoslovak statehood until mid-1946, the prevailing opinion on Hungary’s role highlighted the idea that Hungary would be the second most serious adversary after Germany.

The principles of Czechoslovakia’s military defense concept were founded on an alliance with the USSR, as outlined by the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943, and on the philosophy of the pre-Munich, so-called withdrawal strategy. Accordingly, it was estimated that, complying with Moscow’s military-strategic plans, the Czechoslovak Army would cushion the impact of the “western” aggressor’s first strike until the arrival of the Red Army, while simultaneously conducting defensive withdrawal operations, retreating from Bohemia to Moravia, or, in the worst case scenario, even to Slovakia’s western border. The Red Army’s involvement was to stabilize the front and create the conditions for launching a counter-offensive, which was to liberate the occupied regions and push the theatre of operations onto the enemy territory, delivering a definitive defeat to the enemy, in coordination with the Western allies. The concept emphasized a reliable defense of Czechoslovakia’s north-western, western, and southern border, with effect-delivering strike forces concentrated inside the country.

In the outlined military-political stratification of Central Europe and Czechoslovakia’s military defense project Slovakia had an important role to play, and this in two points. Firstly, in light of the Soviet Union’s intentions and plans, it filled a strategically important area in the suggested triangle of the USSR -- Poland -- Czechoslovakia. Thanks largely to being a link with the other countries and its geographical, defense conditions, Slovakia guaranteed, politically and militarily, that the Central European part of the USSR’s sphere of influence would remain compact. Secondly, it enforced and protected allied interests in the Danube Basin, with the option to export them further into the Hungarian lowlands. It is also important to note that the main routes linking the Red Army’s logistics bases in the USSR and its occupation forces in Austria and Hungary led through Slovakia at that time. When considering Czechoslovakia’s defense concept, Slovak territory provided a sensitive operational-tactical and rear area for the Czechoslovak Army with an adequate industrial and material base, and offered operational-strategic space for concentrating and regrouping allied troops before conducting any offensive operations.

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13 E.g., one of the supreme commanders of the Czechoslovak Army General J. Satorie judged the situation at that time in the following manner: „Our main enemy remains Germany, no matter in which combination. Hungary comes as next into account…“ VÚA-VHA Praha, f. MNO-hl.št. 4. odd. 1946, sig. 38-2/33, čj. 1250/taj. vel.
preservation of Slovakia’s territorial integrity with Moravia deep in the latitudinal direction and a reliable provision of transport routes to and from the USSR belonged among the basic prerequisites for ensuring the success of the Czechoslovak defenses.

Armed forces build-up in Slovakia was an integral part of the developing Czechoslovak military potential, which emanated from the idea of a so-called strong army. Thus, in terms of manpower and military structures, the Czechoslovak Army aimed to build large-scale forces, and in the case of a mobilization, it was to activate as many military forces as possible. Numbering more than 180,000 troops, the peacetime Czechoslovak Army was to be deployed uniformly throughout the entire territory of Czechoslovakia, with 25 percent of division- and brigade-sized formations to be located in Slovakia. In line with the official policy governing the relations between Czechs and Slovaks on the principle of equality and proportional representation, it was envisaged that the Slovakia-based units would be predominantly of Slovak origin.\(^\text{14}\)

In the post-war organizational structure of the Czechoslovak Army, Slovakia formed a relatively independent territorial-organizational entity -- 4\(^{\text{th}}\) Military District (4\(^{\text{th}}\) MD), with its headquarters in Bratislava (wartime Headquarters 4\(^{\text{th}}\) Army). The core of the organizational structure of the 4\(^{\text{th}}\) MD represented two army corps with four infantry divisions, of which one was a fast (mechanized) division with a tank brigade as an internal organizational element. They also included several artillery brigades, an air force division, and units of different army branches (including engineers, communications, automobile troops, etc.). A total of 45,000 troops were planned to man the positions in Slovakia, supported by 1,224 artillery pieces, 65 tanks, and 144 airplanes.\(^{\text{15}}\) The deployment of land forces evenly covered Slovak territory, meeting the operational requirements of the Czechoslovak’s army command. While the location of three infantry division-sized formations aimed to provide for the defense of the southern border and support the flow of troops across the border with the USSR, a fast deployment division “covered” the north-eastern part of Slovakia. At the same time, these forces constituted army reserve units ready to be deployed at the Moravian border and in western and south-western Slovakia.

From mid-1946, the Slovak military identity began to assume new features. As doubts were cast on the reliability of units deployed throughout Slovak garrisons, a move accompanied by an assessment of differences in Slovakia’s internal political development,\(^{\text{16}}\) the national character of Slovak military identity was gradually negated, replacing territorial principle of force replenishment by an extraterritorial one. In connection with the collapse of the anti-Nazi coalition and the USSR’s consolidation of power in central and south-eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia’s top commanders reviewed the conclusions of previous political and military assumptions on a future war conflict. Believing that the next conflict would be fought between the Germanic Anglo-Saxon and Slavic worlds, they shifted away from the withdrawal


strategy to the concept of providing an active and dynamic defence of Bohemia and Moravia as a more convenient point of departure for allied troops to fan out. Accordingly, Czechoslovak units were to defend the country, even if facing encirclement or enemy penetration into Slovakia. The conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Polish allied treaty under the dictate of J.V. Stalin along with the one-way imposition of the USSR’s dominant influence in the Danube Basin after the peace conference in Paris in February 1947, affected the assessment of the military and security situation on the Slovak-Hungarian border\(^{17}\) and finally decreased the direct importance of Slovakia’s territory as an operational space. On the other hand, when it came to military transports and maneuvers, Slovakia’s role in providing a link between the two strategic directions running through the USSR’s buffer zone was stepped up. Emphasis on building up a powerful military force on Czechoslovakia’s western border led to a lower concentration of army units in Slovakia, which increasingly performed the roles of a rear area and a logistics base for the Eastern Bloc’s first echelon armies. The deepening contrastive atmosphere between the former Allied Powers and the shaping of an allied system of satellite states under the USSR culminated after February 1948 in the establishment of a Communist regime in Czechoslovakia.

After realigning the Czechoslovak Army in 1948 and 1949, of all the main battle formations, only one air force and two infantry divisions remained in Slovakia, while armored, chemical troops, and paratrooper units were not represented at all. In Slovakia, the planned manpower figures amounted to 18,860 men (15.1 percent of the total numbers), and their combat power translated into numbers of weapons was 250 artillery guns (10 percent), 32 anti-aircraft guns (10.2 percent), and 60-70 aircraft of different purposes (approx. 6 percent).\(^{18}\)

In 1950, the Czechoslovak political and state bodies adopted a series of measures aimed at generating forces as faithful copies of Soviet armed forces. The reform was launched on 21 September 1950 and involved the transformation of the Headquarters of the 4\(^{th}\) MD in Bratislava into the Headquarters of the 2\(^{nd}\) MD in Trenčín. The new military district covered not only Slovakia but also parts of Moravia; with the result that Slovak territory lost its own identity as a relatively independent territorial-organizational entity within the Czechoslovak army’s integrated system. From the operational point of view, the 2\(^{nd}\) MD was perceived as the Czechoslovak Army’s backyard and second echelon, which was to be operating, if required, within the frame of the front based on the Carpathian Military District (CMD) of the Soviet Army.\(^{19}\) In peacetime conditions it performed training and mobilization tasks, and was the main logistics and education base of the Czechoslovak Army. Through its earmarked units it provided for the defense of the Czechoslovak border in south-western Slovakia and southern Moravia. Plans for

\(^{17}\) In March 1947 (immediately after the conclusion of the peace talks in Paris) General B. Boček, supreme HQ commander of the Ministry of Defense, quoted in connection with the assessment of the military and security situation of Czechoslovakia that „from the point of view of security the most important border is our western border (…) From the operational assumptions emerges clearly that today (…) it is necessary to take into account the defense of the north-western, western and southern borders up to Bratislava“ whereby „the importance of the Slovak-Hungarian border gradually decreases from West to East.“ VÚA – VHA Praha, f. MNO-hl. št. 1. odd. 1947, č. j. 12055/Taj.


mobilization build-up forces involved the transformation of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} MD into the 3\textsuperscript{rd} wartime Army.

At the core of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} MD’s organizational structure, there were two army corps, one deployed in Slovakia (with HQ in Banská Bystrica), while the other one was stationed in Moravia. Each of them consisted of two infantry divisions with corresponding combat support services. Headquarters of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} MD was in command of an artillery brigade, artillery anti-tank regiment, and other units. Of the units directly subordinated to the General Staff of the National Ministry of Defense, a newly formed paratrooper brigade was stationed in Slovakia. Territorial and military anti-aircraft artillery units provided for the air defense of Slovak territory. The air force division was transferred to Moravia. Slovak air space was divided into operational zones, operated by Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and Soviet fighter units, which were expected to conduct joint combat operations in the western aggressor’s estimated attack directions.\(^{20}\)

In gearing up for the upcoming military confrontation with the West, Slovakia became an important armaments manufacturing base in Czechoslovakia. Besides supplying weapons to the Czechoslovak Army, it also delivered weapons to the USSR’s satellite states. Slovak arms factories participated in manufacturing tanks, artillery guns, ammunition, and small arms under Soviet licence. Among the buyers were the armies of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.\(^{21}\)

The establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 led to a more detailed specification of the Czechoslovak Army’s missions within the coalition structures and the strategic plans of the Soviet General Staff. In this regard, the creation of a new organizational structure and operational task forces took into account the principles of engagement under conditions of usage of the nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria, and the strengthening of Hungary’s role in the southern strategic direction. At that time the military organizational structure was boosted by a fighter air force division and two independent air force units and higher anti-aircraft units. Land-based artillery was also substantially strengthened.

Integrated into the first strategic echelon of the Warsaw Pact forces, the Czechoslovak Army’s operational plan envisaged the Czechoslovak Army’s engagement within the structure of the CMD of the Soviet Army. The combat value of the Czechoslovak Army was to be represented in the first echelon by two operational land units (armies), and in the second echelon by strong reserves (however, only one army was available between 1956–1958), backed by numerous combat air force units and bulky combat support artillery and combat service support units. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} MD forces stationed in western Slovakia and southern Moravia until 1958 constituted a peacetime framework of the second echelon forces, the so-called 3\textsuperscript{rd} wartime Army. This was to consist of three army (rifle) corps. One army (rifle) corps and one fortress corps were to be built up as a reserve. From 1958, the peacetime framework of the second echelon army included all units subordinated to the HQ of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} MD. This constituted the mobilization core of Army HQ, involving six motorized rifle divisions.\(^{22}\) After abolishing an infantry division in western


\(^{22}\) Štaigl, J., and M. Stefansky. \textit{Vojenské dejiny Slovenska VI.}, p. 221.
Slovakia, only one operational unit of land forces remained on Slovak territory.

In 1961, the military-political structures of the Warsaw Pact decided that the Czechoslovak Army would, under the Allied Armed Forces, create its own military front with two large operational units (armies) in the first, and one operational unit in the second echelon. Among the main tasks of the front was to neutralize NATO forces in the southern part of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), to take control of the industrial area of Nuremberg, and to cross the Rhine and launch an attack on France. Rapid advance was to be achieved by nuclear strikes. However, because of the ČSSR’s deepening economic problems, the Warsaw Pact commanders withdrew in 1964 their requirement to build the Second Echelon Operational Unit of the Czechoslovak Front. Instead, HQ 2nd MD (from 1965 transformed into Headquarters Military District East -- HQ MDE), based in Trenčín, was tasked to ensure the mobilization deployment of the strong front reserves, of the Headquarters All-Arms Reserve Army, and of the basic components of a complete army-sized formation (artillery division, anti-tank brigade, anti-aircraft division, engineer brigade, and pontoon bridge brigade). Some of the units not earmarked for the Czechoslovak Front were assigned to a formation of territorial troops. In the case of a war conflict they were tasked with maintaining order, removing the effects of nuclear weapons usage, liquidating enemy diversion groups and paratroopers, and making sure that roads were passable for army purposes.

Czechoslovakia’s membership in the Warsaw Pact further deepened Slovakia’s significance as a rear and logistic base in the Warsaw Pact’s military-strategic concept, which outlined the estimated combat use of the Czechoslovak Army. At the same time, Slovakia was developing its armaments manufacturing base and its transport infrastructure. Special attention and support were provided to ensure large military transports of Soviet forces and material, mainly including weapons, ammunition, and fuel, in order to satisfy the requirements of Czechoslovak and allied troops alike. From 1958 onwards, Slovak territory became an operational area of the Warsaw Pact’s integrated air defense system.23

Following the intervention of five Warsaw Pact countries in the ČSSR in August 1968, Slovakia assumed new military-political and military characteristics. The Treaty of “Temporary” Deployment of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia (Soviet Central Group of Forces) led to a large-scale reorganization and relocation of Czechoslovak troops. As a part of this process, one tank division was redeployed to Slovakia, where it was subsequently reorganized from a combat unit into a training one. However, the overall situation remained unchanged when it came to air force combat units -- no one was located in Slovakia. Changes in the organizational structure and troop relocations in Slovakia were accompanied by elaborate efforts to detail mobilization and operational plans. The role of the two all-arms (tank) divisions was to mobilize two other units, one motorized rifle division and one tank division. The Czechoslovak Army’s operational plans took into account the fact that the four divisions mentioned above were to be engaged in the first echelon wartime army as well as alongside the front reserve units.24 However, as of 1 January 1969, in connection with the ČSSR’s transformation into a federation, HQ MDE’s territorial area of responsibility was reduced to cover Slovakia only, an event which allowed for


a more independent Slovak military identity to develop.

To meet the requirements of the Soviet Army, the Czechoslovak military administration in Slovakia had to vacate nine garrisons, five depots, one air base, and one military training area. The largest Soviet unit to be deployed in Slovakia was the 30th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, with HQ in Zvolen. All in all, the Soviet Army deployed in Slovakia approximately 11,000 soldiers, 255 tanks, 146 artillery guns, and 60 helicopters. In the case of a war conflict, the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia were tasked with creating an organic army, one that would “help” to carry out the mission tasks of the Czechoslovak Front. In direct subordination to its HQ, the army was, in its early days, expected to be deployed as part of the first echelon formation or to operate as a reserve force under main command. Later on, it took over some operational tasks of the Czechoslovak Front in the northern part of its operational zone.

Even more decisive changes in Slovak military identity were triggered by the international and domestic political developments at the end of the 1980s, more precisely, by the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of Communist regimes. Outlined in a new Czechoslovak military doctrine, the thesis whereby Czechoslovakia had no external enemies allowed for the large military formations deployed in Bohemia to be “dissolved,” thereby reducing manpower figures and military equipment. Also, there was a shift in the military mindset to redeploy forces proportionately in all parts of the country. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia, the empty garrisons and facilities gradually attracted units of all arms branches, including notably air force, missile, and artillery troops. In Slovakia, the number of air defense units rose markedly. After the political decision to split Czechoslovakia into the independent Czech and Slovak Republics, the process of relocating troops and equipment was accelerated, reaching a new dimension.

5) The period of 1993-2004, when a peaceful division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (ČSFR) led, on 1 January 1993, to the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic as a modern, democratic, and legal state. The geostrategic situation of Slovakia, re-experiencing its independence, was a lot more favorable than that in 1939, however admittedly the country was faced with hidden complications. It may be considered a historical novum that this time Slovakia did not “owe” its independence to a patronage of some European or world powers, but rather gained it through a series of complex political processes which were underway in the entire East Bloc after 1989 and the domestic political developments in Česko-

25 Minarik, P. Střední skupina sovětských vojsk v Československu. www.vojenstvi.cz


Slovakia which they sparked.\textsuperscript{30}

Although the disintegration of the bipolar world marked an end of traditional threats, it brought a new risk of renewing some ethnic conflicts (e.g., in former Yugoslavia), which had been hitherto frozen for decades thanks to the strict bonds between the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was not clear what role would be assumed by the successor of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and, later on, by the Russian Federation, which, despite its extensive conventional troop reductions, maintained its entire nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{31} On the other hand, the position of another world power, the United States, was rather restrained in the very beginning, without demonstrating an interest to extend its sphere of influence eastwards.\textsuperscript{32} A similar position was held by the West European NATO member states.\textsuperscript{33} This behavior revealed Western efforts not to provoke Russia by a swift enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe, which became a transitory “grey zone” between the East and the West, or in other words, a geopolitical vacuum.\textsuperscript{34} Against the backdrop of this ambiguous and changing international situation, Slovakia viewed itself, in light of its cultural and historic heritage, as a state belonging to the European West, and this was also true of the Army of the Slovak Republic. Since it was established, Slovakia has consistently attempted to free itself from Russia’s sphere of influence, where it belonged in the previous period.\textsuperscript{35} To prove its close link to Central Europe, since April 1990 it has participated in the Visegrad Group, later called the Visegrad 4 (Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary). Along with the V4 countries it declared a resolve to join NATO’s defense structures.\textsuperscript{36}

With regard to the split-up of the ČSFR, Slovakia had to -- just as it did in 1939 -- create its own military defense structures. This was not an easy task, though undoubtedly the international climate was much more favorable. As all the key facilities and formations of the first echelon forces were located in the western part of the ČSFR (i.e., in the Czech Republic after 1993), and Slovakia hosted only rear facilities and training grounds, there were not enough facilities to accommodate even the newly established command structures -- the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Adequately equipped airports, air defense systems, and housing and lodging facilities for soldiers were also in short demand. Moreover, complications resurfaced when the property of the former Czechoslovak federal army was divided in an extremely short time between 1 November and 31 December 1992 -- still prior to the


\textsuperscript{32}Ibidem, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibidem, p. 218.


\textsuperscript{35}Jenkinsová, E. S. Slovensko na ceste do NATO. Bratislava 1996, pp. 110-112.

\textsuperscript{36}Boczek, A.B. NATO, p. 212.
split-up of the ČSFR.\textsuperscript{37} Its military equipment, estimated to be worth some 418 billion crowns, and personnel were divided in a 2-to-1 ratio (based on the proportional number of inhabitants living in the Czech and Slovak Republics), which resulted, immediately after the division of the Czechoslovak Army, in a shortage of suitable equipment and personnel.\textsuperscript{38}

Apart from the material and technical aspects of shaping the new defense structure, there was a need to formulate absolutely new defense plans. These were founded upon an assumption, which was anchored in a document entitled \textit{Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic}, and adopted by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 30 June 1994,\textsuperscript{39} whereby Slovakia perceived no \textit{a priori} state as enemy, nor did it feel threatened by any state. At the core of Slovak military strategy was the legitimate defense of Slovakia’s own territory in conformity with the right to self-defense, as laid down by the UN Charter. Based on the same document was also the country’s participation in the pan-European collective defense structures and cooperation with other European states.\textsuperscript{40} From the ČSFR, Slovakia “inherited” membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),\textsuperscript{41} within which it cooperated with other post-communist Central and Eastern European states and NATO countries in delivering security in the region. On 1 December 1994, it joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative (with similar goals). And it began to participate in analogous activities even beyond Europe. This is best illustrated by Slovakia’s involvement in various UN peace operations, for example in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), in Angola (UNAVEM-II), in Somalia (UNOSOM), the Golan Heights (UNDOF), and elsewhere.

Slovakia’s involvement in new defense structures, combined with a purely defense strategy and the adopted international obligations in the field of the Armed Forces, did not require, compared with the previous period, such high numbers of personnel and equipment and, as a result, these were reduced by 17 November 1995.\textsuperscript{42} For example, of a total of 995 tanks in 1993, the Army of the Slovak Republic kept only 478 pieces. Similarly, of 1,370 armored personnel carriers, only 683 pieces remained in service. Of all army branches, artillery saw the greatest reductions, from 1,051 artillery guns to 383.\textsuperscript{43} At the same time, in conformance with the new defense strategy, there was a need to reorganize the Slovak Army’s outdated organizational structure, which it inherited from Headquarters Military District East under the former

\textsuperscript{37} Other V 4 states did not have to face similar problems. See also: Brousil, D. Před 15 lety proběhlo rozdělení československé armády. In \textit{ATM}, 39, 2008, vol. 1, pp. 14-17.

\textsuperscript{38} Jenkinsová, E. S. \textit{Slovensko}, pp. 121-122.


\textsuperscript{40} Ibidem, pp. 12-13.

\textsuperscript{41} Also the membership in the KBSE/OBSE, participation on the Treaty on Open Skies, signed on 24 March 1992 in Helsinki, etc.

\textsuperscript{42} Within the frame of the Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) signed by the representatives of the Čecho-Slovak federal government on 19 November 1990 in Paris.

Czecho-Slovak Army, as much as it was necessary to replace the obsolete weapons and equipment with NATO-compatible equivalents. Since 1993, the Slovak Army has undergone a number of far-reaching reforms. An analogous situation has happened with the Slovak defense industry in an attempt to make it capable of operating independently or, in cooperation with foreign companies, to develop advanced weapons systems and upgrade the existing ones. These steps aimed to prepare the Slovak Army for fully-fledged NATO membership, which finally materialized on 29 March 2004.


45 For instance, the modernization program of the main battle tank T-72 (through versions T-72 M1-A and T-72 M2) which represents until now the backbone of the Slovak armed forces, modernization of the self-propelled cannon howitzer ShKH vz. 77 (to ShKH vz. 99 MODAN), or development of the self-propelled anti-aircraft set ShPLK/BRAMS, etc.
Collective Security: National Egotism

by

Kjeld Hald Galster

1. Aim

This paper endeavors to outline the phenomenon that in Denmark, subsequent to the end of World War I, a strange debate opens on whether it might be possible to subscribe to League of Nations’ collective benefits without bearing a proportionate share of the burdens involved.

2. Background

To a large extent the Danish pre-World War I defense debate happens on the background of the political development of 1870-1901. After the lost war of 1864 against the German powers, the country’s economy grew surprisingly healthy, and as the Treasury accumulated a reasonable “fiscal reserve,” the changing governments of the last decades of the nineteenth century saw an opportunity to implement fairly ambitious defense plans without imposing extra taxes. Since 1849, Denmark has been a constitutional monarchy governed by His Majesty’s Government by the assumed approval of a bicameral parliament. However, approbation of the Budget depended solely on the House of Commons. Thus, the aforementioned fiscal reserve allowed the government to implement defense initiatives, which may not find agreement from a majority in that House, because there was no need for budgetary initiatives. This apparently made the government believe that constitutional, social, and tax reforms, demanded by the parliamentary opposition as a quid pro quo for endorsing the government’s defense plans, could be put off indefinitely. Thus, for years social development was retarded by die-hard conservatives. For this reason, during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the defense issue was a victim of the political contest over constitutional reform.

In 1901, this political deadlock finally dissolved as the last remnants of absolutism were done away with. During the early years of the twentieth century, the political work was influenced by the pervasive feeling of rising tension and latent danger on the continent of Europe. While the creation of defensive alliances appeared unrealistic, new defense laws adopted in 1909 showed Denmark’s strong resolve to defend her status as a neutral power. The Great War proved that these laws had provided an adequate tool for the politicians actually in office during the years of conflict. The Danes managed to stay neutral in spite of a delicate strategic situation between the pincers of great power strife. The political endeavors and the military credibility turn out to be adequate, and the country was spared the four years of misery suffered by so many others.

3. A New Strategic Situation

Following World War I, it is not surprising that a salient feature of the defense debate was aversion to armed conflict. Strongly felt revulsion against war seems
understandable. In this light it seems relevant to examine the interwar balance between pacifism and patriotism in Danish politics.

The Wilsonian agenda of a new system of collective security, which featured prominently in the peace talks as well as in European debate generally, did indeed have ramifications in Danish political dealings. This agenda reinforced the belief that war was a feat of the past, and as ideology and economic concerns combined to compete with defense for public funding, the development of society took precedence over defensive measures.

In many ways Denmark’s international position is unchanged. Possession of the Baltic Approaches remains the only serious reason for aggression against the country and the security challenge seems to be one of providing forces sufficient to make armed aggression futile. In other respects, Denmark’s strategic situation is new. On the one hand, the neighboring Russian and Prusso-German Empires are gone, and in the early twenties no power seemed to menace the Danish shores, waters, and air space. On the other hand, the deployment of mass armies as seen during the Great War may constitute a severe threat to small state neutrality, and for this reason the notion of collective security seems a godsend. This, however, opened a strange debate in Denmark, on whether it might be possible to subscribe to League of Nations’ collective benefits without bearing a proportionate share of the burdens involved. This debate will be the theme of this paper.

4. Political Standpoints

To comprehend fully the arguments, which cover a continuum ranging from pacifism to a moderate will to defend, it is necessary to have a notion of the changing political constellations in Denmark throughout the period.

By the end of the Great War, the Social Liberal Party had become a major political force having taken over government in 1913 and retaining it throughout the war years. This party had a strong pacifist leaning, and although its wartime administration provided for the decent upkeep of neutrality by military measures, its anti-militarist stand was not forgotten. In 1915, the constitution had been amended to become one of “full democracy,” and the political landscape had undergone a true metamorphosis.1 The old Liberal Party remained the leading force of Danish parliamentary activity. The Social Democrats (Labor Party) had become a political force to be reckoned with; the party called the “Right” had ceased to exist, having been swallowed up by the Free Conservatives under the designation the Conservative Popular Party (hereinafter the “Conservatives”), and the change of the electoral system to one of proportional representation had made it easier for small parties to acquire seats in Parliament. During the war, the armed forces had been allotted relatively lavish sums to secure credible neutrality preventing the country from being either occupied or drawn into active participation on either side. The constitutional struggle then lay behind, and the new era heralded battles to be fought primarily over welfare and social change.

1 Unlike the amended Constitution of 1866, which enfranchised all free and unpunished men with independent households, the 1915 Constitution granted the vote to men and women alike and regardless of their social station. For the Commons those older than 25 were enfranchised, while for the upper Chamber the requirement was 35 years. As far as the latter House was concerned, the King’s prerogative to appoint twenty-four of its members for life was substituted by a co-opting mechanism, leaving the appointment of eighteen members for an eight-year period to the outgoing chamber. From internet, accessed 23 February 2006, URL: http://thomasthorsen.dk/dk-co-1915.html.
It is worth noting that the Social Liberal Party had been founded because of discord with the other Liberal groups over defense issues. As this party remained deeply sceptical of the usefulness of armed forces, close cooperation with the Liberals and formation of one big bourgeois bloc opposing the Social Democrats in an “Anglo-Saxon”-like two-party system were impossible. The Conservatives, too, were formed with defense views as defining elements of their party program. They remained strongly patriotic and positive towards making sacrifices to secure optimum defense of the country.

The central issues of the Social Liberals’ and the Social Democrats’ programmes were not defence but the struggle for improved living conditions generally and for their specific groups of voters in particular. Thus, on a defense attitude continuum, from a point of departure in 1919, the Social Liberals are found at the decidedly sceptical end, the Social Democrats slightly closer to the center, while the Liberals and Conservatives hold positive views.

Although their influence on defense issues was slight, at this stage it seems pertinent to mention a number of minor political parties coming forth during the period as a consequence of, inter alia, the newly-introduced system of proportional representation. The Liberals were challenged by a right-wing quasi-Fascist opposition, the Landbrugernes Sammmenslutning (farmers Association) between 1930 and 1940, the Social Liberals by the Retsforbundet (Rule of Law Party) existing from 1926-1960, the Social Democrats by left-wing Socialists in the early 1920s and by the Communists in the 1930s, while Nazis -- the Dansk Nationalsocialistisk Arbejderparti (Danish National Socialist Workers’ Party) -- as well as anti-Nazis -- Dansk Samling (Danish Unity) -- had some following from among traditionally Conservative voters. These parties combined attracted the votes of between ten and fifteen percent of the electorate during the period addressed in this paper. Their voices were heard -- primarily through their own media -- throughout the period but mostly ignored by the vast majority of the defense debate participants.²

5. Debate on Collective Security and National Defense

Denmark had survived World War I unscathed by maintaining military and naval forces at a level commensurate with her policy of balanced neutrality. This, however, had incurred substantial costs. Since the territorial losses in 1864, the Jutland Peninsula had been deprived of its natural defense line, and German seaborne operations might easily bypass a fortified land border between the two countries and debouch surprisingly with considerable forces in key parts of the hinterland. Therefore, and for reasons of financial constraints, measures had been taken primarily to defend Zealand and the capital. Coastal and land fortifications around Copenhagen had been planned, built, and paid for. Ironically, the last ones had been finished during the Great War by the Social Liberals.

During 1919-1925, three different political party views left their marks on the defense debate. The war-time Social Liberal government remained in office until 1920, when it was replaced by a Liberal one led by Niels Neergaard; and in 1924, for the first time ever, a Social Democrat assumed prime ministerial office. Henceforth, and until his death in 1942, Thorvald Stauning served the country as the King’s first

minister, interrupted only briefly, from 1926-1929, by the Liberal Madsen-Mygdahl administration.

The political and the public fora interact by means of newspaper exchanges like feature articles and letters to the editors, and public debate seems to exercise some if limited influence on political rhetoric. While military professionals conduct their debate primarily among themselves, a few academics tend to be somewhat more extroverted. The Liberal government of 1920-1924 was not dismissive of professional advice, but the realization that fiscal constraints did not allow unaltered continuation of the existing defence organization took precedence over military and naval concerns.

Thus, in 1919 change was due, which seemed to be generally accepted. *Denmark’s neutrality* had remained unchallenged throughout the Great War, but after the war politicians generally agreed that the 1909 laws on defense were no longer adequate, and that something must be done to find out how best -- and cheapest -- to adapt to changing circumstances.³

Neutrality during the Great War had provided Denmark with huge benefits from trade with the various belligerents, but the post-war needs for reconstruction of the industrial complex, stocks, and markets demanded investments which could quickly drain the cash surplus. The agricultural production only gradually revived, and under the conditions of deflationary development in 1920-1922, countrymen having bought their farms during the time of high prices were in dire straits redeeming their mortgages. Moreover, many industrial companies were no longer competitive and were outperformed by foreign corporations having access to cheaper labor as well as raw materials. The tight wartime regulation of the Danish economy was loosened by the Liberal government of 1920-1924, and the living standards declined temporarily as a consequence. The Social Democrat government that took over in 1924 pursued a policy of balance between state revenue and disbursements. They do so by, *inter alia*, a policy of reduction and adjustment of expenses to the fall in prices.⁴ It appears, thus, that Liberal as well as Social Democrat governments of the 1920s aimed at cutting state spending to reduce the public economic burden along with the fall in prices and at achieving balanced budgets.⁵ Since funds were needed ubiquitously and the possibilities of raising taxation of personal income were finite, it was natural to expect cuts to be made in defense expenditure as well as elsewhere. Moreover, the post-war years required new arguments to vindicate convincingly the legitimacy of military defense and to put it into the proper context of the international milieu and the Danish democratic system. In the 1920s and 1930s, political reason placed a premium on furthering the development towards an industrialized, urbanized, welfare state. Resources were scarce as far as low-priority purposes were concerned, defense obviously being among them. At the same time, the fledgling League of Nations and its concept of collective security might be seen as providing convenient excuses for halting investments in military rearmament and modernization, which were much needed in the wake of the Great War’s innovative influence on naval, military, and air matters.

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³ One example heard was that funds might be spent more effectively on the acquisition of motor vehicles than on maintaining expensive cavalry forces.

⁴ Hansen, *Økonomisk vækst i Danmark*, p. 45.

⁵ Ibid, p 78.
The 1920s were characterized by remarkable changes of the international environment. The Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, etc., created new maps of the European nation states, and the League of Nations was conceived as the arbiter of international quarrels. Thanks to international treaty arrangements, reasonably stable economic development, and general good will among the nations of Europe, in the early post-war years the prospects for peace looked promising. Under these circumstances, buttressed by pacifism as the logical reaction to the carnage of the Great War, many Danish politicians on the Left believed that the provisions of the Covenant calling for nations to disarm should be implemented, the sooner the better. In order to accelerate peaceful development, and because their armed forces were more harmful than conducive to security, small states should set an example and disarm to a level just adequate for monitoring the borders so as to live up to generally accepted norms for the assertion of neutrality. During the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, however, world crisis set in, Fascist movements gained momentum, and the general climate of trust and good intentions yielded to a kind of state egotism, which made further reliance on the prowess of the League of Nations futile. What seemed to be a realist foreign policy in the 1920s appears to have been pure idealism in the 1930s.

In the wake of the Great War, national defense measures formed a significant part of the political debate, the military deliberations, and the general public discussion, but they were fraught with questions of legitimacy of war and military institutions, and scarcity of funds, manpower, and equipment. Siegfried Sassoon aptly described his own anti-war sentiments in his critical trilogy from about 1930, and his attitude epitomizes an outlook, which is indeed perceptible in the Danish defense debate as well: that of the past European conflict having been “the war to end all war.”

Thus, the post-war era was a time for change. The experiences of the Great War made by the combatants, the technological, organizational, and doctrinal developments of armed forces, as well as the new political situation in Europe, all pointed in the direction of reassessment and innovation. The Social Liberals and the Social Democrats strongly believed in the League of Nations, but as they held firm anti-militarist views they did not agree that Denmark’s contribution to actions undertaken by that organization must of necessity include military might. While these two parties claimed that such tasks must be taken care of by the wealthier powers, the Liberals and the Conservatives insisted that Denmark must indeed carry her share of the burden -- militarily as well as otherwise. The Conservatives and the Liberals wished to make sure that Danish neutrality was credibly defended and that the country contributed actively to the League’s possible military actions.

The stance of the pacifists was that, taking into account the development of long-range artillery, aeroplanes, etc., an aggressor was assumed to possess such overwhelming offensive power that defense of a small state like Denmark is a priori hopeless, and probably even counterproductive. Conversely, professional analyses indicated that a determined great power opponent would be unstoppable; in many specific cases, where Denmark was a secondary theatre of military operations, national resources deployed and commanded in a timely and shrewd fashion might indeed render an aggressor’s prospects far too gloomy to vindicate the endeavor.

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6 Siegfried Sassoon’s trilogy included *Memoirs of a Foxhunting Man* (1928), *Memoirs of an Infantry Officer* (1930), and *Sherston’s Progress* (1936).
However, as the professionals debated primarily among themselves, and because, during the interwar years, they did not enjoy unqualified respect, their persuasive power was limited.

Throughout the post-war decade, the pacifist trend grew along with the sensation that the defense laws of 1922 were more ambitious than the strained Danish post-war economy could bear. The Liberal government that had assumed office on 14 December 1926 supported by the Conservatives saw as its primary task saving the country’s ailing treasury by curtailing public spending. At the same time, the government found that, since the defense budget was inadequate vis-à-vis the force structure foreseen in the 1922 defense laws, the cure would be to slim the forces to make means meet ends. The “Socials” opposed the Liberals’ approach because it foresaw budgetary cuts in all sectors of society but the armed forces. Moreover, the Conservatives were against it because the armed services would be forced to downsize.

In the mid- and late-1920s, there was a penchant towards spending public funds on enterprises of more direct concern to “the man in the street” than defense. All parties but the Conservatives had development of welfare measures on top of their agenda, and cuts in defense budgets remained a theme of considerable importance to the general public as well as to politicians. In 1926, the Social Liberals and the Social Democrats tabled a bill on conversion of the Navy and Army to form naval and military “neutrality guards.” This concept rested on the paradox that on the one hand the Social Democrats would find that the funding of the armed forces as described in their bill would be inadequate for real defense but, nonetheless, unnecessarily expensive. Their intent was to maintain a force suitable for mere surveillance and for countering minor incursions -- not for general defense.

The bill of 1926 on transformation made disarmament become a highly controversial issue. Although this bill did not get the Upper Chamber’s approval, it was reintroduced in the early 1930s, again meeting with refusal. However, in 1932 the Liberals introduced compromise legislation going a long way to accommodate the “Socials” as far as the military and naval budgets were concerned.

In the 1930s, the trend towards totalitarian governance seemed unstoppable. As a consequence of the economic crisis aggravated by the Wall Street crash in 1929, Fascism was extant in almost all European countries, including Britain and France; it was unrivalled in Italy, while in Germany Nazism swelled. Only late in this period did the values and weaknesses of democracy make their way into the hub of the debate, the Fascist trend and the Spanish Civil War being among the initiators. It seems justified to claim that those who were already doubtful as to the effect of Danish armed resistance grow even more apprehensive and slid towards the point of view that non-provocative peacefulness stood a better chance of dissuading great power aggression than did military and naval defensive measures.

Although, in 1926 the “disarmament bill” was tabled under the assumption that there was no real threat to Denmark, this argument was not valid in the 1930s. The feeling of hopelessness vis-à-vis the threat juxtaposed with the wish for peaceful and prosperous commercial relations seemed to dominated the debate and to buttress the political will to save money on defense for the benefit of social welfare. Bo Lidegaard is probably right in claiming that it is not always foreign issues that shape

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7 In the 6th Reichstag, 1932, the Nazis occupied 230 seats out of 608; in the 7th, 1932, 196 out of 584 while in the 8th, January 1933, 288 out of 647.
defense policy; it may sometimes happen the other way around. At this stage, the defense policy of previous years obviously limited the country’s room for maneuver in fields like foreign, commercial, and social affairs that were channelled into a defile from which there was no escape.

While during this phase shortage of funds was the primary reason for the Social Democrats’ wish for arms reduction, the Social Liberals were averse to everything military as a matter of principle. However, it seems fair to suggest that even though the Social Democrats’ official policy was a pragmatic one, their rhetoric carried over from their anti-military past some derogatory phrases which were not very different from the arguments used by some leading Social Liberals.

In this way Denmark increasingly deserted the notion of collective security out of pure and simple national egotism. The Conservatives were dismissive of the concept, but few professionals supported them and openly expressed their apprehension only indirectly, and in the public sphere there is no unequivocal agreement on the matter. Thus, this development set the agenda right up to German occupation in 1940.

6. Conclusion

In the early years of this period the defense policy was shaped on the basis of political discussions in Parliament. However, it appears that in subsequent years the debate degenerated into a struggle between the pacifist Socials Liberals, the slightly more realistic Social Democrats, and the defense positive Liberal and Conservative parties. Obviously, concerns other than those of strict relevance to security influence defense policy debate and decision-making, and over the years defence policy became increasingly prone to being governed by the funds available rather than by tasks derived from realistic threat appreciations. Moreover, the foreign and defense policies shaped during the 1920s assumed a deterministic quality constraining the room for maneuver in the 1930s.

The arguments for reorganizing and downsizing the forces seemed to alter over this period. While at the earliest stage the general disagreement as to the conclusions to be drawn from the Great War characterized the debate, pacifism dominated the middle of the interwar period, and economic concerns constrained the foreign policy room for maneuver, and fear of provoking Germany assumed pre-eminence towards the end of it.

The Social Liberals’ pacifist stance entailed disinclination to accept that the collective security concept and international accords signed by Denmark should necessitate credible and real defense of the country’s neutrality as well as capability to support possible League of Nations action, should such need arise. The party’s ideology was an anti-militarist one, and they regarded the armed services as harmful to their designs on developing civic society and as a waste of resources. Moreover, they estimated that armed defense is a priori hopeless and possibly even dangerous as it might attract unnecessary attention from a would-be belligerent.

From the Social Democrats’ point of view, the power, the influence and status they sought must be achieved at the expense of conservative political forces, whose raison d’être was the preservation of the society of a bygone era with all its inherent economic and social inequalities. Traditionally, so they believed, the Army and Navy are there to preserve exactly that.

The Liberals, being the de facto creators of pre-war quasi-democratic society, had a positive stance on defense matters; and the Conservatives, appreciating that a safe and prosperous society required peace and security, were by any measure the
champions of strong defense. Thus, with some approximation it may be claimed that one side of Parliament claimed to serve King, country, international obligations, and traditional Danish values. The other big parliamentary group, similarly, worked openly for peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries on the basis of the League of Nations’ principles but with minimum emphasis on armed assertion. Implicitly, it transpired that resources taken from the armed forces served the twin purposes of allowing improvements in social welfare, education, and health care, and depriving the habitually conservative defense proponents, including, but certainly not limited to, the officer corps, of some of their influence. This view, obviously, implied a free ride as far as collective security is concerned.

In the beginning, foreign policy -- including threat evaluation, international treaty obligations, and geo-strategic realities -- dominated the defense debate, while towards the end economic constraints were allowed totally to eclipse more pertinent considerations. The decisions made and the trend initiated in the 1920s took on a character of perpetuation, which contributed to impairing the entire defense policy irreparably. For that reason, defense debate and defense policy after 1932 were inescapably locked in their tracks as it is feared that any attempt to repair the damage might be construed as an act of provocative rearmament.

Whether the wish to minimize defensive efforts -- pervasive among leftist politicians from the mid-1920s onwards -- was a token of national egotism or should rather be characterized as realistic foreign policy is a matter of taste. Taking into consideration the peaceful development in Germany in the early- and mid-twenties, the various international treaties, and the general approval of the League of Nations concept, it appears that Denmark actually adapted to the international milieu and to the European trend towards reconciliation, but with the benefit of hindsight it looks manifestly egotistical. Moreover, the declared will to support the League of Nations concept appears decidedly hollow, because any possibility of supporting the League’s endeavor by contributing armed forces is a priori excluded.

Seen in this light, Bo Lidegaard’s assumption -- that decisions taken in defense matters shape the foreign policy -- is vindicated, though for the last part of the period only. From a “point of no return” in the early 1930s onwards the credibility of the Danish government, i.e., the “Socials,” is inextricably linked with continuation of the policies already implemented -- domestic as well as foreign. Thus, though the foreign policy pursued might be accepted as being as realistic as can be achieved under the circumstances, it runs in parallel with a defense policy that is an aberration from the classic logic. Although the intentions as well as the threat appreciation might have been reasonable at their inception, the surrounding world changes faster and more unpredictably than anyone imagines. This “lottery effect” renders the defense initiatives taken in the 1920s and early 1930s defunct as measures for protecting the country’s neutrality later on.

Thus, the post-1932 defense debate set the scene for the upcoming war, but through its outcome it also heralded a new era of alliance defense and public determination not to let a defenceless situation recur. After 1949, by joining NATO, Denmark chose solidarity and loyal support of the common security endeavors, but as far as the interwar period is concerned, unfortunately, national egotism remained the hallmark of the country’s foreign and security policies.
Security in Flux: The Netherlands’ Adaptation to the New World Order, 1989-2009

by

Jan Hoffenaar

In the fast-changing international environment that characterized the years following the end of the Cold War, determining the position of the Netherlands armed forces turned out to be no simple matter. Within a very short time, the principal threat disappeared and the Netherlands was left with a relatively large military apparatus.

One thing was clear from the start: the peace dividend had to be paid out; economies had to be made. But what would be a sensible way to achieve this? What were the threats of the future, and how and with what assets should the military face them? There were no simple answers and this fact weakened the Netherlands Defense organization’s position in the political struggle for allocation of government budgets. As a result, it was confronted with cutbacks again and again. The question I would like to address here is the following: How was the Dutch Defense policy adapted to the changing global security situation? And what were the decisive factors involved?

What was the starting point? In 1990, the Netherlands had a sizable military organization, with tasks covering the full spectrum of force. In fact, three independent “agencies” existed, functioning quite separately alongside one another: a navy, an army, and an air force. Each made its own build-up plans, they carried out their NATO tasks completely independently, and their organizations were for all intents and purposes entirely separate from one another. This particular fact would have a strong impact on the way the transformation took place.

In the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the cutbacks and reduction and reorganization of the armed forces remained entirely within the framework of traditional general defense. They mainly affected the army. The army corps needed a much smaller number of units -- especially of mechanized infantry, tanks and artillery -- and many units could be made mobilizable. Something new was created, too: an airmobile brigade. Such a unit was completely in line with the concept of mobile counter concentration, the new operational concept promoted by NATO’s Supreme Commander in Europe to replace the concept of forward defense, the aim of which was to control larger territories with fewer troops.

The air force also had to cut back. It did not need as many combat aircraft as it was operating at the time. In addition, it was quite obvious that the era of guided missile units based in Germany, where two NATO air defense belts were located, was coming to an end. The air force would shift the emphasis to its air defense tasks inside the national borders and to expanding its transport capability.

The situation was slightly different for the navy. Initially, the potential threat at sea continued to exist. The navy therefore stuck to its division into three task groups. These were made suitable for various types of deployments. In addition, the navy was promised a new amphibious transport ship.

In 1991, the new security situation became irreversible. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the Soviet Union disintegrated. With that, the residual threat had
disappeared as well. In addition, the countries of the former Eastern bloc went through a process of further democratic and economic reform.

The new security situation in Europe made it slightly easier to make drastic choices. Increasingly, the Netherlands began to look into the possibilities of deployment in crises outside the NATO Treaty area and in peace operations. In addition to defending national territory, this became a second key task of the armed forces. It should be noted that NATO’s role in those years was that of a follower rather than a leader.

The debates in the Netherlands about the future main missions and the level of ambition of the armed forces were vehement, internally as well as in politics and the media. Various closely-related issues were raised. The most important question was whether and to what extent the military had to be prepared for a major conflict. It was clear as a bell that many mobilizable units could now be disbanded as well. The question was rather how many should remain.

Furthermore, a decision had to be made as to which types of international operations the armed forces had to be able to participate in. Should these be limited to the treaty area of the CSCE or could deployments take place around the world? Could deployments take place across the entire spectrum of force or should they be limited to low-intensity conflicts? What criteria could be used to assess whether the Netherlands’ interests were at stake? In addition, it was difficult to say what constituted a fair share when it came to determining the Netherlands’ contribution to crisis-management operations.

One discussion connected to all this was the question of whether to maintain conscription. Late in 1992, the Dutch government concluded that the obligation to enlist had to be suspended. That meant that conscription was officially maintained but de facto had ceased to exist. Young men were still registered but they were not called up for service. Practical considerations had been decisive. For two reasons, maintaining actual conscription had become irreconcilable with the required ability to deploy larger units organically to operations outside the NATO Treaty area at short notice. Firstly, if conscription were to be maintained, the duration of the first exercise had to be shortened for societal reasons. As a consequence, the training period for certain positions would be too short, which would adversely affect combat power. Secondly, it had become common practice in the Netherlands not to deploy conscripts outside the NATO Treaty area against their will. This would have rendered the sound planning and preparation of the growing number of missions impossible.

The Netherlands endeavored to keep open as many options as possible for the deployment of its armed forces. Major insecurity concerning future security threats and the absence of firm agreements both in NATO and European contexts kept the subsequent Dutch governments from excluding any tasks in advance. Furthermore, all ready units had to be deployable, in principle, for international peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions.

The goal was to maintain a capability enabling the Netherlands to simultaneously take part with a battalion-sized unit in a maximum of four peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the CSCE. Moreover, at least one quickly deployable brigade-sized unit had to be available in peacetime for the protection of NATO territory and to make an adequate contribution to peace-enforcement operations.

To a large extent, the plans were equipment-driven. They were based on what the services had at their disposal and what they were capable of doing.
In fact, little or no real prioritization among and within the services was established. As a result, the Netherlands continued to have “full armed forces.” It went its own way in the so-called competitive force build-down. Since it had failed to formulate criteria for which types of crisis-management operations the armed forces would participate in and failed to exclude any option beforehand, and because it had no permanent partners with whom to conduct such operations, the Netherlands had to have all necessary resources on hand itself.

This did not change the fact that the Netherlands was at the international forefront in adapting its armed forces to the new security situation. The reorganization was capability-based rather than threat-driven. Much more so than in the past, the armed forces served as an instrument of an active foreign and security policy. The size and nature of the armed forces was partly dictated by the consideration that the Netherlands has traditionally always demonstrated its direct involvement in upholding the international rule of law, stability, and security. How exactly this idea would be reflected and how far the Netherlands' operational ambitions should reach could not be established objectively. It was a political matter, and therefore impossible to settle once and for all. The common thread running through the policy was that the expeditionary character of the armed forces was enhanced by increasing readiness and promoting a more modular structure.

In spite of all the beautiful rhetoric, Dutch defense policy was largely determined by the amount of money made available. It was permanently under pressure from large-scale cutbacks. These cutbacks hardly bore relation to the international security situation, being chiefly intended by the government to put its finances in order. Moreover, there was a constant pressure from the central government to save money by arranging matters more efficiently.

Also then -- the late 1990s -- the security risks were diverse and unpredictable. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction formed one of the greatest security risks. This assessment was related to the “belt of instability” which had appeared on Europe’s edges, running from the Maghreb via the Middle East to the Caucasus. Several countries in this region possessed chemical weapons and were developing ballistic long-range missiles. The idea that terrorists might be able to use chemical or biological weapons was also alarming. Another cause for concern was the great number of intra-state conflicts, particularly in Africa, but elsewhere, too. In some of these conflicts, civilians had become intentional targets of violence, as in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Societies themselves became battlefields.

From 1999, one of the military’s secondary tasks was promoted to its third main task, namely, supporting civil authorities in upholding the law, providing disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally. After 9/11, and the increased terrorist threat since, this task naturally gained significance.

Around the turn of the millennium the Defense organization ran into real problems. More drastic measures were needed. The imbalance between the wish to maintain the same level of ambition and increase the levels of capital spending, on the one hand, and the reality of the increased costs of operational deployments and static or even shrinking defense budgets, on the other, had created an insurmountable tension. The increased cost of contributions to international military missions was caused by the growing complexity of those operations (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan), the use of the latest technologies (such as information and communication technologies), and the accelerated wear of materiel. Added to this were the increasing costs for recruitment, education, and retention of personnel.
As a result of the ever-growing budgetary constraints, all the money was eventually put on one horse, namely the expeditionary capability of the armed forces. The most striking measure was the abolition of all reserve units of the Royal Netherlands Army. In effect, this meant that the organization bade farewell to the old defense concept aimed at countering a large-scale attack. It also meant that the Netherlands abandoned its goal to operate with a division of its own.

The drastic reduction of the armed forces had now started to affect the Royal Netherlands Navy as well. Since the focus in military operations had shifted to supporting and influencing land operations and contesting land objectives, a significant number of frigates were taken out of service.

There was yet no need to reconsider the armed forces' three main tasks. These three main tasks were: defending allied territory; promoting international law, order, and stability; and supporting the national civilian authorities in enforcing the law and disaster relief. Due to the terrorist threat, the third main task had increased in significance. The so-called “safety-net” function which the Defense organization filled on the national level developed into the role of “structural security partner.” Over 25 percent of its military capabilities was earmarked for this purpose.

The distinction between the three main tasks was becoming blurred, however. The view developed that the protection of society was gaining importance in relation to the protection of territory. Furthermore, the idea evolved that through the combination of expeditionary operations abroad and the deployment in the Netherlands, the armed forces were contributing to national security in many ways. This was in line with the words of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson who said: “The fact is, we are going to the problems before they come to us.”

Nowadays, all military personnel are in principle deployable both on the national level and in international operations. Within the armed forces no distinction is made between nationally and internationally deployable assets. It is basically one pool of units that can be drawn from for all possible purposes.

In the meantime, experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan made clear that the complexity of operations was increasing. For example, the troops deployed there were confronted with opponents using irregular tactics. In addition, the importance of special operations had increased, both for combating terrorism and the evacuation of (Dutch) civilians from conflict zones. It was also clear that a broad set of military skills and resources would be required in order to be able to operate in operational networks. In addition, acquiring good intelligence, which is vital to effective operations, required more attention. Due to the fact that operations were conducted far from the Netherlands, the logistic support of missions had become significantly more complex. All this led to increasing costs of operations. Added to this were the increased wear of materiel and the operational losses.

In recent years, more than ever before, prominence is being given, within the budgetary constraints, to urgent reinforcements, i.e., the measures which directly benefit the operational activities of the present. Ongoing missions are beginning to dominate the policy. As a result, the budgets have partly taken on the characteristics of a wartime budget.

The essence of the recent measures was a further shift in emphasis from main weapon systems towards support capabilities. This has to do with the increased complexity of operations. They form part of a comprehensive approach, the key objective of which is not the achievement of military victory, but creating the conditions for the political process, at the heart of which is nation-building.
The ever-recurring question is whether the Defense organization is not in the process of consuming itself. In order to be able to afford the current operations and to fulfil the additional obligations as they arise, major spending programs are frequently suspended or cancelled. In other words, there is still a considerable tension between the ambitions and the means available to fulfil them. For that reason, a so-called future policy survey into the level of Defense spending over the long term is currently being conducted in the Netherlands. This is being done by looking at a number of future scenarios and at the policy options deriving from them.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me recap. Keeping up with the developments in the Netherlands Defense organization over the last few decades has been no easy task. No more than twenty years ago, the Netherlands armed forces were a large and comprehensive regular-and-conscription army, directed at the defence of Western Europe in the NATO context against a massive attack of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. Now, the services have been halved in terms of personnel and become all-professional and fully expeditionary forces, aimed at participating in crisis management operations all over the world. They had been transformed from a threat-driven organization, through an equipment-driven organization, into a capability-based organization. Initially, the Defense organization was oriented almost exclusively towards large conflicts in the context of the general defense. Subsequently, it also began to concentrate on crisis-management tasks (which were increasingly becoming an extension of the general defense task). Nowadays, through its deployments at home and abroad, it contributes to national security in a global environment with various security risks.

The transformation process took place by fits and starts. This process was initiated and sustained predominantly by external (negative) financial stimuli. The ministers of defense in office during this period consistently held on to two principles. The first was that the Netherlands armed forces were never to operate independently but should always work in international partnerships. The second was that it had to retain as many capabilities as possible for as long as possible. The Navy, Army, and Air Force are all still capable of participating in virtually every kind of operation at all levels of the spectrum of force. This quality can be explained partly from the complete character of the armed forces at the end of the Cold War, which formed the starting point of the transformation process, and partly from the wish to always be able in principle to meet a request for participation in a mission, the latter with a view to upholding the Netherlands’ international reputation. The backdrop to this was an international environment which lacked direction and where the Netherlands had to set its own course.

The latter fact made the Defense organization extremely vulnerable, given the fact that the level of ambition was decided upon in a very arbitrary way. The Defense organization no longer had the NATO “obligations” from the Cold War period, which had given the services a concrete mission. In addition, the organization had a considerable layer of meat on its bones at the start of this transformation process.

It seems, however, even discounting the problems with recruiting, that the limits have been reached. The financial frameworks are very tight, whereas the budgets are increasingly geared to resolving the problems of the moment. In addition, the Defense organization is constantly subject to the pressure of having to prove its worth, for its budget may be challenged at any time (the use-it-or-lose-it dilemma). As a result, the budgets are so tightly connected to detailed plans that there is practically no maneuvering room left. Setbacks cannot or can hardly be accommodated. There is virtually no room for interim increases. This state of affairs
conflicts with a number of factors that actually require more flexibility. The first is the practice of international deployments. If only one lesson is to be learned from the past, it is that participation in military missions is never predictable beforehand, in terms of either finances or outcome. Therefore, the specific missions must be budgeted flexibly, meaning that all additional costs -- including those resulting from increased wear of the materiel -- are covered. There should be no ambiguity about this beforehand. Only then will the armed forces not eviscerate itself. That is the price to be paid for making an active military contribution to an integrated foreign policy. A second factor potentially able to disrupt the balance between ambitions and resources when budgets are tight is the increasing costs in connection with the ongoing innovations in military technology. The last factor that must be mentioned is the requirement to retain sufficient maneuvering space to be able to effectively, and, if necessary, simultaneously, conduct various types of missions, to switch quickly between different kinds of deployments, and, additionally, to fulfil various national and international stand-by obligations. The present deployment offers no guarantees for the future. This is, after all, another thing we learned over the past decades: even for the first few years to come, it is extremely difficult to make an estimate of the future requirement for deployment of the Netherlands armed forces. The current level of ambition requires flexibility in all fields: the financial structure, the availability of sufficient (reserve) materiel, training and instruction, etc. This fact also requires some leeway to be present in the capabilities available.

If faced with static or shrinking budgets the Defense organization will -- as proven by developments of the past decades -- have to adjust its ambitions downward with a certain frequency, and the evisceration of the armed forces is a real threat.
Anglo-American Strategic Bombardment in South East Europe: Strategy and Politics

by

Richard G. Davis

In late 1943 and throughout 1944 the Anglo-American alliance confronted several choices on how to employ their strategic bombing forces stationed in southern Italy. This force consisted of the British Royal Air Force’s (RAF) No. 205 Group of approximately 75 operational bombers, which specialized in night time operations, and the American Fifteenth Air Force, which specialized in daytime precision bombing. The Fifteenth grew from an initial force of 200 heavy bombers in November 1943 to 1,000 bombers in August 1944. The Americans had insisted on the creation of the Fifteenth in order to provide a second arm to their strategic bombing campaign against Germany. The U.S. Eighth Air Force, twice the size of the Fifteenth, based in Great Britain, bombed targets in Western Europe, including Germany itself, while the Fifteenth would bomb important targets in southern Europe beyond the range of the Eighth. In particular, the American leadership intended to use the Fifteenth to destroy the single most important strategic and economic target in southern Europe -- the oil refinery complexes at Ploesti, Romania, which supplied the Germans with the bulk of their finished natural oil products, about one-third of the oil available to the Germans from all sources. The area also contained rail lines that would become increasingly important to the Axis war effort as the Soviets pushed the Germans westward. In addition to military targets, South Eastern Europe offered possible diplomatic and political opportunities that strategic air operations might realize. Three of Hitler’s allies in the region, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, waivered in their loyalty and might be persuaded to switch sides or leave the war. Since the Anglo-Americans had no land contact with these nations they would have to apply diplomatic leverage on these nations with air power. For air power advocates strategic operations against these three minor powers might also validate pre-war strategic bombardment theories concerning the ability of bombing to break the will of an opposing power and force it to surrender. This paper briefly examines and analyzes the Anglo-American use of strategic bombing for both military and political purposes in South Eastern Europe.

Bulgaria, which had declared war on Great Britain and the United States, but not the Soviet Union, became the first of the Balkan powers subjected to Anglo-American coercion via strategic bombing. Although Bulgarian forces did not take the field directly against the western Allies, at least eight Bulgarian divisions helped the Germans to occupy Yugoslavia and Greece and took part in anti-guerilla activities, freeing German troops for operations against the United Nations. On 19 October 1943, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, who was habitually more inclined to use strategic air power for political purposes than his American partners, chaired a meeting of the U.K. Defense Committee. The committee concluded:
We cannot tolerate any longer these activities of the Bulgarian jackals, however much they may be under the heels of the Germans. We consider that a sharp lesson should be administered to Bulgaria with the primary object of forcing them to withdraw their divisions from Yugoslavia and Greece, thereby adding to Germany's difficulties and helping our campaign in Italy.

We have carefully considered the best method of bringing Bulgaria to heel. All agree that surprise air attack on Sofia, accompanied by leaflets citing fate of Hamburg and Hannover, would have best and most immediate effects warning in advance of bombing not favored because it will risk increased losses. Better to do it well first and then threaten repetition on a larger scale.

Relatively small diversion of air resources required for above would be well worth while if Germany has to choose between replacing Bulgarian divisions or quitting Greece.

Sofia is the centre of administration of belligerent Government, an important railway centre, and has barracks, arsenals and marshalling yards.\(^1\)

The Committee further suggested that the attacks begin with an American daylight heavy bomber raid followed by a RAF night raid. The next day the British representatives to the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in Washington requested American concurrence and that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, be instructed to carry out the raids at the "first favorable opportunity."\(^2\) The American chiefs agreed, but proposed, that in light of Eisenhower's responsibilities for POINTBLANK (strategic air operations against the European Axis), OVERLORD (the Anglo-American cross-channel invasion of France), and operations in Italy, he be allowed to choose his own time for the attack rather than being instructed to make it his highest priority air task.\(^3\) The British agreed to this stipulation.

As with so many other strategic bombing initiatives the implementation fell far behind the intent. Instead of administering a "sharp lesson," Eisenhower supplied little more than a somewhat tardy demonstration. On 14 November 1943, 90 B-25s of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force attacked Sofia's marshalling yards with 139.5 tons of high explosive bombs. The Fifteenth Air Force followed this up with three small B-24 raids on the marshaling yards; one of 17 bombers on 24 November; another of 31 bombers on 10 December; and the last of 37 bombers on 20 December. The total tonnage of all operations in November and December against Sofia amounted to only 352

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\(^1\) CCS 376, subject: "Bombing of Sofia," October 20, 1943, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Bulgaria (10-20-43), Box 18.

\(^2\) CCS 376, subject: "Bombing of Sofia," October 20, 1943, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Bulgaria (10-20-43), Box 18.

\(^3\) Ibid.
tons of high explosives. On 4 January 1944, bad weather aborted a B-17 attack, although one group hit the marshalling yard in the small Bulgarian town of Dupnitsa, 30 miles south of Sofia. However, on 10 January, the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force (MASAF), at last delivered the thrashing that Churchill had called for more than ten weeks earlier. On that day 142 B-17s of the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force, bombing through more than seven-tenths overcast skies, delivered 419.5 tons of bombs on the city area. That night 42 Wellingtons of Royal Air Force No. 205 Group followed up with 73 more tons of high explosive. Two weeks latter a force of 40 B-17s, frustrated in their attempt to reach Sofia, dropped 117 tons of H.E. on the rail yards at Vrattso, 50 miles north of the capital.

This investment of 960 tons of bombs and only one concentrated raid produced disproportionately spectacular results. A large portion of Sofia's population, including government bureaucrats, fled the city greatly disrupting the administration of the country.

According to a report of the British Joint Intelligence Committee the raids stimulated opposition to the government's pro-German policy, reduced Bulgaria's modest contribution to the German war effort, and increased German anxiety as to Bulgaria's stability. The bombing also caused the German's to divert flak and 100 single-engine fighters to the defense of Bulgaria and to supply modern aircraft to the Bulgarian Air Force.4 On 6 February 1944, the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, who had just returned to Istanbul from Sofia, contacted American Colonel Angel Kouymoundjisky, an agent of the Office of Strategic Services, the American foreign intelligence agency. The Bulgarian Minister stated that he had attended a conference with the Regents, the Prime Minister, and the chief leaders of the opposition and was authorized to ask for the initiation of talks with the U.S. Government with a view to Bulgaria joining the United Nations. He also asked that he be given some form of guarantee that the intended talks would not end the national existence of Bulgaria. As a last point he requested that air raids over Bulgaria be stopped for ten days to permit the Bulgarian mission to reach Istanbul.5 Upon being informed of this demarche British General Maitland Wilson, who had replaced Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, ordered the suspension of bombing, although he specified that the Bulgarians not be informed of it.6 This contact was the first of a long twisted series of negotiations that led to the eventual surrender of Bulgaria in September 1944.

Although Allied bombers would not appear over again Bulgaria for another six weeks, the continuing threat of their action led the Bulgars, on 20 February, to ask the

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4 J.I.C. (44) 37 (0) (Final), London, January 29, 1944, subject: Effect of Allied Bombing of Balkans on Balkan Situation, attached to JIC Memorandum for Information No. 38, February 11, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11, Balkans (2-3-44).


6 Msg MEDCOS 35, CinC Med to British Chiefs of Staff, February 9, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, Folder CCS Bulgaria 092, O.S.S. Plan to Detach Bulgaria from the Axis (8-2-43) Sec 1.
Turkish Government to intervene with the Anglo-Americans to bring about the discontinuance of the bombing of Sofia and other cities. The Turks declined. It would appear that the Allied bombing deeply concerned the Bulgars and it is not a great leap to assume that Allied bombing had been a factor, perhaps a critical one, in their decision to seek a means of leaving the war. However, once negotiations had begun geographic and political considerations prevented a speedy Bulgarian capitulation. If the Bulgars were to turn their coats they would need a good deal of immediate assistance from the Anglo-Americans to prevent a German take over. Since Bulgaria had no common border with any of the United Nations and was almost surrounded by Axis allies or Axis occupied nations, the Anglo-Americans could not give the practical guarantee of quick assistance with ground forces that the Bulgarians required. This was the sticking point in future negotiations. Nor were the Bulgarians fears unfounded. In February 1944, they had before them the Italian example of a state that had changed sides but still had three-fourths of its territory occupied by the Germans. In March 1944, they had the added example of Hungary, where the Germans successfully staged a coup to bring down a government that was waverling in its devotion to the Axis.

Even before the Bulgarian peace feeler, the initial results of the bombing of Sofia led the Anglo-Americans to extend their bombing to Hungary and Romania. On 4 February, the CCS authorized Air Chief Marshal Charles A. Portal, the Chief of Staff of the British Royal Air Force and the overall commander of allied strategic air operations, to target those countries, provided the effort did not interfere with POINTBLANK and the support of land operations in Italy. On 15 February, Portal sent his target priorities, in order of importance – Bulgaria, Budapest, and Bucharest -- to Wilson. When Wilson queried if this message meant that he should resume bombing of Bulgaria forthwith, he was answered in the affirmative. The British Joint Intelligence Committee bolstered Portal's directive by advising Wilson that the Allies had received "a number of Bulgarian offers of surrender," "approaches from Roumania," and that "there are abundant signs that the Hungarian Government is seriously concerned at the bombing of Sofia and Helsinki." Although uncertain as to the genuineness of these initiatives, the Committee recommended to Wilson that he bomb the Bulgarian towns of Plovdiv (a communications center), Burgas (transit port for German imports of Turkish chrome), and Varna (a German navy and sea transport base), for both political and economic reasons until the Bulgarians made "an authoritative approach." The committee further advised the bombing of Bucharest and Budapest in order to produce "panic and administrative

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7Msg 301, Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1944; FRUS 1944, Vol 3, p. 301.

8CCS 482, subject: "Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries," February 4, 1944: NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44).

9Msg COSMED 33, British Chiefs of Staff to CinC Med, February 15, 1944; NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44).

10For Wilson's query see, Msg MEDCOS 51, CinC Med to British Chiefs of Staff, February 17, 1944. For the British Chiefs reply see, Msg COSMED 38, British Chiefs of Staff to CinC Med, February 18, 1944. Both in NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44).
confusion." The Committee added, "it is important that the first bombing [of Budapest] should be effective and perhaps for that reason Anglo-American bombing should precede Russian." Wilson could not act on the new priorities until mid-March because "Big Week," the needs of the Anzio Beachhead, the requirements of the Third Battle of Cassino, and the commencement of Operation STRANGLE (a massive air interdiction campaign over occupied Italy), had first call on his resources.

Meanwhile, as Anglo-Americans awaited the opportunity to hit Balkan targets events unfolding on the Soviet-German front dramatically changed the perceptions of those involved. In the second phase of their Winter Offensive, which began 4 March 1944, the Soviets drove the Germans from the Ukraine almost destroying two German armies and part of another. On 7 March, the Red Army cut the Lvov/Odessa rail line and entered Romanian territory. By 15 April, the Soviets had closed up to the Romanian border and established bridgeheads over the river Bug. In the following weeks the Soviets cleared the Crimea, in the process destroying the German Eighteenth Army, inflicting heavy casualties on the Romanians, and taking Sebastopol on 9 May. The Russian advance made the Romanians and Hungarians even more anxious to quit the war, while cutting the Lvov-Odessa line forced the Axis to shift their line of communications for the southern portion of the Russian front from the direct route through Poland to a new and far more circuitous artery via Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest. This line, forced to detour far to west around the barrier of the Carpathian Mountains, which no major railways pierced, was hundreds of lines longer and over systems far less capable than the main line in Poland. The new route, which was the only source of supply and only retreat route for 40 German divisions, placed yet more strain on the German railway system and, unlike the former one, lay within range of Anglo-American heavy bombers. In the eyes of some Allied commanders, particularly Portal and Wilson, this presented the western Allies with a golden opportunity to attack the Germans at a vulnerable point and to aid the Soviets.

However, Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, the commander of the American Eighth and Fifteenth Strategic Air Forces, wanted to hit what he considered a more important target -- the refinery complex at Ploesti. On 5 March, he asked Portal for permission to attack it, but received no answer. When the weather cleared on 17 March, he twice asked to strike Ploesti. Instead, Portal instructed him to direct the Fifteenth's activities toward the Balkan capitals of Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia, and, after consulting with Churchill, ruled Ploesti off-limits.

Portal's decision reflected both the struggle between the oil and transportation plans in London and the agreed upon Anglo-American bombing policy directed towards Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. If Portal allowed the Fifteenth to plaster Ploesti that would strengthen the case for the oil plan -- it made little sense to curtail the Germans' supply of natural petroleum, forcing them into greater reliance on synthetic oil production -- if the Allies were not then prepared to knock out the synthetic plants in their turn. Portal, himself, gave his reasons as, first, the Ploesti refineries were widely scattered precision targets whose bombing would require more visual days than would likely to be forthcoming and, second, given the air resources available, an attack on Bucharest would

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11Msg PZ 861, from the Air Ministry from the JIC to FREEDOM [Allied CINC Mediterranean], 16 February 1944, AF/HSO Microfilm Reel A6068.
probably have a more adverse effect on Rumanian oil exports than the same scale of effort applied to refineries in Ploesti. In addition, an attack on the Rumanian capital would have a more damaging effect on German political interests.\textsuperscript{12} His directive that the Fifteenth devote more of its efforts towards the capitals of Hitler's Balkan allies added teeth to a policy already implemented by the British and Americans.

On 9 March 1944, Portal informed Spaatz and Wilson of the latest bombing priorities in the Mediterranean,

1. Towns in Bulgaria, including Sofia, Varna, and Burgas, subject to political considerations.
2. Bucharest.
3. Budapest.\textsuperscript{13}

Two days later the British Chiefs of Staff detected "some hope that heavy air attack on Bulgaria, coordinated with diplomatic pressure, political warfare, and action by the S.O.E. and O.S.S. organizations, if carried out without delay, would force the Germans to occupy Bulgaria if she is to be kept in the war." They urged that Wilson be instructed to deliver one or two heavy attacks on Sofia "at the earliest possible date."\textsuperscript{14} The American Chiefs refused to alter the existing priorities. In this decision they relied on the report of the American Joint Planning Committee, which stated, "We are of the opinion that a 'collapse' of Bulgaria to an extent requiring the employment of additional German ground forces will take place only when the United Nations are in a position to place forces into Bulgaria." They concluded, "The collapse of Bulgaria will not be hastened by further air attacks."\textsuperscript{15}

However, events in Hungary and the continuing Axis defeats at the hands of the Soviets led to rapid and seemingly conflicting revisions of Balkan bombing directives. Within Hungary, the approach of the Red Army sparked an internal political conflict between factions that believed that the time had come quit the war and gain the best terms possible from the Anglo-Americans (the Hungarians were terrified of Soviet occupation), and those who felt that the current crisis demanded continued cooperation with the Germans. Admiral Miklos Horthy, the Regent of Hungary and head of state, seemed inclined to support the anti-German factions, although he was not willing to make any overt moves to change current Hungarian relations with Germany. Hitler decided to take no chances on losing vital Hungarian oil and other resources or in having the defense of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[12]{Msg OZ 1638, Portal to General Sir John Dill, Chief, British Military Mission to the U.S. and U.K. Representative to the CCS, March 25, 1944, Arnold Papers, Official File, Box 49.}

\footnotetext[13]{Msg COSMED 55, Portal to Wilson, March 9, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS Bulgaria 092 (8-2-43) Sec 1, O.S.S. Plan to Detach Bulgaria from the Axis.}

\footnotetext[14]{CCS 517, subject: "Bombing of Bulgaria," March 11, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS Bulgaria 092 (8-2-43) Sec 1, O.S.S. Plan to Detach Bulgaria from the Axis.}

\footnotetext[15]{JPS 410/1, subject: "Bombing of Bulgaria," March 14, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS Bulgaria 092 (8-2-43) Sec 1, O.S.S. Plan to Detach Bulgaria from the Axis.}
\end{footnotes}
the east disrupted. On 19 March, the Germans occupied Hungary and forced Horthy to appoint a pro-German regime, which would operate under the eye of a German plenipotentiary. At that point the British War Cabinet, in order to aid anti-German elements in Hungary then in communication with His Majesty's Government, forbade the Allied air operations over Hungary. On 22 March, Wilson asked the Fifteenth to move in the greatest possible strength against marshalling yards in Bucharest, Ploesti, Sofia, and other suitable Bulgarian and Rumanian targets. However, he placed Budapest on the restricted list.

Whereupon Spaatz, the officer with the operational control of the Fifteenth, vigorously protested to Arnold and the American Joint Chiefs that "too many agencies are giving orders to the 15th AF," and, by implication, diverting it from its primary mission -- the bombing of Germany. He added:

I cannot accept responsibility for the direction of the 15th Air Force unless this situation is clarified. All orders for the attack of targets other than those effecting the battle situation in Italy must be processed through my headquarters or the 15th Air Force must be deleted from my command. . . . unless positive and definite action is taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to command channels and is properly impressed on all concerned, I believe that the efforts of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces will be emasculated."  

The Commander of the American Army Air Forces and a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Arnold, promised to bring the matter up with the Combined Chiefs and pointed out to Portal that all orders to the Fifteenth must go through Spaatz and in spite "of the many attractive targets in the Balkans," the higher priority of the POINTBLANK targets should be observed. Portal in his reply regretted the difficulties and promised to prevent a reoccurrence, but pointed out that he forecast such problems in his objections to the establishment of Fifteenth Air Force at the Cairo Conference in December 1943. Portal followed with his justification for requesting more Balkan bombing. He noted that the when the Fifteenth was created:

it was stated that the theater commanders would at their discretion be authorized to utilize the Strategic Air Forces for purposes other than their primary mission, should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action. It has been recognized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that

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17 Msg U 60045, Spaatz to Arnold, March 23, 1944, Spaatz Papers, Diary. See, Msg U 60100, Spaatz to Arnold, March 24, 1944 (Spaatz Papers, Diary) where Spaatz strongly states his fears that the theater commanders are being granted too much authority to direct strategic air forces and as a consequence, "opportunities will be lost that we cannot afford to throw away in the brief time before Overlord."

18 Msg 13235, Arnold to Portal (through Spaatz), March 23, 1944, Spaatz Papers, Diary.
the situation in Italy has constituted an emergency which justified their
effort to targets in Italy. In my opinion and in that of the other British
Chiefs of Staff, the situation in Roumania and Bulgaria now ranks as a
strategical emergency though it is the Germans and not we who are
threatened. We believe the Germans are temporarily at any rate in a very
serious predicament on the south Eastern front and that any action on our
part which will add suddenly and substantially to their difficulties in that
area at this time may yield incalculable to the Allied war position as a
whole and therefore to our prospects for OVERLORD. . . . We feel
convinced that the effect on operations in other areas would be very small,
since weather is rarely suitable for more than one area at a time. . . .

I urge you to consider my views sympathetically and to give your
agreement to our treating the present situation in South East Europe as an
emergency warranting a temporary and largely theoretical departure from
the general order of priority. 19

Reluctantly Arnold agreed, but with the proviso that Portal ensure that Balkan bombing
would occur only on days in which weather did not permit strikes on POINTBLANK and
OVERLORD targets. 20 Portal agreed that the prevailing weather conditions were such
that the targets were mutually exclusive and assured Arnold, "that no instructions will go
out authorizing diversions from targets of primary importance on the priority list unless
really important results can be expected." 21 Portal's arguments carried the CCS. On 24
March, they authorized Portal "to instruct Spaatz and Wilson to depart from the agreed
order of priority in order to deliver one or two heavy attacks on suitable objectives in
South East Europe when the situation warrants it and results of great importance may be
expected." The CCS also told Portal that they expected only a minimum of diversion
from Italian operations and POINTBLANK. 22 The next day Portal set the revised
bombing priorities for the Mediterranean as:

(A) Bucharest, railway centre.
(B) Budapest, railway centre. Existing ban on Hungary is hereby
cancelled.
(C) Sofia and other towns in Bulgaria. 23

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19Msg AX 779, Portal to Arnold, March 25, 1944, Spaatz Papers, Diary.
20Msg 14086, Arnold to Portal, March 25, 1944, Spaatz Papers, Diary.
21Msg AX 902, Portal to Arnold, March 26, 1944, Spaatz Papers, Diary.
22Msg J.S.M. 1592, CCS to Portal, March 24, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44).
23Msg COSMED 71, Portal to Wilson and Spaatz, March 25, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.
Portal had prevailed upon the War Cabinet to remove the ban on Hungary when it became obvious that Hungarian resistance, such as it was, had collapsed.\textsuperscript{24}

It was within the above context that No. 205 Group and the Fifteenth attacked Bulgarian targets during March. On the night of 15/16 March, No. 205 Group attacked the Sofia marshalling yard. The next night No. 205 Group returned to the same aiming point. Two nights later 205 Group struck the marshalling yards at Plovdiv. On the night of 29/30 March, the British attacked Sofia one more time dropping 149 tons. The next day came the turn of the American's to hit Sofia: 246 bombers attacked the marshalling yards; 88 bombers, under orders, attacked the center of the city; and 32 bombers hit the city's industrial area. In all they dropped 1,070 tons of bombs (including 278 tons of incendiaries, the second highest total of such bombs ever dropped by the Fifteenth in a single raid). In terms of the Fifteenth's total wartime operational pattern this was clearly a city area raid. One source reported that this raid caused a fire storm.\textsuperscript{25} Given the inaccuracy of the Allied bombing (neither No. 205 Group or the Fifteenth had as yet received electronic aides) the residents and bureaucrats of Sofia had again been touched by the war. On 17 April, 250 American heavy bombers made their last major raid on Sofia, hitting its marshalling yard and industrial areas. Another 34 bombers struck the rail yards at Plovdiv (ninety miles south east of Sofia on the main rail line to Turkey) the same day.

Four hundred and fifty of the Fifteenth's heavy bombers hit a Budapest marshalling yard and an armaments work in the built-up area of the city on 3 April. The American's returned ten days later, attacking air fields and Me 410 fighter component plants in Budapest with 336 bombers, and industrial targets in Gyor (halfway between Vienna and Budapest) with 162 heavy bombers. No. 205 Group bracketed this raid with missions of 53 bombers on 12/13 April, and 64 bombers on the night of 16/17 April on the Budapest rail yards.

On 5, 15, and 24 April, the Fifteenth sent large missions to attack marshalling yards in Ploesti. Each refinery complex had its own rail yard. As the U.S. official history noted, with some satisfaction, the bombs "with more than coincidental accuracy" fell on the refinery complexes. The Americans did not acknowledge the beginning of an oil campaign even in their security classified intelligence reports and documents.\textsuperscript{26} This bombing had a significant effect on Ploesti's production. German imports of finished oil products, mostly from Romania, fell from 186,000 tons in March to 104,000 tons in April.\textsuperscript{27}

In the meantime, both the Romanian government of Marshal Ion Antonescu and its opposition had already made peace overtures. On 13 October 1943, the Romanian military attaché in Ankara approached the British Embassy with a proposal from Marshal

\textsuperscript{24}Msg OZ 1638, Portal to General Sir John Dill, Chief, British Military Mission to the U.S. and U.K. Representative to the CCS, March 25, 1944, Arnold Papers, Official File, Box 49.


\textsuperscript{26}Craven and Cate, Argument to VE-Day, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{27}Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, appendix 46 (table: xxxvii), p. 516.
Antonescu. In mid-November, Iuliu Maniu, head of the National Peasant Party and the most internationally respected and influential Romanian opposition leader, also approached the British. They insisted that any negotiations include the Americans and Soviets on an equal basis. Maniu's representative, apparently with the knowledge of Antonescu, arrived in Ankara on 3 March 1944, and continued on to Cairo, where he began substantive negotiations with Soviet and Anglo-American officials.\textsuperscript{28} On the advice of the American Joint Chiefs, the U.S. Government concluded that it would pursue these talks in order to remove Romania from the Axis, no matter what the eventual cost might be to the Romanians,\textsuperscript{29} and, by implication, with little regard for the eventual post-war situation in the Balkans. As the Soviet winter offensive pulverized the German forces blocking their path to the Romanian border, the Anglo-Americans emphasized the Romanian's predicament on 4 April, when 313 of the Fifteenth's heavy bombers dropped 866 tons of high explosives (no incendiaries) on Bucharest marshalling yards. On 11 April, the CCS, noting the transfer of German forces from France and the increased dependence of Germany on Romanian armed forces stated, "In Roumania [sic], central control of country weakening and Roumanian Government apparently losing confidence in ability of Germans and own ill-equipped troops to hold Russian advance." Consequently they directed, through Portal, that, "Maximum possible bombing effort on the Balkans until further notice should be concentrated on Roumania where German military position weakest, German economic interests greatest, and the Government most shaken." Portal set the new Balkan priorities as:

(a) Bucharest, particularly railway centre,
(b) Ploesti railway center,
(c) Other Roumanian railway targets, and much lower in importance for the time being and only [emphasis in original] if weather unsuitable for bombing in Roumania.
(d) Budapest railway centre.\textsuperscript{30}

At the same time Portal informed Spaatz and Wilson that towns in Bulgaria "were of little importance." The following week Portal added the Hungarian communication centers of Szolnok and Szeged, both on the main rail line to the southern front to the priority list.\textsuperscript{31} On 12 April, the United Nations presented their armistice terms to Romania. And three days later, 257 heavy bombers dropped 598 tons of high explosives on the Bucharest city

\textsuperscript{28}For the American side of these negotiations see, Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1944}, Vol 4: Europe (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), pp. 133-289.

\textsuperscript{29}See folder, CCS 387 Rumania (10-23-43), Section 1, Rumanian Cooperation with Anglo-American Forces, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File.

\textsuperscript{30}Msg COSMED 87, Portal to Wilson and Spaatz, April 11, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.

\textsuperscript{31}Msg COSMED 89, Portal to Wilson and Spaatz, April 18, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.
area using radar and dead reckoning, and on 24 April, 209 heavies hit Bucharest with 477 tons. As Arnold informed Spaatz these attacks were not just to disrupt rail communications, but were "intended to weaken the position of the Balkan states."  

Given the extent of Romania's cooperation with the Germans, the Allies, breaking with their stated intention of unconditional surrender for the Axis powers, offered generous terms, including a pledge not to occupy Rumania and a promise of the reversal of the Vienna Award of 1940, in which Hitler had deprived Romania of Transylvania.  

But Maniu, a man known for his indecisiveness, procrastinated. He waited, in vain, for some confluence of events that might ameliorate the consequences of his country's war against the three of most powerful nations in the world. On 27 April, the Allies tightened the screw by sending a 72-hour ultimatum demanding a yes or no response to their terms to both Maniu and the Antonescu Government, which was to some extent informed of developments by Maniu. When the time limit expired, with no response from Antonescu and only excuses for inaction from Maniu, an exasperated Churchill received a report from the Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on the status of the talks. The Prime Minister's reply, written at a time when he was delaying pre-Normandy air operations out of concern for French civilian casualties, revealed an all too human capacity to hold two contradictory thoughts at the same time. He noted, "It is surely a case of more bombing."  

No. 205 Group sent night raids to Bucharest on 3, 6, and 7 May. But the Fifteenth dealt the heaviest blows. On 5 May, 550 bombers hit Ploesti. On 6 May, over 667 bombers assailed rail yards and aircraft plants in five different Rumanian cities. And on 7 May, 481 heavy bombers dropped 1,168 tons (including 164 tons of incendiaries) on rail yards in Bucharest. These attacks had a military purpose of denying the Germans oil, snarling communication with the Eastern Front, and to adding to the burden on the rails imposed by the Danubian mining campaign. Given Churchill's pique, the Allies also intended the bombing as a reminder of the consequences of continued delay. Unfortunately the Bucharest raid of 7 May partially missed its intended target and struck a crowded industrial slum. According to Ira Eaker, the Romanians later informed him that his attack killed 12,000 civilians. This was typical of the exaggerated losses often attributed to strategic bombing. The official report of the Romanian Air Staff on the raid reported only 231 killed and 28 wounded, with 1,567 dwellings destroyed or damaged. 

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32Msg WARX 20129, Arnold to Spaatz, April 7, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.

33Msg Yugos 84 Department of State to U.S. Ambassador to the Greek and Yugoslav Government in Exile, Lincoln MacVeagh, FRUS 1944, Vol 4, p. 170. MacVeagh was the U.S. representative in these Rumanian negotiations.


35Ltr. Ira C. Eaker to H.H. Arnold, September 17, 1944, U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC, The Papers of Henry H. Arnold, folder "Letters to General Marshall," Box 44. Arnold also sent a copy to the President (see Box 45, folder, "Letters to FDR").

36Section II-a, Statul Major al Aerului, Nr. 30.543D, May 10, 1944, Subject: Dare de Seama
This spasm of bombing did not push Rumania into switching sides, and the Soviet offensive had ground to a halt by 15 April and would not resume until August. The decrease of immediate pressure lowered the Romanians’ sense of urgency and eased German supply requirements.

On 16 May, in a new directive obviously influenced by the inaugural raid of the Eighth Air Force on German synthetic oil production on 12 May and the Fifteenth's *sub rosa* bombing of Ploesti, Portal revealed another change in Allied bombing policy -- to one placing more emphasis on economic objectives. The directive maintained priority for Rumanian and Hungarian rail centers and added as a secondary objective, "the remaining refinery capacity at Ploesti and the refineries at Budapest and Vienna." The Chief of the Air Staff further encouraged continued mining of the Danube and suggested a factory supplying the Germans with radio tubes in Budapest.37 Three weeks later, 6 June 1944, Portal made the refineries of Ploesti, Hungary, and Austria first priority and the mining of the Danube and operations against the Danubian port of Giurgiu and the Iron Gates, a lock system on the Danube, second priority. Speaking for the CCS, he acknowledged the lack of measurable success in the earlier transportation and political bombing campaign and placed such operations on the lowest priority:

During present lull in fighting on Eastern Front . . . we feel that bombing directed at dislocating rail communications in Rumanian and Hungary with resources likely to be available for the time being relatively bleak. . . . If made they should in our opinion be confined to important centres such as Budapest and Bucharest where resultant administrative chaos offers additional advantages.38

At the end of July, the CCS recognized the improving Allied situation in the Balkans by toughening bombing restrictions:

(a) Strategic priorities for bombing operations in satellite countries (Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania) should, as in the past, be confined to targets of military importance and the selection of these targets will be made with due regard for the probable scale of incidental casualties.
(b) Bombing objectives selected in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania should be of demonstrable military value and targets will be attacked with careful avoidance of civilian casualties.39

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37Msg COSMED 109, May 16, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.

38Msg COSMED 124, Portal to Spaatz and Wilson, June 6, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.

39JSM 166, British Joint Staff Mission (Washington) to British Chiefs of Staff, July 29, 1944, NARA,
This guidance standardized Allied policy for bombing occupied territory in both western and eastern Europe and continued to single out Germany's satellites for harsher treatment than its conquests, but for less strict treatment than the Reich itself. Oil continued to retain the top priority until events at the end of August 1944, when the Romanians had switched sides and the summer offensives of the Red Army had given it direct access to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. At that point the Anglo-Americans suspended bombing of Bulgaria and Romania, unless coordinated with the Romanian and Soviet high commands, and made the bombing of oil targets in Hungary and Czechoslovakia first priority with bombing communications in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece as second.  Bombing of Hungarian and Czech targets continued into April 1945, as long as portions of those countries remained under German control.

In their negotiations with the Balkan Axis governments the Anglo-Americans maintained a solid diplomatic front with the Soviets. This reassured Stalin and recognized geopolitical and diplomatic realities. No lasting settlement in the Balkans could be achieved without Soviet participation. The Romanians continued with the Axis until late August. Ultimately, as with the Bulgarians, they delayed until too late to make an agreement with the western Allies. They also ended up in the belly of the Soviet wolf. By missing their chance to deal with the Allies as a whole, the Axis satellites were eventually forced to come to terms with the Soviets almost one on one, much to their disadvantage.

The results of bombing of Bucharest and other Balkan capitals do not seem to have produced significant political results. Given the weak morale of the Balkan nations' leadership and populations, they would seem to have been excellent candidates for the pre-war air theories that advanced the principle that strategic bombing could panic a state's leadership into surrender. That such did not occur says much about the thinking of air theorists, who tend to emphasize the potency and potential of air power, without adequate consideration of the entire spectrum of diplomatic and military factors involved in warfare. The Red Army, not Anglo-American strategic air power, forced the leaders of Hitler's Balkan satellites to capitulate to the United Nations. Soviet ground forces, when available and no matter how threatening to the satellite regimes, could protect them from Nazi revenge. Air power acting alone could not. On the other hand, the psychological effects of strategic bombing defy exact measurement. The Balkan bombings may well have contributed to defeatism and to a desire to limit commitments to their German partners.

Appendix One: The Mining of the Danube

In April, No. 205 Group began its most significant task in the war -- the aerial mining of the Danube River. One of the world's great rivers, the Danube, wends its way

RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.

40Msg COSMED 176, CCS to Wilson and Spaatz, August 29, 1944, NARA, RG 218, Geographic File, CCS 373.11 Balkans (2-3-44), Bombing of Axis Satellite Countries.
more than 1,700 miles from the foothills of the Swiss Alps and the Black Forest through some of the foremost cities of central Europe and Balkans -- Augsburg, Munich, Linz, Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade, and thence along the Rumanian-Bulgarian border before turning north and emptying into the Black Sea. It is commercially navigable for most of its course, from the Black Sea to Regensburg, and served as vital link in the German southeastern transportation system, allowing them to transport an estimated 8,000,000 tons of goods into Germany from 1942 to 1944.

The mining began on the night of 8/9 April in the Yugoslavian Danube and it continued until the night of 10/11 September, by which time the group's Wellingtons and Liberators had dropped a total of 1,315 mines in Hungarian, Yugoslav, and Rumanian waters. Out of 372 sorties the British lost 9 aircraft and laid 693.2 tons of mines. The naval mine, like its land counterpart, attacks not only the enemy's men and material, but his psyche as well. River captains delayed sailings until assured that their paths had been swept. The Germans had to create a mine sweeping force from scratch and either transfer trained personnel from North German waters or train new ones. Given wartime shortages, ships lost to mines represented a permanent loss the river's freight carrying capacity.

British intelligence, probably ULTRA, stated that between April and July 1944 tonnage carried on the Danube declined by 35 percent from the average of the preceding 8 months and that the mining campaign sank approximately 100 river steamers. The same source further noted that before the mining began the major portion of the tonnage on the river consisted of oil products from Rumania. By June 1944, Rumanian goods tonnage on the river had decreased by 75 percent. Oil tonnage accounted for all decreases in river freight, although cereals and food from Rumania's abundant granaries made up some of the difference.  

By displacing oil traffic from the river to the rail system the mining added one more burden on the already strained German state railroads. The new load proved particularly difficult to bear because it fell on a specialized portion of the rolling stock, oil tank cars. It might well have been that the drop in German oil imports between the beginning of the Fifteenth's bombing of Ploesti in April 1944 owed an unknown, but perhaps significant, portion to the mining campaign. Restriction on transport may also have left oil production in Rumanian storage facilities where subsequent attacks by the Fifteenth torched it.

Appendix Two: Strategic bombing and Tito

The Fifteenth's direct support for Tito's forces reflected the bloody minded nature of the war in Yugoslavia, which combined the traditional struggle against the outside occupier with elements of a civil war of Communists against conservatives, and the virulent ethnic conflict between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Muslims. Simply put, Tito wished to deprive his enemies of shelter and labor. Consequently, his representatives to

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the Allies requested the bombing of cities housing Germans and their collaborators. There is little evidence that the Anglo-Americans examined these requests for hidden motives or attempted to investigate the ethnic or political leanings of the populations in Tito's chosen targets. Apparently it sufficed that Tito attested to the necessity of it. Beginning on 5 May 1944, the Fifteenth attacked Podgorica and eleven other Yugoslav towns, including two attacks on Bihac. As a rule only one or two groups attacked each target and their instructions forbade use of H2X. For the month Twining delivered 509 effective sorties and 1,088 tons of bombs without loss.

The raids had a somewhat checkered legal status. According to international law a country's recognized government has the right to bombard its cities occupied by enemy forces. But the Anglo-Americans still recognized the rapidly disintegrating Yugoslav Government-in-Exile of King Peter. Apparently that individual and his threadbare cabinet did not authorize the raids. The Allies had not recognized Tito, although they seemed to have acknowledged, at least to themselves, that he and his forces would dominate post-war Yugoslavia. Of course, the Allies, according to international law, had the right to bombard enemy garrisons in occupied countries, but only if they did not employ disproportionate force, e.g., 1,000 shells when 100 would accomplish the job. The Fifteenth seems to have met those requirements by requiring visual bombing sending small forces, usually 40 or less bombers. In this instance, as in others, politics overpowers ordnance. However, as much as the bombing advanced the partisan cause, the Allies acceptance of the request from Tito's hands represented a step away from King Peter and towards Tito's cause and ideals. The symbolic power of the heavy bomber, apparently at Tito's beck and call, served to make the Allies’ political position clear and was more significant than the damage inflicted by their bombs.
The Role of the Military in Peace Operations: 
The UN Mission in Congo, 1960-1964

by

Lars Ericson Wolke

In this paper I will discuss some of the lessons that we can learn from the United Nations mission in the Congo between 1960 and 1964. I will examine this conflict both from the UN perspective and from the perspective of two of the participating countries, Sweden and Ireland.

The Congo mission started as a traditional peacekeeping mission, but only in a few days it got out of hand and escalated to a peace-enforcing operation where the UN forces conducted several offensive operations in order to take and hold terrain and destroy the military capability of the enemy. These operations included land and air operations as well as amphibious operations.

First I will give a short overview of the Congo crisis and then present what kind of lessons that could be drawn from this experience and discuss their relevance to the problem of the role of the military in peace operations. My focus will be on lessons from the operational and tactical level, and will exclude the complicated political game within and outside the UN building in New York City. My results are based upon archival research in Sweden, USA (the UN Archives in New York), United Kingdom, and Ireland.

The Congo Crisis, 1960-1964

The Congo Crisis is very closely connected to the wave of independence that spread around the African continent around the year 1960. On 30 June 1960, the Belgian colony of Congo gained independence, but only a few weeks later the southern province of Katanga (today’s Shaba province) declared its independence from the rest of Congo. Katangese independence was supported by the province’s large European population and regular Belgian military units. The local military force, the Katanga gendarmerie, was to a large extent supported by European mercenaries in key positions.

On 17 July, the UN Secretary General, the Swede Dag Hammarskjöld, took the initiative, in accordance with Article 99 of the UN Charter, to propose to the Security Council that a UN mission should be established for Congo. Almost immediately, the ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo, as known by the initials of its French name, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo), began to be organised. It consisted of troops from Morocco, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, and Tunisia, later joined by forces from Sweden, Ireland, India, Liberia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaya, and a number of other countries. The ONUC consisted of some 20,000 men at peak strength.

While Katanga tried to secure its independence, the armed forces of the central government of Congo, the ANC, began to disintegrate. The UN also failed to save the life of the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who was arrested by his political enemies and handed over to the Katangese, who soon murdered him. In this situation the main task for ONUC was to maintain law and order. The focus
shifted very quickly to another, more problematic task, namely to restore the national unity of Congo and to end the Katangese independence efforts. In reality, this meant direct confrontation with the Katangese gendarmerie. In September and December 1961, UN forces tried, in vain, to get total control over the Katangese capitol Elisabethville (Lubumbashi). This resulted in heavy fighting in and outside the town, but the ONUC failed to achieve its goals. It was not until late 1962 and early 1963, after UN air forces had wiped out the Katangese Air Force, that these attempts were successful. In January 1963, the Katangese leader, Moise Tshombe, declared that his state would return to the state of Congo. However, the violence continued with clashes and considerable ethnic cleansing in different parts of Congo. It was not until June 1964 that the UN forces were withdrawn. But the violence and the political turmoil within Congo did not stop until the commander in chief of the army (the ANC), General Mobutu, conducted a coup d’état in November 1965 and established a dictatorship. Mobutu would remain in power for three decades, until 1997. After his fall from power the internal violence in Congo once again began to escalate. The links between the dramatic events of the 1960s and the difficult situation in Congo of the last decade are very close and important.

Some Lessons Learned by the UN Force Commander

In August 1963, the UN Force Commander in Congo, Ethiopian General Kebbede Guebre, was reassigned after having served in the position for sixteen months. He later wrote a very interesting report about the lessons he thought the UN should learn from the Congo mission.

According to Guebre, the fundamental problems were closely related to the fact that the ONUC consisted of forces from a large number of nations, each with its own unique military staff procedures and individual traditions. His primary lessons learned were:

On the political (or strategical) level:

- The ONUC mission lacked a very clear goal from the UN in New York for the whole mission, as well as clear instructions on how much force it was entitled to use and under which circumstances, i.e., clear rules of engagement.
- Sometimes the Force Commander in Congo was very closely supervised by the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General, and he sometimes felt abandoned when critical situations occurred.
- Several national units within the ONUC maintained close contacts with their political and military commanders at home, and followed their informal instructions from them as a part of a national agenda, instead of being totally loyal to the UN.

On the operational level:

- The ONUC HQ had a large and constant lack of civilian political and cultural advisers who could have provided knowledge about the Congolese society and the complicated Congolese politics.
- The ONUC totally lacked the capability of conducting information operations, with disastrous results when the effective Katangese propaganda managed to influence the large media in Europe and the USA with anti-UN information.
The result was a number of very difficult debates in several of the participating states with a demoralizing effect on the ONUC units in Congo.

Guebre recommended that:

- Political decisions in the future should be made by the UN at preparatory to the force being established, to the Force Commander would be able to make all the needed preparations before the operation began.
- Staff officers should serve a minimum of one year with the UN in order to develop and maintain continuity within the staff work. Moreover, common staff routines should be developed and decided within the UN.
- The large contingents within a UN mission should have a common language, in order to secure a smooth cooperation and interoperability within the UN forces.
- The UN should develop a capability of its own for conducting information operations.
- The member states should be encouraged to “earmark” certain units for UN service.

It is not difficult to see that a number of these fundamental problems have occurred in multinational international operations again and again. These were some important lessons learned from the ONUC Force Commander’s point of view. I will now shift focus to the national contingents, mainly the Swedish one.

**Operational and Tactical Lessons Learned**

Between 1960 and 1964, Sweden’s contribution to ONUC included some 6,300 men, staff personnel, technical groups, air units, and army battalions. The casualties were nineteen killed, in action or by accidents. To these casualties we can add the fatal plane crash at N’dola in Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia), that in September 1961 took the life of the UN Secretary-General, the Swede Dag Hammarskjöld.

Most elements of the Swedish forces were deployed in the southern part of the country, in the break-away province of Katanga. The Kamina air base was for a large part of the time the main base for the Swedish forces. In September and December 1961, Swedish forces took part in the offensive operations against the Katanga gendarmerie in Katanga’s capitol Elisabethville (today’s Lubumbashi). Other important tasks for the Swedish battalions were to protect refugee camps crowded with civilians from the Baluba tribe, as well as to transport refugees by railroad. In late December 1962 and early January 1963, Swedish air units under the UN flag conducted a large number of sorties and managed, together with other UN air units, to eliminate most of the Katangese Air Force.

The experiences of the army units are analyzed by the use of the six fundamental capabilities of a war fighting unit to conduct an operation: the capabilities to lead an operation; to gather intelligence; to achieve effect on the enemy forces; to achieve a capability of movement for your own forces; to maintain the fighting capability of your own forces; and the capability of force protection.

The capabilities to lead an operation were very weak among the UN forces. The CIC in the Congolese capitol, Leopoldville (today’s Kinshasa), did not have the capability to command or control any field operations. Neither had the
regional sector staffs, although it should have been their job. But lack of common staff procedures and any common guidelines for operational planning prevented effectiveness. Instead, the responsibility for the leading role landed on the different battalion staffs and, on rare occasions, those at the brigade level. This meant, for instance, that offensive operations involving several UN battalions from several countries -- mainly Sweden, Ireland, India, and Ethiopia -- were very poorly coordinated and conducted, with of course poor result. On a battalion level, the situation was very much brighter from a UN perspective, as well as when an Indian brigade was used.

At the beginning of the operation, the UN forces were strictly forbidden to have any intelligence function whatsoever, in order to avoid any chance of looking hostile in the eyes of the local parties. But very soon the orders were changed and on a tactical level a very efficient radio intercepting surveillance was established (the Katangese commando language was to a large extent French). Special UN units in civilian clothing took suspected European mercenaries (who played leading roles in the Katangese armed forces or gendarmerie) into custody, questioned them, and sent them out of the country. The UN air force provided the ground troops with very essential intelligence information about the positions and movements of the Katangese forces.

The use of force was only authorized for the UN forces where there was “a real danger to UN personnel or property.” Several problematic situations occurred and the UN forces were provided with special training in riot control techniques once they arrived in Congo. The situation deteriorated quickly and the operations became more and more offensive, culminating with large-scale offensives against the Katangese positions in Elisabethville in September and December 1961. The UN forces were, other than their air support, very lightly armed without any tanks or artillery. The most effective equipment was armored cars with machine guns and grenade throwers. In urban warfare, the Swedes found their Carl Gustaf antitank weapons to be extremely effective against snipers. In short, the UN forces had a relatively good capability to achieve a decisive effect on the enemy forces, but that was very much dependent on the fact that the enemy, the Kantangese forces, had basically tanks or artillery. The UN had virtually no capabilities to protect their own forces from, for instance, attacks by even smaller number of relatively old-fashioned tanks.

Mobility and the ability of UN forces to maintain the fighting capability of its own forces were very dependent on air resources, including airlift capability. The road system in Congo was, and still is today, extremely poor and most of the vehicles broke down after only a few days use in the terrible terrain. The large number of different types and models of vehicles made it almost impossible to store spare parts in sufficient number for maintenance and repairs. Besides, the lack of technical support for vehicle repair was a constant major problem for the UN forces. The airlift capability saved the situation, and in this respect the UN relied mainly on the U.S. Air Force, and to some extent on the British Royal Air Force.

The capability for force protection was also very low among the UN units, but it never underwent a severe test because the enemy did not have any heavy weapons platforms, such as tanks and artillery.

Ireland took part in the Congo mission with a total of almost 6,200 men. Two dramatic events took place that shocked both the Irish and the UN forces. In November 1960, an Irish patrol was ambushed by Baluba tribesmen at Niemba in northern Katangza and nine Irish soldiers were massacred. Niemba became a scar on
the soul of the Irish Defence Forces that would last for many years. The scar deepened in October 1961 when an Irish company of 156 men was surrounded by 3,000 Katangese gendarmes in the city of Jadotville and eventually had to surrender. The company was later released, but the officers and men felt they had been deserted by the UN commanders in Congo, and in Ireland a debate started about whether it was right or wrong to surrender, despite the impossible tactical situation for the company. This situation was somewhat similar to what the Dutch unit in Bosnian Srebrenica faced before the massacre there in 1995.

Several Irish battalions reported after the end of their mission that an important factor was that it was essential for company commanders to have the experience “to determine the manner of its operations in accordance with its mission.” Here we have a good example of “mission” tactics, or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik. However, this philosophy of leading tactical units was not widespread within the UN forces.

The Irish confirmed the problems with lack of spare parts for the vehicles, but they also suffered significantly from the lack of interpreters, both in French and in the local Congolese languages, especially Swahili.

Conclusions

A large number of important lessons were learned from the UN Congo mission, 1960-1964, both on a general UN level as well as within several national contingents. Still, why did very little happen? One explanation is that the Congo was the UN’s first large crisis, politically as well as militarily and economically. For a number of nations, such as Sweden and Ireland, the Congo experience created a trauma that was very hard to properly deal with. The result was that everyone wanted to forget Congo and for many years the slogan within the UN was “never a Congo again.” Thus, no one felt the need to really look into the lessons learned and initiate reforms.

To conclude, we can summarize in seven categories the different experiences from the Congo, lessons from which are still used for future international operations:

1. The need for a clear end state for the entire mission.
2. The need for clear rules of engagement.
3. The total ban on any direct political contacts between individual capitals and their own forces within the mission, thus by passing by the command structure of the multinational force.
4. The need for common staff procedures, as well as a common language, within the multinational force.
5. The need for the Force Commander to have at his disposal all the necessary military means (i.e., weapons systems and capabilities) to fulfil his mandate, especially when a peacekeeping operation escalates and ends up being a peace-enforcing operation. This includes air and, when relevant, sea control.
6. The need for communications and intelligence capabilities sufficient for the entire multinational force, especially in a country where the infrastructure is poorly developed or badly damaged.
7. The need for well-developed CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) procedures in order to secure stability and peace once the military operations in the area have been terminated.

Finally, one cannot emphasize enough the importance, at the beginning of an international operation, of an understanding on all political and military levels that a peacekeeping force must also have the capability of being shifted to offensive operations when necessary. Or, as it has been said: “International peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but there are no others than soldiers that could do it.”

Sources

This paper is based upon my own extensive research in the Military Archives of Stockholm; Sweden; the United Nations Archives in New York; the National Archives in London (Kew); and the Army Archives in Dublin, as well as libraries at the Musée de l’Armée in Bruxelles. My results are published in the book (in Swedish) Lessons Learned? Swedish operative and tactical experiences from participation in international operations during the cold war, 1956-1989 – with a special focus on the Congo mission, 1960-1964 (National Defence College, Stockholm, 2007).

by

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The enunciation on 12 March 1947 of the Truman Doctrine pledged the United States to assist free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. Although the statement was initially aimed at winning congressional support for aid to Greece and Turkey, what ultimately underpinned the U.S. Cold War policy was the fear of Soviet penetration, throughout Europe and around the world. As a turning point in U.S. foreign policy, induced by the Communist guerrilla campaign in Greece and the Soviet diplomatic pressures on Turkey, the Truman Doctrine was soon expanded by the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The primary objective of this policy of containment was to block and frustrate Communist expansionist moves in Europe and the Near East.

Post World War II Agreements

The Great Powers -- Great Britain, France, the U.S., and the Soviet Union -- bickered internally and internationally about how to rebuild the post World War II European continent. A critical realignment was taking place in the European balance of power, with an important aspect of the conflict being the Balkan policy between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Initial agreement achieved between Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill in October 1944 in Moscow established spheres of influence in this region by percentage. Whereas the Soviet Union retained influence over Romania and three-quarters influence in Bulgaria, Great Britain retained influence in Greece. Hungary, and Yugoslavia were each to be evenly split.

During the Greek Communist uprising, beginning in 1945, the Soviet Union remained neutral in the conflict to uphold the agreement concerning Greece. Great Britain, however, viewed the uprising as Moscow abandoning the agreement. The U.S. was initially neutral towards the conflict, but later sided with Britain. This


2 The Soviet Union got by far the best of the Balkan Bargain: potential control over an area of 280,000 square miles in central and southeastern Europe with a population of about 38 million (Yugoslavia and Albania are included in these figures). Great Britain, on the other hand, maintained its position in Greece with its prewar territory of about 50,000 square miles restored and its population of about 7 million: X y d i s, Stephen G., "America, Britain, and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947", *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no. 4 (Dec. 1963), p. 584.

3 British hegemony in Greek affairs started out unilaterally, through the guarantee of 13 April 1939, and then assumed a bilateral character with the Anglo-Greek wartime alliance of 9 March 1942. Throughout the war it was the British Government that furnished support both to the Greek Government-in-exile and the resistance groups in Greece: X y d i s, "America, Britain...", o.c., p.582.

4 N a c h m a n, Amikam, "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49", *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4 (Oct. 1990), p. 496.
critical period in the post-war conflict between the Allies became a central theme in shaping western opinion toward the threat of Communism in Europe. In February 1947, the British government announced its sudden intent to withdraw its peace-keeping troops from Greece. The U.S. was left to confront the Soviet Union in a region neither had occupied at the war’s end, but which both considered a vital interest. Without the stabilizing presence of British troops, U.S. intelligence experts believed that the Greek government faced an imminent possibility of collapse and ensuing Communist control.  

The Greek Civil War

Greece faced severe political and economic mismanagement and a civil war followed the withdrawal of Nazi occupation forces in October 1944. Throughout the war, Greek Communist resistance (The National Liberation Front -- EAM, and National People’s Liberation Army -- ELAS), and their resistance rival, the National Republican Greek League (EDES), were often found fighting among themselves. Great Britain had the initial upper hand in Greece, and supported EDES to prevent the rise of Communism. Nearing the end of the German occupation, EAM/ELAS formed a Greek coalition government. 6 Leftist guerrillas, who had resisted German and Italian occupation during the war, had now turned their guns against the parliamentary democracy in Athens. With encouragement from the newly formed Communist governments of neighboring Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and backed by Soviet diplomats in the United Nations, the guerrillas demanded the dissolution of parliamentary government and new elections. With the assistance of Great Britain, the EAM/ELAS fighters were quickly crushed by the regular Greek Army in December 1944. Neither side complied with promises during the subsequent Varkiza Agreement in February 1945 to grant general amnesty to EAM/ELAS members, and for the Communist movement to disarm. The Greek Communist Party, KKE, boycotted national elections in March 1946 and the same month the nation plunged once more into civil war. The ELAS fighters regrouped in the north of Greece and later renamed themselves the Greek Democratic Army under the direct control of the Greek Communist Party. 7 The civil war came to an end only three years later, in August 1949.

The British Military Mission (BMM) was established in Greece in spring 1945 to assist in the organizational work of the country’s Armed Forces during the post-war period. Without the aid of its Allies to whom, among others, it had offered the first victory against the forces of the Axis, Greece could never reconstruct and restore the immense material damages it had suffered. After an agreement between the Governments of Greece and Great Britain, the financial burden for the supply and

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5 A c h e s o n, Dean, Present at the creation: My years in the State Department, New York: Norton, 1969, p. 217.

6 To fully appreciate the post-war Greek environment one has to understand the Greek decimation following the German occupation, as thousands of buildings were either demolished or severely damaged while over two thousand villages were burnt or razed to the ground. This huge disparity between the Athens’ elite, and the rural villages of the north, formed a fertile environment for the seeds of communism: British Embassy, Athens, Monthly Intelligence Review, 15 June 1948, London, Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/72213/R7618, as cited in N a c h m a n i, "Civil War…", o.c., p. 491.

7 N a c h m a n i, "Civil War…", o.c., p. 490.
maintenance of the Hellenic Armed Forces, except for the personnel payroll, would be undertaken by Great Britain.  

Declaration of the Truman Doctrine

The diplomacy preceding the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine from 1944 to March 1947 can be most meaningfully summed up in four phases. In December 1944, the Communist uprising in Athens put to the test Great Britain's determination to preserve even this limited Balkan foothold. Churchill ordered energetic action to maintain it. The Soviet Union stayed neutral and so did the U.S. for about three weeks and then reverted to support of the British in their efforts to reach a political settlement. At this stage of U.S. abstention from Balkan affairs, the Soviet Union got by far the best of the Balkan bargain.  

By late summer of 1946, Great Britain had the impression that the U.S. had informally agreed to carry part of the financial burden of aid to Greece, and it was aware that the U.S. regarded the oil resources and strategic location of the Near and Middle East as of vital importance. U.S. President Harry S. Truman acknowledged that: “As early as the fall of 1945, the British had suggested to us that they would like our assistance in Greece, especially financial help to the Greek government...” On 3 February 1947, the American Ambassador in Athens, Lincoln Mac Veagh, cabled the State Department that according to one rumor the British were proposing to withdraw their troops, or at least a substantial proportion of them. Events in Greece

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8 The armament, vehicles and all kinds of materials necessary for the reorganization of the new army with manpower of 100,000 men (6,775 officers and 93,225 soldiers) would come from British sources. The work of the post-war army reorganization was undertaken jointly by the Hellenic Army General Staff and the BMM, which remained in Greece until 1952, despite the fact that since April 1947 the American Military Mission took over: Hellenic Army General Staff/Army History Directorate, History of the Organisation of the Hellenic Army, 1821-1954, (in Greek), Athens 2005, p. 396.

9 X y d i s, "America, Britain…", o.c., p. 581, 584, 592.

10 “...For that reason I approved the sending of a note to Greece in January 1946, which urged the government of that country to apply itself to a programme with both advisers and funds. Little progress was made, however, as the clearance between the extremes of Right and Left in Greece seemed to become wider and wider. The return of the King only added fuel to the flames. At last in December 1946 the Greek government complained to the Security Council of the United Nations that outside assistance was being received by the insurgent groups. At about the same time the Greek Government accepted our long standing offer of technical advice on their economic problems and I sent Paul Porter as the head of an economic mission.”: T r u m a n, Harry S., Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope, vol. II, p. 99.

11 A brief chronicle of the events, as following: On 20 February, the U.S. Ambassador in London reported that the British Treasury was opposed to the continuation of aid to Greece in view of the bad state of the British finances. The next day, the British Ambassador in Washington requested an urgent meeting with Secretary of State George Marshall. Since he was absent, he was informed after his return on 24 February. This note informed the Government of the United States that the British were to be withdrawn from Greece as from 30 March, onwards. This information and the situation thereby created, came immediately to the attention of President Truman and resulted in his examination of drastic measures to meet the consequences of the British withdrawal from Greece. It was stated that the presence of the British and their army had been mainly responsible for the fact that Greece had not fallen into Communist hands. Mac Veagh cabled from Athens to the effect that Greece felt severely discouraged and that the political leaders were suffering from a sense of deep disappointment and had totally lost their morale. They stressed that the granting of American aid would be useful only if it were given with the utmost speed and if the aid given were sizable. D e n d i a s, Michael, The
and Turkey prompted the U.S. to activate the policy. On 21 February 1947, the British Embassy in Washington notified State Department officials that Great Britain could no longer provide financial aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey. Turkey’s dilemma was the more straightforward of the two. At the Yalta (4-11 February 1945) and Potsdam (17 July–2 August 1945) conferences, Stalin had cited Soviet security needs to justify demands for joint control with Turkey of the Straights of the Dardanelles. The Dardanelles connected the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and offered Soviet Union the promise of coveted warm water ports. When negotiations failed to bear fruit, Stalin conspicuously stationed troops near the Turkish border, and Turkey appealed to Washington for help.

Addressing a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman set the standard for presidential doctrines since. He categorized Greece as a free, democratic nation and by contrast, he portrayed the insurgency in the starkest terms, as a military minority which fed on human want and misery. The President also referred to alleged border violations along Greece’s northern frontier by the country’s Communist neighbors. As for Turkey he simply noted that the Turks had requested financial assistance for the purpose of effecting the modernization necessary for its national integrity. The high point came when the President addressed the larger, global theater. He described the threat in binary terms: At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life, he declared. One way of life is based on the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from oppression, he observed. If Greece and Turkey fell, confusion and disorder might spread throughout the entire Middle East and reverberate around the world. After deploying the emotionally charged noun terror to describe the oppressor’s tactics, Truman proclaimed: “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

Before he could put this policy into effect the President had to combat and reverse his country’s tradition of isolationism. This new and bold departure in American policy had first to be approved by the Congress. Truman himself admitted:

This was the time to alight the United States of America clearly on the side and the head of the free world . . . Greece needed aid and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss. If Greece were lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea

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12 Appendix.


14 Tradition of great strength, dating from the time of George Washington, so deeply rooted as to defeat the efforts of President Wilson at the end of World War I. http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1601.html, as cited on 23 April 2009.

15 On the strong opposition of the isolationists to Truman’s foreign policy, see: Steinberg, Alfred, The Man from Missouri. The life and times of Harry Truman, New York, 1967, p. 294.
of communism. Similarly if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands the position of Greece should be extremely endangered. But the situation had even wider implications. Greece and Turkey were still free countries being challenged by communist threats both from within and without. These free peoples were now engaged in a valiant struggle to preserve their liberties and their independence. America could not, and should not, let these free countries stand unaided. To do so would carry the clearest implications in the Middle East and in Italy, Germany and France. The ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom whenever it was threatened.16

The Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan quickly followed the Truman Doctrine. As an economic measure in stimulating the recovery of Europe, the Plan exceeded all expectations. As a political instrument, using economic means and operating on the seemingly valid premise that economic stability tends to foster political stability, the plan was also generally successful. It is important to note that the enemy addressed under Marshall Plan aid, was hunger, economic collapse, and internal political instability, not external aggression. It is also noteworthy that both President Truman and Marshal Stalin regarded the Plan as a Cold War instrument while the recipients of the aid were more pragmatically motivated.

The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -- all important manifestations of containment -- became realities during the years 1947-1949.17 By late fall 1947, it was recognized that additional support would be required to prevent a Communist victory. In November, President Truman approved sending a formal military planning staff to advise the Greek National Army and help shape the outcome of the war.18 The additional concern of effective distribution of the aid package was addressed directly by Truman in his declaration.19 He requested $400 million in military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey,20 convinced that both countries faced Communist aggression. Truman’s policy was global in scope. Beyond Greece and Turkey, it underpinned an array of Cold War initiatives that guided America’s Cold War policies for four decades.

16 Truman, Memoirs..., o.c., p. 100.

17 These were, essentially, the practical manifestations of the ideas that Winston Churchill expressed at his speech in Fulton. See, War d, Jeremy K., "Winston Churchill and the Iron Curtain speech", The History Teacher, vol. I, no. 2 (Jan. 1968), p. 62.

18 A b b o t t, Frank J., The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense, Monograph, U.S. Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth 1994, p. 16.

19 The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration. See, Appendix.

20 The Truman Doctrine proposed an aid package of $400 million, $300 million to Greece and $100 million to Turkey, which was ultimately approved on May 22, 1947.
The political environment in the U.S. coupled with economic conditions in Greece, lead to an obvious conclusion. Economic aid directly addressed the disparity within the Greek populace, supported the failing economy, and met the immediate requirements of the country. It allowed the Greek government to restore legitimacy, and could help address the disparity, particularly in those areas prone to Communist sympathizers. Meanwhile, for more than a year, the Greek armed forces, inadequately armed and without much experience in guerrilla warfare, had followed a strategy of static defense which proved particularly costly in human life and time limited cleaning-up operations, almost totally ineffective. Since 1 April 1947, the responsibility for the logistics supply of the Hellenic Army had been undertaken by the U.S. Since June of the same year, the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Greece (JUSMAGG) settled in Greece, part of which was the U.S. Military Group for Greece (USMGG). Its mission was to monitor the Mutual Defensive Aid Program (MDAP) for the Hellenic Army. This mission included the programming of material, the supervision of the delivery of supplies, their storage, maintenance, and utilization, as well as the provision of advice and aid towards the Hellenic Army on technical, training, and organizational issues. In order to better fulfill its mission, the USMGG was divided into two Branches (G-3 and G-4). U.S. military advisors supplied and retrained the Greek National Army and devised an aggressive counterinsurgency strategy. As promised, the aid program also funnelled modern weaponry to Turkey’s military establishment. By 1949, the Greek insurgency had subsided, and Moscow showed no interest in testing Washington’s resolve on the Dardanelles.

Critics on the Doctrine. Thoughts on the U.S. Policy.

At first appearance, the logical means to bolster a war effort would be to provide direct military support. Several issues, however, made this option untenable.

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21 Legislative work on the detailed application of the aid programme began at once. The Senate debated the aid bill and voted it through on 22 April 1947. The House of Representatives also passed the bill on 9 May, by 287 votes to 107. The new Act of Congress, signed by the President on 22 May 1947, empowered Harry Truman, from time to time, as and when it seemed to him in the interests of the U.S., to grant over and above any aid provided for by other legislation, any aid to Greece and Turkey as might be requested by the governments of those countries, on terms and conditions to be determined by the president himself. Documents of American History, 7th edition by Commager, vol. II, p. 526.

22 Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine…", o.c., p. 32, 35.

23 The G-3 Branch aimed at advising and aiding the Hellenic Army on issues regarding the drawing up of military plans, the organization, operations, and training, according to the United States doctrine, providing advice and aid in the operation and tactical use of the materials provided. The G-4 Branch provided advice on issues of logistics and aid towards the Hellenic Army and supervised the actions regarding issues of materials of the MDAP, towards providing the Hellenic Army with the greatest fighting ability possible. Until 7 July 1952, the Chief of the JUSMAGG was at the same time Chief of the USMGG, too. After 8 July 1952, the duties of Chief of the JUSMAGG and Chief of the USMGG were separated. With the arrival of the American Mission and the modernization program, the Hellenic Army began reequipping with American armament which replaced the British (60 mm and 81 mm and 4.2 in. mortars, Browning machine guns, anti-tank launchers, 75 mm mountain guns, etc.): H A G S/ AHD, History of the Organization..., o.c. p. 420.

24 Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine…", o.c., p. 35.
With the end of World War II, demobilization\textsuperscript{25} of the war effort had become the primary focus. Additionally, the potential to develop the conflict in Greece into a full scale war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was of concern. The Soviet Union had the clear conventional military advantage in the region. Finally, there was additional concern that direct military action would “cause greater unrest in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean” as well as “give substance to communist charges of American aggression.”\textsuperscript{26} Although Truman’s speech to Congress had mobilized the will of the American public and Congress to support Greece and Turkey in the fight against Communism, that will fell short of actually committing U.S. troops to combat in Europe so soon after World War II. At the time, government officials, Congressmen, journalists, and other elements of the articulate public vigorously debated the merits of the Truman Doctrine, and in the intervening years historians have kept the argument going. Defenders have seen the statement as the moment when Americans abandoned isolationism once and for all, finally accepting, however reluctantly, their full responsibilities as a world power. A thoughtful opposition arose, but it split along ideological lines. A group of conservatives criticized Truman for assigning the U.S. the task of world’s policeman, a role that would require big government and high taxes. Critics on the left faulted the doctrine for its emotional anticommunism, its inclusion of military aid, and its failure to involve the United Nations, but encountered criticism for their willingness to sacrifice the national interest to an unknown, international future. But despite their differences, critics and defenders of the Truman Doctrine tend to agree that the President’s statement marked a turning point of fundamental importance in the history of American foreign policy.

If the Soviet Union did not engineer the Greek uprising and seek thereby to ensconce Greece in its orbit,\textsuperscript{27} why did the United States respond to that conflict with a program to halt Soviet aggression? One answer is that the Truman administration perceived a Soviet threat. Another more demonstrable answer, and one supportive of the first, is that the Greek civil war served not as the cause but the occasion for instituting a hard, anti-communist, anti-Soviet line. Truman's own attitudes concerning Soviet intentions had stiffened measurably and were set forth in his memorandum: “There isn’t a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand -- how many divisions have you?”\textsuperscript{28} After February 1946, it is almost clear that the administration was disposed to adopt a harder line in its dealings with the Soviet Union. While not disposed to be aggressive, U.S. policy was predicated on the assumption that it would likely be necessary to repel Soviet military aggression. The President had conceived the idea of the Truman Doctrine long before the Greek crisis erupted. Thus, the Greek crisis is more clearly seen as the occasion rather than the cause.

\textsuperscript{25} In just two years the U.S. Armed Forces were reduced from 12 million to 1.5 million: \textit{Jo n e s, \textit{A New Kind of War}: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece}, Oxford University Press, New York 1989, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, p. 93-94.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{P o w e r s, \textit{Richard J.}}, "Containment: From Greece to Vietnam, and Back?" \textit{The Western Political Quarterly}, vol. 22, no. 4 (Dec. 1969), University of Utah, Western Political Science Association, p. 849-850.

Responding in haste under the pressure of events, top State Department officials and President Truman determined to send economic and military aid to Greece, and declared a broader commitment to counter Soviet expansion worldwide. Their policy initiative, the Truman Doctrine, linked national interest and diplomatic strategy to a moral claim: the right to counter-intervention, when strong strategic and moral rationales for intervention existed. The parallels with U.S. involvement in Vietnam are said to be striking; both involved U.S. policy of containment to stem the spread of communism. As Greece was the key to Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Vietnam was a key to Southeast Asia. Both were battles against a Communist insurgency.\textsuperscript{29} Even more, Truman’s characterization of the outside world as divided into two camps consisting of freedom and totalitarianism provided a moral map for navigating the planet.\textsuperscript{30}

For the U.S. in the twentieth century, the most important requirement for a congenial international environment has been that Europe not falls under the domination of a single, hostile state. Concern over the European balance of power dates back at least to the turn of the century; the crisis caused by the British withdrawal of aid to Greece and Turkey early in 1947 did not precipitate a fundamental reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. The course of action which Truman proclaimed on 12 March was very much in line with the belief, then almost a half-century old, that American security depended upon maintenance of a European balance of power. While it was acknowledged that the Greek guerrilla movement was led by Communists and did receive instructions from abroad, they carefully pointed out that the rebellion was primarily an indigenous one. There was no effort to demonstrate a comparable internal threat to Turkey: aid to that country was justified, somewhat vaguely, as a counterweight to Soviet imperialism.

\textbf{Conclusion}

During the Cold War everyone was worried that a faraway political crisis might unleash a cascading, domino-like catastrophe threatening not only the U.S. security, but civilization itself. The final challenge to end the civil war in Greece laid in maintaining the support of both the U.S. and the Greek public. Greek public opinion often viewed the war as an ideological conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, being fought on Greek soil. As a result, the motivation for Greece to maintain the war effort, and the Greek National Army troops to fight was often low.\textsuperscript{31} From the U.S. perspective, continuing domestic support was required to maintain the flow of vital U.S. aid. Though it took three years, the Greek government defeated the insurgency, and the Greek economy revived. The Greek and Turkish aid package became the model for a vast economic recovery plan to revive all of a Western Europe. The U.S. policy in Europe from 1947 through 1949 -- the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty -- can best be understood as an

\textsuperscript{29} Ko u s o u l a s, George D., "The Success of the Truman Doctrine was Not Accidental," \textit{Military Affairs} 29, no. 2 (Summer 1965), p. 92.

\textsuperscript{30} The Truman Doctrine foreshadowed the contemporary Bush Doctrine against international terrorism. Fifty years later, President G. W. Bush again divided the world in half when he declared the war on terror to be \textit{a war between good and evil...a war to save the world}: M e r r i l l, "The Truman Doctrine...", o.c., p. 34.

\textsuperscript{31} A b b o t t, "The Greek Civil War...", o.c., p. 18.
attempt, through political, economic, and, later, military means, to achieve a goal largely psychological in nature: the creation of a state of mind among Europeans conducive to the revival of faith in democratic procedures. Confronted with a revived and prosperous Western Europe, it was believed that Soviet Union would abandon plans for expansion and accept peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world.

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Appendix

Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine.
March 12, 1947
Public Papers of Harry S. Truman
[As delivered in person before a joint session]

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.
The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.
Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious, peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five percent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.
As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security so essential for economic and political recovery.
The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations.
along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore authority to the government throughout Greek territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.
The United States must supply this assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate.
There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.
No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.
The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.
We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.
It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece, in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.
No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.
The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do.
We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.
The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.
Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.
Since the war Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.
That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.
The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.
As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against
great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair
the damages of war.
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long
against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so
much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not
only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly
be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and
independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far
reaching to the West as well as to the East.
We must take immediate and resolute action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey
in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting
these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance
which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently
requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in
countries devastated by the war.
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian
and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to
assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such
financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority
also be provided for the instruction and raining of selected Greek and Turkish
personnel.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and
most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such
funds as may be authorized.
If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for the purposes indicated in
this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this
subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work
together.
This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except
that the alternative is much more serious.
The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This
is an investment in world freedom and world peace.
The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more
than 1/10 of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should
safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and
grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope
of a people for a better life has died.
We must keep that hope alive.
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall
surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.
I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

Source: Federal Register Division. National Archives and Records Service, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S Truman, 1947 (Washington,

by

William Stivers

Decolonization transformed the strategic as well as the political topography of the world. Heightened national consciousness would bring to ascendancy not only forces hostile to the West, but it would also spark local rivalries just as threatening to pro-Western stability. At the same time, the loss of territory to Western control would make it all the more difficult to maintain the military presence that seemed so urgent in view of portentous shifts in global power.

This is how forward-thinking military planners viewed the world by the end of the nineteen-fifties. They saw the future in clear detail and prepared to cope with it. In their understanding of basic political forces, they anticipated informed public awareness by roughly twenty years.

The Indian Ocean was to them an area of supreme strategic importance -- a strategic region where the stresses of nation-building and modernization would engender chronic instabilities that would threaten the vital fabric of Western security. This threat, they knew, was rooted in deep-seated historical movements. Nonetheless, they would propose one-dimensional military solutions to problems which they grasped in a much fuller complexity. Thus, the strategic solution to the dilemmas of the post-colonial world would not match up with the perception of what these dilemmas were and how they arose.

Yet, it is precisely this solution that has played a key role in shaping U.S. strategy toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas. It is common wisdom to view the establishment of the Diego Garcia base, the permanent stationing of U.S. naval detachments in the Indian Ocean, and the build up of U.S. air and sea mobile intervention forces in the context of five critical events occurring in the late sixties and the seventies: the initial deployment of Soviet warships to the Indian Ocean in 1968; the 1973 Arab-Israeli War; the enhanced awareness in the early seventies of Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil; the Iranian revolution of 1978-79; and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, the strategy had deeper roots, stretching to the early fifties. In the view of American as well as European policymakers, the threat to the Western position derived not so much from Soviet expansionism as from national independence movements and radical extremisms that threatened to upset the regional balance of power. Rather than accommodate themselves to these movements -- seeking to co-opt them into the Western camp -- Washington officials would seek to guard against them through military means.

Decolonization: The Strategic View

The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower did not regard the Indian Ocean as a strategic area for the United States. Therefore, during the Eisenhower years, 1953-1961,
the main locus of U.S. thinking on the Indian Ocean was in the bureaucracy, specifically, the U.S. Navy.

U.S. naval strategists foresaw the death of European empire and reached unsettling conclusions. In a memorandum dated 5 September 1958, Admiral Roy L. Johnson, director of the Navy Department’s Long-Rang Objectives Planning Group, highlighted one factor behind the Navy’s fears: “As dismemberment of friendly colonial empires into neutralist nationalism proceeds,” he wrote, “the United States would lose access to foreign bases and ports vital for sustained naval operations.”

The contrast between “friendly colonial empires” and uncooperative “neutralist nationalisms” speaks for itself in reflecting a fundamental view of the world. Such a contrast would be insignificant if it reflected the attitude of a sole individual. But it did not. Throughout the Navy Department, strategists saw decolonization mainly as a threat to Western power.

The nature of this threat was drawn out in sweeping stroke in a 1960 Navy Department memorandum prepared as part of a wider National Security Council study of impending global power shifts over the next five to ten years. According to the Navy’s analysts, virtually all of Africa would obtain independence or autonomy “often associated with an increased drift from Western influence.” The same would happen in the Middle East and Far East. As a result of this trend, Western air, land, and naval forces would be expelled from their bases and staging posts. Moreover, there could be no guarantee of aircraft landing or over-flight privileges. Neither could naval commanders count on secure port facilities to fuel, repair, or provision their vessels. All could be denied whenever a local government saw fit -- and it was during times of crisis, when forces were needed most, that such denial would most likely occur.

Standing in the wings, eager to capitalize on Western decline, was the Soviet Union. In the view of U.S. strategists, it would be just a matter of time before the Soviets “exhibited” their interest in the Indian Ocean with a naval presence. But Soviet military capabilities were not seen as the major problem. The Soviets would never be able to replicate the imperial experience of the West. Their options were more limited, but still disturbing. For the very fact of Western imperialism left a legacy of bitterness in the Third World. Thus, the economic weakness and political instability of emerging states could offer opportunities for Soviet penetration, “particularly when accompanied by anti-Western attitudes, as in much of the former or remaining colonial areas.” Under the “guise of peace and anti-imperialism” the Soviets might make common cause with anti-Western elements to press for US action to restrict support of Western military capabilities by member nations.

The effect of this concerted agitation would be to render mainland facilities unsafe -- particularly so when the increase in new African states “gives the under-developed nations a majority vote” in the UN. And “friendly colonial empires” that had provided comfort in the past would prove increasingly useless in the years ahead. First, by the end of the sixties, there would be not many of them left.

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2 Memorandum prepared by Long Range Objectives Group, 31 May 1960 “Factors Affecting Changes in the Power Position in Areas Bordering the Southern Oceans (Indian Ocean, South Atlantic), PM 5710, Serial 0079P93, files of Political-Military Affairs branch, USNA.
But even the territories which remained under European control -- such as Portuguese Mozambique -- would prove of scant use, for in the new age of Afro-Asian nationalism, the United States would only inflame Third World animosity if it based its military position on collaboration with detested colonial powers. Thus, rather than rely on its European friends, Washington would have to keep a distance from them.³

And America would have no greater luck exploiting the sympathies of pro-Western elites. In many areas, indigenous resources of resistance would be inadequate following European withdrawal. Coups, insurgencies, and fragile economies would all contribute to endemic instability. When combined with external pressure -- whether exerted directly by the Soviet Union or by “Communist-oriented” nationalist regimes -- large areas of the Indian Ocean littoral might succumb to neutralization “by contagion or intimidation, with resultant weakening of their ultimate resistance to Communist pressures.”⁴

Thus, for U.S. Naval strategists, decolonization would upset the balance of power in an enormous part of the world. They had no doubts as to what was needed to set the balance right: The United States would have to sustain a military presence in the Indian Ocean, both to support U.S. prestige with displays of force, and, when required, to “intervene promptly to defeat aggression or subversion, restore order, and/or evacuate Western inhabitants.”⁵

While these interventions might in some cases be aimed at defeating or deterring Soviet bloc interference, it is quite clear that policymakers were more concerned with controlling the internal developments of African and Persian Gulf states, supporting “friendly governments,”⁶ and forestalling “local Communist coups.”⁷ For inasmuch as the Soviet Union threatened Western interests in the region, it did so in proportion to opportunities -- afforded by circumstance -- for political, economic, and military penetration. Cutting off Soviet advances not imply a high probability of confrontation with Soviet forces. It meant rather that through timely interventions ashore, the United States could eliminate opportunities that the Soviets might chance to exploit. Anti-Sovietism in this context translated into a general opposition to internal dissidence (often associated with local “Communism”) and destabilizing “radical” nationalisms.

### Sea Power in the Post-Colonial World


⁴ “Factors Affecting Changes in Power Position,” (quote), fn 2; “Assuring a Future Base Structure,” fn. 3.

⁵ “Assuring a Future Base Structure,” fn 3.

⁶ Fn 2.

⁷ “Study of Feasibility,” fn 3.
In the navalist view, sea power would afford the most effective means of assuring pro-Western stability in the region of impending crisis. The absence of continental bases and garrisons would place a premium on sea-going striking power -- on amphibious assault capabilities, on the capacity to deploy forces rapidly from one trouble spot to another without having to ask permission to do so. Serving as floating depots and staging posts, naval vessels could fulfill such needs independently of “foreign bases, use of which may be subject to denial or delay.” The Navy’s prized capital ship, the aircraft carrier, would serve as a mobile air base to support ground forces in limited wars.

To be sure, there were ample disagreements over the scope and the nature of U.S. Indian Ocean deployments. Some officials felt that modest “show of force” operations would be sufficient, to be augmented by attack carriers when need arose. Ships thus assigned to Indian Ocean duty would be detached from the Pacific or Mediterranean. Others, however, saw need for a separate Indian Ocean fleet.

Admiral Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations from 1955 to 1961, advocated the second course. His interest in the Indian Ocean fleet dated from the late forties, when he had already written the British off. Owing to the bureaucratic climate of the times, he could do little more than try to get his colleagues to start thinking about the future U.S. role in the Indian Ocean. By 1961, the time was ripe to bring the question into the open. The new Kennedy administration was alive to the prospects of limited war in the Third World. Thus, when Burke discussed Indian Ocean requirements with Secretary of the Navy John B. Connally in early 1961, he was speaking to a receptive party. The question was submitted for reexamination, with Burke instructing a Navy study group to “get a lot of general naval philosophy” into their work.

Strategic Islands

As ideas for Indian Ocean deployments ripened, so did plans for bases to support them. Freedom from mainland facilities constituted one of the key arguments for placing primary reliance on sea power as Washington’s military trump in the region. However, naval forces themselves needed base support. The Indian Ocean was a huge area. If re-supply came solely by sea, the effectiveness of U.S. forces would be compromised. Without secure refueling facilities, for example, a task force might have to reduce speed simply to preserve oil. Likewise, repair and communications would be more difficult; and the prolonged stationing of a task force would wear more quickly on equipment and men.

The Navy began to consider, then, the issue of bases. Some officers, keen on the idea of getting something for free, proposed in 1960 to take over naval facilities in Kenya -- at Mombasa. This was rejected on the grounds that it would prove “a very short-term

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8 Fn 1 (quote); fn 2.

9 This was the view of Stuart Barber, the top civilian in the Long Range Planning Group; author’s interview, 10 June 1980; see also Memorandum, Admiral Miles H. Hubbard for Burke, 15 August 1961, SPD 1961/5010, files of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), USNA.

10 Memorandum by Burke, for deputy chief naval operations, plans, policy, and operations, 6 March 1961, “Indian Ocean Fleet,” OP-00 Memo 00152-61, SPD 1961 serials, USNA.
mainland base.” Beforehand, in 1959, members of the Long-Range Objectives Group had mulled over the problem and devised a solution more in keeping with political realities: Instead of basing U.S. power on the whims of what one official called “bitchy little nations who wouldn’t let us in,” the Navy would have recourse to “strategic islands” -- sparsely populated territories, immune from pressures for independence, where the United States could build facilities and use them with no questions asked. A number of possibilities existed, most of them under British control. The most promising was the British-owned island of Diego Garcia, located at near equidistance (about 2,000 miles) “from all prospective operating areas.”

The strategic islands concept was formally presented to Admiral Burke in June 1960. In a memorandum entitled “Assuring a Future Base Structure in the African Indian Ocean Area,” the Long Range Objectives Group noted the possibility of “war and tension situations” in the “Indian Ocean, sub-Saharan African area” during the next ten to fifteen years. At the same time, Western base rights would become increasingly insecure. Only small, sparsely populated islands could safely be held “under the full control of the West in face of the currents of nationalism.” Prompt action should be taken to segregate these territories from larger political units due for independence. This was particularly important in the case of Diego Garcia, “a large atoll ideally suited to be the primary Western fleet base and air staging position in the Indian Ocean.”

Admiral Burke pushed this proposal through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it reached the Department of State just as Kennedy took office. The new administration quickly approved a three-pronged strategy for the Indian Ocean region.

First, the United States would deploy naval task forces in the Indian Ocean on a regular basis. These cruises would serve not only to demonstrate American interest and power, but would prepare the way for possible U.S. “contingency operations” -- the catch phrase for military intervention.

Second, Washington would do its utmost to help a financially weakened British government maintain a military commitment “east of Suez.” America and Britain would complement each other in pursuing joint strategic objectives.

Third, just as the Navy had proposed, U.S. and British forces would seek island basing to support military action -- including intervention ashore -- in Southeast Asia, Eastern Africa, and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. would establish these island redoubts despite the views of the littoral government (and of Third World states in general), whose objections would be brushed aside in the name of strategic exigency.

A U.S. Presence

President John F. Kennedy took a strong personal interest in Third World affairs. He took as well an interest in forces, weapons, and strategic doctrines. Far more than

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11 “Assuring a Future Base Structure,” fn 3.

12 Author’s interview with Stuart Barber, chief, Long-Range Objectives Group, 10 June 1980 (first quote); “Study of the Feasibility” (second quote), fn 3.

13 “Assuring a Future Base Structure,” fn 3.
Eisenhower, he sought to contain Third World conflicts through military means. Indeed, he had a direct role in committing U.S. power to the Indian Ocean.

In 1963, when hostilities threatened between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, Kennedy ordered the small Bahrain flotilla strengthened with two additional destroyers from the Sixth Fleet. He also sent a fighter squadron to Spain en route to Saudi Arabia. Political problems caused by this latter movement roused his interest in a U.S. carrier presence in the Indian Ocean. As a result, he asked the Defense Department to consider carrier task force cruises as part of its strategic planning for the area. While subsequent interagency discussion revealed no consensus for a separate Indian Ocean fleet, periodic cruises were deemed highly desirable.

Kennedy’s assassination brought no deflection in the course of U.S. planning. In National Security Action Memorandum 289, dated 19 March 1964, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy conveyed President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision approving periodic deployments to the area. For starters, a so-called Concord Squadron (Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s suggestion) would be sent on an Indian Ocean cruise. The secretaries of state and defense were instructed to submit plans for “regular and intermittent deployments.” The first cruise took place in April and May 1964 and the second in August and September.14

Keeping Britain In

No objective was more central to U.S. Indian Ocean Planning than to preserve a British presence east of Suez. Washington did not relish the thought of going it alone in a new strategic theater; but more than that, the British commanded boundless respect for their ability to do much with limited means. British professionalism, hone by a long historical experience, made Britain the power most suited to take the lead in safeguarding Western interests in the turbulent years ahead.

It was indeed during the twilight of Britain’s world power that the British appeared in most impressive form: British action in East Africa and the Persian Gulf inspired Washington policymakers in their tactical planning as well as in their sense of what could be done. American strategy was modeled on three stellar examples of British “police” work in Oman, Kuwait, and East Africa. These cases demonstrated (so it seemed) both the continued efficacy of Western power and innovative ways to employ it.

In July 1957, a revolt broke out in the sultanate of Muscat and Oman. When Royal Air Force (RAF) air operations failed to suppress it, the British opened a ground

attack in early August, moving British combat units from Aden and Kenya and support units from Cyprus to prop up the Sultan’s forces. After only ten days of British ground operations, the revolt collapsed.

The Oman affairs showed the value of mobile forces operating from central reserves. The British intervention in Kuwait, a much larger operation, afforded a wider proof of how the West could retain supremacy in the face of hostile nationalisms. On 26 June 1961, six days after Great Britain had relinquished her 62-year protectorate over Kuwait, Iraqi President Kassem laid claim to the now “sovereign” nation. He asserted that Kuwait had been historically part of Iraq and that the British had detached the territory by means of a “forged treaty.” Following reported Iraqi troop movements toward the Kuwait border, the Kuwaiti ruler, Sheik Sir Addullah al-Salim al-Sabeh, requested British assistance.

The Sheik made his request on the morning of 30 June. Within twenty-four hours the first British troops had arrived -- a Royal Marine Commando (600) men deployed from the HMS Bulwark, a recently converted “commando carrier” specially designed to dispatch Royal Marine units to trouble areas and speed them ashore by helicopter. A squadron of tanks arrived on the same day, carried by two LSTs. The first RAF planes also arrived. Over the next six days reinforcements poured in by sea and air: By 7 July some 5,700 British troops were in Kuwait. British air superiority was assured by the appearance two days later of the fleet carrier HMS Victorious.

If the Iraqis had ever entertained plans for military action, they wilted in the face of the rapid British military build-up. The British began to withdraw on 19 July. Kuwait was admitted to the Arab League the next day; and in mid-September Arab League troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and the Sudan took over from the remaining British forces. The Kuwait action was followed in 1964 by an equally striking British success in East Africa. In January, the armies of Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda mutinied. The three heads of government -- Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, and Milton Obote -- requested British help, which was swift and brilliant. Using troops airlifted from Britain and Aden, and from British naval vessels stationed off the East African coast, the British quashed the rebels in short order. In this instance, the fleet carrier HMS Centaur served as an improvised commando ship deploying troops to Tanganyika.

But the British would not for long operate at such heights. For both the territorial and financial bases of British power were withering away. American policymakers saw the problem clearly and struggled to resolve it. The strategic islands were critical to the resolution they would seek.

In a memorandum prepared in April 1963, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, director of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, noted the implications of Britain’s territorial retreat. “Until about 1948,” he wrote,

The British had full political control of a number of military bases of varying capability which provided for almost all types of military operations in the Indian Ocean area. The granting of independence to former British colonies has led to the closing of a number of these bases, such Trincomalee in Ceylon. As remaining territories achieve independence this process may be expected to continue; Mombasa, on which the British have expended a considerable amount of money, will almost certainly be closed when Kenya achieves independence. The short-
term future of Aden as a base does not inspire confidence. The long-term future of
the Singapore base is unpredictable but apparently assured for the present.”

Current British strategy, Kitchen remarked, envisioned stationing at Aden mobile
forces, which would move to trouble spots on commando carriers or transport aircraft. Ango-American joint development of island facilities would accord with British thinking and permit their mobile forces to remain effective when the Aden base was lost. This was crucial, officials thought, to U.S. hopes for strengthening the “overall Western military posture in the Indian Ocean” with moves “to complement (but not in any way to replace) the existing British effort in the area.”

The strategic islands would serve an economic purpose as well. Regardless of problems arising from decolonization and increasingly assertive nationalisms, the British economy could not withstand high levels of defense expenditure. If Britain were to remain committed, she would need financial help. An American share in the cost of constructing island facilities would subsidize the British presence and help keep the British physically in the area.

British Indian Ocean Territory

In February 1964, U.S. negotiators went to London to discuss the island basing scheme. They British were perfectly agreed. Neither they nor the Americans wanted to station large, permanent forces in the region, but both saw the need to back up Western interests with military power. The strategic islands scheme would let them have things both ways, providing logistics centers and staging posts for sea or airborne forces which would make up in mobility what they lacked in numerical strength.

So a deal was made. Britain would detach Diego Garcia from the administration of Mauritius and pay the necessary bribes to accomplish this. The United States would carry out construction. The base would be available for joint use.

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16 Ibid.


19 Fn 21; also memorandum by Guy A. Lee, “Mr. Kitchen’s Meeting re Indian Ocean Bases, 3 January 1964,” DEF 15 IND-US.

But before these plans took effect, two things had to happen. First, the detachments would have to take place. There was no doubt that they would -- but there was considerable hand-wringing over how to do this while at once minimizing the anticipated Third World outcry over Anglo-American “neo-colonialism.” Second, the facilities would have to be funded. Here, McNamara would display, at most, differing shades of ambivalence. With his control of the Pentagon budget he could frustrate any State Department understandings which involved military spending -- and in the case of the Indian Ocean basing scheme, he did so.

**The Strategic Islands and the Third World**

U.S. officials harbored no illusions about Third World reaction to the island bases. To be sure, several countries would welcome an increased U.S. presence. Yet in others, the proposed actions would “provoke suspicious and criticism” the Chinese might exploit. The critics, moreover, would prove “more vocal than the supporters.”\(^{21}\) And in the UN, the general atmosphere, “including Afro-Asian anti-colonial and anti-base sentiment, as well as Communist propaganda efforts,” would be poor.\(^{22}\) The best that could be done was to minimize embarrassment. This, officials felt, might be accomplished with good tactics and the right timing. In the meantime, as the survey and detachment proceedings were underway, the strategic islands scheme would be “closely held.”\(^{23}\)

But U.S. planners did not count on an enterprising *Washington Post* reporter, Robert Estabrook. In June 1964, he filed a story on the Anglo-American bases. Not only did his story divulge information the State Department wanted to withhold from Third World governments, but he had managed to capture in precise detail the strategic rationale underlying the whole venture, including the use of the islands “as potential air and sea bases and as staging areas for the airlift of troops to trouble areas.”

State Department officials met with *Post* managing editor Alfred Friendly to try to quash the story. They argued that publication would complicate British negotiations with Mauritius and Seychelles authorities who had not yet been informed of the base initiative. Also, conversations would be more difficult if “conducted in the glare [of] Communist and neutralist propaganda.”\(^{24}\) They apprized him as well of the UN situation. Friendly agreed to stop publication, provided the *Post* was given advance notice when the American and British governments were ready to release the information officially.\(^{25}\) In

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\(^{21}\) Fn 18.

\(^{22}\) Department of State to U.S. Embassies in Dar-es Salaam, Nairobi, Tenarive, New Delhi, Karachi, and Colombo, 18 June 1964, DEF 15 IND-US.

\(^{23}\) Memorandum by Kitchen for Rusk, 11 February 1964, “Discussions with the British on Indian Ocean Islands and Related Topics”; Department of State to U.S. Embassies in Dar-Es-Salaam, Nairobi, Tenarive, New Delhi, Karachi, and Colombo, 18 June 1964 (quote); Department of State to U.S. Embassy, London, 22 June 1964, all in DEF 15 IND-US.

\(^{24}\) Department of State to U.S. Embassy, London, 15 June 1964, DEF 5 IND-US.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
August, however, a leak developed in London which led both the Post and the Cleveland Plain Dealer to publish the full story before a competitor did. The basing scheme, replete with its interventionist overtones, was no longer secret. And Third World reaction to it proved the accuracy of earlier predictions. As one official noted:

Press reaction in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Mauritius, among others, has by and large been in opposition to a U.S./U.K. military presence in the Indian Ocean. . . . Communist and Afro-Asian bloc countries will undoubtedly generate opposition in the UN and elsewhere. The final communique of a recent Cairo non-aligned conference included condemnation of the “expressed intent of the imperialist powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean.”

But secrecy was not the only weapon by which Washington sought to dampen Third World anti-colonial sentiment. A great premium was placed on timing. Prior to formal discussions with the British, U.S. policymakers were concerned with the speed of action. Quick action might “minimize the possibility that local populations would come under external pressures for self-determination or be an object of concern to the UN.” Also, by doing as much as possible before the September 1964 meeting of the UN colonialism subcommittee (the “Committee of 24”) anti-Western pressure might be relieved. This committee, dominated by Afro-Asian countries, had already called for Britain to liquidate its base in Aden. It was part of a hostile UN atmosphere that vexed Washington and was seen as favoring Soviet interests.

The British, however, moved more slowly than the State Department wished, putting as they did considerably more stress on securing local concurrence than U.S. policymakers -- who feared the British might concede a veto to the Mauritian Prime Minister -- thought appropriate. They waited until June 1965 (nearly a year after surveys were complete) before they agreed to detach the Chagos Archipelago (the larger group containing Diego Garcia) from Mauritius. In order to temper Third World criticism, they took steps to get the Mauritius government to approve the detachment. Tentative soundings revealed that the “enabling” costs would involve a £10 million payout. Secretary McNamara agreed to assume half the burden, deducting up to $14 million in research and development costs due the United States under the 1963 Polaris sales agreement with Great Britain.

In September 1965, the Cabinet decided formally on the detachment. Prime Minister Harold Wilson presented this decision as part of a package deal to the Prime Minister of Mauritius, then in London for a constitutional conference on the future of his

26 Department of State to U.S. Embassy, London, 3 September 1964; Kitchen to William E. Lang, deputy secretary of defense for international Security Affairs, 5 November 1964 (quote), both in DEF 15 IND-US. The Washington Post article appeared on 29 August and the Cleveland Plain Dealer piece on 30 August.

27 Memorandum by Kitchen for Ball, Harriman, and Sloan, 14 February 1964, “Discussions with the British on Indian Ocean Islands and related topics” (quote); Memorandum by C. Arnold Freshman for Kitchen, 13 August 1964, “Indian Ocean Bases,” both in DEF 15 IND-US.

28 Department of State to U.S. Embassy, London, 22 June 1964; Memorandum b Kitchen to Rusk, 8 October 1965, “Indian Ocean Islands; Department of State to U.S. Embassy, London, 10 November 1966, all in DEF 15 IND-US.
country. Along with detachment of the Chagos Archipelago, the package included a British defense arrangement with Mauritius, independence within a year, and a large financial “contribution.”

On 8 November 1965, the Queen issued an Order in Council that formed a “British Indian Ocean Territory” (BIOT) consisting of the Chagos Archipelago, the Farquhar Islands, the Aldabra Group, and Ile des Roches. The order came at a propitious time for Anglo-American planners concerned with Third World sensibilities. At the end of October, the British government had made a last ditch attempt to negotiate a settlement to the Southern Rhodesia question. When talks with the white regime failed, a full-scale crisis blew up in early November, culminating in the Rhodesian authorities’ Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November. The Queen’s detachment order, coming in the midst of the crisis, was issued at a time when world attention was focused on a more salient concern -- just what Britain needed to minimize anti-colonialist outcry. The British policy of moving with deliberation had paid off.

The McNamara Problem

The scene of contention now shifted to Washington. There, the last big obstacle was the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara.

In February 1967, the Navy forwarded a request for $26 million to build an “austere support facility” on Diego Garcia. The Navy’s memorandum, drawn up in the Navy Department’s Systems Analysis Branch under the direction of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who would cap his career by being appointed as President Richard Nixon’s chief of naval operations, couched the argument for the base in the lexicon of cost-effectiveness: With an anchorage and fuel stockpile on Diego Garcia, carrier task forces could transit the Indian Ocean more cheaply compared with the costs of refueling by tanker.

In June 1967, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Diego Garcia proposal. The Chief’s memorandum, dated 25 July 1967, laid out a comprehensive strategic rationale for starting work on the base. “U.S. strategic interests in the area,” the Chiefs asserted, “are important and will increase in the future.” One of the chief such interests was oil. A high percentage of Western European oil needs were filled by Middle Eastern supplies. “While other suppliers are more important to the United States, their ability in turn depends on the continued free access of Western Europe to Middle Eastern oil.” Added to this supreme interest was the need to live up to treaty commitments to Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, and Australia.

These interests were seen a subject to increasing peril. Prior to World War II, European nations were “primarily responsible for the peace of the Indian Ocean area,” but now only Great Britain remained in strength -- little comfort because she “had been rapidly disengaging . . . for the past dozen years.” “The result,” the memorandum

29 Kitchen to Rusk, 8 October 1965, ibid.

pointed out, “had been the emergence of numerous weak and mutually antagonistic states who are suspicious, to varying degrees, or openly hostile to their formerly colonial rulers and to Western states in general.” The Soviets and Chinese were taking advantage of these internal instabilities to cultivate influence with Arab and African countries.

No mention was made of a direct Soviet threat to the region. Thus, as before, the strategic problem depicted here arose from uncontrollable nationalisms the Communist powers might exploit. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this line of thought was that to safeguard Western interests, the United States would have to control internal changes in weak, inchoate polities and act as regional gendarme, policing disputes between them.

In the JCS view, existing United States capabilities were insufficient to deal with prospective events in the area. The only assured facilities were British, and these were rapidly diminishing. A case in point was the Aden base: During the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis, strikes, lockouts, work slowdowns, and terrorism made the port unavailable for refueling and, according to a report of the American consul, jeopardized the entire base.

Without Diego Garcia, the Chiefs argued, military options in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf theaters would be exceedingly limited. And haste was of the essence: The Soviet Union and some Afro-Asian states were attempting to create a political situation that would foreclose utilization of the British Indian Ocean Territory islands. The UN Committee of 24 had already charged the U.S. and Great Britain with neocolonialism, and member of the Indian Parliament had raised vehement opposition to bases in the Indian Ocean. These efforts were not likely to decrease with time. The United States had therefore to act quickly to avoid paying an even higher political price for developing facilities in the region.

As for the base itself, the Chiefs envisioned a multi-purpose staging area to support U.S. military action throughout the littoral. The $26 million facility proposed by the Navy could support massive movements of U.S. forces into the region in “contingency situations.” Moreover, although “the initial project would be generally a naval facility, the bulk of the investment would provide improvements of a general purpose nature which could be developed further to meet additional future requirements” -- such as air force operations. The memorandum provided a list of situations in which U.S. military power might be deployed from a Diego Garcia staging post. Twenty possibilities were listed -- all comprising internal and regional crises, none involving Soviet military action in the area. Disturbances in India, political unrest in Ceylon, secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan, an Iraqi assault on Kuwait or Iran, hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia, domestic upheaval in Ethiopia -- these and more were presented as cases requiring U.S. interventionist capabilities in the Indian Ocean.31

We can question, of course, the seriousness of the JCS document: It is quite common to inflate rationales in order to secure funding. It is remarkable, however, that each crisis mentioned above actually occurred, even when only one of them (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait) elicited direct U.S. military intervention. The real importance of the memorandum is best judged in the context of how U.S. policy evolved over time. Indeed, Admiral Zumwalt had advanced a cost-effectiveness rationale only because

McNamara was a technocrat, ill at ease with broad strategic concepts. By speaking McNamara’s own language in respect to Diego Garcia, Zumwalt hoped to overcome the Secretary’s mental barriers and gain approval for the Indian Ocean base.\(^\text{32}\)

But even Zumwalt’s cost-effective packaging of a Diego Garcia proposal was unavailing in 1967. Vietnam was a nightmare, and McNamara was increasingly resistant to new bases and commitments. In the case of the Indian Ocean “support facility,” the Asia division in the Systems Analysis office gave McNamara the reasons he apparently wanted to disapprove the funding. Pointing out that the Navy had left certain costs out of account -- neglecting to figure the expense of diverting ships to Diego Garcia to take on fuel -- the civilian analysts shredded the Navy’s calculations. They argued that anyone who requested U.S. aid could just as well provide facilities. Third World political reaction to an Indian Ocean base had already heated up and would become more unfavorable. Finally, “one would hope we could avoid a race with Peking and Moscow to develop military capabilities in the Indian Ocean area, perhaps in the same way we are attempting to avoid an ABM race, by not giving the other side a reason for acting.”

The systems analysis evaluation was the final stage in the approval process of the McNamara Pentagon. Not only did these negative conclusions regarding Diego Garcia reflect McNamara’s own disillusionment with military interventionism, but they were the last argument, and were thus placed, along with the transmittal indicating approval or disapproval, on the top of the file that reached the Secretary. In a memorandum of 27 October 1967, McNamara accepted the Systems Analysis position and rejected the Navy’s proposal.\(^\text{33}\)

But the bureaucratic momentum was only slowed. The next year McNamara resigned, replaced by Clark Clifford. Paul Nitze, Secretary of the Navy during the first try at approval, was now Deputy Secretary of Defense, virtually guaranteeing that the project would be accepted. The base was renamed an “austere communications facility” and was presented as an “Option B” -- a middle ground between “Option A” (doing nothing) and “Option C,” a more grandiose scheme costing $55 million.\(^\text{34}\) U.S. Navy construction engineers (“Seebees”) arrived in March 1971. The United States had finally gained its foothold in the Indian Ocean.

Since then, that foothold has grown to a substantial presence. In 1974, the Nixon administration announced plans to upgrade the so-called communications facility: The runway would be lengthened to 12,000 feet; a fuel storage area would be built; the aircraft parking area expanded; and the lagoon dredged out to provide better anchorage for carrier task forces. To justify these moves, officials cited the 1973 Middle East war, the energy crisis, the probable opening of the Suez Canal (which would make it easier for Soviet ships to get into the Indian Ocean), and a growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They disclaimed that any plans had existed for expanded facilities on

\(^{32}\) Author’s interview, 10 July 1980.

\(^{33}\) The Systems Analysis arguments were spelled out in the memorandum signed by Enthoven, fn 30. McNamara’s decision was communicated in McNamara to the Secretary of the Navy, 27 October 1967, Sec Def Cont Nr, X-6590, in Defense Department records.

\(^{34}\) U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., 1974, pp.82-83.
Diego Garcia before the war. This, as the evidence shows, was disingenuous, for plans did exist, sitting in drawers and waiting to be implemented. The “austere communications facility” was intended only as a first step in the larger project that finally took shape.35

In early 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the administration of President Jimmy Carter unveiled plans to establish a “Rapid Deployment Force” for use in potential Third World crises. In connection with this, further work was undertaken on Diego Garcia, which was marked out as the center of the American supply network in the region. “Diego Garcia,” as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Robert Komer, put it, “can be viewed as the hub of the wheel with spokes extending to other areas on the Indian Ocean littoral.”36

Today, the Diego Garcia base functions almost exactly as the JCS had planned in 1967. It serves as a refueling and repair facility for American warships in the Indian Ocean. As the home harbor of fourteen “maritime prepositioning ships,” it is the principal support station for the rapid movement of troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in Southwest Asia. U.S. Navy reconnaissance planes, U.S. Air Force bombers, and aerial refueling tanking aircraft have operated from its airfield. It houses part of the U.S. space surveillance network, and is an emergency landing site for America’s civilian space shuttle. During the first Gulf War, the maritime pre-positioning ships anchored at Diego Garcia delivered equipment and stores for soldiers flown to Saudi Arabia from the United States and Europe, and the island served as a base for a wing of B-52 bombers. The Diego Garcia base was used during the invasion of Afghanistan, and on 22 March 2003, B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers flying from Diego Garcia launched the opening bombardment of Baghdad.

Yet, even as the usefulness of the base has been proven, its rationale is self-contradictory -- and has been so for half a century. On the one hand, planners and policymakers recognized that violence and instability in the Indian Ocean littoral were rooted in the internal dynamics of the region. While transnational Islamism has supplanted radical nationalism as the key threat to Western interests, those dynamics remain essentially internal. Yet, for more than fifty years, planners and policymakers have sought military solutions to non-military problems, not because their analysis is faulty, but because there seems to be no other choice.


Total Defense in Total War: The Swedish Military and the Non-military Defense during the Cold War

by

Per Iko

Traditionally, the defense of Sweden has been defined as a total defense, a term compiled as a contrast to total war. This total defense, at least as it was known during the Cold War, rested on four pillars: the military defense, the civil defense, the economic defense, and the psychological defense.

As a part of an ongoing project, this paper will briefly demonstrate how the Swedish military took a lead in organizing, not only the military defense, but also the other “branches” of the total defense in the 1950s and 1960s. All in all, sort of a defense web was created within the different sectors of society, and in many ways in control by the military.

The experiences from the Swedish military mobilization during World War II -- without being forced into actual war -- had given the Defense Staff the understanding that a coordination of the total defense was crucial. One assumption is that in the absence of other initiators taking the necessary lead, the military considered it was forced to act -- hence this military involvement and initiative.

Definition of Total Defense

It is probably without doubt that a defense also comprises activities outside the military sphere. The term total defense may then be used to emphasize a situation where not only military activities are involved. This term, somehow closely associated with Sweden and its defense, came into use during the military state of alert during the World War II. It has been defined as a “defense organized to resist the total war, meaning the mobilization and preparation of the whole society for war.”

So phrased the term total war is somewhat contrary to Erich Ludendorff in his Der totale Krieg from 1935, where the author supposedly argues that the “totalitarian war,” as his term was translated to, calls for the defeat of the enemy; in other words may only be fought by the victorious force. Thus, an intentionally conducted defense representing the state’s total mobilization of forces was not, according to Ludendorff’s definition, a total, nor a totalitarian, war.

An article from 1942, during a period of massive volunteering for the Swedish national defense, described the term total defense as seen in the light of the modern way of warfare; that is that the total war could not be defined properly before the technological development and its use on the battlefield had advanced in a way that a total war was possible to fight. Probably has a conception of a democratically rooted

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1 From the article “Totalförvar” (Total Defense) in Nationalencyklopedin (The National Encyclopaedia), Vol. 18, Höganäs 1995.

2 Eriksson, Arvid: “Den frivilliga folkhärens värde” (The Value of the Nation’s Volunteer Army), in Sveriges frivilliga försvar (Sweden’s Voluntary Defense), Stockholm 1942, p 19–39. Lieutenant-
defense with the full participation of all citizens also played a role when using this term.

In the current Swedish Act on Total Defense and General Alarm from 1992, total defense is defined to an “activity to prepare Sweden for a state of war.” When general alarm prevails, total defense is the only activity carried on by society, which is divided into military activities and civilian (non-military) activities.3

It could be of interest to note that when using Google on the internet and searching for “total defense,” the top hits received are about Singapore, a country that describes the reason for having adapted a “concept of Total Defense (TD) was from the experiences of countries like Switzerland and Sweden.”4 Finland, Denmark, and South Africa are found further down the Google list.

Organization of the Swedish Total Defense

The traditional four pillars of the Swedish total defense: the military defense, the civil defense, the economic defense, and the psychological defense, were not unambiguously classified. In addition the terms “administrative defense” and “other total defense” have had to be used to categorize activities hard to place otherwise, such as medical care or counterintelligence. The Defense Command Committee of 19605 realized the risk for misunderstanding, but contented itself with more narrow definitions of the different tasks involved.

From the 1950s, the non-military pillars were each led by an authority of its own: the Civil Defense Administration,6 the National Board of Economic Preparedness,7 and the Emergency Board of Psychological Defense.8 With some name changes and minor adjustments these assignments were intact until 1986. These agencies were responsible for planning the civilian components of the total defense, but were not exclusive for its execution. Naturally many other agencies were also involved.

The Swedish Ministry of Defense is today a ministry of total defense, with not only the military within its domains. Its present mission is to accomplish the objectives the government and parliament have set for defense policy, protection, and preparedness against accidents and preparedness for severe peacetime emergencies. Within the civil defense is embraced the whole of society, including all the services that need to function in times of crisis and war, including protection and preparation against accidents, both caused by human agency and natural disasters, as well as severe peacetime emergencies, like a natural disaster or an act of sabotage. Civil defense, the civil component of total defense, still consists of a diverse range of

Colonel Eriksson was known as the “Radio Major” after having appeared in a series of radio programs on defense information, appealing to the spirits and confidence of the Swedish public.

3 Lag (1992:1403) om totalförsvar och höjd beredskap.
4 www.nexus.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefense/about_td.html.
5 1960 års försvarsledningsutredning.
6 Civilförsvarsstyrelsen.
7 Riksnämnden/Överstyrelsen för ekonomisk försvarberedskap.
8 Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar.
activities conducted by all of society’s actors in order to strengthen its capacity to deal with heightened alert and war.

However, while the current Swedish Ministry of Defense shares some similarities with the American Department of Homeland Defense, this was definitely not the case after the World War II. Before 1962, the Ministry of Defense only handled military matters. There existed, at least among the general public, an equal sign between the Ministry and the Armed Forces. Almost without exception, every other ministry was responsible for one or more activities of the total defense, with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Commerce the most important.

But there existed no coordination at the government level in time of peace; just a minister without portfolio who only from 1955 had coordination as one of his many other responsibilities. During the Second World War this lack of total responsibility caused a number of ad hoc solutions to be adopted.

**The Highest and Central Levels of Defense Command**

This situation was naturally noted with disillusionment after the Swedish military activities in the 1940s. In 1947, General Helge Jung, the Swedish Supreme Commander, asked the Defense Committee to propose a permanent agency for combining the political and military command with the purpose of better coordination on the highest level.

Politically it was questioned if such an agency would consist of members of the Government only (that is, only representatives of the ruling majority), or if it should be a parliamentary agency with members from all represented parties.

Similarly, a proposal of a board on a level below Government, what is called the central level, was put forward by another committee, the Commission on Civil Defense in 1955. It called for a board where the directors of agencies themselves were represented: together with the Supreme Commander and the head of the Defense Staff, the directors of the Civil Defense Administration, National Board of Economic Preparedness, National Labor Market Board, Agricultural Market Board, and others.

None of these proposals resulted in a decision. Thus, the lack of the necessary body to better coordinate the total defense became significantly overdue.

But they had ignited a spark, resulting in a sort of a debate primarily in military circles. The titles of the pamphlets and books published at this time are in some measure quite revealing. For example, in *To the Freedom of the North. Views on a Modern Defense* (1949) and *Resistance Against A Great Power. Facts Versus*
Words in the Defense Issue (1950), the authors argued for a collective command of the total defense, both on a governmental and a central level. In 1957, a book called Both . . . And. The Defense Problem of the Alliance-Free Sweden. A Military-Political Study by a group of military teachers at the Army War College, as well as the former Army Commander in Sense and Will. Study of Swedish Principles of Defense (1957), and the Navy commander in a public speech, all expressed concerns that coordination still was lacking within the government.

It was finally the Defense Command Committee of 1960 that succeeded in this achievement. This committee was asked to clarify the significance of the conditions for coordination and command, and to find out what demands had to be met in order to fulfil these requisites. The committee was free to propose extensive changes, also of the prevailing division of ministries. It was the modern war and its character of swiftness and violence that would constitute the background.

In its report of 30 December 1961, the committee observed the necessity to create an organization already in time of peace that involved society as a whole, in order to be able to cope with the most severe of all possibilities: a surprise attack on Sweden, possibly including strategic bombing, nuclear weapons, and biological warfare.

The committee considered the creation of a Ministry of Total Defense impossible, since the need for activities such as energy and health care hardly could be separated from peace to war. Instead a secretariat within the Ministry of Defense was proposed to coordinate total defense issues on that level.

A proposal to shift responsibilities of the Civil Defense Administration, the National Board of Economic Preparedness, and the Emergency Board of Psychological Defense over to the Ministry of Defense was judged improperly, due to different political apprehensions of its significance regarding international law.

The Defense Command Committee found however it to be considered necessary to establish a permanent Defense Counsel, consisting of the Prime Minister as chairman, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, together with the Supreme Commander, the head of the Defense Staff, the directors of the National Labor Market Board, Civil Defense Administration, State Medical Board, National Board of Economic Preparedness, National Telegraph Board, the Manager of the State Police, the chairmen of the Central Civilian Transport Committee, 18

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14 Sahlén, Gösta, and Linnell, Carl-Gustaf: Motstånd mot stormakt. Fakta contra slagord försvarsfrågan, Stockholm 1950. Sahlén and Linnell, both majors of the General Staff, were given credits as authors, although their ideas had support from higher levels.


17 The Navy Commander, Vice-Admiral Stig H:son Ericson, gave this speech in Göteborg on 11 December 1957. Ericson was Navy Commander, 1953–1961.

18 Försvarsrådet.

19 Medicinalstyrelsen.

20 Telestyrelsen.

21 Statspolisintendenten.
Emergency Board of Psychological Defense, and Agricultural Market Board, and, finally one of the five appointed Civil Defense Area commanders.

The Committee also found it desirable to create a Total Defense Director’s Board. The Government would designate its chairman, but it was presupposed that it would be the Supreme Commander. Together with the head of the Defense Staff and the directors, managers, chairmen, and commanders of the proposed Defense Counsel, also the director of the General Directorate of Posts and State Power Board, and the manager of Swedish Broadcasting Company, were included.

Both the Defense Counsel and the Total Defense Director’s Board came into existence in the autumn of 1962, as well as a coordination division within the Ministry of Defense. The Civil Defense Administration and the Emergency Board of Psychological Defense remained within the Ministry of the Interior until 1967, and the National Board of Economic Preparedness were not transferred from the Ministry of Commerce until 1983.

The Regional Level

One step towards a more coordinated command on the regional level was with the introduction of Civil Defense Area commanders in 1951. This creation was a consequence of a proposal by a committee examining the organization of the county administrative boards in wartime (at that time there were 24 of them in Sweden). The reason for this proposal was, initially, that while warfare had become more rapid, many of the counties were still quite small. To coordinate resources for civil defense measures such as medical care and transport over an area larger than one county, a new echelon was needed in order to provide the more general view. Since Sweden militarily was divided in six Military Areas, there was at the same time a need for a corresponding level for the non-military component of the total defense.

From a military point of view it was desirable that an Army corps commander or a Military Area commander had only to deal with one civilian authority instead of four or five. Originally the main motive was to create the civil authority where the corresponding military commander would ask for support. Thus, while the Civil Defense Area commander -- one of the county governors -- was designated already in peacetime, there were no staff personnel allocated.

This was changed in 1952, when a small secretariat was attached to each Civil Defense Area commander. Over the years, the commander was given more and more responsibility about civilian evacuation, communications, accommodation of refugees, police and security matters, health and medical care, removal and destruction, etc.

On this level the Civil Defense Area commanders created their own network of co-ordinating agencies: regional representatives from the sectors of telecommunication, broadcasting, railways, power supply, customs, roads, and others,

22 Centrala civila transportkommittén.

23 Totalförsvarets chefsnämnd.

24 Generalpoststyrelsen.

25 Vattenfallsstyrelsen.

26 Sveriges Radio AB.
met regularly and had often more and better knowledge of each other’s role in case of war, than could be said about higher levels.

Military reductions after 1989 included the consolidation of the six Military Areas down to three finally, and the Civil Defense Areas followed suit. The Civil Defense Area commanders were in the end abolished in 2001.

The Military Influence in the Agencies

Another creation in the web of total defense was the military assistants. The first military assistants had been placed in the Royal Railway Board when the Communications Division of the General Staff realized a need for officers with a better knowledge in the running of railways. Regular training of selected officers in railway duties was performed from 1891, and in 1905 a Military Office was constituted, with two military assistants centrally placed in Stockholm, and another five in the regional railway offices. This office overtook the duties of the General Staff to plan for the use of railways in the time of war.

The embryo of a military detachment within the National Telegraph Board was added in 1909 in order to facilitate the military use of the telephone and telegraph net.

Also in the beginning of the twentieth century, a requirement of war preparations was observed in the area of electricity and power supply. One reason was certainly the electrification of the railways. The progress towards a more total war required the State Power Board to establish a Defense Office in 1938 for all matters regarding defense (mainly air defense) of power stations and the transmission of power. The military assistant headed this office.

In most of the areas concerning the communications system a defense office, or a body with a similar name, was initiated in the interwar period. The Board of Roads and Waterways, the General Directorate of Posts, the Civil Aviation Authority, and the National Maritime Administration were among them. These offices were most often headed by a military assistant, and sometimes staffed with deputy military assistants, as well as civilian personnel from the authority.

Simply expressed, military officers served in a civil authority to prepare the authority for war -- not only to serve a strict military purpose -- but they were paid for in most cases from the military payroll. This fact was observed in the early 1960s by the Agency for Public Management, the agency that supports the Government in evaluating and following-up state and state-financed activities. The consequence was, after a succession of official reports that a military assistant would only deal with matters of importance for the Armed Forces. The effect was that quite a few of the military assistants continued their work as heads for the agency’s defense office, but as civilian employees. Their military loyalty was presumably intact.

27 Kungl. Järnvägsstyrelsen.

28 Väg- och vattenbyggnadsstyrelsen.

29 Luftfartsstyrelsen.

30 Sjöfartsstyrelsen.

31 Statskontoret.
Other Examples of the Web of Total Defense

I will just briefly mention a few bodies that played a role in the web of total defense, and were all more or less heavily influenced by the military. Many of them had names, difficult to translate and sometimes difficult to understand.

The Power Plant War Protection Committee\textsuperscript{32} was responsible to examine the requirements for defense measures on planned and established power plants, dams, reservoirs, transformers, etc. The Construction and Repair Readiness Organization\textsuperscript{33} was created to perform construction, repair, and clearing duties within the total defense. It consisted of private companies from the building trade, but it was headed by the commander of the Army Road and Waterway Corps. Finally, the Vessel Selection Commission\textsuperscript{34} was to make a selection of privately owned ships and vessels, which in time of war were to be required by the Armed Forces. Of the commission’s eight members, two were naval officers, one with the rank of captain (Navy).

Reflections

Was anything actually so unique about the Swedish system of total defense? Perhaps it was mainly the label. The system was a product of the Cold War, established to cope with the situation of a small, alliance-free country, sandwiched between the two blocs. It was an organization that permeated the whole of society, forced to function in that way by the international political climate. It answered to the principle of the Swedish security policy: “Alliance free in time of peace, in order to be neutral in time of war”\textsuperscript{35}.

The political leadership had after World War II gained an understanding of the urgent needs regarding the national defense and the conception of a citizen’s defense; however, the same leaders were not able to establish such a system themselves. The initiative went over to the military.

The culmination of the Swedish total defense was probably reached in the late 1960s or 1970s. The system was tested on a regular basis and streamlined in continuously performed exercises. Key figures, especially on lower levels, got to know each other personally, which naturally made synchronization easier. For financial reasons, the system described in this paper resembled a veritable web, was rationalized and limited, at first gradually, but especially after 1989, at a remarkable speed.

One very tangible observation is that a system may be obliterated in hours and days, but will take many years to build -- and will take even longer to rebuild. Sweden never had a chance -- luckily! -- to test this system in wartime. But parts of the diminishing total defense have been standing trial in recent years during other emergencies: the sinking of MS Estonia in 1994, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, and the storm Gudrun in southern Sweden in 2005 -- all of which put the remaining system to a test it did not pass with honors.

\textsuperscript{32} Krigsskyddsnämnden för kraftanläggningar.
\textsuperscript{33} Byggnads- och reparationsberedskapen.
\textsuperscript{34} Fartygsuttagsningskommissionen.
\textsuperscript{35} “Alliansfrihet i fred, syftande till neutralitet i krig”, considered as a foundation stone in the Swedish Government’s Declaration of Foreign Policy from 1950 to the early 1990s.
Russian Proposal on European Security Treaty (EST) and the Future of Collective Security System in Europe

by

T. Parkhalina

Russian foreign policy during the last few years has been characterized by ambivalence, which has been expressed in the desire to be integrated into the Western community and Western institutions and at the same time in the attempts to oppose to the West. This tendency has been developing especially since 2005-2006 when the world economic situation changed. This was connected with the rising oil and gas prices. Among the Russian political class, there was a temptation to correlate this so-called new “economic might” with new political role and status on international arena.

In spite of the declared “diversification” and “multivectors” foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the West is still the main “pain” and main “concern” for those who formulate Russian foreign policy priorities. At the same time Russian leaders speak more and more often about their disagreements with Western partners and Western institutions. So the conclusion can be made that the Russian Federation is using the model “partnership – competition” in its relationships with the West. The so-called “two-tracks” strategy is used: partnership on strategic issues such as the fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), drug trafficking, trade of people, and at the same time certain immunity vis-à-vis critics coming from different Western capitals on the “erosion of democracy” in Russia as well as competition on energy resources and armament markets. Russian political elites have concerns connected with the situation when the Western model of development is perceived by many countries to be attractive, especially in post-Soviet space, and Russia can not suggest any alternative model.

The apogee of disagreements with Western “partners – competitors” was the so-called February 2007 “Munich speech” of President V. Putin, when he criticized a number of Western initiatives and the lack of responses to Russian concerns. This disagreement reflects the aspirations of the Kremlin to achieve respect of the growing Russian role in the process of solution of nevertheless “partner” relations with the West, and the aspirations to formulate the rules where and when Russia could take part with the status of “equal partner.”

The fact is that by the year 2008 Russia was not integrated into the security system in Europe, which is NATO and EU-centric. For this situation, both sides are responsible -- Russia and the West. This fact provokes irritations, concerns, and dissatisfaction from the part of Russian foreign policy designers, and at the same time it should be accompanied by the concerns of Western politicians, as it could be transformed in uncertainties and even unpredictability of Russian behavior in the international arena.

When Russian President D. Medvedev initiated discussion in Berlin in 2008 on a new European Security Treaty, the non-monolithic West perceived it with great concerns. This reaction was conditioned by the fact that on the first stage after its declaration Russian diplomacy accompanied this proposal only by two explanations:

1) It should be a legally binding document;
2) European states should be suggested to start negotiations in their national capacities.

Western countries thought that Russia would like to exclude the USA from the negotiation process, to play on so-called trans-Atlantic disagreements, to marginalize NATO by making this organization “non-interesting” for post-Soviet states. Besides, many among Western politicians and experts thought that Russia had aspirations to suggest the shaping of a body -- similar to UN Security Council for European territory -- where countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Russia would become permanent members and thus they would decide the future of small and medium European states. At the same time the position of the majority of Western politicians was characterized by the recognition of the fact that there is a sufficient number of existing institutions in Europe -- NATO, the EU, OSCE, and Council of Europe -- and there is no need and no sense to create new ones.

The Caucasian (Russian-Georgian) War in August 2008 demonstrated on one hand the ability of the Russian Federation to withdraw from territorial status-quo (connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union), while on the other hand, that the capabilities of the West to influence Russian politics are very limited. The war revealed crucial differences in the approaches of Russia and of the West to find solutions in the so-called “frozen conflicts,” as well serious differences in assessments of the present situation.

Soon after the war, the quick recognition of the independent status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even to a greater extent the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, demonstrated that ignoring Russian proposals could lead to much more serious problems with a country which is a gas and oil supplier for a number of European states. Russia suffered a “cold shower” when it realized that the country has no real ally in the world and especially among CIS countries, when no one state among CIS, CSTO, or SCO did not support Russian activities in the Caucasus, and later when the leaders understood Russia’s own vulnerability in the face of the global economic crisis. The decision was taken to decrease the level of anti-Western rhetoric, and to correlate its position vis-à-vis the European Security Treaty (EST).

After the Evian Summit of Security issues in October 2008, when French President N. Sarkozy was very clear in stipulating that negotiations on EST were not possible without the Americans, but were possible on the basis of OSCE with the participation of all existing institutions, we witnessed the evolution of the Russian position as well as of the positions of Western partners. The primary Euro-Atlantic states, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Norway, Netherlands, and the new U.S. administration, have already confirmed their understanding of the necessity to start negotiations. Their approach was approved at the NATO Anniversary Summit in April 2009. Behind this we can read the understanding of the situation when Russia is not satisfied with its present situation in the security field.

Before starting negotiations both sides -- Russia and the West -- should take into consideration one extremely important factor.

There are differences in the so-called “philosophy of security” between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic countries. Russia perceives security as a lack of threat today; for Euro-Atlantic countries, not only a lack of threat now, but add to this preventive actions aiming at excluding threats in the foreseeable future. Western countries perceive security as a certain number of norms and standards of behavior of individual countries and institutions; Russia prefers security to be based on treaties, that means legally binding documents which, according to the opinions of Russian
politicians, could give guarantees for the future (despite the fact that historical experience has proved otherwise).

As far as the evolution of the Russian position on the EST goes, one should positively ascertain that Russia is ready to discuss not only military-political aspects of the security (that means not only hard security), but different aspects of soft security, at the same time Russian officials refer to the existence of the Council of Europe which has mechanisms to decide issues connected with human rights. From the Russian side there is an understanding that in the case of a legally binding document, its ratification could take decades.

According to the assessments of “official” Moscow, the common interest of all participants of the future European security system consists of using experiences of the existing institutions and thus coming to an agreement on basic principles in the field of security: that means first of all the issues of war and peace (use of force); problems connected with the ambiguity of humanitarian intervention; the elimination of double standards on the issues of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and inviolability of the borders; common approaches to the so-called “frozen conflicts” (rejection of recognition, with only one exception -- consent of involved sides); in the field of arms control (e.g., the abnormal situation with the CFE -- the search of other instruments of control; and the necessity of uniting the efforts of all organizations acting on Euro-Atlantic territory.

The Russian problem was and still is that the existing system is relevant to the interests of all other participants of the system besides Russia. That is why the countries of post-socialist and post-Soviet regions are so persistent in seeking NATO and EU memberships. Another problem is the dramatic loss of confidence after the Caucasian War of August 2008 and the Russia-Ukrainian gas conflict in January 2009, as well as the asymmetry in basic concepts connected with the enlarged interpretation of the security. The problem of all participants of the process is that the Cold War mentality has not been overcome yet and that the tendency for deterrence in the relationships between Russia and the West continues to hinder their development. In addition, it is unclear what deterrence means today. At the same time, security is a dynamic process which could develop in a positive direction only in the case when the common understanding of principles and norms of behavior of all states in the international arena exists.

When we are speaking about the main pillars of the future treaty, one can suppose that in the field of military-political security they should include: a) arms control; 2) non-proliferation and counter-proliferation; 3) confidence-building measures. Indeed, this is a Cold War agenda, but we should not be confused by this fact. The present day realities push the international community to examine again -- on the new stage of European development – the above-mentioned issues. This new stage is characterized by the situation when the majority of Central-Eastern European states are NATO and EU members or have strong aspiration to be integrated into these institutions. Arms control is the sphere where we need new approaches and new documents in the situation when the CFE regime does not work. It is necessary to stress here that arms-control aspects of the EST should not replace the CFE; they have different spheres of regulation. As far as the non-proliferation issue is concerned, it should not become a supposed “hostage” in the amelioration or deterioration in Russia’s relations with the West, because only Russia is encircled by those states who tend to have nuclear arms and so the Russian Federation could become one day a target of irresponsible politicians in those countries. It would be naïve to think that
“flirting” with problematic regimes will save Russia in the future from the threats connected with the use of nuclear weapons.

We need a common threat assessment (it did not happen inside NRC), as this assessment could lead to adequate models of states’ behavior on the level of their elaboration. It should be rational – deriving from the interests of all players -- to develop a center for conflict-prevention.

In the field of confidence-building measures it would be useful to discuss and to adopt so-called “code of conduct” of the states in case of any country would try in the future to involve them into military actions.

An important dimension of military-political security today should be collective efforts in the struggle against international terrorism. This is not only one of the main threats for national stability, but also for survival of individuals. That is why anti-terror and counter-terror activities should be in the focus of European institutions’ and states’ policy. It is extremely important not to mix such notions as social protest and terror.

Any European security treaty cannot exclude different aspects of “soft” security, as only soft security leads to basic rules of development, to certain living standards, and to the respect of rights and freedoms.

While speaking about soft security we should envisage security implications of climate change, energy security, piracy, impact on food markets, etc.

To conclude I would like to mention one important thing -- the EST proposed by the RF could lead relationships between Russia and the West on the level when the elements of partnership -- is the case of respect for the interests of all players -- would prevail over the elements of competition. Let’s use this chance.
After the Cold War: End of States; Birth of States

by

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The end of the Cold War caused great changes in the political landscape of Europe and Asia. This almost peaceful evolution in comparison with the huge bloody upheaval caused by the first and second world wars gives an unusual feature to these transformations.

But, before approaching this, it is necessary to answer a foremost question for the historian concerned with the chronology: when did the Cold War end? Because the progress of the ideas often goes before the events, we could be tempted to place the end of the Cold War period either at the fall of the Berlin Wall (9 November 1989), which symbolically is true, or at the summit of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Paris and that closed with the adoption of the Paris Charter for the New Europe, on 21 November 1990. Of course, the signing at the same conference of the Treaty for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Paris, 19 November 1990) should also not be forgotten.

The choice of Paris as the conference venue and for the signing of the treaty could not have happened by accident. Besides the acknowledgement of the role of France and its president, François Mitterrand, in the management of the downfall of the Communist regimes, I believe that the choice of this capital for the configuration of the New Europe was a return to a normal situation and to “lawfulness,” because in this way the infringed Peace of Paris of 1919-1920 and that unfinished one from 1946-1947 were finally closed.

Coming back to the Charter of November 1990, I observe that a challenge was launched to history: “Europe is liberating itself from the inheritance of the past,” it was declared in the preamble of the charter. But what is significant for our question is the statement that, “The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended.”

The hope on which this proud statement was based was backed especially by the then recent reunification of Germany (3 October 1990), by the downfall of the regimes of Communist dictators in Central and Eastern Europe, and by the evolution of the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev. The latter would soon be put to the test by the August Moscow coup attempt in summer 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), which would happen soon thereafter.

As a result, we can identify the very end of the Cold War as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (July 1991) and of the Soviet Union (August-December 1991).

As the real development of these events may not be reflected accurately in the strict chronologies, it could be said that the end of the Cold War took place between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the downfall of the European Communist dictatorships, and ending with the disappearance of the USSR. While the Cold War ended in Europe, coinciding with the disappearance of the Soviet type of Communism, it
continued to exist in other parts of the world, like China and Cuba.

Among the articles of the New Europe Paris Charter, a major importance was given to the ten principles, the Decalogue, of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975, whose complying and implementation was proclaimed in a solemn manner. The third principle of the Helsinki Decalogue specified the inviolability of the state frontiers, and consequently the rejection of any request or action of seizing or usurpation of a part or of the entire territory of any member state.

This was then considered a success by the Brezhnevian diplomacy just because of this point, which was regarded as recognition of the Soviet empire. U.S. President Gerald Ford, however, expressed objections on the forced inclusion of the Baltic States in the USSR. The Helsinki Final Act permitted in our opinion the peaceful or quite peaceful happening of two major recent events concerning the birth and death of the states: the reunification of Germany and the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and the dissolution of the USSR and birth of fifteen independent republics on the territory of the former Soviet empire.

The death and birth of states in the recent past are fundamentally different in comparison with similar past process in the distant past, mainly from World Wars I and II. This, despite the statements of principles concerning the national self-determination issued by American President Woodrow Wilson on the basis of an undisputable historical idealism and conveniently applied by the hegemonic powers who drew the map of Europe after World War I, or by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the leader of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, as a part of a propaganda, soon contradicted by military and political action.

It is again significant for our times that the unification of Germany was achieved in the spirit of the Helsinki Decalogue by a treaty with Poland that recognized the frontier on the Oder-Neisse line.

The exception that confirmed the rule, but with so much pain, is, of course, the case of Yugoslavia. It is again full of significance that the regime that caused the bloody troubles at the death of the federative state of Yugoslavia, was that one ruled by President Slobodan Milosevic, who began to manifest in 1989 (on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje), with the abolition of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The rejection of the Rambouillet Agreement by the Belgrade government (23 March 1999) and its continuation of ethnic cleansing caused the NATO military intervention and led, finally, to the appearance of a new state. It was a process developed in a democratic way, and only the stubbornness of Belgrade’s leadership to avoid negotiations and choose confrontation has made this such a dramatic development.

In August 2008, following a short Georgian war, Russia recognized the state sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the secessionist entities of the Georgian national territory. Aware of the responsibility of this decision, Moscow diplomacy demanded the summoning of a new conference for security and cooperation, a kind of Helsinki II that would accommodate the real facts with the principles. In fact, launching such a proposal was equivalent to a de facto demise of the first Helsinki Accord by Russia. The political map of Europe had entered into a period of flux.

The diminishing of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act again appears on the
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave birth to new states on the world map of Europe and Asia; among these, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are very large in size. In the Caucasian area, the same phenomenon not only determined the birth of independent states, but also projected a zone of high geopolitical risk, as it also involved harsh competition for energy resources. In this new context, the Black Sea, a veritable Soviet lake until 1991, suddenly became an international maritime basin of great importance for the continental balance of power and also for the transit routes of the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources.

Basically, the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred peacefully and without former inner frontier changes. The “velvet divorce” between the Czech and Slovak republics occurred much the same way in 1993. The case of Yugoslavia’s destruction was tragic and bloody. The Yugoslavian federation was broken by a fratricidal war (1992-1995), caused by congenital national tensions and by the long competition in this area between the great powers during the Cold War. The resolution of the conflict was possible only by international intervention.

Wide integration processes were initiated simultaneously with this dissolution. From 1995 to 2007, the number of European Union members increased from twelve to twenty-seven, and now the EU is confronted with the challenge of Turkish integration or of a Mediterranean complement.

After 1994, simultaneously with these great European evolutions, the Euro-Atlantic integration began -- the eastern extension of NATO, with the frontiers of the alliance being established in 2004 at the Black Sea. The 2008 summer military confrontation in the Caucasus -- launched by Russia, being unthinkable that the ratio of forces between Georgia and Russia would have tempted the first on the way on aggression -- has strengthened the special partnerships of Georgia and Ukraine with NATO.

Of course, the picture of these processes of integration at the European level would not have been complete without the attempt of Russia to structure the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union.

After this prolegomena some studies of cases are needed.

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The Death of the USSR

The four principal elements of the old Soviet system were Communist Party dominance, the hierarchy of soviets, centralized federalism, and state socialism. Gorbachev's programs of perestroika and glasnost launched in 1985 produced radical unforeseen effects that eventually brought that system down. But, by using structural reforms to widen opportunities for leaders and popular movements in the Union’s republics to gain influence, Gorbachev also made it possible for nationalist, orthodox Communist, and populist forces to oppose his attempts to regenerate Soviet Communism.
Although some of the new movements aspired to replace the Soviet system altogether with a liberal democratic one, others demanded independence for the national republics. Still others insisted on the restoration of the old Soviet ways. Ultimately, Gorbachev could not forge a compromise among these forces and the consequence was the collapse of the Soviet Union. A contributing factor is that the USSR was also overwhelmed by the cost of military competition with the USA.

On 7 February 1990, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union agreed to give up its monopoly of power. Over the next several weeks, the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR held their first competitive elections. Reformers and ethnic nationalists won many of the elected positions. On 11 March 1990, the Lithuanian SSR, led by Chairman of the Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis, declared its restoration of independence. However, the Soviet Army attempted to suppress the movement. The Soviet Union initiated an economic blockade of Lithuania and kept troops there "to secure the rights of ethnic Russians." On 30 March 1990, the Estonian Supreme Council declared that the Soviet power established since 1940 in the Estonian SSR was illegal, and started a process to reestablish Estonia as an independent state. The process of restoration of independence of the Latvian SSR began on 4 May 1990, with a Latvian Supreme Council vote stipulating a transitional period to complete independence.

Faced with growing republic separatism, Gorbachev attempted to restructure the Soviet Union into a less centralized state. On 20 August 1991, the Russian SFSR was scheduled to sign the New Union Treaty, which was to convert the Soviet Union into a federation of independent republics with a common president, foreign policy, and military. On 19 August 1991, Gorbachev's vice president, Gennadi Yanayev, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, and other senior officials acted to prevent the signing of the union treaty by forming the "General Committee on the State Emergency." The "Committee" put Gorbachev (then vacationing in Foros, Crimea) under house arrest, reintroduced political censorship, and attempted to stop the perestroika. The coup leaders quickly issued an emergency decree suspending political activity and banning most newspapers. While coup organizers expected some popular support for their actions, the public sympathy in large cities and in republics was largely against them. Russian SFSR President Boris Yeltsin was quick to condemn the coup and grab popular support for himself. After three days, on 21 August, the coup collapsed, the organizers were detained, and Gorbachev returned as president of the Soviet Union.

After the failed coup of 19-21 August 1991, the Soviet republics accelerated their process towards independence, declaring their sovereignty one by one. Their local authorities started to seize property located on their territory. On 6 September 1991, the Soviet government recognized the independence of the three Baltic States, which the Western powers had always held to be sovereign. Yet, in the battle of power, on 18 October, Gorbachev and the representatives of eight republics (excluding Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States) signed an agreement forming a new economic community.

The final round of the Soviet Union’s collapse took place following the Ukrainian popular referendum on 1 December 1991, wherein 90 percent of voters opted for independence. The leaders of Slavic republics agreed to meet for a discussion of possible
forms of relationship, alternative to Gorbachev’s struggle for a union.

On 8 December 1991, the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian republics met in Belavezhskaya Pushcha and signed the Accords declaring the Soviet Union dissolved and replacing it with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev described this as an unconstitutional coup, but it soon became clear that the development could not be halted.

On 12 December 1991, Russia's secession from the Union was sealed, with the Congress of Soviets of RSFSR formally ratifying the Belavezha Accords and denouncing the 1922 Treaty on the creation of the Soviet Union.

Doubts remained over the authority of the Belavezha Accords to affect the dissolution of the Soviet Union, since they were signed by only five of the Soviet Republics. However, on 21 December 1991, representatives of all member republics (except Georgia) signed the Alma Ata Protocol, in which they confirmed the dissolution of the Union. That same day, all former-Soviet republics agreed to join the CIS, with the exception of the three Baltic States. The documents signed at Alma Ata also addressed several issues raised by the Union's extinction. Notably, Russia was authorized to assume the role of the USSR in the United Nations, which meant inheriting its permanent membership on the Security Council.

On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR, declaring the office extinct and ceding all the powers still vested in it to the new president of Russia, Yeltsin. Finally, a day later on 26 December 1991, the Council of Republics (a chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) recognized the dissolution of the Soviet Union and dissolved itself (another chamber of the Supreme Soviet had been unable to work during some months before this, due to the absence of a quorum). By 31 December 1991, all official Soviet institutions had ceased operations, as individual republics assumed the central government's role.

In summary: after the demise of the Soviet Union, we assisted in the birth of the Russian Federation (17,075,400 sq. Km., 142.9 million inhabitants), Estonian Republic (45,226 sq. Km., 1.34 million inhabitants), Latvian Republic (64,589 sq. Km., 2.23 million inhabitants), Republic of Lithuania (65,200 sq. Km., 3.35 million inhabitants), Republic of Ukraine (603,628 sq. Km., 46.4 million inhabitants), Republic of Moldova (33,843 sq. Km., 4.3 million inhabitants), Republic of Azerbaijan (86,600 sq. km., 7.9 million inhabitants), Republic of Armenia (29,800 sq. km., 2.98 million inhabitants), Republic of Georgia (69,700 sq. km., 4.7 million inhabitants), Uzbekistan (447,400 sq. km., 27.3 million inhabitants), Tajikistan (142,100 sq. km., 6.86 million inhabitants), Kazakhstan (2,724,900 sq. km., 16.4 million inhabitants), Turkmenistan (488,100 sq. km., 5.11 million inhabitants), and Kirghizstan (198,500 sq. km., 5.36 million inhabitants).

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The birth of the new states on the ruins of the Soviet Union was coupled with so-called “frozen conflicts.” They have a dual nature: on one hand they are “conventional” ones because they involve hostile states (one state which supports a secessionist movement in another’s territory) and, on the other hand, they are also “unconventional,” because the separatists usually organize themselves in transnational networks and they
survive using organized crime fluxes and other illegal activities.

In fact, the recent past brought some forms of hostile interactions between states in the region, revolving around these so-called “frozen conflicts.” Traditionally, Russia has been accused by Moldova and especially by Georgia of feeding the ethnic separatism in their territories. Until now, neither Moldova, Georgia, nor Azerbaijan have managed to resolve these conflicts. But, more interesting, there is no consensus, even among the experts and politicians from the involved countries, on the exact identity of the contending actors. For example, in the Republic of Moldova, one point of view stands that the real conflict is between Moldova and Russia, and not between Moldavians and Russians, therefore the issues of ethnic conflict are denied and that of geopolitics is overemphasized. In Georgia also, the general impression of most of the public opinion and leadership is that the real conflict is between Russia and Georgia where Abkhazians and Ossetians are seen as proxies of Moscow. Of course, Tbilisi does not recognize the Russian forces standing between Georgians and the separatist territories as “peacekeepers,” especially after the 2008 summer war. To put it in a more objective way, the ethnic tensions and conflicts have been utilized by foreign actors willing to fulfill their strategic and geopolitical wishes, in a zero-sum game against the affected states.

The Black Sea–South Caucasus region is a new Euro-Atlantic borderland plagued by Soviet-legacy conflicts. These were within Moldova (Trans-Dniester), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabach). There are also conflicts in the north Caucasus region, within the boundaries of the Russian Federation (Chechnya).

Trans-Dniester (Transnistria). The conflict in Transnistria (Republic of Moldova) lasted for a few months in the spring and summer of 1992. It resulted in some 1,000 lost lives. A ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 July 1992. The war ended after the Russian 14th Army intervened on behalf of Transnistrian separatist authorities and defeated the Moldavian troops. A trilateral peacekeeping operation has been in place since the ceasefire was declared. As in South Ossetia, the peacekeeping troops consist of military forces from the two parties in the conflict (Moldova and separatist Transnistria), and Russia as the leading peacekeeper. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) oversees the situation. Negotiations on conflict settlement were carried out in the so-called “five sided format,” which consisted of Moldova and Transnistria as conflict parties and Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as mediators. In October 2005, the format became “5 + 2” after the EU and U.S. joined in as observers.

South Ossetia. The open phase of the conflict in South Ossetia (Georgia) lasted between 1990 and 1992 and claimed approximately a thousand lives. The conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement signed on 14 July 1992. As a result of the ceasefire agreement, there is a trilateral peacekeeping operation consisting of Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian troops. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) consisting of Russia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia (a Russian region), and Georgia oversaw the security situation and pursue negotiations on conflict settlement. But in August 2008, during the Georgia–Russia war, everything changed. Supported by Russia, separatist authorities in South Ossetia have declared independence of the enclave that was recognized immediately by Moscow. We have witnessed the birth of a new “state” which has an unclear future. As in the case of Abkhazia, which has been recognized by Moscow as an
independent state, South Ossetia is still considered by the international community as part of Georgia.

**Abkhazia.** The conflict in Abkhazia has been the most serious of the three, as it claimed more than 10,000 lives between 1992 and 1994. The most intense phase of the conflict lasted from August 1992 to September 1993. A “Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict” was signed in April 1994 in Moscow and an “Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces” (Moscow Agreement) was signed in May 1994. However, outbursts of violence and some guerrilla activity persisted in Abkhazia well after these agreements. There is a Russian-led peacekeeping operation under a mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and under the supervision of the United Nations (UN Observer Mission to Georgia -- UNOMIG). But also, like in the case of South Ossetia, the Georgian war brought about the independence of the separated enclave recognized by Russia. Except for three or four other states, Abkhazia, like South Ossetia, is not recognized as an independent state by the rest of the international community.

**Nagorno-Karabakh.** The Soviet Union created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan in 1924, when over 94 percent of the region's population was Armenian. In the fall of 1989, intensified inter-ethnic conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh led Moscow to grant Azerbaijani authorities greater leeway in controlling that region. The Soviet policy backfired, however, when a joint session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and the National Council, the legislative body of Nagorno-Karabakh, proclaimed the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The official violent demonstrations of the Azerbaijan population in Baku and also in Moscow were suppressed by Soviet troops. In December 1991, a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh, boycotted by local Azerbaijanis, approved the creation of an independent state. A Supreme Soviet was elected, and Nagorno-Karabakh appealed for world recognition. By the end of 1993, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh had caused thousands of casualties and created hundreds of thousands of refugees on both sides. Mediation was attempted by officials from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran, among other countries, as well as by organizations including the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began sponsoring peace talks in mid-1992. All negotiations met with little success, and several cease-fires broke down. In mid-1993, Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan, launched efforts to negotiate a solution directly with the Karabakh Armenians. His efforts achieved several relatively long cease-fires within Nagorno-Karabakh, but outside the region Armenians occupied large sections of southwestern Azerbaijan near the Iranian border, during offensives in August and October 1993. In 1993 the UN Security Council called for Armenian forces to cease their attacks on and occupation of a number of Azerbaijani regions.

**Chechnya.** The First Chechen War occurred in a two year period lasting from 1994 to 1996, when Russian forces attempted to stop Chechnya from seceding. Despite overwhelming manpower, weaponry, and air support, the Russian forces were unable to establish effective control over the mountainous area, due to many successful Chechen guerrilla raids. Widespread demoralization of the Russian forces in the area prompted Russian President Boris Yeltsin to declare a ceasefire in 1996 and to sign a peace treaty a year later. The war was disastrous for both sides. Most estimates give figures of between
3,500 and 7,500 Russian military dead, between 3,000 and 15,000 Chechen militants dead, and no fewer than 35,000 civilian deaths -- a total of at least 41,500 dead. In September 1996, a series of apartment bombings took place in several Russian cities, including Moscow, which were blamed on the Chechens. In response, after a prolonged air campaign of retaliatory strikes against the Ichkerian regime (the secessionist government of Chechnya) a ground offensive began in October 1999 which marked the beginning of the Second Chechen War. Much better organized and planned than the first Chechen War, the military actions by the Russian Federal forces enabled them to re-establish control over most regions. After the recapture of Grozny in February 2000, the Ichkerian regime fell apart. Russia has severely disabled the Chechen rebel movement, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus. Russia was successful in installing a pro-Moscow Chechen regime, and the most prominent separatist leaders were killed, including former president Aslan Maskhadov and radical warlord Shamil Basayev.

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The reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 and the subsequent disappearance of the GDR has undoubtedly been one of the most significant changes in the political geography of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. The removal from power of the GDR leader Erich Honecker on 18 October 1989 and the symbolic tearing down of the Berlin Wall on the 9 November 1989 can be seen as an integral part of the logic of change. Nevertheless, the dramatic way in which the Wall was breached, in the form of a popular revolution, and the terminal impact it had on the government of the GDR took nearly everyone by surprise.

On 3 October 1990, less than a year after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, reunification of the two German states was accomplished. Free elections were held throughout the former GDR on 18 March 1990, and resulted in a decisive majority for non-Communist parties in favor of unification with the FRG, and preparations began immediately. However, further progress was complicated by the residual involvement of the four World War II Allied Powers in the government of Germany, and by the absence of a comprehensive peace treaty.

Foreign Ministers of United Kingdom, France, USA, and USSR, together with the Foreign Ministers of the FRG and GDR, met in the Canadian capital, Ottawa, on 13 February, to agree on a framework for reunification. The first issue to be settled was the boundaries of the new state. On 21 June, the Bundestag in the FRG and the Volkskammer in the GDR both simultaneously agreed to renounce any claim to lands east of the rivers Oder and Neisse. On 17 July, the two German states and Poland reached an agreement in principle, to be guaranteed by the four World War II Allies in the government of Germany, and by the absence of a comprehensive peace treaty.

Internally, three key pieces of legislation formed the basis of the new state. An agreement on economic union was concluded on 18 May and crucially provided for the
currency reform, whereby the Ost Mark would be exchangeable on a one-to-one basis with the Deutsch Mark. The legal basis for the all Germany elections which took place on 2 December was provided by an agreement on elections concluded on 3 August. Finally, reunification itself was dealt with in an agreement concluded on 31 August. This reconstituted the five pre-World War II Länder, abolished by the GDR in 1952, and re-established Berlin as the capital of the united Germany.

Geographically, Germany occupies a key strategic position, but because it is also the most populous state in Europe (79.7 million), as well as the most powerful economically, the FRG has unparalleled scope to influence the course of events in Europe as a whole. It is worth remembering that, alone among European states, the FRG today combines the experiences of the Cold War division of the continent into a single, unified state.

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In the late 1980s, the reawakened democratic and national political forces in Slovenia and Croatia began to press for independence, but the actions of a new leader of the Serbian Communist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, caused immense concern in Slovenia and Croatia, where the elections of 8 April and 30 May 1990 were won by nationalist parties. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Slovenia fought a war between 27 June and 7 July, with very few casualties. The war in Croatia started in 3 July 1991 and lasted until 7 August 1995. On 19 December 1991, the Serbian regions from Croatia were united as the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). The recapture of Krajina left only Eastern Slovenia in Serbian hands.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a revival of the Islamic self-consciousness was observed since 1982. Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence on 3 March 1992. Belgrade employed its army in Bosnia in April 1992. A huge process of ethnic cleansing, including crimes against humanity and genocide, took place. The involvement of Croatia and Yugoslavia internationalized the conflict in Bosnia, leading to the UN intervention enforced by NATO in September 1992. The U.S. negotiations led on 31 May 1994 to the partition of Bosnia into the Moslem-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (51 percent), and Republika Srpska (49 percent). The Dayton Agreement of 14 December 1995 ended the war.

In Macedonia, the parliament declared independence on 21 November 1991. International recognition was delayed until late 1993 by problems with neighboring states.

In Kosovo, the leader Ibrahim Rugova of the Kosovo Liberation Army (established in 1989) was elected president of the unofficial “Kosovo Republic” in June 1991. The guerilla war there began in 1996, escalated, and in January 1999 the international community asked for the presence of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The NATO intervention against Yugoslavia was carried between 24 March and 11 June 1999, and ended when Belgrade signed the Kumanovo agreement which transferred the administration of the province to the United Nations. The unilateral decision of independence was taken by the Self-Government Assembly of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. The majority of states in the EU have recognized Kosovo, but Greece, Romania,
Spain, Slovakia, and Cyprus have not. Romania has deployed peacekeeping forces with the EU mission in Kosovo.

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At the beginning of the 1990s, the Czech and Slovak societies had similar economic and social structures and demographic behavior. After the defeat of the Communists in the 1990 elections, the contradictory interests between the Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Public Against Violence became manifest in early 1991. Slovak Public Against Violence won the elections and selected Vladimir Meciar as prime minister. Meciar left Public Against Violence in March 1991 to form the nationalist-populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Following the disintegration of Civic Forum in early 1991, the Minister of Finance, Václav Klaus, formed the Civic Democratic Party. The Czechs argued that a federation was the only way Czechoslovakia could survive, but the road was open to division. In October 1990, the Slovak National Council proclaimed Slovak as official language. By the agreement of Milovy (3-8 February 1992), each republic recognized the sovereignty of the other, each having equal representation in the Federal Assembly. After the elections of 5-6 June 1992, Vaclav Klaus became the Czech prime minister. While Meciar sustained a greater autonomy for the Slovak Republic, Klaus preferred separation. On 25 November 1992, the Federal Assembly approved the division of Czechoslovakia. The Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent states on 1 January 1993.

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Some general conclusions are necessary.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the Western states did not realize immediately the huge geopolitical revolution in Eurasia, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In June 1991 -- a month before the attempted putsch against Gorbachev -- U.S. President George Bush, visiting Kiev, dissuaded the Ukrainians from declaring independence and encouraged them to maintain the Soviet Union. Here it is not an example of the Western refusal to support the unknown effects of a geopolitical storm; it is an example of the lack of preparation for such important transformations. The first shock was followed by an attentive reflection and consequent actions. Among the first, there was the recognition of Russia as heir of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power (despite the location of these weapons on the territory of former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and as a permanent member of U.N. Security Council. The international community rapidly perceived the fact that Russia, with Ukraine, represents a hegemonic power not only in Europe but also in Eurasia, and that without Ukraine, Russia is only a common great power. For the Russian political elite, the end of the Cold War and Soviet Union dissolution put the essential question of its relations with Europe: the old imperial tradition of confrontation, or a new one, of cooperation and integration?

Today’s Europe is completely different from Cold War Europe. Now in Europe, theoretically, any territorial change other than by amiable understanding of interested parties is impossible. Theoretically, because in the Helsinki “Decalogue” there was the special mention that the European frontiers are inviolable, the possible modifications
being allowed only by agreements between the concerned states. Effectively, the birth of states was in all cases based on the former inner frontiers which became international boundaries. The behavior of Russia after the Georgian war in August, 2008, when Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has radically changed this picture.

We assisted in less than twenty years – the duration of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars two centuries ago, or after World War I -- in the disappearance of an empire and of two federative states, and in the birth of an impressive number of states, some of them having been absent from the world political map since Middle Ages. We assisted also in the conscious effort to build a united Europe and, in the East, a Russian Commonwealth.
French Forces’ Tasks during the 2004 Stabilization of Cote D’Ivoire

by

Olivier Liberge

This topic is based on my own experience as an infantry platoon commander in Cote d’Ivoire in 2004. This is why my purpose will exclusively be focused on experiences at then squad-to-company level.

Since the end of World War II, armed forces from NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries have been involved in asymmetrical warfare (post-colonial wars of independence, Vietnam, Angola, and Afghanistan in the 1980s, and, more recently, former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Chechnya, and African wars). To win these asymmetrical wars, the first condition is to defeat the enemy forces; but most importantly and decisive is the stabilization phase which guarantees that peace is on the good tracks.

This transition phase, from intervention to normalization, has been a point of doctrine for the French forces involved in the major peacemaking operations of the last decades. In fact, “to win the battle, I need to win the heart and mind of the people.” In this complex phase, the situation on the ground can quickly and on no notice shift from low to high intensity. So the main challenge for a peacekeeping force is to define clear rules of engagement, to understand them, and to have them applied from the general to the soldier. In a way, the principle of the escalation of force should be perfectly understood by anyone. This requires that the force be versatile (one day wear the blue beret and the next day carry the green helmet).

In the other peace operations I was involved in (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Lebanon) these courses of action were similarly applied. These are the principles for French forces in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Each mission lasts for about four to five months.

1. Situation

With an area of three hundred thousand square kilometers (the equivalent of Romania and Bulgaria combined), Ivory Coast borders Liberia and Guinea to the west, Mali and Burkina Faso to the north, Ghana to the east, and the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. The country's population is estimated to be about eighteen million. Ivory Coast’s terrain can generally be described as a large plateau rising gradually from sea level in the south to almost 500 meters in elevation in the north. The nation's natural resources have made it into a comparatively prosperous nation in the African economy.

On 19 September 2002, while Ivory Coast President Bagbo was in Italy, there was an armed uprising. Elements of the Army mutinied and launched attacks in several cities. The battle for Abidjan lasted for a number of hours, and the government forces secured this main city. However, they had lost control of the northern part of the country, and the rebel forces made their stronghold in the northern city of Bouake. The rebels threatened to move on Abidjan again and France deployed troops from its base in the country to stop possible combat operations. The French
government was protecting its own citizens from danger and trying to prevent a never-ending and murderous civil war like those in Sierra Leone or Liberia.

In January 2003, President Gbagbo and rebel leaders signed accords creating a "government of national unity." However, the country remained split in two, with the north controlled by the New Forces (FN) and the south by governmental troops. A Confidence Zone (no crossing forces and weapons area) was established and controlled by the French troops. Four task forces, each containing more than 4,000 French soldiers, were formed. Each task force was in charge of an area of responsibility (AOR): West, Center, East, and South. Our task force AOR was the Center one containing Bouake, the capital of the New Forces Armed Forces. Bouake is the second main city of Ivory Coast with about 600,000 people.

Our mission was to stabilize our AOR, in order to build peace, and to be prepared to normalize the situation. My commander’s intent was to win the population over to our cause. To carry this out, I planned to conduct a three-phased operation:

-Phase 1: To enforce security.
-Phase 2: To collect information.
-Phase 3: To restore life.

The three phases were to be performed simultaneously and not step by step. To win locals' hearts and minds is the main challenge and objective leading to peace.

2. To Enforce Security

The local populations’ primary concern after a war is to live in security without any violence. The security of materials and people is essential. It is the first condition for political, economical and social rebuilding.

Our first task was to hold our Area of Responsibility and to be in contact with the local population. That is why each company and platoon is in charge of its own respective area. The goal for junior leaders and commanders (from squad to company level) is the perfect knowledge of their neighborhood. Our company was in charge of the southeastern area. My platoon was in charge of an 800-square meter box-shaped area that included the Confidence Zone and the eastern part of Bouake, containing 200,000 people. I divided my AOR into five smaller areas: one for each squad and one, eastern Bouake, directly under my authority.

During phase 1, our main effort was to enforce security. Many various methods were used. The first one was to perform daily combined motorized-foot patrols in the platoon AOR. These were conducted by squads appearing friendly and any halts in the villages helped us to appear as even-handed peacemakers and peacekeepers. It is favorable to the force to patrol one time in a month with our main battle equipment. This show of forces permits us to deter the resumption of the conflict and to reassure the population. The same objective is gained by controlling static and improvised check-points. By using those methods, one can achieve a very good knowledge of the terrain in about three weeks. This allowed us to sense the needs of the population and to define clearly the courses of action and the boundaries of our action. As noted in the introduction, one must keep in mind that during a stabilization operation we can transition quickly from a high to a low level of violence. If this happens, we have just to do the job we have been trained to do for years.
3. To Be in Contact and Collect Information

We have to adapt to all those we come into contact with (populations, political authorities, and belligerents) by developing the necessary candor and understanding at all levels. If these contacts permit us to gain their confidence and hearts, we should not forget that the main objective is to collect information. It is the primary method of gaining an extensive knowledge and to “get a feel” of the theater, the societies, and cultures, the opposing groups, and as much other information as possible.

Two techniques, which are to be in contact with people and authorities, are available. They could take place during patrols or in an informal situation (buying local goods, having a coffee break, etc.). However, in Ivory Coast (unlike other operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia or in the Middle East), we have no language difficulties for information gathering. However, the environment is much more difficult to understand than in the former Yugoslavia, for example. Social, economical, and political structures are very different than ours. Here, each civilian structure, political movement, or military system is organized in a particular way: we do not have a formal pyramidal structure with a head and a base. For example, a military authority can have different functions not clearly identified in a same organization or at different levels. Moreover, the clan system is an additional parameter adding to another hierarchy. Unlike other operations, it allows platoon leaders a large degree of autonomy and initiative on ground.

The common language allows developing detailed courses of action, and these detailed courses actions are necessary to understand clearly the frame of mind and the aims of the population. In fact, the contact with population includes civil authorities in the spheres of media, education, medicine, local chiefs, etc. This is an opportunity for us to suggest a development of our relationship with the population with, for example, sport events or civilian-military actions. This completes our integration into the Ivorian society and it gives us some keys to understand and have a more comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the local culture.

In the same way, the contact with military authorities is an opportunity for us to suggest a development of our relationship. This takes place though day- and night-time joint patrols. These permit one to gain complete confidence of the rebels chiefs and daily control of the rebel forces. This confidence and proximity provide a precious source of information. In addition, the squads acquired a perfect knowledge of the city of Bouake. The population seemed to be deeply impressed and secured by this permanent French presence.

These methods have allowed keeping contact and controlling the rebel chiefs’ state of mind during the March 2004 riots. It also serves a larger purpose, since the information gathered feeds demands from other than those of the deployed force. Information supports maneuver among the people in its entire dimension. Information gathering must allow the chief to know the intentions of the belligerent, to consider his courses of action, to anticipate constraints and reactions, and to identify the difficulties. More than ever, information and contact with the population are a vital element in the conduct of an operation and are a key to success. Knowledge from this information permits understanding, which in turn gives meaning. The understanding of this meaning allows us to direct specific actions towards the population.
4. To Restore Life

Land forces participate in the implementation of, or the provision of support to, specific actions which contribute to the stabilization of the environment. As general security is progressively established, they extend their activity towards others actors and fields. It is often in the success or failure of this mentoring that ultimately, the legitimacy of the operation is built or destroyed. In the stabilization phase and in absence of civil mechanisms, we have to contribute directly to support the population if distress dictates. It is a question of availability in response to an emergency situation: to restore life.

In the former Yugoslavia, the population was clearly influenced by the Western way of life. The needs, therefore, are not the same as those in Ivory Coast. In Ivory Coast, the population has to survive and not to restore a certain way of life. By our presence on the ground, we play a key role that manifests itself in terms of control of the environment, security, transport support, etc. Platoons and squads operate directly in support of the population and primarily play a catalysing role for other actors.

By collecting information, we could get, for example, information on broken water pumps in the bush villages. We could then arrange for workers to repair these broken water pipes. My platoon repaired twelve pumps that provided water to more than 8,000 people.

Our presence on the ground also allowed us to identify the education needs of the local population. As a result of our common language, we were able to provide French school books (mathematics, vocabulary, grammar, and science) that allowed us to establish a library in the main secondary school of Bouake, where 2,800 children studied.

In the same way, our presence on the ground allowed us to identify the medical needs of the local population. The company’s French military doctor made important contributions to supporting local health with medical treatment and medicines.

Lastly, we helped support the local economy by making purchases at local grocery stores, shops, and markets. Items purchased included water pumps, school furnishing, personal items, coffee, vegetables, fruits, and phone cards.

At any rate, whether in this or another field, the force commander needs to define the limits of his activities to avoid getting involved in a level which is beyond his capabilities and attempting to do what other organizations often can and know how to do better than the armed forces. In Bouake in 2004, French land forces were the only ones on the ground and it was essential to find the right balanced courses of action. We strove to operate directly in support of the local populations when the need is to locally re-establish some vital functions or in response to distress or emergencies. Through our activities on the ground, we were contributing to the re-establishment of a stable social and political system.

To sum up this topic, operating in a joint environment, land forces are at the very heart of operational deployments, where the human factor predominates and where action on the ground and the capability for discrimination in the use of force are vital for success. In operations taking place among the population, endowed with power and enduring ability to manage effects and versatility, land forces operate in close coordination with non-military actors in order to stabilize the environment and
to contribute to the return of stable political and social system, which constitutes in Kosovo the desired strategic objective.

Military action is evolving and is no longer enough, on its own, to “win wars”; it leads to the establishment of the minimum conditions for strategic success that develops in the stabilization phase, the new decisive phase in conflict. It is a vast change since the Cold War. But in fact, isn’t it a continuity referring to the colonial age? This was ever well understood by French Marshal Lyautey at the end of nineteenth century, who proclaimed: “The act of war has only really been the means for the creative act, that is, restoring peace and life, and for that purpose, war has been an invaluable means.”
Polish Military Contingents in International Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations between 1973 and 2009

by

Dariusz S. Kozerawski

United Nations peacekeeping operations have been conducted since June 1948 with the first UN observation mission – UNTSO.¹ It was established in order to monitor the Armistice Agreement in Palestine. The first time international peacekeeping forces were deployed in the area of separation was in August 1957 with the UNEF I² mission (after the end of the so-called Second Arab-Israeli War).³ From their initial establishment, peacekeeping missions have been closely connected with military operations and aimed at stopping their escalation, limiting, or even preventing the spread of the conflicts. Such actions have inseparably been connected with participation of military contingents, whose tasks, tactics, and equipment have been changing in the recent six decades.

For over fifty years Polish soldiers have been taking part in international peacekeeping operations.⁴ It must be underlined that since that time the scope of tasks to be accomplished by Polish military contingents has been dramatically transformed. As well as the changes in the ways of combat and equipment of the troops (armed paramilitary groups) taking part in armed conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century, changes were also introduced in the procedures of executing their tasks within peacekeeping operations, and since the beginning of the twenty-first century, in stabilization operations. At this time we can observe a dynamic growth of the military thought connected with a wide spectrum of problems concerning the search for the most effective ways of training and then executing mandatory tasks in the theater of peacekeeping and stabilization operations.

Significant experiences of that time have been gathered by officers and soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces. It must be highlighted that in 1973 Polish peacekeeping contingents started to carry out logistic tasks⁵ in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon).

Between 1973 and 1989, when the government of the Polish People’s Republic was fully dependent on the Soviet Union, there was no autonomous and independent foreign policy and the Armed Forces belonged to the military establishment of the Warsaw Pact. The operations of Polish military units in

¹ UNTSO -- United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
² UNEF -- United Nations Emergency Force.
³ Nordic UN stand-by forces, Helsingfors 1993, p. 91-93.
international peacekeeping operations were limited to logistic tasks. The fact of cooperation with Canadian logistic units in the UNEF II operation\textsuperscript{6} in 1973 is well worth noting. The cooperation was then continued in the UNDOF\textsuperscript{7} operation in Syria (1974-1994), UNTAG\textsuperscript{8} in Namibia (1988-1989), and UNTAC\textsuperscript{9} in Cambodia (1992-1993).

In the 1990s, Polish military contingents conducted logistic tasks in the 1991 Persian Gulf operations, in the UNTAC mission in Cambodia, and in the AFOR operation\textsuperscript{10} in Albania (1999). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the World Trade Center in New York was destroyed as a result of a terrorist attack with the use of hijacked passenger planes (11 September 2001), which was a direct cause for the so-called America’s war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Military actions carried out in Afghanistan were widely approved by the international community (including the UN and NATO), which was confirmed by establishing the anti-terrorist coalition and sending contingents to participate in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the ISAF.\textsuperscript{11} The Polish Army Contingent deployed to the Bagram Air Base near Kabul started to carry out its logistic tasks in 2002. The scope of logistic tasks executed out by Polish Contingents is shown below:

Table 1. Logistic tasks conducted by the soldiers of Polish Contingents in peacekeeping and stabilization operations between 1973 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Area of Operation</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Main Types of Contingent Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>UNEF II – Egypt, Israel</td>
<td>1973-1979</td>
<td>- monitoring the armistice agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- monitoring movements of the parties to the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- establishing and controlling a buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- transport and supply tasks for other contingents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>UNTAG\textsuperscript{12} – Namibia</td>
<td>1988-1989</td>
<td>- ensuring functioning of mission supply central depots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- providing supplies for operational battalions and a civilian component in the northern part of Namibia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4.  | MNF – The                  | 1991     | - maintaining readiness for rescue operations (including

\textsuperscript{6} UNEF II -- United Nations Emergency Force.

\textsuperscript{7} UNDOF -- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

\textsuperscript{8} UNTAG -- United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

\textsuperscript{9} UNTAC -- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

\textsuperscript{10} AFOR -- Albanian Forces.

\textsuperscript{11} ISAF -- International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{12} The similar logistic tasks were conducted in central and south sectors by 89. Canadian Logistic Unit, medical support was provided by Swiss Medical Unit and technical vehicle repairing was conducted by German Repair Group, Zbiory Specjalne Biblioteki Wojskowego Biura Badań Historycznych w Warszawie (later ZSB WBBH), IV.101.23, zał. 5, Sprawozdanie z działalności Polskiej Wojskowej Jednostki Logistycznej w Namibii za okres od 17.04 do 15.10.1989.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Task Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>putting out fires, doing aquatic and sub-aquatic repair works and towing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>providing professional medical help (including medevac and casevac).13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. UNIFIL</td>
<td>providing transportation of personnel and various materials for operational contingents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>ensuring functioning of peacekeeping forces central depots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>maintenance of motor vehicles and other equipment of UNIFIL forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mine clearance as well as construction and fortification works in the areas of peacekeeping troops deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>providing medical help for the whole personnel within the field hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>carrying out tasks connected with providing humanitarian aid for the local people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. UNTAC</td>
<td>providing transportation in the area of responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>providing operational contingents with water, food and fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>building and repairing roads and bridges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. AFOR</td>
<td>protection of the AFOR command post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>protection of refugee and humanitarian aid convoys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Afghanistan</td>
<td>demining of the urban area and areas adjacent to the airport as well as disposing of unexploded ordnance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>„Enduring Freedom”, ISAF</td>
<td>mine and unexploded ordnance disposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>marking out mine fields and passages through them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fortification development of Bagram base coalition Camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>water and fuel distribution in the Bagram base.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the basis of a comparative analysis of the data included in the above table the primary group of logistic tasks carried out during international peacekeeping and antiterrorist operations include:15

13 Polish medical personnel conducted tasks in three Saudi hospitals.

14 UNIFIL -- United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon.

- providing road transportation of people, goods, water, food and fuel from ports and supply bases to particular contingents deployed in the buffer (separation) zone;

- mine, road building and other engineering devices inspections for the needs of peacekeeping force staffs and posts;

- preparing plans and technical specifications of particular operations within the scope of sapper engineering;

- ensuring functioning of peacekeeping forces central supply depots;

- technical maintenance of own and other participating countries vehicles;

- purification of drinking water for particular contingents;

- providing sanitary and medical service for peacekeeping and stabilization forces;

- participation of a group of Polish officers in works of main headquarters of particular missions (including independent command of engineering and medical units).

The number and range of logistic tasks carried out by Polish military contingents in various operations may indicate that there appeared a Polish specialization which included a close cooperation with Canadian units (in the Middle East, Namibia, and Cambodia), and American and NATO elements (in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan). Cooperating countries highly valued logistic tasks completed by Polish subunits for their professionalism. These tasks were also an important element in the international system for the prevention of armed conflicts.

After the fall of Communist Party rule in Poland and other countries of Central Eastern Europe controlled by the USSR, many new armed conflicts broke out and the during ones escalated in violence during the first half of the 1990s. The outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 was a special threat to peace and security on the Old Continent.

The United Nations Security Council decided to send international peacekeeping forces to the region of the conflict, which resulted in a significant qualitative change in the character of the Polish Army units’ participation in international peacekeeping operations. Their contribution consisted of a battalion-strong contingent in the UNPROFOR mission16 in the former Yugoslavia to conduct operational tasks17 (1992-1995). During the following years, Polish operational

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16 UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Forces.

17 Archiwum Instytucji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej w Modlinie (later AIMON), 1224.96.2, Rozkaz dowódcy Jednostki Wojskowej nr 1135 nr 1 z 27.03.1992 r., c. 1.
contingents took part in IFOR\textsuperscript{18} (1996) and SFOR\textsuperscript{19} (1996-2004) peace support operations under NATO command in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{20} It must be underlined that the 16\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Battalion in the 6\textsuperscript{th} Air Assault Brigade from Krakow\textsuperscript{21} was then the first Polish military unit carrying out operational tasks in a NATO mission. After 1999, similar tasks of the KFOR\textsuperscript{22} mission in Kosovo were carried out by a battalion-strong Polish contingent (18\textsuperscript{th} Battalion in 6\textsuperscript{th} Air Assault Brigade from Bielsko-Biała).\textsuperscript{23}

The terrorist attack of Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 in New York, mentioned previously, was the direct reason for the U.S. engagement, and since January 2002, the engagement of other countries, including Poland, in the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter since 2003). It should be stressed, that these activities constitute the new type of multinational operations, which are carried out by international organizations (e.g., NATO in Afghanistan) or a coalition of countries (multinational operation in Iraq). They are also called stabilization operations, which are understood as activities with the use of armed forces, carried out by coalitions of countries (not always with the support of international society) with the aim of keeping or restoring peace and ousting governments, which are not respecting human rights in the area of operation (conflict).\textsuperscript{24} The purpose of these operations is usually to diminish the threat by liquidation of the terrorist forces’ centers, which are very often the spiritual and logistic background for members of terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{25}

Changes in scope and character of operational tasks conducted by the Polish military contingents in peacekeeping, mainly stabilization, operations are presented in the table below.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Since 2004, stabilization activity in Bosnia is continued by European Union peace forces EUFOR during operation “Althea.”} & \textbf{KFOR – Kosovo Forces.} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

18 IFOR – Implementation Forces.
20 Since 2004, stabilization activity in Bosnia is continued by European Union peace forces EUFOR during operation “Althea.”
21 Aimon, 1675.00.1, Zarządzenie szefa Sztabu Generalnego WP nr 136/Sztab z 15.12.1995 r. w sprawie przygotowania 16 bpd do składu Sił Implementacyjnych (IFOR) w ramach operacji NATO w Bośni i Hercegowinie i funkcjonowania batalionu w rejonie misji, c. 171-176.
22 KFOR – Kosovo Forces.
Table 2. Operational tasks carried out by the soldiers of the Polish military contingents in peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the years 1992-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Area of Operation</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Main Types of Contingent Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2   | UNDOF - Syria              | since 1994 | Operational tasks – since 1994:  
- monitoring disengagement of forces.  
- monitoring zones of disengagement and restricted weapons zones. |
- patrolling.  
- controlling vehicle and people movement on roads in the assigned sectors.  
- escorting convoys with humanitarian aid. |
|     | UNCRO- Croatia             | 1995     | - monitoring compliance by the parties with the ceasefire agreements.  
- contributing to conditions conducive to implementation of UN Security Council resolution and economic agreement.  
- monitoring movement of personnel and military equipment across the borders between Croatia and FRY.  
- helping in movement through Croatian territory convoys with humanitarian aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
- patrolling area of responsibility.  
- protecting peacekeeping forces personnel and main objects.  
- monitoring local police force. |
| 9   | IFOR – Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1996     | - monitoring and enforcing implementation, by all parties to the conflict, provisions of Peace Agreement.  
- maintaining contacts with all parties to Peace Agreement.  
- monitoring disengagement zone.  
- patrolling area of responsibility.  
- ensuring freedom of movement for peacekeeping forces.  
- maintaining checkpoints on main roads leading to disengagement zone.  
- controlling weapons and equipment of the parties to the conflict.  
- supporting humanitarian activities. |
| 10  | SFOR – Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1997-2004 | - monitoring situation in the area of responsibility and, when needed, enforcing compliance with Peace Agreement provisions.  
- controlling activities of the parties to the conflict through inspections of declared forces and equipment locations.  
- monitoring approved by SFOR military activities of the parties to the conflict.  
- maintaining permanent liaison with the parties to the conflict. |

26 UNMIH – United Nation Mission to Haiti.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12.</th>
<th>KFOR - Kosovo</th>
<th>since 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|     | - cooperation with the CIMIC Coordination Centre⁷⁷;  
     | - patrolling area of responsibility.  
     | - keeping ready quick reaction force (platoon strength);  
     | - controlling and monitoring marking and clearing mine fields.  
     | - creating conditions conducive to functioning of civilian institutions in order to fulfill civilian aspects of Peace Agreement.  
|     | - taking over responsibility in Kačanik – Strpce sector;  
     | - monitoring demilitarization process and fulfillment of peace agreements in the area of responsibility.  
     | - clearing mines, disposal of unexploded ordnance and obstacles to provide freedom of movement on main communication routes.  
     | - controlling movement on border crossings in: Deneral, Jankovici i Globocica.  
     | - organizing reconnaissance and monitoring system of assigned sector to verify compliance with the peace agreements.  
     | - providing security on main roads in the area of responsibility.  
     | - escorting convoys with humanitarian aid.  
| 13. | PMC Afghanistan ISAF | since 2007 |
|     | - monitoring situation in the area of responsibility.  
|     | - stabilizing situation in the region.  
|     | - coordinating CIMIC projects on the territory of the country (Provincial Reconstruction Teams).  
|     | - supporting process of training of National Afghan Army.  
|     | - creating conditions for handing over authority and functioning of country based on democratic principles.  
| 14. | PMC Iraq “Iraqi Freedom” - Iraq | since 2003 |
|     | - monitoring situation in the area of responsibility to ensure peace and security for local population.  
|     | - collecting and protecting military equipment.  
|     | - creating and providing training for new Iraqi security force.  
|     | - providing basic supplies.  
|     | - helping in administration infrastructure reconstruction.  
|     | - helping in creation of new administration.  
| 15. | EUFOR – Bosnia and Herzegovina “ALTHEA” | since 2004 |
|     | - maintaining military presence in the area of responsibility.  
|     | - collecting and disposal of weapons, ammunition and other fighting equipment.  
|     | - monitoring political, economic and social situation, paying special attention to the upcoming threats.  
|     | - securing freedom of movement of EUFOR forces.  
|     | - supporting international organizations.  
|     | - 24 hour permanent protection of Forces HQ and EUFOR bases on Kinshasa airfields.  
|     | - ad hoc tasks of escorting EUFOR vehicles and personnel in Kinshasa area.  
|     | - providing security for carrying out tasks organized by Forces HQ.  
|     | - maintaining liaison with liaison officers from FARDC.  

⁷⁷ CIMIC -- Civil Military Cooperation.
Air Force unit responsible for protection of airfields N’Dolo and N’Djili (till the end of October 2006). - keeping ready to carry out tasks supporting activities of other subunits (FCIR, OCF). - cooperation with EUPOL in monitoring current situation and police operations.


A detailed analysis of the above data shows that the following were the typical and main operational tasks carried out by PMC:28

- controlling activities of the parties to the conflict through inspections of declared locations of forces and equipment;
- monitoring military activities of the parties to the conflict, which were approved by peacekeeping forces;
- maintaining permanent liaison with the parties to the conflict;
- observing and patrolling assigned areas of responsibility;
- controlling and monitoring the process of marking and clearing minefields;
- controlling people and vehicle movement on designated roads in the area of responsibility;
- escorting convoys with humanitarian aid and VIPs;
- searching objects and places;
- separating local population during demonstrations, state and religious holidays;
- protecting local population (mainly national minorities) from harassment and attacks of hostile paramilitary groups;

- cooperating with the local population representatives within the framework of CIMIC;

- organizing and protecting free elections;

- organizing and training national security forces (military, police);

While thoroughly analyzing Polish military contingents’ participation in international peacekeeping and stabilization operations during the years 1973-2009, one should underline a few pivotal moments in the process of evolution in the way of carrying out these tasks:

- in the years 1973-1992, Polish units conducted mainly logistic tasks (in designated missions, cooperating mainly with Canadian units);

- in 1991, during operations in the Persian Gulf, a Polish logistic contingent for the first time cooperated with NATO soldiers;

- the UNPROFOR operation in former Yugoslavia in 1992 became the turning point in the character of conducted mandate tasks, where Poland for the first time deployed the operational contingent in strength of infantry battalion;

- since 1995, a Polish contingent conducted operational tasks in the framework of IFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under UN auspices and NATO command;

- in 1999, a Polish battalion took part in international peace support KFOR operation conducted by NATO in Kosovo -- for the first time as the contingent of NATO member;

- since 2002, a Polish logistic subunit began performing tasks in the framework of coalition antiterrorist operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan;

- since 2003, Poland engaged in performing tasks in operation “Iraqi Freedom” in Iraq, taking over the zone of responsibility and assuming command over a multinational division (deploying about 2500 soldiers);

- since 2004, PMC performs duties in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of European Union EUFOR operation “ALTHEA”;

- in 2006, a maneuverable subunit of military police took part in EU peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo;

- since 2007, PMC performed operational tasks within international NATO forces - ISAF in Afghanistan;

- since October 2008, Polish Task Forces are the key element of PMC in Afghanistan -- took over responsibility for carrying out tasks in Ghazni Province.
Long-term cooperation with the armed forces of other countries in conducting peacekeeping and then stabilization antiterrorist operations (in Afghanistan and Iraq) is the reason of perceiving Poland, in many societies, as one of the most experienced and well-deserved countries engaged in international community activities to keep peace.

One should stress that the level of activity of military components performing duties in the framework of peacekeeping or stabilization (antiterrorist) operations depends on the growing threat to the international security. Incessantly arising armed conflicts or terrorist acts performed by various extremist organizations make it necessary to permanently prepare and conduct international operations, which are one of the methods of preventing and neutralizing global, regional or national threats.

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*Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, (Warsaw 2002).


Conference Concluding Remarks

by

Major General (R) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu
Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Ministry of National Defense, Romania

Over the past two days, we have listened to more than 20 papers which approached the chosen conference topic from different angles and perspectives. All these papers covered a large spectrum of historical developments generally closely connected with the evolutions, emerged after the imperial demise, on the international arena but also at domestic level in the states affected by the crash of empires.

If we would like to summarize these historical developments, we can conclude that internationally in this paradigm we are witnessing, firstly, a drastic change in the political map of the international scene (the main consequence of the imperial demise) and, secondly, the birth of a new international order according to the will of the victors, when the imperial demise intervenes after a war, or by negotiations if it happens peacefully.

For the first consequence, we have the example of the two liberal orders which emerged after 1919 and 1945.¹

Coming from above, is that international transformation of the system a result of the empires’ crash provoked following a hegemonic war or in a peaceful way meaning via negotiations management of the tectonic dissolution produced by the end of empires within the international system?

As a rule, up to the end of the Cold War, the end of empires took place violently (in the modern era the Napoleonic Empire, the Habsburg Empire, Tsarist Empire, and Ottoman Empire).

What kind of international order appeared after the end of empires?

Here, we should underline as a conclusion, that it is historically proved that it has been a long period of time in which regularly imperial demise took place. For example, the so-called Eastern question, namely the end of the process of dissolution of Ottoman Empire, has extended over more than 115 years.

The end of the colonial empires has happened via processes of reshaping in a sort of regrouping (the case of the British Commonwealth) or an attempt to throw down violently the existing imperial domination (the case of France war in Algeria).

The death of an empire historically involves two aspects: there is a precise historical data in which the empire ceased to exist legally, but inertial, its virtual presence will be felt even for decades implying advancing and retreats, rivalries, etc. This historical feature has proved to be a threat to the stability to the new international order which emerged after the imperial demise.

At the domestic level, the dissolution of empires involves two main processes: a nation-building process and a military construction.

The first process of nation-building, which is today a pregnant presence on the international arena, is developing in two ways which are shaped by the particularity of different cases/situations. The first way is the nation-building process undertaken from both the point of view of expertise and costs assumed by themselves (as it happened in the case of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and even Romania after the First World War) or internationally assisted. In this later case we have the current cases of Bosnia, South-Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Kosovo.

The second process of military construction could be considered a part of the first process, but it has an autonomous evolution due to different historical circumstances. For example, there are cases in which the military of the new states was built from grass as was the situation of the Czechoslovakian Army after the Second World War, or Bosnian military, or by nationalizing the imperial military deployed on the national territory as it was demonstrated here by our Slovenian colleagues who presented an excellent paper on how the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbians built its army after the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

As a first feature we can affirm that a military transformation process might take place especially if the demise of empires develops peacefully. As a general aspect, at both levels, international and domestic, the role of peacekeeping missions should be underlined. These missions have proliferated after the end of Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet Union sanctioning this historical evolution. The peacekeeping missions are undertaken under different aegis: UN, OSCE, European Union, other international and regional organizations. Col. Dariusz S. Kozerawski from Poland and Capt. Olivier Liberge from France gave us excellent accounts on how these missions are performed and how they are developed in the way of carrying out their tasks.

As a general conclusion of our meeting, there are a few aspects that should be underlined: the topic of the conference was of a huge interest for both military historians and specialists on international relations, being closely connected to the current developments of the international arena; it was an enthusiastic answer to the call for papers that we distributed to the potential participants; the papers presented approached
the topic in a comprehensive manner based on solid research leading, therefore, to fertile and productive debates.

At the end, I would like to thank you once again to all of you for your meaningful contribution and constructive discussions we had over the last two days. The Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group achieved another task and we proved that our group deserves to continue its existence and to be listed among the WGs within the PfP Consortium.

Again, it was a great pleasure to welcome you all to Bucharest; I hope to see you in Warsaw, next year.
Appendix A

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EURO-ATLANTIC CONFLICT STUDIES WORKING GROUP

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

END OF EMPIRES: CHALLENGES TO SECURITY
AND STATEHOOD IN FLUX

Under the Patronage of the State Secretary
for Defense Policy and Planning, Mr. Viorel Oancea

25 - 29 May 2008
National Military Center
Bucharest, Romania
**MONDAY, MAY 25**

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<td>• Viorel OANCEA, State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning, Ministry of National Defense</td>
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<td>• Colonel (GS) Dr. Hans-Hubertus MACK, Deputy Director, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam, Germany</td>
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<td>• Major General (r) Dr. Mihail E. IONESCU, Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History</td>
<td>Marble Hall</td>
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<td>10:00-10:15</td>
<td>Family Photo</td>
<td>Moorish Hall</td>
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<td>10:15 – 10:30</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>Moorish Hall</td>
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<td>10:30 – 12:30</td>
<td>Panel 1 <em>End of Empires and Map Changes: Birth of New States</em></td>
<td>Marble Hall</td>
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<td><strong>Moderator: Dr. ERWIN SCHMIDL (Austria)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Keynote speakers:</strong></td>
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<td>10:30-10:50 Dr. Tamara SCHEER (Austria), <em>Two crumbling Empires- One Balkan Region: Ottoman Empire’s and Austro-Hungary’s Military Presence in Sandžak Novi Pazar/Plevlje (1879-1908)</em></td>
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<td>10:50-11:10 Dr. Damijan GUŠTIN, Dr. Vladimir PREBILIČ (Slovenia), <em>New State and the Issue of Defense: the Army of the State of Slovenians, Croats and</em></td>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>Session</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Dr. Sergiu IOSIPESCU (Romania), The End of Empires and State Building in East and Central Europe (XIX-XX century)</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Prof. Grzegorz NOWIK (Poland), Polish Radiointelligence 1918-1920. Austro-Hungarian, Russian and German empires heritage</td>
<td>Dr. Sergiu IOSIPESCU (Romania), The End of Empires and State Building in East and Central Europe (XIX-XX century)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:50</td>
<td>Discussions</td>
<td>Norwegian Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>Norwegian Hall</td>
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<td>14:00</td>
<td>Panel 2 End of Wars: Military Transformation</td>
<td>Marble Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:50</td>
<td>Discussions</td>
<td>Moorish Hall</td>
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<td>15:05</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>Moorish Hall</td>
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<td>16:05</td>
<td>Panel 3 Military transformation, national identity and security interests</td>
<td>Marble Hall</td>
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</table>
Collective Security: National Egotism
17:05-17:25  Dr. Jan HOFFENAAR (Netherlands), Security in Flux: The Netherlands’ Adaptation to the New World Order, 1989-2009

17:25 – 18:00 Discussions

19:00-20:30  Dinner  Norwegian Hall

WEDNESDAY, MAY 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.00-19.00</td>
<td>Cultural program</td>
<td>Bucharest-Sinaia</td>
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<td>19.00-20.30</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
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THURSDAY, MAY 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:30 – 11:20</td>
<td>Panel 4  Resistance Movement, Military Interventions and Peace Operations</td>
<td>Marble Hall</td>
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<td>Moderator: BJC Dr. BRIAN McKERCHER (Canada)</td>
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<td>09:30-09:50</td>
<td>Col. Dr. Tomaž KLAĐNIK (Slovenia), Strategy and tactic of Slovenian Partisan’s and Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>09:50-10:10</td>
<td>Dr. Richard DAVIS (USA), Anglo-American Strategic Bombing of the Balkans</td>
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<td>10:10-10:30</td>
<td>Major Michael BOIRE (Canada), Learning by Doing: The 1st Canadian Armored Brigade in the Sicilian Campaign July-August 1943</td>
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<td>10:30-10:50</td>
<td>Prof. Lars Ericson WOLKE (Sweden), The Military in peace operations: the UN-mission in Congo, 1960-1964</td>
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<td>10:50 – 11:20</td>
<td>Discussions</td>
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<td>11:20 – 11:35</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>Moorish Hall</td>
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<td>11:35 – 13:30</td>
<td>Panel 5  Inside and Between the Two Systems Poles</td>
<td>Marble Hall</td>
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<td>Moderator: LTC THIERRY NOULENS (France)</td>
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<td>11:35-11:55</td>
<td>Dr. Efpraxia PASCHALIDOU (Greece),</td>
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<td>11:55-12:15</td>
<td>Cpt. Zvezdan MARKOVIC (Slovenia), Civil-Military relations in former Yugoslavia (the case of Slovenia)</td>
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<td>12:35-12:55</td>
<td>Major Per IKO (Sweden), Total Defence in Total War: the Swedish military and the non-military defence during the Cold War</td>
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<td>12:55 – 13:30</td>
<td>Discussions</td>
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<td>13:30 – 15:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<td>15:00 – 16:50</td>
<td><strong>Panel 6: Post Cold War: Statehood in Flux and Security</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Moderator: COL. KIM B. HOOPER (USA)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Keynote speakers:</strong></td>
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<td>15:00-15:20 Dr. Tatyana PARKHALINA (Russian Federation), Russian proposal on European Security Treaty and Security System in Europe</td>
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<td>15:20-15:40 MG (r) Dr. Mihail E. IONESCU (Romania), After Cold War: End of States. Birth of States</td>
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<td>15:40-16:00 Cpt. Olivier LIBERGE (France), French forces stabilization tasks in Ivory Coast on year 2004</td>
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<td>16:00-16:20 Col. Dariusz KOZERAWSKI (Poland), The Role and Tasks of Polish Contingents in Peace and Stabilization Operations (1973-2009)</td>
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<td>16:20 – 16:50 Discussions</td>
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<td>16:50-17:00</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
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<td>17:00-17:30</td>
<td><strong>Conclusions and the Way Ahead:</strong></td>
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<td>• MG (r) Dr. Mihail E. IONESCU (Romania)</td>
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<td>• Colonel (GS) Dr. Hans-Hubertus MACK (Germany)</td>
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<td><strong>Discussions on the next annual conference of the CSWG</strong></td>
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<td>19:00 – 20:00</td>
<td><strong>Dinner</strong></td>
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<td>Departure of the participants</td>
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Appendix D

Origins of Central European Military History Seminar

by

William W. Epley and William Stivers

The Central European Military History Seminar began almost by happenstance. In early 1999, Col. Dimiter Minchev, Chief of the International Relations Department of the Military History Institute of Bulgaria, and Dr. Jordan Baev, Professor of International Relations as Sofia University, were visiting Washington, D.C., as guests of Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center of International Scholars. They took the occasion to pay an impromptu visit to the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), where they were met by William Epley and William Stivers of the Center’s International Programs Branch. During this meeting, they broached ideas for establishing a permanent cooperation between the two historical institutes. This initial encounter was capped with a spur-of-the-moment office call on the U.S. Army Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. John Brown, who gave an enthusiastic blessing to the idea. Epley and Stivers decided to expand the project to include additional military history institutes in Central Europe as well as the major institutes in Western Europe.

At the time, the Center of Military History operated one recurring exchange program, which was with the Armed Services General Staff College on Japan. Previous efforts to build permanent contacts with the military history institutes of the former Warsaw Pact states had run aground due to scarce resources: Not only were the Central European states dealing with a difficult economic transition, but the Center itself was still affected by budgetary stringencies stemming from substantial cutbacks during the austerity years of the mid-1990s. Therefore, Epley and Stivers developed a simple formula to facilitate participation notwithstanding fiscal constraints: The partner institutes would establish a permanent seminar that would convene yearly in the Central European states to exchange research on topics determined by consensus of the members. This would allow the Central European colleagues to reach conference locations without excessive travel costs, and allow the “old NATO” colleagues to build new and permanent relationships without having to fund large and massively expensive multinational conferences from their own resources.

To get the project rolling, Epley and Stivers planned a trip to Central Europe in June 1999 in order to gain recruits for their concept. In view of continuing budgetary austerity, they declined to fly within Central Europe and accomplished most of their travel by night sleeper train, in the style of the 1920s. Their first stop was Sofia. Received with extreme graciousness by Minchev and Baev, they spent two full days in consultations over the proposed seminar, complemented by a weekend in the astonishingly beautiful Bulgarian countryside. As they departed Sofia for Bucharest, Col. Minchev valiantly plowed the way through a train station crowded with insistent “porters” wishing to “help” with the luggage.
In Bucharest, they met the Director of the Institute for Political Studies and Military History, Col. Nicolae Vscoi, and his deputy, Col Petre Otu, who greeted them for lunch on the patio of the grandiose Cercul Militar. The ensuing consultations at the Institute resulted in quick agreement from these Romanian colleagues on joining the seminar. Afterward, the American visitors proceeded to a meeting with Brig. Gen. Mihail Ionescu in his office at the Ministry of Defense -- resplendent with its inlaid marble, recalling a de Medici palace. At the time, General Ionescu was Chief of the NATO/WEU Integration Directorate, deeply involved in Romania’s efforts to join NATO. He promised full cooperation, and pointed out, with wry humor, that the deposed dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu, had left behind a lot of good meeting space.

Taking the night train through Transylvania, Epley and Stivers arrived in Budapest, where they lodged in a private pension in a spacious nineteenth-century apartment on the Danube, not far from the Parliament, where they tasted the amenities of the old Hungarian bourgeoisie. Their talks with the Hungarian historian, Brig. Gen. Istvan Szekeres, Deputy General Director of the Military History Institute and Museum, and Dr. Imre Okvath, research chief of the Hungarian History Institute, yielded the same eager assent to the project as they met in the previous two capitals. After the consultations were finished, Epley and Stivers were given a tour of the Museum of Military History. Since they had also visited the Romanian military history museum several days before, they were fascinated by totally different representations of many of the same events. This impressed on them how little they knew of the complex history of the area, and at the same time, demonstrated how valuable the seminar would be for all participants from the “old NATO” states, but particularly for Americans.

The last stop in the journey was Prague, where they arrived at shortly past four in the morning. They were met by then-Captain Eduard Stehlik. He brought them to consultations with Pet Klucina, Director of the Historical Institute of the Army of the Czech Republic, and the two men also quickly associated the Czech Republic with the project. After a visit to the Czech military museum, as well as a display of historical aircraft and armored vehicles some twenty miles from Prague, the first phase of the founding of the seminar was complete.

When they arrived back in Washington, Epley and Stivers reported to General Brown, who gave further encouragement.

Shortly thereafter, the seminar project benefited from some unexpected manna from the Pentagon. A representative of the newly-formed Consortium of Defense Academies and Research Institutes, a subsidiary of the Partnership for Peace program, dropped by CMH to talk about the plans of the Consortium. The Consortium had two main activities that seemed of immediate interest in setting up the seminar. One was the distribution of computers and the establishment of email and internet connectivity in Central European service academies and research institutes. This would be of enormous assistance at a time when most communication was handled -- quite laboriously and unreliably -- by fax. (It now seems like a different historical age, but at the time, the only email connections were to the home addresses of individual colleagues, and these connections were often plagued by worms.) The second was the formation of “working groups” under the auspices of the Consortium. By making the Central European military history seminar a working group of the Consortium, it became possible to pay for the
travel and lodging of participants from non-NATO states through monies available under the Partnership for Peace.

The Consortium would solve, at least during the first several years (i.e., until the aspirant states became NATO members), the budgetary problems facing the seminar. Epley and Stivers went like bees to honey and got in touch with the Consortium office in Europe, located at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. Outlining their intentions, they received prompt approval for the seminar to be organized as a working group. It turned out that the chief of the Consortium, Lt. Col. Kirk Murray (an Oxford-educated, Russian-speaking foreign area officer), had intended to establish a military history working group but had run into several dead ends, and so the CMH project fell into a ready lap. Stivers became, in a very informal appointment, the first working group administrator.

The next step was to gain the participation of Western institutes. Contrary to the myths -- all too prevalent in America -- about Western European “inflexibility” and bureaucratism, all parties responded the invitations quickly and positively -- indeed, with scarcely a breath of delay. A short telephone conversation with the head of the British Army Historical Branch, Ms. Alex Ward, yielded an immediate acceptance. In September 1999, Stivers traveled to Berlin and Varna to deliver a set of lectures. While in Berlin, he made a trip to Potsdam to meet with the chief of the German Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Army Col. Friedhelm Klein, and his deputy, Air Force Col. Hans-Joachim Harder. The two German colleagues accepted without hesitation. Stivers then flew to Bulgaria. The Institute of History of the French Army had sent two officers to the seminar in Varna, organized by Col. Minchev on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the Paris Peace Conference. One, then Lt. Col. Frederic Guelton of Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, was well known in the community of military historians as France’s man for international exchanges. He was accompanied by Major Hervé Roche. When Stivers described the project to them during the opening reception, they expressed immediate interest and promised full support.

With the pieces falling into place, a constitutive meeting was held in Garmisch under Consortium auspices in April 2000. In addition to the institutes visited by Epley and Stivers in the spring of 1999, the Polish and Slovakian institutes, which General Brown had invited via fax, also joined the founding group, bringing the original membership to six. The Western institutes were represented by Ms. Ward for the U.K., Lt. Col. Guelton and Major Roche for France, Colonels Klein and Harder for Germany, and Epley and Stivers for the U.S. Ms. Ward proved especially skillful at resolving certain differences, breaking impasses, and moving the meeting forward. The participants drew up and signed articles of association. They decided to invite Austria and Russia as the first additional members of the seminar. And they decided on the location (Bucharest) and topic (case studies on the Cold War) of the first meeting. The choice of topic, instead of something narrower in scope, was agreed to for the simple reason that members wanted to make it easy to secure contributions from all participants. Ideally, the seminar would rotate through each Central European capital; Sofia was selected as the second site. CMH would continue as the working group administrator up through the first meeting. The French and Germans undertook to assume that responsibility in the following years.
In the summer of 2000, Stivers left CMH to take a post at the Marshall Center, and William Epley stepped in as administrator, and together with the Romanian colleagues, accomplished the difficult work of staging the seminar for the first time in Bucharest, Romania, in the spring of 2001. At that initial meeting, twelve countries were represented and fifteen papers were presented. Each year thereafter, the meeting venues changed and more countries participated. In 2002, the meeting was in Sofia; 2003, Prague; 2004, Budapest; 2005, Vienna; 2006, Bratislava; 2007 Kingston, Canada; and 2008, Ljubljana, Slovenia. In 2009, the seminar came full circle, meeting once more in Bucharest. By 2009, however, it had added as members Spain, Canada, Turkey, Greece, Poland, and Austria, as well as Ukraine and even Macedonia. The success of the seminar is a tribute to the desire of scholars to meet on the common ground of historical science and scholasticism, notwithstanding past quarrels and conflicts. It was made possible by a combination of good will, eagerness to learn, and desire to achieve results without impediments of hierarchy or protocol.