

“21st Century Conflict: From “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) to the “Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs” (RCMA)”

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The title of this conference is “21st Century Conflict: Redefining Security and the Priorities for Cooperation.” One only has to look at a given day’s headlines to see how urgent this topic is, how much national security threats are changing, and how important cooperation can be in enhancing security and stability.

This need to redefine security is being driven by a wide range of factors. They include the new uncertainties in Europe, the rising tensions in Asia, and the brutal ongoing civil-military conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Each region is experiencing new threats and the need for new forms of security.

It is violent religious extremism and international terrorism, the new roles of non-state actors, and the new emphasis on asymmetric warfare, however, that are doing most to make us rethink 21st Century conflict. We now face threats from failed states, civil conflicts, non-state actors, and religious extremists that are civil-military in character and require a much broader approach to cooperation in national security.

These changes in 21st century conflict are forcing us to rethink almost every form of cooperation in national security, the tools we use in meeting these threats, and the way in which we train and educate. They are forcing us to rethink the need to link civil-military operations and the linkages between growing civil problems and civil conflicts.

They are also forcing us to think, educate, and act far beyond the limits of what we once called the “RMA” or Revolution in Military Affairs. We have to go far beyond the beyond the RMA’s emphasis on what we once called conventional warfare. In fact, we now confront the need for an “RCMA,” or Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs.

We must add a civil dimension to 21st Century conflict that responds to the new role national and transnational non-state actors, the systematic exploitation of divisions and tensions within the population of given states and regions, the shift to new kinds of civil-military warfare, and the need for more flexible and adaptive partnerships in security.

The “Conventional” Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Let me begin by addressing the limits that have emerged to the RMA, and what we once thought of as the only “revolution in military affairs.” It seems almost nostalgic now to remember that in 1991, a broad coalition of US, European, and Arab forces fought a war

to liberate Kuwait that involved regular military forces, was fought by conventional forces in direct air-land engagements, and ended in a lasting ceasefire between state actors. It seems equally nostalgic to remember that what many analysts had begun to call the “revolution in military affairs” seemed to be validated by the course of that conflict.

In retrospect, this “revolution” placed a largely traditional emphasis on joint warfare and engagements between attacking conventional forces. It focused on the use of precision guided weapons and suppression of enemy air defense, or SEAD, followed by deep strike and an air-land battle, rapid maneuver, high tempo 24-hour conflict, radical advances in intelligence and targeting, and a near-real time decision cycle based on equal advances in secure communications and digital aids.

Stealth became a reality that showed how a single advance in technology could alter the battle, but ballistic and cruise missiles and missile defense also altered the nature of war. The Iran-Iraq War had already exposed the risk that weapons of mass destruction could be a reality in modern war, but during the conflict, it became clear that Iraq was also seeking to develop nuclear weapons and biological weapons – making proliferation an all too real element of the “revolution in military affairs.”

It took time for the limits to this approach to a RMA to emerge. Even a decade later, that version of the “revolution in military affairs” still seemed likely to dominate 21st Century Conflict. In 2003, another US-led coalition invaded Iraq to deal with the perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction.

This coalition again relied on suppression of enemy air defenses and rapid, high tempo sustained maneuver and the air-land battle. It built on the lessons of previous wars to make far more use of precision strike in both line of sight and stand off operations, and used a greatly improved mix of digital battle management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

In terms of grand strategy, it is also important to note that for much of this relatively brief moment in time, the US and Europe seemed to have emerged as the dominant mix of global military forces, and the US seemed to be the world’s only “superpower.” The Soviet Union had collapsed and at the time, Russia seemed poised to become a future partner. China had not emerged as a major power capable of achieving parity with the US.

More broadly, it was also a moment where the Internet and social networking seemed to have created growing level of global unity reform, and when the steady expansion of world trade seemed to be creating a level of “globalism” that could also help unite and benefit the world.

Yet, within the same year the US led an invasion of Iraq, the defeat of Saddam Hussein began to open up Iraq to sectarian and ethnic civil war, religious extremism, and a mix level of insurgency that the previous efforts to define the “revolution in military affairs” could not cope with.

The Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

In retrospect, strategists, politicians, and military analysts should already have seen that the future would be far more complex and uncertain. They should have done a far better job of remembering just how rapidly history evolves, and how rarely one decade’s

expectations turn into the next decade's realities. There had already been a steady rise in extremism and international terrorism in the 1990s. Moreover, in September 2001, what was becoming a global problem acquired a massive new visibility when Al Qaida attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The fighting in Afghanistan had also begun to provide such warnings well before invasion of Iraq. At first, it did seem that responding with limited amounts of outside airpower and special forces could use the same techniques as the RMA to help local Afghan forces defeat and suppress Al Qaida and the Taliban -- just as the quick defeat of Saddam Hussein's forces in 2003 at first seemed to validate the lessons of 1991 and the existing version of "revolution in military affairs."

However, initial collapse of the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan proved to be all too temporary and local. They quickly acquired a sanctuary in Pakistan, and Taliban and its affiliates began to present a new -- and far more challenging -- combination of terrorism, asymmetric warfare, insurgency, and religious ideological extremism.

By late 2004, similar challenges had emerged in Iraq, along with growing sectarian and ethnic tensions and violence. The Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006 then showed how state sponsorship of a non-state actor and creating a non-state forces with rockets, missiles, and all the tools necessary for irregular warfare could change the regional balance.

More broadly, other 21st century threats were changing the world. The rise of China and the threat of North Korea gave Asia and the Pacific new strategic priority. Iran continued to shift its force structure to focus on irregular warfare, and on the support of non-state actors in other countries. Both China and Iran developed new approaches to irregular or asymmetric warfare in the process -- ones that now include creating artificial islands out of coral reefs.

The Great Recession of 2007 to 2008 showed that "globalism" was scarcely a rising tide that brought on a new level of economic progress and development. Its lingering effects are still a source of tension and problems, and it became all too clear that many nations face critical political, demographic, and economic problems that can trigger lasting civil conflicts as well as critical constraints on their national security spending.

In retrospect, we all should have paid far more attention to the warnings of the Arab Development Reports from 2003 onwards that these forces had reached potentially explosive levels in much of the Middle East and North Africa. In 2011, they helped trigger political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa that have spread throughout the Islamic world, and have created new civil conflicts in states like Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

What some optimistically called the "Arab Spring" then helped to lay the groundwork for the transformation of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) into what became the Islamic State or Daesh and revive the civil war in Iraq while helping to unleash an expansion of religious extremism into Africa, Central Asia, and other parts of the world.

And, asymmetric warfare became a major threat in other regions. The Russo-Georgian crisis of 2008 proved to be the prelude to a far more serious Russian invasion of the Ukraine in late February 2014. It showed that "little green men" could implement a different kind of asymmetric warfare and revolution in military affairs. It again made

European security a critical issue in the West, and it is still unclear how serious the new tensions between Russia and the US and Europe will become.

Dealing with the New Forces Driving 21st Century Conflict

It is important to stress that none of these changes mean that a conference focusing on 21st Century conflict and opportunities for cooperation in security can ignore the advances in the conventional aspect of security and warfare that emerged in 1991 and 2003.

Military planning, cooperation, and education can scarcely ignore the extent to which further advances are taking place in technology and tactics, development like the continuing risk of missile warfare and proliferation, and the fact that all of these changes call for advances in both military professionalism and military education.

And yes, there are other emerging threats. These include new forms of economic warfare, cyberwarfare, use of territorial claims, barriers to international trade and movement, threats to critical infrastructure, and the strategic use of roads, pipelines, rail systems, and the control of the flow of water. Military force can scarcely ignore the fact that geo-economics is becoming as important as geopolitics in some regions of the world.

But, it is now clear that military professionalism and military education must now adapt to the challenges of what amounts to a second form of “revolution in military affairs.” National security must increasingly be tied to meeting the challenges of ideological and religious warfare, to dealing with non-state actors, and to meeting threats that are both civil and military. These changes too call for advances in military professionalism and military education.

New Forms of Ideological Warfare and Struggles for National Unity

One key aspect of this “revolution in civil-military affairs” is the need to fight new kinds of ideological battles using new kinds of weapons. Ideological warfare at the secular level has been largely replaced by warfare at the religious level, religious extremism and by ethnic, racial, tribal, and sectarian tensions.

The world – and particularly the Middle East and Central Asia – is caught up in an ideological war for the future of Islam where violent Sunni extremist movements offer an immediate threat in terms of terrorism and insurgency, but where religious extremism threatens to create far broader divide between Sunni, Shi’ite, and other sects, and which cannot be separated from ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions and conflicts.

This extremism has created non-state actors that are now the most serious threat that many countries face. At the simplest level, nations must respond with stronger and better-trained counterterrorism and counter insurgency forces. They also, however, must create military forces, paramilitary forces, police, and intelligence services that have a new form of jointness and professionalism.

These new forms of ideological warfare are a critical threat to internal security in much of the Islamic world, as well as in Asian and African countries and other parts of the world. They are a source of terrorism and extremism that already threatens the U.S.

Europe, and Africa, Violent non-state actors are committing widespread acts of terrorism, launching violent new forms of insurgency, dividing nations and religions, and producing retaliation in kind.

Religious extremists are fighting their ideological battles using all of the tools of the Internet, as well as other forms of media modern communication, social networking, and civil society. They are exploiting charity as well as international financing systems. They have turned extortion, kidnapping, drugs, and the smuggling of petroleum and archeological artifacts into both new methods of funding raising and further weapons of ideological intimidation.

Dealing with the Causes Rather than Just the Symptoms

Tactical victories and ongoing counterterrorism and internal security operations are still important as a first step in making a broader and more lasting form of victory possible. However, there cannot be any lasting form of “win” where local forces cannot counter the extremist message, identify key tools of extremist activity and influence, and lay the ideological ground work to “hold” and build.”

The transformation of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula into ISIL, the rebirth of the Taliban, the steady spread of extremist movement and non-state actors into new countries and regions, and the flow of foreign volunteers and money to violent extremists in many parts of the world, have all shown there is a critical need for cooperation in countering the threat posed by ideological warfare and religious extremism.

No amount of outside or partner military force can save a host country government from its people. No form of military victory can – by itself – have a lasting effect in the face of these threats. An effective response requires action on a civil-military level to deal with the reasons given portions of the population response to ideological extremism.

There is no one cause of such civil problems, and they vary from cases to case. It is clear, however, that they include failed or weak governance, an inadequate of law, corruption and nepotism, population pressure a youth bulge and unemployment, failed economic development, major shifts population and hyperurbanization, weak or inadequate education, housing shortages, ethnic and sectarian difference, and a reliance on repression instead of reform.

Terrorism, insurgency, and the rise of violent non-state actors are symptoms of these causes and so is the ideological extremism that seeks to exploit them. They are *not the disease*. Accordingly, the use of force alone can at best suppress such challenges, not cure them.

Military and internal security forces must still play a critical role in degrading and destroying such movements. Moreover, this is an international battle where many counties will need allied forces and broad cooperative efforts. *But*, there is no military solution without a matching civil dimension.

No use of international security forces, no mix of tactics and military technology, can produce a lasting victory in this kind of ideological battle and asymmetric warfare without matching civil efforts that counter ideologues, non-state actors, and the outside

states that seek to exploit them. No level of tactical success or victory can matters that loses the population.,

Moreover, ideological warfare is now is being fought in much of the Islamic world ways that seek to exploit all of the broader fault lines in a given state's civil society and often on a generational level. A large share of those who have become extremists -- and who now fight this conflict on the Web and in the field -- are younger men and women alienated from the power structure in their countries and their traditional religious leadership.

The reasons why young men and women -- and others -- become extremists do not have a clear profile. In fact, the need to understand their motives better and how much they vary by movement and country has become a critical aspect of developing a more effective response to 21st Century conflict and for national security strategy and planning.

One example of the sheer scale of the forces at work, however, is the set of demographic pressures that have led to a fivefold increase in the population of the MENA region since 1950. These pressures have interacted with dislocation and hyperurbanization of entire populations, steadily more unequal incomes, growing corruption, and a youth "bulge" and unemployment.

They have helped lead to rapid social changes, alienation, and sometime population migration. They have interacted with a host of other structural political and economic pressures ensure that extremism will be able to capture a significant portion of the population wherever a nation fails to counter it in ideological terms. It also ensures that degrading or repressing a given movement will almost inevitably see the rise of some successor.

The Need for a Civil-Military Approach to National Security

For all these reasons, military and internal security forces must have civil partners that address the causes of such civil-military conflicts. They must take a "whole of government" approach, in dealing deal with the causes of religious extremism and the broader upheavals that have taken place in the world since 2011. These are all struggles where any successful effort to produce lasting security and stability must have a major civil and political dimension.

They are struggles where governments must support their national security forces by seeking to heal the divisions within their society, and must deal with the reasons their populations take sides against their governments and each other. They must address the reasons why extremism and violent non-state actors can find recruits and funding.

Repression alone cannot win such conflicts, and security forces must be bound by the rule of law, new approaches to detention and prison sentences, and efforts to win back volunteers and supporters of extremism. Every major insurgency, civil conflict, or case where terrorism has taken a major foothold is a warning that governments and security efforts must not concentrate on religious or extremists as if they were the only source of such threats.

Nations -- *and their national security forces* -- must examine the impact of internal demographic pressures, urbanization and population movements, limited economic

development, poor distribution of income and government services, unemployment, corruption, and other structural threats to internal security that divided states and push them into civil conflicts. National security forces must objectively assess such factors, and ties their tactics to civil-military efforts that honestly assess them.

There already have been all too many cases where conflicts, ideology, and the actions of violent non-state actors have steadily divided nations along sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and regional lines. If these divisions go too far, even the best internal security efforts cannot prevent political upheavals that can destroy the structure of governance and political norms and prevent the emergence of new national leaders and forces for national unity.

In short, the need for a broader civil-military approach to national security really does require as much of a revolution in military affairs – or more properly – a revolution in civil-military affairs – as the changes in the more conventional forms of warfare.

And, let me again stress a key theme of this conference. This revolution in civil-military affairs has created new areas where sharing successful methods, identifying failures, and cooperation are critical. It is also created new priorities for military education.

We need to develop new forms of international cooperation in finding the best civil and military approaches to the problem. We need new forms of strategic planning that integrate civil-military efforts, use the best methods to actual implement them, and assess the effectiveness of the rest and the ways in which resources are spent. It requires new forms of formal training as well as the development of suitable case studies to uses in national security education.

We need to expand the role of intelligence far beyond identifying terrorist and insurgent threats. We need military forces that achieve far more than tactical success and actually implement “win, hold, and build.” We need new forms of national security teams that work with civilian partners to counter extremist and insurgent influence and create civil-military efforts that can earn the lasting support of the local population.

We require a new approach to cooperation, analysis, training and education, intelligence, net assessment, planning and operations that focuses as much – or more -- on the civil dimension, ideology, asymmetric warfare, and non-state actors as on conventional warfare and military technology,

The Challenge of Non-State Actors and State Support of Non-State Actors

One key aspect of dealing with this revolution in civil-military affairs is to recognize that non-state actors have become as much of a threat as outside states – as well as have become a weapon or tool that hostile states and international movements can exploit.

The Algerian civil war that took place between 1991 and 1998 provided an early warning of how serious threat non-state actors can be in the 21st century. They have since become a major threat in much of North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that even long series of tactical victories can be strategically meaningless without victories at the civil, political, and economic levels.

Moreover, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and other states have also shown that the threat posed by state support of non-state actors has also risen and has evolved far beyond small movements of terrorists, preventing limited flows of volunteers, or controlling transfers of money.

It is now all too clear that non-state actors are becoming steadily better organized and more effective, and that their tactics, organization, funding, and efforts to win political and ideological influence are steadily evolving and becoming more effective.

It is equally clear that once they become well-organized movements of experienced fighters, they can be extremely difficult to defeat, require specialized intelligence and targeting networks to target, and require specially trained Special Forces, and new weapons and reconnaissance systems like unmanned aerial vehicles, (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to attack.

At the same time, non-state actors and extremist movements have learned to use human shields, exploit international law and human rights, combine terror and extortion with jobs and incentives, attack governance and the rule of law as well as national security forces, and even become protostates like ISIL or Daesh.

All these examples show the extent to which 21st century conflict has become a civil-military conflict. Military forces and all the other elements of national security forces – including civil efforts that shape popular support for governments and counter ideological extremism -- need to develop training and expertise in dealing with the full range of threats from non-state actors.

National security forces and intelligence services need to steadily improve their education, readiness, and cooperation in dealing with the rise of non-state actors as major security threats, and especially in preventing them from making the transitions from terrorism to insurgency and from insurgency to protostate.

National security forces must be equally ready to prevent outside states from supporting violent non-state actors as proxies, being used in spoiler roles, used to gain leverage in dealing with other states or to fight non-state actors with other non-state actors. And, security partners need to be ready to cooperate in dealing with a wide range of movements from religious extremists to the creation of such actors by hostile states using specialized elements like the Iranian Al Quds force.

Strategic Partnerships

The impact of non-state actors, terrorism and extremism, the changing nature of insurgency, ideological warfare, and the growing focus on asymmetric warfare do differ from country to country and case to case. The international aspects of such conflicts also vary sharply – even when one looks at a single threat like ISIL operating in two seeming similar neighboring countries like Iraq and Syria.

What all of the developments that make up the revolution in civil-military affairs do have in common, however, is that they all reinforce the need to build more meaningful and flexible strategic partnerships. They all highlight the need for new approaches to structuring such partnerships. They all show the need to go beyond formal security

cooperation and create civil-military partnerships that are flexible and less formal, and are tailored to the specific problems and conditions that threaten given partners.

They show that partnerships as well as national efforts should have both a military dimension – which must often respond quickly and effectively to asymmetric wars dominated by an ideological and civil dimension – *and* a civil dimension that can go from tactical victories and “win” to civil security, healing deep civil divisions, and giving real meaning to “hold and build.”

This does not mean that partnerships should not focus on changes in the military dimension as well – although it this does now mean an equal focus on asymmetric warfare and new forms of conflict. There is a need to evolve new approaches to strategic partnership that focus on the growing diversity in the forms of asymmetric and irregular warfare, and on forms of conflict that increasingly combine ideological, military, political, and economic means.

There is a need to develop a common approach to the tactics for dealing with irregular warfare and civil conflicts. Land, sea, air and missile warfare can be linked to political intimidation and warfare, economic sanctions, terrorism, and insurgency. Conflicts can occur on a multiple levels while rapidly altering the level of deterrence and the structure of alliances.

Creating more effective military partnerships means changes in the use of joint secure communications and data systems. It means new arrangements for sharing key aspects of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It also means a greater emphasis on the growing need for near real time coordination and the rising tempo of operations.

It means taking a common approach to educating and organizing to ensuring the proper changes in interoperability, logistics, and sustainability. It means reshaping arms purchases and military technology to meet the changes in the security threat, and deal with the resulting impacts on logistics and sustainment.

It also means shaping suitable joint training and exercise plans. These are all key areas for cooperation in train and assist missions and in creating new military education programs, as well as cooperation in transfers and creating effective operational responses.

At the same time, strategic partnerships must respond in ways that go beyond military operations and find ways to help partner countries create the best possible mix of civil and military capabilities to deal with local threats on their own, while also creating the best mix of capabilities to support allied reinforcement and power projection capabilities when needed.

Partners must focus as much on “hold and build” as much as on “win.” Joint strategic plans must focus on the restoration of civil order and the rule of law, heal internal divisions with aid and the rapid recovery of conflict areas, restore confidence in governments and rebuild trust. They require an understanding and civil-military effort that reflect the fact that stability operations will often be the most important aspect of the conflict.

Partners must work together to develop and implement mission-oriented force plans, programming, and budgeting that take full account of ideological threats, efforts to exploit ethnic and sectarian tensions and divisions, and the political and economic

problems that help shape the broader “battlefield” in today’s different kinds of wars and military interventions.

The need to combine the capability for conventional and asymmetric warfare, and to plan military forces to play a greater civil-military role, also increase the need for interoperable forces. It means partners must pay even more careful attention to costs and resources, and focusing on common mission priorities

Failed State Wars and Facing the Limits to Military Intervention

Strategic partnerships must do a far better job of adapting to the worst case challenges of the revolution in civil military affairs. These challenges now include the emergence of extreme forms of civil-military conflict in what can only be called “failed state wars.” The levels of prolonged civil and ideological conflict in states like Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan have reached the point where successful national security efforts have become civil-military exercises in “armed nation building.”

Afghanistan is a key example. It has a population of some 29 million to 32 million. It is now in the first stages of a Transition to relying on its own security forces, and far more limited forms of aid and outside military spending. It already has seen a rising threat to more than 10 of its provinces, and unacceptably high casualties to its security forces. Studies by the World Bank and IMF warn of major budget and economic problems.

At the same time, studies of the aid efforts in Afghanistan from 2002 to the present reflect major failures in civil-military coordination, planning and execution, and effective international cooperation. Afghanistan may still succeed, but it faces years of further conflict and uncertainty and 32 million people are clearly at risk.

Iraq is another clear case in point. An apparent victory in the fighting in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 was followed by rising civil conflict in 2011-2013, and the ISIL takeover of much of the Sunni and Western portions of Iraq in 2014 and 2015. More than a decade of aid could not produce effective governance, development, military forces and the rule of law, or national unity between Arab and Kurd or Sunni and Shi’ite. The security forces virtually disintegrated when they were attacked by ISIL, and assessments of the effectiveness civil aid program have far too often been a record of waste, corruption, and failure.

Iraq has become a nation of some 36 million people that is partially occupied, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, has seen more than 3 million of its citizens made into internally displaced person without a home or livelihood, is seemingly a year or more away from a major military effort to restore its unity, and presents a potential challenge in terms of some form of post-conflict political and economic power-sharing federalism that must be resolved at both the civil and security levels.

Syria faces even more direct and brutal threats. Some 250,000 civilians have been killed, and there is no meaningful estimate of the wounded. The UN estimates that a nation of some 19 to 22 million had 7.6 million internally displaced persons at the end of March 2015 and 3.9 million refugees in other countries. It was increasingly divided along sectarian lines and into the rule of repressive Assad regime and mix of movements like

ISIL and the al Nusra Front – an affiliate of al Qa’ida. The UN estimated that a total of 12.2 million civilians – well over 50% of the population -- were at risk along with some 5.5 million children.

Libya too has steadily deteriorated into civil conflict, tribal divisions, regional divisions, and violent religious extremist movements. Oil wealth has to some extent eased the problems its 6.3 million people face, but Libya cannot avoid the growing cumulative human impact of ongoing violence, and failed governance, development, and social order. The World bank estimates that its per capita income in PPP terms has dropped from an average of over \$21,000 in 2010-2013 to some \$12,000, and to only \$5,340 in current prices.

The crisis in Yemen is still developing -- but like previous four countries -- Yemen is steadily mixing religious extremism with growing sectarian tension and conflict. Like Afghanistan, Yemen is extremely poor and far more vulnerable to the disruptions of war than wealthier states. It has a population of some 26 million, failed governance, a failed economy, and ongoing civil conflict.

Taken together, the “failed state” threat in these five countries affects the destiny of some 120 million people -- even if one ignores all of the massive impact that their problems have on the nations around them. Moreover, similar conflicts now threaten to escalate in Africa and Asia.

These levels of conflict also involve challenges no national security structure in the developing world can meet on its own. They push military operations far beyond the narrow limits of traditional stability operations. They require prolonged international cooperation and aid in both establishing and maintaining security and helping to reconstruct national politics, governance, economies and civil societies.

One way or another, some form of more effective international cooperation must be developed at the civil and national security levels that can do a better job of dealing with each existing case, as well as with the risk that the spread of violent extremism will create new cases.

Strategic Planning: The Need for a New Degree of Realism, Honesty, and Transparency

Strategic partnerships also require the development and execution of strategic plans that are honest in dealing with just how serious the revolution in civil-military affairs has now become. Each of the previous failed state conflicts has posed problems on a scale that neither its own government nor its security partners have been willing to openly and properly address.

Each became a case where the host country government tried to rely on denial and propaganda. Each became a case where the outside civil and military effort has failed to come to fully grips with the causes of conflict, and where the outside military role in terms of helping to build stability was uncertain and poorly defined.

This was partly been a result of allowing the scale of such conflicts to escalate to the point where an effective civil response became more and more difficult. It also, however, was the result of the fact these conflicts had political, religious, and ideological aspects

that have made it hard for governments to openly address and deal with. They also created new barriers to security cooperation even among allies that have shown they can cooperate in many other ways.

Each major aspect of this second “revolution in military affairs” has involved areas that have acute political sensitivity in given countries. Each has created a natural tendency to respond with empty reassurances and public relations exercises, with denial and delay, and by leaving them in in limbo, and to focus on more traditional forms of conflict and military education.

It has also become all too clear that no country is yet ready to teach rather than learn. There have been all too many areas in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria where the U.S. and other outside partners have failed to face the seriousness of these challenges, the limits to their civil-military operations, and the need to change and adapt.

A meaningful strategic plan for serious civil-military conflicts requires a new degree of realism, honesty, and transparency about the interactions between the use of force and the ability to meet civil challenges. Denial, spin, and indifference – like a focus on tactical victories –cannot have a lasting strategic meaning.

These are mistakes to learn from, rather than forget. General Petraeus put it all too well when he was asked whether the US learned from the lesson of past wars. He responded by saying. “Well, we take note of them.” The time has clearly come to learn from the lessons of the past and particularly from the lessons of 9/11, 2003, and 2011.

Strategic plans must be based on net assessments of all of the civil and military forces that shape today’s civil conflicts, fuel ideological extremism and support for violent non-state actors, and give states like Iran and Russia leverage in using non-state actors and asymmetric warfare to further divide and exploit such conflicts.

A proper response also requires changes in military training and education to show officers and planners at every level how to measure and counter such divisions and look beyond tactical victories to create lasting civil-military stability and security.

It requires similar education and training of key civil elements in government that deal with education, media, and civil society to act as partners in civil-military operations. There need to be new curriculums at every level of education and training and particularly at the staff college and national defense university level.

Rethinking Train and Assist Missions

Another key example of the need for better cooperation, training, and education is the train and assist mission. Recent combat has shown all too clearly that partnerships need to take account of the civil-military lessons of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Military and civil leaders need to be educated at every level to learn these lessons, and to rethink and broaden their train and assist missions. They need to focus on combat effectiveness and on effectiveness in civil-military operations, and not just on generating new forces.

Force generation does remain a key part of military cooperation and education. New and replacement units do need to be created by recruiting and training personnel, providing suitable equipment and facilities, and forming the unit. There will also be times when outside support from the rear may be enough. However, several thousand years of

military history should serve as a warning that there are no times when leading from the rear is adequate in actual combat.

No amount of training and force generation in the rear, however, can really prepare new units or their leaders for combat. This can create critical problems when outside or allied forces are withdrawn, and new units are sent into combat – as the problems new local forces encountered in the fighting in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown.

Far too many of today's train and assist missions are a recipe for failure at the tactical or "win" level. No one can create effective combat leaders and forces from the rear. Generating or rebuilding forces in the rear is not enough, and is an almost certain recipe for failure. New or weak forces need forward deployed teams of advisors to help them actually fight, to win, and then to immediately act to "hold and build along civil-military lines.

New and weak units need to have a small, but experienced teams of combat leaders embedded with them. Forward deployed train and assist teams – usually Special Forces or Rangers – are necessary to spot good combat leaders and warn against weak, ineffective, or corrupt ones. They are critical in providing the assessment of tactics, defensive positions, and patrol activity. Forward deployed train and assist are needed to encourage active patrolling, and help keep new units active and from becoming static or defensive.

New combat leaders and units need months of on-the-ground help in getting the essentials of combat operations right. Modern forward air control is critical, and the use of drones can make it effective far beyond the line of sight, but so is help in developing effective human intelligence. Insurgents cannot be allowed to have a massive intelligence advantage on the ground, to learn the weakest links in the government forces and their defense, attack them, roll-up the weaker units, expose the flanks and position of the better units, and then force them into what at best is partially organized retreat.

Train and assist teams are needed to provide a second voice when resupply, reinforcement, regrouping, and relief are required. Someone has to bypass the barriers, rigidities, and sectarian/ethnic prejudices in the chain of command and send the right signals to the top..

At the same time, the role of train and assist missions must be broadened to include the civil side of operations. Every tactical victory or success has an immediate sequel: The need for immediate efforts to restore civil life, ensure that victories in irregular warfare does not mean the excessive use of force or revenge, or leaving civilians without support, security, and immediate incentives to support and trust their governments.

Going from "win" to "hold and build" requires a consistent effort at every level from high command to the field, and from strategic planning to day-to-day operations. However, forward deployed train and assist teams can play a critical role in encouraging effective civil-military action. They also can play a critical role in providing advice and feedback in the all too many cases where host country units, militias, and paramilitary forces have has a different ethnic or sectarian bias -- or simply think and act in tactical terms. They can help partners create a local capability to hold, recover, and build at the military and civil levels..

Ideological Warfare and the Changing Role of Strategic Communications

Strategic partners need to be far more forthright in addressing the fact that many 21st Century conflicts have become ideological conflicts that must also be fought on ideological terms. Some of the key weapons involved in meeting these new threats are civil. They are job creation, better and more relevant education, improving key state services like health and medical treatment, reducing corruption, and making governance more responsive to popular needs.

Winning the ideological battle must be a key element in shaping security and counterinsurgency operations, in limiting civilian casualties and collateral damage, in protecting the population, and providing for civil recovery after operations take place. The military and security forces involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency need expert help to explain to their populations and the outside world why force is being used in given ways, to counter extremist propaganda, warn when given types of military and internal security action are counterproductive, and deal with detainees and prisoners.

Key military and national security activities like strategic communications must change radically in response. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts must work with every possible civil element to cope with the extraordinary challenge of dealing with religion, the problems and expectations of a nation's youth, and countering other internal divisions.

National security forces must develop new approaches to educating and reaching the civil population that can be used to counter extremist propaganda. This means finding -- and institutionalizing -- new ways to exploit modern communications, media, the Internet, and social networking that can preserve national security while imposing the smallest possible burden on civil society.

There are limits to what outsiders can do in addressing critical issues like religion. However, there is still a critical need for partner countries that have advanced intelligence, computer, and communications capabilities to assist nations with less capability to identify and track what is happening. This is an areas where far more work is needed to identify areas of cooperation, but they clear include aid in identifying extremist uses of the Internet, media, social networking and other recruiting, revenue raising, and communications tools

Better methods of winning the ideological battle in strategic communications need to be refined, shared, and made available to every security partner. Countering recruiting, the movement of foreign volunteers, extremist propaganda, and fund raising efforts all need to be cooperative efforts. at the same time, the West and Asian states need to learn from the Islamic world how to best reach their Muslim population with respect and reassurance, rather than relying on repression.

Similar cooperation is needed to ensure that joint military operations and outside training and assist efforts minimize the risk of divisions between the forces of largely Islamic and allies and forces and advisors from non-Islamic states.

Cases like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen have all shown that these aspects of cooperation are critical, and the new forms of civil-military cooperation are needed if

Western or non-Islamic forces with different cultures and values are to work successfully with local police, militias, and other non-state actors – not only to build trust between outside and national forces, but to minimize the tension between different ethnic groups and sects.

***Human Shields and Propaganda:
Rethinking Rules of Engagement, Targeting, and Strategic
Communications***

The problem of rules of engagement, targeting, and the use of force that can produce civilian casualties and collateral damage is another area that needs special attention. One of the clear lessons of the last decade and half of 21st Century conflict is the need for strategic partnerships to find better ways to address the issue of how to reshape rules of engagements and the use of force in dealing with ideological conflicts, civil conflicts, and asymmetric wars.

Operations need to both take full account of the need to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, and to ensure that this does not paralyze the effective use of force. There is an equal need avoid creating a political climate and rules of engagement whose net effect is to prolong conflicts, paralyze effective military action, raise the cumulative total of civilian casualties and collateral damage, and increase the risk of defeat.

Non-state actors, ideological extremists, and supporting outside states have already focused on the use of human shields, exploiting civilian casualties and collateral damage, and finding ways to limit or paralyze the proper use of military force. They have made such propaganda and political warfare a key aspect of their operations, and they have often done so with great success.

The problems created by dealing with irregular and ideological warfare should not become problems that make it impossible to make effective use of the advances in targeting, precision strike capabilities, and UAVs and the other advances in IS&R. The use of air and missile power should take careful account of political sensitivities, humanitarian considerations, and make every effort to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage. But, states need to rethink the steady rise in limits to their rules of engagement, and restrictions on the use of airpower, and the problems in strategic communications in describing what such military systems do.

Non-state actors cannot be allowed to make human shields a new constant in every form of irregular and potentially conventional war. This ignores the grim realities of war. There is nothing humanitarian about saving a small number of civilian lives and opening whole towns and cities up to prolonged occupation by threats like ISIL. There is nothing humanitarian about prolonging wars, producing far higher net casualties, and adding to the massive totals of displaced persons and refugees.

The horrors of war are not shaped by a single target or moment in time, but by the cumulative impact of a conflict. There also is nothing cowardly about using force at a distance to strike at forces that butcher minorities, civilians with different religious beliefs, and prisoners of war.

Strategic partnerships must do a far better job of addressing every aspect of these issues. This means changes in strategic planning, the use of technology, intelligence, targeting, and damage assessment. It also means changes in education, training, and exercises

At the same time, however, there is a need for strategic planning that ensures that effective strategic communications efforts take place that explain the real world necessities of war, that focus on the use of human shields and false casualty claims, that address the cumulative impact of each side's actions on civilian casualties and damage, and that show that there are credible efforts in "hold and build" and stability operations that have a major civil and humanitarian dimension.

The civil-military partnerships must be transparent enough to be fully credible, to reach out to threatened and divided populations, to obtain media support, and ensure that action follows words and pledges. The use of military force not only cannot be meaningful or justified without enduring civil success, it cannot win.

Redefining Security and the Priorities for Cooperation

This is a complex and daunting list of ongoing 21st Century challenges that interact in many different ways. It is particularly challenging because we are talking about two "revolutions in military affairs" and not just one.

No military officers or national security planner can ignore the fact that all of the traditional problems in creating effective military forces and security cooperation still exist. None can ignore the fact that the preparation of forces for 21st century conflict is complicated by rising costs, constant shifts in technology and related tactics, and by a growing need for new levels of military professionalism.

It is clear, however, that there is a revolution in civil-military affairs, that there are solutions to the problems this revolution raises, and that the right kind of strategic partnership is one of them. It is equally clear from the that changes in military education and curriculums can help prepare both officers and civilians for these new challenges.

Each area of possible improvement is a subject in itself, but all of the following steps can clearly make a difference:

- Preparing for asymmetric and irregular warfare as methods of conflict that have equal importance to conventional warfare, and whose political and economic dimensions will often be as or more important than their tactical dimensions.
- Accepting the fact that there will often be no clear dividing line between terrorism, insurgency, and the divisions created by other forces within nations that sometimes approach the status of failed states.
- Accepting and responding to the challenge of religious ideological extremism as a key element of war, and the exploitation of sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional, and other differences and fault lines as methods of irregular warfare.
- Developing new forms of net assessments that produce a clear civil-military picture of the forces driving the emergence of non state actors and internal civil tensions and conflicts, and the relative strength and weaknesses of threat forces, host country forces, and outside strategic partners
- Creating strategic and tactical plans that look beyond "win" to civil-military stability operations that can produce both a quick response and lasting solution to "hold and build."

- Preparing both military and civilians, and aid personnel, for an effective whole of government approach to such conflicts.
- Rethinking strategic communications to respond to ideological threats and threats from non-state actors, to explain and justify the necessary military operations and civil actions, and wage ideological warfare as a key element of asymmetric warfare.
- Developing new rules of engagement, conflict assessment, and methods of strategic communications to find the best balance between effective methods of waging war and the need to limit cumulative casualties and collateral damage.
- Redefining strategic partnerships to have the flexibility to be effective in given conflicts.
- Developing new case studies, models, and exercises that reflect the successes and failures in past conflicts, and learn the civil-military, ideological, and broader lessons of past wars.

In fact, each has become an essential steps in dealing with the new forms of conflict that have emerged in the 21st Century.

It is true that every power must adapt its military forces, training, and education in its own way. One size definitely does not fit all. Virtually every state faces a different mix of these challenges, and has different priorities for dealing with them.

At the same time, the fact that strategic partnerships require a new degree of flexibility scarcely makes them less important. The last two decades have provided consistent brutal lessons about the cost of ignoring any of these 21st Century changes in the nature of war. They have shown again and again that successful military and national security operations must meet these new threats, set new priorities for cooperation, and be ready for new forms of conflict.

The key message that we should take from revolution in civil-military affairs is not that it is difficult or somehow impossible to deal with. It is rather that all of us – civilian policy makers, military commanders, planners, educators, and NGOs – need work together. We face challenges that we must not only accept, but also embrace.

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Web version:
www.csis.org/burke/reports

The Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

Case Studies in the Civil Forces Driving “Failed State Wars” in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan

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CSIS


**CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**Burke Chair
In Strategy**

July 2015


The Broader Crisis in Civil-Affairs

Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism



Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, Accessed June, 2015
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>


Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Ranking (Out of 177)



Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index “The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.”

Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Accessed April 2014. <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/>


Gulf GDP Per Capita by Country



■ CIA GDP Estimate, PPP
 ■ World Bank GDP Estimate, PPP
 ■ IMF GDP Estimate, PPP
 ■ IMF Current Prices
 ■ World Bank Current Prices


Sources (Accessed June, 2015): World Bank Indicators: GDP Per Capita, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>
 CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>
 International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org>

The Gulf: A Case Study: Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050 (In Millions)




Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed April 2014.
<http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>

The “Youth Bulge” (Percentage of Native Population Below 25)



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2014, Accessed April 2014,
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region (2008): The Threat From POAYMs



Extremist Non-State, and State Threats



Areas outside of Syria and Iraq in which the Islamic State has declared a wilayat, or state, of the Caliphate.



Source: The Soufan Group

THE WASHINGTON POST

Al-Qaeda allies



THE WASHINGTON POST

Iranian Influence

Lebanon Hezbollah is considered Iran's proxy in Lebanon. It follows Iranian leadership and acts in Iran's interest.

Syria Iran is a strong ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and is active in Syrian command structures and on the ground through proxies, including Hezbollah.

Iraq Iran has directed military offensives against ISIS in Iraq and provided arms and training to Iraq's Shiite militias.

Bahrain Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of backing opposition from the Shiite majority against the Sunni monarchy.

Yemen Tehran has provided money and possibly arms to the Houthi movement, but does not seem to exert a strong influence over the group as it does with Hezbollah.



The New York Times; Source: Institute for the Study of War

Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-arabia-iran.html?_r=0

Regional Strategic Partnerships and Alliances Alliances

Key Islamic Partners Affecting MENA Security

- ❑ **Bahrain** (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf),
- ❑ **Egypt** (Critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),
- ❑ **Jordan** (ally deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),
- ❑ **Kuwait** (provides air bases and land warfare facilities),
- ❑ **Lebanon** (US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),
- ❑ **Morocco** (key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),
- ❑ **Oman** (ally and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),
- ❑ **Qatar** (locate main U.S. airbase in the Gulf, and member of the coalition against ISIS),
- ❑ **Saudi Arabia** (main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism, ❑ **Turkey** (which is a long-standing NATO ally)
- ❑ **UAE** (key military partner to U.S. air and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, provides bases US allies like Britain and France).

Saudi, UAE, GCC Influence



The New York Times


Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-arabia-iran.html?_r=0

Countries Fighting ISIL in Iraq



Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-arabia-iran.html?_r=0

Libya




Libya Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, May 2015)

- **Population:** 6,244,174 (July 2014 est.)
- **Youth Bulge: 45.1%:** 0-14 years: 26.9% (male 859,016/female 820,643); 15-24 years: 18.2% (male 586,7492/female 546,602)
- **Entering Labor Force Annually:** male: 59,547; female: 57,070 (2010 est.)
- **Ethnic Divisions:** Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians)
- **Sectarian Divisions:** Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist 0.3%, Hindu <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated 0.2%, other <.1. note: non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (<1% of the population) and foreign Muslims (2010 est.)
- **Urbanization:** 78.4% (1.13% per year)
- **GDP vs. Labor Force:** agriculture: 2%, industry: 45.8%, services: 52.2% (2014 est.) versus agriculture: 17%, industry: 23%, services: 59% (2008 est.)
- **GDP:** \$103.3B (PPP 2014) \$49.34B (2014 Official Exchange Rate) PPP down from \$148i.9 in 2012.
- **Per Capita Income:** \$16,600 (2014 in \$2013) (95th in the world, down from \$24,700 in 2312)
- **Budget:** revenues: \$18.24 billion; expenditures: \$25.228 billion (2014 est.)
- **Taxes & Other Revenues:** 37% of GDP
- **Exports vs. Imports:** \$17.49 billion(\$34.91 in 2013) vs. \$16.08 billion (\$26.79 in (2013)
- **Direct Unemployment:** 30% (2004)
- **Poverty Level:** 33 1/3%
- **Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking:** 166th worst of 175 countries

Demographic Pressures on Libya

**Libya Total Population
(millions)**




	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Total Population (millions)	0.96	1.12	1.34	1.62	2.00	2.57	3.06	3.66	4.10	4.84	5.03	5.57	6.11	6.41	6.94	7.38	7.77	8.14	8.47	8.75	8.97
Population Growth Rate (percent)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.1%	2.6%	0.7%	2.2%	1.9%	1.8%	2.2%	1.3%	1.1%	1.0%	0.9%	0.7%	0.6%	0.4%
Total Annual Births (millions)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.135	0.130	0.125	0.121	0.118	0.119	0.116	0.115	0.112	0.111	0.111	0.112	0.111	0.111


Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway>, Accessed June 15, 2015.

World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Libya


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

Libya: The Real World Limits of Per Capita Oil Wealth

OPEC (excluding Iran) per capita net oil export revenues

Country	Nominal (\$)					Real (2014\$)				
	2013	2014	2015	2016	Jan-Feb	2013	2014	2015	2016	Jan-Feb
					2015					2015
Algeria	\$1,541	\$1,326	--	--	\$98	\$1,565	\$1,326	--		\$98
Angola	\$1,933	\$1,674	--	--	\$136	\$1,964	\$1,674	--		\$136
Ecuador	\$656	\$693	--	--	\$57	\$666	\$693	--		\$56
Iran	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		--
Iraq	\$2,727	\$2,682	--	--	\$217	\$2,771	\$2,682	--		\$217
Kuwait	\$29,061	\$25,362	--	--	\$2,037	\$29,529	\$25,362	--		\$2,035
Libya	\$4,248	\$1,250	--	--	\$47	\$4,317	\$1,250	--		\$47
Nigeria	\$529	\$483	--	--	\$39	\$538	\$483	--		\$39
Qatar	\$40,770	\$36,013	--	--	\$2,768	\$41,427	\$36,013	--		\$2,765
Saudi Arabia	\$9,053	\$7,900	--	--	\$621	\$9,199	\$7,900	--		\$620
UAE	\$10,442	\$9,435	--	--	\$732	\$10,610	\$9,435	--		\$731
Venezuela	\$2,366	\$2,016	--	--	\$165	\$2,404	\$2,016	--		\$165
OPEC	\$2,514	\$2,186	\$1,114	\$1,481	\$172	\$2,554	\$2,186	\$1,113	\$1,439	\$172

View  nominal or  real data (2005-16)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration derived from EIA's March 2015 *Short-Term Energy Outlook*.

Libya: The Real World Limits of National Oil Wealth

OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export revenues

Country	Nominal (billion \$)					Real (billion 2014\$)				
	2013	2014	2015	2016	Jan-Feb 2015	2013	2014	2015	2016	Jan-Feb 2015
Algeria	\$55	\$48	--	--	\$4	\$56	\$48	--		\$4
Angola	\$27	\$24	--	--	\$2	\$27	\$24	--		\$2
Ecuador	\$10	\$10	--	--	\$1	\$10	\$10	--		\$1
Iran	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		--
Iraq	\$87	\$87	--	--	\$7	\$88	\$87	--		\$7
Kuwait	\$90	\$81	--	--	\$7	\$91	\$81	--		\$7
Libya	\$29	\$9	--	--	\$0	\$29	\$	--		\$0
Nigeria	\$82	\$77	--	--	\$6	\$84	\$77	--		\$6
Qatar	\$42	\$38	--	--	\$3	\$42	\$38	--		\$3
Saudi Arabia	\$278	\$246	--	--	\$19	\$282	\$246	--		\$19
UAE	\$57	\$53	--	--	\$4	\$58	\$53	--		\$4
Venezuela	\$67	\$58	--	--	\$5	\$68	\$58	--		\$5
OPEC	\$824	\$730	\$380	\$515	\$58	\$837	\$730	\$380	\$501	\$58

View  nominal or  real data (2005-16)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, derived from EIA's March 2015 *Short-Term Energy Outlook*.

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Libya in 2015: 188th worst of 189 Countries

REGION	Middle East & North Africa
INCOME CATEGORY	Upper middle income
POPULATION	6,201,521
GNI PER CAPITA (US\$)	11,046
CITY COVERED	Tripoli

DOING BUSINESS
2015 RANK

188

DOING BUSINESS
2015 DTF** (%
POINTS)

33.35

DOING BUSINESS
2014 RANK***

188

DOING BUSINESS
2014 DTF** (%
POINTS)

33.36

CHANGE IN RANK

0


CHANGE IN DTF** (%
POINTS)

↓ -0.01

Rankings	Distance to Frontier
----------	----------------------

TOPICS	DB 2015 Rank	DB 2014 Rank	Change in Rank
Starting a Business	144	137	↓ -7
Dealing with Construction Permits	189	189	No change
Getting Electricity	65	60	↓ -5
Registering Property	189	189	No change
Getting Credit	185	185	No change
Protecting Minority Investors	188	188	No change
Paying Taxes	157	155	↓ -2
Trading Across Borders	139	138	↓ -1
Enforcing Contracts	126	126	No change
Resolving Insolvency	189	189	No change

UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Iraq in 2015: 55th worst of 187 Countries



6/16/2015

IMF Summary Data on Libya in 2015

Subject Descriptor	Units	Scale	Country/Series-specific Notes	2013	2014	2015
Gross domestic product, constant prices	National currency	Billions	i	31.913	24.244	25.359
Gross domestic product, current prices	National currency	Billions	i	83.302	52.320	46.876
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP	Current international dollar	Billions	i	126.603	97.580	102.978
Inflation, average consumer prices	Index		i	163.725	168.309	171.937
Volume of imports of goods and services	Percent change		i	2.470	-23.275	9.995
Volume of exports of goods and services	Percent change		i	-23.816	-67.754	-3.046
Population	Persons	Millions	i	6.122	6.213	6.305
General government revenue	National currency	Billions	i	54.762	21.395	12.870
General government total expenditure	National currency	Billions	i	58.133	44.178	44.816
General government net debt	National currency	Billions	i	-77.363	-53.675	-23.410
General government gross debt	National currency	Billions	i	2.743	20.563	20.563
Current account balance	U.S. dollars	Billions	i	8.895	-12.391	-18.064
Current account balance	Percent of GDP		i	13.577	-30.113	-52.759


IMF,

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=74&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=count&ry&ds=.&br=1&c=512%2C433%2C463%2C474&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CTM_RPCH%2CTX_RPCH%2CLUR%2CLP%2CGGR_NGDP%2CGGX_NGDP%2CGGXWDN_NGDP%2CGGXWDG_NGDP%2CBCA%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a=EM,21.5.15


6/16/2015

Libya

Libya – Terror Incidents




Libya – Fatalities



Source: START Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

Libya Population Density (UN OCHA) 3/2011




Ethnic Divisions in Libya




Source:

https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Libya+tribes&tbn=isch&imgil=Nv_7SFmPlkUDfM%253A%253BtrY0sSD5IYs2dM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fcrooksandliars.com%25252Fmatt-osborne%25252Fwhat-just-happened-libya&source=iu&pf=m&fir=Nv_7SFmPlkUDfM%253A%25252CtrY0sSD5IYs2dM%252C_&usg=__FuA-54aXu74XUMjsgfkQbGcphA%3D&biw=1571&bih=963&ved=OCCoQyjdqFQoTCOqwwomyksYCFYQdvAodtH8AnA&ei=xyF_VaqxJ4O78gW0_4HgCQ#imgsrc=Nv_7SFmPlkUDfM%253A%3BtrY0sSD5IYs2dM%3Bhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.generationaldynamics.com%252Fww2010%252Fg110309.jpg%3Bhttp%253A%252F%252Fcrooksandliars.com%252Fmatt-osborne%252Fwhat-just-happened-libya%3B579%3B458

Energy Vulnerability in Libya



Population and Energy Production in Libya




Source:


https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Libya+tribes&tbm=isch&imgil=Nv_7SFmPlkUDfM%253A%253BtrY0sSD5IYs2dM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fcrooksandliars.com%25252Fmatt-osborne%25252Fwhat-just-happened-libya&source=iu&pf=m&fir=Nv_7SFmPlkUDfM%253A%25252FtrY0sSD5IYs2dM%25252C%25252FfuA-54aXu74JUMjsgfkQbGcpA%3D&biw=1571&bih=963&ved=0CCoQyjdqFQoTCOqwwomyksYCFY0dvAodtH8AnA&ei=xyF_VaqxJ4O78gW0_4HgCQ%3D&imgsrc=p5uEols1vWLEBm%253A%3BP0JT6zEphDJYuM%3Bhttp%253A%25252F%252Fchurlsgonewild.files.wordpress.com%252F2011%252F03%252Flibya.jpg%3Bhttp%253A%25252F%252Fbsa-troop621.org%252Fphotographufm%252Fmap-of-libyan-tribes%3B800%3B635

Rise of ISIL and Areas of Occupation in both Iraq and Syria

Islamic State setbacks

Dissent, defections and reversals on the battlefield are steadily eroding the Islamic State's aura of invincibility in Syria and Iraq, suggesting that the group is starting to fray from within as its many enemies step up their offensives on multiple fronts.





6/16/2015

, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391>

DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL's Reduced Operating Areas as of April 2015

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014.


ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL's area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda', Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/20150410_ISIL_Map_Unclass_Approved.pdf



6/16/2015

ISIS Relies on Extortion and Taxation

ISIS' estimated assets as of the fall of Mosul in June 2014

\$875 mil.



ISIS' estimated major revenue sources in 2014

\$600 mil. Extortion and taxation in Iraq

\$500 mil. Stolen from state-owned banks in Iraq

\$100 mil. Oil

\$20 mil. Kidnapping ransoms



The New York Times | Sources: Patrick B. Johnston, Benjamin W. Bahney, and Howard J. Shatz at RAND Corporation, U.S. Department of the Treasury

The Islamic State takes in more than \$1 million per day in extortion and taxation. Salaries of Iraqi government employees are taxed up to 50 percent, adding up to at least \$300 million last year; companies may have their contracts and revenue taxed up to 20 percent. As other revenue streams have stalled, like banks and oil, the Islamic State has adjusted these rates to make taxation a larger portion of its income.


Oil revenue has fallen to about \$2 million per week, but the group is not dependent on oil income. Much of the production is used for its own fuel. Past oil sales show that the Islamic State was already selling oil at deep discounts that fluctuated among local markets — for instance, selling oil for less in Kirkuk than in Mosul.

The largest expenditure is salaries, which is estimated to be between \$3 million and \$10 million every month. The Islamic State also invests in police-state institutions, such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation, but provides relatively few services.

The group avoids investment in infrastructure because it can be an easy target for attacks, and the territory it holds can change quickly. The group minimizes costs by looting military equipment, appropriating land and infrastructure, and paying relatively low salaries. The group also limits its vulnerability by shifting operations, transitioning between expanding its territory and fueling terrorist activity. The Islamic State's loss of ground in Tikrit last month, for example, has not stopped it from launching attacks in other parts of Iraq and Syria and taking the Iraqi city of Ramadi this weekend.


Patrick B. Johnston, Benjamin W. Bahney, and Howard J. Shatz at RAND Corporation, Financial Action Task Force, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Institute for the Study of War Sarah Almukhtar, "ISIS Finances are Strong," NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/19/world/middleeast/isis-finance.html?_r=0.

Air Campaign



Confirmed air strikes up to 3 June 2015

IRAQ 2,489 SYRIA 1,524



■ IS control ▨ IS support

■ Kurdistan Government-administered

100 km 50 miles

Note: Strikes have not been mapped when the precise location was not given or was unclear.


Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command

BBC

6/16/2015

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, May 20, 2015

Air strikes in Iraq and Syria



Figures are up to 3 Jun 2015

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

TARGETS DAMAGED/DESTROYED*

 Tanks	77
 HMMWV's	288
 Staging Areas	427
 Buildings	1,779
 Fighting Positions	1,415
 Oil Infrastructure	152
Other Targets	2,140
TOTAL	6,278

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments
Current as of 08 May 2015

Source: CENTCOM CCCI

Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2010-2015 Airpower Statistics

UNCLASSIFIED

As of 30 April 2015

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release	
2014	6,981	2014	1,411
2015	7,319	2015	1,859

Number of Weapon Releases

Less Activity  More Activity

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2014								211	760	1,641	1,407	1,867	5,886
2015	2,308	1,756	1,600	1,685									7,349

	2014	2015
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	2,164	2,680
Airlift and Airdrop Sorties	1,992	3,080
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*	14,555	23,000
Airlift Passengers*	9,900	14,500
Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	1,417,900	0
Tanker Sorties	4,828	4,409
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	282	298
Aircraft Refuelings	28,956	29,042

* Iraq only



Operation Inherent Resolve

6/16/2015

Source;

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/Airpower_30_April_2015.pdf


Iraq

Iraq Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, May 2015)

- **Population:** 32,585,692 (July 2014 est.)
- **Youth Bulge: 56.3%:** 0-14 years: 36.7% (male 6,093,069/female 5,878,590); 15-24 years: 19.6% (male 3,237,212/female 3,142,202)
- **Entering Labor Force Annually:** male: 332,194; female: 322,010 (2010 est.)
- **Ethnic Divisions:** Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian, or other 5%
- **Sectarian Divisions:** Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8% (cut 50% since 2003), Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1
- **Urbanization:** 69.4% (3.01% per year)
- **GDP vs. Labor Force:** agriculture: 3.3%, industry: 64.5%, services: 32.2% (2014 est.) versus agriculture: 21.6%, industry: 18.7%, services: 59.8% (2008 est.)
- **GDP:** \$505.4B (PPP 2014) \$232.2B (2014 Official Exchange Rate)
- **Per Capita Income:** \$14,100 (2014 in \$2013) (**109th in the world**)
- **Budget:** revenues: \$101.4 billion; expenditures: \$94.58 billion (2014 est.)
- **Taxes & Other Revenues:** 43.6% of GDP
- **Exports vs. Imports:** \$94.43 billion(84% crude oil) vs. \$62.34 billion
- **Direct Unemployment:** 16% (2012)
- **Poverty Level:** 25% (2008)
- **Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking:** 170th worst of 175 countries

Demographic Pressures on Iraq

Iraq Total Population (in millions)




	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Total Population (millions)	5.2	5.9	6.8	8.0	9.4	11.1	13.2	15.7	18.1	19.6	22.7	26.1	29.7	33.3	36.9	40.4	43.8	47.2	50.5	53.5	56.3
Population Growth Rate (percent)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-2.7%	3.1%	2.9%	2.7%	2.4%	2.2%	1.9%	1.7%	1.6%	1.4%	1.3%	1.1%	0.9%
Total Annual Births (millions)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>


World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq

Income Group, Region, or Country: Iraq


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Iraq in 2015: 156th worst of 185 Countries

REGION	Middle East & North Africa
INCOME CATEGORY	Upper middle income
POPULATION	33,417,476
GNI PER CAPITA (US\$)	6,710
CITY COVERED	Baghdad

DOING BUSINESS
2015 RANK

156

DOING BUSINESS
2015 DTF** (%
POINTS)

50.36

DOING BUSINESS
2014 RANK***

146

DOING BUSINESS
2014 DTF** (%
POINTS)

50.79

CHANGE IN RANK


↓ -10

CHANGE IN DTF** (%
POINTS)

↓ -0.43

Rankings	Distance to Frontier		
TOPICS	DB 2015 Rank	DB 2014 Rank	Change in Rank
Starting a Business	142	136	↑ -6
Dealing with Construction Permits	9	8	↑ -1
Getting Electricity	36	18	↑ -18
Registering Property	109	108	↑ -1
Getting Credit	180	178	↑ -2
Protecting Minority Investors	146	136	↑ -10
Paying Taxes	52	49	↑ -3
Trading Across Borders	178	178	No change
Enforcing Contracts	141	140	↑ -1
Resolving Insolvency	189	189	No change

UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Iraq in 2015: 120th worst of 187 Countries



6/16/2015

IMF Summary Data on Iraq in 2015


Subject Descriptor	Units	Scale	Country/Series-specific Notes	2013	2014	2015
Gross domestic product, constant prices	Percent change		H	6.572	-2.399	1.315
Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	H	232.497	221.130	173.819
Gross domestic product per capita, current prices	U.S. dollars	Units	H	6,685.526	6,164.617	4,700.729
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP	Current international dollar	Units	H	15,177.547	14,570.805	14,448.114
Inflation, average consumer prices	Percent change		H	1.879	2.239	3.000
Volume of imports of goods and services	Percent change					
Volume of exports of goods and services	Percent change					
Unemployment rate	Percent of total labor force					
Population	Persons	Millions	H	34.776	35.871	36.977
General government revenue	Percent of GDP		H	42.575	40.485	40.930
General government total expenditure	Percent of GDP		H	48.412	43.452	50.928
General government net debt	Percent of GDP					
General government gross debt	Percent of GDP		H	32.103	37.022	55.553
Current account balance	U.S. dollars	Billions	H	3.052	-7.748	-16.636
Current account balance	Percent of GDP		H	1.313	-3.504	-9.571

IMF,

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=74&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=count&ry&ds=.&br=1&c=512%2C433%2C463%2C474&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCIPCH%2CTM_RPCH%2CTX_RPCH%2CLUR%2CLP%2CGGR_NGDP%2CGGX_NGDP%2CGGXWDN_NGDP%2CGGXWDG_NGDP%2CBCA%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a=EM,21.5.15

6/16/2015

The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth




The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that, excluding Iran, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned about \$730 billion in net oil export revenues (unadjusted for inflation) in 2014. This represents an 11% decline from the \$824 billion earned in 2013, largely because of the decline in average annual crude oil prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the amount of OPEC net oil exports. This was the lowest earnings for the group since 2010.

For 2015, EIA projects that OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran) could fall further to about \$380 billion in 2015 (unadjusted for inflation) as a result of the much lower annual crude oil prices expected in 2015, a 48% drop from 2014.

For Iraq – assuming no military problems, this means a drop from \$87 billion in 2014 to \$45.2 billion.

OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran), 2013
billion dollars (real, 2013\$)

total = \$821 billion




On a per capita basis, OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export earnings are expected to decline by half from about out \$2,186 in 2014 to \$1,114 in 2015. OPEC net oil export revenues in 2015 are based on projections of global oil prices and OPEC production levels from EIA's March 2015 ShortTerm Energy Outlook (STEO).

Iraq's per capita oil income in 2014 was \$2,682, compared to \$7,900 for Saudi Arabia, \$25,362 for Kuwait, and \$36,013 for Qatar. If EIA is right, it will drop to \$1,368 in 2015.

EIA does estimate that OPEC revenues will rebound to \$515 billion in 2016, with the expected rebound in crude oil prices. (+36%)

Iraq Population Density (UN OCHA) 7/2014



Creation date: 23 July 2014
 Glide number: OT.2014-000374-IRQ


Contact: ocha.iraq@gmail.com
 iraq@mapaction.org

www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/iraq
 www.mapaction.org

Source: Population density data
 from Landsat

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map
 do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations


Sectarian Divisions in Iraq




Source: New York Times, Updated May 11, 2015 <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East®ion=Footer&configSection=article&isLoggedIn=false&moduleDetail=undefined&pgtype=Multimedia>

Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

Iraq – Terrorist Incidents




Iraq - Fatalities




Source: START Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>;

The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015



The first half of March saw a broadening of the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq.

[RELATED ARTICLE »](#)




1 Government forces and allied militias continued to battle ISIS militants in Tikrit.

2 At the same time, ISIS fighters were mounting a fierce assault on Ramadi.

3 Kurdish and Sunni tribal fighters advanced on ISIS territory from the northern city

4 Residents of Hawija said that ISIS executed some of its own fighters for trying to flee as the group came under attack from

ISIS Control of Iraq: May 20, 2015




Source: New York Times, Updated May 20, 2015; <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html>

Energy Vulnerability in Iraq



Sectarian Division of Baghdad: 2003-2009


KEY Sunni majority Shiite majority Christian majority Mixed areas



2003: Before the Invasion

Before the American invasion, Baghdad's major sectarian groups lived mostly side by side in mixed neighborhoods. The city's Shiite and Sunni populations were roughly equal, according to Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor and Middle East expert.






- **Kadhimiya**, a historically Shiite neighborhood, is home to a sacred Shiite shrine.
- **Adhamiya**, a historically Sunni neighborhood, contains the Abu Hanifa Mosque, a Sunni landmark.
- The **Green Zone** became the heavily fortified center of American operations during the occupation.
- **Sadr City** was the center of the insurgent Mahdi Army, led by the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr.




2009: Violence Fuels Segregation

Sectarian violence exploded in 2006. Families living in areas where another sect was predominant were threatened with violence if they did not move. By 2009 Shiites were a majority, with Sunnis reduced to about 10 percent to 15 percent of the population.

- **Huriya** was transformed in 2006 when the Mahdi Army pushed out hundreds of families in a brutal spasm of sectarian cleansing.
- More than 8,000 displaced families relocated to **Amiriya**, the neighborhood where the Sunni Awakening began in Baghdad.
- **Adhamiya**, a Sunni island in Shiite east Baghdad, was walled and restricted along with other neighborhoods in 2007 for security.
- Neighborhoods **east of the Tigris River** are generally more densely populated than areas to the west.



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<http://reliefweb.int/map/iraq/iraq-idp-crisis-iom-dtm-dashboard-displacement-flows-april-25-2015-0>


Fighting in Syria

Syria Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, May 2015)

- **Population:** 17,951,639 (July 2014 est.)
- **Youth Bulge: 53.3%:** 0-14 years: 33.1% (male 3,046,922/female 2,898,060); 15-24 years: 20.2% (male 1,833,802/female 1,789,854)
- **Entering Labor Force Annually:**
- **Ethnic Divisions:** Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%
- **Sectarian Divisions:** Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian) 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo)
- **Urbanization:** 57.3% (1.37% per year)
- **GDP vs. Labor Force: GDP:** \$107.6 (PPP 2011) \$64.7B (2011 Official Exchange Rate)
- **Per Capita Income:** \$5,100 (2011 in \$2011) (**165th in the world**)
- **Budget:**
- **Taxes & Other Revenues:**
- **Exports vs. Imports:**
- **Direct Unemployment:** 33% (2014)
- **Poverty Level:** 11.9% (2009)
- **Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking:** 159th worst of 175 countries

Demographic Pressures on Syria

Syria Total Population (in millions)




	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Total Population (millions)	3.5	3.9	4.5	5.3	6.3	7.4	8.8	10.5	12.5	14.4	16.5	18.6	22.2	22.9	24.7	26.5	28.2	29.8	31.3	32.6	33.7
Population Growth Rate (percent)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3.6%	3.9%	2.7%	2.5%	2.3%	2.0%	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	1.2%	1.0%	0.9%	0.7%	0.6%
Total Annual Births (millions)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>


World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Syria

Income Group, Region, or Country: Syrian Arab Republic


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators.
The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Syria in 2015: 175th worst of 185 Countries

REGION	Middle East & North Africa	DOING BUSINESS 2015 RANK	DOING BUSINESS 2014 RANK***	CHANGE IN RANK
INCOME CATEGORY	Lower middle income	175	165	↓ -10
POPULATION	22,845,550	DOING BUSINESS 2015 DTF** (% POINTS)	DOING BUSINESS 2014 DTF** (% POINTS)	CHANGE IN DTF** (% POINTS)
GNI PER CAPITA (US\$)	2,803	46.51	46.91	↓ -0.40
CITY COVERED	Damascus			

Rankings	Distance to Frontier		
TOPICS	DB 2015 Rank	DB 2014 Rank	Change in Rank
Starting a Business	152	141	↑ -11
Dealing with Construction Permits	189	189	No change
Getting Electricity	76	64	↑ -12
Registering Property	140	140	No change
Getting Credit	165	163	↑ -2
Protecting Minority Investors	78	77	↑ -1
Paying Taxes	117	113	↑ -4
Trading Across Borders	146	143	↑ -3
Enforcing Contracts	175	175	No change
Resolving Insolvency	146	145	↑ -1

UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Syria in 2015: 118th worst of 187 Countries



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IMF Summary Data on Syria in 2015


Subject Descriptor	Units	Scale	Country/Series-specific Notes	2013	2014	2015
Gross domestic product, constant prices	Percent change		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Gross domestic product per capita, current prices	U.S. dollars	Units	i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP	Current international dollar	Units	i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Inflation, average consumer prices	Percent change		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Volume of imports of goods and services	Percent change		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Volume of exports of goods and services	Percent change		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Unemployment rate	Percent of total labor force		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Population	Persons	Millions	i	n/a	n/a	n/a
General government revenue	Percent of GDP		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
General government total expenditure	Percent of GDP		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
General government net debt	Percent of GDP		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
General government gross debt	Percent of GDP		i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Current account balance	U.S. dollars	Billions	i	n/a	n/a	n/a
Current account balance	Percent of GDP		i	n/a	n/a	n/a

IMF,

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=74&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=512%2C433%2C463%2C474&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CTM_RPCH%2CTX_RPCH%2CLUR%2CLP%2CGGR_NGDP%2CGGX_NGDP%2CGGXWDN_NGDP%2CGGXWDG_NGDP%2CBCA%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a=EM,21.5.15

6/16/2015


The Pre-War Ethnic Sectarian Nightmare in the Levant



Source: Columbia University [Gulf/2000 Project](http://www.gulf2000project.org), and <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/27/the-one-map-that-shows-why-syria-is-so-complicated/>

6/16/2015


The Pre-War Ethnic Sectarian Nightmare in the Syria



Source: http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/01/Syrias_Sectarian_Conflict.pdf

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
The Pre-War Ethnic Sectarian Nightmare in the Syria




Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sectarianism_and_minorities_in_the_Syrian_Civil_Warpdf

Rise in Terrorism in Syria

Syria – Terrorist Incidents




Syria - Fatalities




Syria: April 2015


- Opposition forces
- Islamic State
- Kurdish
- Syrian armed forces
- Border crossing
- Areas suffering high-frequency conflict (Oct, Nov & Dec 2014)
- Areas where control has recently changed



Map sources: areas of control and border crossings from the [Syria Needs Analysis Project](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391), all other geographical detail from humanitarian organisations and Google, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391>


Energy Vulnerability in Syria





Map sources: areas of control and border crossings from the [Syria Needs Analysis Project](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391); all other geographical detail from humanitarian organisations and Google, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391>

Syrian Refugee and IDB Crisis: March 1, 2015




Copyright, European Union, 2015. Map created by EC-JRC. The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the European Union.

6/16/2015

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ECDM_20150229_Syria_IDPs.pdf


Syria as Part of a Global Trend

Refugees and Displaced



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

*Most recent refugee data for 2013.





Source: UNHCR, Reliefweb (Figures up to 12 March 2015)

6/16/2015

, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391>

Syria: The Lights Go Out in Aleppo: 3/2012-12/2014






Foreign Volunteers


http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-is-fraying-from-within/2015/03/08/0003a2e0-c276-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html

TOTAL:
21,632



Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

Per million
population



Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included

Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

6/16/2015

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>

NYT Estimate of Foreign Fighters

North Africa and Middle East

The largest share of foreign fighters counted in the study came from Tunisia, a country with one of the more stable post-Arab Spring governments. Saudi Arabia's share is also large, but recent government crackdowns have stanchied the flow of fighters.

Former Soviet States


Decades of officially sanctioned religious persecution, ethnic conflicts and Islamic radicalization are key reasons for the flow of fighters from post-Soviet states, according to Peter Neumann, director of the I.C.S.R. Many fighters have combat experience from decades of war in the Caucasus.

Western Europe

The war in Syria has drawn young Europeans, many of whom have used cheap flights to Turkey as a route to Syria. Mr. Neumann noted that some small European countries like Belgium produce a remarkable number of fighters in relation to their population.

Other regions

American law enforcement officials have focused not only on monitoring social media networks more aggressively, but also on educating state and local authorities about ways to identify potential travelers.




Sources: Country of origin data from Peter Neumann, King's College London; the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence

6/16/2015

Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html>, May 20, 2015

Origin of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq




Yemen

Yemen Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, May 2015)

- **Population:** 26,052,966 (July 2014 est.)
- **Youth Bulge: 62.8%:** 0-14 years: 41.7% (male 5,523,744/female 5,336,795); 15-24 years: 21.1% (male 2,789,510/female 2,709,263)
- **Entering Labor Force Annually:** 287,141 male; 277,612 female (2010 est.)
- **Ethnic Divisions:** predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asians, Europeans
- **Sectarian Divisions:** Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Zaidi Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha'i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.)
- **Urbanization:** 34% (4.03% per year) (\$232.2
- **GDP vs. Labor Force:** agriculture: 9.2%, industry: 26.8%, services: 64% (2014 est.) versus most employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force
- **GDP:** \$106B (PPP 2014) \$45.45B (2014 Official Exchange Rate)
- **Budget:** revenues: \$10.26 billion; expenditures: \$ 14.34 billion (2014 est.)
- **Taxes & Other Revenues:** 22.6% of GDP
- **Exports vs. Imports:** \$7.041 billion versus \$10.39 billion
- **Per Capita Income:** \$3,900 (2014 in \$2013) (178th in the world)
- **Direct Unemployment:** 16% (2012)
- **Poverty Level:** 27% (2014)
- **Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking:** 161th worst of 175 countries

Demographic Pressures on Yemen

Yemen Total Population (in millions)




	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Total Population (millions)	7.8	5.3	5.9	6.5	7.1	7.9	9.1	10.5	12.4	14.8	17.2	20.0	23.2	26.7	29.9	32.8	35.7	38.4	41.1	43.7	46.1
Population Growth Rate (percent)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	2.9%	2.5%	2.0%	1.7%	1.6%	1.4%	1.3%	1.1%	1.0%
Total Annual Births (millions)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>


World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Yemen

Income Group, Region, or Country: Yemen, Rep.


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators.

The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Yemen in 2015: 140th worst of 185 Countries

REGION	Middle East & North Africa
INCOME CATEGORY	Lower middle income
POPULATION	24,407,381
GNI PER CAPITA (US\$)	1,330
CITY COVERED	Sanaa

DOING BUSINESS
2015 RANK

137

DOING BUSINESS
2015 DTF** (%
POINTS)

54.84

DOING BUSINESS
2014 RANK***

135

DOING BUSINESS
2014 DTF** (%
POINTS)

54.89

CHANGE IN RANK

↓ -2


CHANGE IN DTF** (%
POINTS)

↓ -0.05

Rankings	Distance to Frontier
----------	----------------------

TOPICS	DB 2015 Rank	DB 2014 Rank	Change in Rank
Starting a Business	140	131	↑ -9
Dealing with Construction Permits	68	67	↑ -1
Getting Electricity	122	120	↑ -2
Registering Property	44	42	↑ -2
Getting Credit	185	185	No change
Protecting Minority Investors	162	153	↑ -9
Paying Taxes	135	131	↑ -4
Trading Across Borders X	134	130	↑ -4
Enforcing Contracts	85	82	↑ -3
Resolving Insolvency	154	156	↑ 2

UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Yemen in 2015: 154th worst of 187 Countries



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IMF Summary Data on Yemen in 2015

Subject Descriptor	Units	Scale	Country/Series-specific Notes	2013	2014	2015
Gross domestic product, constant prices	Percent change		H	4.824	-0.189	-2.233
Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	H	40.415	43.229	43.140
Gross domestic product per capita, current prices	U.S. dollars	Units	H	1,515.946	1,574.246	1,525.252
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP	Current international dollar	Units	H	3,838.419	3,773.812	3,613.915
Inflation, average consumer prices	Percent change		H	10.968	8.159	8.125
Volume of imports of goods and services	Percent change		H	-3.423	4.363	0.317
Volume of exports of goods and services	Percent change		H	3.490	10.165	48.219
Unemployment rate	Percent of total labor force					
Population	Persons	Millions	H	26.660	27.460	28.284
General government revenue	Percent of GDP		H	23.900	23.644	18.103
General government total expenditure	Percent of GDP		H	30.797	27.780	23.433
General government net debt	Percent of GDP		H	46.712	47.972	52.763
General government gross debt	Percent of GDP		H	48.200	48.906	53.689
Current account balance	U.S. dollars	Billions	H	-1.242	-0.681	-0.966
Current account balance	Percent of GDP		H	-3.073	-1.576	-2.240

IMF,

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=74&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=count&ry&ds=.&br=1&c=512%2C433%2C463%2C474&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CTM_RPCH%2CTX_RPCH%2CLUR%2CLP%2CGGR_NGDP%2CGGX_NGDP%2CGGXWDN_NGDP%2CGGXWDG_NGDP%2CBCA%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a=EM,21.5.15

6/16/2015

Yemen: Historical Divisions





South Yemen was a separate country until 1990. The northwest, an area historically called Yemen, is mostly Shiite. The southeast, known as Hadramawt, is home to a mostly Sunni population. “Yemen and the Hadramawt have seldom been part of the same political entity in the past and have maintained separate identities for a long time,” said Michael Izady, a historian and cultural geographer who has mapped ethnicity and religion for Columbia University.

Source: New York Times, Updated May 11, 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/26/world/middleeast/geography-of-chaos-in-yemen-maps.html?_r=0


[illegible]

Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Key Tribal Areas




Source:
<http://schools.wikipedia.org/image/s3253/325386.jpg.htm>

Energy Vulnerability in Yemen



MAPPING CHAOS IN YEMEN




Rise in Terrorism in Yemen

Yemen – Terrorist Incidents




Yemen - Fatalities



Source: START Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

Yemen Houthi Drive South: 1/14 to 23/15

■ Houthis control or have influence ■ Houthis are able to operate




Source: American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project

Originally from Saada Province, the Houthis practice a variant of Shiite Islam and receive support from Iran. In January, the Houthis overran the capital, Sana, forcing president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to resign. Since then, they have continued pushing south, and this week began pressing on the port of Aden, where Mr. Hadi and forces still allied with him had taken refuge.

Source: New York Times, Updated May 11, 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/26/world/middleeast/geography-of-chaos-in-yemen-maps.html?_r=0


THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE IN NORTHERN YEMEN



6/16/2015

Source: <https://twitter.com/stratfor/status/517996290836148224>


Houthi and al-Qaeda areas



Yemen: Houthi vs. AQAP Areas of Influence

Source:
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156539>,
12/4/2015

Houthi and Al-Qaeda areas: 22 April 2015



BBC


Afghanistan

Afghanistan Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, May 2015)

- **Population:** 31,822, 848 (July 2014 est.)
- **Youth Bulge: 64.2%:** 0-14 years: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)
- **Entering Labor Force Annually:** 392,116 male; 370,295 female (2010 est.)
- **Ethnic Divisions:** Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, other (includes smaller numbers of Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Gujar, Brahui, Qizilbash, Aimaq, Pashai, and Kyrghyz) note: current statistical data on ethnicity in Afghanistan is not available, and data from small samples are not a reliable alternative; Afghanistan's 2004 constitution recognizes 14 ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Gujar, Brahui, Qizilbash, Aimaq, and Pashai (2015)
- **Sectarian Divisions:** Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%.
- **GDP vs. Labor Force:** agriculture: 24.6%, industry: 21.8%, services: 53.5% (data exclude opium production (2012 est.) versus agriculture: 78.6% industry, 5.7%, services: 15.7% (FY08/09 est.)
- **Urbanization:** 26.3% (3.96% per year)
- **GDP:** \$61.69 (PPP 2014) \$21.71B (2014 Official Exchange Rate)
- **Per Capita Income:** \$2,000 (2014 in \$2013) (in the world)
- **Budget:** revenues: \$4.91 billion; expenditures: \$5.037 billion (2013 est.)
- **Taxes & Other Revenues:** 22.6% of GDP
- **Exports vs. Imports:** \$6.39 billion versus \$2.785 billion
- **Direct Unemployment:** 35% (2008)
- **Poverty Level:** 36% (2008)
- **Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking:** 172nd worst of 175 countries

Demographic Pressures on Afghanistan

Afghanistan Total Population (in millions)




	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Total Population (millions)	8.2	8.9	9.8	11.0	12.4	14.1	15.0	13.1	13.6	19.4	22.5	26.3	29.1	32.6	36.6	41.1	45.7	50.2	54.7	59.3	63.8
Population Growth Rate (percent)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	-5.9%	0.8%	-1.9%	3.5%	-1.3%	3.4%	2.1%	2.3%	2.4%	2.2%	2.0%	1.8%	1.7%	1.5%	1.4%
Total Annual Births (millions)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.7	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>


World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Afghanistan

Income Group, Region, or Country: **Afghanistan**


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators.

The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Afghanistan in 2015: 183rd worst of 185 Countries

REGION	South Asia
INCOME CATEGORY	Low income
POPULATION	30,551,674
GNI PER CAPITA (US\$)	700
CITY COVERED	Kabul

DOING BUSINESS
2015 RANK

183

DOING BUSINESS
2015 DTF** (%
POINTS)

41.16

DOING BUSINESS
2014 RANK***

182

DOING BUSINESS
2014 DTF** (%
POINTS)

41.21

CHANGE IN RANK


↓ -1

CHANGE IN DTF** (%
POINTS)

↓ -0.05

Rankings	Distance to Frontier		
TOPICS	DB 2015 Rank	DB 2014 Rank	Change in Rank
Starting a Business X	24	17	↓ -7
Dealing with Construction Permits	185	182	↓ -3
Getting Electricity	141	146	↑ 5
Registering Property	183	182	↓ -1
Getting Credit	89	86	↓ -3
Protecting Minority Investors	189	189	No change
Paying Taxes	79	75	↓ -4
Trading Across Borders	184	183	↓ -1
Enforcing Contracts	183	183	No change
Resolving Insolvency	159	158	↓ -1

UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Afghanistan in 2015: 169th worst of 187 Countries



6/16/2015

IMF Summary Data on Afghanistan in 2015

Subject Descriptor		Units	Scale	Country/Series-specific Notes	2013	2014	2015
Afghanistan	Gross domestic product, constant prices	Percent change		H	3.660	1.534	3.494
Afghanistan	Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	H	20.130	20.312	21.526
Afghanistan	Gross domestic product per capita, current prices	U.S. dollars	Units	H	658.933	649.388	672.545
Afghanistan	Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP	Current international dollar	Units	H	1,924.881	1,936.715	1,976.183
Afghanistan	Inflation, average consumer prices	Percent change		H	7.386	4.611	3.664
Afghanistan	Volume of imports of goods and services	Percent change		H	-8.683	-4.902	8.341
Afghanistan	Volume of exports of goods and services	Percent change		H	8.838	-17.784	-15.951
Afghanistan	Unemployment rate	Percent of total labor force					
Afghanistan	Population	Persons	Millions	H	30.550	31.279	32.007
Afghanistan	General government revenue	Percent of GDP		H	24.394	24.051	27.303
Afghanistan	General government total expenditure	Percent of GDP		H	25.024	26.253	27.356
Afghanistan	General government net debt	Percent of GDP					
Afghanistan	General government gross debt	Percent of GDP					
Afghanistan	Current account balance	U.S. dollars	Billions	H	1.515	1.158	0.660
Afghanistan	Current account balance	Percent of GDP		H	7.526	5.702	3.067


IMF,

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=74&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=512%2C433%2C463%2C474&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CTM_RPCH%2CTX_RPCH%2CLUR%2CLP%2CGGR_NGDP%2CGGX_NGDP%2CGGXWDN_NGDP%2CGGXWDG_NGDP%2CBCA%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a=EM,21.5.15

6/16/2015

The Budget & Economic Crisis in Afghanistan in 2015

AFGHANISTAN'S DOMESTIC REVENUES COMPARED TO OPERATING AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)



Afghanistan's real growth in gross domestic product (GDP), excluding opium, has slowed significantly over the last year, from an estimated 3–4% for 2013 to a World Bank-projected 1.5% in 2014 due to increasing political and security uncertainties.

This has led to a slump in investor and consumer confidence, which is expected to continue through at least the first half of 2015.

With foreign direct investment already in decline, continued insecurity, instability, and systemic corruption will further negatively affect private investment and dampen growth.

All main sectors of the licit economy slowed in 2014, including the services sector, which accounts for about half of GDP; non-poppy agriculture, which typically accounts for about a third of GDP depending on output; and manufacturing and industries, which comprise most of the rest. Afghanistan's Fiscal Crisis.



Opium production is not calculated in official GDP figures, although it figures prominently in the economy. Farm-gate value of the opium economy is estimated at 3.3% of GDP by the World Bank and 4% by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (\$853 million). Higher-priced opium exports are calculated at 7–8% of GDP by the World Bank and 15% by the UN..

...In December 2014, the Afghan government reported a fiscal crisis,⁶⁹⁴ two months after reporting a \$537 million FY 1393 budget shortfall.⁶⁹⁵ The MOF reported that in FY 1393, total domestic revenues—tax and non-tax revenues, and customs duties—missed targets by \$602 million (-35%), and fell by approximately \$187 million from the same period in FY 1392 (-9.9%).⁶⁹⁶ Domestic revenues paid for only 33% or \$1.7 billion of Afghanistan's total budget expenditures of \$5.2 billion in FY 1393, with donor contributions making up the difference. Afghan government expenditures in FY 1393 increased 9.2%, compared to FY 1392. The State Department said the Afghan government carried over some arrears from FY 1393 and could face similar budget shortfalls in FY 1394.⁶⁹⁸

Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of domestic revenue collection in the world, averaging 9% of GDP from 2006 to 2013, compared to an average of around 21% in low-income countries, according to the IMF. Expenditures are expected to continue rising—to 30.5% of GDP in FY 1395 (2016) versus 27.3% in FY 1393, according to World Bank projections—largely due to increased spending on security, service delivery, essential infrastructure, and operations and maintenance (O&M).⁷⁰⁰ The fiscal gap is large and growing. Donor assistance narrows this gap, but does not close it.


6/16/2015

Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq




1/19/2015

Civilian Deaths and Injuries January to December 2009 - 2014




Rise in Terrorism in Afghanistan: 1970-2013

Afghanistan- Terrorist Incidents




Afghanistan- Fatalities




Source: START Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

Figure 3 - Insurgent Areas of Operation in Afghanistan




German Government Map of Threat Levels from Anti -Government Forces: 11/2014



Source: Die Bundesregierung (German federal government), 2014 Progress Report on Afghanistan, 11/2014, p. 19.


Source: Die Bundesregierung (German federal government), 2014 Progress Report on Afghanistan, 11/2014, p. 19.; UN Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security* reports, 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; and 3/7/2014, p. 5.; and SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2015, p. 93.

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagements by region January to December 2009 - 2014




AFGHANISTAN Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2012-2013

The Population Estimation has been done on the basis of the data obtained from the 1381-1384 (2003-05) Household Listing (HHL).



The settled population of the country, by civil divisions, urban, rural and sex is estimated which covers 34 provinces and 399 districts. The total population of the country in 1391 (2012 -13) is estimated to be about 27 million. Around 13.8 million of the said figure are men and 13.2 million women. The settled population of the country (excluding nomads) is estimated at 25.5 million, of which, 12.4 million (49 %) are females and 13.1 million (51 %) males. Similarly, out of 25.5 million settled population, 19.4 million (76.1 %) live in rural areas and 6.1 million (23.9 %) in urban areas .


ESTIMATED POPULATION BY PROVINCE



Data Source: Estimated Population Data
Provided by: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Afghanistan

The accuracy of the data represented in this map remains solely with the source. IMMAP or USAID/OFDA do not accept any responsibility for the accuracy of these figures.

The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement by IMMAP or USAID/OFDA
Date Created: 26 March, 2013
Datum/Projection: WGS 84/Geographic
For copies or questions contact "afghanistan@immap.org"





Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan

- Pashtuns
- Tajiks
- Parwanians (Persian-speaking urbanites and farmers with little or no ethnic affiliation)
- Herzars
- Uzbeks
- Aymacs (Jamshidis, Tamuris, Ferozkohis, Taimanis)
- Turkmen
- Pashais
- Pamiris (incl. Vakhis, Munjis, Yekchis, Ishkashimis, Shugnis, Sanghejis, Sarikolis, et al)
- Nurikhatris, et al
- Sayyids
- Baluch

- Omuzis, Barakis, Panichas, et al
- Arabs (Persian speaking)
- Moghols/Mongols (Persian speaking)
- Kuzibash (in urban areas only)
- Kuzakhs (Karakapaks)
- Brahui
- Kirghiz (Only at Sar-i Pul)

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Resolute Support Mission

Troop Contributing Nations



	Albania	42		Germany	850		Poland	150
	Armenia	121		Greece	4		Portugal	10
	Australia	400		Hungary	97		Romania	650
	Austria	10		Iceland	4		Slovakia	39
	Azerbaijan	94		Ireland	7		Slovenia	7
	Belgium	43		Italy	500		Spain	294
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	53		Latvia	25		Sweden	30
	Bulgaria	110		Lithuania	70		the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ¹	38
	Croatia	91		Luxembourg	1		Turkey	503
	Czech Republic	222		Mongolia	120		Ukraine	10
	Denmark	160		Montenegro	15		United Kingdom	470
	Estonia	4		Netherlands	83		United States	6,839
	Finland	80		New Zealand	8		Total	13,195
	Georgia	885		Norway	56			

Note on numbers: The number of troops above reflects the overall contribution of individual contributing nations. They should be taken as indicative as they change daily, in accordance with the deployment procedures of the individual troop contributing nations.

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

2. See media backgrounder on ["A new chapter in NATO-Afghanistan relations from 2015"](#) and media backgrounder on the [ANA Trust Fund](#).

26 February 2015

Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2010-2015 Airpower Statistics

UNCLASSIFIED

As of 31 March 2015

OPERATION FREEDOM SENTINEL/RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Close Air Support

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release	
2010	33,707	2010	2,517
2011	34,514	2011	2,678
2012	28,768	2012	1,975
2013	21,785	2013	1,407
2014	12,978	2014	1,136
2015	766	2015	67

Number of Weapon Releases

Less Activity  More Activity

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2010	156	154	175	197	300	457	325	416	739	1,043	866	272	5,100
2011	405	341	337	339	426	610	695	516	597	663	308	174	5,411
2012	170	116	229	252	406	521	504	588	385	414	297	202	4,084
2013	193	297	248	284	368	337	256	158	232	189	118	76	2,756
2014	92	114	93	115	164	272	205	437	441	217	87	126	2,363
2015	40	36	52										128

Afghanistan

Combined Data (minus OIR)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	28,747	38,198	34,937	31,049	32,999	5,586
Airlift Sorties	63,000	57,000	39,000	32,000	17,040	2,000
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)	295,000	241,000	265,000	201,000	158,400	13,800
Airlift Passengers	1,368,000	1,233,000	749,000	506,000	202,700	20,000
OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	60,461,000	80,199,000	41,952,000	10,883,000	28,000	0
Tanker Sorties	17,296	19,469	16,007	12,319	9,085	1,255
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	1,050	1,095	980	723	636	63
Aircraft Refuelings	82,603	90,476	67,020	53,266	46,793	3,808
Casualty Evacuation Sorties	3,712	2,959	2,171	576	115	0
Saves	1,888	1,611	1,187	219	32	0
Assists	2,964	2,121	1,646	477	84	0

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- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

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