



COUNTER-TERRORISM REFERENCE CURRICULUM



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FOREWORD

“With guns you can kill terrorists, with education you can kill terrorism.”


— Malala Yousafzai, Pakistani activist for female education and Nobel Prize laureate

NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts have been at the forefront of three consecutive NATO Summits, including the recent 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London, with the clear political imperative for the Alliance to address a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion.

NATO’s determination and solidarity in fighting the evolving challenge posed by terrorism has constantly increased since the Alliance invoked its collective defence clause for the first time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America.

NATO has gained much experience in countering terrorism from its missions and operations. However, NATO cannot defeat terrorism on its own. Fortunately, we do not stand alone. One of the strengths the Alliance can build on is our engagement with the global network of partner countries and other International Organizations who bring in a wealth of experience and knowledge. Many of these have contributed to the development of this reference curriculum, together with the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

Understanding the terrorist threat of today and tomorrow requires not only improved awareness but constant learning and investment in the education of future generations. We sincerely hope that this curriculum will serve the wider counter-terrorism community as an insightful reference document and that it can contribute to national educational processes of both interested Allies and partners, including through NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP).



Dr. Antonio Missiroli
Assistant Secretary General
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Dr. John Manza
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We live in very uncertain times. The COVID-19 pandemic created uncertainty about our societies and our security. This emerging, unusual challenge may seem new - indeed the pandemic itself is called a 'novel' virus. But there is nothing novel about emerging threats which are unpredictable in their form and in their nature.

Terrorism has existed in different forms for millennia. But - like a novel virus - terrorism adapts and changes. Every terrorist incident is unique. This is perhaps why when terrorist atrocities occur the shock to governments, military, law enforcement, as well as to the millions who are directly or indirectly impacted, is so great.

The PfPC was chartered in 1999 to promote defense education, defense institution building, and foster regional stability. Working with over 800 defense academies and security studies institutes in over 60 countries the PfPC accomplishes its work via its international network of defense education and institution building experts, such as those who contributed to this Curriculum.

Supported by the research and activities of its study and working groups, together with the PfPC journal 'Connections', the PfPC helps develop defense education faculties, educational delivery methods (including most recently electronic learning), and the coordination of best practise and skills. Key to this work is the ongoing development of defense education curricula. To date these have included Cybersecurity, Counterinsurgency, Defense Institution Building, Teaching Gender in Military Institutions, NCO Professional Military Education, and now, Counter-Terrorism.

The Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum is the latest example of the PfPC's key role in educational development with NATO and NATO's many Partner Nations across the world. This Curriculum is an invaluable and critical contribution to addressing this most testing of challenges in the many, and unpredictable forms terrorism will take over the years and decades to follow.

Dr Raphael Perl

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June 2020

About this Reference Curriculum

The Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum (CTRC) is the result of a collaborative multinational team of volunteers drawn from Europe, North America, Africa and Asia. As part of the Partnership for Peace Consortium's (PfPC) Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), academics and researchers, as well as practitioners from governmental bodies, law enforcement and the armed forces combined to create this document. Our aim was to produce a nuanced and broad approach to understanding the concepts of terrorism and counter-terrorism by looking at past problems in order to understand the current dilemmas with the intention to try and anticipate future challenges.

This document aims to address terrorism and counter-terrorism with sufficient depth that will enable all learners in NATO member states and partner countries or organisations, regardless of experience, to develop a more complete picture of the issues and challenges that exist, past, present and potentially future. It takes into full consideration the national, regional and international security policy and defence policy implications. The reference curriculum provides a multidisciplinary approach that helps learners develop the knowledge and skills needed to understand terrorism and counter-terrorism in order to successfully anticipate and mitigate potential threats.

We are grateful for the support of the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) and the PfPC Education Development Working Group under Dr. Al Stolberg and Dr. David Emelifeonwu. In addition, Laura Alami, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Maria Galperin Donnelly, PfPC International Programs Manager, Dr. Gary Rauchfuss, National Archives and Records Administration, and Mariusz Solis, NATO DEEP Coordinator, who all helped make this effort possible through direct and tangible support. We also wish to acknowledge Prof. Yonah Alexander, Elena Beganu, Dr. Juliette Bird, Gabriele Cascone, Dr. James Forest, Dr. Akram Fraihat, Ferenc Hegyesi, Charlotte Jordan, Dr. Sandër Lleshaj, Lindsey Martin, Richard Prosen, Dr. Tom Robertson, Prof. Alex Schmid and Rebecca Trieu for their significant efforts in this endeavour. Without the immense contributions of Allison Bailey, Leah Contreras, Ashley McAdam, David Winston and Tyler Zurisko, this document simply would not have come together. Last but most certainly not least, all the contributors that stayed committed to the project for its entirety are owed an enormous debt of gratitude.

Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel and Dr. Peter K. Forster

CTRC Academic Project Leads & Editors

I. AIM OF THIS DOCUMENT

Terrorism has been a defining theme of the post-Cold War age. While its roots stretch back some two millennia, its contemporary relevance has ensured that terrorist acts and states' attempts to counter them have scarcely left the news cycle for two decades. The method of terrorism does not just entail violence but is also an act of ideological communication, as well as psychological warfare against the public morale and state apparatus.

It is important to stress that terrorism, extremism, radicalism and sectarianism have been experienced by all nations. These forms of fanaticism are not tied to, or part of, any religion, creed or race of people. Terrorism is a global threat that requires shared solutions.

Beyond the most well-known and heavily researched terrorist organisations, there is an ever evolving and dynamic landscape that continues to generate challenges for state security apparatuses. The very endurance of terrorism as a tactic, strategy, and way of warfare demonstrates that while states may increasingly wish to be done with terrorism, it remains, evolves and spawns new movements that present threats that may not have been previously envisioned.

Despite its prominence, terrorism remains an emergent issue. There are still significant debates in the field regarding what terrorism is, how it should be studied, and what are the best methods to counter it. Thus, the creation of this reference curriculum is, in part, a means of identifying and securing a useful common ground in order to gain a better understanding of holistic counter-terrorism strategies. Additionally, this curriculum identifies gaps and areas which can serve to cut across disciplinary and practical boundaries, particularly those between civilian, law enforcement and military institutions. As a reference document this curriculum can serve to increase greater intellectual and professional interoperability within and between partner countries and NATO alliance members.

This document, while comprehensive, is not exhaustive. Without sacrificing depth, it is intentionally broad, designed to enhance the teaching of counter-terrorism across a range of professions from both military and civilian spheres within and beyond the Alliance. It is an introduction to pivotal themes of counter-terrorism, which should be supplemented with reference to the particularities of an organisation's individual perspective, priorities and approach. For those with prior experience

of the field, the curriculum serves as a useful summary of their focus areas and an introduction to debates outside their specialties

II. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND CHALLENGES

As noted, the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism is a methodologically diverse field, replete with debate, extending even to fundamental definitional discussions. On the theoretical side, it is important to note the distinction between 'terrorism' and 'terrorists'; while the features of terrorists change according to circumstance, the features of 'terrorism', such as the importance of ideology, remain constant. Operationally, further challenges persist, as states are forced to essentially calculate the degree of risk with which they are comfortable, juxtaposed against the potential impact of a successful attack.

An increasingly technologically-driven world makes security considerably more difficult. Terrorist groups have demonstrated impressive literacy and agility with a variety of new-age innovations in interconnectivity, from the far corners of the dark web to popular easily accessible social media platforms. These formats enable the widespread propagation of ideas, tactics and strategy, at a rate that was simply not possible in decades past. Encrypted messaging systems complicate efforts to track suspected terrorists or identify their associates, networks and strategies. Technological advances have also provided new avenues to bolster one's security apparatus, but terrorist groups have arguably adopted these new tools to an even more effective degree than the institutions they target.

As the COVID-19 pandemic altered virtually every facet of human life globally, it also potentially shapes how terrorists recruit and plot new and evolving targets of opportunity. Furthermore, the coronavirus impacts on governance by creating political, social and economic instability. Terrorists could exploit this as well as other scenarios and situations, such as ensuing regional tensions between nations.

This curriculum addresses these challenges at the theoretical, operational and technical levels. While the curriculum does not claim to provide all the answers, its aim has been to highlight foundational and informative material and structures through which ideas and strategies can be developed.

III. STRUCTURE OF THIS CURRICULUM

This document provides a comprehensive framework by which readers may gain a more nuanced understanding of the myriad challenges that terrorism presents. Its contents are separated under thematic headings, each of which is subdivided into blocks and modules. The four broader Themes are as follows:

- Theme 1: Introduction to Terrorism**
- Theme 2: Understanding Ideologies, Motivations & Methods**
- Theme 3: Contemporary Challenges & Evolving Threats**
- Theme 4: Counter-Terrorism: Strategy, Operations & Capacity Building**

In general, the curriculum travels chronologically and thematically forward, beginning with a more historical and analytic lens before arriving at contemporary practices and future projections. Further detail can be found in the Table of Contents, but to summarise:

Theme 1 contains the widest-reaching perspectives, first delving into the all-important question of how one defines terrorism and the various characteristics often used to describe it. It then explores terrorism's past, reaching deep into human history to contextually situate present-day threats among their many precursors. Finally, those two elements dovetail in an explication of the varied types of terrorism, the varied longevity of terrorist groups and how those differences can help us understand both the larger phenomenon and particular groups and movements.

Theme 2 focuses primarily on ideological factors, first analysing the radicalisation processes that provide modern terrorist groups with members and sympathisers. After examining both violent extremist and transnational ideologies, it then explores personal and organisational motivations in pursuing terrorism, as well as the methods by which individuals and groups do so.

Theme 3 is grounded in the state of terrorism today, beginning with the financial methods groups use to fund attacks and maintain their organisations. It then projects a range of emerging threats, including the potential acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, the technological innovations exploited by terrorist groups to advance their goals, and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).

Finally, though counter-terrorism elements are found

throughout the curriculum, Theme 4 focuses specifically on what states can do to combat a constant and multivalent threat nexus. It assesses the tools available to states at the international, regional and national levels to best protect their citizens and institutions, designating the use of those tools to the relevant bodies and how they combine to form a cohesive national strategy. It further focuses on the methods by which states can bolster their capacity to combat terrorism and outlines the use of table-top exercise (TTX) training to assess vulnerabilities and work toward building the necessary capability to ensure future security.

IV. USING THIS CURRICULUM

This curriculum is composed of open-source information, and therefore does not operate at the classified level that some may prefer or require. However, even in those cases, it can still serve as a set of guidelines under which that information can be categorised and collated. Furthermore, the curriculum identifies some sources which should be accessed with caution, as they are texts written and used by extremists that could be flagged by national and international agencies when accessed.

The curriculum does not delve into the granular detail required of tactical prescriptions, instead keeping its perspective broad so as to cover the vast expanse of strategic and operational lines of inquiry that fall under this immensely complex and evolving topic.

Finally, it is important to reiterate that this reference curriculum should be utilised as a starting point which provides an outline of core issues and topics across terrorism and counter-terrorism. The wide-ranging nature of the curriculum is explicitly designed to allow engagement at different levels of seniority and experience, in order to bridge disciplinary and professional boundaries. The variety of potential learners will entail differing levels of information and detail and the precise nature of the learning requirements and exercises will vary based on local, national and regional priorities. Thus, most of the modules in this curriculum can be treated for stand-alone teaching purposes or part of other modules, entire blocks, as well as complete themes.

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THEME 1: INTRODUCTION TO TERRORISM

Theme Overview

Terrorism is neither new nor monolithic. While the manifestations of terrorism have varied over time and space, its fundamental premise has remained the same. Theme 1 consists of three blocks designed to enhance understanding of the history and interpretations of terrorism. Block 1 looks at defining terrorism which is critical because it enables its recognition and prevention. Block 2 discusses the history of terrorism and demonstrates the value of this history to current counter-terrorism efforts. Through historical analysis it becomes clear that a knife wielding extremist in 2017 may have borrowed a tactic from the first century *sicarii*. Through examining the history of terrorism, we enhance our ability to identify terrorist patterns and strategies to predict, deter and prevent acts of terrorism. Block 3 assesses the common factors that stimulate terrorism as well as the drivers that engender, sustain and contribute to the collapse of terrorist groups. The terrorist 'life cycle' and longevity is informed by the history discussed throughout this theme.

Block 1.1 Defining Terrorism

Goal

The goal of this block is two-fold: to provide a summary of various definitions of terrorism and to examine the reasons for a lack of consensus on a definition of terrorism among academics and practitioners.

Description

When it comes to defining terrorism, politically motivated violence against unarmed civilians is generally accepted as a terrorist act. Still, governments and international organisations struggle to agree on a single universally accepted definition of terrorism. Diverging views on what constitutes terrorism often results from disagreements surrounding people's right to self-determination, as enshrined in Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter. Reaching a common definition is further complicated by the '*political exclusion clause*' that seeks to adjudicate between what would normally be considered crimes and the right to resist tyranny. A significant bar-

rier to definitional unanimity is framed by perspectives, moral judgements, prejudice and geopolitical interests leading to the phrase, '*one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter*'.

NATO defines terrorism in its military documents as the '*unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives*'. While commonality is found in terms such as violence and fear, definitional differences are apparent depending upon the perspectives of those defining the term. For example, The Arab League definition, however, includes an exemption for cases of violent struggle against foreign occupation: 'All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence.' The essential question is what constitutes 'whatever means'?

Bruce Hoffman, a noted scholar, offers an academic definition, '*Deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threatened violence in the pursuit of political change. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience*'.'

Another distinguished academic, Martha Crenshaw, defines terrorism as '*the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behaviour. It involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to communicate a political message to watching audiences*'. Similarly, terrorism expert Brian Jenkins famously described terrorism as 'theatre'.

From these definitions some common principles help formulate some key characteristics of terrorism. Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence perpetrated by non-state actors targeting 'non-combatants' with a goal of achieving psychological impact on an audience beyond the event itself for a political, social, religious, or ideological purpose.

Disagreements persist concerning an accepted legal definition of terrorism. This is because different countries have different experiences with terrorism that have shaped their separate understandings. However, the international community has recognised that estab-

lishing a common definition of terrorism is required. A standard definition allows an effective coordinated international response to terrorism that adopts pragmatic approaches and marshals all instruments of government and society in order to combat it.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe how NATO's definition of terrorism reflects the Alliance's overall goals.
- 2) Explain the main obstacles to the adoption of a single universally accepted definition of terrorism.
- 3) Analyse and interpret the similarities and differences in the definition of terrorism among key multilateral organisations such as the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union, and the United Nations.
- 4) Identify common elements within the various definitions of terrorism used by the international community.
- 5) Describe how the modern definitions of terrorism create a difference between state and non-state actors.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why is having a common definition of terrorism essential to the international effort to stop terrorism?
- b) How does international terrorism differ from domestic terrorism?
- c) What might be some appropriate ways to frame an international dialogue against terrorism?
- d) How do differences in definitions affect counter-terrorism implementation?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 1.1.1 Insurgents & Terrorist Organisations: Differences & Similarities

Goal

This module will introduce learners to insurgent groups and how they are similar to and different from terrorist organisations.

Description

Insurgency and terrorism are terms used interchangeably for political expediency, media impact, and popular understanding. However, insurgency and terrorism are distinct from one another. They encompass different strategies. A protest movement may begin as an insurgency and over time adopt terrorist strategies, or the opposite can occur. This is why clarifying the differences between insurgency and terrorism is essential, as they present different challenges and necessitate different responses. Both insurgency and terrorism are types of asymmetric, irregular warfare where the capabilities possessed by combatants results in the use of atypical military operations, often including terror tactics.

An insurgency is a struggle for control over a political space (governance and geography) between state and non-state actors, who are characterised by significant support from a portion of the population or national group. Insurgents are typically defined as revolutionaries or separatists; however, a third type, 'the expeller' emerged from the quintessential Spanish insurgency to oust Napoleonic forces from Spain.

As discussed in Block 1.1 terrorism is a much-contested and multi-faceted term. A common differentiator between terrorism and insurgency is the *frequency* in the use of violence as well as the selection of targets. Terrorist violence is fitful and sporadic with a primary focus on non-combatants. Insurgent violence is sustained and often is the precursor to civil war, as was the case in Lebanon before the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990).

Learning Objectives

- 1) Examine irregular warfare as an umbrella term for both insurgency and terrorism.
- 2) Distinguish insurgency from terrorism.
- 3) Evaluate the national security implications of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

- 4) Assess the common origins of insurgent activities and terrorist activities.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Despite conceptual differences, why are the terms 'insurgent' and 'terrorist' used interchangeably?
- b) Why are insurgent groups perceived differently from terrorist organisations by the general populace?
- c) How does applying the label 'terrorist' to an opponent aid a state in its counter-terrorism strategy?

Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 1.2 History of Terrorism

Goal

This block introduces learners to a historical overview of the evolution of terrorism. Through a series of historical examples, learners will observe how tactics, motives and ideologies have changed and, in some cases, remained the same across centuries.

Description

The history of terrorism spans several millennia. The word 'terrorism' entered the modern lexicon during *la Terreur* or the French Revolution's, 'The Terror', (1793-94). While a multitude of factors trigger acts of terrorism, political factors have been consistent motivators. As several of the examples below illustrate, the need to redress power imbalances and perceived political 'wrongs' often motivate acts of terrorism. Early historical examples of terrorism targeted elite individuals, while later examples and definitions have fluctuated between revolutionary activities to disrupt the governing system to government abuse. Terrorism therefore has changed as systems of government and society generally have evolved.

From the ancient Greek period until the advent of early modern terrorism, knives and other such items were used to carry out assassinations. Stabbing was the primary tactic used in the ancient period. The early modern period brought more complex tactics and ideologies, in large part due to changing political ideologies, economic systems, and advanced weaponry. For example, the 'Gunpowder Plot' attributed to Guy Fawkes used a complex combination of targeted assassination and explosives as tactics, with the intention of causing both specific deaths and mass casualties. This plot would not have been possible without the increased prevalence of dynamite.

Ideology has also evolved over the centuries, leading to significant variation between groups. Indeed, historically terrorism has been inspired by ideologies ranging from doctrines of the Abrahamic religions to secular, political ideologies such as Republicanism, Anarchism and Nationalism. These ideologies will be examined in the following historical examples: Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the assassination of Julius Caesar, the *Sicarii*, the *Order of Assassins*, the 'Gunpowder Plot,' the 'The Terror', the Luddites, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, the assassination of U.S. President William McKinley, and finally, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Recognise that terrorism is not a new phenomenon and its history provides insight into strategies used by terrorist organisations.
- 2) Describe counter-measures employed to mitigate acts of terrorism through history.
- 3) Create a chronology of the major 'phases' of terrorism from the ancient to modern period.
- 4) Identify the ideologies or tactics that may drive acts of terrorism.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How has terrorism evolved?
- b) By analysing historical case studies, what changes or consistencies may be observed in terrorist tactics, motives and ideologies?

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Module 1.2.1 Tyrannicide & Regicide

Goal

Among the earliest examples of what would now be considered acts of terrorism are acts of violence against particular ruling elites. This module examines historical examples of tyrannicide and regicide and how they constitute a type of terrorism.

Description

The first recorded acts of terrorism were political assassinations. These were forms of tyrannicide, the murder of a tyrant, or regicide, the killing of a ruler, as seen in ancient Greece and ancient Rome.

- **Harmodius and Aristogeiton:** On the first day of the Great Panathenaea, in 514 BC, Harmodius and Aristogeiton killed Hipparchus, brother of Athenian tyrant Hippias. Scholars believe that this was part of a larger conspiracy to overthrow and assassinate Hippias. However, Harmodius and Aristogeiton were unable to carry out the full plot because Harmodius was killed immediately after the two assassinated Hipparchus. Aristogeiton died in captivity following severe torture. Although unsuccessful in killing Hippias, Harmodius and Aristogeiton became the preeminent example of tyrannicide. This was in spite of the fact that Hippias continued his tyrannical rule for another four years. Their legacy made assassination a viable option against a corrupt or perceivably corrupt political elite.
- **Julius Caesar:** The assassination of Julius Caesar is perhaps the most infamous example of regicide. Ambushed on the 'Ides of March' (March 15) in 44 BC, Caesar succumbed to his 23 stab wounds inflicted by his fellow senators led by Brutus and Cassius. However, scholars have debated for some time if this assassination was in fact a case of regicide, not tyrannicide. The importance of Caesar's murder is that prior to this attack, most notable politically motivated killings had been carried out against definitive tyrants. Caesar, on the other hand, had been an incredibly successful and beneficent ruler of the Roman Empire and was not universally considered to be tyrannical. Caesar's assassination, as opposed to the plot against Hippias, was not based upon classical period law that made it permissible to kill a tyrant or anyone who designs to become a tyrant. Instead, it reflected the political aspirations of the Roman senators to restore the Roman Republic. Thus, Caesar's assassination set the concept of terrorism down two paths: one recognising that political assassination was definitively more nuanced than previous conceptions and another in which regicide became a tactic to effect political change.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define tyrannicide and regicide.
- 2) Describe the similarities and differences between tyrannicide and regicide.
- 3) Analyse the historical precedents of these strategies.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What factors push individuals to carry out political assassinations?
- b) How are tyrannicide and regicide forms of terrorism?
- c) What impact do these two types of terrorism have on subsequent kinds of terrorism? What are some of the parallels between ancient tyrannicide/regicide and modern-day political assassinations?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 1.2.2 Guerrilla Warfare & Targeted Assassinations

Goal

This module will examine the *Sicarii* and *Hashashin* (Assassins), two of the earliest known terrorist groups to have committed terrorist acts largely motivated by religion.

Description

Both the *Sicarii* and the *Assassins* targeted high-ranking elite members of their own societies in order to express their political and religious grievances. The *Sicarii*'s primary goal was to incite a mass uprising to expel Roman rulers from Judea. Ultimately, the *Sicarii* engaged in mass suicide, which effectively ended the movement. Similarly, the *Assassins* desired to overthrow the Seljuk Empire. However, they used different tactics such as martyrdom in an attempt to implement their distorted version of Islam in society and government.

- **Sicarii:** The *Sicarii* were a Jewish sect operating in the years leading up to the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE). Historical accounts of the *Sicarii* were recorded by Josephus, a Jew who defected to the Roman side. The group, often considered a radical faction of the Zealot movement, claimed Jews were oppressed under Roman rule and sought to inspire a mass uprising to expel Roman influence in Judea. Their name comes from the Latin word 'sicae,' a type of dagger used in ancient Rome. The group received their name due to their trademark tactics of stabbing their victims to death in public places using daggers hidden underneath their cloaks and then feigning sympathy for the victim to remain anonymous. The *Sicarii* approach worked to create an atmosphere of anxiety and fear in public places in Judea. *Sicarii* attacks were often committed during Jewish religious holidays and the group often targeted high-ranking Jews that obtained wealth from their support of the Romans. The *Sicarii* also kidnapped prominent Jewish leaders to use them as hostages to trade for the release of their imprisoned comrades. Ultimately the *Sicarii* tried to expose elite Jews as traitors to the Judaic people and encourage revolt against what they perceived to be Roman oppression. The doctrine to which they claimed to adhere was 'No lord but God,' which they promulgated until their demise. The *Sicarii* participated in the 66 CE revolt in Jerusalem but ultimately

failed to sustain their leadership position, eventually fleeing the city and leaving the movement in the hands of the Zealots. The *Sicarii* eventually met their end in 73 CE when the Roman authorities besieged Masada, resulting in the mass suicide of the *Sicarii*, estimated at 960 people. The *Sicarii* preferred to die by their own hands rather than submit to Roman slavery, demonstrating their apocalyptic ideology and an unwavering commitment to their religious doctrine.

- **Assassins:** The *Order of Assassins*, or simply the *Assassins*, refers to a group called the Nizaris, who followed an extreme brand of Isma'ili Shi'ism. The movement was founded in 1094 CE by Hasan-i Sabbah, a diplomat sent to Persia by the Cairo based Fatimid Caliphate. Hasan brought the more radical Isma'ili Shi'ism, which capitalised upon Shi'ism's history of suffering, to the forefront of Persia, where it gained popularity by defining a Persian identity distinct from the Seljuk Turk Sunni majority. The *Assassins* used the concept of 'taqiyya,' which is the practice of concealing one's religion in the face of persecution (this practice continues to be used by some terrorists, most notably the 9/11 hijackers). The Nizari movement's goal was to inspire revolt against the Seljuks and to 'purify' Islam with their own version, which was inherently linked to political goals. They were called hashish users (*Hashashin*), which was a derogatory way to imply they were false Muslims. This is the root of the modern term 'Assassins'. They conducted targeted assassinations of high-ranking political and religious figures like caliphs, emirs, and judges. Acting in daylight in public spaces such as mosques, especially during times of religious significance, they contributed public reaction or political terror to the trinity of assailant, victim, and God. As a result of using the dagger, their weapon of choice, they faced almost guaranteed death when carrying out attacks. In fact, the *Assassins* were indoctrinated and trained as 'Fedayeen', those who did not fear death and sought martyrdom. This practice was used to gain sympathy among the population and inspire fear and awe in their enemies. The *Assassins* posed a significant political threat to Seljuk rule, and their movement spread from Persia to Syria before the group was put down by the Mongols at Alamut in 1275.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe how the *Sicarii* and *Assassins* used religion to perpetrate acts of terrorism.

- 2) Explain how religious, social, and political motives intertwined for both groups.
- 3) Compare and contrast the goals and methods of the Sicarii and Assassins, including the use of religion.
- 4) Analyse the connections of the activities of the Sicarii and Assassins to modern terrorists.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Should the Sicarii and Assassins be considered terrorists? Why or why not?
- b) Was religion used by each group as a justification for action, a means to an end, or an end in itself?
- c) What was the relationship between political, social, and religious motives and objectives for each group?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 1.2.3 Sectarianism & Revolution

Goal

In the early modern period of terrorism, geographic focus shifted from the Middle East to Europe. Terrorist activities in early modern Europe varied widely according to their context and aims. While related to ancient forms of terrorism, terrorism in the early modern period featured advanced capabilities and strategies. These acts of terrorism were often directly reactionary, occurring during or after periods of political, religious and social change. The goal of this module is to examine the variety and reactionary nature of early modern terrorism in three different situations: a sectarian terror plot, a period of tyrannical rule, and a protest movement.

Description

The early modern period spans from approximately 1500-1800. This was a period of extensive political, religious and social upheaval across Europe. Major events included the Protestant Reformation, the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. These seminal events led to extreme forms of oppressive rule and protests characterised by violence that have since been regarded as terrorist acts. The technological advancements of the day such as the development of explosives and execution devices also enhanced the violent acts.

It is important to understand case studies of terrorism that took place during the early modern period and which set a precedent for future terrorist movements. The Gunpowder Plot, organised by a group of politically extreme English Catholics, was a mass assassination attempt intended to change the religious-political status quo. The French Jacobins' The Terror used mass executions as a means of political coercion and radical rule; and the Luddites, a group of disenfranchised Northern English trade workers affected by the rise of machinery, created a protest movement responsible for economic disruption and industrial sabotage.

- **Guy Fawkes:** The 'Gunpowder Plot' to blow up the Houses of Parliament on November 5, 1605, devised in part by Guy Fawkes, was an example of terrorism driven by the English Reformation's sectarian divides. Fawkes was an English Catholic who demonstrated commitment to his faith by fighting for Catholic Spain against Protestant countries during the Eighty Years' War. Along with fellow sectarians Thomas Wintour and Robert Catesby,

Fawkes plotted to assassinate the English Protestant king, James I, in hopes of restoring a Catholic monarch to the throne. Leasing a cellar under the House of Lords, the conspirators stored barrels of gunpowder with the intention of detonating them during the opening of Parliament to kill the king and government. The plot was discovered and disrupted. Fawkes and his fellow conspirators were interrogated, tortured, tried, and executed. While the plotters were notionally driven by their sectarian beliefs, scholars describe the plot as an act of political terrorism. Although it is framed as a regicidal assassination attempt, the Gunpowder Plot is an early example of a terrorist act that used explosives and would have caused numerous fatalities had it been successful.

- **The Terror (1793-1794):** During the French Revolution, the ‘The Terror’ represented a time of widespread political coercion and violence under the rule of the Jacobins, a revolutionary faction led at the time by Maximilien Robespierre. The exact causes of the Terror are debated. Factors include threats of foreign invasion, socio-religious change, popular uprisings and new ideas regarding the role and structure of government that originated in Enlightenment philosophy. The Terror was administered by an executive body consisting of two committees and a ‘Revolutionary Tribunal’. Committees of surveillance were also established across the country to identify and arrest ‘disloyal suspects’. People who were deemed traitors were tried without appeal. Those caught carrying weapons were executed, as were hoarders. The Terror sought to crush dissent, including armed groups, and ease economic hardships. In the summer of 1794, the work of the Revolutionary Tribunal intensified. The right of defendants to legal counsel was removed and the definition of crimes against the Republic expanded. Where there was no access to evidence, ‘moral proof’ was used to sentence people to death. The period after June 10, 1794 is known as the ‘Great Terror’ as an average of thirty executions were carried out per day. Ultimately, the unsustainable and somewhat paradoxical nature of the Terror led to the overthrow of Robespierre who was guillotined in late July 1794. The term ‘terrorism’ originated from the extreme political coercion and systematic violence employed by the French Republic during The Terror. However, as is evident, the term has since come to encompass many other forms of violence and intimidation.

- **Luddites (1811-1816):** The Luddites were a radical group of early nineteenth century weavers and textile workers who feared the replacement of their skills and the loss of their livelihood by automated looms and knitting frames. In protest, they undertook industrial sabotage by destroying machinery and looting and burning mills and factories across Northern England. They also sent death threats to local magistrates and food merchants. The Luddites are named for a mythical apprentice, Ned Ludd, who was thought to have destroyed textile machinery in the late eighteenth century. (This is where the term ‘luddite’ or ‘neo-luddism’ comes from in contemporary parlance, as it refers to someone who opposes modern forms of technology.) The movement began with machine-breaking in Nottingham in 1811 and spread quickly to other areas including the West Riding of Yorkshire and Lancashire. In addition to military force, the government responded by declaring machine-breaking illegal. As a result, many Luddites were found guilty of crimes in association with their activities and were either executed or forcibly sent to Australia. While debate regarding the nature of the Luddite movement and its origins continues, it is generally agreed that anxiety over potential loss of livelihoods in the wake of the Industrial Revolution triggered the Luddite movement. A poor economic climate resulting from the Napoleonic wars, difficult working conditions and poor political representation for tradesmen are also thought to have contributed to their rise. Although the Luddites were active in several geographical areas, there was no national organisation, ideology or figurehead. Their political motivation is also debated. Although unsuccessful, the Luddite movement is seen by some terrorists as a justifying precedent for economic disruption and committing violent sabotage to draw attention to their grievances.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe how political, religious and social change catalysed terrorism in early modern Europe.
- 2) Identify the variety of terrorist acts that occurred during the early modern period.
- 3) Compare and contrast the targets, tactics and motivations emerging from these particular examples.
- 4) Describe how forms of early modern terrorism connect ancient forms of terrorism and modern terrorism.

Issues for Consideration

- To what extent is each of these examples politically, religiously and economically motivated?
- In each case, what were the goals of the perpetrators and to what extent were they successful in achieving them?
- Should all of these examples be considered acts of terrorism?
- How do the motivations, tactics and targets of early modern terrorists differ from those who came before and after?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 1.2.4 Anarchism & Ultra-Nationalism

Goal

The goal of this module is to introduce the learner to the emergence of modern terrorism through the use of three examples: the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 by the *Narodnaya Volya*; the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901 by anarchist Leon Czolgosz; and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 by the Black Hand.

Description

The concept of 'propaganda by the deed', championed by Carlo Pisacane (1818-1857), Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876), and Sergei Nechaev (1847-1882), is key to understanding terrorism from the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth century. The fundamental shift was that ideas result from the deeds of men instead of deities and that the deed's impact transcended the deed. Violence, then, was necessary to educate and inspire revolution amongst the masses. Violence was pivotal for *Narodnaya Volya* and the anarchist movement that inspired Czolgosz. Emerging from an era promoting individual liberty and the concept of nation states, all three cases constitute secular movements with political goals that embrace ideals of duty, self-sacrifice and liberty.

- 1881- Assassination of Tsar Alexander II - *Narodnaya Volya*** (The People's Will) - On March 1, 1881, Russian Tsar Alexander II was murdered by a bomb thrown by Ignacy Hryniewiecki, a member of *Narodnaya Volya*, in St. Petersburg, Russia. *Narodnaya Volya* was formed in 1879 after splintering from *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom). The original group, established in 1876 after the 'Mad Summer of 1874', saw thousands of urban students travel to the countryside with the intention of provoking a peasant uprising against the autocratic government of Tsar Alexander II. Facing failure and increased police repression, the founders of *Narodnaya Volya* saw traditional propaganda as ineffective and turned to violence. As with the Anarchists of the era, they sought to target symbols of the state's oppression and, more generally, the dominant world order. By March 1881, the government had arrested most members of *Narodnaya Volya* and the organisation was close to collapse. However, Sofia Perovskaya, a former member of the aristocracy and acquitted member of the 'Trial of the 193' in 1878 still managed to lead the final

operation that ultimately led to the successful assassination of the Tsar. Narodnaya Volya's attempt to spark a popular uprising through the Tsar's murder failed. However, 'propaganda by the deed' was now seen as a key tactic of revolutionaries of various political persuasions, and dynamite was now an important terrorist weapon. Remnants of Narodnaya Volya reconstituted in the early part of the 20th century as the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

- **1901- Assassination of President William McKinley - Leon Czolgosz** On September 6, 1901, U.S. President William McKinley was shot and killed by anarchist Leon Czolgosz in Buffalo, New York. Although Czolgosz acted alone, he was inspired by the growing worldwide anarchist movement. Four months after Tsar Alexander II's assassination, the International Anarchist Congress convened in London, and adopted the policy of 'propaganda by the deed' alongside advocating for the learning of technical sciences, such as chemistry, to develop bomb-making skills. Johann Most, a German refugee, emphasised 'propaganda by the deed' and produced bomb-making manuals in his publication, *Freiheit*, which was circulated in the U.S. from 1880 to 1885. He was a key influence on American anarchists including Leon Czolgosz. The following decade also saw Italian anarchists assassinate: French President Carnot in 1894; Spanish Prime Minister Cánovas in 1897; Austrian Empress Elisabeth in 1898; and Italian King Umberto I in 1900. Against this backdrop, anarchist Leon Czolgosz shot President McKinley twice in the abdomen. The President succumbed to gangrene caused by the wounds eight days later. Czolgosz later described killing the 'enemy of the good people' as his duty in order to liberate Americans. He was sentenced to death on October 29, 1901. In response, President Roosevelt enacted strict immigration laws from 1903 prohibiting individuals with 'abstract political ideas' from entering the U.S. and identified anarchism as a dangerous foreign ideology.
- **1914- Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand - The Black Hand.** On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary was assassinated in Sarajevo, Bosnia by Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Young Bosnians, by order of the Black Hand. Following Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defence) was established in Serbia in order to radicalise the Serbian youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia. In 1911, the *Black*

Hand was a splinter group of Narodna Odbrana, and was led by Dragutin Dimitrijevic, or Apis, who was also the head of Serbian military intelligence. This ultra-nationalist group's aim was the unification of Serbdom, and the regeneration of the Serbian people. The Black Hand targeted Franz Ferdinand because he was considering offering concessions to the Serbians, a political move that the group feared would weaken the Bosnian nationalist movement. The Black Hand trained the would-be assassins, members of the 'Young Bosnia' group, in Serbia and supplied them with weapons and safe passage back into Bosnia and Herzegovina to commit the attack. Danilo Ilić, a Bosnian Serb and member of the Black Hand, led the operation. Three of the would-be assassins failed to discharge their guns, or detonate their bombs, while the fourth missed his bombing target. It was only after the Archduke's security team changed direction following the missed bombing that Princip got his opportunity and succeeded in killing the Archduke and his wife, Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg. Princip failed in his attempt to commit suicide in the immediate aftermath and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment before dying in prison on April 28, 1918. The shooting created the July Crisis which resulted in Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, and, subsequently, the First World War.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define the ideologies of anarchism and ultra-nationalism.
- 2) Describe the concept of 'propaganda by the deed' as understood by radicals in the late 19th and early 20th century.
- 3) Compare and contrast the motivations, tactics and targets emerging from these three assassinations.
- 4) Analyse how technological developments affected change in terrorist tactics.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What is the role of duty, sacrifice and liberation in these three, non-religious plots?
- b) What can governments do to identify, prevent, and tackle radical movements aimed at destruction of the state? How do government responses, from concessions to repression, affect terrorist activity?

- c) What is the legacy of this period of terrorism?
- d) How did the invention of dynamite change the tactics of terrorists?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 1.2.5 Revolutionary & Counter-Revolutionary Terrorism

Goal

The goal of this module is to help learners understand revolutionary, counter-revolutionary and state-sponsored terrorism. Additionally, learners will be able to articulate how terrorism can often be used as a method of control by certain governments.

Description

While the preceding modules were organised in a chronological examination of the history of terrorism, this module focuses on three forms of terrorism that do not fit neatly in a chronological sequence.

Revolutionary Terrorism, a bi-product of insurgency, is the use of violence by violent groups emerging from the citizenry against governments with the intent of altering the existing socio-political order. This type of terrorism typically arises when opposition movements see no legitimate means to gain political power and traditional military victory seems improbable. Instead, guerrilla warfare tactics like bombings and assassinations are employed with the goal of gradually weakening a government until it collapses, and a new order can be imposed. Revolutionary terrorism is arguably the most common form of terrorism in the world today. Prominent examples include the Bolsheviks during and after the Russian Revolution (1917-1922), the Tupamaros in Uruguay (1970s) and the Red Army Faction in Germany (1970-1988), and the Black September Organisation (1970-1973).

Counter-Revolutionary Terrorism is the systematic use of violence by governments or recently deposed political elites against their own citizens. This type of terrorism usually arises when governments can no longer maintain law and order through legitimate institutions or after a revolution has taken place and the newly deposed elites seek a return to power. Tactics include the use of death squads, torture, state-sponsored militias, and other forms of extra-judicial violence. Historical examples include Iran and the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War that started in 2012, Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega's 'Dignity Battalions' (1988-1990), the White Terror in Russia (1917-1920), Operation Condor in South America (1968-1989), and The Terror in France (1794-1795). Recently, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has shown signs of resorting to counter-revolutionary terrorism to thwart the burgeoning opposition.

A key difference between revolutionary terrorism and counter-revolutionary terrorism is that the former often publicises its actions while the latter wishes to keep them from the public eye. Nevertheless, the two forms of terrorism are intimately linked both leading to a cycle of violence that often culminates in a civil war.

State-sponsored terrorism, on the other hand, is intentional state support for terrorist acts of violence, either through direct support for the act itself, support to maintain the survival of terrorist organisations or support to bolster a terrorist group's political position. Critically, state-sponsored terrorism differs from terrorism carried out by the state as the former requires some form of separation between the terrorist actor and the state itself. The term is ambiguous as states can support both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary terrorists, and do not require complete ideological coherency between state and the terrorist organisation. It can be more of an alignment of tactical, strategic or political objectives.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify, describe, and differentiate between revolutionary terrorism and counter-revolutionary Terrorism.
- 2) Describe the 'co-dependent' relationship between revolutionary terrorism and counter-revolutionary terrorism.
- 3) Analyse key historical and contemporary episodes of revolutionary terrorism and counter-revolutionary terrorism.
- 4) Explain how to differentiate among different types of terrorism, including the policy implications that go along with each type of designation.
- 5) Create a 'Terrorism Typology' with definitions, cases or episodes and policy responses.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Are the efforts of the West to gain allies in the fight against transnational terrorists inherently crippled by its support of counter-revolutionary terrorists in Central and South America?
- b) Is there any significant difference between acts of revolutionary terrorism and counter-revolutionary terrorism? Or is it just a matter of 'One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter?'

- c) Why is it important to differentiate among the different types of terrorism? What are the policy implications for how we define and apply these terms?
- d) Why is it important to differentiate among types of political violence, such as insurgencies, civil war, revolutions, and state-sponsored terrorism? What are the policy implications for how we define and apply these terms?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 1.3 Longevity of Terrorist Organisations

Goal

This block introduces learners to how terrorist groups form based on the drivers that contribute to radicalisation. It includes the life cycle of terrorist organisations, examining how these groups sustain themselves, evolve and decline.

Description

Terrorism never completely ceases but individual terrorist campaigns and the groups that wage them eventually decline. A terrorist group's resilience and relevance to its sympathisers as well as subsequent governmental responses following the growth and emergence of a particular group affect the longevity of the terrorist organisation.

Terrorist organisations need ideology accompanied with the tools and weapons to conduct attacks. In addition, they require operational space and security, intelligence and a command and control structure. They also require a recruitment pool, training for recruits, and expertise in many areas of work including bomb making, finance, logisticians and ideology.

The success of a terrorist group is measured by the ability to win adherents to their cause and then transform its resources into action. Their violence creates the political, economic and social ramifications that affect the target population and government. Terrorists use this strategy to create and maintain group cohesion and progress towards what they believe will eventually be a successful outcome.

Counter-terrorism strategies are primarily aimed at degrading and eventually dismantling a terrorist group's leadership and infrastructure in order to downgrade or eliminate its operational space. In the information age, terrorist organisations have greater tools to diversify messaging, planning, resources, financing, and recruitment. The creation of virtual sanctuaries in cyberspace enhances the terrorist organisations' lifespan, even as their physical safe havens are threatened, diminished, or eliminated.

Furthermore, rivalries among and within terrorist groups may lead to decline, obsolescence, or regeneration. Even terrorist organisations that share ideological foundations and political objectives can have violent divisions. These cleavages may lead to groups' dissolving but also

may spawn new splinter groups that contribute to the endurance of ideological foundations and other political objectives. This occurs both at the inter-group and intra-group level both which warrant understanding.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Analyse the factors that lead to some terrorist organisations being able to evolve whereas others decline.
- 2) Describe the key elements that enable a terrorist group to sustain itself.
- 3) Identify the factors that contribute to a terrorist organisation's capabilities.
- 4) Understand how rivalries between terrorist groups impact their longevity.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How does a terrorist group's command and control structure impact on its durability in comparison to its ideology and doctrine?
- b) Which counter-terrorism strategies are the most effective in limiting the longevity of a terrorist organisation?
- c) How do terrorist groups maintain cohesion within their ranks?
- d) Does the virtual sanctuary of the internet enhance a terrorist group's longevity?

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Module 1.3.1 Key Factors that Contribute to the Spread of Terrorism

Goal

This module outlines the common factors that contribute to the radicalisation process. Learners will understand that while there is not one pathway to radicalisation, there are often common push, pull and personal drivers that can be identified as factors that lead to the spread of terrorism.

Description

There are three types of drivers that contribute to radicalisation and, by extension, the spread of terrorism: *Push*, *Pull* and *Personal*. *Push drivers* describe the structural causes that motivate individuals to engage in violence. These include state repression, deprivation, poverty, discrimination and social injustice. *Pull drivers* refer to what makes membership in an extremist group attractive. Examples include a sense of 'brotherhood', material or political gain, or reputation enhancement. *Personal drivers* are those traits that make certain individuals more vulnerable to radicalisation than their peers, such as a pre-existing psychological disorder or traumatic life experience. Scholars have a three-level model for examining these drivers. *Macro-Level* drivers are those that impact a significant amount of people or an entire state or region. As 'push' drivers, they are the result of poor governance or economic and political marginalisation. *Meso-Level* drivers are socio-cultural in nature and are often derived from subcultures within a majority. These work to 'pull' individuals into extremist groups via narratives of violence, victimisation, justice and reward. *Micro-Level* drivers are the 'personal' drivers such as alienation, discrimination and psychological disorders that make one group member more prone to violence than others.

Terrorist groups have mastered the art of manipulating these drivers for their benefit and often use attrition, intimidation, provocation and disrupting the peace or status quo to exploit susceptible individuals and prolong their existence. Thus, by breaking down factors to the macro, meso and micro levels one is able to grasp not only the different ways in which people are radicalised but also the tactics that terrorist groups employ to their advantage.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Differentiate between the three types of drivers contributing to radicalisation and the spread of terrorism.

- 2) Describe how and why some ungoverned spaces become incubators of terrorism.
- 3) Identify reasons why some group members radicalise while others do not.
- 4) Analyse, via the three-level model of analysis, the influence and interplay of push, pull and personal drivers.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How and why do individuals radicalise?
- b) Which of the three types of drivers do you think is the most important? Which is the least important?
- c) If the road to radicalisation is different for every person, how can radicalisation itself be combatted?
- d) How has technology, particularly social media, enhanced recruitment into extremist organisations through the exploitation of push, pull, and personal drivers?
- e) If every individual follows their own path to radicalisation, then what does that say about the level of ideological cohesion within terrorist groups?
- f) How can we use our knowledge of push, pull, and personal drivers to explain the lifecycle of terrorist organisations?
- g) What types of drivers should governments understand to counter the extremist threat at home and abroad?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 1.3.2 Stages of Terrorist Organisations' Life Cycle


Goal

This module describes the common life cycle of a terrorist group so that learners can understand the typical pattern and manner in which terrorist groups form, sustain themselves and either adapt or decline.

Description

The life cycle of terrorist organisations may be divided into three main stages: emergence, duration and decline. The emergence stage concerns how and why a group is formed, created or otherwise comes into play. While many terrorist organisations are the product of 'splintering' from existing groups, old groups can reappear after a period of dormancy.

The duration stage spans an organisation's period of activity and may consist of one or more sub-stages that reflect an organisation's evolution. The duration of each terrorist organisation varies, as it is based on a group's organisational structure, its goals and objectives, and the strategies and tactics it employs. Notably, an organisation may change in terms of structure, strategy and goals,



as it adapts to internal and external forces and conditions. The ability to effectively adapt to such factors will boost the longevity of the organisation and may lead the organisation into a new sub-stage duration. If the organisation is unable to adapt, it will enter a stage of decline.

It is important to note that decline does not mean disappearance. An organisation may seek refuge in physical safe havens until re-emerging at a future date. Additionally, some terrorist organisations have expertly navigated the digital domain. They increase their reach and prolong their relevance through ideological dissemination on the web. Now more than ever, a terrorist organisation's ideology can outlive the organisation itself and continue to propagate, evolve and inspire, even after the group enters the decline phase or ceases to exist completely. Finally, it is crucial to recognise that a group's organisational, ideological and operational approaches create a dynamic relationship with the life cycle's phases.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify the three phases of a terrorist organisation's life cycle: emergence, duration and decline.
- 2) Explain how and why terrorist organisations emerge, survive and decline.
- 3) Recognise how different organisational structures (hierarchical, decentralised), ideological and political goals, as well as tactics and strategy, may influence the life cycle of terrorist organisations.
- 4) Analyse the evolution of terrorist organisations within the duration phase, from hierarchical structure to decentralisation and also from physical presence to virtual space.
- 5) Identify conditions that contribute to or detract from the longevity of a terrorist organisation.
- 6) Evaluate how and why terrorist organisations decline.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What conditions contribute to the emergence of terrorist organisations?
- b) How and why do terrorist organisations evolve over their lifespan?

- c) What factors contribute to the longevity of a terrorist organisation?
- d) How and why do terrorist organisations 'end' or decline?
- e) How has the life cycle of terrorist organisations and the characterisations of its stages evolved overtime?
- f) Does the life cycle vary among different types of terrorist organisations and what are the implications, such as public perception, media coverage, consideration in research/analysis, legal decisions?
- g) How can understanding the life cycle of terrorist organisations inform or impact potential counter measures?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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THEME 2: UNDERSTANDING IDEOLOGIES, MOTIVATIONS & METHODS

Goal

Theme 2 explores the motivations, methods and organisational structures associated with terrorist groups including those that engage in transnational violence as well as Ethno/Religious Nationalist groups, Radical Left-wing and Neo-Nazi Supremacist terrorism. This theme will deepen learners' understanding of violent extremist ideologies, motives, strategies, and the combination of push and pull factors that underpin the radicalisation process.

Description

This theme aims to define and explain the motivations, methods and organisations of terrorist groups. Block 1 addresses a central part of this theme by analysing the concepts of radicalisation, extremism and violent extremism, and provide a typology of various radicalisation drivers. This block will examine the historical development of different extremist ideologies and explore their nuances. Block 2 identifies several prominent examples of types of terrorist groups including their political and social orientations. These include Ethno/Religious Nationalist Terrorism, Radical Left-Wing terrorism and Neo-Nazi Supremacist Terrorism. Block 3 examines the rise of transnational extremism and specifically Terrorist Groups who Abuse Religious Motives (TGARMs) such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Transnational extremist ideology explains the distinctively global threat posed by modern transnational terrorist groups and delves deeper into the ideologies, doctrines, and narratives that drive transnational extremists to carry out attacks. Block 4 covers the primary motivations for transnational terrorism on the individual and collective level. It will also describe the recruitment tactics used by extremists to harness the power of individuals' personal grievances through physical and digital engagement. Block 5 includes the organisation and command control of terrorist networks and structures as well as the recruitments methods, tactics, techniques and procedures.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Understand the radicalisation process.
- 2) Compare and contrast extremist ideologies, doctrines and narratives.
- 3) Describe the unique characteristics of transnational extremist terrorist groups.
- 4) Analyse how globalisation and digital media facilitates global terrorism.
- 5) Assess how terrorist groups' motivations influence their organisational structures and tactics.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why do people become radicalised?
- b) What are the different types of extremist ideologies?
- c) Why does transnational terrorism pose an especially critical threat?
- d) How has globalisation accelerated the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon?
- e) What is the relationship between individual radicalisation and transnational terrorist networks?
- f) How do a terrorist group's strategic objectives shape its organisational structures and tactics?

Block 2.1 Overview of Radicalisation

Goal

This block aims to provide learners with an overview of the radicalisation process and the combination of push and pull factors that lead to radicalisation.

Description

Radicalisation is a process whereby people turn to extremist or violent extremist views. Radicalisation processes are complex and are often triggered by a combination of individual/internal and societal/external drivers. While the reasons for radicalisation may vary based on the context, many extremists share similar underlying traits. There are push and pull factors that make someone susceptible to radicalisation. From an individual perspective, internal factors may include psychological issues and personal grievances, such as social exclusion and isolation, family abuse, lack of purpose or not feeling valued. From a societal perspective, as illustrated in Theme 1, the breakdown of rule of law, political processes and human rights issues may serve as external catalysts for radicalisation.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define the concepts of radicalisation, extremism and violent extremism.
- 2) Describe the process of radicalisation.
- 3) Identify potential push and pull factors.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do people become radicalised?
- b) What internal and external factors lead to radicalisation?
- c) What makes an individual or community less susceptible to radicalisation?
- d) How can governments prevent individuals from resorting to violent extremism?
- e) What role do governments play in fuelling radicalisation?

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Module 2.1.1 Understanding Radicalisation & Violent Extremism

Goal

There are no universally accepted definitions of radicalisation, extremism or violent extremism. This module will clarify their meanings and give learners an understanding of the broad nature of radicalisation.

Description

Radicalisation is a process whereby individuals come to adopt extremist views that may eventually incite them to carry out violence. Radicalised individuals espouse different ideologies but share several common characteristics:

- Call for absolutist solutions
- Use of violent methods to further their goals
- Ideological motivations and desire to change the existing social order
- Divorce with democratic values and the rule of law

An act of terrorism is an act of communication from a radicalised individual or group to larger governing body or power. Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare whereby terrorist organisations, through indiscriminate

attacks, try to forcibly enact the change of a political system. Within this strategy, radicalisation, extremism and violent extremism become tools of warfare used against the foundations of society and government. Terrorists and their sympathisers issue messages to explain and justify their deeds. This propaganda is then used to radicalise susceptible individuals. It is also used to instil fear in the greater population by convincing them that the attacks can be stopped only by appeasement and concessions to their demands. The greatest danger presented by terrorism is thus not necessarily the direct physical damage, but the impact on the way policy-makers and possible recruits feel, think, and respond to terrorist acts. Another dynamic that is important to understand are the parallels and interplay of goals, narratives, strategies and tactics between different terrorist groups, which on the surface may be at odds ideologically, but these terrorist groups also find themselves benefiting from the cycle of violence and radicalisation and feeding off each other to fuel their respective agendas.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define the concepts of radicalisation, extremism and violent extremism.
- 2) Understand the factors that lead to the radicalisation of individuals.
- 3) Identify the commonalities of radicalised individuals.
- 4) Discuss the ways radicalisation can lead to violence.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What is the relationship between an individual's radicalisation and terrorist organisations?
- b) How do terrorist organisations try to justify the use of violence?
- c) Why is it difficult to determine one set of factors that lead to radicalisation?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.1.2 Radicalisation Pathways

Goal

In this module, learners will identify and learn the underlying issues driving radicalisation, the targeted propaganda created to exploit these issues and the push and pull factors leading to radicalisation.

Description

Pathways to radicalisation can differ depending on context, location and experiences. People can be radicalised through family, friends, local communities or simply by seeking to be part of groups. It is common for people to be radicalised through ideological influences, identification of kinship, and propensity towards misogyny and violence. The appeal of charismatic leaders and recruiters plays a significant role in radicalisation. Certain environments, such as prisons, are breeding grounds for radicalisation as they allow vulnerable individuals to fall under the influence of recruiters. The human need for belonging and group connection often plays a key role, especially when combined with narratives associated with shared ethnic ties, race issues, religious sects, or in the case of TGARM, appeals to certain target audiences.

Radicalisation Factors

The following list illustrates prominent radicalisation factors according to the push/pull factor typology:

Push factors:

- Lack of personal agency
- Lack of purpose or meaning
- Lack of security or stability
- Unclear legal status, including migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees
- Poor relationship with family and/or friends
- Experienced domestic violence
- Exposure to state violence
- Perceived injustice

Pull factors

- Exposure to extremist narratives and propaganda
- Experiencing physical and/or digital recruitment
- Having a radicalised family member
- Having a criminal record
- Being involved in a gang
- Being lured by promises of security
- Seeking glory, veneration, or martyrdom
- Motivated by misogyny and propensity to violence
- Seeking thrill and adventure

Some frequent factors also include belief in ideological narrative, moral disengagement, self-isolation, hatred towards western culture, rejecting other people of the same faith, and rise in sectarianism. There are also examples of people who are educated and successful and have supportive families with connections to Western culture that are still susceptible to radicalisation.

Radicalisation can also occur with Single Issue Terrorism (SIT). This focuses on a specific singular issue, instead of having political, ideological or religious motivations. Examples of SIT can include acts of violence orchestrated by anti-abortionists, animal rights activists, and eco-activists, whose agendas represent the extreme fringes of broader movements.

Another dynamic is that of Involuntary Celibates (Incels) which has been a growing online subculture since the turn of the millennium. Incels meet online through chat forums to discuss their feelings about not having relationships or failing to attain perceived expectations of a man. Violent extreme Incels have been involved in the glorification of violence, objectifying women, misogyny and sense of entitlement. This has resulted in threats against women online, and physical

violence to women and society. Incels can opportunistically attach themselves to ideological or religious terrorism, as part of a sense of belonging. They can also sporadically switch agendas and allegiance and claim to be motivated by SIT.

It is critical to study radicalisation on a case-by-case basis to determine common risk factors, trends and patterns.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify factors that governments need to understand when forming counter-measures to radicalisation.
- 2) Analyse how radicalisation varies based on context, location and experiences.
- 3) Examine how transnational events contribute to the process of radicalisation.
- 4) Evaluate how social and political structures support upward mobility and reduce the need for resorting to violence.
- 5) Assess the threat of radicalisation in prisons.
- 6) Discuss the role a government can play in generating grievances that can contribute to radicalisation.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What platforms do extremist organisations use to entice potential fighters to join them?
- b) Why does the 'liberation' narrative resonate with audiences in the West and elsewhere?
- c) What segments of society are more or less susceptible to radicalisation?
- d) How do the push and pull radicalisation factors differ between people motivated by TGARMs and SITs?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

References

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Block 2.2 Violent Extremist Ideology

Goal

This block will introduce learners to the different types of violent extremist ideologies. Learners will focus on political and nationalist ideologies and organisations such as Neo-Nazi groups, the Irish Republican Army, the Weathermen, and other far-right/far-left leaning groups.

Description

Behind the violence that extremist groups perpetrate is an ideological message that directs a group's recruitment methods, objectives and tactics. Many times, this ideological message is created as a response to national, racial or political frustrations with the hope of relieving those frustrations through violent action. Therefore, to understand different violent extremist ideologies requires analysis of the doctrines and propaganda that serves as the basis of their agendas.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify different extremist ideologies.
- 2) Compare and contrast extremist ideologies, motivations and narratives.
- 3) Describe the unique characteristics of distinct nationalist terrorist groups.
- 4) Analyse how international agents unintentionally spur terror.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are common characteristics across extremist groups?
- b) How do different extremist groups justify violence?
- c) What role do historical rivalries, colonial histories and sectarianism play in inciting violence?
- d) What are the main differences between far-left and far-right extremism?

Module 2.2.1 Ethno/Religious Nationalist Ideology

Goal

This module aims to provide learners with an understanding of the key characteristics of terrorist groups inspired by ethno/religious nationalism which

could be aligned to a particular theological belief, ethnicity, sectarianism or dogma. In addition, learners will gain a clearer understanding of the historical context behind these groups and the ideologies that drive them to commit acts of violence.

Description

Ethno-religious nationalism is a broad set of concepts that place emphasis on particular identities based on culture, religion, ethnicity or racial heritage. Ethno-religious nationalist terrorism can derive from a desire to gain independence or greater autonomy within or across national borders. Ethno-religious nationalism also involves the politicisation and mobilisation of ethnicity and/or religion to pursue violent or on non-violent socio-political change.

Depending on the region and the historical and political circumstances, ethno-religious nationalism may not be directed specifically against other ethno-religious groups but rather can be a response to what is perceived as the marginalisation of their particular group by state authorities. Past uprisings and suppression of sacred or cultural institutions can serve to fuel ethno-religious movements. Ethno-religious movements can be found on the right or left of the ideological spectrum and have been known to engage in sectarian violence and discrimination against other religious, ethnic and linguistic groups.

Several examples of ethno-religious nationalist groups include:

- **Irish Republican Army (IRA):** The IRA has been an organisation dedicated to re-establishing a united Ireland free from British interference. The core belief of Irish Republicans, who were primarily Roman Catholics, is that the only way for Ireland to gain complete independence is through physical force. After the beginning of the Troubles in 1969, the IRA split into the 'Officials' and 'Provisionals'. The Officials were far more Marxist in their ideology and became linked to the political wing, *Sinn Féin*. The Provisionals were a mildly socialist nationalist military organisation who soon became the dominant group. For the IRA, the war of attrition came not as a result of a failed revolutionary strategy, but rather as the natural consequence of the transition from ethnic conflict with Protestants (1970-1971), to a more offensive strategy intended to render the existing state inoperable so that the British army would be forced to withdraw.

- **Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA – Basque Nation and Liberty):** Founded in 1959 this was a splinter group from the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party). Although it was originally a purely nationalist organisation, it soon developed a socialist/Marxist dimension. Their ideological debates focused on three main themes. First, the ethnic and cultural aspect of the struggle for Basque freedom. Second, the liberation of the working class. Third, events in the Third World such as the Algerian and Vietnamese revolutions against France and the Cuban triumph, which were held up as ideal strategic models.
- **Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party):** What became the PKK started off as a small clandestine cell of Marxist nationalist radicals in 1973. Their ideology began as a fusion of revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism intended as the foundation of an independent Marxist-Leninist state known as Kurdistan. This transformed into a complex terrorist organisation that to this day maintains a few thousand armed fighters and garners some support for its legal party in general elections. The PKK does not have a clear and consistent political ideology, but it has been successful in framing Kurdish grievances in an ideological manner that focuses on Kurdish identity.
- **Hezbollah (The Party of God):** A Shiite political, military and social organisation that has significant influence in Lebanon. Hezbollah's ideological origins can be traced to the Shiite Islamic revival in Lebanon in the 1960s and '70s. Its formal institutional emergence came about in 1985 with the publishing of an 'open letter' that identified the US and the Soviet Union as its principal enemies and called for the 'obliteration' of Israel, which it said was occupying Muslim lands. Hezbollah received state-sponsored support from Iran and Syria during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the early 1980s. After Israel withdrew in 2000, Hezbollah continued to strengthen its military wing, the *Islamic Resistance*. Its capabilities are comparable with the Lebanese army. Hezbollah has been a key power broker in Lebanon's complex cohabitational political system. Hezbollah's military wing has carried out bombings and plots against Israeli and Jewish targets and is designated a terrorist organisation by Western states, Israel, Gulf Arab countries and the Arab League. Hezbollah has relied on the military and financial support of Iran.
- **Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement):** This group originated in 1987 after the beginning of the first intifada (uprising), against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under its charter, the group is committed to the dismantlement of Israel. It originally had a dual purpose of carrying out an armed conflict against Israel through its military wing, the *Izzedine al-Qassam* Brigades, and delivering social welfare programmes. Since 2005, it has also engaged in the Palestinian political process, and reinforced its power in Gaza by winning a Palestinian Parliament election against its secular rival Fatah in 2006. To its supporters, Hamas is seen as a Palestinian resistance movement whereas Israel holds Hamas responsible for all attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip. Hamas developed a reputation for crude rocket attacks and suicide bombings in the first years of the second intifada. They saw 'martyrdom' operations as avenging their own losses and Israel's settlement building in the West Bank. Hamas in its entirety, or in some cases its military wing, is designated a terrorist group by Israel, the U.S, E.U. and U.K.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Based on regional dynamics, define the different aspects of ethno-religious nationalist terrorism.
- 2) Explain how 20th century international politics contributed to the emergence of modern sectarian terrorism.
- 3) Define terms such as 'revolutionary terrorism' and 'war of attrition strategy'
- 4) Establish a typology of the major nationalist terrorist organisations and outline their tactics, use of violence and aims.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are the key differences between the IRA, ETA, PKK, Hezbollah and Hamas in terms of strategy and tactics?
- b) How do these groups rely on public support to sustain themselves, and how does this affect their strategy?
- c) In terms of political participation, what separates ethno-religious nationalist terrorist groups from the TGARMs?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.2.2 Radical Left-Wing Ideology

Goal

This module focuses on the ideology that has inspired radical left-wing extremist groups and will provide learners with an understanding of their doctrines and motivations.

Description

Radical leftist extremism is future-orientated, seeking to reform or destroy an existing system prior to building a new and just society. During the 1960s, opposition to the Vietnam War, combined with varying influences from socialist/communist ideologies, produced a wave of 'New Left terrorism'. Radical groups in Europe, Latin America and the US undertook campaigns of political kidnappings, assassinations and bombings to advance the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political agendas and make demands for social justice. These groups saw

themselves as vanguards for minorities and marginalised groups within their societies and in the Third World, thus adopting Lenin's 'vanguard strategy'. The vanguard strategy is the belief that revolutionary conditions will rarely occur spontaneously from within the exploited lower classes or group. Instead, revolutionary conditions must be created by a committed and disciplined revolutionary movement, which will build a generalised climate of change. Left-wing extremists rely on the internet to attack their opponents, using a method called 'doxxing' to release personal information about their adversaries that could endanger their livelihood and safety. These groups largely engage in violence as a method of self-defence in skirmishes with far-right radicals.

Radical left-wing extremist groups past and modern, are generally inspired by anti-government, anti-police, anti-capitalist and anti-conservative ideology. Modern groups, while remaining staunchly anti-imperialist, have recently focused on opposing governments at home that they interpret as fascist or against their leftist ideals. Many left-wing extremists today are also motivated by concerns of climate change or animal cruelty. Environmental militancy, particularly, uses civil disobedience, economic sabotage and guerrilla warfare to stop what they perceive to be the exploitation and destruction of the environment. Left-wing extremists have engaged in activities against companies involved in the extraction of fossil fuels as well as medical, chemical laboratories that are funded by commerce and governmental agencies. Some of these entities can be classified as Left-wing, Anarchist, Single Issue Terrorists (LASIT).

Examples of radical left-wing terrorist groups include:

- **Baader-Meinhof (Red Army Faction) – West Germany:** Led by Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, the Red Army Faction (RAF) the first left-wing terrorist group to surface in the post-World War II era. Emerging in 1968 as an offshoot of the *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentbund* (The Socialist German Student Union, SDS) student protest movement, it was bitterly opposed to what it termed 'American imperialism'. They were attracted to the new 'youth identity' which rebelled against the de-Nazification of Germany, which they perceived to be a failure. Their ideology was closer to Maoism than Marxism-Leninism. These groups were avowedly anarchist but practiced nihilistic dissident terrorism and were New Left in orientation. However, after a crackdown by police on the new generation of RAF leaders and

the failure of the 1977 Schleyer kidnap, the group began to steadily decline and eventually collapse.

- **Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades)** – Italy: The Red Brigade was a Marxist movement that sought to create a revolutionary environment by waging a widespread campaign of urban terrorism in order to establish a Leninist-style Communist state and to remove Italy from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The group modelled itself on previous urban guerrilla movements and saw itself as a continuation of the Italian partisan resistance movement of the 1940s.
- **The Weathermen – USA:** A splinter faction from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Weathermen, also known as the Weather Underground, turned to violence largely in opposition to the Vietnam War and out of a desire to support militant groups like the Black Panthers. Their ideology centred around black power and black nationalism, as well as pursuing an anti-imperialist strategy and aligning themselves with the New Left. Using Lenin's theory of imperialism as its ideological basis, the group called for an end to US military action abroad and the creation of a classless world. By bombing military and police targets, the Weathermen provided moral and political censure of the war in Vietnam and the state's assaults on people of colour in the US.
- **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, FARC) & Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) – South America:** FARC is the largest and best trained terrorist group in Columbia. It was formed as a Marxist-Leninist peasant force, promoting a political strategy of agrarianism and anti-imperialism. Sendero Luminoso ('Shining Path') in Peru espouses an extreme left revolutionary ideology and continues with its campaign of particularly savage violence. They regard other socialist countries to be revisionist and consider themselves alone as the vanguards of the world communist movement. By establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat, they believe they can lead the way towards world revolution.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Understand the historical context behind the rise of New Left terrorism.
- 2) Outline key characteristics of left-wing extremism.
- 3) Define 'vanguard strategy' and identify leftist terrorist groups that use this strategy.

- 4) Explain the progressive development of leftist ideology for each terrorist group.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What does the concept of 'revolution' mean to these groups?
- b) How do left-wing extremists justify the use of violence?
- c) How is Marxist ideology adopted and implemented by these groups?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.2.3 Neo-Nazi Supremacist Ideology

Goal

This module will provide learners with an understanding of the ideology and agendas that have guided contemporary Neo Nazi and/or white supremacist groups.

Description

Neo-Nazi supremacist ideology is based on Adolf Hitler's racist project, which has been appropriated by contemporary neo-Nazi groups, sometimes referred to as far-right extremist groups. The goal of many neo-Nazis is the realisation of a fascist state governing society by virtue of its white 'Aryan-Nordic' race and background. Many advocate that some land and space should be designated as 'white only.' It is directly based on hatred of Jews, black people, LGBTQ+, the disabled, and other ethnic and religious minorities. Neo-Nazi supremacist groups promote a racist hierarchy that is based on dubious theories about the inherent superiority of white people above other races and opposition to inter-racial marriages in order to avoid racial contamination

With regards to terrorism, Neo-Nazi groups advocate the use of violence and intimidation to make their racist vision known and felt. Modern manifestations of Neo-Nazi supremacist ideology include opposition to immigration of non-white people, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and exclusion of other visible minority groups. They use the internet to proselytise their views by publishing long doctrines and manifestos that repeat racist tropes and fascist myths. Many Neo-Nazi groups are influenced by the Ku Klux Klan that originated in the U.S. They have a long and violent history of committing hate crimes against minorities. The Ku Klux Klan promotes a racist vision in which they feel they must protect themselves from the 'onslaught' of minorities that wish to 'take over' white spaces.

Some Neo-Nazism Supremacist doctrines include:

- **An illegitimate occupational government** – far-right activists reconcile their patriotism with their attacks against their own nation by claiming that their country is controlled by communist forces, thus characterising their behaviour as revolutionary. In America, the term 'Zionist Occupational Government' (ZOG) refers to a Jewish group that controls Washington.
- **Racial Holy War (RaHoWa)** – this term was coined by activist Ben Klassen to describe an apoca-

Neo-Nazi Supremacist Terrorism

The Norway Attacks. In 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, from Norway, detonated a fertiliser bomb outside the office of Norway's Prime Minister in Oslo. He then launched a mass shooting on the island of Utøya, where there was a meeting for the Worker's Youth League. Posing as a police officer he fired intermittently for more than one hour, killing 69 people. Breivik surrendered to Norwegian police and claimed in a manifesto he wrote to be 'Justiciar Knight Commander' for 'Knights Templar Europe.' Breivik acting on his own chose his targets for their connection to Norway's Labour government, whom he believed to be complicit in a conspiracy to weaken Europe through a 'Cultural Marxism.' Breivik, notably, declines to associate Cultural Marxism with Judaism, as many similar writers do, and considers Israel an important ally against Islam. Breivik's manifesto also references 'Eurabia', a perceived pro-Muslim cabal controlling the European Union.

Murder of Jo Cox. In 2016, Jo Cox, a British Member of Parliament died after being shot and stabbed multiple times in Birstall, West Yorkshire. The perpetrator, Thomas Alexander Mair had mental health problems, although he was declared sane in the moment of the crime. Mair had links to British and American racial supremacist groups including the neo-fascist National Front (NF) and the National Vanguard. He believed individuals of liberal and left-wing viewpoints, were the cause of the world's problems. Mair was found guilty of her murder and other offences connected to the killing.

The NSU Murders. Uwe Böhnhardt, Beate Zschäpe and Uwe Mundlos formed the National Socialist Underground (NSU) in Jena, Germany, and were responsible for the murders of ten people across the country, mostly Turkish and Kurdish immigrants. The group also claimed responsibility for a nail-bomb detonated in Cologne's Turkish neighbourhood in 2004. All three perpetrators were known by police to have Nazi sympathies, and an animated confession video delivered anonymously to the German media made reference to the need for Germans to 'stand with your country.' However, the full extent of the NSU's crimes were only discovered after the death of Böhnhardt.

lyptic war between races. Many groups believe in this or an equivalent reckoning.

- **Holocaust denial** – To many far-right activists, the Second World War was a conflict between Adolf Hitler and the Jewish-controlled Allied Powers. The Holocaust, in this interpretation, was a myth designed to convince the world that Jews had been the victims, and not the victors, of the conflict.
- **Black people as Jewish muscle** – among the ‘weak’ races, black people are considered intellectually challenged but physically strong, while Jews are considered morally and physically deficient, but cunning. Many right-wing texts and ideologues present the enemies of the white race as being Jewish conspirators manipulating Black foot-soldiers.
- **White Genocide** (often euphemised as the ‘Great Replacement’) – many far-right activists believe that communists seek to destroy the white race through abortion and/or miscegenation.
- **Spirituality** – many far-right groups are spiritual. The most common far-right religion is Christian Identity, which holds that Anglo-Saxons are the true descendants of the biblical Israelites. Also common are far-right versions of Neo-Paganism.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Understand the core tenets of modern far-right ideology
- 2) Recognise how the ideology is relevant to activists in various countries
- 3) Identify how far-right activists view their own acts of violence as acts of patriotism
- 4) Describe the social and psychological factors that push people to engage in far-right violence.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How does far-right ideology translate to violence?
- b) To what extent can the modern far-right be considered more of a cult rather than a political movement?
- c) Are some governments less vigorous in their pursuit of right-wing extremist groups?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small

group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 2.3 Transnational Extremist Ideology

Goal

This block introduces learners to the prominent ideologies, dogmas and narratives that underpin transnational extremist ideology and are used and sometimes re-interpreted by TGARMs for their tactics, strategy and recruitment.

Description

Transnational extremism is an international phenomenon in which TGARMs embrace terrorism, based on the warped ideology that calls on their followers to engage in violent activity to institute their warped version of Islam. Through their depraved vision these entities seek to institute their version of an Islamic state, which they refer to as a caliphate, but, reflects only a distorted interpretation of the faith. Both al-Qaeda and

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) are examples of TGARM.

Despite similar ideological narratives, group-specific strategic and tactical characteristics exist. TGARMs like al-Qaeda and ISIS have alternated their focus of attacks over time between what is termed as the 'near enemy', secular government in Muslim-majority nations, or the 'far enemy', namely the West. The focus of attacks is often tied to leadership changes in the terrorist hierarchy or evolving strategic priorities, partly due to the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations.

Transnational extremism is unique from other forms of extremism in that unlike previous eras of extremist activity, transnational extremism does not occur within specific geographies of instability. It poses an interconnected, global threat through the use of devolved hierarchies and international networks. People can access extremist propaganda worldwide, attributed

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda (also known as al-Qaida and al-Qa'ida). The transnational terrorist group is responsible for some of the most heinous attacks on Western targets, including the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. Founded by Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda was designed to be a global movement to attack the 'far enemy' and Western interests as well as the 'near enemy' which they identified were governments in the Middle East. They came to prominence following the attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Following 9/11, al-Qaeda shifted its network to Pakistan where many of its senior leaders were captured or killed by U.S. forces. The group was still able to plan and inspire plots against the West. Al-Qaeda also maintains several branches, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) who have been able to carry out attacks against governments, military and civilians. Following bin Laden's death by U.S. forces on 2 May 2011, in Pakistan, former deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri became al-Qaeda's leader and began a process of reorganising the group in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS (also known as Islamic State, ISIL, and Daesh). The group emerged

from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), founded by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2004. It faded into obscurity for several years after the surge of U.S. troops to Iraq in 2007. However, it began to re-emerge in 2011. Over the next few years, it took advantage of the instability in Iraq and Syria during the Arab Spring to carry out attacks, spread its doctrine, and bolster its ranks. The group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 following a split with al-Qaeda. In 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the formation of a so-called caliphate which at its peak stretched from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq, and renamed the group the Islamic State. In 2015, ISIS expanded into a network of affiliates to several other countries. Its branches, supporters, and affiliates increasingly carried out attacks beyond the borders of its so-called caliphate. Under the U.S.-led Operation 'Inherent Resolve', ISIS had lost 95 percent of its territory by 2018, including its two biggest occupations, Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and the northern Syrian city of Raqqa, its de-facto capital. In March 2019, the last ISIS holdout in Baghouz, Syria, fell which formally ended the group's claim to any territory. The mass surrender of ISIS fighters and their families presented another challenge of what to do with the detainees. The al-Baghdadi era of ISIS ended on 26 October 2019, when he was killed in a U.S. mission in northern Syria.

to al-Qaeda and ISIS, through digital platforms that encourage them to carry out attacks anytime and anywhere. Local conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa or Asia can have far-reaching ramifications in Europe, North America and Australia. Similarly, people who are radicalised in their home country may travel to conflict zones and receive combat training that equips them to carry out attacks once they return home. In response to today's interconnected environment a global, coordinated counter-terrorism response is required.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe how extremist TGARM scholarship contributes to militant ideology.
- 2) Explain the progressive development of militant ideology.
- 3) Explain the increasing use of violence to supplement this ideology in the modern era.
- 4) Analyse how history and geography contributes to militant activity.
- 5) Identify the media used by extremists to disseminate their propaganda.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Who are the key ideologues that inspire transnational extremists?
- b) Why do transnational extremists seek historical and biblical precedents to justify their violent ways?
- c) What is the significance of establishing a state through transnational extremist ideology and terrorism?

Module 2.3.1 Ideologues & Doctrines

Goal

This module aims to familiarise learners with the ideologues and doctrines that inspire transnational extremism. Learners will understand the unique contributions of individual ideologues and how those contributions collectively inform postmodern extremist militancy for TGARMs. In addition, they will become acquainted with frequently used doctrines that justify

carnage and gain a better understanding of how violence is perceived to be a criterion of liberation.

Description

Militant extremism originates from ideologues that gained prominence during geo-politically turbulent periods of history. Ideologues proposed doctrines as a set of ideas during times of war or politically unstable periods when there was a perception that Islam and its identity were under attack. Ideologues often recommend resorting to conflict and justify this through religious exegesis in their scholarly works. At times, this would be distorted by transnational terrorist groups to propagate their agendas, tactics and strategies. The ideologues precedent of linking nuanced theological arguments to tangible action gave them prominence. Although in some cases their ideas were meant to only have relevance to a local context, terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have distorted elements of the ideologues' doctrines and abused the interpretation of *jihad*. This gave rise to radical ideologies that advocated violence against Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Examples of ideologues and how their doctrines are used, and sometimes re-interpreted, by TGARMs include:

- **Ibn Taymiyyah (1263 - 1328):** In the thirteenth century, the Mongol invasion of the Abbasid caliphate drove medieval scholar and jurist Ibn Taymiyyah to formulate a tactical treatise on warfare and the concept of *jihad* as strictly a defensive measure. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the Mongols were 'false' Muslim rulers that should be rejected on the basis of faith. *Jihad* is defined within Ibn Taymiyyah's scholarship is misused by transnational terrorists to support acts of violence as seen in ISIS publications *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. In his treatise, 'A Principle Regarding Plunging into the Enemy, and is it Permitted?', Ibn Taymiyyah discussed the warfare tactic of *inghimas* (plunging into), which he considered acceptable for the outnumbered Abbasid soldiers fighting the Mongols before the fall of Baghdad in 1258. *Inghimas* entailed fighting the enemy alone or with a few others, inflicting harm on them, publicly or covertly, despite the fact they know they are likely to be killed. ISIS has exploited the concept of *inghimas* to justify killing as many people as possible, especially the police and military, until they are incapacitated.
- **Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703 - 1792):** Born in the Najd region of what is now present-

day Saudi Arabia, Wahab sought to counter what he saw as innovations that were corrupting the private and social practices of Muslims. From his discourse *Kitab al-Tawhid* (*The Book of Monotheism*) Wahhab's devised the 'Ten Nullifiers' which served as a checklist whether people were practising their faith correctly or 'imitators' based on their adoption of other beliefs and ideas. TGARMs like ISIS have re-interpreted Wahhab's 'Ten Nullifiers' to justify terrorist attacks against Muslims and non-Muslims, including women and children, Shi'as and Sufis. ISIS in particular re-interpreted and selectively lifted parts of *Kitab al-Tawhid* as a justification to carry out violence and declare and excommunicate some Muslims as *Takfir* (apostates).

- Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935):** Rashid Rida developed a doctrine for a caliphate led by a ruler elected by Islamic scholars and governed by his interpretation of Sharia (religious) law. To establish this objective, Rida believed it was a necessity to remove the bid'ah (innovations) of Western influence that he believed had pervaded the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Rida's treatise *al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-'Uzma* (*The Caliphate or the Exalted Imamate*) advocated his own interpretation of Salafism because Sufi excesses and blind imitation of the past (*taqlid*) had hurt Islam. Modern day radicals and extremist groups interpret Rida's ideas about caliphate to justify their activities as necessary to establish a state devoid of any ideas from the West and strict punishments to those that did not adhere to the rules.
- Hasan Al-Banna (1906 - 1949):** Born in British-occupied Egypt, Al-Banna was originally a school-teacher that identified the West as the cause of Egypt's social and economic problems. Al-Banna advocated religion as the only 'true' framework for governing Muslims. He founded the Muslim Brotherhood (also known as the *Ikhwan* in Arabic) to promote what he deemed as ideals throughout Egypt and, eventually all of the Middle East and North Africa. Al-Banna founded what is known as The Secret Apparatus as the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood that plotted and trained for the eventual overthrow of the Egyptian government. The Muslim Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus is known as one of the first TGARM clandestine organisations tasked with organising subversive, violent activities against the state. The Secret Apparatus also engaged in targeted assassinations of
- Egyptian politicians including in 1948 when they murdered Egypt's prime minister, Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha. The Secret Apparatus served as a model for future terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
- Sayyid Qutb (1906 - 1966):** Qutb was an influential member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In 1964 he wrote *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (*Milestones*), a text that established the framework for postmodern extremist militancy. Qutb became a vocal critic of the West even before studying in the United States in the 1950s. His critique focused on the perceived materialism and immorality in the West. Qutb wrote *Milestones* to advocate for an Islamic state based on his interpretation of the Sharia that would stand in contradiction to Western and secular forms of government. A fundamental aspect of this text is Qutb's charge that the Egyptian government and other governments in the Arab world were *living in a state of Jahiliyyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance). Qutb claims that it is obligatory for all Muslims to participate in his own defined violent revolutionary *jihad* against the *Jahili* state in order to pave the way for proper Islamic rule. Qutb was subsequently jailed for his views. Because *Milestones* declared Egypt's government as *kufir*, Qutb was charged with treason and eventually executed. To radical extremists, Qutb's ideas for revolutionary violence against secular Arab states became the ideological foundation for al-Qaeda and continue to be utilised to this day.
- Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941 - 1989):** Born in a village north of Palestine, Azzam played a critical role in recruiting foreign fighters to Afghanistan to battle the Soviets in the 1980s. In *Defence of Muslim Lands*, Azzam argued that *jihad* was a *fard'ayn* (individual duty) as well as a *fard'kifayah* (collective responsibility). In *Join the Caravan*, Azzam urged all Muslims globally to do their part in liberating and reclaiming once Muslim lands thereafter occupied by what he deemed as infidels. Azzam rejected targeting existing Muslim nations like Egypt or Jordan. This emphasis shifted radical thinking to a globalist perspective by targeting non-Muslim states. His ideas influenced both al-Qaeda and ISIS who have venerated Azzam in his propaganda.
- Abu Bakr Naji (pseudonym):** *Management of Savagery*. Parting with the scholarly tradition set by other ideologues, *Management of Savagery* was published online by an unknown author. ISIS uses *Management of Savagery* as a blueprint for

establishing an 'Islamic State.' The book depicts the West as victimising the Islamic world through colonial oppression. The author claims the only option is to 'vex and exhaust' the West through a series of coordinated terrorist attacks in order to weaken their resolve and morale. In particular, the *Management of Savagery* speaks about visualising terrorism and should be seen as theatre so that graphic violent acts survive in people's memory. The text also speaks about targeting members of the military and law enforcement because if the people that provide security are weakened, society in turn becomes weak.

- **Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir (pseudonym): *Fiqh al-Dima', or The Jurisprudence of Blood*** The author, known only through his alias, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, which implies he may be Egyptian, claimed to have joined the anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan. His influence upon al-Qaeda, ISIS and their affiliates is profound. ISIS made the *Jurisprudence of Blood* as compulsory reading for its recruits. The 579-page text claims to provide theoretical and legal groundings for TGARMs to commit atrocities, predominantly against Muslims. It's takfiri ideology focuses on excommunicating Arab and other Muslim governments and their respective populations that are deemed to be living in *Jahiliyyah*. Al-Muhajir calls on attacking Muslims and non-Muslims by legitimising the use of assassinations, kidnapping and taking hostages, conducting suicide operations, beheading people, killing children and non-combatants.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Assess how social history and the history of Western imperialism in the Muslim world contributed to the development of militant ideologies.
- 2) Understand the misuse of *jihad* and the relationship between violence and perceived Muslim liberation.
- 3) Identify the use of Qur'anic scripture to increasingly justify acts of violence.
- 4) Analyse the similar themes of liberation embedded within *Milestones* and *The Management of Savagery*.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why is political secularism vehemently rejected by the ideologues?
- b) What is the relationship between Qur'anic scripture and violence as presented by the ideologues?
- c) Why is a so-called caliphate perceived by the extremist ideologues to be essential for warding off Western intrusion?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.3.2 Organisational Narratives

Goal

This module identifies the connection between abstract extremist ideology and its application through violent action. Learners will analyse how various militant organisations have interpreted doctrine and ideology to formulate distinctive narratives of extremism. In addition, learners will understand the priorities of prominent militant TGARM groups and observe how such priorities take precedence over proclaimed ideology.

Description

TGARM groups promote instability and enact violence across various regions in order to pursue ideological and military aims. These groups often align with local affiliates that may later pursue their own priorities or realign with other affiliates contingent upon the local leadership and their agenda. Transnational extremist groups uniformly use anti-colonial and anti-Western messaging to provide justification for their militancy. These militants use the inequities within their regions to recruit members and raise revenues to provide services that undermine state legitimacy. However, the actualisation of militant ideology and doctrine varies between the individualised goals of specific militant sects. As demonstrated by the animosity between al-Qaeda and ISIS, ideological stakeholders clash upon theological priorities and the implementation of those priorities. It is important to evaluate the significant TGARM narratives and propaganda.

Inspire (Magazine): Al-Qaeda – (Also known as al-Qaida and al-Qa'ida). Although al-Qaeda was badly

damaged in the aftermath of the U.S. and Allied intervention of both Afghanistan and Iraq, the organisation continues to operate international cells and is showing signs of rebuilding under its leader - at the time of writing - Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda's abilities were diminished further with the emergence of ISIS. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda continues to pose danger to North America and Europe through 'lone actor attacks.' In addition, al-Qaeda's affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), publishes its propaganda through the magazine titled *Inspire*. Similar to ISIS's *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines, *Inspire* possesses a full colour layout mimicking news writing styles often found in Western publications. Issue seventeen of *Inspire* dedicates several pages to 'Targeting Means of Transportation' which outlines how to best harm the United States infrastructure. Such 'article' is meant to inspire violence but more importantly suggests power. The ideological narrative of al-Qaeda stems from *Milestones*. However, any claimed religiosity, in reality comes second to violence.

Dabiq and Rumiyah (Magazines): ISIS – (Also known as ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and Daesh). The group's first propaganda magazine, *Dabiq*, was named after the Syrian town which is mentioned in the Qur'an as one of the signposts towards Armageddon. Within *Dabiq*, the organisation caters its anti-Western message towards non-Arabic speakers with glossy and well edited content in multiple languages. ISIS maintains a presence on social media in order to lure potential foreign fighters to join their agenda, including young adolescents. Once the town of Dabiq was liberated from ISIS, the group changed the name of their publication to *Rumiyah*, which is the ancient Arabic name for Rome. Similar to *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah* is tactical, encouraging lone actor attacks. It promoted its 'Just Terror' series turning vehicles into lethal weapons or increasing knife attacks or hostage taking to lure the police. Ideology was still present, including interpretations of Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyyah.

Learning Objectives:

- 1) Understand the components of transnational extremist recruitment networks.
- 2) Describe the differences between various militant organisations and their narratives of extremism.
- 3) Explain the prioritisation of conquest and violence over adherence to ideology.
- 4) Describe the different histories of al-Qaeda and ISIS

- 5) Identify how Islam is abused by these groups to further violent agendas.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do terrorist groups utilise, misinterpret, and adapt Qu'ranic ideals and narratives to further their violent agendas?
- b) How does this manipulation of Islamic scripture and history allow terrorist groups to justify violence?
- c) How are these narratives used for recruitment purposes?
- d) What instruments are most effective in combating transnational terror groups?
- e) How can international actors better coordinate to disrupt TGARM networks?

Learning Methodology:

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles reflective journaling.

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Block 2.4 Motivations

Goal

This block helps learners develop a deeper understanding of the unique motivations that make transnational extremism an especially dangerous global threat. Learners will understand the motivations behind radical individuals as well as the broader compulsions of terrorist groups. In doing so the learner will examine how individual motivations can be mobilised into collective movements. In addition, this block discusses the phenomenon of the 'lone actor' and how transnational extremism has become a movement that inspires individuals that are not formally part of any organisation to commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, this block provides examples of the typical motivators for operatives in al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Description

As with other forms of extremism, the individual motivations of extremists are complex and vary based on context, backgrounds and demographics. Although engagement with extremist ideology or ideologues is a common motivator, there are few cases of individuals radicalising merely through consumption of extremist material without any connection with other like-minded individuals. Potential recruits often possess a variety of frustrations that render them susceptible to co-optation and manipulation by extremist groups. Further, those that are susceptible to radicalisation are often not merely

The Motivation Challenges

In this excerpt, Kruglanski and Orehek outline the logic of reducing the incidence of terrorism by focusing on the quest for significance motivation:

'This framework suggests potential ways to reduce the incidence of terrorism in the world. If terrorism is motivated by the quest for significance, then opening alternative opportunities for significance restoration that do not include violence should reduce the use of terrorism-justifying ideologies. This can occur on both the individual and group levels. On an individual level, providing support for an individual's personal aspirations and social mobility should provide alternative avenues for the gaining of personal significance. On a group level, reducing perceived injustices through diplomacy and negotiation should reduce the need for violence as a means of achieving one's objectives.'

against secular society but also against Muslims. These movements also offer potential recruits simple answers and the self-respect, worth and affirmation that the wider society is unable to supply.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the relationship between individual motivations and collective movements.
- 2) Identify various push and pull factors for recruitment for al-Qaeda and ISIS.
- 3) Explain how transnational extremist organisations integrate individual members' motivations into the wider agenda of the group itself.
- 4) Understand how 'lone actor' attacks occur.
- 5) Analyse the relationship between lone actors and transnational extremist networks and the concept of attack inspiration.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do terrorist organisations manipulate personal grievances of individuals vulnerable to radicalisation?
- b) What are the main motivations of people on each level of a terrorist group? What motivates a potential recruit, a current member or a leader?
- c) What role, if any, does religiosity or ideology play in the motivations of transnational extremist groups and radical individuals?
- d) What role does propaganda play in motivating transnational extremist attacks?
- e) How do international events motivate individuals to join TGARM groups?

Module 2.4.1 Push & Pull Factors

Goal

In this module learners will understand the specific push and pull factors involved in recruitment for terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Description

There are 'macro' and 'micro' factors that motivate terrorist groups. On the macro level, TGARM groups are motivated by ideology and the strategic needs of the group. On the micro level, the histories and personalities of members and leaders are strong motivators. There is

a fair amount of overlap between macro and micro-level factors with regards to recruitment. Potential recruits are 'pushed' by their own personal, family and communal histories into these groups, but they are often 'pulled' by recruiters who use their knowledge of the grievances of potential recruits to radicalise them. Groups like these capitalise on recruits' personal vendettas to create a compelling personal motivation to contribute to the groups' mission. In effect, terrorist groups harness the emotional potency of personal motivators by subsuming them within the group's overall fundamental motivation.

In some cases, there are direct causal links between radicalisation and mental illness that can carry an array of social and clinical risk factors which should be identified. The social risk factors can include family dysfunction, friendship with radicalised individuals as well as an absence of romantic relationships. Clinical risk factors include a delusional disorder, antisocial personality disorder and excessive or pathological fixation framed on political/religious ideology. Furthermore, identification, results in the individual's belief that they are an agent or soldier advancing a particular belief system. This can be exploited by terrorist recruiters that seek to groom vulnerable individuals through physical or virtual interactions.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify common motivations pushing individuals to support and act on behalf of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organisations.
- 2) Describe the allure of al-Qaeda and ISIS despite the warped interpretation of jihad for disaffected and isolated individuals.
- 3) Evaluate the role that ideology plays in TGARM recruitment.
- 4) Explain the role adventurism plays in the radicalisation of Western recruits and how abusive religious propaganda promotes a positive, revisionist image of the TGARM lifestyle.
- 5) Describe the commonalities in social behaviour and background of extremist recruits.
- 6) Discuss how recruits are motivated by personal incentives to engage in terrorist activity.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What role does the announcement of a Caliphate have on the motivations and aspirations of potential recruits?

- b) How do the TGARM definitions of *kufri*, *jihad*, *Jahiliyyah* prompt individuals to join or commit acts of violence?
- c) Why does the propaganda of ISIS, al-Qaeda and other organisations appeal disproportionately to certain youth?
- d) How does the foreign policy of Western states stimulate the flow of recruits into transnational terrorist groups and networks?
- e) What are the different motivators of potential recruits in the developed and developing worlds?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.4.2 Lone Actors

Goal

This module discusses lone actors and how they are radicalised and used by terrorist groups. It will provide explanations for lone actor attacks and their relationship with larger, formal terrorist groups or other radicalised persons.

Description

Lone actor terrorists are individuals that perpetrate violence without direct interaction, training or support from terrorist groups. Lone actor terrorists represent unique challenges for security and law enforcement officials. A primary reason for this is that it is often difficult to gauge whether a lone actor has had

direct contact with a TGARM or has simply been inspired by terrorist group activity and propaganda. Inability to track and predict their activity also creates challenges for prevention and de-radicalisation of lone actors. Lone actors often merge individual grievances or frustrations with a perceived societal injustice and use ideology or religion as a justification for violent actions. However, despite common conceptions of isolation, lone actor terrorists are often connected in some form to radical social networks. Chat-rooms and social media allow lone actors to connect with others of a shared ideology or be influenced by ideologues. To effectively combat lone actor terrorism, security officials must develop ways to monitor media and social networks that provide susceptible individuals with radical ideological propaganda and which serve as breeding grounds for terrorism.

It must be noted, that lone actors with mental health issues can be induced to commit acts of terrorism. These issues are not entirely triggered by ideology or perceived

Lone Actors

Timothy McVeigh. In 1995, ex-U.S. Army soldier Timothy McVeigh detonated a bomb destroying much of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and leaving 168 dead. McVeigh felt that the 1992 Ruby Ridge Standoff and the 1993 Waco Siege demonstrated that the U.S. federal government sought to disarm Americans in preparation to forcibly subjugate them. The bombing, which he planned with fellow army veterans Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier, was intended to inspire a mass uprising against the government.

Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik. In 2015, the married couple from Pakistan, opened fire on people at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. They killed 14 and injured 22 others. Both had dedicated their allegiance to ISIS and its then leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Muhamad Lahouaiej Bouhlel. In 2016, during Bastille Day, Muhamad Bouhlel drove a truck through the pedestrian promenade in Nice, France, killing 85 and wounding 18. He was directly inspired by ISIS propaganda's 'Just Terror' tactics published in their magazine Rumiyah.

James Fields Jr. In 2017, a car was deliberately driven into a crowd of people who had been peacefully protesting the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville,

Virginia, killing one and injuring 28. The driver was neo-Nazi James Fields Jr. who had driven from Ohio to attend the rally. He was convicted for hit and run, first-degree murder and eight counts of malicious wounding, and sentenced to life in prison. He also pled guilty to 29 of 30 federal hate crime charges which also resulted in another life sentence conviction.

Benjamin Herman. In 2018, Benjamin Herman stabbed two female police officers, stole their guns, and shot and killed them as well as one civilian in Liege, Belgium. He also took a woman hostage. A convicted criminal, Herman was on a 48 hour leave from prison. Herman planned his attack based on 'Just Terror' tactics published in the ISIS magazine Rumiyah.

The Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting. In 2018, the Tree of Life (L'Simcha Congregation) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was targeted by a lone shooter, during Shabbat morning services. Eleven people were killed and seven were injured.

The Christchurch Mosque Attacks. In 2019, consecutive terrorist shootings occurred at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. The attacks which were carried out by a lone actor, took place during Friday prayers. The shootings began at the Al Noor Mosque and continued at the Linwood Islamic Centre. 51 people were murdered and 49 injured.

grievances. Fixated lone actors with mental health issues can carry out violence with limited understanding of ideology or what the organisation they claim to represent stands for. However, they are more vulnerable and prone to exploitation by radicals. Thus, counter-terrorism professionals should aim to work with mental health experts to deter this kind of exploitation.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the process of radicalisation experienced by lone actor terrorists.
- 2) Identify how personal grievances combine with ideologies to motivate lone actors.
- 3) Examine the role that social media plays with respect to lone actor terrorism.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why does TGARM ideology appeal to marginalised, disaffected individuals?
- b) How does the perceived discrimination feed into the radicalisation of lone actors?
- c) How has ISIS and al-Qaeda shaped their digital strategies to appeal to lone actors?
- d) How can the use of mental health professionals be effectively utilised in the identification and critical intervention of individuals of concern?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.4.3 Group Motivations & Strategic Objectives

Goal

This module examines how group motivations are converted into strategic objectives by terrorist groups. It also addresses how group motivations evolve over time, such as the transition from ideological goals to criminal pursuits. Additionally, this module will also examine the role of terrorist affiliates and their importance for a group's global presence.

Description

Group motivation is an important trait that distinguishes one terrorist group from another and impacts the relative success of counter-terrorism policies. A group's motivations and ideology influence its strategic objectives, as well as its operational plans, tactics, and targets. Like any form of collective action, terrorist movements are motivated by a mix of individual and collective identities, often based on shared birth traits such as ethnicity or adopted through indoctrination and experience. Distinguishing between terrorist groups' motivations and strategic objectives is paramount to successful counter-terrorism approaches. Too often differences between groups are overlooked. It is wrong to assume that all radical terrorist groups, even those affiliated with major transnational networks, operate with the same ideological goals and objectives.

Additionally, regional affiliates of larger terrorist groups are important to these organisations' global networks. Motivations for affiliates to pledge allegiance to transnational groups, can range from ideological, organisational, or financial. Regional actors may feel they benefit operationally and strategically by association with more powerful entities who in turn may want to spread their doctrine and agenda to other parts of the world. Ungoverned spaces also enable transnational groups to exploit the lack of administration, socially, politically and economically and therefore issue instructions and direction to the affiliates. However, allegiance to a larger international terrorist organisation can result in local tensions with other groups in the affiliates' home countries which could also be seen as outside interference. Furthermore, orders and edicts could be challenged by the local affiliate as they may not reflect the situation on the ground, or it negatively impact on their revenue streams. Another area of weakness is the potential disruption or interception of communication channels between local leaders and their contacts in larger organisations which could reveal divisions and disputes and

thereby harming the perception of unity and consensus. Potential disputes and disagreements can also extend to tactics and strategies, between the affiliate and a larger terrorist groups, contributing to allegiances and loyalties changing to rival factions.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Analyse the relationship between TGARM group motivations and strategic objectives.
- 2) Describe how strategic objectives influence group tactics.
- 3) Explain how group motivations evolve and shift because of strategic factors.
- 4) Distinguish strategic objectives between different groups.
- 5) Understand the importance of predicting the future of TGARMs by analysing the dynamics of their activities, influences and potential interactions.

Regional Affiliates

Boko Haram is a terrorist group based in Nigeria. It emerged in 2009, when the Nigerian government cracked down on what had become a proto-state institution in Maiduguri, northern Nigeria. It's Abubakar Shekau has led a reorganised insurgency largely against the Nigerian government, while also bleeding into neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger. In 2010, Boko Haram would collaborate with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would provide them with weapons and training in order to expand its own reach into sub-Saharan Africa as a way of gaining strategic depth. Subsequently, Boko Haram demonstrated significant tactical and operational advancement in its capabilities by carrying out suicide attacks using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) as well as kidnappings-for ransom, raiding military barracks for weapons and staging increasingly prison breaks. Following the death of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and the perceived weakening of his terrorist group, coupled with the subsequent rise of ISIS and the civil war in Syria, Boko Haram began to distance itself from al-Qaeda. Instead it started emulating ISIS by declaring a Caliphate in northern Nigeria. Increasing convergence was reflected

not just in terms of symbolism and ideology but also in tactics and targets including beheadings and murder of other Muslims. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS, adopting the name Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, the relationship was fractious, as tensions arose between the tempestuous Shekau and his overseers leading to several internal splits whilst ISIS tried to replace Shekau and failed.

The Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP) is an offshoot of ISIS announced in late January 2015 when it declared its intention to establish a caliphate in modern-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, parts of China, India and Central Asia. Since then, the group has conducted several high-profile terrorist attacks in Afghanistan against Afghans and international troops. Their resilience has raised concerns for the wider region. However, the 2015 IS-KP official establishment was more a rebranding exercise than a true expansion of ISIS. Fighters associated with the IS-KP were previously part of the Afghan Taliban but have decided to form their own faction given the disagreement with the Taliban's main body Quetta Shura. IS-KP has clashed with the Taliban in the Afghanistan's eastern province of Nangharhar as it was led by disgruntled Taliban leaders.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What determines a group's strategic objectives?
- b) What factors help or hinder a group from achieving its objectives?
- c) Why is understanding group motivation so important for counter-terrorism policy?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 2.5 Methods

Goal

This block examines the links between the motivations of terrorist groups and their organisational structures, recruitment methods, command and control, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Learners will learn how to assess terrorist threats based on a terrorist group's intent, capability and the extent of foreign terrorist fighter involvement.

Description

Terrorists develop their methods based on their operational capabilities, resources, support structures, recruitment tactics and overall strategy. Their collective approach to terrorism is dependent on the extent to which they are able to out-manoeuvre counter-terrorism efforts on the local, regional and international level. Most importantly, group methodology is determined based on the ultimate goals of the organisation. The ultimate goal of a nationalist terrorist group such as the PKK, for example, is the recognition of Kurdish national identity through the creation of a Kurdish state. The goal of a transnational extremist group such as al-Qaeda, however, is the destruction of the West's way of life and strategic capabilities. A significant differentiating factor between transnational terrorist organisations is their geographical scope of action and whether they carry out attacks regionally or globally. They may focus on what is known as the local 'near enemy', secular government in Muslim-majority nations, or the 'far enemy', the West itself. An organisation's leadership structure is a differentiating characteristic, some organisations have hierarchical models of command and while others adopt more de-centralised modes of action.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify key terrorist networks and areas of concern.
- 2) Compare and contrast transnational terrorist group's intents and capabilities.
- 3) Examine the interplay between local conflicts and international consequences.
- 4) Identify types of terrorist Command and Control and TTPs.
- 5) Distinguish between direct command hierarchies and lateral, devolved relationships and networks.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How has globalisation affected transnational extremism?
- b) What factors influence a TGARM's choice of organisation structure?
- c) What factors influence a terrorist organisation's tactics, techniques and procedures?
- d) How does digital engagement cause physical engagement and vice versa?

Module 2.5.1 Terrorist Networks & Organisational Structures

Goal

This module examines key terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda, ISIS and their global affiliates. It will equip learners to assess terrorist threats based on a terrorist network's organisational structure, intent and capability.

Description

Terrorist threats can emerge locally, nationally and transnationally. Group motivations crystallise into cohesive collective movements with some form of organisational structure used to communicate, recruit, and convey authority. Understanding terrorist networks' internal and external support structures is critical to countering terrorist threats. Furthermore, by assessing the composition of terrorist groups including how they function day-to-day, helps to better identify and categorise the most prominent transnational extremist networks.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Distinguish between local, national and transnational threats.
- 2) Apply social network theory to the proliferation of terrorism.
- 3) Identify major terrorist networks and theatres of concern.
- 4) Compare and contrast different organisational structures.
- 5) Assess the prominence of various terrorist threats.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do terrorist networks benefit from regional turmoil?
- b) Why do groups link themselves to transnational movements?
- c) Under what conditions is a strict hierarchical structure advantageous?
- d) How does a group's organisational structure affect the activities it can stage?
- e) What are some examples of state-sponsored terrorist networks?
- f) What critical capabilities/elements would be necessary for a successful network?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.5.2 Command & Control

Goal

This module will explore the various types of command and control structures employed by terrorist networks, including the increasing use of cellular technology and social media for executing command and control.

Description

Command and control are the exercise of authority by designated personnel over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a common goal. The command and control authority relationships that exist within terrorist groups can take on different forms, depending on the

group's leadership, strategic objectives and organisational structure. Command and control techniques are dependent on the relationship between a group's counterparts. They can reflect strict power hierarchies or more devolved, lateral relationships. The advent of globalisation also affects operational command and control for transnational terrorist groups because it has enabled broader communication and faster international travel.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify and compare different forms of command and control in terrorist groups.
- 2) Describe the evolution of command and control networks.
- 3) Analyse how a command and control chain works in decentralised organisations such as terrorist cells.
- 4) Discuss how groups utilise technology.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are the benefits of a digital command and control network?
- b) What factors influence the chain of command and control?
- c) How do non-hierarchical groups achieve command and control?
- d) What determines the ability of a commander or leader to exert authority?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.5.3 Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)

Goal

This module addresses how terrorist groups exploit their environment to gain tactical advantage and transfer TTP knowledge via shared resources, training and information exchange.

Description

Terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) typically take on the form of non-conventional or guerrilla warfare. Terrorist TTPs are often developed through lessons learned from other groups, depending on their relative success and potential transferability across conflicts and environments. Common terrorist TTPs include target selection, intelligence methods and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, harassments, hostages and ambushes. TTPs that are known to be successful are often 'inherited' by later terrorist groups and group subdivisions. For example, al-Qaeda adopted many of the techniques of the Egyptian al-Jihad group when its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri migrated to Afghanistan. TTPs vary depending on a group's goals, resources, operating environment, support structures, and the extent to which they deal with local, regional or international counter-terrorism operations.

Terrorist groups not only adopt particular strategies based on their likelihood of success, they also utilise it because of alignment or coherency with the core ideological stance of the organisation. Ideology is not merely

a justification for terrorist action but also an important aspect of terrorist operations and serves to constrain as well as enable its operations. Ideology can influence TTP decision-making in a number of ways, including tactics such as suicide bombing, inhuman attacks, hostage-taking and ambushes. It can also dictate weapon selection such as guns, bombs, knives and vehicles. Furthermore, it encompasses recruitment strategy including whether women and children can be used.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe how terrorists use their environment to gain advantage.
- 2) Identify common TTPs employed by terrorist groups.
- 3) Discuss the origins and evolution of suicide bombing.
- 4) Compare and contrast TTPs across terrorist groups.
- 5) Discuss the tactics of information warfare.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do terrorist groups select targets?
- b) How do terrorist groups acquire TTP knowledge?
- c) What kind of weapons and tools do terrorist groups prefer?
- d) How do terrorist groups use media to their advantage?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.5.4 Global Environment & Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)

Goal

This module will provide learners with an understanding of the impacts of globalisation on the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon.

Description

Due to advancements in communications technology, transnational extremist groups are able to broadcast their ideology to a much wider audience and connect with sympathisers. This has resulted in high numbers of international recruits and a diversification of strategy and tactics. Of particular concern is the globalisation of TGARMs and the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon. The term 'Foreign Terrorist Fighters' has become increasingly synonymous with groups that lacked any formal state affiliations or regular army. They comprise of volunteers whose motivation to fight in conflicts abroad can range from thrill and adventure, seeking notoriety, ideologically zealous, or the propensity to violence and misogyny.

Increasingly, women have also engaged as FTF's as their roles within terrorist groups evolve. Some have been the wives of FTFs, but they also can engage in dissemination of ideological propaganda, weapons training and fundraising. Some of the children of FTF's that were either born or have grown up in ungoverned spaces, have been exposed to weapons and combat training as well as executing prisoners.

The rise of the FTF directly correlates with the prominence of transnational extremism. Transnational extremist groups around the world fill their ranks with foreign nationals who have been radicalised at home and travel abroad. It is important to understand this connection in order to develop ways to deter FTF recruitment and movement.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Understand the TGARM concept of 'global *jihad*'.
- 2) Analyse violent extremism in the West through exported radical ideology.
- 3) Describe how a global environment affects recruitment.
- 4) Compare and contrast terrorist groups' use of the internet.
- 5) Explain the FTF phenomenon.
- 6) Explain the role of female recruits.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What factors facilitate global TGARM?
- b) What is meant by the term 'digital caliphate'?
- c) Where and when did the FTF phenomenon originate?
- d) Why are some groups able to attract more FTFs than others?
- e) How do FTFs travel to conflict zones?
- f) Can there be safe and successful rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for FTFs?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.5.5 Recruitment Methods – Physical Engagement

Goal

This module will acquaint learners with the methods that transnational extremist networks use such as physical proximity, personal contact and shared connections to engage, radicalise and recruit new members to their cause.

Description

Despite the role that personal grievances and other motivations play in rendering an individual vulnerable to recruitment, radicalisation rarely occurs in a vacuum. Physical engagement with extremist social networks in neighbourhoods, prisons, and places of worship plays a fundamental role in radicalisation. Criminal networks

and the social bonds formed during incarceration can similarly engage and radicalise individuals through the concepts of brotherhood and empathy along with the provision of purpose and direction. Additionally, it is essential to understand TGARM social engagements, strategies for recruitment and the use of physical social networks to recruit both domestic and foreign fighters for action in conflict zones as well as the Western world.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify examples of pre-existing social networks comprised of returning foreign fighters, radical ideologues or other embittered individuals in the West that enable terrorist activity.
- 2) Explain how organisations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda exploit existing networks to promulgate their ideology and exploit potential recruits.
- 3) Identify the common characteristics of terrorist propaganda and engagement with potential recruits.
- 4) Identify the common steps in the radicalisation of individuals interested in TGARM activity, from their initial introduction to radical content to the decision to support terrorism.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How does the ghettoisation of communities in Western Europe affect engagement with transnational extremist networks?
- b) What role have some places of worship played in radicalisation?
- c) What does the disproportionate representation of foreign fighters from certain Western countries indicate about existing TGARM social networks?
- d) How is the ideology of ISIS displayed in its propaganda?
- e) How does al-Qaeda and ISIS manipulate Islamic beliefs and traditions to appeal to the specific motivations or situations of viewers?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small

group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.5.6 Recruitment Methods – Virtual Engagement

Goal

This module will familiarise learners with the ways that transnational extremist networks exploit virtual technologies and social media to engage, radicalise and recruit individuals to their cause.

Description

Terrorist groups use virtual technology as a vital resource for broadcasting their message and coordinating attacks. Despite the efforts of governments and some internet technology organisations to stop the use of the internet as an incubator for terrorism, the rise of the digital age and powerful technologies have enabled extremist organisations to engage with and encourage potential recruits. Social media platforms and video game chat rooms facilitate terrorist recruitment by providing pathways for radicalisation through the dissemination of ideology and propaganda and other content by TGARMs. In addition to recruitment, digital technologies boost the communications, logistics, reconnaissance and finances of terrorist networks, allowing them to easily coordinate

plots around the world using encrypted messaging.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the impact of social media in the engagement and recruitment of Western Foreign Fighters and sympathisers.
- 2) Describe the role that mass dissemination of video has in TGARM engagement and propaganda strategies.
- 3) Identify the common digital tools utilised by TGARM organisations and SIT social networks to engage with sympathisers and recruits.
- 4) Discuss how digital engagement and video is used to promote sectarianism and division.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why is extremist propaganda broadcast through social media so effective for recruitment purposes? What is it about ISIS videos that make them compelling for viewers?
- b) What role has the internet played in facilitating engagement between radical terrorist organisations and potential recruits?
- c) How is video used to elicit emotional responses from sympathisers and recruits (such as anger, empathy, or fear) that can then be translated into support for terrorist organisations?
- d) What are the similarities and differences in virtual recruitment and radicalisation by TGARMs and SITs?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 2.5.7 Terrorist Insider Threat

Goal

This module helps learners understand key characteristics of the terrorist insider threat which is an unlawful use of violence by employees or trainees, usually within a position of trust, against the organisation they are affiliated with. An insider attack can serve the agenda of a terrorist group, promote its ideological narrative and damage morale because of the perceived betrayal. This module also discusses how insiders use their familiarity of an organisation’s building layout and structure as well as security access, systems and networks. This is important to understand in order to avoid complacency and

Insider Threat Terrorism

Rodney Wilkinson. In 1982, Wilkinson, an anti-apartheid militant, successfully detonated four bombs at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in South Africa. Wilkinson had deserted from the military before taking a job at the Koeberg plant in 1978. With a background in building science, Wilkinson obtained a position that gave him access to the most sensitive sectors of the plant. To date, his plot remains the only known successful nuclear insider terrorist attack.

Nidal Malik Hasan. In 2009, U.S. Army psychiatrist Hasan opened fire on unarmed soldiers and civilians at Fort Hood army base in Killeen, Texas, killing 13 and wounding 32. He claimed his actions were to protect the Taliban and Islam. It was discovered that he exchanged emails with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American-Yemeni cleric who was part of al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). There were warning signs about Hasan which were ignored.

Rajib Karim. In 2010, Karim, a British Airways (BA) employee, was arrested after it was discovered that he had been in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki and was actively using his position within BA to attempt to carry out a terrorist attack on behalf of al-Qaeda. In 2011, Karim was found guilty of plotting to blow up an aircraft and sharing sensitive information with al-Awlaki.

Green-on-Blue Attacks. Between 2011-2015 there was a substantial spike in green-on-blue attacks on NATO troops in Afghanistan. The problem accelerated in 2011, when just after U.S. President Barack Obama announced plans to pull U.S. forces out of Afghanistan, the Taliban, operating from safe havens in Pakistan, stepped up efforts to infiltrate both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Subsequently, there was an increased emphasis on force protection with 'Guardian Angels' being utilised to watch trainees continuously during advisory initiatives.

identify red flag warnings to prevent insider terrorists taking advantage of the situation.

Description

Understanding the motivations and planning of an insider threat can help organisations to mitigate the potential for infiltration by terrorist actors. It would also enable organisations to continuously re-evaluate their procedures to prevent exploitation of existing operational weaknesses and better detection of insider threats. Trust is a core element exploited by those who engage in terrorist insider activity. The threat becomes exacerbated when an insider uses their knowledge of the organisation, its systems and security procedures to cause harm.


Hotspot target locations for terrorist insider threats include recruiting from within police headquarters or a military base and the infiltration of critical national infrastructure such as airports or nuclear installations. Another dynamic is what is known as 'green-on-blue' attacks. This is where an individual or group in the military or security forces, who are being trained, advised or mentored, either by a colleague or an allied partner, suddenly and maliciously turns on them usually with the use of a firearm or knife. There is a range of potential reasons for these attacks, but in the case of an act of terrorism the insider could be manipulated, coerced, received financial incentives or voluntarily choose to engage in violence. Sometimes, the individual is in a position of authority and can have security clearance. This individual may also try to gain the trust of a colleague or counterpart in order to lure them into a trap. Regardless of the typology, when there are ideological reasons, the individual is motivated by a desire to support the cause of the terrorist movement, knowing it is likely to cost their own life or incarceration.

Because the terrorist insider threat can be diverse, spontaneous and hard to predict, organisations need to conduct Threat Awareness Training (TAT) by recognising the Potential Risk Indicators (PRIs). These are behaviours which can identify when an employee or recruit poses increased risk compared to peers and his/her own baseline behaviour over time. Stakeholders must identify the PRIs and align them with the organisation's critical assets, vulnerabilities, and risk tolerance.

In relation to terrorism, some of these PRIs include:

- Disruptive behaviour, disobedience or poor work ethic;
- Expressing hatred or intolerance of a society or culture;

- Voicing ideological sympathy for violent organisations;
- Self-imposed isolation and being uncommunicative;
- Accessing websites advocating/promoting terrorist literature;
- Seeking spiritual sanctioning to engage in violence.



In conjunction with physical PRIs, there are also virtual PRIs that need to be understood:

- Encrypted social media activity;
- Use of USB/flash drive on classified systems;
- Numerous system log changes;
- Personal email use and external cloud transmission in restricted areas;
- Abuse of file transfer protocol.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Recognise the different forms of terrorist insider threats and the challenges they present.
- 2) Evaluate the requirements to build an insider threat mitigation capability.
- 3) Assess how cultural awareness can reduce the possibility of tensions which could be exploited by terrorists to recruit an insider.
- 4) Identify counter-terrorism prevention programmes that can be tailored for military personnel who could be induced by extremist ideologies.

- 5) Explain how employees need to deal with issues of trust and complacency when it comes to training for potential terrorist insider threats.

Issues for Consideration

- a) When judging an individual's risk factor, is it possible to develop a holistic programme to incorporate information from virtual and physical sources?
- b) How does your organisation promote information sharing on the topic of insider threats across key departments and offices?
- c) What are the lessons learned from past internal insider threats as they relate to potential risk indicators, policies, controls, and training that organisations should adopt?
- d) Is it possible to develop employee monitoring systems that balance privacy concerns and the growing threat of Internet radicalisation?
- e) What are the benefits and disadvantages of the 'guardian angel' policy when any training or advisory initiative is monitored to protect against possible insider attacks?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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THEME 3: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES & EVOLVING THREATS

Goal

Theme 3 introduces learners to contemporary challenges and threats posed by terrorism on a global scale. This theme will explore tactics used to finance terrorist activities, potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), emerging technologies and the facilitation of terrorist ideologies, and the impact of foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) travel on international, regional and local safety and security.

Description

Building on Theme 2's focus on motivations, methods and organisations of terrorist groups, Theme 3 explores the ways and means used to implement terrorist ideologies. Organised criminal activities are a major revenue source for terrorist groups worldwide. Block 1 will assess the connection between criminal and terrorist organisations as well as identify ways that terrorist organisations leverage criminal activities to finance their activities. Block 2 examines efforts by terrorist groups to acquire chemical and biological weapons and the potential threats posed by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials (CBRNE). The threat of these materials and their use are further compounded by terrorists' use of the internet, the dark web and other technologies not only to launder money and gain access to financing, but also to obscure their identities. Block 3 assesses the use of emerging technologies and the challenges associated with anonymity in detecting and deterring terrorism. Finally, Block 4 will focus on the challenges posed by FTFs and issues in identifying, incarcerating, and potentially reintegrating terrorists back into society while diffusing the potential proliferation of terrorist rhetoric and protecting local communities from possible recruitment.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify the sources of terrorist financing.
- 2) Assess criminal syndicates and their influence on terrorists.

- 3) Explain the use and trends of CBRNE as a terrorist weapon.
- 4) Assess the implications of emerging technologies on the proliferation of terrorist ideology and access to people, weapons and financing.
- 5) Comprehend the motivations of FTFs, the challenges associated with their travel, and possible mitigation factors.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How have emerging technologies assisted terrorist organisations in proliferating their ideologies and financing opportunities?
- b) What are the linkages between crime and terrorist organisations, and how do both entities exploit each other for mutual gain?
- c) What are the challenges associated with identifying FTFs – prior to travel, while engaged in an active conflict zone, and upon their reverse flow to their countries of origin and other regions?
- d) How accessible are CBRNE materials to terrorist organisations, and would such materials be used in an attack?

Block 3.1 Terrorist Financing and Terror-Crime Linkages

Goal

This block provides learners with an overview of the links between criminal enterprises and terrorist organisations. Additionally, learners will be able to identify sources of terrorist financing and understand the economic and financial factors that affect the viability of a group.

Description

Terrorist organisations require money and resources to operate and procure arms, equipment and provisions. The source of funds may be legal or illicit, and funding can take the form of donations or front companies. Most terrorist groups are either directly or indirectly tied to criminal organisations. Some directly engage in criminal enterprise, including narcotics and arms trafficking, extortion, smuggling of resources, piracy and kidnapping for ransom.

Terrorism financing is a global problem that impacts a nation's security and destabilises economic development and financial markets. The need for funds means that a terrorist organisation will be subject to many of the same economic and financial factors as any other business entity. Sustainable Terrorist organisations that operate business models with revenue generating activities bolster their strength and sustainability.

Learning Objectives.

- 1) Analyse the financial characteristics of a terrorist group.
- 2) Identify the different business models used by terrorist groups.
- 3) Identify the key strengths and weaknesses of these models.
- 4) Describe how a particular group raises, stores and moves funds.
- 5) Describe the measures used to counter terrorist financing.
- 6) Explain the strengths and weaknesses of different tools and approaches used to counter financing terrorist organisations.
- 7) Assess the threat level to the global economy and market systems of terrorism financing.

The Chechen Crime-Terror Nexus

Increasing poverty, corruption, and war in the Russian North Caucasus brought an increase of crime, particularly the criminalisation of the radical Chechen separatist movement. This is especially pertinent because of the need and difficulty of the Chechen separatists to fund their struggle. A significant amount of the Chechen separatists' funding came from illegal business practices in Russia as well as a strong association with the notorious Chechen organised criminal gangs. These separatist groups also have connections with the TGARM movement. This creates a convergence for terrorism such as assassinations, hostage-taking, and attacks against civilians. The North Caucasus has been referred to as the 'Afghanization' of the North Caucasus' where a combination of organised crime and ideological radicalisation has produced a very unstable situation.

The D-Company

Since the early 1990s, the criminal cog that links terrorism across Asia and seeps into Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia has been the notorious D-Company, an organised criminal group, led by the drug kingpin and underworld boss Dawood Ibrahim, based in Pakistan. Ibrahim has earned the infamous tagline of 'second richest criminal after fellow drug lord Pablo Escobar'. The D-Company has been responsible for a significant amount of drug, human and weapons trafficking as well as extortion, counterfeit IDs and bribery that has contributed to fuelling terrorism and insecurity across the four continents. This includes al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The collaboration between senior leadership in terrorist and criminal organisations, proliferated courtesy of the D-Company.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why do sustainable terrorist groups rely on good business practices?
- b) How do terrorist groups rely on criminal networks to finance their operations?

- c) How can states properly undermine a terrorist organisation's source of finance without infringing on the rights of the private sector?
- d) What incentives do terrorist organisations have to participate in illicit activities like hostage taking and extortion?
- e) How can governments mitigate the risks of piracy and goods smuggling?

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Module 3.1.1 Terrorist Organisations' Business Activities

Goal

This module enables learners to draw the connection between financial resources and the execution of terrorist attacks. Learners will also be able to define and describe various types of illicit and 'front' business activities that terrorist networks are often involved in.

Description

In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, analysis of terrorist financing tends to look at the operational cost of the attack itself whilst ignoring the overall costs of running the organisation. Most contemporary literature on terrorist financing tends to focus on revenues and pays less attention to costs, which are equally important when trying to understand how the financing of a terrorist organisation is structured. To appreciate how terrorist organisations finance their activities it is necessary to understand their business enterprises, which includes cost structures and revenue streams, key partners, activities and resources, threats and opportunities. These aspects must be considered in depth when studying the financing of a terrorist organisation.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify the types of 'business' activities undertaken by terrorist groups to generate revenue.
- 2) Explain how terrorist organisations move and store funds/assets.
- 3) Explain how terrorist activity changes when revenues and costs change.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How does the group pay costs and settle debts?
- b) What business and financial relationships does the group have and how does it maintain these relationships?

The Haqqani Network

The Pakistan based Haqqani network is a key component of the Taliban that has fought NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. The Haqqani network uses the tactics of both terror and crime to sustain itself. The Haqqani network is also the most sophisticated and financially diversified terrorist group with interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Arab Gulf. They maintain enduring relationships with networks which identify the West as their enemy. In addition to raising funds from ideologically like-minded donors, the Haqqani's front and shell companies are engaged in: Import-export; Transport; Real Estate; Car dealerships; Construction; Hostage taking; Taxation; Narcotics and precursor chemicals.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah (Party of God) is a Shiite Lebanese political party and militant group. It utilises a network of companies and brokers to procure weapons and equipment, and clandestinely move funds on behalf of operatives. They leverage front companies and engage in drug trafficking, money laundering, transshipment and smuggling,

FARC

In Colombia during the 1980s and 1990s, Marxist guerrilla terrorist groups like the FARC utilised the illegal drug as a form of financing their movement. They began collecting taxes on small illegal drug trafficking organisations to improve their financial status. With the fall of the two main drug trafficking cartels of Medellín and Cali in the 1990s, an unintended consequence was that the FARC came to control the coca-growing regions in the Colombian Amazon and tax the income from the sale of coca-paste.

- c) What resources are available to the group and how are these used?
- d) What are the financial threats and opportunities for the group?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.1.2 Crime-Terror Linkages

Goal

It is important to understand the link between criminal and terror organisations; studying one sheds light on how the other operates. In this module, learners will be able to articulate the connections between these parallel entities.

Description

In some cases, a terrorist group may have operated as a criminal entity long before it is formally recognised as a terrorist group. Equally, when no longer pursuing political goals these entities may revert to a criminal form. Criminal organisations tend to act predominantly as enablers for terrorist groups rather than through direct involvement in terrorist acts. Terrorist groups depend on the services of criminals outside their own structures to generate revenue, provide intermediary services, obtain documents, procure weapons and collect intelligence. However, the converse is not necessarily true as criminals operating in the same environment as terrorist entities do not share that same dependence on terrorist

EU Drug Report

This excerpt from EU Drug Report (2016) highlights the fluid connection between petty crime and terrorism.

'A study of jihadi terrorist cells in Western Europe found that the majority of the activities did not require significant funds, and there was a trend towards single-actor plots (Ofstedahl, 2015). However, given the adaptability of such organisations, this may change once again. In this study drug trafficking was only rarely a source of finance. Nevertheless, the increasingly fragmented nature of terrorist activity in Europe gives rise to concerns that groups or individuals with a dual criminal/terrorist profile may be harder to detect, as their activities may not register as important with either those concerned with organised crime or those investigating terrorism.'

groups. Further, prisons can act as recruitment hotspots and incubators for radicalisation, and many terrorists have criminal histories. While prisons have been a fertile place for radicalisation and recruitment they can also serve as incubators for positive change and transformation of radicalised individuals.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain the relationship between criminal and terrorist groups.
- 2) Assess how prisons serve to connect criminality and terrorism.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How does criminal and terrorist activity converge?
- b) How can the relationship between criminal and terrorist groups operating in the same space be described?
- c) How can time spent in prison lead to the radicalisation of criminals into terrorists?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.1.3 Maritime Terrorism & Piracy

Goal

This module examines the threat of piracy and terrorism to maritime security and supply chains. It identifies the threats and challenges as well as tactics and strategies employed by non-state actors for the purposes of piracy and terrorism. It will also assess the regional and international cooperative initiatives to tackle these challenges to maritime security.

Description

The seas serve as a superhighway to maritime infrastructure, energy supply chains, raw materials and information technology-driven cargo movements. Consequently, the sea-based trading system is vulnerable to piracy, illegal drug trafficking, gun-running, human smuggling and terrorism which disrupt maritime supply chains and damage the global economy and international security.

Maritime terrorism is a daunting threat that targets both civilian and naval vessels. The challenge is compounded by the collaboration between criminals and terrorists. Significantly, terrorist groups have evolved with modern navigation technologies and developed innovative tactics to challenge maritime forces. They have successfully attacked oil tankers and ferries as well as conducted operations against highly defended warships, port infrastructure and oil terminals.

USS Cole & MV Limburg

Al-Qaeda executed maritime attacks against the USS Cole in 2000 and on the French tanker MV Limburg in 2002. Its operatives successfully rammed into these vessels with high-speed boats laden with explosives. The USS Cole incident forced navies across the globe to re-examine the changing nature of terrorist groups' tactics. Al-Qaeda's interest in underwater capability was revealed in the interrogation of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, nicknamed 'Prince of the Sea', the mastermind behind the MV Limburg attack. Before he was caught, al-Nashiri had also planned an operation to bomb American and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar, off the northern coast of Morocco. Al-Nashiri disclosed that if warships became too difficult to approach, tourist ships could be targeted. In 2003, the Singaporean authorities arrested 15 members of Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate, that had elaborate plans to attack US naval vessels at Changi Naval Base.

The Mumbai Attacks

In 2008, the Pakistani terrorist group, and al-Qaeda affiliate, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) demonstrated their maritime capability when several of their operatives left Karachi, Pakistan, in a vessel, hijacked an Indian fishing craft and killed the crew, just before reaching the waterfront of south Mumbai. The terrorists were in constant communication with their leaders in Pakistan through satellite telephones. They were proficient in using the Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation, had good knowledge of the landing points in south Mumbai, obtained through open source digital maps, and were well trained in operating high-speed inflatable craft. Their plans included using hostages as shields to escape, again by sea. 166 people were killed in the attack.

A large proportion of piracy and terrorism take place on littoral zones. Thus, littoral security is an important part of national security. The problem is exacerbated in size and seriousness by the growing involvement of organised crime groups that have cooperated with terrorist groups for monetary purposes. This entails the illegal transportation and trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, creating unforeseeable problems for dozens of nations.

Securing maritime supply chains from disruption is an enduring global task. A maritime security framework necessitates multilateral arrangements to counter non-state armed groups at sea. This includes joint sea and air patrols, naval exercises and forums, crisis management, intelligence sharing, training and capacity building.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain the relationship between piracy, criminal enterprise and terrorist groups.
- 2) Explain the effects of operating in international waters which could be permissive or non-permissive for maritime security.
- 3) Analyse the tactics, targets, and effects of maritime terrorism.
- 4) Distinguish referential and geographical difference between maritime terrorism and piracy.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Do terrorist's maritime attack tactics differ based on geography?
- b) Why is it important to determine intent before escalating levels of force?
- c) What are measures that can be taken to deter a vessel that is determined to be hostile?
- d) What are the challenges in having an effective multilateral maritime security architecture?
- e) Do terrorist tactics differ in terms of maritime attacks depending on geography?

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Module 3.1.4 Natural Resources, Corruption & Conflict

Goal

Although there is no single set of conditions or commodities that facilitate terrorist financing, there are several recurring factors. This module helps the learner identify those factors and understand how location, governance, and access to natural resources can improve access to revenues for terrorist organisations.

Description

Conditions exist in many regions which enhance the capacity of terrorist groups to raise funds. Typical factors include exploitable natural resources; corrupt or inefficient governance; and internal conflict. In these regions, terrorist groups often emerge as the strongest actors, which in turn enhances their funding and further strengthens them. The most frequently trafficked natural resources include: oil, timber, charcoal and gold along with the '3T minerals' (tin, tantalum and tungsten) and wildlife. However, terrorist groups will exploit any commodity if revenue can be generated from its trade. For example, ISIS has made the trafficking of looted artefacts a major source of their financing.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify regions where conditions exist to facilitate terrorist financing through corruption, conflict and exploitation of natural resources.

- 2) List the commodities which are often associated with terrorist financing.
- 3) Explain the value of illicit trade to terrorist financing.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How important is illicit trade to terrorist groups?
- b) What level of collusion is required to sustain large smuggling operations?
- c) What is the global value of illicit trade and what proportion of this is used to fund terrorist activity?
- d) Which illicit commodities offer the most lucrative revenue streams?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime

This excerpt from the 2018 Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime report highlights how the exploitation of natural resources helps finance of terrorist groups.

'Charcoal is Africa's black gold, and the trade helps to finance groups such as al-Shabaab. The market is estimated at \$9-25bn per year, with governments losing at least \$1.9bn in revenues. Organised crime can make \$2.4-9bn per year off the trade and militant groups can make as much as \$289million. The trade in charcoal is expected to triple in coming decades. Some allege that recent attacks by al-Shabaab, such as that on Westgate, were retaliation for offensive moves against their control of the charcoal trade'

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Module 3.1.5 Terrorist Financing

Goal

This module delves deeper into the types of financial processes terrorist groups employ. Learners will be introduced to the many ways terrorist groups legally and illegally raise, store and transfer funds.

Description

The financing activities of terrorist groups fall into three broad categories: raising, spending/storing and moving. To raise funds, terrorist groups employ various methods: direct or state sponsored support; individual donations; criminal activity; trafficking; smuggling; extortion; fraud; use of charities; use of legitimate businesses; use of tithes; and smaller, self-funded networks. Once funds have been raised, they will be spent or distributed locally, stored or moved to another location. It is important to note that extortion in territories that terrorist groups control may often be presented as legitimate taxation.

Methods for storing and moving funds include: physical movement; use of international trade systems; Alternative Remittance Systems; offshoring; use of safe havens, failed states and state supporters; use of cryptocurrencies; and use of charities. To move funds, money laundering techniques are often used. The process of money

laundering has three key stages: placement, layering and integration. Placement is the injection of cash into the financial system. Layering is the use of transactions to obscure ownership. Integration is the return of 'cleaned' monies to a beneficiary.

Learning Objectives

- 1) List examples of how funds are raised, stored and moved.
- 2) Describe the principles and stages involved in money laundering.
- 3) Assess the strengths and weaknesses between various financial techniques.
- 4) Describe why and how charities are used/misused by terrorist organisations.

Al-Shabaab

This summary is from The Terrorism Electronic Journal, Volume VI, Number 1 describing Al-Shabaab's tactics in financing their operations within the United States:

'Al-Shabaab was successful in tapping into Somali diasporas within the United States by exploiting ethno-nationalist ties that were then leveraged to finance terrorist activities. Between 2007 and 2013 there were six independent cells with little interconnectivity that engaged in various illicit fundraising schemes from individual donors. A cell in San Diego collected money at a local Mosque and had a trusted group of supporters that donated regularly. A cab driver in the St. Louis cell solicited funds from fellow cab drivers that he ascertained to be of Somali origin. The Minneapolis Cell set up teleconferences in which Al-Shabaab leadership were present and would directly speak to groups of twenty individuals and ask for donations on a monthly basis. Additionally, the Minneapolis cell used young girls travelling in groups to go door-to-door to collect donations, under the facade that the money was going to a charity to help orphans in Somalia. Once collected, in order to send the money abroad the cells utilised multiple hawala services, including using female aliases as to avoid providing their own identities. The entire finance network relied on obtaining small cash donations to prevent the money from being traced back directly and sending small transaction to prevent being flagged'.

Issues for Consideration

- How does a group deal with shortfalls or excesses in revenues?
- What form do assets take?
- Does the group have a global network or is it reliant on intermediaries?
- What access to international trade systems does a particular group have?
- Why are charities attractive to terrorist organisations?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.1.6 Countering Terrorist Financing

Goal

This module provides learners with an overview of the types of methods nations and multilateral organisations employ to counter terrorist financing. Additionally,

Financial Action Task Force

In 2001, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental organisation founded in 1989 by the G7 to develop policies to combat money laundering, expanded its mandate to counter-terrorism financing. The FATF is identified as the global standard in anti-money laundering

This excerpt from the FATF's 2019 Terrorist Financing and Risk Assessment Guidance (2019) outlines how terrorist financing risk is different from terrorism risk:

'Terrorist Financing (TF) risk and terrorism risk are often, but not always, interlinked. For example, an assessment of TF risk will require a consideration of the domestic and foreign terrorist threats. If a jurisdiction has active terrorist organisations operating domestically or regionally, this will likely increase the probability of TF. Nevertheless, in light of the cross-border nature of TF, a jurisdiction that faces a low terrorism risk may still face significant TF risks. A low terrorism risk implies that terrorist individuals and groups are

not using funds domestically for terrorist attacks. However, actors may still exploit vulnerabilities to raise or store funds or other assets domestically, or to move funds or other assets through the jurisdiction.

Crucially the factors associated with TF risk are also distinct from those associated with Money Laundering (ML) risk. While laundered funds come from the proceeds of illegal activities, funds used to finance terrorism may come from both legitimate and illegitimate sources. Similarly, for ML it is often the case that the generation of funds may be an end in itself with the purpose of laundering being to transmit the funds to a legitimate enterprise. In the case of TF, the end is to support acts of terrorism, terrorist individuals and organisations, and for that reason the funds or other assets must, for the most part, ultimately be transferred to persons connected with terrorism. Another important distinction is that while identification of ML risk is often enforcement-led, TF risk by the nature of the threat will need to be more intelligence-led.'

learners will be able to identify the existing organisations, structures and strategies in place to counter terrorist financing.

Description

Following the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, tracing terrorist funding became a key activity in countering terrorism. Consequently, anti-money laundering responses were put in place to counter terrorist financing. To build effective strategies to deter, detect and disrupt terrorist financing the following measures are incorporated:

- Sanctions
- National/International watch lists
- Private sector engagement
- Improving international standards and regulations
- Improving record keeping and traceability of financial transactions
- Harmonisation of definitions and methods of enforcing anti-money laundering laws

It is important for each country, to identify, assess and understand the terrorist financing risks it faces in order to mitigate, dismantle and disrupt terrorist networks. Specific metrics can include:

- Improving inter-agency coordination including between local, provincial and federal authorities on combating terrorist financing risks
- Identify and enforce action against illegal Money or Value Transfer Services (MVTs), cash couriers, and enforcing controls on illicit movement of currency.
- Enhance terrorist financing investigations and effective capacity for prosecutions of target designated persons and entities, and those acting on behalf or at the direction of them.
- Preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets, and prohibiting access to funds and financial services.
- Work in conjunction with the U.N. to try and ensure the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions against all 1267 and 1373 U.N. designated terrorists and those supporting them.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify the measures used by national/international agencies and organisations to counter terrorist financing.
- 2) Examine the strengths and weaknesses of various counter-terrorist finance measures to disrupt, degrade or defeat terrorist organisations.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What international bodies counter terrorist financing?
- b) How well structured and responsive is the international financial system for addressing the complex and evolving challenges of terrorism?
- c) How do differing legal jurisdictions affect strategies to counter terrorist financing?
- d) What trade-offs must be made when developing strategies to counter terrorist financing?
- e) What major successes have there been in countering terrorist financing?
- f) How does the pressure to demonstrate short-term success undermine efforts to achieve more long-term, sustainable success?
- g) What are the crucial weak points in strategies to counter terrorist financing?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 3.2 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear & Explosive Threats (CBRNE)

Goal

This block introduces learners to the threats of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials (CBRNE). In addition, this block will help learners assess the individual threat factor for each type of material and understand the rationale and calculus that terrorist groups consider when employing these types of materials.

Description

Ordinarily, CBRNE materials are used to benefit humankind and to create the conditions for a prosperous world. Towards the end of the 20th century terrorists have been searching for ways to acquire and employ CBRNE as weapons. The full extent of the potential CBRNE threats cannot be predicted because they evolve in non-linear ways and are affected by several outside factors, including economy, flow of goods and people, and meteorological conditions. Such uncertainty makes it difficult to determine the nature or origin of such a threat and complicates response efforts.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define CBRNE threats.
- 2) Describe trends in CBRNE terrorism.
- 3) Describe practical reasons for the increase of CBRNE terrorism.
- 4) Describe limitations to terrorists' use of CBRNE materials.
- 5) List the advantages and disadvantages to terrorists of using CBRNE materials.
- 6) Explain the potential impact of CBRNE incidents.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How widespread is the use of CBRNE terrorism?
- b) Where would a terrorist group want to obtain CBRNE material? How can access to these materials be feasibly blocked by governments?
- c) What are possible strategies to prevent CBRNE attacks?

Sarin attacks in Japan: 1995

In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious sect released sarin in the Tokyo Metro system. Liquid sarin contained in plastic bags wrapped in newspapers were delivered by five teams. The packages were placed on five different subway trains. Carrying their packets of sarin and umbrellas with sharpened tips, the terrorists boarded their appointed trains. Each one dropped his package and punctured it several times with the sharpened tip of his umbrella. As the liquid volatilised, the vaporous agent spread throughout the car. Five victims had cardiopulmonary or respiratory arrest with significant miosis and extremely low serum cholinesterase values.

The subway attack caused considerable chaos and casualties. Twelve people were killed, approximately 6,000 persons were exposed, a total of 3,227 went to the hospital, of whom 493 were admitted to 41 of Tokyo's hospitals. This incident underscores the potential dangers should such weapons fall into the hands of terrorist groups.

- d) In the event of a CBRNE attack, do nations have the necessary response capability?

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Module 3.2.1 Chemical Threats

Goal

This module helps learners identify chemical threats and distinguish the different types of chemical materials that are often used in attacks. In addition, this module discusses how chemical attacks are conceived and possible response strategies.

Description

Chemical threats may be divided into two broad categories: chemical weapons agents and toxic industrial chemicals. The two categories differ in many ways. For example, toxic industrial chemicals tend to be commercially available, whereas chemical weapons are kept under heavy guard. Both, however, have the capacity to cause serious damage and occur in enormous quantities worldwide.

Chemical weapons agents comprise a diverse group of highly toxic substances including nerve agents, blistering agents, choking agents, blood agents, riot control agents and incapacitating agents. Toxic industrial chemicals constitute thousands of elements available in the manufacture of commercial products. The method in which a chemical agent is released depends on several factors, including the properties of the agent, preparation of the agent, its durability in the environment, and the route of infection.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define chemical threats.
- 2) Describe the nature of chemical threats as a distinct form of warfare.
- 3) Identify the main chemical agents which might be used as a terrorist chemical weapon.

- 4) Analyse the ways that terrorists might release chemical agents.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Where would terrorists obtain the chemical material for use in an attack?
- b) Would terrorists be able to process the chemical material so it could be dispensed effectively and efficiently?
- c) Do chemical weapons have the significant capability often attributed to them?
- d) Would there be any signs, either during the weapons development or during dispersal, that authorities could target?
- e) Do nations have the necessary response capability?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.2.2 Biological Threats

Goal

This module helps learners understand biological warfare and discusses different types of biological threats and agents. In addition, this module discusses common ways to obtain biological material as well as the necessary responses, if any, to counter such threats.

Description

Biological warfare has been used for millennia. With evolving knowledge of microbiology, culturing techniques and means of dissemination, the threat has become more acute. Biological weapons include microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses and fungi, which can infect disease and ailments amongst humans, animals, and agricultural crops.

Biological weapons include toxins produced by certain bacteria, fungi and plants. Biological attacks can destroy crops and livestock, as well as negatively impact regional or national financial markets. The method in which a biological weapon is released depends on several factors, including the properties of the agent itself, preparation of the agent, its durability in the environment, and the route of infection.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define biological threats.
- 2) Describe the nature of biological threats as a distinct form of warfare.
- 3) Analyse the main biological agents which might be used for a terrorist's biological weapon.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Where would terrorists obtain the biological material for use in an attack?
- b) Would they be able to process the material so it could be dispensed effectively and efficiently?
- c) Do biological weapons have the significant capability often attributed to them?
- d) Would there be any signs either during the weapons development or during dispersal that authorities could target?
- e) Do we have the necessary response capability?

Anthrax use in the United States

In October 2001, lethal anthrax spores were sent via U.S. mail to offices in the U.S. Senate and several news media companies. Twenty-two people became ill and five died as a result of the attacks. There were two waves of letters containing anthrax spores. The anthrax spores caused lung infection. As many as 30,000 people were placed on medication to prevent illness. All affected sites were subjected to simultaneous investigations, including public health (case finding) and medical response (treatment); forensics (crime investigation); environmental (worker safety/clean up); and tactical (operations and intelligence). Multiple state and local jurisdictions were involved, as well as multiple federal agencies.



Packages with anthrax spores sent to offices in the U.S.

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.2.3 Radiological & Nuclear Materials as Emerging Threats

Goal

This module introduces learners to the science behind radiological and nuclear materials, and possible strategies to counter such threats.

Dhiren Barot and the Dirty Bomb Plot

Dhiren Barot, a British based al-Qaeda operative, conducted research and developed a viable plan on the means to acquire, construct, and use a radiological dispersal device (RDD), a weapon otherwise known as a 'dirty bomb.' Al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN materials was made apparent by a number of documents and videos that began to surface from al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Barot spent months doing research for his plan, the main component of which was to blow up limousines filled with gas tanks in underground parking areas. Barot, researched multiple sources including scientific articles, books and manuals found in libraries and on the Internet. Barot, was meticulous in his targeting and planning activities.

Through long-standing connections to the al-Qaeda leadership hiding in Pakistan, Barot was actively seeking the guidance and approval of his handlers as a prelude to carrying out the attacks. Along with several other plotters, Barot was arrested by British counter-terrorism authorities in 2004. In 2006, Barot was sentenced to life imprisonment, after pleading guilty to conspiracy to murder. Barot's terrorist plot, if it had come to fruition, would have resulted in significant human, social and economic destruction.

Description

The basic science behind radiological and nuclear (R/N) materials as well as the strategies for preventing their military use has not changed since the beginning of the Cold War. However, new European landscapes, fluid borders and the influx of refugee migrations have all created opportunities for terrorist networks to traffic, misuse or proliferate a wide variety of R/N materials. As such, counter-terrorism training and education initiatives must change accordingly to maintain security.

It is important to understand the science behind R/N materials, as discovering new radiological sources that can be exchanged, purchased, smuggled, or stolen will be vital in controlling its use. Furthermore, any successful strategy to combat R/N trafficking and terrorism must include emergency response equipment. Three specific strategic areas of concern for R/N incidents, accidents, or malicious acts involve: industrial materials; medical sources; and military R/N threat materials.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify the potential threats of terrorist use of R/N materials.
- 2) Describe R/N items that are widespread throughout the world and have multi-purpose designs, uses, and threat considerations.
- 3) Explain Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) planning and equipment for R/N events.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do nations maintain technical R/N equipment and training readiness without a perceived post-Cold War threat of nuclear or radiological use?
- b) Are there unique challenges for terrorist groups in acquiring or trying to deploy R/N threats?
- c) What Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) curriculum is needed for nations to remain relevant, adaptive, and capable to counter an ever-increasing terrorist threats from R/N materials?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small

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Module 3.2.4 Explosive Threats

Goal

This module provides learners with basic knowledge of explosives and the different types of explosive components and precursors that are often used in terrorist attacks. Learners will discuss how explosive devices differ based on a device's components, which includes a switch, an initiator, the main charge, a power source, and a container. In addition, learners will also analyse how explosive devices are utilised by terrorist organisations and current technical countermeasures employed by governments. Finally, learners will be introduced to Attack the Network (AtN) activities that are employed

to defeat improvised explosive device (IED) threat networks.

Description

Terrorists utilise a wide variety of explosive precursors and components, some of which may have been manufactured specifically for military use while the majority are multipurpose commercial items that are readily available. Regardless of originating source, all have the capacity to inflict serious physical injuries, damage critical infrastructure, and spread fear and disruption across affected civilian communities. The use of explosives, particularly by terrorist networks and lone actors, is a more present and direct threat that kills and injures more people than other attack method, with small arms as the only exception.

Explosive precursors and components are inexpensive, legal and readily available around the world and most do not require any forms of identification for purchase. Terrorist networks operating in both ungoverned spaces and urban capital cities can establish IED production facilities that go undetected. These networks also frequently train new recruits and other seasoned veterans in IED construction and the proliferation of IED manufacturing knowledge and experience from active combat zones remains a significant problem for military and security services. The growth of social media has also greatly aided IED construction knowledge and instructional videos and materials are often shared in online terrorist forums. To defeat IED threat networks, militaries must employ defensive technical countermeasures and conduct AtN operations.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the different types of explosive precursors and components that are often used in terrorist attacks.
- 2) Identify the numerous ways that terrorist networks can acquire explosive materials.
- 3) Analyse the differences between home grown terrorists' use of explosives compared to expert, in-person trained terrorists.
- 4) Explain current technical countermeasures and AtN Operations.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What is the AtN framework and methodology and why is it utilised to target IED threat networks?
- b) What technical countermeasures are currently available to defeat IEDs?
- c) How has social media impacted the proliferation of IED manufacturing knowledge and what can be done to mitigate this impact?
- d) What are common explosive precursors and are certain precursors more prevalent in different operating environments and geographies?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 3.3 Terrorist Use of Cyber Space & Technology

Goal

This block gives learners an overview of ways terrorist groups use converging technologies, conventional and social media and cryptocurrency to expand their ideological reach as well as improve the efficiency and execution of their tactics, strategies and attacks.

Description

With the dawn of the digital revolution, terrorist organisations embraced new ways to create chaos on the world stage. Virtually every terrorist attack or attempt involves some type of technology either cursory or substantively. Terrorist groups have taken advantage of the advancing connectivity of the age to conduct focused cyberattacks. Building on Theme Two's exploration of technology, this block focuses on the use of technology as a tool to perform large scale attacks, gain new sources of funding, hack into secure databases and systems, and take advantage of alternative media.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Outline the evolution of converging technologies and assess its future threat capability.
- 2) Describe the target audiences and recurring content goals in terrorists' use of media.
- 3) Explain the challenges presented to governments by the increasing popularity of cryptocurrency.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How did the advent of widespread digital electronics impact terrorist activities?
- b) What kind of targets are made vulnerable by new technology?
- c) How can a nation or organisation protect against cyberattacks on secure systems?

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Module 3.3.1 Converging Technologies

Goal

This module examines converging technologies and assess the emerging threats and vulnerabilities they pose.

Description

Converging technologies refers to a device or platform that integrates various technologies to meet new challenges or answer old questions. A prime example is the smartphone, which combines the functionalities of camera, internet and telephone technologies into a single device. It is necessary to consider threats from both the physical convergence of technologies and knowledge enhancement that comes with accessibility. For example, drones combine CAD, GIS, and BIM software and as well as 3D modelling software resulting in analysts being able to produce more exact data. Terrorist organisations leverage this convergence to improve surveillance, but also have used drones as a weapon delivery platform. As terrorists continue to develop their cyber capabilities, other smart technologies become a vulnerability. Looking at the future, the convergence of Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and Cognitive science (NBIC) is predicted to cause a revolution that has the capacity to rival the industrial revolution. Application of NBIC to improve a human soldier's combat reflects three approaches:

- Functional Narrative (Smart Soldiers),
- Human Performance Enhancement (Robo-sapiens), and
- Oppositional Narrative (Stepford Soldiers).

The applications include magnetic resonance to overcome sleep deprivation, enhanced cyborg abilities, and other technologies to improve vision. Dangers associated with the advancements are vast and the abuse of them must be closely monitored and contained. Terrorists already have discovered that Captagon overcomes sleep deprivation. Their exploitation of the NBIC convergence would be devastating.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define converging technology.
- 2) Describe the threats and vulnerabilities posed by converging technology.
- 3) Identify converging technologies that affect the security landscape and counter-terrorism strategies.
- 4) Distinguish the differences among converging technologies.
- 5) Understand the future of converging technologies from a physical and knowledge acquisition perspective.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How do counter-terrorism stakeholders effectively respond to the threats and vulnerabilities of converging technologies?
- b) What is the evolution of physical converging technologies such as drones and what counter-measures are available or need to be developed?
- c) Can emerging disruptive technologies such as cyber-infiltration be countered?
- d) What might be the next converging technology that will be adopted by terrorists?
- e) How has counter-terrorism strategy and tactics, techniques, and processes be affected by converging technologies?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accom-

plished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.3.2 Terrorist Use of Media

Goal

This module introduces learners to the use of media by terrorists to gain new recruits, coordinate plans and carry out attacks.

Description

New media, especially social media such as blogs, web forums and encrypted communication applications allow the sharing of user-generated content and have

enabled terrorist groups to contact global audiences, influence select groups of like-minded people, globalise local grievances, and create virtual terrorists. Social media has enabled terrorist organisations to bypass the editorial controls of traditional media to spread and amplify their message. Additionally, terrorists have been able to securely and anonymously communicate with each other and potential recruits, evading detection and creating better opportunities for well-coordinated attacks. Ultimately, new media has enhanced terrorist capabilities in several areas including recruiting, training, and dissemination of propaganda. The somewhat anonymous and ‘many-to-many’ nature of new media makes it hard to control the platform and counter terrorist threats and plots that are born online.

Learning Objectives

- 1) List areas where new media has enhanced terrorist capabilities.
- 2) Explain how ‘virtual entrepreneurs’ take advantage of anonymous accounts and encryption to recruit and radicalise potential sympathisers.
- 3) Distinguish between direct plotting through social media and encouragement and facilitation.
- 4) Identify the various media platforms terrorist groups use to spread their message and goals.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How has social media influenced audiences differently than traditional media or self-published articles?
- b) How does the depiction of terrorism by traditional media affect public opinion?
- c) What platform will terrorists use next to recruit and spread their ideology?
- d) How can social media be used to counter the violent ideology being disseminated by terrorist groups on the same platform?
- e) What role do civilian platform owners have in countering terrorist messaging?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.3.3 Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrency

Goal

This module delves into the criminal use of cryptocurrency and the threats and challenges it presents to counter-terrorism efforts. Learners will be able to describe the current and potential future terrorist uses of cryptocurrency.

Description

Cryptocurrencies are digital assets of exchange used in place of traditional financial assets for transactions, particularly on the dark web. Cryptocurrency has a distributed ledger technology to secure financial transac-

tions making them anonymous and difficult to track. As a result, this medium of exchange is very attractive to terrorist groups. While Bitcoin is the most recognisable cryptocurrency, various forms exist and their values depend on the number of users, units sold or traded per day, and units in circulation. Cryptocurrency can also be bought and sold using standard currencies such as the dollar or euro.

The primary exploiters of cryptocurrency are not actually terrorists but organised crime groups. For terrorists, cryptocurrencies are often unavailable or too complicated to use effectively and thus have not been embraced organisationally. Notwithstanding, the al-Qaeda linked al-Sadaqah is seeking 'Bitcoin funding' and in 2014 and 2015 ISIS in Syria used cryptocurrency for small transactions.

It is essential that counter-strategies be developed prior to the expansion of its use by terrorists. For example, countering cryptocurrencies requires better regulation and identifying and exploiting network components including traceable digital records and information sharing.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the characteristics of cryptocurrency.
- 2) Analyse why cryptocurrency creates challenges for counter-terrorism experts and law enforcement.
- 3) Explain how cryptocurrencies emerge and how they are used such as crypto-mining, cryptocurrency stations and crypto-jacking.
- 4) Evaluate how criminal and terrorist groups exploit cryptocurrencies today.
- 5) Develop a risk matrix of potential future uses of cryptocurrency by terrorists.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What is the relation between criminal and terrorist use of cryptocurrency?
- b) Can a government implement regulations on cryptocurrencies in order to track payments?
- c) How should a government prosecute cases where cryptocurrencies are used to transfer funds to terrorist groups?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 3.4 Challenges Related to Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)

Goal

This block outlines the challenges Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) pose to nations, counter-terrorism experts and policy makers. Learners will be able to profile FTFs, delve into their travel patterns, identify motivations for recruitment, and describe the recurring problems when an FTF returns to his/her country of citizenship or residence.

Description

After FTFs slowly started to gravitate towards the Syrian Civil War, the UN Security Council defined the term in 2014 as '*individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict*'.

An estimated 42,000 FTFs travelled to Syria and Iraq from over 90 countries – eclipsing the total FTFs who travelled to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia – and up to 30% returned home by 2019. This marked a watershed escalation in the scale of FTF involvement and redefined the phenomenon. Through focusing specifically on the lessons learned from attempts to deal with these FTFs, readers will be able to fully comprehend the recent and unprecedented challenges posed by FTFs and apply this knowledge to the next FTF resurgence.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define the term 'Foreign Terrorist Fighter'.
- 2) Explain FTFs reasons for travelling to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq.
- 3) Evaluate how the FTFs experience in the combat zone may have rendered them an increased risk to security.
- 4) Evaluate the proportion of returnees that pose a security risk.
- 5) Analyse factors that influence decisions about which returnees pose the greatest threat.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are the common motivations that cause people to become FTFs? What are the systems or programmes that nations can put in place to prevent this radicalisation?
- b) What kind of border regulations are necessary to deter the departure of FTFs?
- c) Should nations have rehabilitation structures for returnees? What should these structures look like?
- d) How should governments prosecute returnees?
- e) What are the strategies for dealing with children of returnees and raised in the conflict zone?

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Module 3.4.1 Reasons for Travel

Goal

This module examines the character traits and motivations that cause people to become FTFs.

Description

The optimum moment to interdict a prospective FTF is prior to their departure to a combat zone. To do this, one must understand the demographics from which they originate, as well as the circumstances that push them to fall in with a local 'radicalising milieu' before travelling to a combat zone. It is only through developing an acute understanding of this process that governments can hope to identify individuals who are considering the choice to travel and participate in terrorist organisations.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain the demographics, characteristics and motivations of FTFs.
- 2) Explain the process by which FTFs make the choice to travel.

Reasons for FTF travel to Syria and Iraq

After seeing images of Assad's alleged atrocities against Muslim civilians between 2011-2012, many of the early FTFs travelled out of a sense of duty to protect fellow Muslims from an Alawite tyrant. However, as anti-Assad forces became increasingly sectarian and splintered from 2012-2013, those who still opted to travel did so with the intent of joining one of the emerging TGARM groups, who were fighting fellow Muslims rather than uniting against Assad. As ISIS began carrying out terror attacks in Europe from May 2014, and declared its so-called Caliphate the following month, the reasons to travel were increasingly, and inexorably tied to the ideology and agendas of TGARMs. Many FTFs were also motivated by the propensity and appeal of violence, as well as sectarian and misogynistic beliefs.

- 3) Analyse how a government could identify a potential FTF.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What demographics best characterise FTFs?
- b) How important are socio-economic factors in a FTFs choice to leave?
- c) How important is the desire for purpose and belonging in a FTFs choice to leave?
- d) What are the short-term indications that someone may be becoming involved in a 'radicalising milieu'?
- e) What can the mode, time and pattern of travel indicate about a FTFs reason for leaving?
- f) What does the date of departure tell us about a FTFs reason for leaving?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.4.2 Preventing Terrorist Travel

Goal

This module outlines prevention and security methods to obstruct FTFs from traveling to conflict zones and training grounds. To do this, the module looks closely at case studies such as the FTFs that travelled to Syria and joined ISIS by way of Syria's bordering countries.

Description

In July 2016 Turkey deported some 3,500 suspected FTFs and denied entry to a further 2,200. This occurred by introducing risk analysis units at airports and border crossing points, as well as a no entry list bolstered by increased information sharing. Following the UNSC Resolutions 2178 and 2253, countries began to provide more FTF information to multilateral databases. In accordance with resolution 2178, most European nations adopted the Advance Passenger Information System (AIPS).

The process of border security reform by Turkey, EU Member States and the UN, demonstrates the necessity for more detailed information on passengers and more comprehensive sharing of this information.

Additionally, learners must understand how FTFs travelled to Syria and who facilitated their evasion of law enforcement and governmental bodies, as this provides the necessary information to adopt effective counter-terrorism legislation.

How FTFs travelled to Syria and Iraq

The 'radicalising milieu' will often be ready and waiting to organise a prospective FTF's departure, so that once he/she makes the decision to go, they can send them off quickly. While they play a crucial role in facilitating travel, they also often place the prospective FTF in contact (via closed web forums and encrypted messaging service), with an ISIS handler. This handler provides crucial security and counter-surveillance advice about which entry points in transit countries have yet to enter into enhanced information sharing. The handler outlines details to prepare the traveller for improved security screenings. Moreover, prospective FTFs risked being turned away in Syria if they travelled without the permission of such a handler.

ISIS's online publications provide general instructions on remaining undetected at both the airport and in transit to the various safehouses along the border. The instructions advise to fly via separate legs; however, these publications are not as important as the bespoke arrangements made by the milieu, and the handler. The integral role of the 'radicalising milieu' can further be seen in the fact that around 50% of all FTFs leave as a group. In terms of intervening before the FTFs departure, both France and Germany conducted preventative interviews with those deemed suspicious, and implemented travel bans accordingly. Then, they would be picked up by 'fixers' and taken to a 'safe zone' where they would be interrogated to confirm their identities and assure their honest intentions. Once the fixers got the green light from ISIS representatives, they would smuggle the FTFs across what used to be a relatively porous border into Syria.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify why FTFs travelled to Syria and joined ISIS.
- 2) Explain the typical process a FTF undergoes to travel to a battlefield.
- 3) Describe the border security reforms adopted in Turkey and the EU.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What is the role of the 'radicalising milieu' in organising FTF travel? How does this interlink with the role of the ISIS handler?

- b) What is the role of online propaganda in facilitating travel?
- c) How could security forces identify suspected FTFs and intervene to prevent travel?
- d) How did FTFs travel to Turkey? What security measures could have been implemented to prevent this?
- e) How did FTFs cross the Syrian border? What security measures could have been implemented to prevent this?
- f) What can we learn from the reforms implemented by the UN and the EU?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.4.3 Impact of the Combat Zone on FTFs

Goal

This module provides learners with an understanding of the effects, radicalisation, brutality and technical experience, of the combat zone on FTFs.

Description

It is crucial to understand how, and to what extent, FTFs become both highly trained and brutalised within the conflict zone. Through looking at several indicators, such as the nature of their roles, the extent of their exposure to combat, and their arrival and departure dates, it is possible to estimate how their experience may have further radicalised and trained them to pose a significant national security risk upon their return.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain how combat zone experiences can render an FTF more dangerous on his return.
- 2) List the indicators that a FTF has become more radical.
- 3) Identify the types of information a government can glean from analysing the nature of FTFs return from a combat zone.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How could a FTF's ideology change while in the combat zone?
- b) What training and combat experience would a FTF receive, and how could that render him more dangerous if he returned?
- c) How might FTF's become increasingly brutalised while in the conflict zone, and how could that render him more dangerous if he returned?

FTF Impact in the Conflict Zone in Syria and Iraq

After being vetted on arrival, FTFs undergo several weeks of military basic training as well as one or two weeks of religious education, until their ISIS commanders are satisfied that they toe the Group's extreme ideological line. This ends with them pledging bay'ah (an oath of allegiance), to fight and die for then ISIS leader Abu Bakhr al-Baghdadi. Then, depending on how specialised their roles are, further training could involve becoming proficient at constructing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), or in undertaking covert warfare, which poses an especially pressing threat if they were to return home. During this time FTFs also formed personal transnational networks with other fighters, which could pose an additional threat if such links were operationalized upon their return. It is also crucial to understand that not all FTFs could be categorised as combatants all the time, with some having engineering, hacking, medical, adminis-

trative or cooking duties. However, every single one had received basic training and was ready to be called up to fight at any time. Almost all saw combat at some point, with most enduring it as their main occupation. Moreover FTFs, for both propaganda purposes and because ISIS could not find local recruits to do so, filled 70% of the most inhumane roles (torture, executions, beheadings and suicide attacks). Indeed, from the beginning ISIS would often purposefully expose FTFs to violence as quickly as their skills would allow, readying them for the brutal shock tactics they were to use both on and off the battlefield. FTFs were then encouraged to pillage conquered towns, leading them to rape and torture residents. While it was generally true that the longer they stayed in the combat zone the more brutal they became. The most dangerous fighters were not necessarily those who stayed longest. Those that didn't flee ISIS's decline witnessed spiralling brutality and increasingly bleak chances of survival.

- d) How does the date of a FTF's departure and return indicate his level of radicalisation?
- e) What are the issues and concerns regarding FTF women and their accompanying children who remain in the conflict zone?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 3.4.4 FTF Reverse Flow

Goal

This module analyses the security methods and strategies already employed in Europe to gain a fuller picture of the clues and information a government can glean from FTFs attempts to return to the countries where they had once resided.

Description

‘Reverse flow’ refers to the pattern of FTFs returning to their former countries. In order to develop adequate security measures, it is necessary for governments to assess the conditions and details of a FTF’s attempt to return to his/her former country. Through analysing the strengths of successful security reforms implemented across Europe, as well as the elements that could have been improved upon, governments can understand what measures are necessary to stem reverse flow of FTFs.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Analyse how border security reforms have stemmed reverse flow.
- 2) Explain what further reforms could result in even fewer returnees.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How did reverse flow routes differ from outward routes? Was this due to improved border security?
- b) What consular support was open to a returnee?
- c) What challenges did fake documentation pose to the improved border security system?
- d) What can we learn from how transit states processed and returned FTFs? How could it be improved?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

Reverse flow from Syria and Iraq to Europe

Many returnees would attempt to return via the same channels they arrived, involving the ‘fixers’ smuggling them into logistical hubs in Turkey before returning via multiple legs. However, due to the increased border security measures and information sharing mentioned previously, this became increasingly difficult as time went on. Even the smaller number who attempted to hide among the migrant flows resulting from ISIS’s violence faced the same issue. There were several alternative options open to prospective returnees, with some requesting consular support, especially if they required new passports or assistance with children born in Syria or Iraq. Others, however, would fake their deaths in order to travel covertly, especially if they managed to acquire a fake identity. These fake documents (especially passports and death certificates), posed the greatest threat in terms of bypassing Europe’s improved border security and information sharing system.

For those who were identified at airports, some coun-

tries have a problem where the policing authority and the migration authority that is responsible for the deportation of illegal residents are separate, and there the country of origin is not getting informed about potential returnees. To mitigate this, some law enforcement agencies work with their embassies and consulates to know about potential returnees when they appear to request new travel documents. Conversely, if FTFs were identified via the second legs of their journey through other EU transit states, the national authorities would generally, after an interrogation and investigation, hand the returnee over to their foreign embassy or consulate. The aim is to promote greater sharing of information but also gave the country of origin plenty of warning ahead of its FTFs return, as well as a proper escort to assure they didn’t abscond on arrival. All transit nations should require advanced passenger information, passage name records and biometric technology at their airports and mainland ‘exit points’, which should then be linked up to the INTERPOL and national databases.

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Module 3.4.5 FTF Returnee Activities

Goal

This module helps learners to differentiate between threatening and non-threatening FTF returnees and implement the strategies to prevent a well-trained and radicalised returnee from planning an attack.

Description

It is important to distinguish between various types of FTF returnees: men, women and children based on the threat that they pose to national security. When determining the threat posed by returnees, their behaviour before, during and after they travelled to ungoverned lawless territories is important. Nations should develop gender and age-sensitive approaches to returnee challenges without foregoing the need to critically look examine the evidence of racialised behaviour in every type of individual.

Once returnees infiltrate society they can create or resuscitate dormant networks and the authority to radicalize and

recruit new adherents to their cause. Many returnees have battle experience, IED and weapons training. War stories give them charisma, credibility and a hardened ideological perspective. Returnees present three principle concerns:

- Direct threat of violence. They intend to plan or carry out attacks, possibly inspired or instructed by a terrorist group in the conflict zone.
- Non-violent threat. They pose a risk to national security by committing non-violent activities such as recruitment, disseminating extremist ideology, and inciting others to violence.
- No current threat. A small group of returnees appear to have renounced ideological extremism, but they may pose a threat in the future.

Returnee's activities in Europe after Syria and Iraq

Among FTF returnees who do become or attempt to become terrorists at home, the median lag time between return and plot or arrest is less than six months. Therefore, there is about a five-month window after the FTFs returns in which there is the greatest risk for committing terrorism. Thereafter, the threat reduces but it should not be assumed the situation won't escalate later. Also relevant is how long the individual spent in the conflict zone. If they were abroad for a just a few weeks, it is likely their radicalisation was limited. However, those that spent more than several months in ungoverned spaces will have received weapons training, ideological guidance and engaged in murder. They are dangerous and a security concern.

Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian national of Moroccan descent, grew up in Molenbeek, a district of Brussels. He travelled to Syria to join ISIS and became a key cog in their recruitment strategy as well as planning and coordinating terrorist attacks. Abaaoud travelled back and forth to Europe whilst also organised several terrorist plots including the 2015 Paris Attacks and the Verviers cell in Belgium. Abaaoud also directed Mehdi Nemmouche, a terrorist of Franco-Algerian origin, who shot and killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014 and Ayoub El-Khazzani who boarded a Thalys express train from Amsterdam to Paris in August 2015 with a cache of weapons and subsequently was overpowered by passengers.

Prison, instead of serving as a deterrent against further terrorist violence can in fact exacerbate the situation. Thus, it is also important to prioritise the potential risk of in-prison radicalisation by both male and female FTFs. This can entail dispersing inmates identified as potential radicalisers across the prison population or conversely, housing them separately from the general prison population. Both approaches need to be in accordance with carefully evaluated risk assessments. There is also a need to strengthen in-prison monitoring, by creating specialised units to inform risk assessment and post-release risk-mitigation strategies.

Post-release monitoring measures of FTFs should include the creation of dedicated teams to monitor former inmates, and the use of administrative measures that combine electronic monitoring with restrictions, including over travel and Internet usage. It is essential that all such approaches comply with domestic and international human rights law.

The radicalisation of children and their travel to a conflict zone has become a regular feature of counter-terrorism investigations. Minors have been either exposed to violence or directly engaged in serious criminal acts. Policies will vary on how to deal with returning minors, dependent on age. They could be treated as a suspect or part of a safeguarding case, or both. Minors may need to be subject to referrals for community-based management and projects by local authorities and charities. They will need to be subject to extensive family court proceedings aimed at protecting children from harm including radicalisation by parents.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain how you would identify dangerous returnees.
- 2) Identify the unique threats posed by returnees.
- 3) Analyse how you could prevent the 'undecided' from turning back to radicalism.
- 4) Explain how prisons can often exacerbate FTF radicalisation.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How likely is a returnee to carry out an attack?
- b) How does the date of return indicate returnees' reasons for returning?

- c) On average, how long does it take for dangerous returnees to carry out an attack after returning?
- d) Aside from carrying out attacks, how else could returnees assist in causing terror?
- e) Why are attacks by FTFs more deadly?
- f) How does society address those minors returning from conflict zones, both short and long term?
- g) How should we prepare for the contingent of hard-core FTFs?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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THEME 4: COUNTER-TERRORISM: STRATEGY, OPERATIONS & CAPACITY BUILDING

Goal

Theme 4 introduces learners to counter-terrorism (CT) strategies at the national, regional and international level. Learners should gain a better understanding of operational response techniques and defence capacity-building to create effective protocols and partnerships needed for countering terrorism.

Description

CT measures are taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorist attacks. CT includes counter-force activities and containment by military force, intelligence and civil agencies. Effective counter-terrorism strategies must be risk-based, intelligence-driven and comprehensive, employing all elements and aspects of national and international security functions, measures and operations. These strategies combine both hard and soft power elements such as civilian oversight, military support, policy changes, multilateral diplomacy and an adaptive-response model supported by security and intelligence reports. Because terrorism knows no boundaries, counter-terrorism requires partnerships with those who share a commitment to counter-terrorism. Block 1 looks at the international and regional counter-terrorism strategies. Block 2 analyses the components of national strategy which include the rule of law, law enforcement, intelligence as well as diplomacy and the role of the military. Block 3 addresses the counter-terrorism strategies which range from strategic communications to border security and identity intelligence to hostage recovery. Finally, Block 4 focuses on building counter-terrorism capacities which entail building integrity, capability building, measures of effectiveness, table-top exercises and lessons learned.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the key components of effective counter-terrorism strategies at the national, regional and international level.
 - 2) Describe and assess the hard and soft power counter-terrorism tools available to governments.
 - 3) Identify protocols and techniques that will improve intelligence management and border security.
 - 4) Determine essential procedures needed to respond to terrorist threats.
 - 5) Simulate the defence capacity-building process through a table-top exercise.
- ### Issues for Consideration
- a) What are the key strategic and operational issues and challenges related to terrorist threats?
 - b) What counter-terrorism tools does a nation have at its disposal, and how can these tools be employed in formulating an effective counter-terrorism strategy?
 - c) What military capabilities are most important for an effective counter-terrorism strategy?
 - d) Under what circumstances should military force be used against terrorism?
 - e) Can law enforcement and the military cooperate on counter-terrorism strategies?

Block 4.1: International & Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Goal

To provide learners with a comprehensive view of the global fight against terrorism, this block explains how select international organisations work towards a common counter-terrorism goal.

Description

In the fight against terrorism, the responsibility to monitor, engage, deter or punish lies predominantly with sovereign states. International and regional organisations, however, also play a role, engaging with nations along principles of complementarity and non-duplication. These organisations including the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Global counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF), African Union (AU), and INTERPOL, can provide guidance and draw from diverse national

expertise and policies to extrapolate best practices across borders. Such organisations are committed to fostering international peace and security, and promoting social progress, equality and human rights. In leadership and assistance capacities, they form a global counter-terrorism network, establishing standards by which nations can aim to develop their own frameworks. They also help open diplomatic pathways for the sharing of intelligence, and the formation of regional and international counter-terrorism strategy.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Differentiate between national and international/regional approaches to counter-terrorism and the importance of cooperation.
- 2) Describe the overarching strategy in the fight against terrorism.
- 3) Assess the respective specialties of key international organisations.

NATO's Counter-Terrorism approach

NATO's work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

Evolution and key milestones

NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on the United States. Starting with 2003 Operation Active Endeavour is expanded to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar and later to the entire Mediterranean. In October 2016 Operation Active Endeavour is succeeded by Sea Guardian, a broader maritime operation in the Mediterranean. In 2003 NATO takes lead of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF's primary objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists. On 1 January 2015 after the termination of ISAF, NATO's Resolute Support Mission continued to build capacity

of Afghan security forces and institutions in assistance to the Afghan National Unity Government.

NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, recognises that terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly.

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, Allied leaders decide to provide support through NATO AWACS aircraft flights providing information to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. NATO begins training and capacity building in Iraq, while continuing to train Iraqi officers in Jordan.

During the May 2017 meeting in Brussels, Allies agreed an action plan to enhance NATO's contribution to the international community's fight against terrorism with NATO's membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL. This focused on the establishment of a new terrorism intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters and reinforced the cooperation with allied partners. In July 2018, at the Brussels Summit, Allies decided to establish a training mission in Iraq and increase their assistance to the Afghan security forces, providing more trainers and extending financial support.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What roles do international and regional organisations play in facilitating the building of military and national security capacities?
- b) What can multilateral organisations do to assist counter-terrorism efforts?
- c) How do international and regional organisations empower traditional capacities for peace and security?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 4.2: Components of a National Strategy

Goal

CT requires the participation of several organisations who perform a variety of interlocking tasks, including disrupting terrorists' planning and operations, prosecuting terrorists and supporting societal efforts to identify, prevent and mitigate the impact of the drivers of violent extremism. In this block, learners will examine how a nation's counter-terrorism activities must be regularly reviewed to assess effectiveness against existing threats and adapt to emerging ones.

Description

A comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy requires both hard and soft power instruments. Hard-power responses to terrorism are rooted in the capacities of a nation's law enforcement, intelligence agencies and military. Soft-power elements involve national governments' policies and programmes aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), education or religious-leader training programmes, rehabilitation opportunities, re-integration and disengagement programmes, and de-radicalisation initiatives. A comprehensive approach to CT, requires effective elaboration, differentiation, and integration of the various components including law enforcement, military, political, legal, intelligence and civil society organisations. Integrating these capabilities is essential to strategy initiation and implementation. This block examines the legal frameworks, the capacity of law enforcement agencies, and the use of diplomatic, intelligence, and military instruments in combatting terrorism.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Distinguish between the roles of governmental bodies, civilian agencies and armed forces in a counter-terrorism strategy.
- 2) Analyse the effectiveness of a whole-of-government counter-terrorism approach and the impact on the military.
- 3) Evaluate the contribution military capabilities can make to a counter-terrorism strategy.
- 4) Identify the Rules of Engagement for using force.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What national security organisations does a nation have at their disposal, and what roles might they play in formulating an effective counter-terrorism strategy?
- b) How might these entities' roles differ from nation to nation?
- c) How can a nation best balance the responsibilities of and coordination between the components of its national apparatus?

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Module 4.2.1: Rule of Law

Goal

This module outlines counter-terrorism laws within the international and national rule-of-law frameworks. In addition, it considers the challenges that open societies when employing a counter-terrorism strategy.

Description

Because terrorism knows no boundaries there are many complexities that come with preventing, apprehending and adjudicating terrorist acts. To address these complexities, international law is upheld in accordance with bilateral or multilateral treaties.

States should consider the role of criminal justice authorities in the investigation and disruption of terrorist activities. The primary objective of any effective criminal justice response to terrorism is to prevent terrorist incidents before they produce large-scale casualties, while fully respecting applicable international law and promoting the rule of law.

UN Security Council Resolutions

UNSCR 1368 was unanimously adopted on 12 September 2001, to justify U.S. military intervention against al-Qaeda after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and called on all States to strengthen counter-terrorism capacity.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted as UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288 on 8 September 2006, calls nations forth to exercise preventive and capacity-building measures in compliance with the UN Charter and other international conventions.

The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, established on 15 June 2017, ensures that resource mobilisation and strategic efforts are coordinated on an international level in adherence with the 2006 resolution. The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and UN Development Programme (UNDP) are the main points of contact for rule of law in counter-terrorism and post-conflict settings. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, for instance, encourages Member States to share intelligence on terrorist groups and formulate regional agreements to mitigate the risk of a non-state armed attack.

A strong counter-terrorism legal framework also has relevance at the national level. The UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288 declares that states should 'make every effort to develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system that can ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in domestic laws and regulations.' National laws should incorporate prevention strategies to increase public awareness, mitigate the risk of attack and encourage information sharing and interagency cooperation. Finally, all national counter-terrorism laws must respect the protection of human rights and should not be exploited to further marginalise domestic populations.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify global and state laws that permit secure information-sharing networks and preparation for surprise counter-terrorism attacks.
- 2) Assess how international law affects the deployment of military force against terrorism.
- 3) Compare and contrast international conventions and domestic laws for dealing with those engaged in terrorist activities.
- 4) Demonstrate how terrorism may be prosecuted in the criminal justice system and disrupted or detected through other legal processes.
- 5) Describe appropriate methodologies for protection of human rights (suspects and others) in terrorism investigations.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Under what circumstances can military force be used against terrorism?
- b) How can the respective rights of suspected terrorists or terrorist supporters be managed in military-led or intelligence-led operations and the criminal justice system?
- c) How does the rule of law ensure operations are legal, necessary, and proportionate to ensure that terrorists are accountable for crimes committed?
- d) How can legal powers be utilised to deny terrorists' access to valuable assets, such as money, property, and weaponry?

- e) How can terrorism trials be conducted fairly and securely?
- f) Does the state collect information pertinent to counter-terrorism that is inaccessible to prosecutors? Should this change?
- g) What categories of information are useful in terrorism cases? Mechanically, how is this information introduced in criminal proceedings?
- h) What is the proper balance a government should consider between ensuring security and preserving and open society?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.2.2: Law Enforcement

Goal

This module examines the role of law enforcement organisations in counter-terrorism and their collaboration with other elements of national security such as the military.

Description

To effectively combat terrorist threats, every country needs a domestic terrorism police force and prosecution capacity. With goals to sustain preventive measures, domestic police forces must establish their permanent role in counter-terrorism efforts through inter-agency and multilateral cooperation. Law enforcement agencies should be equipped with the infrastructure and specialised training required to perform counter-terrorism functions within the justice system.

Effective investigation of terrorist threats involves gathering and analysing information collected by multiple agencies within a single government. This requires a methodological shift towards intelligence-led policing

that also employs community-oriented approaches to prevent the rise of violent extremism. By utilising community liaison teams, law enforcement can also engage in disruptive operations by enhancing relationships with identified communities in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). Through safeguarding, they can identify and prevent individuals vulnerable to radicalisation and the ideological influence of terrorist groups from joining. Additionally, law enforcement agencies must work within the rule of law to ensure that proper investigation and prosecution procedures are followed, so that rights and liberties are not violated in the pursuit of security.

One recurring challenge to successful investigations and prosecutions is the lack of coordination, cooperation and information sharing among government law enforcement, intelligence and prosecution agencies. Appropriate structures and frameworks are required to enable time-sensitive exchange of information. Data on FTFs held by multilateral organisations, which is sourced from conflict zones, would be improved if the military are enabled to share information collected from the battlefield and coordinate with law enforcement.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Assess law enforcement capacities in counter-terrorism measures and why such capacities are a necessary part of an effective counter-terrorism strategy
- 2) Analyse a country's rules of evidence and past counter-terrorism prosecution record to determine which intelligence-based counter-terrorism collection and sharing methods might best serve legal prosecutions of terrorists
- 3) Identify ways to prevent and incapacitate terrorist facilitators located in your countries through rule of law-based remedies

Issues for Consideration

- a) What role does law enforcement play in implementing an effective counter-terrorism strategy?
- b) What guidelines should be used to facilitate information sharing and gathering between militaries, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to best effectuate preventive counter-terrorism measures?
- c) How can law enforcement and militaries cooperate on counter-terrorism strategies?

- d) What can police officials do to strengthen long-term capacity and permanency in counter-terrorism efforts?
- e) How can law enforcement agencies improve their ability to incapacitate terrorist facilitators?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.2.3: Diplomacy

Goal

This module outlines the roles and responsibilities necessary to harness diplomacy in the fight against terrorism.

Description

International counter-terrorism diplomacy is the sum of the policies, strategies, programmes and efforts taken by national authorities to mobilise international networks of senior political leaders and counter-terrorism professionals in the fight against terrorism. Typically, ministries of foreign affairs exercise policy oversight for all international counter-terrorism engagements and capacity-building programmes. Senior officers in the military often serve as quasi-diplomats and can be used effectively to coordinate efficient counter-terrorism diplomatic strategies.

In addition, in order to deter, degrade and defeat terrorist threats especially those that cross national borders, close collaboration between governments and non-governmental stakeholders is important. Two-levels of diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, may be required. Bilateral diplomacy entails two countries partnering to address their counter-terrorism priorities, including capacity-building efforts and operational collaboration. Multilateral diplomacy, on the other hand, includes negotiations toward the adoption of measures to secure agreed-upon international political commitments, sometimes legally binding, to fight terrorism.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define the key concepts and components of a diplomatic strategy in combating terrorism
- 2) Describe and differentiate between bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism agreements
- 3) Compare and contrast international counter-terrorism diplomacy with domestic strategies
- 4) Design an organisational framework for counter-terrorism diplomacy efforts

Issues for Consideration

- a) What practical results have multilateral organisations achieved to help address international terrorism?
- b) How should diplomats leverage both bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism efforts?
- c) How can governments and non-governmental entities effectively partner to develop and implement international standards and counter-terrorism good practices in limited resource environments?
- d) What are some of the most effective and efficient ways to build political will, mobilise an international consensus, and achieve tangible and practical counter-terrorism goals?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

NATO & Diplomacy

NATO provides diplomatic platforms to advance counter-terrorism goals and create ties with other international organisations that could support the development of NATO Partner capabilities. International counter-terrorism best practices are also developed, promulgated, and implemented in multilateral venues, such as the United Nations and the Global counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF). These venues bring together experts and practitioners from around the world to share experience and expertise and develop tools and strategies to counter the evolving terrorist threat.

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Module 4.2.4: Intelligence

Goal

This module outlines the roles and responsibilities necessary to harness intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination in the fight against terrorism.

Description

The role of intelligence is to support decision-makers in the planning and execution of counter-terrorism strategy. Due to the largely clandestine nature in which terrorist groups operate, counter-terrorism operations rely heavily on detailed and actionable information to successfully dismantle terrorist networks. Intelligence is central in identifying: members of terrorist organisations; motivation and commitment factors; types of internal and external support; techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs); a group's operational environment; and a centre of gravity that can be leveraged to target the network. Intelligence is collected by utilising multiple sources in order to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible:

- SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)
- HUMINT (Human Intelligence)

- ELINT (Electronic Intelligence)
- MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence)
- OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence)

After raw intelligence is collected, it is analysed and disseminated to the appropriate decision-makers. Decision-makers must conduct a cost-benefit analysis of whether to act on a target and possibly lose an intelligence collection capability and/or reveal a source or allow it to remain operational to continue gathering intelligence. However, prolonged operations only increase the possibility a threat actor becomes aware their network has been penetrated, and upon discovery would result in them changing their modus operandi. For example, if a terrorist organisation learns that their cell phones are being monitored, they are most likely to change their form of communication, thus leaving an intelligence gap until new sources can be established. Therefore, counter-terrorism operations must be planned extensively to successfully dismantle terrorist networks, without losing intelligence leads or collection capabilities.

Furthermore, developing a high-level counter-terrorism strategy requires a steady stream of intelligence from multiple sources. That requires the cooperation of multiple law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Terrorist groups adapt and evolve their TTPs to thwart counter-terrorism efforts, however, national and international intelligence sharing continues to be a fundamental factor in responding to the dynamic terrorism threats.

Human Network Analysis and support to Targeting (HNAT) is an intelligence process that provides understanding of the organisational dynamics of human networks and recommends individuals or nodes within those networks for interdiction, action, or pressure. HNAT consists of Human Network Analysis (HNA), HNA support to operations and effects that attack, neutralise, and influence networks. HNAT was initially developed as part of NATO's Counter-IED efforts to Attack the Networks, but the processes and tools also apply to Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Assess the role of intelligence agencies and their need to dynamically adapt to the ever-changing threats from terrorist organisations
- 2) Identify methods to collect, analyse, and disseminate intelligence information in order to illuminate terrorist networks
- 3) Assess the importance of cooperation with national law enforcement agencies and international partners

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are the roles of national and military intelligence organisations in the national security decision-making process?
- b) What are potential considerations when deciding whether to prosecute a terrorism target or continue to collect on it?
- c) What mechanisms can be established to enhance cooperation with national law enforcement and international partners??

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.2.5: Military

Goal

This module introduces learners to the advantages and limitations of military counter-terrorism capabilities, while discussing some of the considerations around employing military capabilities.

Description

The 21st century operational environment necessitates a need for the military to move away from its conventional operational role to performing a broader set of kinetic and non-kinetic actions in the fight against terrorism. Although the military applies the same warfighting principles, the limits of operational capability have

expanded and the lines once constraining unconventional action have blurred. The post September 11th years marked the start in which the military assumed counter-terrorism efforts worldwide.

While the military is capable and has been successful in conducting counter-terrorism operations, it faces several limitations. Most notably, the military alone cannot play a direct role in domestic operations. Only a coordinated effort with multiple government agencies can produce measured and durable results. Moreover, each theatre of operation is different; therefore, there are no generic counter-terrorism strategies that can simply be reused. Instead, there are several factors that need to be addressed to combat the terrorist threat, and the military's role must be one that facilitates follow on civic action. The military does conduct certain functions that are essential to a counter-terrorism strategy. These include but are not limited to:

- 1) Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection, exploitation, and assessments to enhance overall situational awareness.
- 2) Sharing of relevant counter-terrorism information with key non-military actors (law enforcement and emergency services)
- 3) Maintaining a system of indicators and warnings to facilitate early detection of imminent threats.
- 4) Promoting, through engagement and strategic communication, a common understanding of counter-terrorism concepts and the potential military contributions to counter-terrorism efforts.
- 5) Eliminating threats and targeting key leaders in a terrorism network to dismantle its operational capabilities and discourage its growth.
- 6) Training, advising and assisting host nation security forces.

Additionally, military expertise in operational planning is not often matched by other agencies. The military can facilitate a combined, interagency environment with the capacity to interconnect multiple agencies to coordinate efforts. The military may also be called upon as first responders, operating in areas wherein there is a lack of civilian capacity to thwart or respond to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there are several scenarios where the military could find itself in a position to collect evidence or arrest suspects on behalf of law enforcement, including both in conflict and non-conflict situations. It is important

to note that the military presence cannot effectively provide a long-term replacement law enforcement and emergency services. As long as senior-ranking military officials recognise civilian political authority as superior and ensure that institutional bias does not affect counter-terrorism response recommendations, military capability remains a vital component of any effective counter-terrorism strategy.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify common military capabilities used for counter-terrorism.
- 2) Explain the contribution military capabilities can make to a counter-terrorism strategy.
- 3) Analyse the constraints of only using military force in a counter-terrorism setting.
- 4) Describe the military's role in the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence for counter-terrorism purposes.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What military capabilities are most crucial for an effective counter-terrorism strategy?
- b) How can the military best utilise its resources and functions to support a whole-of-government approach to CT?
- c) Why is the illumination and targeting of terrorist networks through military action alone not sufficient to ensure lasting degradation of terrorist threats?
- d) How can a government best employ its military capabilities while keeping human rights considerations paramount?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 4.3: Counter-Terrorism Capabilities

Goal

This block provides several useful measures, policies and recommendations to help nations improve their overall capacities in preventing and responding to terrorist threats.

Description

Protecting a nation's borders from the illegal movement of weapons, drugs, contraband and people is key to a nation's security. Alongside robust border security protocols and properly resourced and trained border officials, nations should develop identity management capacities and protocols. Sharing timely identity information among border security, law enforcement, military, and security services, as well as with regional and international partners and appropriate multinational organisations, is the key to providing enhanced national security.

In addition to these key capacities, it is vital for a nation's comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy to include a strong communications plan to thwart terrorist propaganda and recruitment methods, as well as practices and procedures to prevent and respond to possible hostage crises. Finally, it is important for a nation to properly support and train its military for proper prevention, response, and management practices for any possible terrorist threat.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Recognise the need for reciprocally functioning border security and identity management programmes to thwart terrorist travel flow.
- 2) Classify the types of communications strategies that can be employed to counter terrorist propaganda and recruitment methods.
- 3) Describe the role of the military in nation's overall threat management.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What power should be used to stop someone at a border?
- b) Why is it important for multi-agency collaboration in the collection of identity information?

- c) To what extent can details about an attack be released to the public?
- d) How can a nation best prioritise its citizens when dealing with a hostage crisis?
- e) In what way should the military be employed in responding to terrorist threats? For example, should drone operations be considered to stop terrorists crossing a nation's borders?

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Module 4.3.1: Exploiting the Vulnerabilities of Terrorist Organisations

Goal

This module focuses on identifying and exploiting the tactical and strategic integrity of terrorist organisations in order to find ways to increase the cost to terrorist organisations of planning and executing terror activities.

Description

An effective counter-terrorism strategy requires a thorough understanding of the internal structure of terrorist organisations, including the varying goals of members, financial streams and resource allocation, the level of centralisation in operations, and the efficacy of leadership. By understanding these elements and their dynamics, counter-terrorism strategies can be developed to exploit potential vulnerabilities within organisations.

The goals and ideologies of terrorist organisations should be explored in the context of individual leaders and organisational structure. Conflicting goals of leadership can be exploited to foment dissent and internal conflict, leading to potential schisms and limiting leaders' efficacy. Assessing the varying goals at different levels of the organisation can serve to expose organisational vulnerabilities. For example, newer recruits tend to prefer more violence than those at higher levels of the organisation who seek more strategic use of violence.

Terrorist organisations have varying vulnerabilities depending on the level of control and direction especially if there is an organised central command. Highly centralised terrorist organisations are more vulnerable to monitoring by security services and operatives have a higher likelihood of capture. Less centralised organisations are more secure, but less efficient, more prone to fragmentation, and less able to meet organisational goals. Targeting the leadership structure can create a significant vulnerability but has the potential to strengthen the terrorist organisation through empowering more effective leadership or further radicalising the group. Thus, the costs and benefits to disrupting the leadership structure should be addressed. Integrating these

information-related capabilities contribute to counter-terrorism strategies and campaigns and ensures control of the battlespace narrative.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Identify the factors that limit a terrorist organisation's political impact
- 2) Assess the opportunities to create schisms within terrorist organisations
- 3) Analyse the vulnerabilities of centralised and decentralised terrorist organisations.
- 4) Outline the strategies used to push terrorist organisations to decentralise operations, and determine the costs and/or benefits of such actions
- 5) Assess how decentralisation leads to lower financial efficiency

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are the potential costs and/or benefits of disrupting the leadership structure of a terrorist organisation?
- b) Why are low-level operatives generally the most radical in terrorist organisations and how can this divergence be exploited to disrupt the organisation?
- c) What methods can be employed to decrease trust within a terrorist organisation?
- d) Does the splintering of terrorist groups lead to more manageable threats or heightened violence from increased competition?
- e) What are some critical vulnerabilities faced by all terrorist groups that may be exploited?
- f) How do terrorists deal with the organisational trade-offs between security and efficacy?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.3.2 Strategic Communications

Goal

This module introduces learners to best practices in the field of counter-terrorism communications, examples of

The Amman Message

In November 2004, His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan presented what became known as The Amman Message which evolved into a landmark document that reasserts the tolerant principles of Islamic faith, guiding inter-Muslim relations and the Muslim world's relationship with other faiths and cultures. Its goal was to clarify the true nature of Islam. The Amman Message provided a basis for unity within Islam, peaceful co-existence with diverse and plural societies, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, good governance and human rights. The Amman Message also sought to enhance cooperation in countering terrorism and violence which categorically have no place in religion. As King Abdullah stated: 'Islam rejects extremism, radicalism and fanaticism - just as all noble, heavenly religions reject them - considering them as recalcitrant ways and forms of injustice. Furthermore, it is not a trait that characterises a particular nation; it is an aberration that has been experienced by all nations, races, and religions'.

In 2005, King Abdullah assembled 200 scholars from 50 countries representing all schools of jurisprudence in Islam who issued a declaration known as the 'Three Points of the Amman Message.' The first point recognised the validity of all eight legal schools of Islam. The second forbade declarations of apostasy (takfir) between Muslims, while the third established conditions for issuing fatwas (Islamic legal rulings). The Three Points have come to represent an unprecedented and historic religious and political consensus by Muslims around the globe. Since then, more than 450 Islamic scholars and institutes from more than 50 countries have endorsed it.

effective communication platforms, and the challenges of preventing public misperceptions of the military and law enforcement caused by miscommunications.

Description

To develop an effective counter-terrorism communication strategy, it is vital to understand how and why terrorist organisations use communication tools. Terrorism is by nature a communicative act designed to propagate their ideology, influence the actions of a government, instil fear among the populace and increase its membership. To create this narrative, terrorist organisations often choose targets for symbolic and provocative purposes, depict NATO-member countries and allied partners as hostile violators of human rights, and leverage social media to recruit and groom potential adherents. Terrorist organisations are keenly aware that their survival depends on promoting their narrative in the public domain through advanced communication tools. Thus, an effective counter-terrorism communication strategy will include both technical skills to block terrorist media use and strategies to win the battle of the narrative.

Additionally, it is important to ensure that a nation's military and law enforcement personnel are trained on proper communication protocols when engaging the community. They must understand the significance of their actions in a social media saturated world, especially when employing any activity that may be perceived as overly hostile or in violation of human rights. This is particularly important as military and law enforcement personnel engage with the local population who support, interact with, or possess knowledge about insurgent terrorist organisations.

Governments should also create their own communications strategies that include the dissemination of content that prevent extremist content, including half-truths and distortions, from influencing the public. Other government communications initiatives include:

- Regulations governing the promotion of violence and hate through social media outlets.
- Work with private sector companies to create effective platforms to keep the public informed of public safety threats.
- Create safeguards to protect against human rights violations.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain the connection between terrorism and media coverage
- 2) Analyse the various ways terrorist organisations exploit government actions that appear to violate human rights
- 3) Describe how military and law enforcement forces active in a terrorist-dense region effectively interact with the local populace in order to create a positive narrative for the fight against terrorism
- 4) Analyse how governments might maintain a healthy communication system with the local population
- 5) Assess how the modern social media impacts strategic communications

Issues for Consideration

- a) How is terrorism propagated by media coverage?
- b) How can military and law enforcement forces better interact with the local population to create a positive narrative for the fight against terrorism?
- c) How might governments maintain healthy communication with the local population?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.3.3: Border Security

Goal

This module provides learners an overview of the main counter-terrorism challenges at the border, what measures states are taking to address them and how the international community can be enlisted to support these efforts.

Description

Borders offer great opportunities to deter, detect and disrupt terrorist threats. The challenge for the international community is to ensure that FTFs are identified and detected as they attempt to travel. It is essential for nations to set up effective measures at the border to assess whether a traveller is using a legitimate identity because of the production and distribution of high level fraudulent or stolen travel documents. Border control authorities are increasingly using biometric tools such as face scans, fingerprints, and eye-recognition to accurately determine someone's identity. With the adoption of Resolution 2396 in December 2018, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has identified a series of measures aimed at helping states prevent the transit of terrorists.

The resolution has three key border security elements: (a) appropriate screening measures at the borders and enhancing identity management; (b) increasing the collection of passenger data and biometrics and (c) improving our sharing of information, both among states and within states. Due to limited capacity and resources, states will likely require several years to adopt all these border-related measures. In this context, regional and international organisations have started to play a key role in raising awareness and promoting the implementation of the Resolution, while providing operational and legislative assistance to states.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the border management-related responses adopted by the international community to deal with the threat posed by returning and relocating FTFs
- 2) Describe the foundations of a border management strategy
- 3) Explain the concept of defence/security-in-depth and its relationship to border security

Issues for Consideration

- a) What border management-related responses adopted by the international community to deal with the threat posed by returning and relocating FTFs exist in your nation?
- b) What key elements should be utilised for traveller identification and how should a nation design the foundational outline of a border management strategy?
- c) How can the use of technology enable border guards to move from subjective opinions to a rules-based, objective analysis of a traveller?
- d) Once a suspected terrorist is identified at the border, what response measures should be utilised?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.3.4: Identity Intelligence

Goal

This module addresses how countries may build their national identity information capability and why building a country's identity information and intelligence capacity is essential to counter-terrorism efforts.

Description

Identity information and intelligence capabilities, including biometric enrolment and screening systems,

INTERPOL's Project First

This excerpt from INTERPOL demonstrates the benefits of sharing identity information internationally:

'Project First (Facial, Imaging, Searching and Tracking) promotes the move from a 'need to know' to a 'need to share' culture. It aims to improve the identification and detection of terrorists and their affiliates by using the latest technology in digital image processing and facial recognition. Local law enforcement officers are trained to use mobile equipment in order to record the biometric data of prison inmates convicted of terrorism-related offences. This data is then stored in INTERPOL databases, for example as Blue Notices which are international alerts to collect additional information about a person's identity, location or activities in relation to a crime. The data can also be searched against other INTERPOL databases, in particular the facial recognition system and fingerprints database, to positively identify individuals and their international movements. In 2018, Iraqi authorities used specialised equipment to create digital profiles – consisting of nominal, fingerprint and facial data – of unknown convicted terrorists in a prison in Baghdad. 42 profiles were converted into Blue Notices to obtain additional information; this led to the identification of three high-level foreign terrorist fighters of three different nationalities, who were already recorded in our databases.'

forensics results and identity intelligence, are effective tools in detecting threat actors and support networks. These capabilities both enable a nation to actively intercept a threat to prevent harm as well as identify threat actors after a terrorist attack. Border security uses identity information to detect threat actors at the borders to prevent them from entering the nation. Law enforcement uses identity information to interdict terrorists and threat actors who do manage to enter the nation. The military uses identity information to assess FTFs in conflict zones.


It is essential that identity information be shared between security and intelligence agencies, allies and appropriate multinational agencies so that information possessed by one can promptly inform the others as terrorism crosses security and defence boundaries. A governance process or regulatory body should be established to ensure maximum efficiency and safeguarding of data. Through enhanced risk-based screening and identity management, increased collection of passenger data and biometrics, and improved information sharing, each nation may better implement an effective counter-terrorism strategy.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the importance of identity information, especially biometrics.
- 2) Explain the key elements of traveller-identification.
- 3) Explain how technology can help establish a rules-based, objective analysis of a traveller.
- 4) Explain the importance of standards and interoperability for identity information sharing.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How would a counter-terrorism strategy work without border traffic information?
- b) What should a national identity information enterprise governance structure look like and what should its scope of coverage be regarding data handling and rights protection?
- c) How does a nation balance the need for identity information while also preserving individual rights to privacy?



Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.3.5: Special Operations Forces

Goal

This module aims to outline the functions of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in counter-terrorism and the circumstances wherein direct military action may prove necessary to manage and contain a terrorist threat.

Description

The response to increasingly irregular and rapidly evolving terrorist threats is largely tasked to the military because of the contextual complexities and vast area of operations where many terrorist groups find safe-haven. SOF units provide numerous capabilities and options to thwart terrorist threats such as direct action against high value targets and partnered operations. Along with SOF, conventional military units also provide train, advise, and assist activities and are integral elements to counter-terrorism campaigns. SOF missions vary, but

typically include establishing contact with and training local forces, conducting tactical operations through the six phases of the 'Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse and Defeat' (F3EAD) targeting cycle, and providing intelligence to decision makers.

While mitigating a terrorist threat requires large amounts of resources and coordinated efforts, SOF provide key elements to reaching the end state. First, through their training of local forces they facilitate an indigenous government's governance and security capacity. For example, at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, coalition SOF units with Task Force Dagger were instrumental in establishing first contact and leading local forces in the efforts to combat the Taliban and eliminate al-Qaeda's safe haven. Second, SOF are key in eliminating key players within a terrorist network, eliminating safe havens, and disrupting command and control capabilities. Third, they provide on-the-ground intelligence collection, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities to help decision makers plan strategic operations based on reliable information. By no means can SOF units be the only solution to countering terrorist threats, however, they can be instrumental in laying the groundwork for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. In order to adequately set the stage for follow-on actions, nations must ensure that their SOF units are properly trained in building local relationships and preventing the adversary's narrative from demonising military forces.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the SOF capabilities that may be used as part of counter-terrorism strategy.
- 2) Explain why SOF units may be better suited to counter-terrorism than conventional units.
- 3) Analyse the limitations of using SOF in the counter-terrorism strategy.

Issues for Consideration

- a) In what circumstances might SOF be deployed to combat terrorism?
- b) Should a nation deploy SOF forces within their own borders?
- c) What risks associated with employing SOF need to be mitigated in planning a counter-terrorism strategy?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.3.6 Security Cooperation - Train, Advise, Assist (TAA)

Goal

The goal of this module is to introduce learners to the variety of methods available to cooperating national defence organisations to assist host nations in building irregular warfare (including counter-terror and counter-insurgency) capabilities through Security Cooperation (SC). Additionally, this module will analyse best practices and common shortfalls encountered when conducting 'Train, Advise, Assist' (TAA) missions.

Description

Security Cooperation (SC) activities can occur across the continuum of conflict. The most successful programs use a comprehensive approach in which military assistance occurs simultaneously with cooperative efforts of other governmental and non-governmental organisations. Central to the success of SC activities is the cross-cultural competence and relationship-building skills of the participating military personnel. The best-trained units engaged in SC should have leadership that is well versed in the history, culture, language, politics, topography, religion, economics and local grievances of the sector in which they will deploy.

Some conventional forces (CF) must be trained to effectively execute TAA requirements. CF units that are rigidly hierarchical and ill prepared to empower lower levels of the command structure to operate independently from senior leaders will be unlikely to succeed in developing host nation environments. As such, cooperating national defence organisations would be well advised to cultivate a talent pool of trained SC advisers with traits such as 1) the ability to operate outside of formal authority structures, 2) a tolerance for ambiguity, 3) perceptiveness, 4) the ability to accept and learn from failures, 5) respect for differences and 6) warmth in human relations. Finally, the most successful defence organisations typically adopt a 'train the trainer' mentality in which experienced SC advisers are rotated from their deployed roles into military schools where the next generation of advisers are being trained. Through this model, a continuous pool of new advisers is developed rather than overstressing the specialised units and personnel with records of successful SC engagement.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the range of activities included in Defence Security Cooperation (SC).
- 2) Identify the specific factors that contribute to effective or ineffective TAA engagement by military advisers.
- 3) Recognise the skills and traits which should be cultivated in effective TAA advisers.
- 4) Analyse the need for both SOF and CF units trained for SC and TAA missions.
- 5) Understand the 'train the trainer' model.

Issues for Consideration

- When, across the spectrum of conflict, should Security Cooperation (SC) be initiated with host nations?
- Why might certain military units succeed, and others fail during SC missions?
- How can SOF and CF units complement each other's efforts to maximise SC success?
- What are the advantages for defence organisations to develop and manage a pool of talented and experienced 'Train, Advise, Assist' personnel?
- How can defence organisations identify and attract personnel with the desired traits of successful advisers?
- How does the 'train the trainer' model build sustainability for SC engagement?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives/ outcomes will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussions and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.3.7: Hostage & Personnel Recovery

Goal

This module examines why and how terrorist organisations take hostages. Additionally, learners will be able to describe the fundamental practices and protocols in deterring and responding to hostage crisis situations.

Description

Over the last century, there has been a significant global shift toward hostage-taking by terrorist groups and non-state actors. Hostage takers use at times sophisticated tactics to kidnap private citizens, in the hopes of gaining financial, political, propaganda and recruitment benefits. Thus, it is important for nations to maintain a no-concessions policy, denying terrorists and hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner exchanges and policy changes.

In standing by this policy, nations remove a primary incentive to kidnap individuals, thereby halting or thwarting the cycle of hostage-taking and deterring further terrorist attacks. In addition to a no-concessions

UN Definition

The United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages defines a hostage crisis as occurring when a person 'seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hostage) in order to compel a third party... to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage.'

policy, national militaries should resource and train highly skilled small-unit hostage rescue teams to effectively handle high-threat terrorist actors in a hostage rescue scenario. Military action teams should work alongside local and regional political actors and law enforcement entities to maintain a national-level crisis negotiation response team capable of responding to hostage-taking in real-time. A robust, empowered, and interagency crisis-negotiation team offers decision-makers more options for a non-confrontational resolution, while maximising prospects for the victim's safe and expeditious release.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Outline the fundamentals of crisis negotiation, the indicators of progress and the determination of a successful outcome
- 2) List the situations when a small military team should be employed for the containment of the terrorist threat
- 3) Identify the learner's nation's ideal negotiation strategies, protocols for future contact and non-negotiable items
- 4) Explain how negotiation strategies might differ depending on terrorist groups' objectives

Issues for Consideration

- a) What are the fundamentals of crisis negotiation, the indicators of progress and the determination of a successful outcome?
- b) What might an ideal negotiation strategy and protocol for future contact look like? What items are non-negotiable?

- c) How might negotiation strategies differ depending on respective terrorist group's objectives?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Block 4.4: Building Counter-Terrorism Capacities

Goal

This block provides learners with an overview of key developmental processes and initiatives such as NATO's Building Integrity (BI) initiative, measures of effectiveness and capacity building. In addition, this block explains two training techniques, tabletop exercises (TTXs) and a Lessons Learned model. These training techniques enable governments to continue to improve their developmental processes and counter-terrorism preparedness, collaboration and capacity.

Description

To sustainably improve and increase a country's counter-terrorism capacities, there must be good developmental processes in place. Developmental processes help create conditions where nations and organisations can effectively implement successful long-term counter-terrorism objectives through strengthening the quality of security, legal, and military institutions and personnel. Intentionally gathering and analysing information from past and real-time responses to terrorist threats enables counter-terrorism practitioners to learn and improve. These processes help establish metrics to evaluate overall counter-terrorism readiness and success, and can be tailored to fit a national, regional, or international levels of operations and engagements.

In order to achieve overall counter-terrorism capacity growth, it is vital for nations and organisations to improve their systems of governance and fight corruption. Therefore, building integrity should be a priority for any nation and its counter-terrorism apparatus. Building integrity is a long-term goal that includes legislative and administrative changes and increased levels of trust, transparency and accountability.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the purpose of developmental processes.
- 2) Articulate the connection between strengthening institutions and gathering information from past and real-time responses.
- 3) Explain the value of measures of effectiveness, tabletop exercises and lessons learned processes to overall counter-terrorism capacity building.

Issues for Consideration

- a) How can a nation or organisation plan for long-term strategic counter-terrorism success?
- b) How might defence tools for CT, including special operations, security force assistance, and BI prove useful?
- c) What developmental processes exist in the learner's nation?

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Module 4.4.1: Building Integrity

Goal

This module outlines the NATO Building Integrity (BI) initiative and helps the learner understand the importance of BI to overall counter-terrorism strategy and capacity.

Description

Research suggests the existence of clear links between terrorism, corruption, and poor governance. Illicit trade and trafficking of goods and people fuel terrorism with the necessary means to carry out their activity. Framed by NATO's three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security, the NATO BI initiative addresses matters of good governance including accountability transparency, and links between corruption, organised crime, and terrorism. NATO BI aims to provide Allies and partner states with tailored support to reduce the risk of corruption and enhance the understanding and practice of good governance in their defence and security establishments.

BI methodology provides a set of selected measures for identifying and applying risk mapping methods that allow efficient allocation of limited organisational resources. BI covers principles of good governance, the functioning of public institutions and various checks and balances. The implementation of the NATO BI policy is implemented through analysis, capacity building activities aimed at defence and security related institutions, and consultations offered by a network of NATO certified institutions and subject matter experts (SMEs). Areas of expertise include:

- Assessing corruption as a security risk;
- Understanding the impact of corruption in crisis management and in the context of missions and operations;
- Democratic control of the armed and security forces, including the role of elected officials;
- Management of human resources, including recruitment, promotion, rotation of staff, management of talent and support for veterans;
- Management of financial resources, including public procurement, budgeting, oversight, and auditing;

- Code of conduct and risks to reputation;
- Corruption and international law and policy;
- Lessons learned and evaluation of experience in a theatre of operation.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain the NATO BI initiative.
- 2) Describe the basic concepts of good governance and integrity, transparency, and accountability in the defence and security-related sectors.
- 3) Analyse the areas wherein BI and other good-governance measures are employed as part of counter-terrorism strategies, policies and actions.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why is BI a necessary prerequisite to capacity building?
- b) As part of counter-terrorism strategies, policies and actions, where should BI and other good governance practices be employed?
- c) What BI principles best address terrorism in domestic and international frameworks?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

References

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Module 4.4.2: Capacity Building

Goal

This module introduces learners to the fundamental principles and challenges of capacity-building.

Description

Capacity-building is a process whereby nations and organisations build and enhance their set of resources, information, skills, structures and equipment to more competently respond to terrorist threats. The goal of capacity-building in counter-terrorism is to enable partner nations to mitigate government and societal factors that contribute to terrorist recruitment and improve their response capability. Capacity-building is often dependent on an international or regional partnership, in which one state with a strong counter-terrorism system helps strengthen its' partners capabilities. Capacity-building encourages a top-down approach in which government and political agents lead an initiative to prioritise counter-terrorism at all levels of the state.

NATO's Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative

This initiative builds on NATO's extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity-building support of the Alliance. It aims to reinforce NATO's commitment to partner nations and help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security, stability and conflict prevention. The programme is extended to countries upon their request, and with Allied consent. Allies have offered Defence Capacity Building (DCB) packages to Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, the Republic of Moldova and Tunisia, following their requests.

Security sector reform (SSR), a fundamental aspect of capacity-building, is the process of transforming a state's defence apparatus in order to increase security sector efficiencies, oversight and integrity. SSR ensures the security services serve the national interests as opposed to regime interests. Within the context of a counterterrorism strategy, SSR ensures that the security services abide by the rule of law and ameliorate rather than exacerbate friction between society and themselves.

SSR is typically a joint venture between a host country in which the reform will take place and a 'donor', an international ally that pledges to provide financial and military resources to improve the host country's security mechanisms. The donor will often provide training to local police, military, and security services, financing for the modernisation of security technology, and consultancy aimed at improving the host's justice system. The goal of SSR is to develop the host country's security capabilities including processes and procedures to the point at which it can effectively and efficiently defend its institutions and territory.

Capacity-building, from the perspective of a partner nation, requires consideration of a variety of external and internal factors. External factors include capitalising on opportunities, such as a surge in political will after a terrorist incident or finding the right change agent to champion the programme. Internal factors include relentlessly communicating the programme goal to all stakeholders, ensuring the vision is shared and understood while maintaining focus in the face of inevitable setbacks. Countries should build the capacity of partners that have the political will and desire to engage, as well as the ability to sustain and absorb the training and adopt train-the-trainer programmes. Partners also need the ability to understand the training and the capacity adopt train-the-trainer programmes.

There are three key components for capacity building:

Seek Out Change Agents: Change agents are those leaders with the political will and skill to lead an organisation through the important phase wherein capacity is developed. It is the job of capacity-building practitioners to find and heavily invest in the right change agents. Without dedicated and competent leadership, a capacity-building investment will not succeed.

Maintain Momentum: Momentum is a critical factor in any capacity-building operation, and in too many cases, it is derailed by outlying failures amid proven

Current Practices and Methodology

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allied leaders decided to launch the NATO Training and Capacity-Building Missions in Iraq to assist local forces in the fight against ISIS. The international organisation pledged to adapt the 2017 Action Plan to respond to evolving militant threats, specifically through financial aid and technological capacity building. An essential component involves partnerships with other international actors, such as the EU and the UN, and reports of counter-terrorism measures of effectiveness from member countries. 'Connecting the dots' between the movement of foreign fighters and coordination of intelligence operations has always been one of the most difficult tasks. This was apparent in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks. Many nations were quick to adjust their security strategies to readily address both internal and external threats. MOEs thus depend on real-time performance.

successful track records. It is paramount that all parties remain on the same page and press forward with progress even when facing additional pressure.

Set the Framework: Establishing a clear, overarching framework that includes rules, procedures, and obligations for all change initiatives and actors to abide by is essential to the success of the operation. Likewise maintaining discipline in seeing a nation's vision through to implementation is the foundation for effective change. Once the framework and vision are agreed upon, alterations should be considered cautiously and must follow the agreed framework.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Define the basic concepts and components of counter-terrorism capacity building.
- 2) Explain the purpose of security sector reform (SSR) and the role of donors/partners in a host country.
- 3) Articulate some of the challenges related to capacity-building efforts with special attention given to external and internal factors.
- 4) Identify some of the foundational elements of successful capacity-building programmes.

- 5) Examine the ways in which donor countries support the improvement of the host nation's set of resources, information, skills, structure and equipment.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why is capacity-building essential for successful counter-terrorism efforts?
- b) What are the basic concepts and components of civilian counter-terrorism capacity-building?
- c) What organisational elements of capacity-building efforts currently exist to fight terrorism?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.4.3: Measures of Effectiveness

Goal

The goal of this module is to outline the purpose, process, and challenges of implementing a system for measuring effectiveness in counter-terrorism strategies and programmes.

Description

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are determined by measuring how successful a strategy is in preventing, countering, and responding to a terrorist threat or attack. MOEs should be mutually agreed upon and distinguished from measures of performance (MOPs), as reflected in many counter-terrorism operations. NATO's Joint Doctrine for Operations states:

‘The assessment plan, including the data collection and reporting plan for measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) criteria defined

during the planning process, is developed. MOEs measure the attainment of end-state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect, while MOPs measure task performance.’

In constructing a holistic approach to measuring counter-terrorism effectiveness assessments need to consider not only death counts, but also factors such as logistical support, civilian cooperation and/or intra-agency communication. Such tactical, strategic and operational planning cannot be determined through experimentation and thus depends on past practices. The principal challenge in constructing this holistic approach is access to transparent and effective collaboration among civil societies, government agencies, and military operations within and across borders. Intelligence teams face the challenge of determining what information necessary to assess an MOE may be shared without compromising a nation or organisation's security.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Explain how to build MOEs for counter-terrorism capacity and response.
- 2) Distinguish between MOE and MOP.
- 3) Describe the challenges related to sharing information that is needed to measure effectiveness.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why are MOEs so vital to an effective counter-terrorism approach?
- b) What MOEs prove useful in strengthening future counter-terrorism capacity and resilience based on past performance?
- c) When determining an MOE, how should intelligence teams decide what information to share without compromising their own security?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Module 4.4.4: Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Training

Goal

A tabletop exercise (TTX) is an exercise where leaders, thinkers, and practitioners across nations and sectors respond to a mock terrorist attack to gain insight into proper response procedures and prevention policies. This module will help the learner explain the purpose and goals of a TTX, as well as explore ways to execute a TTX.²

Description

A TTX is designed to test the theoretical ability of a group to respond to a hypothetical real-world scenario. As the scenario unfolds, learners strategically evaluate and assess the situation, explore possible responses, and prepare to manage the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. TTXs place learners in a role-play envi-

ronment to help clarify responsibilities, frame contributions, and stimulate creative dialogue on questions and circumstances offered by facilitators. This helps identify challenges, create resilience and contingency plans, share best practices, and facilitate interagency cooperation amongst nations. The primary aim is to develop concrete action plans and innovative recommendations for senior leaders related to current and future challenges.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the importance of a TTX for capacity building and overall counter-terrorism strategy.
- 2) Identify the type of case studies that would form the basis for a TTX.
- 3) Describe how you would plan and execute a TTX.
- 4) Explain how you would capture and distribute the outcomes gathered from a TTX.

Issues for Consideration

- a) What kinds of forums are best for a TTX to be effective?
- b) How does the collaboration of thinkers and practitioners across all fields and sectors benefit the success and sustainability of a TTX?
- c) What kinds of outcomes should be aimed for when planning a TTX?

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

References

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² A guideline for this type of TTX is included in the appendix.

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Module 4.4.5: Lessons Learned

Goal

The goal of this module is to outline the NATO Lessons Learned process and demonstrate its value in building counter-terrorism capacity.

Description

The purpose of lessons learned is to create a formal approach to gathering best practices from previous operations. By doing so, individuals and the organisation can reduce the risk of repeating mistakes and increase the chance of success. In the counter-terrorism context, this reduces operational risk, increases cost efficiency and improves operational effectiveness.

In 2002, NATO introduced the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon. Its mission is to serve as NATO's centre for performing joint analysis of operations, training, exercises and experimentation, including establishing and maintaining an interactive NATO Lessons Learned Database. As part of this objective, the JALLC created the lessons learned process as follows:

NATO Lessons Identified, Lessons Learned, and Best Practice Process Model

- 1) Analysis Phase: After an in-depth analysis to understand the root causes and improve future practices, the observation turns into a lesson identified. A special type of lesson identified is the best practice, a technique or method adopted to optimise organisational performance as compared to other available processes.
- 2) Remedial Action Phase: After the remedial action phase, a lesson that has been fully staffed with the associated improvement and implementation action(s) identified and adopted, a lesson can be declared learned.

- 3) Dissemination Phase: Lessons learned are provided as amendments to doctrines and policies.

Learning Objectives

- 1) Describe the NATO Lesson Learned process.
- 2) Analyse the importance of lessons learned processes in building counter-terrorism capacities.

Issues for Consideration

- a) Why does a lessons learned and best practice model help create an effective counter-terrorism strategy?
- b) What are the challenges in executing the lessons learned model?
- c) What is the prerequisite for sharing lessons learned between nations, NATO, EU and International Organisations?

Lessons Learned in the U.K.

As part of lessons learnt from the effects of terrorist attacks, the U.K. has continuously evolved its CONTEST strategy which focuses on:

- Improving the resilience of communities to terrorism.
- Share information more widely and support more local interventions with individuals in communities.
- Share information and data with a much wider set of partners, providing counter-terrorism expertise to better target our local interventions.
- Support capability building to ensure our international partners have the effective local responses they need to tackle the threat in their regions.
- Seek a more integrated relationship with the private sector, both to better protect our economic infrastructure and to scale our ability to tackle serious and organised crime and terrorism.
- Emphasise engagement with Communications Service Providers, recognising the internet has been a key way for radicalisers to communicate their propaganda, and for terrorists to plot attacks.

Learning Methodology

In addition to the individual study of and research into supplied references, learning objectives will be accomplished by lectures; discussions; in-class exercises, small group discussion and participation; scholarly articles and reflective journaling.

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Appendix

TTX Guidelines

TTX Summary: The PfPC-CTWG developed a tabletop exercise (TTX) methodology that featured moderated discussions and utilised role play scenarios to examine the growing Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) problem. The TTX format developed was first piloted in July 2015. TTX learners have included representatives from the diplomatic, policy, military, civil society, academic, intelligence, and law enforcement communities, who were asked to focus on developing innovative solutions to help address the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon. The aim is to go beyond the whole-of-government approach.

The objectives of TTX seminars include: 1) building awareness of terrorist-related challenges among a community of counter-terrorism professionals; 2) developing actionable responses; 3) sharing good practice and 4) identifying further areas for international collaboration.

Learning Objectives of TTX:

- Discuss key strategic and operational issues and challenges related to terrorist threats.
- Promote a constructive team-oriented dialogue to develop recommendations in three key outcome areas: communications strategies (or positive narratives), policies and programmes.

Roles:

- Role play allows for clarity of responsibilities and provides a frame of reference and departure point for ensuing discussions while encouraging creative feedback. Learners will respond to case studies by playing roles based on their professional background.
- Facilitators guide the TTX discourse and ensure the substance of conversations is aligned with core objectives.
- Observers monitor the exercise; they do not participate in the moderated discussions.
- Rapporteurs take notes throughout the exercise and assist the facilitators in guiding the conversations.

Expectations:

- Open and interactive seminar environment.
- Varying viewpoints welcome, but learners should be respectful and tolerant of others' views and allow sufficient time for all to contribute to the seminar's outcomes.
- Think outside the box; there are no right or wrong answers.
- The written materials and resources provided are the basis for discussion.
- Be willing to engage in a challenging conversation in a cordial manner.
- Accept the scenario and work within the case study's presented parameters.
- At the conclusion of the TTX, be prepared to offer constructive feedback on how to improve this TTX from both a format and substance perspective.

Format: TTXs include three substantive sessions that factor in planning, preparation and operational phases of a terrorist-related challenge. This would include aspects such as Logistics & Deployment, Pre-Attack Planning & Preparation and Attack Execution. TTX are unclassified with discussions and opinions shared on a non-attribution basis under Chatham House rules.

Scenario Development: To create a case study for an interactive seminar, present a fictitious country that faces radicalised terrorists either homegrown or returning after travelling to and fighting in ungoverned spaces. Create a case study that represents the general conditions and characteristics of a country that reflects local and regional challenges. In developing a useful, pragmatic, timely, and relevant case study or scenario, several objectives should be kept in mind:

- 1) Draw influence from recent case studies or forecasted terrorist activity based on extremist group trends.
- 2) Provide a timeline of unfolding events to keep learners aware of an evolving situation.
- 3) Ensure narrative incorporates multiple interjection points to which learners must respond which are also time-sensitive.

- 4) Incorporate a variety of elements in scenario that require a response from all stakeholder sectors.
 - 5) Assess relevant terrorism threats based on the targeted region.
 - 6) Establish a notional list of expected policy outcomes.
 - 7) Develop relevant background documents and materials.
- Improve the abilities of the military and other key partners to prepare for, respond to, and manage terrorist incidents.
 - Devise a strategy to maintain and regularly exercise those capabilities and responses.
 - Analyse the connection between the local and central-government response to a terrorist incident.

TTXs provide a useful counter-terrorism engagement and capacity-building platform to:

- Outputs:** Throughout the TTX seminar, a Task Force comprised of learners, facilities, and observers will develop concepts, ideas, and feedback and offer these as input to the Rapporteur who is responsible for developing a presentation to be given at the seminar's concluding session. The Task Force will provide recommendations to:
- Evaluate the effectiveness of existing plans and systems.
 - Train military personnel and highlight discovered vulnerabilities.
 - Operationalise international/regional/national counter-terrorism strategies
 - Identify gaps and eliminate overlaps
 - Develop doctrine, policies and training requirements
 - Bolster international and domestic interagency collaboration
 - Promote train-the-trainer concepts
 - Move beyond theory to practice

Abbreviations

APIS	Advance Passenger Information System	HNA	Human Network Analysis
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula	HNAT	Human Network Analysis and support to Targeting
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	HUMINT	Human intelligence
AtN	Attack the Network	ICB	Institutional Capacity Building
AU	African Union	IED	Improvised Explosive Device
BI	Building Integrity	IRA	Irish Republican Army
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Materials	ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
CF	Conventional Forces	ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
C-UAS	Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems	IS-KP	Islamic State in Khorasan Province
CT	Counter-Terrorism	ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
CTRC	Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum	ITTD	Insider Terrorist Threat Dynamics
CTWG	Combating Terrorism Working Group	JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction	JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
DCB	Defence Capacity Building	Ji	Jemaah Islamiyah
DPO	Department of Peace Operations	LASIT	Left-wing, Anarchist, Single Issue Terrorists
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency	LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence	MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response	ML	Money Laundering
ETA	Basque Nation and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna)	MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
EU	European Union	MOP	Measures of Performance
F3EAD	Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse, and Defeat	MVTS	Money or Value Transfer Services
FATF	Financial Action Task Force	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter	NBIC	Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and Cognitive science
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia	NF	National Front
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum		
GPS	Global Positioning System		

NSU	National Socialist Underground	SIT	Single Issue Terrorism
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe	SME	Subject Matter Expert
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence	SOF	Special Operations Forces
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism	SSR	Security Sector Reform
PfPC	Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes	TAA	Train, Advise, Assist
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)	TAT	Threat Awareness Training
PNV	Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco)	TF	Terrorist Financing
PRI	Potential Risk Indicators	TGARM	Terrorist Groups Abusing Religious Motives
RAF	Red Army Faction	TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
RaHoWa	Racial Holy War	TTX	Table-Top Exercise
RDD	Radiological Dispersal Device	UN	United Nations
R/N	Radiological and Nuclear Materials	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
SC	Security Cooperation	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentbund)	UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence	VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
		WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Note: Not all terms below appear in the preceding text, but many may prove useful in crafting specific learning exercises.

Alternative Remittance Systems: These are financial services which are used to transfer funds from one geographic area to another using pathways outside the traditional financial system, rendering them to regulate. *Hawala* is a major example of this. *Hawala* is a system for transferring money in which money is paid to an agent who then instructs another associate, usually in a different country, to pay the final recipient. While this is a traditional financial technique used throughout the Muslim world, it has been co-opted by terrorists that use *hawala* to move money around without detection.

Anarchism: This is the political belief in the abolition of all government and re-organisation of society on an organic basis. This was an especially popular idea in the West in the early 20th century when many became disenchanted with monarchy and empire.

AtN (attack the network): This is a military term that is considered part of Counter-Improvised Exploding Device (C-IED) strategy. It is an offensive technique that focuses on preventing the use of enemy IEDs. It encompasses three main strategies: gaining intelligence, building relationships, and neutralisation. AtN is designed to disrupt both social networks involved in the planning of IED attacks and the physical process of IED detonation. AtN employs both lethal and non-lethal methods to accomplish its goals.

Bid'ah: An Arabic term meaning innovation in reference to religious matters. TGARMs have frequently misused it for their own agendas.

Biometrics: This is a measure of biological characteristics used to identify and track individuals. It is a technique that is becoming more popular as a method to authorise the mobility of persons crossing borders or accessing secure areas. Biometrics include fingerprint, facial, and eye recognition information that corresponds to an online database.

CAD, GIS, BIM software: These stand for, respectively, Computer Assisted Design and Drafting, Geographic Information System, and Building Information Modeling. They are software techniques used to design and build 3-D systems and are increasingly being used to create drones and other military intelligence apparatuses.

Captagon: This is a drug whose medical name is fenethylamine hydrochloride. It is an amphetamine that stimulates the central nervous system that makes users feel happy, alert, productive and able to stay awake for long periods of time. It is a popular drug in the Arabian Peninsula and found its way to Syria, where Islamic State manufactured it for its soldiers to take before battle for increased longevity and feelings of invincibility.

Chatham House Rule: This is a technique for fostering honest, open conversation and dialogue without fear of reprisal or punishment. Named after the original 'Chatham House' in London where the practice was first used at the Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs, it is now used around the world. The Rule reads as follows 'When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under Chatham House Rules, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed'. This means that all things that contributors (including learners, lecturers, and rapporteurs) say during the TTX (tabletop exercise) will be kept anonymous.

Cryptocurrency: This is virtual currency that uses cryptography to process transactions online. It is a monetary form commonly used by terrorists to purchase weapons because cryptocurrency exchanges are difficult to trace. Types of cryptocurrency include Bitcoin, BlackCoin, and Monero.

Far Enemy: The 'far enemy' in extremist ideology is literally the enemy external to the Muslim homeland and is largely understood to be the West. This term is used to garner support for attacks on the West. It is also part of a greater strategy in terms of target-choice for many violent TGARM extremists and ideologues.

FTF: *This is the acronym for foreign terrorist fighter. The FTF phenomenon is a process in which recruits or sympathisers travel to zones of conflict to support terrorists and/or participate in terrorist activity.*

IED (improvised explosive device): *These are makeshift bombs deployed outside of conventional warfare. IEDs include both advanced apparatuses built by knowledgeable*

bomb-makers and simple, home-made bombs put together by lone-actors using the internet.

Globalisation: This term describes the interconnected nature of the world's cultures and economies. The 21st century has accelerated this phenomenon through the introduction of new technologies such as social media and faster methods of travel.

Hard power: In terms of counter-terrorism, hard power strategies are those that use military and police to stop acts of terrorism.

Inghimas: This translates from the Arabic as 'plunging into'. First espoused by the medieval theologian and general Ibn Taymiyyah, this refers to the battlefield technique of taking a knife and running into an enemy, potentially killing oneself in the process. The idea of *inghimas* has been co-opted and adapted by modern extremists in the present day to justify terrorism.

Jahiliyyah: This is the Arabic terms which means 'pre-Islamic ignorance'. *Jahiliyyah* is used to refer to the time before the Prophet Muhammad and the birth of Islam. It also refers to institutions or people, including Muslims, as un-Islam or opposed to it. It is often used in extremist texts and by TGARMs to spur action to institute radical ideals at all levels of state and society.

Kufr: This is the Arabic word for 'infidel'. While this generally refers to an individual that is a non-believer of a certain faith, in the case of the extremist ideologues it is also applied to governments or societies at large that these ideologues deem to be anti-Islamic.

Littoral security: Littoral security is the safeguarding of the waters closest to shore. It is in these areas that the majority of piracy and maritime terrorism take place.

Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science (NBIC): These are inter-related fields of study that are referred to as 'converging technologies for improving human performance'. These technologies will have an increasing role in the lives of humans and are already being employed by certain terrorist groups. It is essential that counter-terrorism officials anticipate the growing use of these technologies and find ways to effectively counter-act their use by enemy combatants.

Near Enemy: The 'near enemy' is what extremist interpret to be local institutions in Muslim areas that have

adopted non-Islamic ideals. Like the notion of the 'far enemy', the notion of the near enemy in extremist doctrine is used to justify certain strategies. For example, Sayyid Qutb claimed that it was first necessary to launch jihad against local governments before transitioning to the West. Osama bin Laden of al-Qaeda, however, was well known for prioritising the destruction of the West.

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): This is a process through which authorities at the local, national, regional, and international level attempt to disrupt terrorism before it occurs by addressing radicalisation pathways for individuals and groups.

Soft power: Soft power counter-terrorism is a strategy that uses new government policies to discourage radicalisation and acts of terrorism within the population. Soft power approaches often incorporate P/CVE to re-educate and rehabilitate radicalised individuals.

Security Sector Reform (SSR): This is part of the process of capacity-building, in which a state's defence systems are transformed for maximum efficacy. The goal is to reform these systems for the sake of efficiency and integrity while protecting the human rights of civilians.

Takfir: A concept frequently used by TGARMs that refers to the excommunication of Muslims whom they categorise as apostates and non-believers.

TGARM (Terrorist Groups that Abuse Religious Motives): These are terrorist organisations that twist, defile, or otherwise misinterpret religious doctrine in order to justify their violent activity.

Ultra-nationalism: This is an extreme form of nationalism that promotes the interests of one state or nationality over all others. This typically manifests in violent struggle against other nationalities.

U.N. Resolutions 1267: Issued in 1999, it was designed to paralyse certain operations of the Taliban, following their consistent violations of international humanitarian law, as well as the establishment of connections between them and al-Qaeda. As a result, these resolutions froze some of the Taliban's assets, imposed a limited air embargo on them and demanded that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden and the senior al-Qaeda leadership. Over time, the asks became a targeted assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo against a Sanctions List, designating specific individuals and entities, associated with them or violating international humanitarian

law in the same way. Al-Qaeda was added on this List through the Resolution 1988 (2011). 'The Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee' was created within the Security Council Committee, through the Resolution 1989 (2011), in order to update the list, report on these specified groups and implement measures to hinder them. ISIS, (also known as ISIL Daesh and Islamic State) was added to the List through the Resolution 2253 (2015), and the 'Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee' became the 'ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee'.

U.N. Resolutions 1373: These resolutions, issued in 2001, were designed to encourage international cooperation to hinder terrorism, following the 9/11 attacks, through the exchange of information between States; the strengthening of border control by criminalising and reducing illegal immigration, and applying thorough investigative procedures before granting asylum; and the forbiddance of States' support to terrorist groups, for example through financial aid, supply of resources such as weaponry, or recruitment of their members. These resolutions led to the creation of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): This is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological device intended to harm a large amount of people. Terrorists from across the political spectrum use these materials. Well-known cases include the 1995 Tokyo subway attack, in which the Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shin-riko deployed sarin gas through the Tsukiji subway station, and the still-unsolved Anthrax attacks in 2001 in which anthrax was placed in letters and mailed to U.S. politicians and news outlets.

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