THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES
IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS:
LESSONS FROM THE PAST, CURRENT ISSUES AND
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
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LESSONS FROM THE PAST, CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

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This volume includes the proceedings of the 17th annual conference of the Conflict Studies Working Group of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. The topic of the conference was: “The use of armed forces in domestic affairs: Lessons of history, current issues and future developments”. The event was jointly organized by the Institute for Military History and War Studies- Royal Danish Defence College and the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History- Ministry of National Defense of Romania and took place between 29 May and 2 June 2017 in Bucharest, Romania.

The use of the military in domestic sphere has a long history. The role and missions of the military forces have undergone transformative changes in the last two centuries. Traditionally associated with their capacity to provide territorial security and defense, the military forces have been called to assume larger responsibilities in the realm of internal security. For much of the 20th century, the military forces were the only reliable force having the capacity to maintain internal security, public order and respond to various challenges to the authority of the state.

The 21st century brought about new challenges with the rise of non-state actors, high technology penetration, the rise of cyber networks, the increasing use of hybrid technics, etc. After a period characterized by expeditionary warfare and international missions, which dominated the post-Cold War strategic thinking, recent global events seem to underscore the domestic role of military forces. Now, the battlespace is a mosaic of risks and threats that demand a broad re-assessing of the role, tasks and missions of the military forces in domestic affairs.

Obviously, this is not a fully novel situation as history can provide relevant examples of how the military forces changed their role and missions as to tackle domestic challenges. Nevertheless, the scope and urgency facing contemporary military forces today represents a break with last decades’ developments. Furthermore, this contemporary use of military forces in domestic affairs may present contemporary states operating under circumstances different from what characterized past centuries.

This collection of papers addresses historical and contemporary debates about the role and missions of the military forces seeking to provide thought-provoking
perspectives on how the military historically had to and still are to adapt to new tasks and responsibilities in accordance with the changing nature of national security needs. The studies depict the role assumed by the military from supporting nation-building and providing domestic security to providing internal stability and order and counter non-military threats and challenges. The evolution of military’s role in domestic affairs, cooperation between military and civilian authorities, legal issues and national doctrine development, emerging security challenges and their impact on shaping the military conduct on the domestic front are major themes of this volume.

The book contains six sections. Each section provides both historical context and a brief look into the emerging contemporary developments that may require a broad re-assessment of the role of the military in domestic affairs.

Section I explores specific challenges associated with hybrid warfare, separation and counterinsurgency which shape and determine the military conduct in domestic affairs. The topics addressed refer to both a historical perspective by analyzing the Soviet Attempts of Hybrid War against Romania- the Year of 1924, and a more contemporary case study focused on democratic shift and the impact of hybrid warfare.

Section II investigates the way in which the military forces had to extend their responsibilities, in times of war and peace, in order to accommodate new tasks and missions to handle specific domestic situations. The case-studies focuses on the role of the French Armistice Army following the defeat of France in June 1940, the organization of the civil defense system in Slovakia after the Warsaw Pact military intervention in Czechoslovakia (August 1968), the Danish military presence in Greenland, and the changing role of the armed forces in Georgia.

Section III addresses the issue of the military’s involvement in civil wars and internal conflicts showing how and under what conditions the military forces have been called upon to assume greater responsibilities in domestic affairs. The selected papers are especially relevant to explore this topic with a special focus on analyzing the case of the U.S. Army in the Borderlands of Jacksonian America, the challenges of the Israeli military administration in the occupied territories (1967-1974), and the nature of the intervention of the military in the Yugoslav crisis (1981-1991) as an example of managing an internal crisis in a multi-national state.

Section IV seeks to investigate, based on specific national experiences, the question of how the armed forces intervened to handle domestic crisis and internal disturbances. The papers included in this section address the issue of the role played by the military to suppress the counter-revolutionary mutiny in the Danube Flotilla in 1919, the involvement of the Yugoslav Army on livestock disease control regulations in the Julian Region between 1946 and 1954, as well as the typology of conduct of the Romanian military forces in domestic affairs at the beginning of the 20th century.

Section V analysis the way in which the military had to adapt its tasks and re-assess its responsibilities under specific historical conditions. The case-studies pre-
presented include the transformation of the Greek Army in late 1940s to an efficient policing force and the role of Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, more specifically the dynamic of the relations between police and the military forces in Netherlands during the 20th and 21st centuries. This section also provides a theoretical perspective on the assessment methods and evaluation metrics that can serve as reliable indicators of progress in an internal conflict.

Section VI approaches the changing role of the military forces against the backdrop of rapidly evolving security risks and challenges to domestic security. Under internal and external pressures, the military is now assigned to assume new tasks and missions that reflect both continuity and break with last century developments. The issues of migration, nation-building, and societal security are central themes addressed within this section. The main case-studies depicted focus on: societal security and state-building in Republic of Moldova and the issue of migration flows and border control in the Cold War and post-Cold War Bulgaria.

The originality of this book rests on its overall approach aiming at integrating in an articulated framework both historical experiences and contemporary perspectives. This allows a more comprehensive picture on the overall dynamic of the military engagement and its responsibilities in handling domestic crises and challenges as well as patterns of military typology of action at domestic level.

It is not the scope of this volume to produce a history of the military’s involvement in domestic affairs. The main goal is to focus on selected events that are relevant for getting a better understanding of the relations between the military forces and domestic security showing how and to what extent the military can became a useful tool in coping with internal sources of vulnerability. Each of the papers presents a specific case-study that allows to identify and analyze the particular conditions and the main rationales that shape the conduct of the military forces.

This book brings together an international team of scholars and experts to develop a comprehensive approach- both historical and contemporary-on the challenging issue of the role of the military forces in domestic issues.

Another important goal is to stimulate research and debate on the complex issue of the role assumed by the military in domestic affairs and its potential development and also to open up new ways of thinking about the issue of domestic security. The publication is intended to bring a value-added to the existing military history and international relations literature, but also to serve as a useful reference work to those engaged in military-related areas of analysis or decision.

At the same time, the relevance of this book lies in its overall concept and research approach as it contains a collection of studies that draw from various national perspectives, historical experiences and security perceptions. The topics approached cover a wide area of subjects related to the issue of domestic security and military engagements that help to depict possible solutions, best practices and lessons learned that are historically and politically relevant. Based on different national/local experiences, one can explore and identify various angles of analysis regarding the use of the military forces on the domestic front that reflect both spe-
cific national imperatives as well as distinctive state behaviors, patterns of strategic culture or motivations of a state’s actions. The historical case-studies included in the volume reveal a complex dynamic that shaped the role of military in the domestic affairs while the more contemporary approaches show that the changing security environment may require new ways of accommodation in terms of goals and missions to be conducted by the military forces at internal level.

Dr. Carmen Sorina Rînoveanu
Jakob Brink Rasmussen
ADDRESS by Mr. MIRCEA DUŞA, State Secretary for Defense Policy,
Planning and International Relations,
Ministry of National Defense, Romania

Ladies and gentlemen, dear guests,

I am honored and delighted to participate at this scientific event. I welcome you on behalf of the Department for Defence Policy, Planning and International Relations, of which I am in charge, and I am glad that we could organize this conference in partnership with the representatives of the Danish Royal Defence College. Romania and Denmark have always enjoyed excellent cooperation in the military sector, education and scientific research.

The Department for Defense Policy, Planning and International Relations has actively supported the work of the Partnership for Peace Consortium since its foundation and has encouraged the Romanian military and civilian experts to participate and contribute to various activities and project developed under its aegis.

Through the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania hosted several important events of the PfP Consortium, the most recent being its annual reunion held in 2014. Now, in partnership with Denmark, we are organizing, for the third time, the annual conference of the Conflict Studies Working Group of the PfP Consortium. We have two previous experiences of this kind, the first in 2001, at the very beginning, in partnership with the US, and the second time in 2009, in partnership with Germany.

It is a great pleasure to greet each one of you and to thank you for joining us at this important scientific event to discuss the issue of the role of the armed forces in domestic affairs, a topic which is of outmost importance nowadays.

Usually, when we talk about the role of the armed forces of any state, we think in terms of the traditional missions that they are called to perform, namely to defend the territorial integrity and to protect the citizens by discouraging external opponents or by preventing actions of conquest and destruction. However, the decades after the Cold War have shown us that the armed forces of a state cannot be limited solely to this role. The global security environment is becoming more and more complex and unpredictable, and while several factors intervene in its destabilization, these are increasingly difficult to identify and anticipate.

Any army, at a one point, is going to face new situations. Threats can come from both states and non-state actors who have vast resources and a large number of followers. More and more such groups and armed organizations are being identified, that resort to extreme violence to achieve their goals. They only follow their own rules, they are animated by extremist ideals and they can cause violent movements capable of generating instability.
Particular attention should be paid to the risk of terrorist acts. We have the latest example in the UK and unfortunately we have faced such situations in many major European cities. All these are phenomena which, repeatedly, can seriously destabilize certain states and may weaken citizens' trust in the authorities.

Hence the need for the armed forces of the Euro-Atlantic nations to be better prepared. The Special Forces (rapid reaction forces), together with the gendarmerie brigade and the national army, must be ready to cope with the hybrid war and the collisions caused by the extremist movements. The training must be conducted at both levels: doctrine and endowment (armaments, ammunition) and tactical and operational training.

In this context, your presence here, esteemed experts, is a prerequisite for an intense and productive dialogue that allows the authorities of each state to identify the real issues of the security environment and the nature of the threats. On this basis, inter-state cooperation procedures could be identified, in order for the armed forces to develop the capabilities and procedures for intervening in dealing with serious internal crisis situations.

Before concluding, I hope you will have beautiful memories after these days spent in Romania. I saw in the program that you will make a small incursion into the past of our country. You will visit Predeal and Bran where you will have the opportunity to discover historical and cultural vestiges very dear to us. I do not want to ruin surprises, but I'm sure you'll love it!

I wish you have a successful and rewarding conference and a pleasant stay in Romania.

Thank you!
Your excellences, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great privilege for me to be present at 17th Partnership for Peace Conflict Study Working Group Conference here in Bucharest. Officers and scholars from defence academies and universities from around the world have gathered to present papers about a very relevant and timely topic; the use of military forces in domestic affairs.

Ever since the establishment of the first state-like societies thousands of years ago, their armed forces have been used in various kinds of domestic affairs. Most importantly, military forces were used by powerholders to secure the state’s integrity from within (as well as from the outside) by deterring threatening rebellions and revolutionaries. As history wore on and states and their military forces developed, other tasks were added. For instance, both armies and navies were extensively being used to countering criminal activities such as smuggling. The armed forces also played a significant role in road construction, and cartography. With the advent of industrialisation, armed forces were typically among the first institutions to embrace new technologies and this made the expertise of the armed forces quite attractive to civilian society. The very first telephone line in Denmark - between the parliament and the Royal palace - for example was installed by the navy’s engineers.

As democracy and liberal values spread, it became increasingly important to limit the role of armed forces to that of defending the state against foreign aggressors, rather than also being a tool of domestic repression. Since the end of the Cold War, a majority of especially Europe’s armed forces started to focus on engaging in expeditionary missions - from the peacekeeping missions in the 1990s to the warfighting campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan following the attacks on the United States in September 2001. With the assistance of NATO-countries - both Iraq and Afghanistan are today struggling to develop their own armed forces to solve domestic tasks - securing peace and stability being the most important of these.

This development and focus on the contribution to international operations perhaps let the domestic tasks in a bit of a shadow not least when it comes to the distribution the scarce economic resources of many defence forces.

However, recent tragic terrorist attacks in several European countries has obviously pushed governments and military professionals to rethink exactly how to use the armed forces. In a number of European countries nowadays, you are likely to encounter soldiers patrolling the streets and guarding important civilian objects.
At the other end of the scale, there are also more peaceful areas where the armed forces may still have a significant role to play in a domestic setting. The Danish navy, for example, is not only safeguarding our national waters against hostile intrusions. While operating at sea the navy also carries out search-and-rescue, assist in fishery inspection and break ice along the coast of Greenland. As this examples makes clear, the use of military forces in domestic affairs is a complex and many faceted topic. Each nation participating in this conference has its own distinct history of using military forces in domestic affairs and each of these experiences serves as a valuable key to new knowledge. Thus, this conference is also a unique opportunity to learn from each other. With the current migrant crisis, the growing rise of international terrorism and other developments in mind, there is nothing that indicates, that this year’s conference theme will soon be outdated.

I am thus confident that bringing together so much competence at this conference will result in the production and sharing of new important knowledge about this important and very timely theme. Equally important, this knowledge should be put to use by officers, politicians and fellow scholars around the world. After all, the use of military forces in domestic affairs poses several fundamental questions of which I know that many are to be addressed at this venue during the next two days.

With these words and on behalf of the Royal Danish Defence College, I want to thank our Romanian colleagues for a successful planning of this conference, and I want to wish you all a productive conference and a pleasant stay here in Bucharest.

Thank you.
Mr. Secretary of State, Rear Admiral Nils Wang, ladies and gentlemen, honored guests,

It is my great honor and pleasure to welcome you most warmly on behalf of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History as the host institution of this prestigious event. This is for the third time when - as director of the institute - I have the privilege to organize the annual conference of the Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. In 2001, in Bucharest, we have organized the first conference of this group- at the time being named the Military History Working Group- together with the Center of Military History from the US, and again in 2009 in partnership with the Center of Military History and Social Sciences from Potsdam, Germany.

This year annual conference of the CSWG represents our first cooperation with the Institute of Military History and War Studies of the Danish Royal Defence College and I am confident that this will open new opportunities of further cooperation between our institutes. Personally, I want to extend my appreciations to our Danish colleagues for their involvement and outstanding support and all the efforts they made to help organizing this event.

This conference is characterized by a number of particular features. First, this conference marks 17 years of continuous activity of the Conflict Studies Working Group, a group that became over the years one the most important and prestigious scientific international platforms of cooperation between NATO and Partner countries from the Euro-Atlantic area. Second, it brings together a large group of scholars, military historians, specialists and experts on security and international relations. Having here such a prestigious audience- 41 participants from 20 Euro-Atlantic nations- is already a major achievement and success. Third, this conference marks the participation of new countries as members of our CSWG. I would like to point out that, for the first time, we have participants from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Republic of Moldova, and Israel who are very welcomed to join us for future CSWG’s events and projects.

As I mentioned before, this is not for the first time when as the director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History host this event, yet, since the last time we met in Bucharest in 2009, our part of the world has witnessed vast and rapid changes while the global challenges have multiplied, have become more complex and as always interconnected.
The topic that we will discuss over the next two days reflects this shift in the overall systemic configuration that requires a new reading of the role and missions that the armed forces are called to assume. I want to mention here that our Danish partners came up with this idea- of approaching the role of the armed forces in domestic affairs- and this proved to be, indeed, an exceptional idea.

The role of the armed forces is changing rapidly since we have to be ready to face with a growing and rapid strategic uncertainty and dangerous time ahead of us. We all looked with astonishment at the latest developments in Manchester following the horrible terrorist attack a few days ago. Now the armed forces patrol on the street taking over larger responsibilities in providing safety and security and extending their missions and scope of action.

We saw what happened in Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels, Paris, Nice to name just a few. It is obvious that this multiplication of the terrorist attacks requires a forcefully and efficiently answer and a broad re-evaluation of the role of the military that is now called increasingly more to step in and provide internal order and security.

This is why the topic we address today is particularly relevant. We- as a group of professionals (academics, experts, historians, researchers)- are coming together to share views and provide knowledge on the main roots, characteristics and rationales of the military engagement in internal affairs and, also important, to imagine ways and tools needed for the military to fulfill its new tasks and missions.

I'm very confident that our conference will be an important scientific event which will contribute to a better understanding of a complex and complicated topic but, even more important, will contribute to a major PfP Consortium’s goal, namely enhancing cooperation and dialogue, open exchange of views and experience sharing, strengthening our personal and institutional bonds, discussing openly on issues of common interest. If we will achieve these goals, we can already call our conference a success.

Our conference is another proof that the CSWG has become over the years an important forum of dialogue and scientific cooperation, bringing together military historians, specialists, but also security experts from NATO and PfP countries to discuss military and strategy-related issues.

Again, I would like to thank you each of you for accepting our invitation and for your willingness to attend and contribute to this conference. Your presence here demonstrates the importance of our Working Group as a well-recognized platform of research and scientific cooperation, but also the need to continue working together.

I do look forward for a successful conference and I wish you all great success!
SECTION ONE:
HYBRID WAR, SEPARATION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY. NEW BOTTLES FOR OLD WINE OR NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES?
DANIILA ŞIŞCANU AND MANUEL STĂNESCU

SOVIET ATTEMPTS AT HYBRID WAR AGAINST ROMANIA IN 1924

Introduction

While the means employed by states and non-state actors to conduct what we generically call „hybrid war” have changed, the fundamental principles of using a combination of conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve a political goal are a natural development in the history of conflict. The difference now is that current hybrid warfare has the ability to modify any strategic calculation of potential belligerents through the constant evolution of non-state actors, information technology, and the proliferation of advanced weapons systems (Deep, 2017). The unipolarity of the international system that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union generated atypical military challenges, which gradually replaced classical military disputes. If „traditional” conflicts have both conventional and unconventional forms, separated from an operational perspective, current hybrid war tends to combine them. Hybrid warfare practitioners apply „conventional capabilities, irregular military tactics and formations, as well as terrorist acts, including violence without discrimination, coercion and criminal activity simultaneously” (Hoffman, 2007: 20-22).

In order to decipher the current patterns used in hybrid warfare, it is important to analyze how international actors have used combined techniques throughout history. For instance, all the elements of a hybrid conflict could be found in the „world revolution” preached by the new leaders of Soviet Russia toward the end of WWI. Romania became a target after its unification in 1918 with Bessarabia. This article will focus on events in 1924 and on the actions that the Soviet Union undertook concerning Romania during this year. The main objective of the research is to show that these actions had the characteristics of hybrid warfare. In this context, the study will address three major events: the Soviet-Romanian negotiation held in Vienna (March 27- April 2, 1924); the Tatar-Bunar Riot of September 11-17 and its outcome; and the Creation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the left bank of the Dniester River (October 12, 1924).

The struggle for the permanent revolution

The events in Russia in 1917 promised to impart a whole new dynamic to a Europe depleted by war. Although aware of Russia’s poor economic development,
and the lack of conditions for building a Marxist socialist society, Lenin was firmly convinced that after the Bolsheviks took power, this event would trigger a chain reaction that would turn the Russian Revolution into a World Revolution. The Bolshevik leaders did not relinquish their belief in the victory of the world revolution even during the critical moments of the civil war. At the Seventh Congress of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party held on March 6-8, 1918, Nikolai Bukharin stated that: "At the moment, the proletariat has the task to spread this civil war worldwide. Comrades, this is not an unachievable objective, it is a realistic one."

The belief that the world revolution was the only means of ensuring the construction of socialism in Soviet Russia is also apparent in the fact that the “victory of socialism in all countries” was inscribed in the very text of the Constitution adopted on July 10, 1918. Likewise, in the PC (b) statute, adopted at the Second VIII Congress held on March 18-23, 1919, it was noted that: “The only way that humanity can overcome the impasse created by imperialism and the imperialistic wars is embracing the proletarian communist revolution. Whatever the difficulties of the revolution and its possible temporary failure or counter-revolutionary waves, the definitive victory of the proletariat is imminent” (Constantiniu, 2010: 31).

In this context, an international communist organization called the Third Communist International (Comintern) was founded. The Founding Congress (opened and conducted under Lenin’s rule) was held in Moscow on March 3-6, 1919. The new organization, designed by Lenin, wasn’t necessarily conceived as a cooperation framework between the newly formed communist parties, but mostly as a control center of the international communist movement: the supreme headquarters of the world revolution (Constantiniu, 2010: 31). In fact, the affiliated parties were considered to be national sections of the Communist International (39 political groups, movements and parties were invited to attend the Congress) while the Comintern itself was perceived as the world communist party. During the Second World Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow between July 19 and August 7, 1920, there were two fundamental documents adopted to ensure the functioning of this forum, namely the statute and the conditions of admission to the Comintern (Stănescu, 1994: 16). The so called Twenty-one Conditions which were initiated mostly by Lenin had transformed the Communist parties from all over the world into Moscow’s own agencies of influence and espionage, making them an integrated part of a “hybrid war”. These new developments often triggered radical (yet justified) political and legal reactions from governments across Europe.

The international developments during 1917-1920 seemed to favor the aspirations of “professional revolutionaries.” The suffering and misery caused by war were a fertile ground for riots and protest movements. During 1918-1920, mass demonstrations took place in Vienna and Berlin, and there was barricade fighting in Plzen and Kladno (Czech territories). Similar popular uprisings and revolts happened in Buenos Aires, Haiti, Korea, Egypt, Syria, China, Silesia, and Northern Lebanon.

It is worth mentioning that some of these movements and rebellions succeeded in producing temporary political outcomes: the Finnish Workers’ Republic (January
28-May 5 1918); the Soviet Republic of Estonia (November 29 1918-February 1919); the Soviet Union of Lithuania (December 16 1918-August 25 1919); the Soviet Republic of Latvia (December 17 1918-January 1920); Soviet Republic of Bremen (January 10-February 4 1919); Hungarian Republic of Councils (March 21-August 1 1919); and the Soviet Republic of Bavaria (April 19-May 1 1919) (Tănășescu, 1995: 104). The world revolution seemed to become a reality, at least in Europe, and the methods used were those of a hybrid war: irregular military tactics and formations, coercion and violence, ambiguity and confusion, as well as the exploration of economic, social or ethnic vulnerabilities.

Romanian-Soviet negotiations

Romania was united with Bessarabia in March 1918 following a democratic vote in the country’s governing body. Previously, the province was annexed to the Tsarist empire in 1812; and prior to this it was an integral part of Moldavian Principality under Ottoman suzerainty. From the outset of this unification process, Romania was a central target for the new Bolshevik regime. In April 1919, against the backdrop of the enthusiasm created by the proclamation of the Soviet Republic of Councils in Hungary, Romania was declared an “enemy of Soviet Ukraine” by Christian Rakovski, who in January 1919 became the President of the Council of Soviet People’s Commissars. Rakovski stated that “currently, Hungary is our ally and it offers its armed forces to fight capitalist states. We have set our mission: to invade Romania by supporting our right flank in Hungary and push the Romanians to the sea” (Constantiniu, 2010: 33). From 1917-1918, the Bolshevik regime, constrained by events, recognized the self-determination of Finland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, but it never recognized the self-determination of Bessarabia. The geostrategic importance of the area where Romania is located forced the new regime in Russia to adhere constantly to the position of contesting Bessarabia’s right to belong to Romanian geo-political space (Tănășescu, 1995: 106). Events in autumn 1920 in Romania followed the same modus operandi as all the coup attempts in Europe: a general strike in October failed but was followed by an assault on the Senate on December 8, 1920 which resulted in fatalities and injuries. However, the socialist movement in a predominantly agrarian country had superficial support among the public, which led to a prompt reaction from the authorities (Tănase, 2005: 44-45).

The last revolutionary wave coordinated by the Comintern on the old continent occurred in 1923 in Germany, but economic, social, and political developments were no longer favorable. Practically, the failure of the insurrection in Hamburg in October 1923 marked the end of attempts to trigger a European revolution. Lenin’s death in January 1924 was followed by a ferocious battle for succession and opened a fierce debate within the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) concerning foreign policy strategy. There were two main theses: one was advocated by Trotsky and called for a „permanent revolution” while the other was supported by Stalin and advocated sustaining the construction of socialism in one country. Stalin’s idea, which prevailed in the internal doctrinaire struggle, brought the issue of the „security belt” into the
center of Soviet foreign policy vision, which involved the gradual replacement of „capitalist encirclement" with „socialist encirclement” (Constantiniu, 2010: 40-41).

Under these circumstances, the Romanian-Soviet negotiations concerning Bessarabia were held between March 27 and April 2, 1924. The unification of Bessarabia with Romania had not been recognized by the Soviet regime. The Soviet side’s approach to the negotiations was characterized by a certainty that they would fail; the request to organize a plebiscite in Bessarabia as a way of deciding whether this province belonged to the Soviet Union or to Romania was dismissed by the Romanian negotiators, since it overruled the decisions of the National Council (Sfatul Țării) of March 1918 and those of the Peace Congress of Paris. The fact that the negotiations were only a way to mask true intentions is evident in the proposals preceding the negotiations to create a state entity on the left bank of the Dniester River.

The Vienna negotiations were conducted on the Romanian side by the Romanian ambassador to Sofia, Constantin Langa-Rășcanu, and on the Soviet side by the Moscow Ambassador to Berlin, Nikolai Krestinski. The falsity which plagued the negotiations is apparent in the telegram sent by Gheorghi Cicerin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to his plenipotentiary deputy in Vienna, where he instructed his subordinates: „The word plebiscite must be heard at the conference. The Romanians will probably leave once you mention Bessarabia, therefore, among your first words, when you mention it, use the word plebiscite. Make sure to use this word right in the first sentence” (Preda, 1999: 219-220). The verbal instructions given to the Vienna delegation by Ion I.C. Bratianu, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Romania, stated that good neighborly relations between the two countries could not exist without establishing the border: „It is us who should establish the border, so no discussion can come up on this issue.” If the Soviet side was to set conditions, „asking for what is probably the plebiscite,” then the Romanian negotiators were advised to use „all known reasonings and the Treaty of Paris” (Preda, 1999: 220-221). For the Romanian side, a plebiscite was out of the question, since the unification had already been recognized by the Allies. In April, shortly after the closing of the conference, the deputy of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maksim Litvinov, told the press that Romania had compromised the Vienna Conference, as the Soviet government had tried to „resolve peacefully and fairly one of the most painful problems of current international politics.” He argued that „until the decision on a plebiscite is reached, whose norms must be agreed with the Soviet government and the local population, we will consider Bessarabia as an integral part of Ukraine and the Soviet Union” (Preda, 1999: 255-258). In fact, the authorities from Moscow were preparing to resolve the issue of Bessarabia in a way which was directly contrary to a peaceful solution.

**The Tatar-Bunar revolt: spontaneous or planned?**

On July 20, 1924, the Intelligence Bureau of the Communist International Executive Committee sent an official document to the Communist Parties of Poland,
Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, unequivocally revealing the aggressive intentions of the Kremlin over the neighboring states: "Following the Communists' request from White Russia [Belorussia], Ukraine and Romania, the Executive Committee has set up armed detachments in these regions. These detachments will gather all the communists who will fight against the governments of their countries, with guns in their hands." Subsequently, the action became tangible and concrete: on August 8, 1924, the Comintern launched an insurrectional plan aimed at the complete overthrow of state authority in Romania. Designed by Vasili Koralov, a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and secretary of the Balkan Communist Federation, "The Communist Operation Project in Romania from September 1924" involved local communist organizations and set the directions of action, the date to start the hostilities, the logistical bases, the operations coordinators, as well as support from the Red Army detachments. According to the plan, Romania was divided into five operation areas and the second area, comprising Bessarabia, was the one where the main attack was to be conducted (Rauș, 2017:33).

Tatar-Bunar was a fishing village in southern Bessarabia – relatively unknown in Romania – with a majority Russian population. On the night of 15-16 September 1924, a group of armed men, who called themselves the "revolutionary committee," took control of the village, attacking the post office, cutting off all the telephone and telegraph wires, taking over the gendarmerie station and killing the commander and his two subalterns. Amid an atmosphere of terror and gunfire, the authorities were told by the leader of the "revolutionaries", a certain Nenin (whose real name was Andrei Kliusnikov), that Bessarabia was proclaimed a "Soviet republic". Later, the locals were notified by Nenin that the town did not belong to Romania, and as the Red Army entered Bessarabia, civilians were asked to arm themselves and fight alongside the "revolutionaries" (Otú, 1998: 40). Part of the population, mostly ethnic Bulgarians and Russians, joined the revolt, while the Romanians and the German minority fled from the villages fearing violence. At the end of the day, gangs of agitators took control of several other villages in southern Bessarabia, creating in each of them a "revolutionary committee." Somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 people joined the rebellion, mostly representatives of the minorities. Authorities were warned of the rebellion, and the government sent artillery troops belonging to the 3rd Army Corps and a navy unit. After two days of intense fighting, on the morning of September 18, the army assaulted Tatar-Bunar, and on September 19 the revolt was stifled. The number of casualties was variously recorded as ranging between a few hundred and three thousand; the leaders of the uprising, including Nenin, were shot, and 489 people were arrested (Otú, 1998: 40).

A useful trial
It is important to stress that this rebellion was not expected to be successful. One of the objectives was to produce precise effects among Western public opinion. The scenario was identical to the previously triggered events in Estonia and Poland,
exhibiting a "hybrid war" pattern of action: attacks on administrative offices, police offices and gendarmes; raising the red flag on official buildings; declarations that the local population was "fraternizing" with the Soviet agitators; and a ferocious reaction from the authorities. Moscow claimed that it was a people’s uprising against the authorities, which unfolded against a background of ethnical and territorial issues, and therefore a possible intervention by the Soviet Union in order to pursue its "interests" would be justified. Moscow did not recognize the Treaty of Versailles, a fact that was to further justify its involvement in orchestrating these rebellions. The Tatar Bunar incident was a diversion that served Western pro-Soviet propaganda (Tânase, 2005: 80), and so was the trial that took place after the suppression of the insurgency, nicknamed by the press “Trial of the 500”. During this trial 285 people were prosecuted.

The reaction of the Romanian authorities to these events was prompt. In December 1924, a law against the alteration of the public order was passed, banning the Communist Party of Romania (Monitorul Oficial, 1924). The trial was held from August 24 to December 2, 1925, at the Military Court of the Third Army Corps of Kishinev. Most of the 285 individuals prosecuted initially were freed (202 people were acquitted), but the rest faced convictions. Iustin Bătășev, one of leaders, was sentenced to forced labor for life, another of the convicted protagonists received 15 years of forced labor, another 3 to 10 years, and five others received 5 years in prison. The remaining individuals received sentences of 1 to 3 years in prison (Rotari, 2004: 247). The unusually large number of persons prosecuted, along with the fact that some of the defendants and witnesses did not speak Romanian resulting in hearings which proceeded with the help of translators, made the trial last much longer than expected. It is worth mentioning that the defense was conducted by Romanian lawyers with left-wing sympathies.

The media drew widespread public attention to the event, offering the opportunity for the Soviet regime to use its propaganda machinery to transform this trial into an indictment against Bucharest. Many foreign journalists, intellectuals with left-wing sympathies, lawyers, representatives of various organizations (most of them financed by Moscow) arrived in Kishinev. It was a successful propaganda exercise for the Soviet regime. The Soviets managed to transform Romania from a victim of an armed act of aggression into a "dictatorship” controlled by a "bloodthirsty oligarchy” which caused a peasant revolt, an oppressive state towards national minorities, and an expansionist state bent on annexing foreign territories (Tânase, 2005: 81). A plethora of famous intellectuals, including Romain Rolland, Albert Einstein, Maxim Gorki, Theodor Dreiser and Paul Langevin, used the press to protest the so-called "reprisals" carried out by the of Romanian authorities (Cermotan, 2017). In November 1925, a delegation led by the well-known writer Henri Barbusse arrived in Kishinev to monitor the trial. In 1927, Barbusse wrote a brochure entitled “The White Terror in the Balkans”, also known as “The Executioners.” Paid by the Comintern, Barbusse used the material provided by the Soviet propaganda apparatus, spreading fake information and denigrating the Romanian government.
Later, he declared the following: "If I had been accused of coming to Romania with preconceived ideas, I could respond that I was never a revolutionary, until I went there" (Rotari, 2005: 250). The brochure was edited, translated into several international languages, and distributed by the International Red Aid Organization (MOPR). During the trial, the organization had around 1200-1500 members and perpetuated clandestine activity. The organization’s main objectives were to take care of the communist prisoners, support their trial defense processes, help them during imprisonment, support their families, and organize campaigns for their release. The organization was very well financed, receiving the equivalent of $1,500 every month „besides covering the costs of the trials, brochure editing, the release of the arrested, etc.” (Pavelescu, 2001:172).

In a discourse in Parliament on December 9, 1925, the Undersecretary of State of the Ministry of the Interior, Gheorghe Tătărescu (who would become Prime Minister in 1934-1937 and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the first pro-Communist government installed in Romania on March 6, 1945) declared the following about the incidents in Tatar-Bunar:

The Dniester separates two worlds where the new one cannot rise without demolishing the old one. The Dniester separates two concepts of life: instead of the old concept, the concept of the slow and evolutionary transformation of mankind towards a world that gradually and peacefully is creating perfection and more justice, a new concept of brutal transformation of the society arises seeking to replace the other one, through terror and violence [...] Communism has descended from the world of utopias into the world of reality, bringing along confusion and disorder. The regime that was born out of this doctrine cannot be maintained and cannot be confined within the boundaries where it was brought to life and organized; it has to spill over, otherwise it will die. That is why, from the very first moment, in the minds of the leaders of the Russian Communist movement, it was clear that it was necessary to organizing the world revolution as a vital condition for ensuring the future of the Communist state (Tătărescu, 1996: 104).

Given the ambivalent nature of these armed challenges near the border, the Romanian government had to take some measures. Bucharest tried to consolidate the eastern border by sending additional troops, hoping that the presence of the Romanian army would serve as a deterrent to new subversions carried out by undercover soviet agents.

However, this “spontaneous revolution” was only one element of a more sophisticated mechanism. It had to be completed with the creation of a “ghost” state, a form of frozen conflict through which hybrid war was waged by the Soviet Union against neighboring countries. In this specific case, it continued with the creation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The creation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

As noted previously, the Vienna Conference was the last attempt made by the two parties – Romania and Soviet Russia – to settle the Bessarabian dispute through
negotiations. In 1924, as the communists consolidated their power and international position, Moscow clearly stated that Bessarabia was considered a Soviet territory. The Soviet representatives came to the conference knowing from the outset that it would be impossible to reach an agreement. The failure of the negotiations only gave them more reason to intensify their hostile actions against Romania during the inter-war period.

After the failure of the Vienna Conference, a secret document signed by one of the Comintern leaders, Karl Radek, noted that „the issue of Bessarabia will soon be solved by arms” (Cojocaru, 2009: 17). However, the plans to trigger a popular uprising in Bessarabia failed. As a result, the creation of a state entity on the left bank of the Dniester was put in motion.

To better understand the reasons behind this decision, an “overall view of the picture” is needed. It is known that Bolshevik totalitarianism, installed in Russia in 1917, was perceived only as the base for a global revolution of the proletariat. In July-August 1920, during the Red Army’s successful offensive on Warsaw, it seemed that the goal of the European revolution was to be achieved in the coming months or weeks. Nevertheless, in August the Bolshevik troops were defeated by the Poles. The results of the war with Poland and the decrease of the revolutionary wave in Europe forced Lenin to reconsider the idea of the world revolution. He concluded that Europe was not yet ready for it and proposed abandoning the assault tactics and adopting the “siege of capitalism.” The new strategy implied settling bases of the Red Army at the borders of the neighboring countries, by creating a series of autonomous republics (Şișcanu, 2014: 79).

The idea of Soviet Moldavia was conceived as early as 1921 by Romanian communists who had emigrated to Soviet Russia and was re-launched in 1923 in the context of the new developments within Soviet-Romanian relations. The implementation of this project was perceived by the Kremlin leadership as a means of putting pressure on Romania on the eve of the Vienna Conference. Thus, at the beginning of 1924, when issues concerning the organization of the conference were still being negotiated, the Soviets began preparations for the formation of the Moldovan Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester River.

While making the preparations for the Vienna Conference, the Soviet authorities had initiated a propaganda campaign against Romania on the issue of Bessarabia. This campaign gained momentum with the creation – in Moscow, throughout the country and abroad – of new propaganda organizations, namely the Associations of the Bessarabians. These organizations had the task of aggressively criticizing the Romanian authorities, condemning their politics regarding Bessarabia, and organizing different types of public manifestations in support of the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Republic on the territory between Prut and Dniester and its unification with the Soviet Ukraine.

On February 4, 1924, in Moscow, an „Initiative group” consisting of Romanian communist emigres was convened to discuss „the organization of an autonomous region of Moldovans near the Dniester River” and ‘the colonization of the left bank of
the Dniester with Bessarabian refugees and demobilized soldiers of the Red Army.” The next day, the group approved the “Memoir (petition) regarding the necessity of establishing the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic.” It was signed by Grigori Kotovski, Alexandru Badulescu, Pavel Tkacenko, Solomon Tinkelman, Alexandru Nicolau, Alter Zalic, Ion Die-Dicescu, Theodor Diamandescu, Teodor Chioran, and Vladimir Popovich (Moraru, 1992: 54).

The document contained all the necessary explanations justifying the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. First, it was clearly stated that the new territorial entity would “have the same political and propagandistic role as the Republic of Belarus has towards Poland and the Karelian Republic has towards Finland. It will gain the attention and sympathy of the Bessarabian population and will create clear pretexts for the unification of Bessarabia with the Moldavian Republic.” According to the document, “the unification of the territories from the both sides of the Dniester will serve Soviet Union as a strategic breach towards the Balkans (through Dobrudja) and Central Europe (through Bucovina and Galicia), which will be used by USSR as a bridgehead for military and political purposes.” On the other hand, according to the document, the annexation of Bessarabia was to have profound consequences on Romania itself:

1) First of all, this will shake the unity of the nationally consolidated Greater Romania and will strike the moral authority of the bourgeoisie, who still braves it out with the fulfillment of the Romanian national aspirations. 2) It will also serve as an additional impetus to the tendencies in the newly joined provinces regarding their national self-determination. The (state) organization of the national minorities (Bulgarians, Gagauzians), who will live within the borders of the future Moldavian Republic, will serve as an example for the national minorities inhabiting the old Romanian Kingdom. 3) The future agrarian reform in Bessarabia must produce a very strong influence on the peasant movement in Romania itself, not to mention the importance of approaching the borders of the Soviet Union, which will also influence the communist movement in Romania. 4) The expansion of the Soviet power over the territory of Bessarabia is of even greater significance, as this region is bordering in the North and East with Bukovina and Galicia, where the Ukrainian population shares a deep support for the URSS, and in the South - with Dobrogea, inhabited by Bulgarians.

All these facts will undoubtedly exert a strong influence on the surrounding areas and, in an appropriate international context, will serve in revolutionizing the situation throughout the Balkan Peninsula. It is important to point out that there was no consensus between the Bolshevik leaders from Moscow and Kharkov (the former capital of Soviet Ukraine) regarding the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Republic. For instance, on March 3, 1924, Georgy Chicherin, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated in a

1 RGASPI, fond 495, inv. 289, f. 1, pp 14-19
2 Ibidem
3 Ibidem
note addressed to Viacheslav Molotov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, that the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Republic was premature at that time, pointing out that „it would boost the expansionist tendencies of Romanian chauvinism. The discovery of such a large number of Moldovans, in essence Romanians, on Ukrainian territory, will strengthen the position of the Romanians in the dispute over the issue of Bessarabia” (Cojocaru, 2009:16).

At the same time, the Ukrainians perceived the creation of the new Moldavian Republic as a threat to the territorial unity of Ukraine. Therefore, on April 18, 1924, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine rejected the project, deeming it unnecessary.

Nevertheless, it was decided to put the project into action. It is important to specify that there were three proposals concerning this new territorial entity. The members of the „initiative group” supported the idea of creating a distinct republic within the USSR. Mikhail Frunze, who was commander of the armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea as well as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks and was considered to be an expert on this subject, recommended that the new territorial entity should have the status of an autonomous republic within the Ukrainian SSR due to the lack of the financial funds, the small size of the territory, and the small number of ethnic Moldovans. At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership from Kharkov considered that the best solution for the Moldavian population from the left bank of the Dniester was to create an autonomous region.

On July 29, 1924, after six months of conflicting debates, the Political Bureau of the CC of the Communist Party adopted a decision „On the creation of the Moldavian ASSR” which stated the following: „To consider necessary, first of all for political reasons, the demarcation of the Moldovan population into a special Autonomous Republic within the Ukrainian SSR and to propose to the Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Ukraine to issue the corresponding orders to the Ukrainian Soviet organs” (Rotari, 2004: 267).

On August 12, 1924, in Odessa, the CC Bureau of the CP (b) of Ukraine adopted the decision to create a special commission to conduct the organization of the Moldavian ASSR. The Ukrainian leadership was particularly prudent in selecting members for the committee assigned to form the new republic. Thus, the members of the “Initiative group” who developed the Memoir were excluded from this process. On August 15, the Organizing Committee was established. It had confidential status and it consisted of only three persons: A.L. Grinstein (as president), I. I. Badeev, and Gr. I. Staryi. All three were members of the “Zakordot” – the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine – a cover for the Soviet communist secret service which was conducting espionage and sabotage activity against Poland and Romania. The composition of this committee was strongly contested by Ion Dic-Dicescu, the secretary of the “Initiative group”, stating that the group had already formed a similar committee in February.
However, the Gubernial Committee of Odessa rejected his objections, commanding him to accept the authority of the Organizing Committee (Cojocaru, 2009:23).

On October 12, 1924, during the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the decision regarding „The Establishment of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Soviet Republic” was adopted. According to this document, the western and southwestern borders of the newly created republic coincided with the state border of the Soviet Union, meaning that the Moldavian Autonomous Republic also included the territory between Dniester and Prut. Once again, the Soviet Union insisted on pointing out the fact that it did not recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania.

In its message at the First Congress of the Soviets in Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic held from April 19-23, 1925, the government of Ukraine stressed that „the MASSR is the result of a correct policy of the Soviet Power and that it will exert a particular influence in order to revolutionize the people of Romania and the Balkans” (Şişcanu, 2014: 78). Though this new state formation was presented as a state of the Moldovans, which was created based on self-determination rights, in reality the Moldavian ASSR was formed for well-determined political purposes, including the occupation and Sovietization of the Romanian territories (Rotari, 2004: 263).

Conclusions
The main objective of this study was to show that the actions undertaken by the Soviet Union concerning Romania and the Bessarabian question had the characteristics of hybrid warfare. According to the 2014 Wales Summit Final Declaration, “hybrid warfare threats” are deemed to be present when “a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design” (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014). Analyzing the strategies and the actions used by the Soviets in accordance with this definition, it is evident that Moscow resorted to methods which can be characterized as hybrid. For instance, during the Tatar Bunar riot they employed a range of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions. At the same time, claiming that it was a peasant revolt against the abuses of the Romanian authorities, they managed to create ambiguity and confusion concerning the nature, origin, and objective of the threat.

Using propaganda, the Soviets effectively exploited the vulnerabilities of the Romanian authorities. This propaganda was directed at international public opinion and served to justify Soviet claims over Bessarabia by emphasizing the self-determination concept. The Soviets knew that the self-determination principle is more popular in public opinion than historical considerations, and this offered them leverage in their anti-Romanian propaganda.

The Soviets also managed to keep the level of hostility below the threshold of conventional war. Moreover, Moscow was the party who initiated the Vienna Conference, thereby appearing in the public eye to be a proponent of reconcilia-
tion. It is worth mentioning that one reason that the Soviets selected Vienna was because one of the biggest Comintern propaganda coordination centers was to be found in this city.

Yet the most overwhelming proof of the Soviet Union’s aggressive plans against Romania is represented by the so-called memoir, which contains not only explanations of the need to create a new territorial entity, but also an outline of the consequences together with instructions about how to use such consequences to maximize the Kremlin’s expansions.

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HYBRID WARFARE AND DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFT

Introduction

Today, the prospect of global-scale conflict looks remote. Yet regional wars exhibit significant similarities whereby actors are susceptible to diverse and destabilizing historical factors, especially regarding weakened or challenged states and violent extremist groups. The increased threat of major regional wars coupled with simultaneously empowered extremist groups can quickly overwhelm small and medium-sized powers. As a result, the need for alliances increases and so does the rate at which such alliances are developed.

The increased complexity of global and regional security and safety affects nearly every aspect of human activity. Globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts increase the complexities of state challenges, while violent extremist groups in the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa add to this complexity by undermining regional and global security through a combination of traditional and non-traditional threats. The increasingly complex and unpredictable environments combined with the range of threats has been termed “hybrid warfare” which has quickly become the new security concept for the 21st Century.

According to military theoreticians, “hybrid warfare” is the combination or mixture of conventional military power, irregular tactics, and other instruments of national power: political, informational, diplomatic, economic, and psychological (epthinktank.eu, 2015). Hybrid warfare emerged as a term in 2005 and was used to describe the strategy applied by Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon war. Since then, the term “hybrid” has been a topic of discussion within contemporary and future warfare circles and it has been largely accepted and adopted as the basis for modern military strategies (nato.int, 2017).

The current population of the world is diverse. Some nations are beset by an aging problem while others are witnessing a growth in their populations. A country’s population can be an asset as well as a burden, and the path experienced by a country in this regard depends entirely on how its demographics are harnessed and its population is controlled. As the feasibility of conventional warfare has diminished, hybrid warfare has quickly become widespread. One of the most important components of this warfare is instigating a demographic shift. A demographic shift
can be implemented in myriad ways such as religious conversions, illegal and legal migration, as well as economic and political suppression. Once achieved, demographic shifts can be used to secure some strategic gains.

Throughout ten years of research and writing, hybrid warfare experts have failed to do justice to the critical role that demography plays in the success of a hybrid warfare approach. This persists even though the role played by demographics in successful hybrid approaches is not new. General Eisenhower acknowledged the key role of the population in complex operations (history.com, 2017). In addition, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Michael Hayden has noted a possible causal relationship between the population and hybrid conflicts. Yet despite such testimony from renowned experts – making causal or potentially causal linkages of the population to hybrid warfare – systematic analysis and classification of a population’s relationship to hybrid warfare has not been established in contemporary literature. This essay examines how demographic shifts caused by hybrid threats and hybrid warfare lead to inter and intra-state migration.

**Demographic shifts employed as a hybrid warfare tactic**

There are numerous reasons for demographic shifts: these include urbanisation, socio-economic and political shifts, conflicts, and military operations. Such demographic shifts not only help to facilitate hybrid warfare but are also used as a tactic within hybrid warfare. For example, nations experiencing a youth bulge characterized by resource shortages, economic deprivation, and social fissures undergo significant demographic shifts. In such regions, a significant proportion of a largely youthful population flows from the countryside into cities in search of jobs. Once relocated, they endure negative conditions such as cultural shocks, alienation, disease, and a low standard of living. There are some significant “pull” dynamics driving demographic shifts such as economic opportunity; meanwhile “push dynamics” arising from war increasingly seem to be the driving force behind the displacement of civilian populations (e.g. the massacre of Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh [Khojali] by Armenians). The intentional use of demographics is sometimes hard to prove definitively but the movement of populations may be an indirect means of undermining the social institutions of Western nations. By weakening those social institutions, the hybrid actor or state extends the battlefield thereby imparting stress on a central government or the state. An examination of three recent conflicts which employed hybrid war strategies reveals that – whether it occurred incidentally or intentionally – the displacement of sectors of a population yields significant strategic advantages.

Commenting on Armenian President Serzh Sarkisyan’s tactics in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Tomas De Vall explains that the Khojali genocide was a planned operation designed to scare the people living in Karabakh and adjacent regions (Tomas, 2008). In the April 2016 escalation, using social media and news web-pages, the Armenians attempted to implement a hybrid attack designed to cause the settlers living next to the front line to flee from their settlements. However, utiliz-
The use of military forces in domestic affairs:

ing the lessons learnt from other hybrid warfare activities around the world, the Azerbaijani Government and military took preventive actions to prevent panic and provocation among locals as well as military personnel.

Events in Ukraine are also an instructive case study revealing the ways in which Russia has applied hybrid tactics to occupy Crimea by provoking and supporting militants in eastern Ukraine. According to statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1.1 million refugees have fled from Ukraine (unhcr.org, 2016). The key reason for the migration crisis in Ukraine is the war in Donetsk and Lugansk, and the annexation of Crimea. Putin's hybrid warfare plan consists of provisioning weapons to the Russian Ukrainian militants and using mercenaries to destroy infrastructure, thereby causing an external and internal refugee crisis. This tactic is closely aligned with Putin’s concept of combined foreign and security strategy and hybrid warfare. The sociopolitical, demographic, and linguistic makeup of Crimea was a key component in Russian operations to suppress dissent and minimize resistance (stratcomcoe.org, 2014: 8). In the wake of Crimea’s annexation – even if Ukraine is leaning towards the West – the world community has comprehended and accepted that due to their strategic importance Crimea and Eastern Ukraine will always remain under the Russian influence. Notably, 17.3% of Ukraine’s population identified themselves as ethnic Russians during the 2001 Ukrainian census and a majority of them are in East Ukraine which is seeking greater autonomy with covert Russian backing. This, of course, augurs badly. Reports suggest that Eastern Ukraine will soon be adopting the Russian Ruble, and its 3 million residents are likely to be acquiring Russian passports (Warrior, 2016).

A hybrid warfare case study can also be generated from the conduct of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the wake Saddam Hussein’s regime. ISIL and their supporting groups sought to force populations from territories they wished to occupy by provoking inhabitants, or by exerting psychological influence on a portion of the population by taking advantage of social media and other informational means. Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi (also known as Haji Bakr) is a former colonel in Saddam Hussein’s regime where he served as an intelligence officer. He was the strategic planner for ISIL. Under his leadership, ISIL missionary operatives opened bases and recruited informers by using demographic hybrid warfare tactics. Part of Khilfawi’s strategic plan relied on provoking a demographic shift: forcing a portion of local populations to flee into neighbouring countries (Orton, 2015). His plan was to weaken local resistance and cause a humanitarian crisis in neighbouring countries so that no neighbouring country would be able to interfere with ISIL’s efforts. Approximately 13 million Syrians were displaced after conflict broke out there (about 60 percent of Syria’s pre-conflict population). More than 6 million have been internally displaced within their own country, while more than 5 million have moved to neighboring countries. Of these, 3.4 million fled to Turkey, 1 million to Lebanon, 660,000 to Jordan, and 250,000 to Iraq. The number of Syrians living in North African countries like Egypt and Libya surged in 2014, from 500,000 to 2.5 million. About 1 million Syrians moved to Europe as asylum seekers.
or refugees. Meanwhile, about 100,000 displaced Syrians now live outside Europe, Africa, and the Middle East – primarily in North America. Since the start of the conflict, an estimated 52,000 Syrian refugees have resettled in Canada and another 21,000 have resettled in the United States (Connor, 2018).

So, assisting and exploiting a demographic shift increases the likelihood of mass migration and prompts more stringent border security for more susceptible countries. In April 2016, the President of the German interior intelligence agency, Dr. Hans-Georg Maasen, stated that security authorities wrongly evaluated ISIL's strategy as one which aimed to infiltrate Germany (dw.com, 2016). In fact, ISIL's strategy did not aim to conduct terrorism within German borders but rather to achieve its strategic interests through the creation of a migration crisis. ISIL wanted to cause internal problems in Europe and Turkey through a flood of immigrants, calculating that Turkey and Europe would eventually agree to stop the migration crisis. ISIL sought to keep Turkey, Europe and others preoccupied with their domestic issues so that ISIL could consolidate its power in Iraq and beyond. The main dynamic arising from internal threats created by demographic shifts appears to follow the political scientist Samuel Huntington's thesis that cultures will clash along the fault lines between them. It would follow, therefore, that when immigration mixes these cultures within a nation state such fault lines are the site of clashes within that state rather than on an inter-state level as is more historically recognizable. This clash might spark conflict which is initially localized but may spread to like-minded groups within other nation-states: a process inviting comparison with theories of tribalism described by Robert D. Kaplan (Tilney, 2011: 50).

In hindsight, it is clear that demographic shifts have been an immensely influential factor throughout history in campaign planning and execution. In the modern art of hybrid warfare, before launching operations or conducting a military campaign, a state or group will start to influence the population in ways that serve its own purposes. This culminates when a population loses its sense of patriotism and provides support to its new overlords (at least tacitly) or when it flees or starts migrating to other countries. Thus, if a country is not capable of harnessing its demographic dividends, then other countries might become influencers via their proxy organizations. The overriding goal of this approach is to drive a wedge between different stakeholders of the same society. Of course, this does not mean that a country should simply pander to its religious and ethnic minorities rather than effectively mobilizing its major population; yet the bottom line is that demographic inertia threatens to unbalance societies and it can be utilized to topple fragile societies via pressure at local and international levels.

Asymmetrical activities such as demographic shifts have become widespread, enabling the nullification of an opponent's advantages in armed conflicts. To facilitate or expedite these shifts, actions such as the use of special operations forces and the support of internal opposition, are used to create an operating front within the boundaries of the opponent's state. In addition, informational operations and other social influence activities are constantly being perfected. A current example...
is that by exacerbating the crisis in Syria, Russia is seeking to intensify the refugee crisis for Europe.

Russia has been accused of deliberately targeting civilian areas in Syria with airstrikes in order to increase the number of refugees fleeing the country and entering Europe. European Union (EU) president Donal Tusk has claimed that migrants were being sent to Europe as a campaign of “hybrid warfare” to force concessions from its neighbours. Tusk noted that “an influx of hundreds of thousands of people is a ‘weapon’ and ‘political chip’ used by the EU’s neighbours who want to harm the continent” (telegraph.co.uk, 2018).

**Conclusion**

We are witnessing the maturation of a new instrument of hybrid warfare: the provocation of demographic shifts. These shifts have a profound effect on internal and external political institutions as well as social groupings, outlooks, and choices. Therefore, it is important to enumerate some clear conclusions. First, migratory waves are used as a tactical tool of hybrid warfare. Second, countries must design their national strategic concept in ways which plan for a possible refugee crisis in future. Third, African countries should be supported with investment to create an internal employment demand capable of keeping their expanding younger generation within their own borders. Fourth, world countries must work on conflict resolution and peace-building in regional hot spots to provide a peaceful and favorable life for these populations. Fifth, failure to adequately address migration waves might lead to inter and intra-cultural clashes and unrest across the world.

Weaker powers have always looked for asymmetric methods when combatting stronger opponents. The current hybrid warfare approach leverages demographic shifts that the West may not be able to absorb. Understanding this tactic is the first step in developing a counter approach. Future uncertainties call for more flexible approaches. In the foreseeable future, strategies used to provoke demographic shifts are liable to become dirtier (whether it be through religious institutions or a country’s intelligence agencies). Responses will need to be strong. Migration trends are only going to increase, meaning that the world is in the grip of a different type of warfare where guns are supplanted by humans in a continual context of strategic rivalry.

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SECTION TWO:
THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AND NEW TASKS IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
Morgane Barey

A NEW AIM FOR A NEW ARMY: THE ARMISTICE ARMY AND FRENCH DOMESTIC SECURITY

Introduction

By late June 1940, French forces had been swiftly defeated following the “Phoney War” and the Battle of France. The armistice conventions decreed by the Germans and Italians reorganized the French Army to humiliate and punish the French for the Treaty of Versailles signed at the end of World War One (28 June 1919). It was a position calculated to weaken France politically and militarily. Except for internal peacekeeping troops, the French Army demobilized and dismantled its forces, and only a small armistice army of 100,000 men (army, navy, air force and police force) was authorized. This army newly called “Armée de maintien de l’ordre” (domestic policing army) – was deprived of the use of modern materials. There was to be no artillery with a caliber above 75 mm, no tanks or anti-tank gunneries, no airplanes, and no anti-aircraft defense. It was also a transitional body, designated to be used to maintain French authority over free-zone territories during the armistice, and then cancelled when the peace with Germans and Italians was signed. However, with the English bombings of the French fleet at Mers-El-Kébir on 3 July 1940, and the Free French attack on Dakar which occurred from 23-25 September 1940, these military restrictions were lifted. German and Italian authorities supported the idea of armed forces in occupied France and its empire to protect it against possible attack from English and Gaullist forces. A reinforcement of the armistice army was initiated, prompted by the threat of an enemy attack on French territories. Thus, the armistice army was entrusted with two missions: on one hand to maintain public order inside the national borders, and on the other hand to assure the defense of the homeland and the empire against all outside aggression. A directive from the 2nd Air Region Command on May 1941, approving the government policy, explained nevertheless that the first mission took precedence over the second (Directives pour les commandants des compagnies d'instruction, 1941).

For the Vichy regime and its supporters, the restructuring of the Army to suit the obligations of this armistice army afforded a chance to organize the troops in new ways. The regime sought to avoid the mistakes that led the French Army to defeat, and as such a new mission was envisaged. Redesigned and refined from pre-war mishaps, or at least presented as such, it now needed to maintain public order while emphasizing patriotism and excellence. Vichy leaders especially hoped that
these changes could instill a similar enthusiasm in the nation. The Vichy regime
did not consider the higher Army authorities responsible for the collapse of 1940.
Rather, the government argued that the behavior of a few officers and soldiers dur­
ing the Battle of France revealed the limits of military education practiced under
the Third Republic. Thus, there was a shift in the use of the army. First reorganized
to maintain public order in accordance with the armistice conventions, it soon be­
came a political tool in the hands of the regime.

How was this transformation from French Army to armistice army made? What
were the new aims defined by the regime? And for what purposes? Once we reach
the end of November 1942, and the German invasion of Free Zone, what conclu­
sions can we draw about this army?

This paper proposes to answer these questions by using a sample of archives
held in the Service Historique de la Défense in Vincennes, and Army newspapers
published by the Vichy regime.

Creating the New Army

Between June and late November 1940, the French High Command faced the
double task of demobilizing the vestiges of the defeated French Army while they
constituted the new army units and watched for signs of civilian disorder (Paxton,
2003: 56). This restructuration was a starting point for redefining army missions
and reorganizing its troops.

The terms of the armistice conventions decreed that the new French Army
would only be composed of volunteers thereby ending conscription and the idea
of a ‘nation in arms’ that had existed since 1798. Yet while the armistice army
was envisaged as a professional army, in practice the replacement of conscripts
with volunteers proceeded so slowly that the armistice army essentially remained a
conscript army throughout its existence. Nevertheless, the release of officers was a
topic of great interest to the Vichy regime. From an initial tally of 30 000 officers,
the armistice army could only keep around 10 000, and the new government ex­
pected to keep the ones who best embodied the Révolution Nationale established by
the new government. For such purposes, different expediencies were introduced
such as lowering age limits, “civilianization” of specialized units, or exclusion of
Jews and freemasons. The objectives here were to refine the army in accordance
with the new aims defined by the regime and expressed by General Colson1: “the
future army will be very reduced, so it matters that it will be composed of ele­
ments having the most important value on all points: military mind, intellectual
and physical qualities. (…) Therefore, I stipulate that officers and NCOs who may
be heavy, tired or doubtful, and who, in a general way, may not possess all moral
and professional qualities expected by leaders, must be reported with a view to be­
ing eventually dismissed from the Army” (Colson, 1940). Thus, from the outset
of the Vichy regime, the setting of the new armistice army was primarily perceived
as way to ensure the due compliance of officers and soldiers with the government.

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1 Secretary of State for War from the 12th of July until the 6th of September 1940
As such, military academies were redefined in order to “train leaders able to fill, beside their military role, the national and social role granted to the New Army, which means to serve one day as a guide and example for the country” (Revue de l’armée française, janvier 1942). From now on, an officer needed to be more than a simple military figure on duty for his country, he had to be an apostle of the regime.

Equally, the re-organization of this new small army was deemed to be concomitant with embarking on a new mission. On 25 October 1940, General Huntziger, Secretary of War, distributed a note on the moral conduct of the Army saying that, if restoring the honor, arms, and status of a vanquished France was the final goal of the Army, “it has today a first mission to accomplish and a role to play. This mission is to maintain public order. This role is to extend public order in the nation by the influence of its example. The public order notion is primordial. It is vital for the recovery of the country” (Secrétariat d’État à la guerre, 1940). The “Armée du maintien de l’ordre” name given to the armistice army signified something further: “it allocates to the army an arduous task, more arduous due to its low troop numbers, but indispensable to the success of the recovery undertaken. (...) With our small army, there will be no question of high stature themes. We need to see, to work, to improve in accordance with what is possible and the mission to be accomplished. The first imperative is to maintain public order”(Secrétariat d’État à la guerre, 1940). Consequently, in accordance with usual war practices, military commands were appointed to ensure security in each county. The state of siege declared in September 1939 conferred on these commands an exceptionally large authority, much broader than one understood in strict military terms (Paxton, 2003: 57).

Yet quite soon the government had to face a dilemma. The armistice army was a transitional one, and the Vichy regime’s leaders were hoping that the peace treaty’s influence would be transient enough to allow them to recreate a real army. When such hopes proved false, the longer-term existence of the armistice army raised some issues, as underlined by General Huntziger in a note on the army’s state of mind in June 1941. Here, Huntziger explained that the internal and external situation was becoming more and more difficult. Hence, the army, whose high mission had not changed, must provide broader society with an example of discipline, confidence, and calm: “The army has received a mission to maintain public order. This mission may involve the use of force, but it is mostly an action to maintain in the country an atmosphere of unconditional support of the Marshall’s work, an atmosphere that is chiefly responsible for the maintenance of public order. It is thus a question of duty for any members of the army, and mostly for officers, to contribute more than any other French people to maintaining this atmosphere of discipline, confidence and calm” (Secrétariat d’État à la Guerre, 1941). For the Vichy regime, public order was to be maintained through the moral example and moral guidelines of the armistice army. As such, this new army is mostly regarded as a tool in the Révolution Nationale process.
New aims and new purpose?

On August 1941, Admiral Darlan delivered a speech where he extended the mission of the armistice army: "it is minimizing the task of the army to limit it only to a role of peacekeeper. The mission of the army stays as it always has been – to constitute a forged tool in the hand of the government, which has exclusive authority and works for the well-being of French people and the glory of the Fatherland" (Darlan, 1941). Thus, for the new government, the armistice army was not only an “armée du maintien de l'ordre,” but rather a political army supposed to serve the government’s will and to support it in its processes (Revue de l’Armée Française, 1942).

These changes were made possible by the re-attachment of the Guard (ex Garde Républicaine) to the armistice army. The government intended to use this unit in maintaining public order in non-occupied zones. The Guard was thus in charge of surveillance of the demarcation line, surveillance of former military chiefs and politicians of the Third Republic in detention centers, carrying out security in military jails, and conducting surveillance in the refugee camps. All these missions would normally have been part of the mission of public order placed in the hands of the armistice army; but the Vichy regime dedicated a new mission to its troops. For the government, the army was still in charge of public order, but not via police missions. An article on the armistice army published in February 1941 explained and justified what its new aims were: “Order is the primordial condition of new state edification. The Army will be the guarantee of this order. It will be the model. This notion of order, a token of progress, must be understood in all its forms, but mostly in its higher signification of the spiritual order, because it would be a serious mistake to imagine a kind of praetorian guard eventually in charge of police missions. The Army, by its own presence, will inspire order and respect. In the work of reconstruction and sanitation undertaken it has a role to play, a civic role: absolute devotion to the head of state, to its person, and total support of his actions”. Moreover, the article concludes: “[as] guardian of public order, protector of France’s renovation, the army will not allow the sacred flame which shines on the Fatherland altar to be extinguished. Thanks to it, to its unceasing devotion to duty, the French people may advance on peaceful paths, in dignity and honor” (Revue des Deux Mondes, 1941). We can see, then, that the new missions for this new army were to encompass a role very far from simply maintaining public order. In fact, such missions were mostly seen as a way to ensure the army’s fidelity towards Maréchal Pétain and his new government by giving the troops a political role, which was a major break with the past. There was thus a shift: having begun with domestic security, the role of the armistice army slowly evolved into one which envisaged it as the spearhead of “Révolution Nationale” values.

Accordingly, military training was re-thought in academies where new emphasis was placed on such matters as the value of the Fatherland, the oath of allegiance required from all to the Maréchal, the regular visits from the regime’s high dignitaries (Pétain, Darlan, etc.), ceremonies focused on the national flag, and the introduc-
tion of patriotic songs for the military march. A very staunch focus on ethical values was added to the training, because officers and soldiers were expected to act and behave as models before the eyes of the whole nation. Their actions were redefined to show the path of recovery to the country. Ethical training was deemed the main preoccupation of military academies because of its importance for the reconstruction of a well-disciplined army – a force which would be reliable, well-educated, and where all the cadets existed “in a high moral atmosphere and in a broad knowledge of their duties” while knowing, at the same time, how to deliver orders and to obey (Directives d’activités pour la période d’été, 1941). This training met two opposing objectives: maintaining the tradition of a prestigious institution, while responding to the need of the regime: modelling officers and soldiers as active partisans for a new government. Nevertheless, all these changes prompted many divergent opinions among the troops and French people.

**How was this army perceived?**

The existence of the armistice army allowed French troops to conciliate two approaches: on one hand, the duty to obey the presiding legal power, which included a certain affection for Maréchal Pétain and the Vichy regime, along with the Révolution Nationale and its principles; and on the other hand, the will to resume arms against Germany, and to prepare for this by any means necessary, including illegal actions towards armistice conventions. Even if there never was a viable large-scale mandate granted to the armistice army1 this reorganization reconciled the troops with shared feelings among them. The transitional period was viewed as a way to reform the military society deeply, and as such, many officers and privates wrote reports and articles to share their visions of the new army, its role under the new regime, its recruitment, its training, and its future reconstruction once the war was over.

Nevertheless, the missions that the Vichy regime allocated to the army broke with the main mission normally allocated to it: namely preparing and fighting the war. As such, the French population, as well as some soldiers, were dubious about accepting this new role. An army colonel, writing about the links between the army and the nation, underlined the failure and limits of the armistice army as conceived of by the regime: “more than ever, a problematic mindset prevented the French from understanding why our country had to maintain an army in the metropole territories. What did this “Armée de maintien de l’ordre” signify to them? Such a mission did not fall to police and to police forces? An army, they thought, was not meant to be trained and educated with the aim of conducting civil war!” (Réa, n.d.).

This deep skepticism was also shared by some of the military protagonists themselves. After the invasion of the free zone by the Germans on 11 November 1942, they faced the true reality of the meaning “Armée de maintien de l’ordre.” When the commander of Aix-Marseille Forces made the Saint-Cyr cadets available to the Germans to help them in maintaining law and order, this order was felt as a hu-

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1 It never reached the 100 000 men allocated for its need, except for officers.
miliation for the students, as described by a cadet in his diary: “Saint-Cyr, the academy of traditions, panache, glory, honor, now reduced to the role of peacekeeper and under the supervision of our worst enemies, against whom we were ready to fight until the final sacrifice – we who in the hope of finishing with beauty had all prepared with fervor and deep concern” (Mémorial de la Promotion Croix de Provence, n.d.).

Finally, on November 26, the German authorities dismissed this army, ending the experiment of re-modelling and re-defining the army and its mission. Officers and soldiers were sent back to their families, and in order to avoid the STO they were kept occupied. Free zone cadet residents were sent to “Chantiers de la Jeunesse” where by virtue of their technical training they were mobilized as leaders, while occupied zone cadets residents were sent to universities or prestigious schools to complete their intellectual training (Instruction donnée par le bureau des écoles du secrétariat d’État à la guerre, 1942). The government hoped in this way to keep its soldiers close to the regime and to France, in order to call them back when the time had come to take up arms against Germany. But some of them, disillusioned by the regime after November 1942, chose another path. A few decided to join the Resistance, while others crossed the Pyrenees and reached North Africa, especially Algeria, where a new government had risen since December 1942.

Conclusion
The creation of the Vichy regime in France was introduced as a way to reform society deeply, especially military society. Slandering the Third Republic and its effect on the army, the new regime decided to issue new missions to its troops in order to proceed with national reconstruction. One of these roles was to maintain public order and domestic security. But quite quickly this mission was transferred to the Guard, while the armistice army was allotted an ethical role. This shift conferred on the troops – mostly officers – a political role by requiring them to embody the regime and the Révolution Nationale. As such, the armistice army became an instrument utilized by the Vichy regime and its leaders, which had profound consequences when the prospect arose of resuming arms against Germany in November 1942.

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Matej Medvecký

CIVIL DEFENSE IN SLOVAKIA DURING THE NORMALIZATION PERIOD

Introduction

In the post-1968 military intervention period, civil defense in Czechoslovakia was defined as an integral part of the national defense of the country. It included measures for protecting the population in case of an enemy attack, for preparing the means to smoothly run the economy under war conditions, and for dealing with the results of any prospective attack. Members of the civil defense forces were responsible for training the population to use specialized equipment, teaching them basic rules of behavior under attack, informing the population on signals used to announce different types of danger, and running the early warning system and the sheltering provisions for the population. In peacetime, they were responsible for building specialized facilities and for implementing technical measures undertaken by engineering units designed to protect the population, the economy, and important historical, artistic and cultural sites. Such measures also aimed to facilitate evacuations of the population, workers and industrial installations.1

Before 1968

The tradition of civil defense may be traced back to the interwar period. During the Second World War there was a special civil protection force responsible for assisting the population in case of air attacks. Most often, it was organized on a territorial basis into small units consisting largely of retired or reserve officers who commanded a small group of several other people. During the military operations in Slovak territory in 1944/1945, its members – especially in bigger cities – provided assistance and organized civilians into bunkers or cellars. In 1948, as the international situation grew more severe, it was decided to enlarge this body and broaden its tasks. Civil defense worked within the organizational frame of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in Slovakia the responsible body was the Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and in 1949 one of the specialized battalions was formed in Trnava. In 1951, pursuant to a decision adopted by the government, the body was now to be formed according to the Soviet model. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for

1 Military Archives – Central Register (Vojenský archív – centrálna registratúra, hereafter VA CR) Trnava, fund No. 4031, box. No. 22, Role and Tasks of the Civil Defense of ČSSR in peace, under defense emergency and several issues related to interoperability of the Warsaw Pact counties, 1984.
organization and coordination of this body, but most governmental departments had to fulfill tasks related to the civil defense according to their area of specialization.

The whole system consisted of two parts – military and non-military. In the 1950s, the non-military parts of the civil defense were established such as regional structures or structures within individual governmental departments. Tasks of these services varied from medicine to forestry. Also, broad training of the population started while existing military units were upgraded to regiments. In Slovakia, such units were located in Žilina and Malacky. The end of the 1960s brought political liberalization in Czechoslovakia together with questions about transforming or even disbanding the civil defense. In the year following the Warsaw Pact intervention a constitutional act on Czechoslovakian federation was passed. Therefore, tasks related to federalization of the administration were crucial. The “federalization” of the civil defense was hampered by insufficient staff numbers and this lack of personnel became even more pressing when “bearers of incorrect views” had to leave their posts after purges related to the Warsaw Pact armies invasion.¹

The main tasks during peace and wartime were defined as follows:

• formation and training of units, formations, and staff bodies of the civil defense; education and training of the population regarding protection during hostile air strikes or attacks based on weapons of mass destruction; education about forms of cooperation and dealing with the aftermath of such events
• early warning of the population under threat of hostile attack and prior to enemy attack, as well as evaluation of the consequences of such attacks
• preparation and implementation of individual and collective procedures designed to secure protection and survival of the population during a war, as well as preparing preconditions for subsequent restoration of the state and society
• building of civil defense facilities such as bunkers, command posts, and protected working places for directing bodies
• organization of CBRN protection of the population and its basic needs
• rescue of the population and material assets in places under threat of enemy attack
• organization of people’s lives when evacuated or living under special conditions such as an environment contaminated by nuclear or biological weapons
• providing assistance during rescue works after natural catastrophes in peacetime.²

After 1968

In the 1970s and 1980s, civil defense in Czechoslovakia aligned once again with Soviet military doctrines. It was presumed that in case of war between the Eastern and Western blocks, neither side would hesitate to use nuclear weapons at a tactical

² Ibid
and strategic level. Planners assumed that Czechoslovakia would be most affected since NATO armies were expected to use tactical military strikes against troops in Czechoslovakian territory and focus on attacking a known arms-production facility. Such a scenario would have had dramatic consequences, leading to the disintegration of the economy and damaging the capacity of the government to rule the country. In addition, predictions foresaw a serious impact on the fighting capacity of the army and many casualties among the population. Therefore, it was deemed a priority to establish an effective early-warning system. Yet the construction of the relevant bunkers was completely stopped in late 1960s due to a worsening of the country’s economic situation. The most important milestone of the civil defense development was the transfer of the responsibility from the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Federal Ministry of National Defense. At the beginning of 1976, following the Soviet example, the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CC CPC) passed a resolution regarding the transfer. Aligned with this was a command from the president and general secretary of the CC CPC Gustáv Husák. The resultant measure codified agreement regarding transfer responsibility for the civil defense tasks approved by bodies of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The military part of the system consisted of staffs of commanders on various levels – including federal, national, both capital cities, regions, and districts – as per the administrative division of the country. In the regional structures of the Czechoslovak Peoples’ Army, a deputy commander for civil defense was established at all relevant command levels. In the Slovak Socialist Republic, the post of deputy commander of the East Military District for civil defense was established and held by Major General Pavel Figuš (in 1976), Major General Ján Puškár (1976-1985), Major General Jiří Egg (1985-1986), Col. Břetislav Nytra (1986-1989) and Major General Marián Horský (1990-1992). Additionally, special civil defense regiments existed. There were both federal and territorial regiments. Slovakia had two such regiments and their number was to increase to ten in case of war. However, their real value was questionable since a majority of conscripts would have struggled to work with obsolete equipment.

Slovakia deployed two regiments – the 5th Civil Defense Regiment in Žilina which was territorial and dissolved in 1976, and the 6th Civil Defense Regiment in Malacky which was federal. The 6th Regiment consisted of a pioneer company, a signals company, a chemical company, a medical company, and a headquarters.

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2 Central Military Archives – Administration Archives (Vojensky ústredný archiv – správny archív, further on VÚA SA) Prague, f. Office of the Minister of the National Defense, box No. 30, Letter to the Secretary General of the CC CPC and the President of ČSSR, Attachment to the Information to the Minister M. Dzur, 5. 1. 1984.
company. The regiment was stationed in Malacky in the western part of Slovakia. Every year, new conscripts were summoned to the regiment. The regiment was reorganized in 1976, 1980, and finally in 1990 when it became the 31st Civil Defense Military Rescue Regiment.\(^1\) Soldiers were trained to acquire very specialized skills necessary to perform tasks related to protection against radiation or in case of chemical attack. At the same time – similarly to other socialist countries – soldiers were obliged to help the national economy by participating in harvests or fulfilling different ad hoc tasks.

The non-military part of the system was much larger than the military one. In Slovakia, it consisted of some 700,000 people. However, the bulk of these people were regular employees of a factory, company, or administrative body who were assigned to a civil defense committee. The non-military system was divided into territorial and departmental services. Territorial services consisted of commanding bodies where commanders were usually people of acknowledged standing (e.g. the highest commander of the civil defense in Slovakia was the vice-premier of the government of Slovak Socialist Republic). Lower level positions were attached to posts in regional administration. Apart from the territorial civil defense structure, civil defense formations and units worked in individual industrial or other facilities.\(^2\) Various departments of civil defense took charge of individual services. For instance, the Ministry of Health was responsible for civil defense medical services, while the Ministry of Water and Forest Management was responsible for water-supply engineering and so forth.\(^3\)

After the federalization of Czechoslovakia, the structure of civil defense adopted to the constitutional changes. The newly-established Slovak Socialist Republic therefore had its own civil defense commander and staff. For most of the period, 1st Deputy Prime Minister Július Horvát served in the post (1969-1988). The Chief of Staff Col. Jozef Kováčik held the post from 1970-1989, and his successor, Lt. Col. Milan Šišulák, served until 2004.\(^4\) At first, there was a great lack of staff at the top of the structure. There were three main reasons for this. The first was the federalization process itself, since at the time of establishing new ministries the question of civil defense staff was naturally considered to be of lesser importance. The second reason was rooted in personal purges related to the Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968.\(^5\) The third reason for top-level staff being scarce was that many civil defense

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\(^1\) Ibid., Box No. 72, Assessment of Task Fulfillment Resulting from the Order of the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovak Federal Republic and Guidelines of VVVO for Exercise Year 1990-91.


\(^5\) 241 people were interviewed and of these 13 were expelled from the communist party, while in 16 cases party memberships were cancelled. 7 people received a penalty pursuant to internal communist party directions, 4 people were dismissed from work, 3 transferred to a lower position, and 3 cases remained unfinished. VHA, f. Civil Defense Staff Bratislava (Stáb CO Bratislava), box No. 2, Minutes from the Control of Current State at the Civil Defense Staff 23. 9. 1970.
staff (especially officers) served from the early 1950s and fulfilled conditions for retirement. At that time, 15% of all serving officers were older than 50 years of age.¹

One of the most expensive sectors of the civil defense system involved the construction of bunkers and providing equipment for individual protection as well as the early warning system. A report from 1970 declared that there were approximately 1000 bunkers in Slovakia capable of protecting 135,000 people. The first of these were built in 1951. Prior to 1962, between 80-100 bunkers were built every year with a total capacity of 10-13,000 people.

The number of bunkers constructed went into decline post-1962 due to Czechoslovakian economic problems (the crash of the 3rd five-year plan) and at the end of the decade construction ceased.² In 1970, a decision was reached to start the process again and another 19 bunkers with a capacity of 25,000 people were planned for 1971-1975. Concerning individual protection, plans were launched to supply the population with individual chemical protection equipment, starting with selected groups. Each region, organization, or factory had a special Committee for Supplying of Population with Equipment of Chemical Protection that delivered the supplies in case of emergency.³ Yet the national resources were not sufficient to cover all the needs of its huge military system. For example, the dosimeters available in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly obsolete and new ones were distributed in very insufficient numbers.

The civil defense transfer in 1976 to the Ministry of National Defense brought with it a Long-term Plan of Development of Civil Defense in Slovakia for 1976-1990. This was prepared by the staff officers of the civil defense staff of the Slovak Socialist Republic.⁴ Among other projections, it anticipated massive investment in infrastructure – including bunkers and command posts – with expected costs of 400 million crowns. The Plan postulated further investments worth 1 billion crowns for 1976-1990, and working in 5-year intervals (related to 5-year plans for economy) funds for bunkers alone were set at 200 million (1976-1980) and 400 million for 1981-1985 and 1986-1990. An additional several hundred million crowns was to be spent on equipment such as gas masks, filters, sensors, as well as on flats for civil defense personnel. The overall investment for 1976-1990 in Slovakia was calculated to be 3 billion crowns and it is not clear whether this figure includes maintenance costs.

Therefore, the state looked for ways to rationalize this expenditure and after 1971 a new concept of bunkers was adopted. Bunkers were very often built within new industrial facilities and were designed for dual-purpose usage with a storage

¹ Ibidem.
³ Ibid., Attachment No. 6, Supplying of the Population by Means of Individual Anti-Chemical Protection.
function envisaged during peacetime. Hence, larger sites became the preferred option.\textsuperscript{1} The developer – usually companies, national committees etc. – usually had to finance the bunker (at least partially). Alternatively, a developer might be expected to finance the bunker and only later receive refunding from the federal defense budget.\textsuperscript{2} In some cases problems occurred, and in any case a collective tendency to view civil defense structures with disfavor existed. The necessity of constructing such costly and technologically complicated facilities meant that developers tried to avoid such tasks by pleading a lack of construction capacity, technological difficulties, or a lack of sufficiently skilled workers.\textsuperscript{3} Knowing what we do about the “peculiarities” of a planned economy, we can affirm that civil defense facilities consumed time and resources and caused even longer delays in finishing constructions.

Another important part of the civil defense infrastructure was the early warning system. In autumn 1970, the Council of the State Defense approved a new concept for further developing this early warning system. The key element consisted of a network of strong pneumatic sirens not dependent on the public electricity distribution network which had a projected cost of 550 million crowns. It was expected to be fully functional by 1985.\textsuperscript{4} The plan predicted that in 1984 an air-raid emergency would be signaled in Prague, Bratislava, Banská Bystrica, and Košice within 20-30 seconds. However, the system still was not completed in 1985 and delays were especially evident in eastern Slovakia. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the number of sirens built every year was 300 (compared with 350 planned). The shortfall was caused by delays of supplies (sirens from German Democratic Republic) and by prioritizing the construction of an antenna for receiving the Soviet TV signal. In 1985, the system consisted of 1576 sirens – and 145 of these had a remote control. In 1990, the network was 66% finished (2372 sirens, 420 with remote control).\textsuperscript{5}

**Impact on the population**

Generally, the most visible part of the civil defense system in the 1970s and 1980s was the part devoted to training the population.\textsuperscript{6} Act No. 73/1973 Collection of Laws on defense education defined the term “national defense education” as the creation and strengthening of communist ideology and the will to defend


\textsuperscript{2} "Investors of flat, civic and industrial facilities as well as traffic and agricultural buildings are obliged to fulfill all requirements of the civil defense pursuant to special regulations of the Ministry of Interior of ČSSR and subsequent regulations of other ministries and central bodies of the state. If the investor belongs to the socialist sector the real costs are covered in the federal budget (via national budgets) in extent defined by special regulations of the Ministry of Finance of ČSSR." VHA, f. Defense Council of SSR, box No. 1, inv. No. 2, Information on Preparation of an Act on the Civil Defense, 25. 9. 1970.


\textsuperscript{5} VA CR Trnava, f. 4031, box No. 4, Data for Conception of Civil Defense of ČSSR.

Czechoslovakia. The 6th paragraph of the Act decreed obligatory civil defense training of the population. Apart from ideological firmness, trainees were supposed to learn about protective measures when facing an attack carried out by weapons of mass destruction, about their tasks during evacuation, and about providing assistance when dealing with the aftermath of an attack.

The preparation for civil defense consisted of attending lectures on two main subjects: military-political and technical. The first subject was closely related to communist doctrines. The second subject was more practical – and it focused on teaching civil defense signals; evacuation of people or institutions; individual protection; collective protection; behavior in the event of nuclear, chemical or biological attack; decontamination; extraction; first aid; fire protection and so forth. These lectures were held in offices and in schools of all levels by members of civil defense staffs (army officers) or by personnel responsible for civil defense tasks.

Though this training might have saved lives in the event of war, a large part of population considered it absurd. People viewed it as a waste of time or at least as a “necessary evil”. Generally, they thought that the knowledge would not be of much help in confronting a genuine attack which used weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, training became a target of mockery (“urban warfare in mountains”).

An indication of popular opinion might be illustrated with the following quote from a book dealing with 1970s in (Czecho)Slovakia: “It was in 1970 and during a compulsory course on the civil defense that a colonel explained to us how to behave in case of a nuclear assault. He was not the legendary one to advise us to hide in the explosion crater but his statements were also worth remembering. (...) He showed to us how to protect ourselves in case an imperialistic nuclear weapon exploded in our vicinity. To survive (according to his words) it was necessary to have a plastic bag and to lie in a certain position face-down with hands over our heads and our heads inside our plastic bag.” However, it was not only ordinary citizens who were skeptical about the usefulness of civil defense training. The same is at least partially true for representatives of the country. For instance, in 1981 the Czechoslovak government passed a resolution on lowering the numbers of staff employed in administration. People responsible for civil defense were often the first to be “made available” for other jobs.

However, the more ordinary tasks undertaken by civil defense are also noteworthy here. In various cases, soldiers and officers responsible for civil defense tasks provided invaluable assistance in the face of natural disasters or industrial accidents. Several such cases are documented. Formations of civil defense played an important role in combating cholera epidemics in eastern Slovakia in 1970.

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2 Sebo, Juraj 2009: Normalne 70. roky. Bratislava : Marenčin PT, p. 208
3 Ibid, p. 209.
4 VÚA SA Prague, f. Office of the Minister of the National Defense, box No. 30, Letter to the Secretary General of the CC CPC and the President of ČSSR, Attachment to the Information to the Minister M. Dzúr, 5. 1. 1984.
the second half of October 1970, a segment of employees from the coal power plant in Vojany fell ill to cholera. One of these patients died within 24 hours of being hospitalized. Meanwhile, 17 villages were quarantined and hospitalization was carried out for those who were ill, potentially ill, or asymptomatic carriers of infection. Medical staff actively searched for ill persons and examined almost 33,000 people. Specialized quarantine stations were established and all transport hubs were checked by the army and security forces. Special attention was paid to the provision of safe drinking water and food as well as other measures.¹ All measures were approved by a special ad hoc committee established by the Slovak Socialist Republic government.

The Slovak Socialist Republic civil defense staff was the executive body of the governmental committee and it arranged activities carried out by units and formations of civil defense with the exception of medical services. During the cholera outbreak, members of the federal civil defense regiment from Malacky were also deployed, namely its chemical company. Soldiers were responsible for disinfection works in the quarantined villages.² Throughout their one-month deployment they disinfected 1416 houses, 19 kilometers of roads, and almost 39,000 square meters of area as well as 3000 items of underwear, bed sheets and cloth. Similarly, soldiers from the regiment were deployed to combat a rodent infestation in Eastern Slovakia in 1972,³ to work against foot-and-mouth disease, and to provide assistance in railway accidents. They were in many cases even deployed to “assist the economy” through tasks such as chemical protection of hops at harvest times; but help provided by the army to the civil sector was common in most communist countries. At the same time, civil defense experts were responsible for preparing emergency plans for industrial facilities such as nuclear plants and even more emphasis was placed on such preparations after the Chernobyl accident. Such tasks filled more of the civil defense agenda at the end of 1980s when tensions on the international scene eased.

The collapse of the communist regime brought vast changes to the country and to the civil defense system. In 1990, a new concept was prepared which decreed that preparation for conflict with NATO countries was no longer a priority. Tasks related to securing the livelihood and health of citizens became more important. Measures deemed especially vital here included providing timely and effective help, carrying out relief works to provide necessities to inhabitants of territories hit or threatened by an emergency situation, and enacting measures to make the economy resilient.⁴ The source document shows some continuity with the previous period and presumes further construction of bunkers and partial continuity in civil defense edu-

² VA CR Trnava, f. 04019, Report on Deployment of Anti-Chemical Unit in the operation “CHOLERA”.
³ Ibid, Report on Deployment of Anti-Chemical Unit against Rodent Infestation in Eastern Slovakia Region.
⁴ VA CR Trnava, f. 4031, box No. 4, Data for Conception of Civil Defense of ČSFR.
cation where communist doctrines were to be abandoned. However, the last two points on this agenda were never realized.

The onset of economic transformation suspended all costly projects. Gas masks or other protective equipment was very often given as humanitarian aid to other countries such as Saudi Arabia. However, amassed experience was of some use and found expression in missions such as the Czechoslovak CRBN contingent in 1st Gulf War as well as several others.

**Conclusions**

Fortunately, Cold War expectations proved to be ill-directed and wrong. Today, it is almost impossible to evaluate how the system would work in case of inter-bloc war. Yet for researchers there is an additional challenge hidden in the relevant documents. Large parts of the source material are characterized by red-tape phrases, empty words, and “very special” idioms. This is true for such documents as operational plans, equipment plans, evaluations of exercises, and the educational magazine “Civilná obrana” where articles often claim to analyze gained experience but in fact offer only a rewriting of directives.

On the other hand, civil defense is still an important state tool in a world where it is not possible to preempt, identify, or prevent threats such as terrorism and natural or industrial accidents. Today, the Slovak Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for such tasks. It has a special department responsible for “civil protection” with regional bodies within the state administration. As remnants of the Cold War, plenty of former civil defense bunkers are hidden all around the country. Today, many of these serve as storerooms but in some instances people have devised other functions. In a few cases these sites even host concerts or exhibitions or are used as pubs or discos.

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A DEFENSE FORCE FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION?  
THE DANISH ARMED FORCES IN GREENLAND

Introduction

The enormous but sparsely populated Arctic island of Greenland is one of three constitutional parts of the Danish realm. Whereas Greenland in most spheres of domestic government enjoys full sovereignty, its foreign and defense politics are under the auspices of the Danish government in Copenhagen. With the advent of an increasingly strong independence movement in Greenland, this arrangement is challenged and may eventually.

This article addresses the Danish military presence in Greenland, emphasizing the many civilian tasks that the Danish armed forces carry out in this capacity. In addition to protecting the island's territory, the Danish defense force in Greenland carries out diverse assignments, which in Denmark proper are primarily the responsibility of civilian agencies. These include search and rescue; inspection of fishing vessels; guarding of the national park in northeast Greenland; monitoring the naval environment and, if necessary, containing and removing pollution. What follows is partly based on written sources, and partly on observations made during field trips to Greenland. In May 2016, the author participated as an observer in the SAR exercise LIVEX 2016 aboard the navy vessel Thetis, and in May 2017, he sailed from Nuuk to Ilulissat on the navy vessel Knud Rasmussen.

Historical, geographical, and political contexts

Greenland is one of three parts of the Danish realm (Rigsfællesskabet) – the other two being the Faroe Islands and Denmark. These three counties are all that is left of what used to be a multinational Danish miniature empire encompassing the above-mentioned entities plus Norway (until 1814), parts of Ghana (until 1850), Schleswig-Holstein (until 1864), the Virgin Islands (until 1917), and Iceland (until 1943). Covering a vast area of more than 2 million square kilometers, Greenland is by far the biggest entity in the Danish realm (in comparison Denmark itself is just above 44,000 square kilometers). In terms of population, matters are reversed. In contrast to Denmark’s 5.7 million inhabitants, Greenland is extremely sparsely populated – it is inhabited by just over 56,000 people of whom around 88 percent belong to the native Inuit population, while around 10 percent are Danes. Even if the enormous areas covered by glaciers and inland ice are deducted, the population density is 0.14 inhabitants per square kilometer.
Greenland’s place in the Danish realm is, like that of the Faeroe Islands, regulated by the Danish constitution plus legislation on home rule dating from 1979. In 2009, this legal standing was extended to self-government. Greenland has been through a continuous process of assuming responsibility for more and more areas of government – and while foreign and defense policy remains the prerogative of the Danish government in Copenhagen, almost all domestic affairs are now in the hands of the Greenland government in the capital Nuuk (Steinberg et al., 2015: 66). This includes the right to issue concessions to extract minerals and energy – an area where Greenland possesses considerable riches but is hampered in the extraction of these by the harsh climate, a limited workforce, poor infrastructure, and a turbulent investment climate (Taagholt & Brooks, 2016).

The challenges posed by nature are paramount when assessing the tasks of the armed forces in Greenland – a fact which cannot be over-stated or sufficiently stressed. The climate is arctic (subarctic in the southernmost part). In most places, the temperature only rises above zero degrees Celsius during the summer months while during the winter it may drop to around 50 degrees below. Along the coasts, navigation is hampered by cliffs and underwater reefs as well as frequent fog and arctic storms. Drifting ice represents a constant danger to shipping and during much of the year large swaths of sea are inaccessible due to a thick ice cover. In addition, superstructure icing represents a real danger. Conditions are no better inland. Many coastal areas are rocky, vegetation is extremely sparse, and the terrain offers almost no cover. Moreover, most of Greenland is covered by an ice sheet rising to more than 3,000 meters. Another conditioning factor is the absence of roads and inhabited areas. The terrain is difficult to cover on foot and hence the most efficient way of moving men and material is by boat (when ice conditions allow) or by sledge, ski, or motor sledge.

Unlike Denmark, Greenland is not part of the European Union. As a Danish country (prior to home rule), it followed Denmark into the European Common Market in 1972, despite a 70 percent ‘no’ vote in Greenland at the referendum on whether Denmark should join or not. In 1985, only a few years after home rule had been introduced, Greenland, after a second referendum, left the European Common Market.

The experience of having been “forced” to join an economic community, whose fishery policies were detrimental to Greenland’s interests, is described by many observers as one of the cornerstones of the independence movement. Yet other factors contribute to a strong urge for full independence among many Inuit, such as a feeling of being second-class citizens in their own land because many Danes occupy jobs in the administration of bigger businesses. Also relevant are collective expectations of a prosperous future if a combination of melting ice and higher prices in minerals and energy makes it feasible to start commercial mining and drilling. This was tantalizingly summarized in a US embassy assessment in 2007 stating that Greenland “is ‘just one big oil strike away from’ economic and political independence” (Steinberg, et al., 2015: 66).
One important parameter in the debate on independence is whether and how Greenland can manage without the substantial economic subsidy it currently receives from Denmark. This amounts to an annual sum of 3.682 billion Danish kroner, or around 491 million euro (Statistik, 2017: p. table 425). At present, Greenland is highly dependent on this money-flow due to its fragile economy, and it might be even more so in the future since several challenges loom ahead, such as an increased number of senior citizens. However, some politicians in Greenland argue that Denmark owes the country substantial subsidies – as compensation for past injustices – even if Greenland gains independence. Areas of contention identified here include various modernization schemes affecting the Inuit population, and pollution created by the military presence in Greenland (Breum, 2014). The fact that American bases were established in Greenland during World War Two and the Cold War without asking the local population is also part of this injustice argument. Further speculation pertains to whether Denmark was able to limit its defense spending to a rather modest sum during the Cold War because providing Greenland as a base area for the United States gave it leverage in Washington (Henriksen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017).

At times, the Danish military presence in Greenland is viewed in this light – during a debate in the parliament of Greenland a politician even termed the recent movement of the operational headquarters from the remote location of Grønmedal in southwestern Greenland to Nuuk an “occupation.”

Hence, this paper addresses both a contested subject and a matter that remains sparsely researched at present. Virtually no literature exists on civil-military relations in Greenland, or on the impact of the Danish military presence on Greenland’s society (Poulsen, 2017). This lack of research may stem partly from the physical distance between many major military installations and bigger civilian settlements on the enormous island, partly from the absence of research institutions in Greenland, and partly from a weakly-developed tradition for studying civilian-military affairs in Denmark. Turning to Denmark itself, we encounter a similar research void concerning the impact of the armed forces on society (Poulsen, 2013). Nor does the domestic role of the defense force seem to have elicited significant academic interest in other quarters of the Arctic. A bibliographical study carried out by the present author did not locate a significant body of texts on the topic. Even the major work on Arctic security is virtually silent on the domestic aspects of the presence of armed forces in the region (Grant, 2010).

The Danish armed forces in Greenland

The presence of armed forces in Greenland is rather novel. Until the early twentieth century, Danish naval vessels patrolled and guarded the waterways along the coast of Greenland at infrequent intervals – and only during the summer season. Often, such patrolling only took place every fifth or tenth year. After the First World War, a more regular schedule with annual cruises was adopted with a newly-

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1 The speaker of Partii Naleraq on 2 December 2015 at the parliament of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut)
built inspection vessel *Hvidbjørnen* specially constructed for the task of navigating arctic waters (Jensen, 2011: 108ff.). The Second World War triggered a substantial militarization of the island.

American forces were deployed on the island in 1941 and constructed various bases. Some of these still exist while others, such as Greenland’s two airports, were later converted to civilian use. After the Second World War, Denmark established its first ever permanent military presence on the island and with the advent of the Cold War the American military presence grew. Even today, there are major American defense installations on the island, most notably the Thule Base, which is still home to several hundred American servicemen (though during the Cold War it was many times larger). In comparison, the Danish military set-up was and remains small. North east Greenland – constituting the world’s biggest national park – is policed and guarded by the Sirius sledge patrol. This part of the Danish defense force consists of only a dozen men and some 85 sledge dogs.

Apart from a few additional minor installations in east Greenland, there is an air presence by virtue of a bombardier CL-604 Challenger based at the airport of Kangerlussuaq, plus a significant naval contingent. The Danish navy currently deploys one inspection ship of the Thetis class to Greenland, plus two inspection vessels of the Knud Rasmussen class. In addition, there is an inspection cutter, but this vessel will soon be replaced by a third vessel of the Knud Rasmussen class (Jensen, 2011: 321). These ships cover a sea territory of 470,000 nautical miles (Forsvarskommissionen, 1997: 282).

Overall command of these forces is situated in Nuuk. This is the site of the Arctic Command headquarters where approximately 50 servicemen and civilians are employed. The Arctic Command is also responsible for Danish forces on the Faroe Islands. Most members of the armed forces in Greenland are ethnic Danes, and there are several reasons for this. Most importantly, there has never been military conscription in Greenland. Contrastingly, the Danish population has been subject to universal male conscription since 1848. Greenland’s omission from the conscription system is partly explained by the fact that the country was a colony until 1953. Even when Greenland became a Danish country in 1953, it was argued that extending conscription to Greenland would be impractical (due to the logistical challenge) and detrimental to the local economy (as the young men form a vital part of an economy that until recently was based on fishing and hunting). Today, the Inuit population, like Danish females, enjoy the right but not the duty to serve as conscripts, and to sign a contract as professional soldiers. The Danish Defense force promotes a policy of diversity (*mangfoldighed*) but keeps no separate statistic about the parts of the realm in which soldiers are recruited. Hence, accurate statistics are not available regarding persons with Inuit background who have served in the armed forces. It is important to stress, however, that the size of the population of Greenland is so small that recruitment even under the best conditions would only result in a small number of the total defense force being of Inuit origin.

Nevertheless, the Inuit population is barely represented in the Danish defense force operating in Greenland (Selvstyrekommissionen, 2003) and the implications
of this are quite important. First, few members of the armed forces in Greenland speak the native Inuit language. The soldiers also look physically different. Although some actually live in Greenland, and might even have an Inuit spouse, most “commute” from Denmark. This represents another obstacle to recruiting more Inuit. The navy ships operating along the coast of Greenland are based in Frederikshavn Naval Station in Jutland. If a crew member reports for work in Frederikshavn from a home located on Greenland, he or she is expected to personally cover the travel costs to Frederikshavn. This expense may easily be in the range of 1,000-1,500 euro.

While it is true, as noted earlier, that some politicians in Greenland portray the Danish military personnel in Greenland as occupants, this is not a mainstream point of view. Others have argued strongly that the Danish military presence is a condition for protecting the waters of Greenland from poaching from foreign fishing vessels (Breum, 2014: 41). In general, however, the debate over military matters and the contribution of the Danish Armed Forces to the well-being of the island is limited and sporadic, rather than perpetual and passionate. Similarly, the low number of Inuit in the armed forces has rarely been addressed in the political debate on the island. Recently, however, this has become a topic for debate, and currently a Greenland home guard is on the drawing board. It is noteworthy that the notion of a Greenland home guard seems to focus primarily on how such a unit might contribute to disaster management and other tasks servicing civilian society (Forsvarsministeriet, 2016).

This focus indicates the need for addressing such tasks in Greenland and reveals that local threat-perception is different from the strategic agenda in Denmark. Whereas Danish governments since the outbreak of war in Ukraine have increasingly viewed Russia as a direct security threat, this point-of-view seems much less widespread in Greenland, even though Greenland and Russia recently laid conflicting territorial claims to the North Pole (Staun, 2015: 12). The scant regard some politicians in Greenland have for security guarantees and for being embedded in western security structures is indicated by a recent statement by Greenland’s minister for foreign relations. Referring to a claim that Danish and American governments must shoulder financial responsibility for the environmental damage done by bases in Greenland, he threatened that if this did not happen, Greenland might terminate the current base agreement with the United States (Breum, 2016). It is evident, then, that territorial defense alone is not likely to justify the military presence in Greenland in the eyes of a considerable segment of the population. Hence, it may be of interest to ask what else the Danish military presence on the island offers.

The Danish armed forces and civilian-oriented tasks

The most profound task of the Danish forces in Greenland is to defend the island. This part of its portfolio has been stressed by the Arctic Command recently. In peacetime, however, the Arctic Command’s duties encompass a large range of other tasks. This is not new – in fact, for as long as there has been a Danish military presence in Greenland, the armed forces have combined enforcement of sov-
ereignty and civilian-oriented tasks (Forsvars kommissionen, 1997: 8). Today, the Defense force’s tasks in Greenland can be shortlisted as the following: “Surveillance, show of sovereignty, fishing inspection, search and rescue, environmental surveillance, pollution control, hydrographic surveillance and support to the civilian society.” (Forsvaret, 2013) 1

Obviously, this list of assignments does not paint the full picture. For a start, a more detailed list can be made – especially regarding the last category “support to the civilian society.” Secondly, the civilian-oriented tasks are secondary to defending Greenland and are likely to be downsized or cancelled in times of crisis and war. Thirdly, they are not carried out in isolation from other responsibilities. This was clearly stressed in the 1997 defense review, and little has changed since: “When the defense force assumes such tasks [civilian-oriented tasks], they are normally one aspect of an integrated approach to resolving tasks; this is to be understood so that it is the traditional tasks [of defending Denmark] which enable the Defense force to carry out other assignments in a way beneficial to society. One example is that the Defense Force is carrying out fishery inspection and control plus search-and-rescue around Greenland and the Faroe Islands in combination with surveillance and territorial protection” (Forsvars kommissionen, 1997: 119).

Not all tasks are conducted with equal frequency. They also differ in visibility and the degree to which they may be deemed important by Greenland’s society. Tasks involving VIP transport and support of scientific expeditions are primarily related to visits from Denmark, such as the royal family or biologists and geologists from Danish and foreign universities. At the other end of the spectrum, missions such as search and rescue, rendering medical support through an naval physician, or evacuating a severely ill patient to a hospital are far more visible and tangible for the communities.

Rather than carry out an exhaustive survey of the aforementioned tasks, the next part of this paper will describe what may take place during a few days at sea on a Danish navy vessel while on patrol. The description is based on observation and analysis performed by the author during three days aboard the navy vessel Knud Rasmussen in early May 2017.

The Knud Rasmussen departed Nuuk during the afternoon of 4 May and arrived in Ilulissat (almost 500 km further north) in the afternoon of 7 May 2017, and during this passage the ship and its crew performed various tasks oriented toward supporting Greenland’s society. After sailing for around 24 hours, partly through solid ice, the vessel arrived at the small harbor of Qasigiannguit in the evening of 5 May. There was more ice and snow this year than was usual for the season, and the ship had been ordered by the Arctic Command to open a channel through the ice from the harbor to the open water. The main purpose was to allow shipping to the town, which was low on supplies. After completing the job, the Knud Rasmussen called the harbor and a representative of the town, and a local fisherman came aboard for a cup of coffee and a snack. Besides discussing how to broaden the corri-

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1 For a detailed list see Jensen (2011), p. 322.
... dor already made in the ice, requests were made for the vessel to break the ice in an area with good fishing possibilities, so that the local community which relied on fishing almost exclusively could ply their trade. It was agreed that the Knud Rasmussen would take care of that matter soon, if the ice did not break up of its own accord prior to this time. The ship’s crew was also invited to play a soccer match against the local old boys’ team. The captain of Knud Rasmussen promised that he would gather a team for a match next time his ship called at Qasigiannguit. After departing from Qasigiannguit, Knud Rasmussen broke more ice.

Now, the objective was to prepare a sea lane for a coaster carrying supplies to Iulissat, the third biggest town in Greenland. This took most of the night between 6 and 7 May. Aboard Knud Rasmussen was an officer from Greenland’s fisheries inspection, as the ship had been assigned to inspect fishing vessels. Due to ice, inspection could only be carried out during the last day of the author’s stay onboard. An inspection crew consists of two persons – the representative of Greenland’s fisheries inspection and the ship’s fishery officer. The naval task is partly to liaise between the ship and the inspector, and partly to monitor the safety regulations on the ships and boats inspected. “Don’t focus too much on the nitty-gritty” was the gist of the captain’s instructions to the inspecting crew.1 His order was not sanctioning any disregard for the safety and fishing regulations under which the local fishermen operate. Rather, his words reflected the fact that fishing is vital to the survival of the population of Greenland, and that the navy seeks to strike a balance between advising the fishermen and penalizing them.

Anecdotal history has it that a bullet hole visible on the name plate of the navy inspection cutter Tuluq was caused by an angry fisherman who had been monitored one time too many and fired a shot at the ship when drunk. This raises a delicate question. Are such tasks as fishery inspection appreciated by the local population? Are they a source of goodwill for the armed forces or are they alienating the armed forces from the population of Greenland? “When I meet Inuit who complain that [during fishery inspection] we knock poor fishermen on their head with a lot of rules and regulations, I remind them that we are merely enforcing legislation decided by the local authorities”, is how the captain of Knud Rasmussen sees this problem.2

Yet the Danish navy primarily carries out fishery surveillance and inspection at sea rather than along the coast, and here the biggest challenge is not minor breaches of the law by local fisherman but encroachments by foreign fishing vessels. Thus, even though local fishermen who receive penalties might be unhappy with such interactions, there seems to be an overall appreciation of the fact that the navy is securing Greenland’s fishing fleet against illegal fishing. This was clearly reflected in the 1997 defense review, where the local governments of the Faroe Islands and Greenland stressed that they did not want the navy to downsize its level of inspection (Forsvarskommissionen, 1997: 263).

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1 Observed on 6 May, 2017 aboard Knud Rasmussen.
2 Interview on 7 May 2017 aboard Knud Rasmussen.
Another issue which has prompted some complaints is that navy ships, when sailing through solid ice, have unintentionally cut traffic lanes. During the winter, it is common to travel on the ice along the coast and icebreaking may then disrupt traffic for a certain time. It seems, however, that this is a minor problem. During most of the winter, the water freezes again very rapidly, and it may only be a matter of hours before it is possible to cross over again.

The contribution rendered by the navy and air force to search and rescue is significant and represents a recurring part of the armed forces’ work in the Arctic. Given the size of Greenland’s territory and the extreme climatic conditions, the current number of vessels appears to be a bare minimum. They are in the words of one of Knud Rasmussen’s officers “slow moving ambulances” with responsibility for an enormous territory, and the need for robust assets which can carry out search and rescue and evacuation operations is likely to increase in the future with the advent of more commercial shipping around Greenland due to melting ice (Rottbøll, 2013). Exemplifying some of the likely challenges in the future is the fact that 2013 saw the first large cargo ship sail though the Northwest Passage and in August 2016 the cruise ship Crystal Serenity navigated the same waters with 1,700 passengers (Tech, 2016; Rottbøll, 2013).

Recent exercises such as LIVEX 2016, in which the armed forces played a pre-eminent role, have rehearsed scenarios about how to address major shipwrecking incidents off the coast of Greenland – training for the type of incident which might happen when the number of cruise vessels increases (Forsvaret, 2016).

The Danish Defense Force’s significant contribution to the wellbeing of Greenland’s society was made very clear when a landslide caused a tsunami which hit the remote Arctic hamlet of Nuugaatsiaq on 17 July 2017. The tsunami caused enormous damage, washed away several houses, and resulted in four persons missing, while the remaining population had to flee their homes. Shortly after the incident, the Joint Rescue Coordination Center at the Arctic Command initiated a relief operation. Supplies and medical personnel were flown in by helicopter and a surveillance aircraft was activated to search for the missing persons and to assess the risk of additional landslides.

As part of the operation, two naval vessels were ordered to the area and eventually the hamlet’s 75 inhabitants were evacuated by helicopter to these ships (Forsvarskommando, 2017). The rescue operation at Nuugaatsiaq was generally seen as highly successful. The success was, however, partly the result of good luck, since two naval vessels were in the relative vicinity of the disaster site and the weather was reasonably good. Given the size of Greenland, the fate of rescue operations on land as well as on sea depends to a certain extent on chance. A mis-match between the assets available for disaster relief and the scale of risk presented by such a vast area was acknowledged in Fall 2013 in a report by the Danish national audit office. The office noted that the risks of navigating in the waters around Greenland were not sufficiently matched by the means available for search and rescue. It was also stated that the Defense Force had failed to give sufficient priority to monitoring
the maritime environment and supervising ships carrying environmentally dan­
gerous cargo (Rigsrevisionen, 2013). These observations formed part of the back­ground for a review of the Danish Defense Force’s activities in Greenland in sum­mer 2016. The result was a budgetary increase, the deployment of an additional ship to Greenland, and multiple other initiatives (Forsvarsministeriet, 2016).

Alternatives to Defense Force completion of civilian tasks
The Danish Defense Force also contributes to search and rescue in Denmark, but the extensive list of roles associated with supporting local communities in Greenland extends beyond what the Defense Force does in the rest of the Danish realm. Icebreaking, for example, was outsourced in 2012 and the Danish Defense Force’s only responsibilities in this field are now ice surveillance and forecasting as well as coordination of ice breaking (Forsvarsministeriet, 2016).

Speculation may follow about whether it is convenient to leave these tasks in the hands of the Defense Force as a way of legitimizing it and bolstering its share of the national budget. This cannot be excluded, but it must be stressed that the current situation has arisen primarily due to the absence of viable alternatives and a clear political demand for the Defense Force to carry out these tasks in and around Greenland. Yet what will happen if Greenland becomes independent? Is it likely that an independent Greenland could operate robust ships like the current Danish navy vessels, holding costs near their current level? Or could alternatives be found?

The most one-dimensional answer is that rather than building up its own miniature navy, Greenland should simply privatize the many functions currently carried out by the Danish armed forces. This option is complicated by the fact that the costs of operating around Greenland are high and that it may be difficult to obtain an adequate number of competing commercial bids for the task (Rahbek-Clemmensen, et al., 2012: 20). Another option may be to transfer Greenland directly under the American security umbrella, rather than continuing in a joint defense relationship with Denmark. Another would be to join forces with Iceland and the Faroe Islands (provided they seek independence too). The U.S. forces stationed on the Thule base are already contributing to a variety of tasks, including surveillance and local search and rescue. Whether an independent government in Greenland would be able to obtain a better base deal than the current one remains to be seen, as the current base arrangement offers the U.S. forces all they need. Also debatable, given the dimensions of the challenges, is the question of whether the three small (in terms of economy and population) Atlantic entities – The Faroe Islands, Greenland and Iceland – might manage in the distant future to perform the present tasks jointly.

In this respect it is instructive to look at Iceland which gained its independence from Denmark in 1943. This sub-polar country is located not very far from Greenland, and like Greenland fishing is immensely important to its economy. Island is also quite sparsely populated and has a history of fighting fishery wars with its neighbors, especially Great Britain. However, Iceland also differs from Greenland in a number of crucial areas. The population is around six times bigger
and its GDP is significantly higher (per capita GDP is almost 50 percent higher). Iceland does not have armed forces as such. Instead, Iceland guards its maritime areas – a sea territory of 758,000 square kilometers – via a coast guard. The coast guard is in charge of search and rescue as well as monitoring fishing outside the Icelandic economic zone (Guard, u.d.). These tasks are currently carried out by a fleet of three ships – Thor, Ægir and Tyr.

In addition, the coast guard operates a number of helicopters and fixed wing planes. Thor – a state-of-the-art ship and the coast guard’s most recent acquisition – was commissioned in 2011. The construction costs amounted to over 400 million euro (Breum, 2014: 224). From a comparative perspective, the possible cost of Greenland following the example of Iceland may indicated by the fact that the estimated price tag of Denmark’s military presence in Greenland is in the range of 67 million euro annually (Breum, 2014: 219) and that figure only represents running costs. In comparison, the annual budget of the government of Greenland is around 1,000 million euro (almost half of which is paid by an annual Danish state subsidy).

**Conclusion**

With its beautiful and pristine nature, along with its many natural resources and energy riches, Greenland may seem destined for a bright future. Yet its diminutive and widely-dispersed population, and the considerable mismatch between the size of the current economy and the ambitions of the political establishment on the island, suggest that the road towards full independence is fraught with economic challenges. Higher energy prices and a spike in commodity prices may change the situation somewhat, but most economists are skeptical about overly-optimistic scenarios. This means that an independent Greenland would need to make many hard choices, including decisions about how the current tasks being carried out by the Danish Armed Forces should be addressed in a post-independence scenario. In the absence of viable alternatives to the present set up, it seems likely that the very last link to Denmark to be severed will be that of joint defense.

In this sense, the domestic role of the Danish Defense Force in Greenland is not simply to defend the island and to carry out a range of important tasks benefitting local communities. The role also involves serving – unintentionally – as an impediment to Greenland assuming full independence.

**Bibliography**


Lana Mamphoria

REDEFINING THE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: THE CASE OF GEORGIA

Introduction

Among the Western powers, the long-standing conception of the armed forces was that they must primarily defend against traditional external military threats. During the Cold War, the armed forces of Western nations were intensely focused on external conflicts and engaged in defense against potential external attacks. The top priority of security provision in the Euro-Atlantic area was to meet wide-ranging military, ideological, and political challenges from the Soviet Union. The international realities after the Cold War wrought transformation. Peace, stability, and greater optimism ushered in a ‘peace dividend’ by notably decreasing defense spending and the size of armed forces – triggering structural and identity changes. The first shifts in the role of the military from the traditional mission of external defense occurred in this post-Cold War climate when the armed forces of Western nations acquired “non-traditional” roles. These roles extended to international peace support operations and national duties that had typically been outside of their jurisdiction such as disaster relief, law enforcement, and counterterrorism.

At present, notions of a peace dividend are beginning to be reversed and the international system is expecting a second round of shifts in the face of emerging threats and unprecedented security challenges. The growing network of terrorist organizations, cyber insecurity, transnational crime, and migration crises in Europe have been challenging the response capacity of armed forces. The military are increasingly called upon to perform various multiple-role functions to address both “traditional” and “non-traditional” threats at international and domestic level.

Throughout the 1990s, Georgia’s defense policy adapted to the vast changes in the security contexts outlined above. The changes influenced long-held assumptions about the functions of the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) and triggered a profound series of shifts in relation to their core role. After the restoration of Georgia’s independence, the GAF were transformed and were primed not only for defending against external threats but for contributing to international peace operations and assisting in the management of domestic affairs. The redefinition of the GAF as international contributors or as supportive forces at an internal level was a novel development in Georgia’s security outlook.
General Approach to the Domestic Missions of the Military

Societies have always argued about the appropriateness of newly-defined tasks for the armed forces which extend beyond their core function of external defense. In the western democracies there are divergent approaches to the domestic functions of the military: in one country we may have some hybrid organizations, like the gendarmerie in France, whereas in others there are strict constitutional restrictions on using armed forces in domestic affairs. Generally, the authorities called upon and the restrictions applied depend on historical, legal, social and political contexts that are unique to each country.

Broadly, though, armed forces missions have moved beyond traditional parameters. A wide range of internal military and civilian tasks are performed by different branches of the armed services in all countries. According to research of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Schnable, Krupanski, 2012: 19) – which conducted comparative analyses of domestic functions of the military in the western democracies – typical internal roles and tasks are categorized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law-enforcement related Tasks</th>
<th>Disaster assistance-related tasks</th>
<th>Environmental assistance-related tasks</th>
<th>Cross-over tasks</th>
<th>Miscellaneous Community assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public order; Counter-terrorism; Border control; Drug enforcement; Law enforcement; Crime Investigation; Support for major public events; Building and personnel security; Cyber operations; Intelligence gathering.</td>
<td>Domestic catastrophe response; Disaster relief.</td>
<td>Environmental Protection.</td>
<td>Search and rescue; Training; Monitoring; Equipment and facility provision; Miscellaneous maritime activities; Scientific research.</td>
<td>guard for parades; harvest support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing this general list of functions to the domestic tasks of the GAF, it is noticeable that it performs only limited number of them. Georgia’s legislative framework places constitutional restrictions on using the GAF in domestic affairs and stipulates that the core domestic mission is to support civilian authorities during emergencies.

The GAF has undergone several structural and functional changes regarding its domestic role. Defense policy and the use of armed forces are carried out in accordance with the Constitution of Georgia and other defense legislation. Moreover, the GAF are guided by strategic and intra-agency documents that define the missions, values and structures.
The legislation regulating the defense sphere is updated periodically which means that the GAF may adapt its missions accordingly amid the effort to meet new threats and challenges. These legislative documents state that the GAF’s core purpose is to defend the nation’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and to fulfill international obligations. The decision about deploying the armed forces is made by the president with the consent of the parliament.\(^1\) Legally and conceptually, the main objectives of the GAF are: deterrence and defense; contribution to strengthening regional and international security; and providing support to civil authorities during natural and man-made disasters.\(^2\)

Codified restrictions on using the armed forces domestically are an understandable precaution, as they are rooted in the historical experience of Georgia. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Georgia’s declaration of independence, the main obstacle confronting the newly independent country was the establishment of a legitimate Georgian government. Minimal experience of statehood presented various challenges that were used opportunistically by the Russian Federation to realize its strategic objectives. Chief among these was to assert control over the post-Soviet countries. Russia fomented tensions between pro and anti-Russian Georgian politicians that led to the civil war and the establishment of various military or paramilitary organizations with ambiguous origins and purposes. The paramilitaries promoted domestic riots and the toppling of the first democratically elected president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The experience of civil war in the 1990s and the involvement of troops in domestic riots had a negative impact on society and influenced its perception of extended military functions in Georgia. Consequently, once released from the bloody proceedings of the communist regime, there was no political and social support for using military internally, apart from the national defense definitions that were written into the legislative framework.

**How Georgia’s Armed Forces Coordinate during Emergencies**

In addition to its external mandates, the most widely-known domestic GAF missions involve supporting civilian authorities during emergencies. The GAF are responsible for supporting specific requests from the relevant crisis management coordination agencies with rapid mobilization of relevant material-technical resources to mitigate the consequences of natural and man-made disasters. In these circumstances, the GAF implements the “National Response Plan on Natural and Manmade Emergency Situations” under the command and control of civilian agencies to enhance the response capacity of civilian security providers.

Moreover, the General Staff develops a GAF Support Plan for responding to natural and man-made emergencies which defines the necessary forces/units, ca-

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pabilities, and scenarios for assisting the civil authorities. Given the importance of close cooperation between all interagency actors during emergencies, the GAF Support Plan concentrates on collaboration mechanisms with different Government agencies for identification of available resources. Past practice indicates that such military assistance is chiefly a last resort enacted when such emergencies exceed the response capacity of civilian institutions.

The Ministry of Defense of Georgia (MOD) has a special unit – the National Guard – which in emergency situations is responsible for supporting civil authorities. If additional forces are needed, other relevant units of the armed forces can support civilian security institutions in performing tasks related to disaster relief. In addition, the National Guard performs so-called non-traditional crossover military tasks, such as participating in humanitarian operations, providing support during various events and ceremonies, conducting training and education (training of reservists, preparing citizens for civil defense), as well as providing support and assistance to government authorities during the State of Urgency. Even in these cases, military forces cannot be used without obtaining the consent of the President and parliamentary approval. This process was on display in August 2017, during the Borjomi Gorge fire, when the Prime Minister requested that the President issue a decree and introduce it before the parliament, seeking approval to use the armed forces for assisting civilian agencies. A second well-known case was in June 2015, during heavy flooding in Tbilisi, when the parliament unanimously supported the President’s decree about involving military units in the disaster relief efforts. The President’s decree envisaged the involvement of the Armed Forces Engineering Brigade, Logistic Support Command, Air Force and Air Defense Command, and the National Guard.

Problems with Law-enforcement Functions of the Military in Georgia

Georgia has a destructive track-record when it comes to paramilitary organizations, as witnessed throughout the 1990s civil war. Hence, the law-enforcement related tasks of the Georgian armed forces are strictly limited, and currently Georgia has no hybrid organizations like the Gendarmerie (France) or Carabinieri (Italy). All law-enforcement functions such as counterterrorism operations, public order, border control, and criminal investigation are under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the 1990s, Georgia had a paramilitary organization called Internal Troops that was integrated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs but represented Georgian military forces. The exact functions of Internal Troops were ambiguous and characterized as a duplication of the GAF. According to the law, the key functions of internal troops were:

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- Rendering assistance to the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and the State Security Ministry of Georgia in protection of public order, safeguard of the public security, and maintenance of the rule of law;
- Participation in combating organized crime, terrorist, and diversion groups;
- Guarding of especially important state facilities and special cargoes independently or jointly with the Special State Security Service and other bodies of Georgia;
- Participation in defense of Georgia.¹

The Internal Troops supported the police and other security units in restoring public order in the event of large-scale riots and internal armed conflicts. They were involved in almost all law-enforcement related tasks, like anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations, and had the right to use heavy weaponry. The great obstacle of the organization was blurred parameters and a lack of clear distinctions concerning missions among the GAF, Internal Troops, and other Police forces. This was deliberately done by the government of Eduard Shevardnadze² (1992-2003) as part of an overall strategy of creating a network of different militarized organizations to "check and balance" one another.³ Shevardnadze ordered the development of five militarized ground units: the Georgian Armed Forces; Border Guard; Government Guard; Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and Special Units of the Ministry of State Security.

The real motive behind the attempt to counter-balance the security organizations was President Shevardnadze's fear of conspiracy. In a bid to greatly reduce the risk of further plots or military coups – and ever-conscious of the fate which befell the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia – Shevardnadze created overlapping security institutions.⁴

² Eduard Shevardnadze, former President of Georgia (1992-2003), served as First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party (1972-1985) and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (1985-1991). Shevardnadze was involved in many key decisions of Soviet diplomacy including the reunification of Germany. He was the second President of Georgia, governing for two terms, and was forced to retire as a consequence of the Rose Revolution.
³ United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logics of International Hostility, Aaron Belkin, 2005, State University of New Your Press, pg.105-107
⁴ On March 311991, the Georgian population overwhelmingly supported the independence of Georgia. Based on this, Georgian parliament passed the declaration of independence and declared secession from the Soviet Union. On May 26 1991, former dissident and anti-soviet activist Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first democratically elected president of Georgia, winning 86% of the votes cast. Gamsakhurdia was faced with socio-economic and political problems, including tensions with ethnic minorities (Abkhazians, Ossetians) and a lack of qualified and devoted public servants. The great dilemma of the Gamsakhurdia government was tense relations with the Russian Federation and a simultaneous lack of international support from the West, which finally determined their destiny of existing in isolation.

In December 1991, paramilitary groups and armed opposition with the support of Moscow, launched a coup, took control of official buildings, militarily overthrew President Gamsakhurdia and secured state power. They created the Military Council whose self-declared mission was to "introduce economic reforms and maintain order" until new elections could be held. As the leaders of the military council were without any political experience, they organized the return of Eduard Shevardnadze (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and of Georgian descent) from Moscow to Tbilisi who later
In 2004, after endless controversies, and at the recommendation of European and American counterparts, the Internal Troops organization was abolished. Its functions were split: basic law-enforcement tasks were given to the Special Tasks Department (Ministry of Internal Affairs) whereas all the other military units with their heavy weaponry were transferred to the GAF under Ministry of Defense supervision.

Chastened by its negative experience of paramilitaries, Georgia has no similar organizations nowadays. They were established during the period of domestic turmoil when Georgia was struggling with remnants of the Soviet era. As such, contrary various European precedents, the paramilitaries in Georgia were not extended or systematized. The lessons of the 1990s demonstrate that blurred lines of responsibility between the security providers caused systemic failure and encouraged fragmentation of security institutions. They lost credibility and made society critical of paramilitary organizations. Currently, there is a clear distinction between the functions of the military and the police since their missions do not overlap.

At this time, the law-enforcement functions of the GAF are strictly limited and cover only special cases within the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. Specifically, the Department of Military Police, which is a legal unit under the General Staff, performs law-enforcement tasks (criminal investigation, response to administrative offense, arresting/pursuing suspects) but its jurisdiction is not nationwide and is contained to the structural units of MoD.

New Threats to Security versus New Obligations for the Military

In recent years, security threats and risks have moved beyond traditional assumptions: they have varied in form and character and have often been mutually inter-related, and suffused with unpredictable difficulties. Traditional distinctions between internal and external security are gradually disappearing. Contrary to previous patterns, the enemy is able now to act by using the physical and virtual environments: acting on land, sea, and in the air, while exploiting electronic information. Hence, combatting threats to national security now encompasses traditional and “non-traditional” methods of military operation, including responses to terrorist attacks, organized crime, cyber defense, and information operations. Protecting citizens against these new threats requires not only a military response but a coordinated inter-agency effort with enhanced collaboration on policy, intelligence and other security resources.

1. Cyber Defense as a re-defined mission of the military

Acquisitions have not been wholly one-sided or threatening, and new technologies have advanced the military’s capabilities and readiness to defend the nation.

became the second President of Georgia (1992-2003). President Gamsakhurdia and his government remained in exile until the suspicious death of Gamsakhurdia on December 31, 1993. One version of events is that he was assassinated, while others claim that he committed suicide. The investigation is still underway.
Cyber security has become pivotal in the modern military. This has brought new complexities to international relations, since state and non-state actors conduct cyber operations to achieve a variety of political or military objectives that render co-existence contentious and difficult. Cyber threats are one of the major challenges to the modern world as an actor in one region can use cyber capabilities to destroy data, disrupt businesses or shut-off critical systems. The capacity of cyber-attacks to reach desired goals without the need for mass deployment of troops represents a new dimension of warfare.

Efforts to reform Georgian national defense have constantly been overtaken by changing events in the international system. However, as the global security environment amassed a greater knowledge of how to respond to emerging threats, the Georgian Armed Forces began re-defining their domestic mission by taking on tasks devoted to mitigating cyber risks and defending the country from attacks in cyberspace. When Georgian security challenges contain categories of cybercrime directed against critical information systems, cyber defense in the military includes a defensive role ensuring that the military and government networks are secured. In 2008, parallel to the Russian military attacks, Georgian cyberspace was the target of Russian aggression. It ushered in a new phase of warfare against Georgia in which land invasion was preceded with cyber war. The web-sites of the President's administration, Parliament, ministries (including Ministry of Defense of Georgia), and news agencies were under cyber blockade. Internet servers were under unauthorized external control which routed internet traffic through Russia. The government of Georgia evaluated this as cyber warfare and confirmed that the attacks were carried out by Russia as part of military conflict.1

The cyber-attacks during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 showed that the nation's cyber defense systems were vulnerable and highlighted the need to foster cyber defense resilience. As part of increasing its focus on the importance of communication and information systems to the command and control of the GAF, Georgia began strengthening its cyber defense capabilities and increased inter-agency cooperation in terms of building effective cyber security systems.

Currently, in concert with other state agencies, Georgia’s Ministry of Defense is responsible for defending national interests and mitigating harmful results caused by attacks in cyberspace. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense, the LEPL Cyber Security Bureau2 was established to protect and secure information...

1 Russian cyber war against Georgia was orchestrated from St. Petersburg (Russia) by Russian Business Network (RBN) which conducted the cyber-blockade. Thirty-six important websites were identified as targets, including the US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi, and the websites of Ministries, the Central Election Commission, and the Supreme Court. The official website of the President was unavailable for 24 hours while some news agency sites remained paralyzed even after two weeks. http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/doc/1006922/CYBERWAR-%20fd_2_.pdf
and communication technology systems for the Civil Office of Georgia’s MoD and structural sub-divisions of the Military Forces of General Staff. Georgia’s Minister of Defense approves the statutory output and the structure of the Cyber Security Bureau and carries out the activities stipulated by Georgian legislation on information security.

The main goals of the Cyber Security Bureau are:

- Development of Cyber Security joint policy;
- Provision of information and communication technology system security in the defense sector;
- Implementation and development of computer security incident response 24/7 mechanisms (CSIRT, CSIRT/CC, Call Center 24/7);
- Protection of information and communication technology infrastructure under the MOD of Georgia from cyber threats and cyber risks;
- Study of existing infrastructure within the MOD of Georgia, as well as the development and enhancement of its security;
- Elaboration of the conceptual base („Cyber Security Policy”, „Cyber Security Development Action Plan” etc.);
- Harmonization of Georgian Legislation with international legal norms;
- Provision of awareness-building in Cyber Security field;
- Participation in educational programs and training;
- Establishing close relations on a national and international level;
- Retraining military personnel according to contemporary standards of cyber security.1

In protecting defense cyber infrastructure the bureau cooperates with other relevant structures of the J6 Communications and Information System Department of General Staff and Information Technology Department of the MoD. This cooperation aims to promote efficient maintenance of information security. It also seeks to exercise effective control over the implementation of information security policy within the structural units of the GAF.

2. Transnational threats – new challenges for domestic security

Transnational security threats imperil the political and social integrity of nations and are emerging as some of the key security challenges facing the global security system. Forces such as international terrorism, transnational crime, and illegal migration are classified as non-military transnational security threats mostly committed by non-state actors, which do not pose direct challenges to sovereignty but rather to effective governance and authority. Responding to these challenges requires long-term strategy as well as combined national and international efforts.

The spread of transnational threats has also affected Georgia’s security context. The protracted conflicts in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region2 and the continued oc-

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2 Armed conflict between Georgians and the ethnic-minority Abkhazians (1992-93) and Ossetians (1991-92) broke out straight after the dissolution of the USSR and Georgia's declaration of Independence. Both regions had autonomy, but they refused any form of union with Georgia, as their separatist
The occupation of Georgian territories created a favorable environment for transnational organized crime. In the wake of the armed conflicts of the 1990s, the secessionist regions of Georgia have been transformed into territories with widespread illegal activities such as smuggling, human and drug trafficking, as well as illicit arms trading. Preventing the spread of organized crime in these territories is one of the obstacles Georgia faces due to an inability to agree on the political status of secessionist regions.

Apart from occupied territories, another problematic region is Pankisi Gorge, which creates an environment vulnerable for international terrorism. Historically, the Gorge has been populated mostly by Muslims and it was famous for the Chechens who fled Russian reprisals during the Chechen war of the 1990s. Now, some Muslims from the Pankisi region have joined ISIS and are fighting in Syria or Iraq. The Russian government frequently uses the situation to further their propaganda by characterizing Pankisi as a “safe haven” of terrorism and blaming Georgia for sheltering “terrorists.”

Given that the GAF are not allowed to perform law enforcement functions, responding to transnational threats is the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Nevertheless, the GAF shares the burden of mitigating such threats by performing various supportive functions like providing armaments, intelligence sharing, logistical support, and assistance to border control processes. Moreover, the law permits the use of land divisions of the GAF if a terrorist attack is conducted on Georgia’s Territory. It should be stressed that, except in emergencies, a terrorist attack is the only scenario that permits the use of the GAF in domestic affairs. The unit deployed in such situations is the Georgian Special Operations Forces (GSOF) which has a brigade-level command structure under GAF supervision. There are very few occasions where the GSOF is used during counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, since most of these are conducted by special units of the Minister of Internal Affairs. One notable case was in 2003, when Georgia conducted special operations in Pankisi Gorge to force the surrender of suspected armed Chechen militants who crossed Georgia’s border. During massive counter-terrorist

\[1\] Pankisi Gorge is populated by Georgians and Muslim minorities whose origin is in the North Caucasus, mostly ethnic Vainakhs, locally known as Kists. During the Second Chechen War (1999) there was an influx of Chechen refugees who escaped Russian government repressions. In the early 2000s, Chechen irregulars tried to use Pankisi as a staging area for fighting with Russia. The situation was exploited by Russia to justify its unlawful penetration into Georgia’s territory under the guise of launching strikes against “Chechen guerrillas”. The Georgian government has consistently been faced with the task of keeping the situation under enough control to prevent further regional deterioration. Currently, there are believed to be about 200 Chechen fighters in Syria and Iraq, led by commanders from Pankisi. One of the most prominent was Omar Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili), veteran of the Russian-Georgian war (2008) and former serviceman of the Georgian army, who later became ISIS commander in Syria. He was killed in July 2016, during a battle in the town of Al-Shirqat, Iraq.

operations, about 2,500 troops were deployed from Georgia’s Defense, Interior and State Security Ministries.¹

Moreover, to prevent transnational crime Georgian armed forces are involved in the development of various supportive programs to assist the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For instance, in 2016, the Ministry of Defense initiated a special program to encourage young men from Pankisi to join the GAF and thereby further their integration into wider Georgian society. In order to develop the program, several representatives of the GAF were sent to Pankisi. Their mission was to provide the local population with comprehensive information about the roles and duties of the GAF. The recruitment drive ended successfully and 33 men living in Pankisi expressed their desire to serve in the GAF, which represented a good result for a new program.

Conclusions

The location, scale, and duration of future conflicts are difficult to predict. The altered and ill-understood complexion of recent conflicts triggered the rise of subsequent crises including terrorism, civil wars, insurgency, and cyber threats, which challenged the response capacity of militaries involved. The functions of the military are increasing as it accepts additional responsibilities, and it is frequently called upon now to assist security agencies in performing more unconventional tasks. This is evident in recent cases in Europe, where the terrorist attacks and the influx of migrants prompted questions about expanding the functions of the military in domestic law enforcement issues, such as border security or supporting public order processes. In view of increased instability within states and the stalemate nature of ongoing conflicts, the foreseeable future will certainly bring a continued re-shaping of conventional approaches to defense so that the military can respond to unconventional challenges.

Already, traditional paradigms defining the roles of the GAF have gradually been re-conceived by acquiring additional functions beyond territorial defense. Presently, the GAF do not have legal permission to be directly involved in domestic security operations and there are no clear signs of re-focusing the role of the GAF toward security-oriented tasks. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the GAF from having an adaptive approach to newly-defined armed forces missions both domestically and internationally. One indication of this is the ready engagement of the GAF in different international cooperation mechanisms to increase interoperability

¹The anti-terror operation in Pankisi (2003) was a response to Russian Government pressure to “contain a threat posed by Chechen fighters in Pankisi.” Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded that the Georgian Government handle the situation otherwise they would take actions. At the same time, Russia constantly accused Georgia of using its special forces to train Chechen militants. The USA suggested that Georgia should conduct an operation to prevent further escalation of an already tense political situation between the countries. Despite Georgia’s launch of an anti-terror operation and its extradition of suspected Chechen fighters to Russia, the Kremlin remained irrate and questioned Georgia’s commitment to detaining suspected Chechen militants.

Russia’s discontent was caused by the refusal of Georgian leadership to a sanction joint operation in Pankisi.
with NATO forces and defense transformation processes. The experience that the GAF has accrued in terms of international anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations is indispensable for overall security in domestic affairs. Even though the GAF is not naturally organized for this kind of mission, they should certainly be trained and equipped to execute such tasks in the event of emergencies. Part of the GAF’s future may very well involve in dealing increasingly with non-state actors, which will require high levels of defense readiness, resilience, and inter-operability. Moreover, if the current European tendency toward increasing armed forces functions in domestic affairs increases, the domestic functions of the GAF are also likely to be extended, bringing greater involvement in stabilization and security processes internally.

**Bibliography**


*Conceptual Documents/Laws*


SECTION THREE:
ARMED FORCES IN CIVIL WARS AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS. OLD ROLES – NEW PARADIGMS
At once a standing army and a colonial constabulary, the early nineteenth-century U.S. Army epitomized the contradictions of the early republic. Although founded in defiance of metropolitan control and convinced that citizen soldiers were the ideal guardians of liberty, the young United States discovered (and rediscovered) over its first forty years that these ideals could not meet the demands of territorial expansion and external security, and it gradually conceded the necessity of a regular army. To this army fell the task of policing the republic’s borderlands and converting them into bordered lands within the national domain—a task that entailed the assimilation of residents deemed fit for self-rule and the marginalization or expulsion of those who were not. Committed nationalists (and, perhaps ironically, republicans), few of the army’s officers questioned the legitimacy of this mission.¹

Yet service in the borderlands called into question republicanism’s tacit association of fitness for self-rule with color or race, as officers entertained a wide range of views on the Indians, mestizos, and creoles they encountered but discovered frontier whites—and some of their own soldiers—utterly lacked the capacity and virtue demanded of republican citizens. This was especially true during the Jacksonian wars of Indian Removal, which placed a predominantly northern, middle-class officer corps in the heart of the Old South and at the center of national debates over the locus of sovereignty, the meaning of national honor, the sources of republican virtue, and the currency of class and race as measures of human worth.²

¹ As Ricardo Herrera has recently argued, “republicanism provided a vibrant, durable, and long-lived set of interrelated concepts that gave order to and made sense of Americans’ military service for nearly a century.” Many Americans, however, considered the regular army anathema to classical republicanism, which vested responsibility for armed self-defense in a virtuous citizenry rather than in an army for hire. Nevertheless, army officers considered themselves true paragons of republican virtue and civic mindedness in the age of Jackson, when self-interest appeared ascendant. Ricardo A. Herrera, For Liberty and the Republic: The American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861 (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 24. For a longer view of the importance of republicanism to American military principles and policy, see Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

Suspicion of “standing armies” was part and parcel of the “real Whig” republicanism that had helped produce the American Revolution. Leaders of the U.S. Army were well aware of this and determined to co-opt republicanism as the secular creed of its officer corps and to dedicate themselves to the mastery of conventional warfare – something the militia could not claim – which would keep the army well out of domestic affairs. This accorded neatly with the expectations of most Americans, many of whom still questioned the need for a regular military and considered the federal government’s authority under the Constitution confined almost exclusively to the realm of foreign affairs. The Constitution nevertheless effected the re-establishment of metropolitan control in matters of foreign affairs, which included diplomacy, war, territorial expansion, and trade – not only with other European powers but also with the continent’s indigenous people (Edling, 2003).

Notwithstanding later-day bromides about an era of free security, the early American Republic was anything but secure, especially on its continental frontiers. The risk here was less an invasion by Spain or – the War of 1812 notwithstanding – Great Britain or their Indian allies than it was that itinerant American settlers would fall into the orbit of one of these foreign powers, isolating the fragile nation and hemming it in along the eastern seaboard (Lewis, 1998: 13-16). As much as army officers may have yearned for laurels from conventional European warfare, the bulk of their attention and energy was directed to the continental interior, their garrisons outlining the aspirational limit of the nation’s dominion. Such an arrayal provided the army with few opportunities to demonstrate its capacity for conventional warfare while fully occupying its officers in the business of playing peacekeeper between frontier Indian tribes and the vanguard of settler invaders.

While historian Lisa Ford has recently emphasized the limits of territorial ambition and the prevalence of multiethnic, legal pluralism in pre-1820s America and Australia alike, it is worth emphasizing the fact that pluralism was, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America, nothing more than a practical accommodation to the heterogeneity of the frontier and the relative weakness of the nascent American state (Ford, 2010). Among the several Enlightenment principles that guided the American founding fathers, pluralism was not to be found.1 This was made very clear by the nation’s first naturalization act in 1790 and by the veritable crisis brought on by the Jefferson administration’s purchase of Louisiana from Napoléon in 1803 (Kastor, 2004: 22-24).

Congressional debates over the purchase dwelt less on its constitutionality than on how the United States would possibly govern a population so diverse as that of the Louisiana Territory, populated as it was by a multitude of Indian nations, Spaniards, Britons, Frenchmen, and Americans who had deliberately placed themselves beyond the reach of the U.S. government. Significantly, Congress rejected

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outright the possibility that the United States would limit the blessings of citizenship on the basis of ethnicity or faith. Doing so would render the United States a proper imperial power, something anathema to the nation’s founding principles.

As the concept of a “settler imperialism” has gained currency, it is tempting to assume that this ostensible antipathy toward empire was disingenuous, but we have to bear in mind that “The past is,” indeed, “a foreign country,” and in fact they “do things differently there.”¹ We must not mistake the Founders’ and post-Revolutionary generation’s aversion to imperial relations for our modern anti-imperial sentiments. They – and least of all Thomas Jefferson – had no objections to a grand republic of continental scale and historic significance. They simply rejected out of hand the idea that alien “others” could participate as true equals in the American experiment of self-governance. To accommodate them permanently as less than equals would require the construction and maintenance of imperial structures they had rebelled against in 1775. For this reason, Brian DeLay has recently argued, imperialism may be “too benevolent a term...for what happened in much of the continental United States” (DeLay, 2015: 932). A proper empire would have at least allowed for discriminatory pluralism – whereas the young United States would not. Rather, it would have to assimilate or expel all of Louisiana’s inhabitants over time. Those of African extraction, meanwhile, would be expelled or subjected by degrees to a condition of slavery that denied them even their humanity.

To its collective chagrin, the task of ordering this transition fell to the U.S. Army, notwithstanding its best-laid plans to win the trust and esteem of its countrymen by demonstrating competency for conventional war and disinterest in domestic affairs. Responsible for enforcement of the Trade and Intercourse Acts that governed all aspects of Indian-white relations on the frontier, the army was the embodiment of metropolitan power and in this capacity found itself arbitrating disputes between Indians and settlers on a regular basis (Prucha, 1984: 89-114, passim). Typically, army officers considered the Indians “more often sinned against than sinning” and exercised their duties in a manner that would win the trust of Indians at the expense of that of settlers.² Indeed, army officers in the Old Northwest routinely found themselves called before civil courts for – in enforcing the federal law to its letter – trammeling the imagined rights of settler squatters and resource pirates (Prucha, 1968: 194-208).

This state of affairs hardly made the army fond of its constabulary duties, but it did contribute to the systematically disorderly-yet-effective expansion of the national domain. The army was generally powerful enough to manage Indian relations and stabilize the borderlands enough for white settlement – but not powerful


enough to prevent crises once the white settlers achieved critical mass. Although the army usually blamed settlers for provoking the ensuing conflicts, it dutifully took their side once they erupted. Once the dust cleared and the blood dried, most of the involved Indians were forced westward – but the army soon followed, destined to repeat this cycle as the frontier lurched westward.¹

The one great aberration from this model in the first half of the nineteenth century came in the southeastern United States among the “Five Civilized Tribes,” so called because their matrilineal tracing of family lines ensured that the children of European traders and Indian women would be fully incorporated into their mothers’ tribes and clans. Such Cherokees, Creeks, and Choctaws often attended very good schools, dressed in the latest European fashion, owned slaves, and built elaborate homesteads and plantations. They also used their knowledge of English common law traditions to fend off the assaults on their people’s land base and sovereignty that had sent so many other tribes reeling westward after having exchanged their ancestral homelands in exchange for pennies and empty promises (Young, 1981).

In this regard, the Cherokees were perhaps the most remarkable of these tribes because they not only retained the services of top American jurists but also in 1827 adopted a constitution modeled on that of the United States. But the Cherokees’ principal antagonist – the state of Georgia – was also remarkable. As one of its governors proclaimed in 1824, Georgia was the only one of the original American colonies with royal charters that had, as of that date, not yet perfected its dominion over its chartered limits, which encompassed most of the Cherokee nation (Ford, 2010: 137). As a Southern state, it had also enjoyed relatively few benefits (aside from the construction of federal roads) from its union with the other states under the Constitution. Here, local militia forces rather than the army had formed the vanguard of expansion, and concessions made to the federal government regarding the prerogative of managing Indian affairs had always been regarded as conditional. If the federal government could not deliver, all bets were off.

Thus, when the state called on the federal government to remove the Cherokees in the 1820s and 1830s, it was less an admission of the state’s incapacity to achieve this end unilaterally than it was a gesture of contractual obligation. Were the United States to default on its end of the bargain, there was no guarantee that Georgia would consider itself bound further by the constitutional compact.

Although the Southern states had not followed the model of military colonization that prevailed in the Louisiana Territory and the Western Great Lakes region, Georgia was hardly ignorant of the army’s penchant for exercising metropolitan control over settler-Indian affairs. Indeed, as Georgia’s campaign to evict the Cherokees quickened over the course of the 1820s, the federal government actually

¹ In two volumes, Samuel J. Watson provides the most current and comprehensive account of the U.S. Army’s activities as a frontier constabulary in the first half of the nineteenth century: Jackson’s Sword: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1810-1821 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012); and Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1821-1846 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013).
withdrew U.S. Army troops guarding the Cherokee-Georgia frontier so that they would no longer pose an obstacle to Georgia’s ambitions. But when the Cherokees nevertheless refused to abide by the terms of the fraudulent 1835 removal Treaty of New Echota, Georgia called on the federal government to make good on its promise to remove by force any Indians unwilling to submit to the sovereignty of the settler state.

Predictably, perhaps, Indian Removal provoked crises in both state-federal and civil-military relations – not to mention wars against the Creeks in Alabama and southern Georgia and the Seminoles in Florida. The conflagration began here in December 1835, and by the time it ended nearly seven years later, the bulk of the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole nations had been forcibly removed to the Indian Territory west of the Mississippi River – and the reputations of most of the army’s senior commanders lay in tatters (Hall, 2011: 64-84).

So too did any sense among the army’s officers that their efforts had served the cause of republicanism, which could only flourish where the citizens were virtuous and “fit” for self-rule. In those quarters in which the army had preceded white settlement, the Indians’ capacity for self-governance was manifestly superior to that of the handful of whites that they encountered – many of whom had sought refuge from government in the borderlands of the West and South. In Louisiana and Florida, moreover, army officers encountered wealthy planters of Spanish descent who epitomized the sort of genteel stature to which many army officers aspired.

One of the more notable of these was Jose Mariano Hernandez. The son of “Minorcan” immigrants and owner of three plantations near St. Augustine, he was arguably the most powerful man in east Florida. He had served as the first territorial delegate to Congress, and as a brigadier general of militia he directed operations around St. Augustine. That his parents were of mixed Mediterranean ancestry and had been indentured servants did not disqualify him from such offices at this juncture and place – although his labors on behalf of the U.S. government would help speed to a conclusion this uniquely heterogeneous chapter of Florida’s history.

In 1837, however, St. Augustine was perhaps the most colorful and exotic city anywhere in the United States, a product of its colonial history and the recent influx of Anglo-Americans of means eager to establish themselves among Florida’s new elite (Dewhurst, 1881: 151). Among them was Robert R. Reid, who had served as the U.S. judge for east Florida since 1832 and, during the Second Seminole War, hosted lavish balls at his home. According to one army surgeon, these events occurred two or three times a week throughout the summer and “rarely concluded before 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning.” The dances were, “principally Spanish,” as no doubt were many of the ladies in attendance – at least by Anglo-American estimation (Jarvis, 1906: 276). That their surnames were Spanish did not yet, in the late 1830s, disqualify them from being considered “white.” And in the eyes of status-conscious army officers, they were certainly more virtuous than the Georgia and North Carolina riffraff who blighted middle Florida.
Further down the peninsula, things got complicated. While nearly all officers acknowledged that the Seminoles were guilty of nothing more than defending their homes and that the American pretext for war was a sham, their empathy for the Seminoles was tempered by the fact that this was the least “civilized” of the so-called Five Civilized tribes. Race – as they understood it – had less to do with the Seminoles’ assumed incompatibility with American republicanism than their dim prospects for assimilation.

But officers were less sure what to make of the Spanish creole inhabitants of Florida who fell somewhere between Hernandez and the famous Seminole war leader Osceola, who was himself of mixed Indian-European ancestry. Since the eighteenth century, Havana fishing companies had trolled the coasts of Florida and established summer fishing camps called ranchos. Local Indians – who Anglo-American visitors styled “Spanish Indians” – provided seasonal labor at these camps and intermarried with the Spaniards. By the 1830s, four such camps in Charlotte Harbor (on the Gulf Coast) had been in continuous operation for nearly half a century with annual revenues of approximately $18,000 (roughly $500,000 in real terms). Soon thereafter, Americans began to establish their own ranchos on the Gulf Coast. In 1834, a Baltimore sea captain named William Bunce established a rancho at the mouth of the Manatee River (on the south side of Tampa Bay) and a fishery on Palm Island. Here, Bunce employed Spaniards and their Indian relations to run his operation – but once the war commenced rumors began to swirl that they were in league with the enemy.¹

Bunce, however, felt vulnerable to Seminole attack, so in 1836 he moved his fishery to Palm Island near the mouth of Tampa Bay so that he would be under the protective watch of the U.S. Army (Dodd, 1947: 246-52; Convington, 1954: 61). It was a tragic mistake, as the following year the senior commander in Florida ordered all Indians on the island rounded up and shipped out, reasoning that the Seminoles would continue to resist so long as they had kin who remained in Florida. The lowly lieutenants sent to enforce the edict protested its humanity, but the commander stuck by what was essentially a “one-drop rule” for Indian removal.² But even in this instance, the rationale was callously practical rather than explicitly racist, as the same commander allowed other Florida Indians who were not related to the Seminoles to remain in Florida indefinitely.

Officer attitudes regarding blacks did not, on the whole, diverge wildly from those of the nation at large. While race did not disqualify virtuous Spaniards, creoles, and Indians from potential incorporation into the body politic, a stark line separated them from men and women of African descent, whether free or bound. This did not mean, however, that most officers embraced the Southern racist dogma then concretizing. Contrary to popular impressions, middle-class northerners

¹ Bunce argued that Indians in his employ spoke only Spanish and rarely left their island homes for the mainland. James W. Covington, „A Petition from Some Latin-American Fishermen, 1838,“ Tequesta 14 (1954): 62.
predominated the officer corps of the era, and if few of them may justly be labeled abolitionists, a great many of them were struck by the violence and haughtiness of the Southern slave society.

This was especially true of Lt. John Phelps of Vermont, West Point class of 1836. Although paternalistic and ethnocentric, Phelps did not subscribe to the pseudo-scientific racist sentiments that were by then hegemonic across the South and, indeed, the nation. To the contrary, his sentiments were typical of nineteenth-century abolitionists, whose cause he later joined. He would resign his commission – presumably in protest – the day fiery abolitionist-cum-terrorist John Brown was sentenced to hang for his assault on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. In his journal and correspondence, Phelps recorded with evident delight debates between a racist surgeon (who intended to write a book about the inferiority of blacks) and a black interpreter who, in Phelps's estimation won every argument. He was also ethnographically curious about creole settlements that had no ready place in the racial taxonomies of nineteenth-century America.1

But Phelps's fairly progressive views on race were counterbalanced by an abiding disdain for the “common man” – whatever his race or profession. In this regard he was hardly unique among his peers, who blamed white immigrants for instigating the Second Seminole War. One of them railed against the “infernal vampyres that congregate on our frontier, who, in violation of all that is honourable in man & all that is sacred in female character, have taken advantage of their unprotected condition.” “These demoniac ravishers” raped and pillaged their way through Indian country, creating a problem that at once stained national honor and subjected army officers to a conflict that compromised their individual honor.2 Similarly, Phelps blamed all evil on “the vampyre-like pioneers of civilization who have been fast crowding upon them” (Phelps, 1927: 68).

Here we see the darker side of what we might mistake as relatively progressive views on race among the officer corps. As a proto-abolitionist and proto-environmentalist, Phelps is a somewhat sympathetic figure – until you trace the full arc of his career. He rejoined the army to participate in the holy crusade against slavery in 1861 but railed against Gen. George B. McClellan’s efforts to extend the franchise to troops in the field in 1864 – or to freedmen after the war, considering them too ignorant and debased to cast informed votes. He was firmly opposed to further territorial expansion because it would inevitably lead to the incorporation of more Mexicans, asserting, “No one who knows any thing of the people of Mexico will ever believe them capable of self-government, whether under the leadership of our race or that of France.” And he worried mightily – and in explicitly racist terms – about extending the franchise to immigrants, who he thought would use the vote to drive the United States into unjust and unnecessary wars. As for extending the

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1 Phelps diary, 19 March and 6 November 1838, Series III, John Wolcott Phelps Papers, 1833-1884, New York Public Library; John Phelps to Helen M. Phelps, 12 November 1838, Box 1, Series I, Phelps Papers.
2 Samuel Forry to John Phelps, 3 July 1837, Box 1, Series I, Phelps Papers.
franchise to women, well, no logical argument supported that measure. In fact, only men with college diplomas should be allowed to vote – unless their degrees were in divinity or law.1

As an abolitionist, Phelps was hardly an archetypal army officer, yet his evolution as a racist over the course of the nineteenth century conforms rather neatly to the process described by Reginald Horsman in Race and Manifest Destiny almost forty years ago (Horsman, 1981). But in another important respect Phelps is typical of his fellow officers in a way that complicates the Horsman thesis. As agents of empire operating in the polyglot, multiethnic borderlands of the expanding American state, they did develop taxonomies of virtue and capacity for self-government with references to race that became more salient as the century progressed. Yet their exposure to white “vampyres” – speculators and other elites – rapacious and undisciplined state and territorial volunteers, and dirt-poor squatters also disproved the notion that membership in the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood was by itself a sufficient guarantor of fitness for republican self-rule.

Ultimately, the army’s officer corps came away from its removal experience convinced of its own superior virtue, weary of its constabulary duties, and disgusted with Jacksonian democracy. Whatever the merits of these convictions, they ultimately diminished the army’s willingness to act any longer as a metropolitan brake upon settler colonialism and further conditioned officers to consider themselves the best judges of fitness for self-rule as they and the frontier moved westward. The consequences for the indigenous people of the trans-Mississippi West were hardly salutary.

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1 Phelps, “Correspondence,” 12 June 1869, Folder 2, Box 6, Series IV, Phelps Papers; “The Political Franchise,” undated, ibid.


Orit Miller-Katav

THE SIX DAY WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Introduction

“We were like dreamers” (Kimche and Bavli, 1968: 171) best defines the prevailing sentiment in Israel when the Six Day War ended on June 10, 1967. The outcomes of the war stunned the Israelis, the Arab countries, and the rest of the world. The battles of a war spanning just six days were sufficient for Israel to capture extensive territories and conquer their inhabitants. Overnight, the local residents came under the State of Israel’s control. Securing such a prompt and overwhelming victory meant that Israel and the rest of the world faced a new and instantaneous situation – one completely different to the pre-war order. Decision makers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rested on their laurels. The incredible victory filled the eyes of Israelis with euphoria, the eyes of the world with admiration, and the eyes of the Arabs with rage. The victory did nothing to warn Israel of the immediate future that awaited in which two more wars with Arab states loomed – the War of Attrition in 1969 on the Israeli-Egyptian border, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War on Israel’s borders with Syria and Egypt. In addition to the wars against proper armies, a wave of terrorist attacks also broke out. The new reality of the territories that were added to Israel dictated immediate organization. Israel began to realize that an organizational system should be put in place to meet the requirements of all parties: military, political, civilian, legal, and local.

The State of Israel’s territory grew significantly through the seizure of extensive tracts of land from the countries with which it fought. The Golan Heights was conquered by defeating Syria, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip were conquered by defeating Egypt, and the West Bank and Jerusalem were conquered by defeating Jordan (Segey, 2005: 480-481).

The majority of the population was concentrated in the area that was seized from Jordan – the West Bank. The first four months, from June to September 1967, were the most critical from practical and political perspectives. During these months, the military government system was intensively formed and established to immediately address Israeli control in the territories. Decisions were made during this period – and military, political, and legal actions were taken – which dictated the establishment of the government’s infrastructure. The military government system was based on international law and Israeli law.
This article reviews the need for the Israeli government to take action in light of the new reality it faced. The study presents a historiographic account of the stages of the process by scrutinizing a succession of government decisions and the combined activity of government institutions. The article’s scope ranges from the moment Israel became aware of the extent of its newly-acquired territories and local populations to the period after the end of the Yom Kippur War and the Arab Summit Conference at Rabat in 1974.

As soon as the Six Day War was over, it was obvious to the Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, and to the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, that a military government in the West Bank had to be established immediately (Segey, 2005). The political and military system began to prepare for the establishment of a military government in the territories. Prior to the war’s end there had been no real plan to prepare for the possible scenario that became the reality. Yet a limited degree of precedent and preparation had existed since 1956 when the military legal system had been prepared for control of the territories and the local population subsequent to the Sinai War – a conflict in which Israel was forced to contend with the particularities of a military government in Egypt. In December 1966, the military government in Egypt came to an end. During this period, the local governors gained experience in running a military government. After the Six Day War, the scope of control was much greater.

The territories that Israel gained following the Six Day War had a population of approximately one million. These areas were divided into administrative and legal districts: The Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, and Merhav Shlomo. Once IDF control was established in these territories, the nature of the law changed. The local law that existed in each district remained intact but it was subject to changes stemming from the establishment of the military government. Such law was also subject to security legislation which was determined by commanders of the military forces in all areas. Security legislation is any document that is signed by IDF district commanders or authorized by the IDF. It is a category that can include such documents as manifestos, orders, instructions, ads, and licenses. In the wake of the war, the army’s Chief of Staff appointed the commander of the IDF forces who duly enacted security legislation in his area of command. International law recognized this practice as a basis for action on the ground.

International law deals with a multitude of legislative areas, including laws pertaining to occupied territory. There are various laws that address what is permissible for an occupying power. Moreover, there are restrictions on the activities conducted in these territories. For example, the military commander in an occupied territory is not eligible to cancel or amend an existing law in this territory, unless it is necessary for the sake of securing the governing forces or administration of the territory. Furthermore, as military personnel, the commander must obey the instructions of his superiors in the military and implement the

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1 The Chief of Staff that served in the war was Lt. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin.
government's policy on this issue. According to the law existing in the occupied territory, the person in charge of the territory in Israel is the Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories. His authority – as it manifests in practice – is publicized in orders and proclamations that were distributed to the local residents.

The first order established the authority of the military in the territories that were conquered. The second order instructed inhabitants about the continued validity of the legal system in the territory, subject to the authority of the military commander to announce new orders which would update this system of laws as necessary. The territory of a country is deemed to be under a military occupation or under a belligerent occupation when the enemy state actually controls the territory and is capable of exercising this authority. It is standard practice that the occupying state issues a proclamation about its occupation of the territory, but it can be an occupation even in the absence of any such proclamation. International law recognizes the legality of a military occupation as part of an armed conflict, but places restrictions and conditions on administration of the occupied territory. The military occupation does not grant the occupier sovereignty. Sovereignty remains in the hands of the state whose land has been conquered even though it does not have actual control over the occupied territory. The occupying state must institute a military government that will be responsible for public order.

Israel is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, but Israel's position was that the Fourth Convention only applied to the occupation of another country's territory. The West Bank is not recognized as sovereign Jordanian land except by Britain and Pakistan. Israel believed that this was not another country's territory, and therefore the Convention's applicability is dubious. The factual and neutral statement "Occupied Territories" was proposed by the Legal Advisor of the Defense System, Meir Shamgar. From a legal standpoint, two main principles apply to the administration of occupied territories. First, caring for the population of the occupied territory from a humanitarian perspective. Second, leaving the situation in the

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1 The Law in Occupied Territories, a booklet submitted by the Ministry of Justice, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, year published unknown.
2 IDF archives, 117/1970, proclamations published by the IDF by the commander of the regional forces.
3 Hague regulations, section 42.
5 Israeli Law made the military government in the territories subject to Israeli administrative law. There is a clear and detailed definition for everybody in the military government regarding its authority and the nature of legislation it is responsible for. In Israel, the Knesset enacted legislation on the issue of the territories, and a court system was established in the Occupied Territories in order to create appropriate legal solutions for all entities involved in this framework – solutions which were compatible with international law.
7 Ibid.
8 At the time, Meir Shamgar was the Attorney General for the defense establishment. He was also the Military Advocate General, and then served as a judge and president of the Supreme Court.
occupied territory intact for the original sovereign, who will return to the territory when the occupation has ended (Hofnung, 2001: 285-296).

When Israel began to form the military government in the territories the first orders were issued to activate the government, including the institutional/organizational infrastructure. It was necessary to immediately weigh in on existential problems that began to emerge among the local population, such as fuel supply and handling the agricultural economy, rebuilding villages that were damaged during the war, and the complex issue of refugee return (Kimche, 82-180; Gazit, 1985: 56-57).

The patterns of organization and action in the territories were already determined in the month following the war. Changes, if made, were enacted while establishing the various systemic entities in their position, thereby promoting familiarity with the local environment, the population, and the actual system. According to international law, the official and overall responsibility for the activity in the territories rested with the military commander there. The commander was a military officer and not a civilian in a government position. However, the government ministries were conducting the civil activity, and each ministry operated within its realm of authority and responsibility. That is why the IDF did not establish an independent civil headquarters that would set policy in the territory. Instead, the IDF served as a general framework that employed the representatives of the various ministries and civil authorities. It coordinated their activity, and in special cases the army served as an appeals authority.\(^1\)

The coordination method worked on several levels and included Ministerial Committees for planning and consulting, which were officially appointed by the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, and the Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol. The roles of the various committees included handling political contacts, consolidating contacts with the local leadership, as well as consulting on military, political, and civil issues in the occupied areas (Gazit, 1969: 6-7; Dayan, 1967: 493-494). The government and its ministries failed to reach a consensus on how to shape the responsibilities of the government and its pattern of conduct in the territories; nor could it agree on the nature of each responsible authority. There are several reasons for this impasse. First, the government's initial difficulty in preparing to control and administer stemmed from the sudden separation of senior positions within it. This separation began a few days prior to the outbreak of the war and resulted in a separation between the position of Prime Minister and the position of Minister of Defense. Until this point, both positions were held by one person – the Prime Minister. However, on June 1, 1967, due to coalition-based pressure and national pressure, a National Unity Government was established. The Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, appointed Moshe Dayan as the Minister of Defense, while Menachem Begin and Yosef Sapir were appointed Ministers Without Portfolios (Sasson, 2004: 100).

\(^1\) IDF archives, 117/1970, General Narkis Normalization West Bank, to Chief of Staff from Department of Security and Publicity, 30.6.1967.

IDF archives, 117/1970, Supervision in a liberated area, to the Military Secretary from the Chief of Staff’s office, 20.6.1967.
A second factor was the coalition structure of the Israeli government, where each party in the coalition strived to participate in every decision and policy, even at the expense of weighing down the system of making and executing each decision (Gazit, 1985: 94-95). At the administrative level, coordination was split and divided among two bodies: The Committee of Directors General and the Coordinating Committee. The Committee of Directors General began operating on June 25, 1967, concurrent to the Special Ministerial Committee headed by Minister of Finance, Pinchas Sapir. The committee's role was to draft a policy for handling the civilian issues in the territories. The Coordinating Committee was established on August 18, 1967 in order to provide a solution to the problem of the political and security activity in the territories (Sasson, 2004: 102-104). The two mechanisms merged into one body called The Unit for Coordination of Activities in the Territories, headed by Shlomo Gazit.¹

The military government in the territories coordinated between the government's policy and what was being enacted in the territories. In practice, the system was given a central coordinative role and needed to mediate across a spectrum of interests that ranged from the local population concerned with daily human necessities up to the official and elected officials of the local inhabitants, such as village leaders, regional governors, and mayors. Military representatives sent the heads of the Israeli establishment messages, correspondence, and a clear picture of what was happening in the territories. This encompassed the desire for collaboration in order to promote interests of the local inhabitants and a system-wide perspective on how this would serve the Israeli system.

In government meetings headed by Prime Minister Golda Meir – appointed after Levi Eshkol's death – diverse opinions were heard for and against keeping the territories, and discussions flowed regarding how they should be governed and the issue of overall responsibility. This responsibility manifested in the ongoing handling of the local inhabitants and the state's international commitment to conduct negotiations on the future of the territories. These discussions focused on how Israel should act with regards to the local population, the governors, and the Arab representatives. At the same time, there was acknowledgment of a real need to conduct talks with Jordan, together with the United States, in order to reach a general understanding about the future of the territories and the relations between both countries.² Government officials forwarded proposals for solving the problem of the territories and the local population.³


² The National Archives have protocols that detail what all the members of the government committees and the Labor Party say, including a quote from every speaker regarding the study topic and parallel topics that converge with the subject. In my study, I will rely mainly on these protocols and on the official correspondence immediately following the meetings among the members and between the members and other foreign officials such as Israeli delegations, embassies, and consulates abroad, officials in Jordan and the United States.

³ The protocols from the government meetings and the protocols from the Labor Party meetings regarding the party's proposed platform reveal the speakers' opinions about the Palestinian population.
Immediately after the Six Day War, on June 26, 1967, Yigal Allon submitted to Prime Minister Eshkol a document entitled *The Future of the Territories and Handling the Refugee Problem*. In the document, Allon outlined a detailed peace plan addressing Judea and Samaria, and Gaza. Since it was a comprehensive peace plan, it also addressed the Golan Heights and the Sinai. Allon presented the plan to the government for the first time in late July 1967—subsequently known as the Allon Plan. The document had four basic premises. The first stated that peace with the Arab countries and the Palestinians was possible and necessary: the period in which instability and terror could benefit either side was over. According to the second premise, the geo-strategic integrity of Israel must be retained to enable defensible borders and the prevention of future wars. The third premise stressed that the State of Israel must maintain a Jewish demographic majority to ensure the existence of a Jewish democratic state according to the Zionist vision. The fourth premise advanced the idea of giving the Palestinian nation the opportunity of self-determination without undermining the State of Israel's security, and the option of choosing political ties with Jordan or with Israel.

Allon's document detailed the proposed arrangements based on the Green Line, which was meant to be the basis for negotiations in Israel and with Jordan in

and the responsibility that the State of Israel must or must not exhibit toward it, including the issue of livelihood and integrating the residents in building projects inside the State of Israel, factory development, construction, agriculture, paving roads, etc. There is a clear reference in these meetings to the direct connection between the Prime Minister Golda Meir and King Hussein of Jordan, and to the need to involve the King in the future of the territories and their Arab population. There is also reference to Jordan being in an internal political/economic crisis that requires American financial assistance. All this was all said openly in government meetings.

1 Minister Yigal Allon officiated in the Sixth Knesset during the Eshkol government (13th Government) as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labor and Immigrant Absorption. During the same Knesset in Meir's government (14th Government), he remained the Deputy Prime Minister and was Minister of Education and Culture. During that Knesset, in between the 13th and 14th Governments, Allon officiated as Acting Prime Minister subsequent to Eshkol's death until Meir was elected as Prime Minister. During the Seventh Knesset, he continued to serve as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education in the Meir government (16th Government). When Meir's government resigned as a result of the Agranat Commission report on the outcomes of the Yom Kippur War, and following Rabin's election as Prime Minister (17th Government), Allon was appointed Deputy Prime Minister once again and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Allon was one of the more prominent Labor Party leaders and was one of the party's settlement faction leaders. In an interview I conducted with the former President of the Supreme Court and Honorable Justice Emeritus Mr. Meir Shamgar, Mr. Shamgar told me that with regards to the Plan, Allon worked alone and at his own discretion.


3 The Green Line is the State of Israel's armistice line with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, as determined in the armistice agreements that were signed in 1949, after the War of Independence, and in the period before the Six Day War in 1967. It received its name because of the green pencil that was used to mark the new borders on the map of Israel. At the end of the War of Independence, additional territories were added to the State of Israel that were not included in the 1947 partition plan that Britain proposed (during the British Mandate period in Palestine) and agreed upon at the U.N.
the search for a permanent understanding and set of conclusions. Israel's eastern border would be the Jordan River and the line bisecting the Dead Sea from north to south and the continuation of the Mandate border throughout the Arava Desert. West of Jordan, a strip of land 15 kilometers wide would be added and incorporated into Israel, impacting a sector in the Judean Desert area, including Kiryat Arba. The width of the strip would range up to 25 kilometers and serve as a link to both the Negev and the Jordan Valley. The Jericho area would have a corridor from the East Bank of the Jordan River to the West Bank. There would be a crossing between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, enabling contact between the populations in both areas, and free passage to a port in Gaza. The entire Jerusalem area would be annexed to the State of Israel. Negotiations would be conducted between the State of Israel, the residents of the densely Arab-populated areas in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and Arab countries to determine an agreed-upon government in those areas. Concerning the other borders, only necessary border adjustments would be made. Allon's proposal was officially rejected by Levi Eshkol's government. In September 1968, Allon submitted another plan based on the original document, which was amended to alleviate the implementation of the original plan, but this proposal was also rejected by the governments headed by Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin.1

On September 3, 1973, a document drafted by Minister (Without a Portfolio) Yisrael Galili was approved at the Labor Party Secretariat. It outlined a plan of action for the territories conquered during the Six Day War and offered suggestions about how to deal with the local population.2 This document was aptly called The Galili Document. It raised several points which discussed in detail the future of the territories, and the future of the Arab population, along with questions about how to deal with them from a political and civil standpoint. First, it noted that after the elections, the next government would continue to act on the basis of the current government’s existing policy toward developing the land, employment and services, economic ties, open bridges, autonomous activity and renewing the municipal representation, orders by the military government, rural and urban settlement, rebuilding the refugee camps, as well as controlled and supervised employment of the Arabs from the territories in Israel. Regarding the Gaza Strip, rehabilitating refugees and development options were discussed, and a plan of action was set for a period of 4 years, including allocating the funding required for its implementation.

Concerning the development of Judea and Samaria, a 4-year plan of action together with adept canvassing for the requisite funding were deemed necessary to implement the development of the economic infrastructures and to promote the vital services in healthcare and education. Here, the need to secure foreign sources of funding for the plan was highlighted and the benefits were outlined: it

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2 National Archives, A7067/8, The Territorial Subject; National Archives, A7022/13, The Layout Platform.
would create a means of rehabilitating the refugees and developing the territories; it would bestow benefits on Israeli entrepreneurs in the territories and encourage further entrepreneurship and the building of factories; it would promote independent activity among the residents in Judea and Samaria and offer assistance to local entrepreneurial initiatives regarding education, religion, and services; and it would underpin the patterns of democracy in social and municipal life. It was also stated that the “open bridges” policy would continue, the work of the residents of the territories in Israel would be controlled in regard to numbers and regions, and their working conditions would be assured. Regarding the outposts and settlements, it was determined that new towns would be built and the settlement project would be strengthened. The continued development of the regional center at the Rafah Crossing would also be assured, while the process of populating and developing Jerusalem and its environs would continue along a trend of consolidation. Finally, the issue of realizing Government Resolution from September 13, 1970 was raised regarding the town of Nabi Samwil, which entailed building a deep-water port south of Gaza and an industrial center to develop Israeli industry in the areas of Kalkiliya and Tulkarem.¹

Other proposals ran concurrently with the Galili and Allon plans, such as the administrative proposal of the “Committee of Four” which Prime Minister Levi Eshkol appointed on July 4, 1967. This submission sought to raise suggestions about ways of handling the territories and the local population based on an analysis of the situation and on talks conducted with the local officials. The Committee’s members were senior government officials, headed by the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Yaakov Hertzog. Moshe Sasson was in charge of the program of contact with the locals. Shaul Bar-Haim from the Foreign Ministry and David Kimche representing Mossad were also members.² The Committee’s conclusions and recommendations appeared in another document that did not achieve any real influence or validity (Gazit, 1999: 142-143, 177-178; Segev, 2005: 538-539; Sasson, 2004: 91-109).

In Israel, various suggestions and opinions regarding the situation in the territories and the future of the talks with Hussein King of Jordan were raised in government meetings and in Labor party meetings. On January 2, 1968, Golda Meir – who was then the MAPAI³ secretary – said: “There will not be a solution for the territories without peace and no peace without a solution for the territories. I want to add borders to Israel that are more or less safe, maximum security, so that the border is as far from what it was on June 4 as possible. And somehow that the Arabs will not remain amongst us.”⁴ At the Labor Party convention in Tel Aviv on October 4, 1973, Golda Meir – now Prime Minister – stated: “I said this two days

¹ National Archives, A7067/8, The Territorial Subject.
² Ibid., A7067/8, The Territorial Subject.
³ In 1966-1968, with Golda’s resignation from the government, she was chosen as the General Secretary of the Mapai Party.
⁴ National Archives, A7028/1, Territories - Discussion summary, points from the political discussion at the party secretariat on 2/1/1986.
ago in public, at the European Council: Had we entered negotiations with them like we thought, which was at the end of the wars – they would have gotten more. Now, they will get less. If this carries on for five-six more years, they will get less than this. I'm prepared to say this again in front of the entire world.”

Prime Ministerial correspondence throughout the period covered by this study exhibits a pattern: the Israeli leadership expresses its desire to deal with international elements in the world and especially Jordan, with the assistance and mediation of the United States, in order to end the conflict.

In December 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union organized a Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva, sponsored by the United Nations. The U.N. Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, convened and ran the conference. It was conducted based on Security Council Resolution 338, which called, among other things, for the involved parties to negotiate – with a suitable sponsor – for the purposes of establishing a just and sustainable peace in the Middle East. Egypt and Jordan agreed to participate in the conference on the condition that other countries would attend the meetings, and they would not need to negotiate directly and without mediation with Israel. The discussions were conducted at separate tables because Egypt and Jordan refused to sit at a round table with Israel. The Palestinians were not invited to this session, but their representatives were present at the next conference (Rabat).

The Arab Summit Conference at Rabat took place in October 1974. That month, before the Conference convened, another plan was proposed to King Hussein of Jordan as the basis for an agreement to separate forces between Israel and Jordan. The plan was drafted by Yigal Allon and was called the Jericho Plan (Zac, 1996: 21-22). The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, supported the plan, but the Israeli Prime Minister was reluctant to do so. King Hussein of Jordan was also reluctant to support the plan since he preferred Israel's vertical withdrawal along the Jordan River, and requested that the discussion of the plan be postponed.

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2 Kurt Waldheim was the Secretary General of the United Nations between 1972 and 1981. In 1986, he ran for the presidency in Austria. It turned out that during the Second World War he served as an officer in the Wehrmacht (the unified armed forces of Nazi Germany) which committed war crimes. This was viewed unfavorably in the world in general and in Israel in particular.
3 U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 was adopted toward the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. This resolution discussed a ceasefire, enacting Security Council Resolution 242 and initiating negotiations between the relevant parties with adequate sponsorship to bring about a just and lasting peace between the parties in the Middle East. U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted on November 22, 1967, and was based on a British-American initiative following the Six Day War. The main parts of the decision pertained to the complete retreat of armed Israeli forces from the territories that were conquered and an end to the claims or conditions of war as well as the need to respect the territorial sovereignty and integrity, and political independence of any country in the region and its right to live in peace within secure, recognized, and free borders. All such conditions were deemed to be jeopardized by acts of force. The Palestinians disapproved of this resolution since they viewed the displaced as refugees.
5 National Archives, A7052/15, Yitzhak Rabin's proposal on negotiations for an interim arrangement 1.4.1971.
until after the Conference. It was decided at the Conference that the PLO\(^1\) would be the only body authorized to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Palestinian people with regard to the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Allon’s Jericho Plan was not realized.

In the period after the Six Day War – between 1967-1974 – there were multilateral talks and relations between Israel, Jordan, and the United States, including covert ties and talks that were conducted during that time between Israeli representatives and King Hussein of Jordan. The United States was a full partner in the covert talks, which took place with its encouragement and assistance. The reality of a military government in the territories after the Six Day War was the result of relations, ties, and multilateral negotiations between Israel, Jordan, and the United States. During this period, the Prime Ministers of the State of Israel were Levi Eshkol (1969-1967), Golda Meir (1974-1969) and Yitzhak Rabin (1974); King Hussein ruled the Jordanian Kingdom. The American presidents who mediated were Lyndon B. Johnson (1967-1969), Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald R. Ford (1974). Although Israel had to account for what was happening in the territories, it seemed that every decision made in Israel passed through the diplomatic and secret channels to the United States and Jordan.

Concurrent to what was happening in the West Bank, there were also factors influencing the three countries’ relations internally. Presidents, prime ministers and administrations were replaced, pressures bore down on governments, parliamentary debates raged, and operative proposals arose from members of successive administrations for dealing with the reality of taking possession of the territories after the Six Day War. There were rifts and foreign relations crises and international conferences, such as the Geneva Convention and the Rabat Conference.

The existing research literature pays substantial attention to the relations between Israel, Jordan, and the United States in view of the peace treaty that was signed on October 26, 1994 at the southern border crossing of Arava, and which came into effect the following month, on November 10. Relations between Israel and Jordan saw times of war, but also times of mutual willingness to cooperate, talk, and seek peace. Much of the professional literature that I consulted deals with Israel’s wars with its neighboring Arab states, and it covers the sequence of events and the factors preceding the wars. One of the books that sheds a great deal of light on relations between Israel and Jordan, with the mediation and cooperation of the United States, is Moshe Zak’s book *Hussein Makes Peace* (Zak, 1996). The book describes the American involvement in Israeli politics and in the feverish talks between the two states.

Zak’s research deals with a span of 31 years – from 1963 until the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 – and it relies on a variety of Western archives

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\(^{1}\) Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO is comprised of several different organizations that represent the majority of the Palestinian national organizations. The PLO operates according to the Palestinian Charter document. The Arab League was the first body to officially recognize the PLO, which was established under its auspices. Since November 22, 1974, the PLO has had a delegation at the U.N., and since January 12, 1976, it has been entitled to participate in Security Council discussions.
and various historical materials. The author draws heavily on personal interviews with important officials on both the Israeli and American sides who participated in the negotiations to promote peace. Another book which illuminates the Six Day War and the widespread reverberations that were felt throughout Israel during and after the war is Tom Segev’s book *And the Face of the Country Changed* (Segev, 2005). This book touches upon the days preceding the war, the tension in Israel, and the discussions regarding the possibility that a war would break out. This is followed by a detailed description of the course of the war and its effects, including Israel’s establishment of the military government in the territories, along with a discussion of how the local population coped, ranging from the villagers to the village leaders and town governors. The book details political relations in Israel and their impact on relations with Jordan and the United States.

Moshe Sasson was a Foreign Ministry official and Israeli ambassador who participated in numerous talks and negotiations, and his work *No Roundtable* (Sasson, 2004) reviews and describes the sequence of events in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His book is divided into three parts which are rich in details about the covert ties between Israel and its neighbors. The first part: The Conflict (1919-1979), addresses the proto-negotiations between Israel and its neighbors even before the State of Israel was founded, shedding light on initiatives to establish friendly neighborly relations between the Arab countries and the fledgling Jewish settlement and then with the young State of Israel.

Avi Shlaim’s book *King Hussein. A Political Biography* (Shlaim, 2009) examines King Hussein’s life as a descendent of the Hashemite Dynasty and a network of historical events around the King is considered in great detail. The book describes Jordan’s path toward the Six Day War and portrays its endeavors to cope with its aftermath. It also examines the dialogs that the King conducted with representatives of the Israeli government, including personal meetings that he held with Israeli Prime Ministers in Israel. There is an extensive description of the civil war that the Palestinian terrorist organizations conducted in Jordan. These organizations wanted to overthrow the King and to rule in his place, which included assassination attempts. The assistance the King received from Israel is also noted. Shlaim details the path of October war and the sequence of events which led to Geneva. The outcomes of the Rabat Conference are also detailed, including the King’s displeasure at being ousted from representing the Palestinians and the West Bank.

Abba Eban’s book *Personal Witness, Israel through My Eyes* (Eban, 1992) looks at the processes that led to the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War from the perspective of Israel’s Foreign Minister who served between 1966 and 1974. The book discusses the problems of the territories and global opinion according to how they were experienced and understood among decision makers in Israel. Moreover, Eban deals with political processes viewed through the lens of his work as Foreign Minister and as a senior official in the Israeli governments headed by Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir; and he considers the nature of his relations with both Prime Ministers as well as the nature of the Ministry’s work. The book de-
scribes the covert ties and the talks between Israeli officials and Jordanian officials mediated by the United States, and it details the arguments, internal dilemmas, and the official statements of Israel, Jordan, and the United States.

Another extremely important book underpinning my research is Golda Meir’s autobiography *My Life* (Meir, 1975). In a flowing, personal register Meir reveals her part in the decision-making processes as the Israeli Prime Minister. The book covers all the events considered by the present study and it contributes greatly to an understanding of the factors that caused them. It also extends to revealing the Prime Minister’s feelings and deliberations prior to, during, and after making decisions. The book strongly reinforces other accessible sources of information, and it affirmed my data and subsequent conclusions.

**Conclusions**

The establishment of a military government in the territories stemmed from unilateral Israeli actions prompted by realities which arose at the end of the Six Day War. Concurrently, there was also consensual covert cooperation between Israel and Jordan, mediated by the United States. After rapid victories, and amid euphoria, the State of Israel was only partially prepared for establishing a military government in the West Bank, but it could proceed because the military legal system was somewhat prepared for a situation where it controlled an occupied civilian population. Previous knowledge and experience had been gained from Operation Kadesh in 1956 and the ensuing control exercised over the Gaza Strip. The reception that awaited Yisrael Galili’s and Minister Yigal Allon’s operative proposals regarding the establishment of a military government in the territories was comparably complex and mixed. The Israeli decision makers dismissed various aspects of them but continued to deliberate, and the proposal’s influence persisted because of the prevailing spirit among foreign officials who were in diplomatic contact with Israel’s leaders. Notably, it was the King of Jordan who definitively dismissed the proposals. The United States attempted to persuade the King to consider the proposals and to try to reach an agreement that would lead to a peace treaty. The outcomes of these covert talks were evident in Jordan’s conduct toward Israel in the coming years. Thanks to the multilateral ties between the countries, Jordan avoided getting embroiled in additional wars with Israel.

At the Arab Summit Conference at Rabat, Jordan was stripped of the responsibility for representing the Palestinians and the West Bank. The responsibility for relations concerning the West Bank and representation of the population were transferred to the PLO. King Hussein was disappointed with this decision. Almost three decades would elapse after the war, and countless rounds of political talks, before a peace treaty was signed between Israel and Jordan. The General from the Six Day War, Yitzhak Rabin, extended his hand in peace to King Hussein of Jordan. Egypt, who fought two more difficult wars with Israel, was the first to sign a legendary peace treaty brokered by the United States. It is interesting to note that while wars are an expensive business – more accurately, the most expensive a state has – a state always prefers to spend less on peace.
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TO STEP INTO THE ARENA OR NOT: MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS (1981-1991)

Introduction

This article examines an internal crisis in a multi-national state and discusses the ways that the military leadership viewed a solution for the crisis undergone by the state and political regime. In the Yugoslav communist regime, the military was under strict political control. Hence, the question of whether to act independently – seizing power along with responsibility for state leadership – had never really been on the Yugoslav Army’s agenda until the mechanisms of this political control fell apart. Consequently, the military leaders acted quite autonomously but endeavored to preserve dual elements: the socialist order as well as the state. Given the dissolution of the socialist system, these were contradictory efforts that robbed the state military of all legitimacy in the eyes of at least one side in the dispute. Thus, the Yugoslav Army attempted to implement its own vision of state preservation, even if this meant an increased role in incubating a state of emergency as a means of triggering a soft coup. Its unsuccessful direct involvement in the political crisis led to a total loss of any legitimacy and had an important impact on later military involvement in the Yugoslav wars.

Development of the armed forces’ legitimacy

The Yugoslav People’s Army inherited its extraordinary claims to legitimacy from World War II, as it had led the liberation struggle on the side of the Allied forces against fascism and Nazism. Through the principle of total mobilization, the Yugoslav political elite developed the people’s armed forces in the full sense of this expression. Cast as the rightful heir to the liberation, the Yugoslav People’s Army acquired an important social status (Jelošič, 2002: 217). This was promoted significantly by the leading political elite, which saw the Yugoslav People’s Army as an instrument for indoctrinating the masses as well as for ensuring its own ideological domination and political consolidation. Thus, the armed forces became a guardian of internal stability, a facilitator of international cohesion, and a shield from external threats. In this sense, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia benefitted from its extraordinary geopolitical position as well as from its cunning foreign policy. Both blocs supported it and provided it with weapons. Direct military assistance to the Yugoslav People’s Army was provided in the form of affordable, older yet opera-
tional weapons systems (Bebler, 1993: 63). Apart from the stockpiling of Western as well as Eastern weapons in Yugoslavia, we must also take into account the formation of the military industrial complex, consciously encouraged by the Yugoslav political elite. This resulted from the external political efforts of Yugoslavia to establish a so-called third alternative or the Non-Aligned Movement. As this Movement's most important protagonist, Yugoslavia wanted to wield an enviable military power in order to fill the position of a military mentor to third-world countries or to its economically weaker partners. Numerous programs of military counselling, assistance, training of military instructors, and direct assistance with the development of military systems in the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement were implemented. The role of the arms trade, established between Yugoslavia and other Non-Aligned states, became increasingly prominent as well (Guštin, Prebišić, 2008: 339).

In the domestic-political sense, the Yugoslav weapons industry also represented a compensatory measure for the quite apparent differences in the economic development of the republics in the Yugoslav federation. Josip Broz Tito's enveloping influence as the President of the Republic, President of the Communist Party, and unchallenged Commander of the armed forces ensured a stable, generous, and especially unwavering financial support for the Yugoslav People's Army. The armed forces gradually and inexorably became a new element in the federation, privileged in terms of power, which was viewed as a manifestation of the Serbian domination in the common state, especially by Slovenia and Croatia. The reason for such a perception stemmed from the obvious national anomaly of the officer staff, dominated by the Serbian nation partly due to historical circumstances, but also because of the centralist efforts of the political elites (Hadžić, 2002: 54).

These circumstances allowed broad, influential patterns to take hold: extraordinary stockpiling of weapons in the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; formation of a strong military industrial complex; and a lack of mechanisms for controlling the armed forces available to civil society and the political sector. The preservation of very tangible civil-military relations through President Tito's cult of personality provided the Yugoslav People's Army with an extremely high level of legitimacy, which represented the basis for the formation of the privileged status of the armed forces. Such foundations enabled the highest military leadership to transcend the role of fulfilling its commander's orders and to start influencing the decision-making process. This led to a rejection of the political elite's decision in 1991, and ultimately a capacity to begin acting independently of a political regime which retained its legal standing but had grown less and less legitimate in the eyes of Yugoslav citizens (Guštin, Prebišić, 2014: 122).

In the 1980s, the generals of the Yugoslav People's Army began making public statements about the economic policies in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and commenting prominently on the actions of the political elites. This solidified into an assumed right to act as gatekeepers who 'conceded to' the appointments of the President of the Federal Presidency and Presidents of the Federal Government in the state. Through significant amounts of criticism and indirect in-
fluence, they endeavored to put a lid on the increasingly plural public information available and called for ever-stricter censorship (Bebler, 1992: 45-47).

**1981 – the first internal military intervention**

The first glimpses of the Yugoslav state crisis were already visible during the economic crisis at the end of the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1980s, after prolonged hesitation, the Yugoslav political class – without exception among the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – also identified it as a crisis with political dimensions. Even though the socialist regime underestimated the political crisis, it treated the events in Kosovo in 1981 extremely seriously, as the regime was acutely sensitive to the tensions between the nations in the federal state. In Kosovo, people – especially students – demonstrated openly and in large numbers. They did not submit to the rules regarding public gatherings, and they kept publishing anti-socialist slogans as well, unsettling the state leadership profoundly (Nation, 2003: 224). As matters stood, the state leadership had already been very upset by the loss of its last two strong figures, Edvard Kardelj and Josip Broz Tito, in just two years (1979 and 1980, respectively). It had also been destabilized by the economic crisis that seemed to be unsolvable without submitting to the International Monetary Fund – in other words, to the monolithic class opponent, the representative of capital. However, the most important aspect of the Kosovo crisis was that the military leadership actively entered the domestic-political arena for the first time because of it.1 "Already at the very beginning we realized that we could not expect anything from the state leadership. We set out to do our job without waiting for orders. With General Bjelogrlić as well as a group of other generals and officers, we came up with a plan to deploy units in the region of Priština and other centres in Kosovo – Peć, Đakovica, Uroševac, Podujevo, and Kosovska Mitrovica" (Mamula, 2000: 38). Following a formal appeal from the State Presidency, and with the blessing of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Army intervened. It deployed an armored brigade to this province and put a stop to the demonstrations within two days (Mamula, 2000: 33-44).

The regime characterized the demonstrations as an action by the pro-fascist and counter-revolutionary elements and thus established a context for their resolution. However, it also emphasized the system of the Total National Defense and Social Self-Protection as problematic. As this system was based on the mass participation of people in all communities, it turned out to be a part of the problem rather than the solution. This resulted in the disarmament or disbandment of all the territorial military structures. New ones were established with reliable personnel, mostly not of Albanian descent, even though as much as 85% of the population of the autonomous province of Kosovo was Albanian by that point (Mamula, 2000: 33-44; Malcolm, 1999: 316).

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1 Admiral Branko Mamula allows for a possibility that the Minister of Defence at the time, General Ljubičić, wondered whether to take over the leadership of Yugoslavia at the moment of Tito’s death. Mamula, 2000: 23-26.
The first outlines of the independent role of the Army

In the middle of the 1980s, the Yugoslav crisis deepened. In the institutional sense, the political party of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was divided into seven republican and two autonomous provincial organizations. Besides these, there was the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People’s Army. Gradually the divergence between these organizations started increasing, leading to the formation of three blocs: reformists who argued for liberalization; reformists who supported orthodox communism; and those who wished to maintain the status quo (Woodward, 1995: 364).

The Army, as noted, had its own military political party: the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People’s Army, which exerted complete political control over the military community (around 97% of officers and 100% of colonels and generals were members). This party sided with the camp that wanted to preserve the status quo. However, it was more in favor of orthodox communists rather than those who strived for liberalization. The concern with its own economic position represented an important aspect of this Organization’s political activities, since as the biggest budget consumer (up to 22% of the total budget), it was very worried about its own financing in the battle for the diminished budgetary resources (Marković, 2007: 216).

Later, in the middle of the 1980s, the Army pondered how it might carry out its fundamental duty by itself – defending the communist system from internal threats as well as the state from external ones. These efforts were initiated by Admiral Branko Mamula, the Secretary of Defense at the time. His plan of 1987, which was not drawn up formally and was only known by a few of his closest associates, envisioned that the Army, or rather the military leadership, should take the initiative and start dictating political reforms with the aim of ensuring security. The goal was to keep Yugoslavia unified, operational, and communist. In 1987, the leading generals informed the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States of these plans. At that time, rumors that Yugoslavia’s stability and even its existence were in question, and that the Army might be preparing for a military coup, started spreading for the first time (Mamula, 2000: 60-72, 104-108).

Operationalizing internal military intervention (1989-1990)

As the differences between the distinct factions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia deepened, the military leadership became increasingly active politically. Under the pressure of the crisis, the camp of the status quo supporters crumbled. On the other hand, the strength of the leader of the League of Communists of Serbia Slobodan Milošević kept increasing: through violent or peaceful means he mobilized half of the state for his camp. However, amid the struggle against a combination of communist political orthodoxy, demands to centralize decision-making, and economic reformism, another camp formed as well: an „unprincipled coalition”, as the camp of those who opposed Milošević was characterized by the Macedonian politician Vasil Tupurkovski. This side was represented especially by
the President of the League of Communists of Slovenia, Milan Kučan. New political groups and parties – in opposition to the ruling political organizations of the League of Communists – started forming in the western republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and then throughout the entire state (Silber, Little, 1996: 115-116).

On 24 January 1989, new incidents unfolded in Kosovo, this time related to efforts to defend already achieved levels of autonomy, and the abolition proposed by amendments to the Serbian Constitution. Due to Serbian pressure, the State Presidency proclaimed a state of emergency in the territory of Kosovo and deployed the police as well as military forces. Both opened fire at the protesters, who remained mostly peaceful at the time, and killed ninety of them (Pirjevec, 2003: 401).

The goals of the joint action changed significantly. At first, the orthodox communists identified the reformists as the beginning of a counter-revolution, and according to their doctrine and communist vocation it was their duty to put a stop to such attempts by any means. The reformists were accused of introducing, or attempting to introduce, a multi-partisan political system. These efforts culminated at the beginning of 1988, when the military and state leadership discussed „assisting” their comrades in Slovenia, who had allowed the formation of political organizations outside of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Plans were drawn up for military intervention and the internment of communist and non-communist political leaders in Slovenia during any potential unrest (Omerza, 2013: 37).

When these plans were made public with the consent of the Slovenian leadership of the Communist Party of Slovenia, a serious scandal broke out, followed by the arrest of Janez Janša and two of his associates. Mass protests ensued, and a mass movement developed in Slovenia calling for the release of those arrested. However, in the middle of this affair, another front opened. Due to the rigidity and lack of understanding exhibited by the Army, the trial turned into a conflict between nations: between Slovenians and the Serbo-Croatian-speaking majority in Yugoslavia. This mobilized a far greater mass of people in Slovenia and in fact provided additional momentum to the reformist communists. It also resulted in demands for the confederalization of the state, and subsequently in demands for Slovenian independence.

The compromised vanguard of communism was losing its internal legitimacy in the entire state. It was replaced by nationalism, which could not function as an integrative force in the Yugoslav multi-national state. One of the side effects of this profound dispute was also that in the eyes of one group – Slovenians and gradually Croats – the military leadership became suspicious, backward, and increasingly illegitimate (Pirjevec, 2003: 42).

Concurrently, the Army – designated as the „army of the people” and defender of the revolution – was offended by this widespread rejection and radicalized in the opposite direction. The military leadership found a political ally in the Serbian political leadership headed by Milošević, especially with regard to centralizing the state and preserving communism. The new Minister of Defense, General Veljko Kadijević, personified this informal alliance through his frequent contact with new
Serbian leader Milošević, and with a Member of the State Presidency, Borisav Jović. They rallied around the preservation of Yugoslavia and the centralization of the state. In the first year of their cooperation, they shared a common interest in preserving communist rule, at least outwardly, but at the end of 1989 Serbia openly abandoned these aspirations as well (Kadijević, 1993: 88).

In January 1990, Milošević’s forces within the Party mustered an extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. However, instead of securing the expected victory for itself at the Congress, they provoked the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: the Slovenian and Croatian organizations left, and others no longer saw any point in carrying on with the Congress. Thus, the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People’s Army lost its political backing, which was obviously still extremely important for it – certainly psychologically, but also personally, as these people’s positions were at stake.1 When it ended up in the cold, the leadership of the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People’s Army (or in fact the military leadership that controlled this Organization) engaged in unsuccessful attempts to restore the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Half a year later, it decided to establish its own political party named the League of Communists: Movement for Yugoslavia.2 Even though a massive influx of the former members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was expected, this party achieved only a small membership of people from outside of the Army, while part of the officer staff avoided joining the new party as well. However, in this way the Army in fact entered the multi-party political space, which had in the interim been established in a majority of Yugoslav republics.

The crisis of the armed forces’ legitimacy

The internal crisis of the multi-national armed forces was an important factor in the diminishing legitimacy of the Yugoslav People’s Army in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Years of national inequality in the very structure of the Army turned out to be more and more problematic after the death of President Tito, as the use of Serbo-Croatian as the language of command clearly and undoubtedly favored the central core within the federation – but in fact especially the Serbian/Montenegrin nations. This was all the more apparent in the increasing anomalies when it came to representation of the other nations among army officers.

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1 During this same meeting, General Kadijević explained to Jović that „the Presidency should exert control over the Federal Executive Council”, and that the Yugoslav People’s Army had prepared the plans „for all critical parts of the state, especially Croatia and Slovenia, ensuring that it could get it all under its own control in the shortest time possible”, and that he was aware of the fact that „I cannot control the whole of the Presidency, but we can be in the majority” (Jović, 1996: 142). Kadijević describes the nature of this meeting as follows: „It has to be emphasised that this meeting and discussion is more important than any sessions or discussions which could be held in our country today, and that there are no institutions where such discussions could be held” (BJ, 139). At another point, Jović remarks: „Veljko (= Kadijević) tends to explain such analyses to me, but for understandable reasons he does not wish to present them to the whole Presidency” (Jović, 1996: 68).

2 The League of Communists: Movement for Yugoslavia was a political party, established on 19 November 1990 with the re-organisation of the members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the Yugoslav People’s Army.
With the increasingly obvious and constant expansion of Serbian nationalism, such a situation became more and more disturbing. The Yugoslav People's Army was gradually understood as the Serbian Army, and thereby as a troubling element for the other Yugoslav nations, especially Slovenians and Croatians.

An even more important reason for the diminishing legitimacy of the Yugoslav People's Army can perhaps be found in the increasing politicization of the armed forces and their involvement in political life. Even though the Army's goal was to achieve the stabilization of the political system by strengthening the centralization process and restricting the progressively louder separatist aspirations of the individual nations, its entry into the political arena had precisely the reverse effect. A significant erosion of the legitimacy of the League of Communists as the ruling Party in Yugoslavia, and the consequent delegitimization of the powers of the federal authorities that were an extension of the Communist Party, represented a significant blow against all the factions striving to prevent changes and to preserve Yugoslavia as it had been managed and led. The Yugoslav People's Army, which declared itself a protector of President Tito's legacy, and conceived of itself as bulwark against all attempts at internal division, could scarcely expect anything other than a complete loss of legitimacy; and nor could it avoid evolving into a force that the Yugoslav nations experienced first as an irritant and ultimately as a hostile element (Jelušić, 1997: 79-81).

Compared with the armed forces in the other communist states, the Yugoslav People's Army had a distinct characteristic: the total politicization of the Army through the Party Organization in the Army. In this manner, the political reliability of professional soldiers and control over their activities was ensured, while this Organization at the same time functioned as a formal channel, legitimizing not only the Party in uniform, but the whole political role of the Federal Army. Simultaneously, the politicization of officers in the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People's Army represented a way to legitimize the political activity of soldiers, and it was precisely this Party Organization that represented a formal mode of justifying the political involvement of the Army. Therefore, all officers sooner or later had no choice but to join the League of Communists. With the 1974 Constitution, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia may have strengthened its central authority, but in fact it became a coalition of nine Parties: six from the individual republics, two from the autonomous provinces, and one from the Army. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia preserved its standing as the civilian supervision of the Yugoslav People's Army (Bebler, 1994: 353). However, the representatives of these same forces became an integral part of this supervision, as 15 representatives of the Army were members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which had 166 members. In short, the Army gradually started supervising itself. Given the mounting tensions between the individual republics' Leagues of Communists, room was made for the disproportional role and strength of the highest military leadership in what was otherwise a political process of leading the state. This is the reason why the military leadership could
proclaim itself as the defender of the Federal Constitution and guardian of the federation. On the same grounds, the Yugoslav People's Army never considered a military coup or coup d'état with the aim of replacing the legal federal leadership (Bebler, 1993: 65). Meanwhile, the military leadership showed significantly less understanding for the ideas which would involve attacking the federal system or result in territorial truncation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus, the Polish scenario was not realistic. However, it was completely conceivable that the Army would intervene in Kosovo in 1981 and 1989, as the demands for the formation of the Republic of Kosovo represented a breach of the Federal Constitution (Glenny, 1999: 653-655).

A plan to intervene after the first multi-party elections in April 1990

In April 1990, those working most closely with the Minister of Defense drew up the initial plans for the intervention of the Army in both of the republics that had called for and carried out multi-party elections: Slovenia and Croatia. „However, Veljko believes that in case the rightist or irredentist forces win (at the elections), we are justified (because all of this is unconstitutional) to remove them by force. The use of force is always a possibility” (Jović, 1995: 138). „Veljko Kadijević ... proposes that the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demands that the Constitutional Court declares the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia as unconstitutional. Naturally!” (Jović, 1995: 136). When the military leadership realized that Serbia would not support it, it considered the use of force. „It has been ensured that control can be exerted over everything, in the shortest time possible, in all critical parts of the country, especially in Croatia and Slovenia” (Jović, 1995: 139).

Yet of all the plans for military intervention, only the immobilization of the Territorial Defense weapons was realized. On 15 May, these weapons were ordered to be transported to warehouses controlled by the Yugoslav People's Army. Thus, the Territorial Defense of Croatia (except for three municipalities in Herzegovina) as well as the Territorial Defense of Slovenia (except for thirteen municipalities) was completely disarmed. At the same time, this resulted in a significant political conflict, leading to urgent defense self-organization of both republics and purchases of weapons via the grey or black market (Mikulić, 2007: 61).

Thus, the military leadership could only resort to the question of the internal relations between the Yugoslav republics as a legitimate reason for its interventions into state politics. The Army resolutely opposed any confederate system, especially as its representatives kept emphasizing that in such a system the role and structure of the Army would have to change as well. It was truly afraid of „republican armies”, and not only in principle but also because of the division of its own forces between the individual armies. However, as the military leadership noticed that nobody was paying much attention to its warnings and wishes, it started discussing how to resolve the crisis with an intervention intended to allow for a new social contract to preserve the state. Yet the Army leadership – Kadijević and his closest associates – did not have it in them to opt for a violent resolution of the crisis. Throughout
1990, and for the first half of 1991, they sought political allies in order to realize their political goals. Neither the State Presidency nor any other federal institutions could provide such support. Therefore, the military leadership refrained from any interventions, but made repeated threats and issued severe political demands.

The realization of the Slovenian independence referendum in December 1990 led the Yugoslav military leadership into another attempt at preparing a military intervention. The military leadership drew up several scenarios, but these were still relatively poorly prepared in the operational sense. The Army's problem with addressing the crisis via a military coup always stemmed from its doubt regarding whether it should attempt this in the entire state or in just a few republics. Implicit here was the question of whether it should also harm its political ally Milošević or make its Yugoslav all-state position very problematic by intervening in just one or two republics (Janša, 1994: 63-68).

The Army saw an opportunity in the activities of the Croatian defense leadership and their illegal importation of weapons for the Croatian armed formations. This scenario began on 9 January 1991, when the federal Presidency called upon the citizens and republics to hand over all the weapons in the possession of illegal groups – especially the Croatian and Slovenian paramilitary units – to the Yugoslav People's Army. The military leadership elevated the status of the Yugoslav People's Army to battle readiness (Pirjevec, 2003: 410-411).

The “soft coup” of March 1991

At the behest of the Serbian authorities, the Army intervened in the demonstrations in Belgrade organized by the opposition. The military leadership pre-named itself the Supreme Command, thereby assuming the mantle of military-political leadership set aside for wartime or times of imminent threat, and it demanded that a session of the State Presidency be convened on 12 March, 1991. The Members of the Presidency from the western republics were dubious about taking part at all. As matters stood, a majority of politicians predicted that the Yugoslav People’s Army might in fact arrest those Members of the State Presidency who it did not support it and proceed by carrying out a full takeover of power. However, at the session the military leadership demanded that the six members who were present introduce a state of emergency, thus bestowing special powers on the Army. Under severe psychological pressure (the session took place in the facilities of the state military command in the Užička ulica street in Belgrade), the vote turned out unfavorably for the military leadership, as it failed to secure the required majority of votes. The military leadership then resorted to another maneuver: carrying out a military coup independently, both with its own forces and simultaneously with external support (Silber, Little, 1996: 69-71).

On 13 March, the Minister of the Army secretly travelled to Moscow for a discussion with the Soviet Minister of Defense Dimitry Yazov. The meeting was undoubtedly a disappointment: Yazov withheld any support, stating that he could not even get things under control in his own country. However, at the same time the Yugoslav Minister of the Army was at least somewhat optimistic, as the Soviet
prediction that the Western forces would not intervene in Yugoslavia in case of a takeover of power instilled in him an increasingly realistic hope that an independent intervention might be successful.

Witnesses report that a day later the Minister of the Army met with the Serbian leadership, worried about the protest of the Serbian opposition in Belgrade. Here, it was confirmed that the Army would take over state power. „In the presence of General Adžić, Veljko literally said: ’Let’s go for a military coup’... I asked him what he meant by a military coup. He answered that the Government and the Presidency would be replaced. That he wouldn’t touch the Assembly, but that he wouldn’t tolerate any protests either. The governments of the individual republics and everything else would not be touched provided they supported the coup. Otherwise, they’d be removed as well. Slobodan did not ask anything or make any comments... After I heard what Veljko had to say, I told him that I’d resign on the following day, after the session... I’d give the Army room for action. I’d also talk to Nenad Bućin (Montenegro) and Yugoslav Kostić (Vojvodina) in order to get them to do the same” (Jović, 1995: 296).

The continuation of the session of the Supreme Command and the Presidency was announced for 15 March. In order to prevent an intervention of the Presidency against the military leadership, the Serbian Member and President of the Presidency told General Kadjević that he would resign in case the Presidency failed to vote for the introduction of the state of emergency. The Presidency failed to introduce the state of emergency yet again, and the President of the Presidency Jović resigned „in order to make room for the Army” (Jović, 1995: 306). He publicly explained his resignation – a coordinated resignation of all three Serbian Members of the Presidency – by stating that he did not want to take part in an institution that „strives to tie the hands of the Yugoslav People’s Army” and which „has expressed an obvious distrust of the state’s armed forces”(Jović, 1996: 306), even if „the Yugoslav People’s Army or the state’s armed forces do not have any tasks or intentions to get involved in the political life or influence the decision-making process with regard to the future of the state” (Jović, 1996: 305). Milošević then stated that „under these circumstances he no longer acknowledged any decisions taken by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that he would not take part in its work (in the function of replacing the Members of the Presidency from Serbia)” (Jović, 1996: 306). However, even in the following days the military leadership refrained from any attempts to take over the state leadership directly. The Army drew up new analyses, showing that they did not have any legal basis for their intentions, despite the actions of the Serbian side (Jović, 1995: 308-309). Jović stated that „They seemed very strange. If they took all of these analyses into account when they told us that they had decided for a military coup, it is unclear how they had made that decision. If they failed to keep all of this in mind, then they were not serious” (Jović, 1995: 310).

Consequently, the Serbian leadership turned its back on the Army and focused on another strategy, restricted to the Serbian sphere of interest. The Minister of Defense, General Veljko Kadjević, was allegedly especially unsure and unable to
handle these kinds of decisions. Admiral Mamula described him as a general who executed orders, not a general who gave them (Mamula, 2000: 216). The dedication of the military leadership to Yugoslavism and its outlook on the crisis was another factor. General Kadijević even believed that the nations which did not want to be a part of Yugoslavia should not be forced to do so. Finally, the Yugoslav People's Army or the organizers of the coup would not have had any external support for their actions.

After the introduction of the state of emergency was delayed in the second half of March 1991, the focus shifted from the Army to political opponents. The military leadership was no longer discussed. However, in what were already altered circumstances, on 25 June 1991 the military leadership found political support for the realization of what it had aspired to for a long time: the carrying out of a limited military intervention, aimed at preventing the attainment of independence of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia. As it turned out, this was no longer a military coup, even though some foreign countries still saw it as such.

Consequences of the delegitimization of the armed forces

The military's legitimacy suffered immensely due to the fading of supra-national concepts (trans-Yugoslavism) and notions that became unacceptable for the leaderships of the republics. Thus, the National Liberation War and socialist revolution lost their importance, and the link was weakened between civilian society and the Army, which struggled to sustain its legitimizing narrative issuing from World War II that anointed it as the national army. In an effort to address this declining status, and legitimize its own survival, the Yugoslav People's Army insisted on the consistent implementation of the multi-national officer staff structure as well as on direct communication with the civilian environment. None of these efforts were successful. The former was impossible in the practical sense, as neither Slovenians nor Croatians had any motivation (with few exceptions) to attend military academies and thus join the officer staff. At the same time, this meant that the potential for advancement to the highest ranks was not equal for everyone. Officers did not have equal opportunities to advance to the rank of general due to the republican quotas. As far as communication was concerned, the result was even worse, as the military system had been closed for years and communication had been carried out indirectly through the Supreme Commander and through the Communist Party due to deep politicization of the Armed Forces. Therefore, the Army was unable to meet the communication challenges of the liberal 1980s, and nor could it deal with the provocations of the younger generations.

The delegitimization of the armed forces caused its alienation from the environment of civil society, which in turn resulted in a rapid increase in the number of people who did not wish to take part in compulsory military service. Despite severe sanctions for dissidence, the question of alternative civilian service led to a severe social conflict between the youth (especially Slovenian) and the rigid military leadership. In its stubbornness the Yugoslav People’s Army made an important mis-
take, as it perpetuated the standpoint that a handful of dissidents could threaten the functional imperative of the armed forces. Thus, it publicly expressed doubt in its own fighting ability and strength. All of this had another consequence: the mobilization of civil society movements, which immediately spread the confrontation between the Army and the youth to other sectors. Two such sectors are especially noteworthy: the economic and the national. The disintegration of the armed forces’ legitimacy led to essentially desperate attempts to demonstrate the military’s power violently, and to thereby indirectly discipline civilian society.

This turned out to be fatal over the extended course of ten years. Such behavior led to the final and complete breakdown of relations between the Yugoslav People’s Army and the citizens of the individual republics. These were citizens who understood the acts of violence – which the Army attempted to legitimize as crucial for maintaining the territorial integrity of the state and for preserving the social system – as acts of open aggression. This led to a state of war in which the Yugoslav People’s Army assumed the role of hostile occupying forces.

A final point of grave importance concerns not being able to confront the increasing nationalism amassing around Milošević, and not acting in accordance with the Yugoslav constitution. Setting out as self-styled defenders of the internal social order and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People’s Army was doomed to become a state army that gradually changed into the army of Serb violent expansionism, committing serious violations of international law and atrocities against humanity.

**Bibliography**


SECTION FOUR:
THE MILITARY IN INTERNAL DISTURBANCES.
LEGAL ISSUES AND NATIONAL EXPERIENCES
Mihály Krámlí

THE „MONITOR MUTINY” IN HUNGARY IN 1919

Introduction

The most famous Hungarian naval mutiny – the so called „Monitor Mutiny” (monitorlázadás) – was a counter-revolutionary mutiny in the Danube Flotilla during the short-lived Hungarian Republic of Councils in June 1919. Contemporaries also knew it as the „Naval Counter-revolution” (tengerészeti ellenforradalom). In fact, a majority of the vessels which participated in this mutiny or uprising were patrol boats and not monitors. However, the press christened it the Monitor Mutiny because journalists and laymen tended to view all the river warships as monitors. Since monitors had a great reputation in the era immediately after the Great War, this expression had a satisfyingly bombastic air.

In 1917-18, the „Red Seaman” – in Russia the „красный матрос” and in Germany the „Roter Matrose” – became one of the symbols of the revolution. Contrastingly, in Hungary in 1919 the seamen and monitors became symbols of counter-revolution. The expressions „Monitor Mutiny” and „White Seaman” found their places in the narratives of the Hungarian left and right.

The political situation in Hungary in 1918-1919

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in November 1918 – a collapse foreshadowed by the so-called Aster Revolution that started in Budapest on 31 October 1918. On the Revolution’s first day, King Charles IV appointed Count Mihály Károlyi, the leader of the revolt, as Hungarian prime minister. On 16 November, the provisional government declared Hungary a People’s Republic, with Károlyi as both prime minister and interim president. This event marked the end of four hundred years of Habsburg rule in Hungary. The new republic and the new government faced overwhelming internal and external problems and the Károlyi government’s measures failed to stem popular discontent. The Entente considered Hungary a partner in the defeated Dual Monarchy and dashed the Hungarian’s hopes via a succession of diplomatic notes. On 20 March 1919, the French head of the Entente mission in Budapest gave Károlyi a note delineating the final postwar boundaries, which the Hungarians found unacceptable. Károlyi and Prime Minister Dénes Berinkey were now in an impossible position. They knew accepting the French note would endanger the country’s territorial integrity, but were in no position to reject it. Berinkey resigned in protest.
Károlyi turned power over to a coalition of Social Democrats and Communists. The latter promised that Soviet Russia would help Hungary to restore original borders. Although the Social Democrats held a majority in the coalition, the Communists led by Béla Kun immediately seized control and announced the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic or Hungarian Republic of Councils (Tanácköztársaság) on 21 March 1919. Károlyi was arrested and the most he could achieve was a subsequent escape to Paris. On 23 March, Lenin gave an order to Kun that the Social Democrats must be removed from power, thus forming a real „dictatorship of the proletariat.” Accordingly, the Communists started to purge the Social Democrats from the government the following day.

A new government called the Revolutionary Governing Council was created. The government was led by Sándor Garbai, but Bela Kun as Commissar of Foreign Affairs held the real power. In a radio dispatch Kun asked for a treaty of alliance with Soviet Russia, but the Russians refused because they were tied down in the Russian Civil War. Thus, the Hungarian government was left on its own, and a Red Guard was created. In addition, a group of about two hundred armed men was formed as a mobile detachment, a so called „terror group” led by József Cserny. Other similar detachments were also formed, the most famous of which was the „Lenin Boys” led by Tibor Szamuely. These groups killed and terrorized many people, and numerous conflicts with the local population ensued.

In late May, after the Entente military representative demanded more territorial concessions from Hungary, Béla Kun attempted to fulfil his promise to restore Hungary’s old borders. In early June, the Hungarian Red Army invaded the southeastern part of the newly-forming Czechoslovak state (today Slovakia) – the so called „Upper Hungary” (Felvidék). The Hungarian army achieved some success against the Czechoslovak troops and planned to march against the Romanian troops in the East. An important factor in the success of the Hungarian Red Army on the Northern front was that many professional officers of the former Austro-Hungarian Army served in it and fought for the patriotic aim of restoring the old borders. Despite communist promises on this issue, the communists declared the establishment of the Slovak Soviet Republic on 16 June. Confronted with the proclamation of this new republic, Hungarian nationalists and patriots soon realized that the communist government had no intention of restoring the previous Hungarian borders. Despite the military victories against the Czechoslovak forces, the Hungarian Red Army started to disintegrate due to the fundamental tension between patriots and communists. After 16 June, the patriotic professional officers began to leave the army and the internal support of the communist government weakened significantly. On 24 June, one week after the proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic, a serious uprising against the communist regime erupted. The uprising had two centers – the Ludovika (Military Academy) in Budapest and the Flotilla – and the latter site became famous as the „Monitor Mutiny.” While the uprising in the Ludovika Academy was suppressed swiftly and the Flotilla uprising failed to achieve its goals, they represented clear signs of a weakening communist regime.
Proceeding on the premise of a French promise that Romanian forces would withdraw from the Tiszántúl (Trans-Tisza), the communist government withdrew its troops from Upper Hungary. Yet while the Hungarian troops withdrew from the North, the Romanian Army was not pulled back and this seriously undermined the communist regime. After an unsuccessful offensive against the Romanian Army, the regime collapsed on 1 August 1919.

Outside the territory ruled by the communists there were counter-revolutionary movements, but they did not have any real impact on events – mostly because the Entente did not recognize them. The so-called Anti-Bolshevik Committee was established in Vienna in April 1919. However, the Committee failed to reach its aims even though its membership included Count István Bethlen and Gyula Gömbös who were later prime ministers of Hungary. On 5 May 1919, a counter-government was formed in Arad with Count Gyula Károlyi as Prime Minister. Romanian authorities imprisoned some members of this government, while other members fled to Szeged – a city which was then under French rule – and formed a new government. The War Minister was Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy who would later serve as Governor of Hungary.

**The Danube Flotilla in 1918-1919**

The Austro-Hungarian Navy had a significant Danube Flotilla (k. u. k. Donauflottille). The independent Danube Flotilla with its centuries-long traditions was dissolved in 1866. Yet due to the ambitious Turkish naval build-up – both at sea and on the Danube – the commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, decided to re-establish the Danube Flotilla as an integral part of the Navy in 1869. The first pair of armored river monitors was built in 1871-1872. On the eve of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy possessed the largest naval force on the Danube. The Danube Flotilla successfully fought on the Serbian front in 1914-1915 and on the Romanian front in 1916. A squadron of monitors and patrol boats operated on the Black Sea and on the Ukrainian rivers in 1918. In 1918, the Danube Flotilla consisted of ten monitors and eight patrol boats.

In the famous telegram of 30 October 1918, Charles IV, acting in the twilight of his capacity as Emperor and King, ordered the handing down of the Adriatic Fleet to the Croatian National Council and the Danube Flotilla to the Royal Hungarian Government. The telegram was signed by Vice-admiral Franz von Keil.1 By the next day, the withdrawal of the Flotilla from the Serbian front had started. The monitor Bodrog ran aground and was left behind. In Vukovar, the South Slav crews and the commander Linienschiffskapitän Marius Ratkovic disembarked. On 4 November, the Hungarian fregattenkapitän Olaf Wulff became the commander of the Flotilla. On the same day, the Flotilla’s units hoisted the Hungarian flag. The majority of the Flotilla, six monitors and six patrol boats, arrived in Budapest on 6 November. In Budapest, the German and Czech crews left the Flotilla and the vacancies were filled by Hungarian sailors arriving from the Adriatic (Csonkaréti 1980: 200).

The Entente did not recognize the distribution of the former Austro-Hungarian Navy between Croatia and Hungary. The Belgrade Military Convention of 13 November 1918 required Hungary to hand over six monitors. The Entente mission in Budapest – noting the bad condition of the old monitor Szamos – demanded five monitors and two modern patrol boats instead. On 13 December, the Hungarians handed over five monitors but protested again at the prospect of handing over the two patrol boats. The Entente mission, led by French lieutenant-colonel Vyix, put great pressure on the Hungarian Government and on 18 December the two patrol boats were duly handed over. Vyix also demanded the disarming of vessels remaining in Hungarian hands. The Hungarian naval personnel were reluctant to disarm the vessels, so British sailors executed the disarmament in January 1919. The dismounted guns and other fittings were loaded on a barge which was towed beyond the Southern demarcation line. In December 1918, Olaf Wulff proposed establishing a river police force utilizing the few remaining vessels. He also urged the continuation of work on the monitor Inn and patrol boat Lachs in the shipyard Ganz-Danubius in Budapest. The Lachs entered in service in May 1919 while the Inn was not in service until 1920 and sailed under the Romanian flag (Csonkaréti 1980: 202-203).

The communist regime recognized the importance of the Danube Flotilla. There was a great need for warships on the Northern front because a part of it was the Danube itself, and the Southern demarcation line also required vessels. The river force of the Hungarian Soviet Republic did not have an official name, though generally it was called Danube Guard (Dunaórség). The Flotilla was a part of the Danube Guard under the name Red Danube Squadron (Vörös Dunai Hajóraj). Yet communist efforts toward a total sovietization of the Flotilla failed: the crews elected their former officers as leaders, while a non-communist was elected as political commissar against the communist candidate. The commander of the Danube Guard was Cosinus (Kozma) Böhm and the commander of the Red Danube Squadron was Dezső Skripecz. In accordance with the Soviet-Russian practice the ranks were abolished. The head of the Naval Department of the Commissariat of War was Szilárd Zemplén. Olaf Wulff was arrested on 22 March but a few days after he managed to escape to Vienna.

Using captured Russian Hertz mines, the Danube Guard laid a mine barrage at Uszód consisting of 1524 kilometers of munitions deployed against the Entente warships operating from Baja. A second mine barrage was laid at Dunavecse which covered 1568 kilometers. During April and May, three monitors and six patrol boats were put into service. Apart from the Szamos, the Ganz-Danubius shipyard repaired and made serviceable the two veteran monitors Maros and Lajta (ex Leitha) which had been out of active service for more than a year. As well as the four patrol boats (Viza, Compó, Csuka, Fogas), two new patrol boats Pozsony (ex Lachs) and Komárom (ex Stôhr) were put into service. The vessels were re-armed with land artillery pieces: howitzers, machine guns, and even wooden mock guns. The Danube Guard also possessed two armed steamers (Proletár, Munka), two minelayers (Baja, Bácska), two

From 10 May onwards, the units of the Red Danube Squadron participated in the campaign against the Czechoslovak troops. In early June, during the fighting around Párkány (today Sturovo in Slovakia), almost all the warships were ordered to sail to Esztergom on the opposite side of the Danube. Over the next few days, the units of the Red Danube Squadron successfully fought against the Czechoslovak troops until the offensive was halted. After 16 June – as witnessed in the case of the Red Army – the loyalty of the patriotic professional officers in the Danube Guard toward the communist government began to deteriorate rapidly.

**The Monitor Mutiny**

Initially, an isolated uprising against the communist regime took place in Alsólendva in Zala county on 21 April. It was easily suppressed by the government. In May, other local uprisings occurred, such as the one in Tolna county. The most serious uprising took place on 24 June. This revolt had two centers, the Ludovika (Military Academy) in Budapest and the Red Danube Squadron. The leader of the Ludovika uprising was army Captain Jenő Lemberkovics. The organization of the Ludovika uprising had started a few weeks previously. The organizers hoped that the military commander of Budapest, the ex-social democrat József Haubrich, would join the uprising, but this proved to be a fatal error. The Ludovika uprising started at 4 p.m. on 24 June and it was Haubrich who suppressed it within fourteen hours. Lemberkovics was shot but Lieutenant-Colonel Guido Romanelli, the leader of the Italian Military Mission, succeeded in preventing mass executions.

The organization of the uprising in the Red Danube Squadron started on 20 June 1919 when Szilárd Zemplén and his political commissar Kálmán Benkő, a former petty officer, discussed the possibility of an uprising and joined the planned Ludovika revolt. Zemplén had already been in contact with the organizing committee of the planned Ludovika uprising. They harbored great hopes and envisioned the rapid collapse of the communist regime. They shared the false belief of the organizers of the Ludovika uprising that József Haubrich would join the revolt, and that after taking Budapest it would be an easy task to take control of the country (Benkő 1920: 8-11).

There is a common misconception that the organizers and the participants of the so-called Monitor Mutiny sympathized with the views of the counter-government of Szeged and that their aim was to join the so-called National Army commanded by Miklós Horthy.¹ In fact, they wanted to overthrow the communists and to form a social democrat provisional government until a democratic general election could be held. It is evident that they were politically naive and misjudged the situation.

¹The socialist regime after 1948 sometimes labeled the participants of the Monitor Mutiny “Horthy-fascists”.
On 21 June, the officers of the units stationed in Budapest (monitor Maros and patrol boats Pozsony and Csuka) were won over to the cause. On 23 June, a delegation – consisting of László Csicsery and two political commissars Benkő and Béla Ankner on the board of patrol boat Csuka – sailed to Esztergom to persuade the officers and crews of the ships stationed there to join the uprising. They claimed that the white troops were advancing to Budapest and the communist government would resign within days and would turn power over to a social democrat provisional government. They successfully convinced a majority of the officers and the crews, apart from those of the monitor Szamos. The crew of the Szamos consisted of devoted communists and they suspected that the delegation from Budapest was not telling the truth. In the evening, some Szamos crew members arrested Dezso Skripecz, the commander of the squadron, officers Csicsery, Babos, and Illés, and political commissars Benkő, Ankner, and Brunhuber, which nearly caused the end of the uprising.

The sailors of the Szamos planned to bring the arrested persons to Budapest aboard the monitor and to expose their conduct to Haubrich. This almost certainly would have resulted in their execution. Benkő and Brunhuber finally managed to convince their arrestors to free the members of the deputation. The Csuka left Esztergom with four armed sailors from the Szamos. During the journey back to Budapest these sailors were disarmed and arrested (Margitay-Becht 2007: 242).

The Csuka arrived in Budapest at noon on 24 June. Due to the events at Esztergom, the organizers decided to bring forward the uprising to 24 June rather than wait until 26 June. A telegram was sent to the three ships at Esztergom whose crews sympathized with the uprising. At 4 p.m. on 24 June, the monitor Maros and patrol boats Pozsony and Csuka hauled the red flag and hoisted the National Flag in Budapest-Öbuda. The three units left the Óbuda naval base and headed southward in the direction of central Budapest. En route the officers used speaking-trumpets and tried several times to call upon the people on the riverbanks to join the counterrevolution – but without effect. According to the original plan, the monitor Maros, equipped with a 10-centimeter howitzer, was expected to fire at the communist headquarters – the so-called „House of Soviets” – the Hotel Hungária on the promenade of the left bank of the Danube. However, the monitor passed without shooting because there was a great crowd on the promenade. On Zemplén’s order the patrol boat Pozsony turned back and fired three rounds from her 7 cm gun. The crowd cheered and waved. The Red Guard appeared on the promenade and dispersed the crowd. Miklós Berend, a famous doctor and the head of a children’s hospital, was killed by the Red Guard and his body remained on the promenade until the evening (Benkő 1920: 13-15, Margitay-Becht 2007: 242-244).

1 Some sources state that instead of the patrol boat Csuka, Fogas was the third unit in Budapest. There are other controversies over the ships participating in the Monitor Mutiny. For instance, a journalist who wrote a report about the uprising „invented” a non-existent ship, the monitor Csaba.

2 The Hungarian communist regime of 1919 strictly banned the use of national symbols as the National Anthem and the National Flag.

3 Under the socialist regime after the Second World War official historiography stated that he had been killed by the mutineers.
The three ships sailed to the Southern Railway Bridge. The *Maros* anchored there and guarded the bridge, while the two patrol boats returned to the center of the city and tried to persuade the population of the city to join the counter-revolution (though again without any effect). Returning from this mission, the *Csuka* sailed to the naval airbase of Csepel, where the mutineers negotiated with the commander of the airbase, who promised that they would not attack the ships. In the evening, Zemplén returned to Óbuda aboard the patrol boat *Pozsony*. While traversing Budapest, the patrol boat was under constant machine-gun fire. At 1 a.m. on 25 June, the patrol boat *Fogas* from Esztergom joined the *Pozsony* north of Budapest. The two patrol boats, under the cover of darkness, returned unharmed to the Southern Railway Bridge. While the *Pozsony* sailed back to north, Haubrich, the military commander of Budapest, sent a motorboat to the monitor *Maros* with a negotiator. He offered nothing more than an armistice of three hours. From this point onward, it became evident to everybody that Haubrich never sympathized the cause of the uprising (Margitay-Becht 2007: 245).

At dawn on 25 June, the commander of the naval airbase of Csepel sent a motorboat and informed the mutineers that he was obliged to attack them – but he promised that the bombs would miss their targets. The monitor *Maros* and patrol boats *Csuka* and *Fogas* weighed anchor and departed southward, headed for Dunapentele. The patrol boat *Pozsony* remained at the bridge. Some time later, aircraft from Albertfalva (rather than from Csepel) attacked the *Pozsony*. At the crew's demand, the *Pozsony* weighed anchor and sailed to Dunapentele. Due to the uprisings in the Ludovika and in the Red Danube Squadron, the communist government declared a state of emergency on 25 June.

On 25 June, the monitor *Lajta* and patrol boat *Komárom* hoisted the National Flag and crossed Budapest from north to the south under heavy fire. During the crossing, it is alleged that a grenade from one of the ships accidently hit a house killing two women. The *Pozsony* reached Dunapentele by early afternoon on 25 June. The *Lajta* and the *Komárom* reached Dunapentele at 5 p.m. on the same day. The *Pozsony* and the *Komárom* immediately departed for Paks with Benkő and Csicsery in an attempt to persuade the crews of the ships stationed there to join the uprising. Their mission failed, and the *Komárom* returned to Dunapentele at 4 a.m. on 26 June. Due to a mechanical failure, the *Pozsony* anchored 10 kilometers upstream of Paks. During this time, in Dunapentele, the crew of the armed steamer *Munka* was nominally persuaded to join the mutineers, but a majority of her crew harbored greater sympathy for the communists. On the evening of 25 June, the commanders decided to sail to Baja looking for help from the British river Flotilla to continue their fight against the communist regime (Margitay-Becht 2007: 246-247).

On the morning of 26 June, flying boats from Csepel, manned with new, communist aircrews, attacked the ships in Dunapentele. At 8 a.m., the two monitors, three patrol boats, and the armed steamer left Dunapentele. The *Komárom* stopped beside the *Pozsony* and anchored mid-stream. A half hour later, the two patrol boats

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1 HL HM 1920 Eln. 11. oszt. box no. 829, 11033
weighed anchor when the reparatory works on the machinery of the Pozsony were finished. At Paks they caught up with the Munka.

During the First World War – on the Danubian front – the river warship battles anticipated prior to the war never occurred, apart from the unsuccessful Romanian surprise torpedo attack on the Austro-Hungarian Flotilla at Ruse in August 1916. The first and only engagement between river warships on the Danube in the period between 1914 and 1919 was the so-called Battle of Paks between the two patrol boats and the armed steamer Munka.

At Paks, the Munka hauled the National Flag and hoisted the Red Flag and turned to the right bank. The crew of the Munka refused Zemplén’s attempt to enter negotiations. The commanders of the two patrol boats didn’t want to open fire on their former comrades, but the crew of the Munka was of a different opinion and the armed steamer opened fire from its two 4.7 centimeter guns. At first, the Munka fired on the Pozsony. The Komárom then made a 180 degree turn and opened fire on the Munka. A round from the armed steamer hit the conning tower of the Komárom, piercing the thin armor and exploding inside. The explosion killed the commander of the Komárom Jenő Mahr and seriously wounded László Csicsery, who later died of his wounds. The two patrol boats scored several hits on the Munka and the steamer sank in the shallow water near the riverbank (Csonkaréti, 1980: 214; Dezsnéyi, 1959: 95-96; Margitay-Becht, 2007: 248).

The mutineers were shocked by the death of two officers, along with rumors that Tibor Szamuely was approaching the mine barrage of Uszod with red troops and 15 centimeter artillery. They sailed to Uszód where – thanks to the spring flood – there was a 15-20 meter gap between the barrage and the riverbank. In the atmosphere of panic the patrol boats without any precaution slipped between the barrage and the riverbank. They were fortunate; and seeing their success, the wider monitors with deeper draft followed the patrol boats and luckily crossed the mine barrage. While the mutineers crossed the barrage, the machine guns of the barrage guard remained silent. The dead bodies of the two officers were lying in state on the poop deck of the monitor Lajta.

The Hungarian city of Baja was at that time under Serb and French rule. Stationed in Baja were three British ML barges and the gunboat Ladybird as well as four Serb monitors, Vardar, Drava, Morava and Drina (the latter being ex Austro-Hungarian vessels). The commander of the naval station at Baja was RN Captain Vernon Haggard. On 25 June, the British intercepted some radio messages of the mutineers and they placed four ships in readiness. In the afternoon of 26 June, the mutineers reached Baja under white flag. When the British sighted the approaching warships the ML 236 opened fire. After a few rounds, the crew of the ML 236 sighted the white flags and ceased fire. Zemplén, aboard the Ladybird, tried to explain the situation to Haggard and asked for his help to return and fight against the communists again. Haggard told him that he could not act alone and he would ask Paris. He invited the Hungarians into the port wherein the British disarmed the Hungarian ships. On 27 June, the answer arrived from Paris ordering Haggard...
to intern the mutineers and to hand over the Hungarian ships to the Serbs. Later, those interned were transported to Serbia as prisoners of war and were freed in September and October of that year. Subsequently, prize money was distributed and Captain Haggard received £142 (Margitay-Becht, 2007: 250-252).

In reaction to the Ludovika uprising and the Monitor Mutiny the regime resorted to large-scale reprisals. This became known as the Red Terror and seriously reduced domestic support for the government. The communist regime collapsed six weeks after the uprisings. On 25 June, in the barracks of the Flotilla in Óbuda, an assembly was held to condemn the counter-revolution. The communist workers and sailors clamored for harsh punishment for the mutineers and wanted to execute them on the parade ground of the barracks (Újság, 1919). Fearing an attack by the mutineers, the Danube Guard laid a new mine barrage three kilometers south of Uszód. During this operation, the minelayer Bácska struck one of her own mines and sank (Csonkárt, 1980: 215).

Conclusions

The two uprisings of 24 June were isolated, badly organized, and without any chance of success. The participants in the Monitor Mutiny were very naive in their belief that showing the National Flag would spur all citizens of Budapest to rise against the communist regime. This naivety was also evident in their belief that the British would help them to fight against the reds.

When the Romanian troops left Budapest in November 1919, all the remaining Hungarian river warships were transferred to Serb, Croat, and Slovene command. In 1920, the Entente Powers returned four patrol boats to Hungary and in that year the Royal Hungarian River Guard was founded.

Under the conservative regime of Governor Horthy (1920-1944), the mutineers did not become real heroes due to their different political aims in 1919. After 1945, the mutineers became reactionaries or "Horthy-fascists." Today, the mutiny and the mutineers are largely forgotten. Csicsery and Mahr, the officers killed at Paks, have a memorial plaque on the wall of the former barracks of the river Flotilla in Óbuda. The last survivor of the mutiny is the museum ship Lajta, which is the honorary flagship of the small Hungarian river Flotilla.

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1 On the other hand, in 1919, British naval officers in Baja erected a column beside the graves of the two fallen Hungarian officers using their own money.


Introduction

The Julian Region was the subject of a protracted territorial dispute between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Italy, and after the Second World War clarifying the status of this region became even more complex due to the interests of the great powers. Yugoslav and Allied Forces entered Trieste on 1 May 1945 almost simultaneously, causing a crisis that threatened to produce an armed conflict between Yugoslav and Allied Forces. The crisis was addressed in Belgrade on 9 June 1945 when Yugoslavia signed an Agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States; and this was followed by an Agreement in Devin on 20 June between the Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean and the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army (Milkic, 2016: 141-160). The Julian Region was occupied and divided into Zone A, which was an area under the authority of the Anglo-American Military Administration (the British XIII Corps and the US 88th Infantry Division), and Zone B which was under the control of the Yugoslav Military Administration. When the Peace Treaty with Italy entered into force on 15 September 1947, the Free Territory of Trieste was formed as an internationally recognized state whose territorial integrity and independence was guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council ("Ukaz o ratifikaciji Ugovora o miru sa Italijom", 1947: 1001-1085). Due to the impossibility of choosing a governor for the entire area, a division was upheld between Yugoslav and Anglo-American areas until the Agreement of 5 October 1954, which resolved the Trieste crisis and divided the Free Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Article 4 of the Peace Treaty defined the border between Italy and the Free Territory of Trieste, while Article 22 dealt with the border between Yugoslavia and the Free Territory. (Milkić, 2014: 105-122). The Free Territory’s area was 738 square
kilometers (Anglo-American Zone 222, Yugoslav Zone 516); the length of the land border with Yugoslavia was 84 kilometers; and the border with Italy was 4 kilometers long. The Free Territory of Trieste had 128 kilometers of coastline. According to statistics from the summer of 1946, there were 164,226 inhabitants in Zone B – of whom 39,219 were engaged in agriculture, and 6,942 in industry (Prinčič, 2007: 425-432). Agriculture was the most important branch of the economy, and the main feature of the Zone B economy was its inter-connected dependence on Yugoslavia (Dukovski, 2005: 183-199; Prinčič, 2008: 147-160; Milkić, 2010: 13-38). Apart from the development of other branches of agriculture, pig breeding was improved, licensing and selection of bulls were introduced, the noble breeds of cattle were imported, and milk control was introduced. In 1949, the number of cattle exceeded pre-state levels by 20% and milk production increased by 7%.

In the following year, pork exports reached 3,000 which set a new record. With the help of a well-organized veterinary service, the Yugoslav Military Administration paid great attention to the suppression of contagious livestock diseases.

There were many problems in relations between the Yugoslav and Allied Military Administrations, and these were primarily related to economic issues and the turnover of the population, which was up to 15,000 people daily (Milkić, 2014: 105-122). Economic relations between the two Zones were determined by the Devin Agreement, which regulated the jurisdiction and principles of the joint Yugoslav-Anglo-American Economic Commission. After 15 September 1947 and the Peace Treaty’s entry into force, the number of border incidents on the Yugoslav-Italian border increased. At this time, there were already 12 current border disputes and 18 disputes that were resolved. During the first year of the Free Territory of Trieste, the Yugoslav Army Military Administration recorded a total of 33 incidents on a demarcation line between the Yugoslav and Anglo-American Zones. The method of issuing travel permits allowing Yugoslav citizens entry to the Slovene Littoral, Trieste, Gorizia and Istria was regulated by a decision from the Ministry of Interior of 28 September 1945. Citizens who travelled to Zone A in the direction Ljubljana-Trieste obtained the declaration for entering the territory of the Allied Military Administration from the authorized officer of the Yugoslav Army Military Administration in Postojna. If travelling in the direction Rijeka-Trieste, a pass declaration was supposed to be obtained from the Yugoslav Military Administration in Opatija. The existence of the Free Territory of Trieste caused many violations of Yugoslav airspace by American and British planes flying from Austria to Italy. Freedom of movement and trade was also hindered by the occasional occurrence of cattle diseases in the Julian Region.

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1 Military Archive Belgrade, VU-1, 1368, 4, 1/2.
3 Military Archive Belgrade, VU-1, 1368, 2, 1/88-1/90.
4 Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia, Political archive, 1945, box 14, No. 5789.
The outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 1946

On 5 March 1946, the British Embassy informed the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Allied Military Authorities had submitted a report on the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the Julian Region.1 According to their information, typhus (Typhus Abdominalis) appeared in Zone B at the same time. Given that there was no possibility of checking the state of contagious diseases in the entire territory of the Julian Region, Allied Military Authorities, for the purposes of preventive action, proposed a periodic exchange of information and periodic consultation with the appropriate Yugoslav Authorities in Zone B in order to coordinate control measures against the epidemic. The British Embassy declared that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) were cooperating in this business as well. At the end of the announcement, it was proposed that the Yugoslav government designate an official who would go to Trieste to agree with the Allied Military Authorities on the substance of the agreement that should be reached. The information on the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, as well as typhus in Zone B, was also received on 9 March by the US Embassy in Belgrade.2 It was emphasized that medics of the XIII corps had no prior knowledge of the sources of these epidemics – neither location nor key indicators – so they were not in a position to organize preventive measures. The US Embassy proposed sending a Yugoslav official to Trieste for the purpose of liaising with the XIII Corps officials about occasional counselling on cooperation regarding the control of the epidemic between the Health Authorities of Zone A and Zone B, and the occasional exchange of information between the Health Authorities of the two Zones. On 9 March, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the Health Department of the Yugoslav Army General Staff and asked for an opinion on the response that should be given to the British Embassy.3 On 11 March, the Head of the Fifth Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Cerovic, submitted the text of the British declaration with proposals for suppression of the relevant epidemics to the Health Department of the Yugoslav Army General Staff and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.4

Since tackling these issues was within the competence of the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of National Defence, the Deputy Chief of the Health Department, Colonel Dr. Dura Mešterović, submitted the entire case to this department on 11 March.5 On 12 March, in a response signed by Minister Dr. Vaso Ćubrilović, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry pointed out that foot-and-mouth disease is a readily transmissible infectious disease, which at that moment had not spread to the territory of Yugoslavia on the Zone B borders (in Croatia and

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1 Ibid., 1946, box 39, No. XXXIX/3.
3 Ibid, No. XXXIX/4.
5 Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia, Political archive, 1946, box 39, No XXXIX/15.
Therefore, this Ministry emphasized the need to implement the most comprehensive veterinary and sanitary measures possible in order to prevent the spread of this infection into the Yugoslav territory. Its statement also noted the need for full cooperation between Yugoslav Veterinary Authorities and the Veterinary Authorities of Allied Military Authorities in Zone A where the infection emerged. The ensuing suggestion was that the bodies of the Yugoslav Veterinary Service should contact the Allied Military Authorities in Trieste to reach an agreement on common measures that would be taken to prevent this disease. Thus, pending the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry indicated that it would appoint a veterinary expert who would travel to Trieste and do the job. Equally, the Ministry committed itself to informing, in a special letter, the Ministry of Agriculture of Croatia and Slovenia about the epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in Zone A, in order to take the necessary measures to prevent the spread of the infection into Yugoslav territory.

On 15 March, an Act containing the text of the American statement was submitted to the Sanitary Department of the Yugoslav Army General Staff and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry by Cerović. He communicated the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the necessity of accepting the suggestions of the US and British embassies regarding cooperation, noting it was an essential policy for the people and the economy of the Julian Region.

On the same day, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Rede Rudolf, the Head of the Veterinary Department, approved the position that there was a need to take the necessary measures to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He stated that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, through its Veterinary Bodies, should work with the Allied Military Authorities, and that he would issue an order to the Veterinary Bodies of the Fourth Army to cooperate in its field on this issue.

Once an agreement had been reached about the necessity of cooperating with the Anglo-American Military Authorities, the competent Yugoslav ministries worked to harmonize the best forms of cooperation. On 19 March, the Deputy Head of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, O. Juranić, confirmed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry that it was necessary to appoint a veterinary expert who would work on site in Trieste to contact Allied Military Authorities and undertake joint measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease in the Julian Region. Juranić asked the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry for the timely appointment of a vet who would prepare for the task awaiting in Trieste. Having consulted with the Ministry of Agriculture of the National Republic of Slovenia, the Head of the Department of Veterinary Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture

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2 Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia, Political archive, 1946, box 39, No 2740.
3 Ibid., No. 2768.
4 Ibid., No. 2768.
5 Ibid., No. 2788.
and Forestry, Milutin Gec, announced on 22 March that a veterinary surgeon, Dr. Lojze Gunde, an official of the Veterinary Department of the National Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Agriculture, had been appointed to cooperate with the Allied Military Authorities.1

Concerning the information on the typhus epidemic in Zone B submitted by Allied Military Authorities on 11 March, Colonel Dr. Mešterović informed the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of National Defence that the Medical Department would take the necessary measures in cooperation with the Medical Department of the Fourth Army.2 On 15 March, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed the information about typhus in Zone A and Zone B of the Julian Region to the Sanitary Department of the Ministry of National Defence and requested an urgent situation report on the ground.3 On 19 March, the Head of the Hygienic and Epidemiological Section of the Department of the Ministry of National Defence, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Černozubov, signed an Act in which the Veterinary Department of the Ministry of National Defence was informed that the field trials found no typhoid sufferers in Zone B, and that it was established through circumstantial evidence that epidemics were not present even in Zone A.4 On 22 March, Colonel Dr. Mešterović conveyed this information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.5

Cooperation with the Anglo-American Military Authorities in the field was enabled even prior to the Yugoslav veterinarian’s official referral to Trieste. Directives were issued to a veterinary director of the Fourth Army to cooperate, if there was a need, with the Allied Military Authorities in combating foot-and-mouth disease. Collaboration with the Civilian Veterinary Bodies of the Republic of Slovenia was also mandated. In terms of the epidemiological situation in military units located in the Fourth Army’s area, Lieutenant Colonel Roda Rudolf reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 March that there was no evidence of infectious diseases up to that moment.6

The official announcement of the adoption of a proposal to coordinate disease-control activities in the Julian Region was made on 3 April, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the British and US embassies that Dr. Lojze Gunde had been appointed to be the Yugoslav representative. He stood ready to come to Trieste and awaited only the granting of an entry permit for Zone A.7 On 11 April, the British Embassy expressed its satisfaction with the fact that the Yugoslav government was ready to send its representative to Trieste.8 The Embassy’s communiqué expressed Allied approval for the entry of Dr. Gunde into Zone A and stated that after arriving in Trieste, he should report to the UNRRA representative in the ad-

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1 Ibid., No. 3268.
2 Ibid., No. XXXIX/15.
3 Ibid., No. 3164.
4 Ibid., No. 913.
5 Ibid., No. 3164.
6 Ibid., No. 3400.
7 Ibid., No. 2530 and No. 2740.
8 Ibid., No. 4033.
miralty building. On 15 April, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the British Embassy's statement and thanked them for obtaining the approval for the departure of a Yugoslav representative to Trieste.¹ On the same day, the Head of the Fifth Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. Krulj, submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry the English Military Authorities’ approval for Dr. Gunde’s journey, with the remark that he needed to set off as soon as possible.² On 17 April, the Yugoslav Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Slovenia the approval pertaining to Dr. Gunde.³ A special Act ensued from this Ministry by which Dr. Gunde was designated for this task.

In Ljubljana, on 25 April, Milan Dolenc, the Head of the Veterinary Department of the National Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Agriculture, sent information to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Belgrade, which enabled Dr. Gunde to receive instructions and travel to Trieste.⁴ He had his first meeting with the Allied Military government on 26 April.⁵ Dr. Gunde informed his ministry in Ljubljana about the details of the meeting and on 17 May the report was sent to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The information on the meeting in Trieste was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 May, together with the positive opinion of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry regarding the agreement reached at the meeting on joint engagement on the fight against animal diseases. It was resolved that on the 1st and 15th of every month there would be a mutual submission of reports between Zone A and Zone B on the movement of livestock diseases.

Livestock diseases in the Free Territory of Trieste

The protection enacted concerning cattle diseases in the Julian Region implied the cooperation of the Yugoslav government with the Italian government. The first initiative on the Yugoslav side was started on 9 December 1947 through an office in Rome related to the regulation of rail transport, which was also supposed to regulate the functioning of the veterinary and phytopathological services.⁶ Various pre-war bilateral treaties based on Article 44 of the Peace Treaty had their importance extended by the Yugoslav government on 25 February 1948 – and among these was the Convention on animal diseases signed on 12 August 1924 in Belgrade.⁷ From 1-10 November 1948, a conference of representatives from the Ministries of Transport, Agriculture, Interior Affairs, Foreign Trade, and the Post of the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia was held in Trieste with corresponding representatives of the Allied Military Administration in order to regulate the bor-

¹ Ibid., No. 4033.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia, Political archive, 1946, box 39, No. 5789.
⁶ Ibid., 1948, box 70, No. 423754.
⁷ Službeni list, 74, 3 September 1949, pp. 1054.
nder railway traffic and other problems related to it. The conference concluded a provisional agreement regulating border crossing services for passengers, as well as luggage and goods traffic between the Allied Military Administration and Yugoslav state railways. The Agreement — in principle — regulated the customs service, veterinary service, phytopathological service, and postal service. Since the material of the Border Veterinary Service could not be regulated by one Article, the Interim Agreement on Border Veterinary Service between Yugoslavia and the Allied Military Administration was concluded as a separate Annex to that Agreement. On 29 December 1948, the Ministry of Agriculture gave its consent to this Veterinary Agreement. On 1 January 1949, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Yugoslav Economic Delegation in Trieste to convey to the Federal Army Administration that the Yugoslav government agreed with the Agreement on the Border Veterinary Service between Yugoslavia and Zone A. On 4 February 1949, the Head of the Yugoslav Economic Delegation, Dr. Franz Hočevar, informed the Federal Military Administration that the Yugoslav Authorities concurred with the Agreement, thus bringing it into force.

The Allied Military Administration regularly provided reports within the framework of the agreed exchange of information on the condition of animal diseases. Accordingly, the relevant report on veterinary diseases in Zone A for the period from 1 January to 15 January 1949 was sent to the Yugoslav Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry by the Yugoslav Military Administration on 24 January 1949. In addition, the Yugoslav Military Administration received newsletters about infections and veterinary diseases in Zone A. In December 1948, the Military Administration registered one case of anthrax caused by the bacterium *bacillus anthracis* in Zone B; seven cases of swine fever in the district of Kopar caused by classical swine fever virus (CSFV); and 60 cases of swine fever which had been registered in the Buje district. On 5 January 1949, the Main Staff of the Allied Military Administration in Trieste submitted the Bulletins of Infections and Veterinary Infections in December 1948 in Zone A to the Veterinary Commission of the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army. During this period, there was one pre-existing and one new case of pseudo erysipelas (a diffuse inflammation of the skin) in Trieste. A pre-existing instance of the same disease was reported in Devin in Nabrezina, as well as an ongoing case of swine fever in Zgonik.

On 4 February 1949, Hočevar informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Federal Military Administration had proceeded as per the Temporary Veterinary Agreement, and had advised the Yugoslav Economic Delegation that the municipality of Trieste was the center of the less complex form of foot-and-mouth disease. He asked Foreign Affairs to inform the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry about

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2. Ibid., No. 42539.
3. Ibid., box 105, No. 42179.
4. Ibid., No. 42179.
5. Ibid., No. 42179.
On 26 February 1949, the Economic Delegation submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a veterinary bulletin for the first half of February 1949, which it had received from the Allied Military Administration. Due to animal-borne infectious foot-and-mouth disease in Italian villages along the border, the Yugoslav-Italian border was closed from November 1951 to March 1952 between the province of Gorizia and Yugoslavia for the passage of farm-owners on both sides of the border. Livestock disease was soon transferred to Yugoslav territory where 25 livestock were infected. Hence, Yugoslav and Italian vets met and agreed to close the crossings for farm-owners on both sides of the border until the disease was eradicated. Throughout the duration of the infection, vets at the border met several times and consulted on further measures. The commander of the Yugoslav Army’s Military Administration, Colonel Miloš Stamatović, informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 February 1952 that despite the measures which had been taken at the crossings through the demarcation line, livestock infectious disease had spread from Zone A to Zone B in several villages in the Koper region. Due to the danger of disease spreading further, the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army banned the flow of motorway and maritime traffic between the Yugoslav and Anglo-American Zones on 15 February. The prohibition was not imposed on officials of the Yugoslav and Allied Military Administrations, nor on persons with diplomatic passports and foreign travelers. Freight traffic by sea was free only through the port of Piran. The Yugoslav Military Administration informed the Allied Military Administration about the measures taken. On 6 March, the crossings of the relevant farm-owners were opened again, but three crossings remained closed because the Italian side of the sector was still impacted by infectious disease. Other crossings on the Italian side were open to transit of persons, provided the persons were not from the infected sector. In response to the measures taken by the Yugoslav government, on 14 March 1952 the Italian office requested information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about such actions, with the request that the transit of persons should not be disturbed through the total closure of all border crossings. Once the Ministry of Interior had informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the measures taken to suppress foot-and-mouth disease, the note was sent to the Italian Office on 24 April 1952.

Border closure and various restrictions affected the flow of people and goods. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav and Allied Military Administration tried to provide an unobstructed trade exchange. Cross-border trade between Zone A and Zone B in the period from 1 October to 31 December 1951 was 15% higher than in the previous three months. After being banned due to foot-and-mouth disease, the import

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1 Ibid., box 106, No. 42289.
2 Ibid., No. 44054.
3 Ibid., 1952, box 86, No. 45159.
4 Ibid., No. 45159.
5 Ibid, No. 45159.
6 Ibid., No. 414883.
of cows and bulls from Zone B began to re-start in this trimester. In the period from 1 January to 31 March 1952 – despite a border closure between two Zones from 13 February to 7 March due to foot-and-mouth disease in Zone B – trade increased by 20% compared to the previous three months.\(^1\) Imports were around 58 million liras, while exports reached 47 million liras a month.

**Conclusion**

The suppression of livestock diseases in the Julian Region and its surrounds between 1946 and 1954 reflected the specific status afforded to this region. Mindful of its foreign policy commitment to resolve the Trieste crisis by uniting the Julian Region, the Yugoslav government tried to protect its economic as well as political interests in the area through its fight against livestock diseases. Cooperation with the Allied Military Administration was initially hampered by the lack of adequate contractual obligations enabling cooperation, as well as by mutual mistrust. Although the Devin Agreement defined the modalities of cooperation between the two Military Administrations, the Yugoslav government started full-capacity cooperation only after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty in September 1947. Appropriate measures for the protection of animal diseases were applied at the border to Italy. The process of establishing the Free Territory of Trieste coincided with the restoration of Yugoslav-Italian diplomatic relations, which facilitated cooperation in the Julian Region quite considerably and introduced these new cooperative parameters into international legal frameworks. The engagement of the Yugoslav government in the fight against animal diseases in the Julian Region was based on Agreements between the Yugoslav Army Military Administration and the Allied Military Administration or it was present within the framework of the Yugoslav-Italian Bilateral Agreements.

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THE ROLE OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES
IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: 1907-1944

Introduction
This paper will seek to analyze the role played by the Romanian Armed Forces in managing the main domestic crises which broke out between 1907 and 1944 and decipher the circumstances which shaped the practical involvement of the military in domestic affairs. The main research hypothesis starts from the assumption that the use of the Armed Forces answered to a complex network of factors, both internal and external, and was made in accordance with specific legal procedures regulating the state’s responsibilities to secure internal stability and order. The article’s research parameters have been selected for both practical and historical reasons. First, there is the need to analyze the political fabric of the Romanian state which gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877, opening a new chapter in the political evolution of the country. Confronted with multiple lines of vulnerability at both internal and external levels, the Armed Forces were to become both the guarantor of internal order and the protector of the democratic political regime. Subsequently, the crisis that broke out in 1907 represented the most serious and dramatic internal crisis facing the newly-emerged Romanian state which had far-reaching political and social consequences. In turn, 1944 can be viewed as the end of an era and the beginning of a new chapter in Romania's history leading – in just a few years – to the establishment of the Communist regime and the integration of the country into Moscow’s hegemonic sphere. Against this background, the Armed Forces became a highly politicized tool as part of the Communist apparatus and its role was under strict Party control. From this perspective, the role and responsibilities of the Armed Forces need to be studied with a distinct paradigm since their conceptual framework changed significantly after 1945-1947.

The Legal Framework
At the beginning of the 20th century, Romania lacked an articulated legal framework to regulate the role and missions of the Armed Forces in domestic affairs during peace time. The first important legal document was adopted on December 10, 1864 when the law concerning the state of siege was approved by Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the ruler (domn) of Romanian Principalities. It should be mentioned that the Romanian legal system at the time was largely influenced by the French model, the
law of December 1864 being in fact a translated copy of the French law of 1849 (Serban, 2005: 38). According to Article 1: “the state of siege can be declared only in case of an imminent danger against the order and public safety”. Additionally, Article 4 stipulates that the government could, in such extreme internal situations, transfer to the military authority, partially or entirely, the responsibilities belonging to the civilian authorities to preserve public order. The “military authority” was to include commandants of army corps and any commandant of big unit (division level) which integrates under its subordination a military court (Sperlea, 2014).

The Constitution of 1866 did not make additional stipulations regarding the specific conditions under which the Armed Forces could be engaged in handling internal crisis. It was not until 1907 that new provisions were introduced in order to regulate the domestic responsibilities of the Armed Forces. The background was provided by the critical situation generated by the Romanian Peasants’ Revolt which broke out in 1907. Against this backdrop, on March 15, 1907, a new document was adopted called: “Instructions concerning the use of the army in case of internal turbulence. Summon. State of siege” (Hamangiu, 1907). Article 1 of the law stated that: “The army is due to intervene whenever is necessary to maintain the state’s public order and the internal security at the request of the civilian authorities as well as at its own initiative.” Article 2 developed specific situations when the involvement of the army was considered necessary, namely in cases of civil unrest, disorder, “noisy and threatening” gatherings, or disturbances affecting the public order. Since the law contained some unclear stipulations concerning the procedures for endorsing the state of siege, large segments of the civilian authorities could easily make use of it: these included ministers, local authorities, mayors and their deputies, members of the Public Ministry, police officers, county police, and board guard officers. Inevitably, this deficiency allowed a misuse of the legal framework by the civilian authorities so that the use of the military was to become the rule rather than the exception.

In 1912 new legal instructions were published under the name: “Ministerial instructions concerning the use of the Armed Forces in case of civilian turbulence” which significantly extended the competences of the Armed Forces in internal affairs. According to the new stipulations, if a state of siege was endorsed, the responsibilities of the civilian and police authorities to protect the public order were to be taken over by the military which had the ability to act as it deemed necessary.

The Constitution of 1923 sought to establish a general frame for the juridical regulations regarding the responsibilities to protect internal order and security. Article 128 of the Constitution mentioned that “in case of danger, the state of siege can be established, partially or generally”, but it stopped short of providing clear regulations on the responsibilities of the military which, nevertheless, was to remain the main authority in such specific situations (Muraru and Iancu, 1995:81). It is important to mention that the Constitution of 1923 did not clarify the way in which the state of siege could be established, since the term used was “in case of necessity” which allowed a broader reading of the text. The new Constitution recognized
the right of the Parliament to endorse the state of siege (regardless the law of 1864 which recognized the ruler (domn) as being the responsible authority).

On February 4, 1933, the Parliament adopted the “Law on authorizing a state of siege” which stated that the Government could establish a state of siege, for a 6-month period, at any time it considered appropriate. This stipulation allowed the governmental authorities to use the Armed Forces largely unrestrictedly and to extend the legislative regulatory framework by adopting additional decrees and laws that made the military a tool to be used to counter any situation perceived as being a potential risk to internal security. It is worth mentioning that Romania, after 1918, had to deal with a multitude of internal challenges generated by growing strategic uncertainty and, therefore, the governmental authorities found it easy to read the existing law regulation in a broader manner leading to the establishment of a quasi-permanent state of siege (Floarea, 2005: 52).

The circumstances shaping the internal crises

Romania’s internal stability in the first half of the 20th century was greatly affected by the eruption of a series of crises. Some of them are especially important to our understanding of the circumstances in which the army was called to play an active role in domestic affairs: the peasants’ mutiny (February 21- April 5, 1907); the workers’ revolt (1919-1920); the Hotin uprising (January/February 1919); the Tatar Bunar uprising (September 1924); the Grivita strike (February 1933); the Palace coup of September 6, 1940; the legionnaires’ rebellion (January 1941); and the coup d’état of August 23, 1944.

While there are particular features which characterize each of the afore-mentioned crises, all of them were part of a complex and complicated configuration which shaped the internal dynamics of the Romanian state.

External factors

At the end of the Great War, Romania reached its national historical goal through the territorial unification of the country which integrated the territories of Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. The new territorial configuration soon became a highly fraught issue as regional security started to deteriorate and was subjected to rising revisionist regional ambitions. Romania’s borders became the target of its revisionist neighbors, namely Soviet Russia in the east, Hungary in the west, and Bulgaria in the south, each of them aiming at reshaping the post-war territorial status-quo against Romania. Facing multiple challenges around its borders, Romania was extremely anxious about any action which could generate domestic instability and sought to avoid situations which could encourage the neighboring revisionist countries to use any internal weakness to undermine the state’s national security. This explains why preserving internal order by any means – including the use of the military – was viewed as a top priority.

Subsequently, the shifting external dynamics played a significant part in shaping the military pattern of behavior in domestic affairs. By the end of 1930s, the
outbreak of the Second World War started to profoundly challenge Romania’s security posture. Under the pressures of military dynamics, Romania had to find alternatives for its survival – moving from the Western security system (after its collapse in 1940) to an alliance with Nazi Germany formed in November 1940 (as the only option to counter the Soviet threat) to joining the United Nations in August 1944. Due to the critical military situation, maintaining internal stability became an imperative invoked to avoid a political vacuum that could undermine Romania’s war effort. Within this configuration, one could integrate the changing typology of military involvement in domestic affairs by engaging in the internal political struggle and assuming a prominent role in the country’s leadership.

Hybrid factors

The rise of the Bolshevik regime in Russia and the establishment of the Third Internationale added a new major cause of concern in Bucharest. At the time, the terminology of hybrid warfare was unknown but a close look at the tactics used by the Bolsheviks against Romania in the first half of the 20th century shows that the hybrid pattern was employed by Soviet Russia against Romania as a strategy to undermine the state institutions and create internal islands of instability and disorder. Starting in 1919-1920, Romania became the subject of an ample revisionist and offensive agenda orchestrated by Moscow based on three main coordinates: (1) to spread the Bolshevik revolution; (2) to destabilize the country; (3) to undermine the country’s territorial integrity. This was especially worrying since the Soviet Union never recognized Romania’s post-WWI eastern border (namely the unification of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina with Romania) and never ceased to claim its territorial rights over these territories. Moreover, in July 1924, the Comintern adopted a plan which aimed to trigger a large-scale operation against Romania using both military force and subversive instruments (Raus et al, 2017: 13). Unlike classical military threats, the new hybrid strategy used by the Bolsheviks was based on a complex mechanism of subversion, propaganda, manipulation, and disinformation. The main goal was to create instability from the inside and weaken the ability of the state’s institutions to react. These actions overlapped with growing attempts or operations conducted by Moscow’s sponsored groups which aimed to provoke internal uprisings wherein the main goal was to create artificial territorial entities and facilitate the occupation of pieces of Romanian territory. A key element of the new strategy was to mobilize the support of local Communist sympathizers. The Communist influence was especially high among the working class where the Romanian communists succeed in acquiring significant power over the trade unions. The main activities conducted by the Communists, under Moscow’s guidance, were especially focused on anti-system propaganda, creating divisions among the workers, and encouraging workers’ revolts and rebellions against the government. The Communist local leaders came to play a prominent role in fomenting social unrest based on a scenario directed by Moscow following well-known tactics of subversion, propaganda and violence. Hence, fear of Bolshevik influence had
greatly increased by the mid-1920s and the situation came to be viewed as a critical security threat. This context was a vital influence on the political decision to deploy military force in dealing with this new source of internal danger.

Socio-economic factors
At the beginning of the 20th century, Romania was transitioning from being a mostly medieval economy to a capitalist and market economy. The “stress” of modernization had profound effects, leading to a deeply divided economy and an increasingly polarized society. The economy was essentially dominated by wealthy elites with large business interests who controlled and defined the political agenda based on their own political and financial interests (Miroiu, 2016: 35). At the opposite end of the spectrum was a majority of the population who struggled to subsist. At the turn of the century, 80% of the population still lived rurally and was subject to various forms of exploitation by the big landowners who owned the largest share of the country’s wealth. Moreover, lack of medical assistance, the high rate of death and illiteracy, as well as poor hygiene conditions deeply affected the daily life of the peasants. At the same time, the modest but growing industrialization process gave birth to a dynamic working class. Their living conditions resembled those experienced by agricultural workers. The working class was struggling with poverty, low wages, and poor working conditions, which deepened the already existing fault lines in society. This brought into existence an abyss within society at large which reached critical dimensions during the Great Depression of 1929. The workers’ uprisings of 1920, 1929, and 1933 integrated a significant economic dimension grounded in the growing social discontent and economic alienation among the working class, although this was only a piece of a more complex configuration which determined their specific framework of action and explained the course of further developments. Bucharest’s main concern was that the social turmoil could generate growing political instability and encourage foreign forces to use the discontent of the population to weaken the state’s security.

Political factors
This factor integrates the deep polarization of the political scene and the growing political instability which weakened the ability of state institutions to manage the domestic crisis. It also includes the incapacity of the political elite to develop responsible, well-articulated economic and social policies capable of meeting the basic needs of the population. An illustrative fact here is that between 1918 and 1938 there were over 25 separate governments, some of which were in power for just a few days or weeks (Mamina and Scurtu, 1996). The instability of the government affected its capacity to manage the multiple internal crisis and, therefore, 

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1 Due to the impact of the economic crisis, industrial production dropped by 37%, trade fell to one third of its previous level, and nearly 500 factories entered bankruptcy (Mamina and Scurtu, 1996: 71). As a result, almost a third of the industrial labor force became unemployed. The social downfall is starkly evident when we consider the fact that there were 370 industrial strikes which deeply shook the social and political stability of the country (Ban, 2011: 315).
the military option was regarded as the most convenient method of managing the rising internal challenges. In addition to the instability of the governments, by the 1930s relations between King Carol II and the main democratic forces became very tense while the radical-extremist forces gained considerable influence and appeal among the population. The struggle between the main democratic forces and King Carol II – whose plan was to establish a dictatorial regime – led to a deep division of the political scene. By 1938, the King dissolved the Parliament, imposed single-party rule, and effectively ended the long-standing constitutional regime. This development further weakened the democratic regime and the responsible state institutions along with their ability to efficiently address growing domestic and external challenges. This became especially worrisome once geopolitical dynamics changed rapidly with the outbreak of the Second World War, leaving Romania in a security vacuum and highly exposed to the aggressive ambitions of its revisionist neighboring powers. The political crises generated by the new emerging strategic realities installed the military as a key player in the complicated internal political games.

Military Engagement in Handling Domestic Crises: Case Studies

1. The peasants’ mutiny took place between 21 February and 5 April 1907. The revolt started in northern Moldovia (the north-eastern part of Romania) but it quickly spread to southern regions and covered the entire country. Given the size of the movement, this is widely considered the last major peasants’ crisis in Europe. There was a clear economic background to the peasants’ revolt since it was largely an expression of the deep discontent among the peasants due to their difficult working and living conditions. Why, though, did the revolt turn into a major internal crisis which required the brutal intervention of the Armed Forces? Following the government’s order on February 26, 1907, the 13th Regiment Dorobanti was sent to crush the insurgents in Barlad (Moldavia). Facing the rapid spread of the movement, all units of the 4th Army Corps were mobilized. Then, on March 3, 1907, the Command of the troops for maintaining order was established in Iasi (Serban, 2005: 39). The scale of the revolt, which extended towards Bucharest, generated a deep political crisis resulting in the removal of the Conservative government led by Gheorghe Gr. Cantacuzino. The outgoing government was replaced with a Liberal government led by D.A. Sturdza. Amid the political crisis, the revolt took a more violent turn, and the main confrontation between the insurgents and the Armed Forces took place in close proximity to the capital on March 12 (Sperlea et al, 2007: 9). Against this background, General Alexandru Averescu – who was appointed as minister of War – pledged a firm military intervention against the insurgents to restore order and avoid a further surge of chaos. He was to play an important role in the decision to engage the Armed Forces and in starting the practical preparations for the intervention. On March 13, 1907 order no. 6 from the Minister of War addressed the army corps regarding the measures to be taken to crush the revolt. One day later, on March 14, an additional order was issued by the Minister on the use of weapons and artillery against the insurgents (Roller, 1948: 803-804). On March
18, 1907, at the request of General Averescu, a law concerning the state of siege was declared which in fact allowed the elaboration of operational plans against the insurgents. By the end of March, with the intervention of the Armed Forces, the revolt was defeated and public order restored. The role of the Armed Forces was praised by King Carol I who on March 29, 1907 issued a special order stating that: “due to the army’s decisive action a great trouble was removed and order has been promptly restored” (Sperlea et al, 2007: 30).

Nevertheless, the army intervention led to vivid debates concerning what was called the brutality of the Armed Forces. The scale of the repression – the data indicates around 11,000-13,000 peasants killed – remains a subject of major controversy. To what extent was the revolt a threat to internal security? It is obvious that most of the groups were spontaneous and they lacked a coordinated platform of action. Their action did not aim at undermining the political order and their claims were primarily economically-driven. The reasons behind the government decision to use military force seem to stem from the rapid development and the large-scale dynamic of the crisis, the fear of internal chaos, and growing concerns that foreign powers might attempt to manipulate the revolt to destabilize the country. The rumors concerning possible infiltrations of foreign agents (from Austro-Hungary and Russia) within the revolt made matters even worse. It is significant that King Carol I justified the army intervention as a “state’s requirement” (Sperlea et al, 2007: 30). While internal security was seriously challenged, the extensive loss of life made the case for military intervention a highly contentious issue. The fact that the authorities destroyed documents containing the evidence of the military actions against the insurgents – and here the role of King Carol I cannot be ignored – left many unanswered questions concerning the 1907 event.

2. The Khotyn uprising took place between January 20 and February 1, 1919 in the northern part of the country (Khotyn county). This was the first attempt conducted from the outside to seize forcibly a piece of Romanian territory by employing both armed rebellion and hybrid tactics. The revolt was largely an action conducted by state actors – Bolshevik Russia and the Ukrainian Popular Republic – and non-state actors like the White Movement (Kiritscu, 1989: 439; Rotari, 2005: 107). The fact that most of the population in the Khotyn area was of Ukrainian origin was used as a source of pressure from the inside. The goal was to encourage and use the nationalistic feelings of the Ukrainian population from northern Bessarabia in order to turn popular opinion against the Romanian authorities and boost their call for self-determination with a view to joining the emerging Ukrainian state.

The Third Internationale played an important role here and became increasingly active via a special general staff headquarters created in Harkov and a secondary headquarters established in Odessa (Tatarescu, 1996: 76). The plan of action was articulated along three main lines: (1) to organize armed attacks across Dniester in order to keep Romanian forces engaged on the Dniester border; (2) to conduct a permanent campaign of harassing the population; and (3) to attack institutions and weaken their credibility in the eyes of the people (Tatarescu, 1996: 76-77). The
implementation of this plan had started in an articulated way by 1919-1920 with the immediate goal of extending the Bolshevik revolution into Bessarabia.

The attacks of the rebels in the Khotyn area started on January 20, 1919. Armed groups of 200-300 people crossed the Dniester river and launched military actions along the entire Dniester border which became virtually a theater of war. On January 23, Khotyn was occupied by the rebels who established the Khotyn Directorate consisting of 5 persons who took over the political leadership of the area. Most of the Ukrainian population joined the rebel forces and started an internal uprising against the Romanian authorities. For Romania the situation was especially complicated due to the rapid deterioration of strategic conditions at its Western border where the Bolshevik regime of Bela Kun seized power in Hungary (Rotari, 2005: 121).

Facing a rapid decline in territorial security, Bucharest decided to use military force as the means of restoring territorial order. The Romanian military operations against the insurgents started on January 28, 1919. Their main goal – as General Schina, the Commandant of the 1st cavalry division put it – was “to clear the county of any Bolshevik gang, to punish with the strongest harshness the rebellious populations, to make any recidivist actions impossible and to recover Khotyn” (Stanescu, 1995: 24). On February 1, the Romanian troops led by General Davidoglu liberated Khotyn county and restored order. The Bolshevik armed groups withdrew to a position 25 kilometers from Dniester (Kiritescu, 1989: 440). On February 7, 1919, General Prezan issued an order stating that circumstances required that firm measures be taken, including retaliation against any future incursions across the Dniester.

Although the Khotyn uprising included some local elements who instigated actions against the Romanian authorities and joined the rebel groups, the revolt was largely an action organized and conducted from the outside by Ukrainian nationalists and Bolsheviks. The primary goal was to cleave Bessarabia and Romania and change by force the territorial settlements which were agreed upon after the war. The Khotyn uprising was not only a matter of internal order but an existential issue which concerned the country's national security and the protection of territorial borders, all of which fueled justifications for the intervention of the army to suppress the rebellion.

3. The Tatar Bunar (Tatarbunary) revolt took place between 12 and 17 September 1924. Its implications were far-reaching – and it is widely asserted that this event represents the most prominent subversive action organized by a state (Soviet Russia) against another sovereign state in the period after the First World War. The historiography on the subject reveals that the revolt in Tatar Bunar was in fact a military operation organized and coordinated by the Comintern with Moscow’s direct involvement (Rotari, 2005: 238-240). The armed groups who engaged in the operation were trained and organized in Soviet Russia. The operation exhibited a hybrid pattern and integrated a mix of subversive and propaganda actions, acts of sabotage, disinformation, and espionage executed by internal Communist agents recruited among the local population who had covertly infiltrated the target areas/
villages with a Russian or Ukrainian majority to help with the preparations from the inside (Rotari, 2005: 244).

The rebellion evolved into the largest armed operation of its kind – targeting the territorial integrity of the Romanian state, seeking to destabilize south-eastern Moldavia as the starting point of a broader anti-Romanian offensive (Rotari, 2005: 238). The armed action was launched on 15-16 September 1924 by Bolshevik armed groups from across the Dniester leading to the seizure of Tatar Bunar village. A pro-Soviet revolutionary committee was created calling for the creation of a Moldavian Soviet Republic and an end to “Romanian occupation” (Otu, 1998). The attacks broadened to include the nearby villages and were followed by the establishment of Soviet-type institutions in the occupied areas. According to the estimates, there were 4,000-6,000 rebels involved, mainly Ukrainians and Russians (Rotari, 2005: 244).

The reaction of Romanian authorities was delayed due to the relative isolation of the region (Tanase, 2005: 80). The Romanian military intervention was launched on September 16, 1924 with the deployment of the artillery troops of the Romanian Army Third Corps. Two days later, the Romanian forces drove away the rebels from Tatar Bunar village and pushed them back beyond Dniester. Given the growing concerns regarding the security situation in southern Bessarabia, rear admiral Gavrilescu Anastasie moved the whole Danube fleet towards the Danube Delta to support the land troops and capture the groups of rebels who were trying to escape into the Soviet Union. After three days, the armed rebellion was suppressed and on September 19 the Romanian army restored order in southern Bessarabia. The operation resulted in 1,600 people arrested and 3,000 rebels killed, including some of their leaders. Furthermore, Royal Decree no. 3310 of October 5, 1925 introduced a state of siege in southern Bessarabia. Soon after, the Romanian Communist Party was de facto banned on December 17, 1924 (Marzescu Law), leading to the arrest of almost all Communist members and agents known in Romania (Tanase, 2005: 80).

4. The Workers’ strike at the Grivita Railway Workshops took place between early January and February 16, 1933. A mix of economic factors, political instability, and growing Communist subversive actions underpinned the outbreak of this workers’ uprising at Grivita railway workshops in Bucharest. According to the historical literature, initially the revolt did not have a violent character and the negotiations between the government and the strikers at the end of January reached a peaceful compromise. However, there was widespread fear in Bucharest that the strike was in fact an operation mounted by the Communists and had a politically-revolutionary agenda. This theory gained more traction as events unfolded. The decision to establish “factory committees” on the Soviet-based model, and the growing propaganda activities conducted among the workers, were seen as clear evidence of a Communist orchestrated movement (Tiu, 2011). As the newspaper “Universul” put it: “the request to establish Soviet structures within the state’s workshops...fully proves that foreign elements, left-wing extremists and agents have begun to activate among the railway workers” (Tanase, 2005: 200). The newspaper “Adevarul”
adopted a similar line: "from the government's standpoint, the only explanation of the events lay in the presence of the Communist agents who want to destabilize the state" (Adevarul, 1933: 1).

On February 2, the Council of Ministers drafted a project to authorize the government to declare a state of siege (Scurtu and Buzatu, 1999: 260). The proposal was motivated by the fact that the country was facing the danger of a Communist revolution (Adevarul, 1933: 3; Tanase, 2005: 201). Facing the rapid deterioration of the situation inside the railway workshop and growing street movements in support of the strikers, the ministers and the government were left with limited options to manage the emerging crisis. On February 3, the Parliament adopted a law on the state of siege which, the next day, was endorsed by King Carol II. Against this background, the army was assigned a prominent role in coordinating the counter-measures. The law on the state of siege was invoked in combination with the so-called Marzescu law of 1924 which banned the Romanian Communist Party and together they provided the legal framework for the intervention against the Grivita strike. The 2nd Army Corps in Bucharest was assigned to coordinate the military actions. The intervention of the Armed Forces started early in the morning of February 16 when the military and gendarmery forces surrounded the workshops. Approximately 4,000 people barricaded themselves inside the workshops and decided to resist and fight back against the military. The military intervention was very quick and in less than 30 minutes the strike had been stifled. According to the estimates, 7 people died, 44 were wounded, and 3,000 were arrested (Adevarul, 1933: 3; Tanase, 2005: 204).

The military intervention was largely supported by the political parties which deemed that state authority needed to be restored and firm measures were necessary to prevent internal disorder (Scurtu, Buzatu, 1999: 259-260). The Minister of the Interior, G.G. Mironescu, in his speech in front of the Parliament, praised the role played by the Armed Forces claiming that the country was menaced by a major threat and that "there are forces working secretly to provoke the collapse of the country" (Adevarul, 1933: 3). In other words, the use of the Armed Forces and the declaration of a state of siege were necessary conditions to quell the strike and thwart potential actions which could put in jeopardy the state's internal security.

The Military involvement in Internal Power Dynamics

With the onset of the Second World War, multiple factors brought Romania to a point of strategic collapse: the dramatic shift in the systemic power configuration following the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 23, 1939), the German military offensive starting in September 1939, and the disintegration of the Versailles security system which reached its climax with the defeat of France (June 1940). The most critical sequence unfolded between June and August 1940 which saw Romania lose Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (occupied by Soviet Union), and the northern part of Transylvania (occupied by Hungary). In this period we witness an important shift in the military's pattern of engagement in domestic affairs. The core element was the decision to assume greater responsibilities in man-
aging political crises as well as playing an even more prominent role in securing the
country's internal stability. This trend established the military as the key force in
settling the terms of political power dynamics. This pattern of behavior was clear in
three special cases: the Palace coup of September 6, 1940; the Legionnaires rebel­
lion of January 21-22, 1941; and the coup d'état of August 23, 1944.

5. The Palace coup of September 1940 refers to the operation orchestrated by
General Antonescu. It was backed by both the military and democratic political
forces and aimed to force the abdication of King Carol II who was held responsible
for what was called “the greatest national disaster” – namely the country’s territo­
rial disintegration of 1940. On September 6, King Carol agreed to abdicate and
transfer the royal powers to his son Michael. The first decree signed by the new
King Michael I was to declare General Ion Antonescu as the leader of the state
with full leadership powers (Conducator). The military cabinet of General Antonescu
was expected to focus on two major priorities: one was to avoid an internal power
vacuum and facilitate a peaceful monarchical transition (critically important in a
time of war); the other was to re-shape Romania’s system of alliances by aligning it
to Nazi Germany which was deemed the only means of countering the Soviet threat,
preventing a total collapse of the country, and regaining the lost territories.

6. The Legionnaires rebellion. A major concern of the Antonescu military cabinet
was to avoid internal chaos and potential political turbulence that could weaken
the ability of the state to handle dramatic external conditions. This thinking under­
pinned the military intervention used to confront the Legionnaires Movement (also
called Iron Guard) which attempted to seize political power by force and sparked
the outbreak of the Legionnaires rebellion on January 21, 1941. In fact, the rebel­
lion was the result of a power struggle between Antonescu and the Legionnaires
Movement with each trying to strengthen their hold on power and seize control
over country’s leadership. It is important to note that the Iron Guard, which en­
joyed broad support from the Nazi Party in Germany, was a far-right movement
whose ideology was strongly influenced by ultra-nationalistic, antisemitic, and xe­
nophobic philosophy. On January 23, General Antonescu ordered the intervention
of the Armed Forces to crush the rebellion. One day previously, on January 22, an
order of the Minister of Defense (no. 17.986) had been issued stating that “the army
should fulfill its duty with no hesitation so as to defend order and the state.” Being
aware of the agenda pursued by the Legionnaires’ leaders, General Antonescu took
several preventive measures. In December 1940, two directives were issued regard­
ing the “The path of action for the army to maintain internal order in the capital
and suburbs” and “The detailed execution plan in case of the army’s intervention.”
It was specified that “in case the police and the gendarmerie cannot manage a situ­
tation provoked by public disorder, it is the responsibility of the army to intervene”
(Beldiman, 2002: 103).

1 Romanian Military Archives, Fond Corpul 7 Armata, File 2588, f 33.
Although it was specified that the intervention of the army would be made at the request of the civilian authorities, the new regulations allowed the regiment commanders to take initiative when the circumstances required an emergency intervention. The new regulations provided legitimate grounds for the government's decision to use the Armed Forces to stifle the rebellion. According to the existing figures, 30 soldiers were killed and 100 were wounded, while the number of Legionnaires killed was about 200. Many of those who survived fled to Germany where they found shelter under the protection of the Nazi regime.

7. The Coup d'etat of August, 1944. This case concerns the coup d'état of August 23 which led to Ion Antonescu's removal from power. The action was motivated by critical strategic and military conditions brought on by the rapid Soviet military advance on Romania's eastern frontier as Germany lost ground in face of the advancing forces. There was a widely-held consensus in Bucharest that the only viable option for Romania was to withdraw from the alliance with Germany and conclude the Armistice Convention with the Allied Powers. Facing Antonescu's reluctance towards this plan, King Michael I, backed by the military and by political forces, orchestrated an operation against Ion Antonescu who was arrested on August 23, 1944. However, the military remained the key player in the emerging power configuration: the King appointed General Sanatescu to form a new military cabinet, and military was the main pillar that the monarchical regime relied on to assume the political responsibilities of leading the country amid the switch to agreement with the Allied forces.

These case studies allow us to enumerate some important considerations regarding the use of the Armed Forces in Romania's political crises. First, such actions were repeatedly determined by the strategic conditions. Very important here was the impact of the rapid territorial disintegration in 1940, the collapse of the Western-based system of alliances, and the need to accommodate the changing war dynamics. Against this backdrop, the stability of the political regime was a critical factor in shaping the country's ability to handle the emerging security threats and challenges. From this perspective, the military was to become a key pillar in maintaining internal stability and managing the imperatives of war efforts.

Second, the military regime did not attempt to change the constitutional monarchical system or introduce a dictatorial military regime. When General Antonescu seized political power in September 1940, he remained committed to the institution of the monarchy while seeking to uphold the engagement of the main democratic political forces (Scurtu and Buzatu, 1999:401). In a similar vein, in August 1944, King Michael relied upon the military to organize the coup leading to Antonescu's removal, and the monarchy remained throughout the period as the main source of legitimate national prerogatives and the symbol of the constitutional democratic political system.

Third, the main political forces largely supported the military in assuming a more prominent leadership role. The rationales were twofold: firstly, these political leaders remained reluctant to take over more political responsibilities due to the
complicated circumstances shaped by Romania’s involvement in the Second World War (Stoenescu, 2002: 276-278). Secondly, there was a broad political consensus that the military was better suited to managing the country’s leadership in times of geopolitical and security turmoil.

Conclusions:

In broad terms, the military was called upon to play an important role and assumed a high profile in handling the internal disturbances that the Romanian state faced in the first half of the 20th century. This can be explained based on both internal and external considerations.

External circumstances remained the most important driving force in the decisions to engage the Armed Forces to handle domestic crises. Due to the complex geopolitical configuration around its borders, the rise of Bolshevik threat, and the imperative of securing Romania’s newly-established borders, the political leadership in Bucharest viewed with concern any potential development that could endanger the country’s stability. Against this background, the military became the guarantor of state’s security and the main authority able to preserve order in times of turmoil. However, despite its extensive authority to manage domestic crises, the military did not attempt to change in any way the existing political system, to undermine the political code, or to advocate for military dictatorship. Moreover, the intervention of the Armed Forces in managing various crises was conducted in full accordance with national legislation and legal provisions governing the role and responsibilities of the Armed Forces in domestic affairs.

The fact that Romania lacked strong institutions as well as the political cohesion needed to build a robust internal security establishment increased the reliance on the Armed Forces. This mix of factors installed the military as the unique option for managing the situations which could harm the country’s internal order and security.

While military intervention was legally justified, various controversies remain concerning the scale, severity, and sometimes the brutality of the interventions (with the Peasants’ revolt of 1907 being a case in point). Questions persist about how justified such military action was, and about whether the crises could have been managed by other means. Yet despite such controversies, it is generally recognized that military intervention was the only viable and legitimate solution to compensate for the country’s domestic weakness. Such action was viewed as the only way to accommodate the security needs of the population and preserve internal security in a complicated and unpredictable security environment.

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SECTION FIVE:
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES: REDEFINING “ENEMIES” AND RESHAPING MILITARY TASKS
ARE WE WINNING OR LOSING? ASSESSING SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

"War is not a chess game but a vast social phenomenon with an infinitely greater and ever-expanding number of variables, some of which elude analysis."

David Galula

The Purpose of Assessment

As we know from Helmuth von Moltke, no plan survives beyond the first contact with reality (Moltke, 1993). Therefore, during the execution of any military operation a commander requires constant feedback, preferably through a standardized assessment process, to evaluate the progress his forces are making, determine whether he is achieving his objectives, and identify trends that may determine success or failure. Assessment will also inform his decisions on how to allocate (or reallocate) his resources, and whether and when to alter his operational design. At the strategic and political levels similar assessment processes should support the decision to continue with, or change, strategy and national policy.

Assessments can be presented in a variety of forms. Formal reports and papers provide a narrative of an operation's progress. Tables and graphs show a wealth of quantitative information, as well as trends over time or in space. Maps can show not only the deployment of forces, or territory gained or lost, but also a host of other spatial data, from infrastructure, through the distribution of economic indicators, to popular opinion. And in the PowerPoint Age just about any information can be shown (or distorted) visually. At higher echelons of command independent analysts can render invaluable service: they can state unvarnished truths and unwelcome conclusions, since their career is not subject to command influence.

In technical terms the assessment process is fairly simple. It is applicable to any conflict—indeed, to any warlike activity and to most peaceful pursuits. It is a continuous three-step cycle (Operation Assessment, 2015: 6):

1. Monitoring. Data are collected on the various lines of operation, and indicators are developed from the data. The indicators serve as a baseline for the assessment (What happened? What is happening now?). This provides an understanding of the situation and allows its comparison with that described in the commander’s concept of operations, or in the tasks assigned to the civilian administrator.

2. Evaluation. The progress and likely future trajectory of ongoing operations are gauged, based on the output of the monitoring process. (Why did it happen? Did it make any difference? What are the likely future opportunities and risks?) Through evaluation the commanders and their counterparts in the civilian admin-

istration determine what is working and what is not, gain an insight into how to better accomplish the mission, and identify future opportunities, as well as risks to mission success.

3. Taking action. Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff constructs possible useful changes to the plan, identifies courses of action that have sufficient merit, and recommends them to the commander or civilian official. (What do we need to do?)

In a conventional conflict this assessment process is a reasonably straightforward business. The adversary and his capabilities are known; the end state and the intermediate objectives are defined in mission statements and orders to subordinate commanders; the military force is in control of operations, and the legal environment and the rules of engagement are fairly clear. At the same time, modern science and technology make the collection of vast amounts of data possible while enabling reliable analytical methods (operations research and systems analysis — ORSA) and enormous processing power. These conditions are conducive to centralized and uniform assessment methods. Data are collected in accordance with top-down requirements, decontextualized, averaged, aggregated, and analyzed by mathematics-heavy methods. The end result is (hopefully) an easy-to-digest picture for the decision makers, be they civilians or military (Connable, 2012; Mushen and Schroeden, 2014). Attrition and force generation rates, armament production figures, territory gained or lost, or indicators of morale as surrender and desertion figures do not show who the ultimate victor will be, but they give an indication of who is ahead at the given moment (Campbell et al, 2011).

Assessment in Asymmetric Conflict

In an asymmetric conflict the operational environment is fundamentally different. The state’s security forces have to apply force against fellow citizens — often against friends, neighbors, brothers. The adversary is a non-state actor, whose definition of success is fundamentally different from that of the constituted government. He operates within society and treats the population both as the battlefield and as the prize to be won. His operations are below the utility threshold of the armed forces, but above what law enforcement bodies can generally handle. The battlespace is a mosaic of localized challenges that demand decentralization and mission command in order to come up with the appropriate local solutions (Connable, 2012: xv).

Western military forces were called upon from time to time to respond to such challenges to the authority of the state, but even the most recent experience — that of the British Army in Northern Ireland — is already ten years in the past.1 As a result, this is uncharted territory for most western armed forces: they have no recent experience in it, they do not train for it, and they do not have doctrines for it. Trying to remedy this shortfall is a densely sown political minefield: if it becomes

1Operation Banner, the deployment of UK regular forces in Northern Ireland, came to an end in 2007.
public knowledge that the armed forces are being trained to prevail in an internal conflict, opposition politicians and the press will immediately accuse the government of preparing to suppress legitimate political dissent, or worse.

In these circumstances the security forces need very clear political guidance on the end state they should achieve and the limits they must not cross, but such guidance is rarely forthcoming.\textsuperscript{1} The end state may be clear to the specialist, but it is difficult to persuade the policy makers to accept it – especially when serious concessions to the rebels are called for. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that in an intra-state conflict there are many stakeholders, and they are not equally interested in decisively defeating the insurgency. Powerful political figures with their own – often divergent – agendas may interfere in operations in order to advance their own purely personal or narrowly focused group interests.\textsuperscript{2} The rules of engagement constitute another dangerous area: either they are too permissive and lead to excessive “collateral damage” among the civilian population, or are too restrictive and lead to excessive casualties among security forces personnel. These conditions do not lend themselves to centrally-driven, quantitative, and decontextualized assessment (Connable, 2012: xv).

Since there is no doctrinal guidance for assessing the progress of operations in a purely domestic context, various recent – and not so recent – expeditionary operations must serve as surrogates for study. They are limited and unsatisfactory surrogates, because the expeditionary forces are foreign to the geography, society and culture in which they operate, the rules of engagement they observe are permissive, and they enjoy some (and sometimes extensive) immunity from the host nation’s laws. They do not have the same stake in the conflict as the indigenous forces: eventually they go home, whether the counterinsurgency effort was successful or not. Furthermore, in some insurgencies they are arguably more of a catalyst – or even a cause – of the conflict rather than a stabilizing presence.

\textbf{Southeast Asia, Iraq, Afghanistan: Bitter Lessons}

Selecting the wrong metrics can lead to seeing progress where there is none, or perceiving reverses when in fact progress is being made. A pair of examples from Southeast Asia will suffice to illustrate this point.

In 1953 the French built the de Lattre Line to protect the Red River delta – the key area of northern Indochina – from Viet Minh attacks. The line consisted of mutually supporting forts and bunkers and it enclosed an area of about 20,000 square kilometers which sustained a population of 8,000,000 in nearly 6,000 villages and several large cities. Over 80,000 soldiers were deployed to garrison the perimeter

\textsuperscript{1}For reasons that are not germane to this paper, the political decision makers often fail in their duty to provide unambiguous guidance. The commanders of the security forces and the senior civil servants may have to discern the desired end state through their own experience or professional training. As the Indian Army’s doctrine acknowledges, “As distinct from conventional war, clear-cut directions in a LIC [low intensity conflict] scenario may not always be available.” (Indian Army Doctrine, 2004: 24)

\textsuperscript{2}The history of the Khalistan insurgency in Punjab (1988-1993) is a notorious example of the deleterious effect of divergent political agendas on the counterinsurgency effort. (Gill, 2001)
and hunt down Viet Minh incursions. On the maps of the French command the concept was working well: only a few small areas within the perimeter were assessed as not under firm government control.

It took a political science student (Bernard B. Fall, conducting field work for his PhD thesis) only a few weeks of research to show that the French were deceiving themselves. Instead of such classified information as troop strengths, major operations, significant action reports and casualty figures, Fall relied on public administration information that was freely accessible, such as tax collection records and (as a cross-check) village teacher assignments. He plotted the data on a large-scale map of the delta, finding that the two ostensibly unrelated indicators showed a strong geographic coincidence. The French were actually confusing military accessibility with control of the area. They were correct in believing that they controlled Hanoi and Haiphong, and their patrols and convoys moved relatively freely throughout most of the delta. But the small rural garrisons controlled only such areas as were within the effective range of their weapons (Fall, 1963 and 1966).

Fall's map showed that in over one third of the villages the Viet Minh had killed the government's tax collectors, the centrally-assigned teachers, and the village chiefs loyal to the colonial government. Viet Minh cadre were teaching in the schools (and indoctrinating the students), and the taxes were supporting the Viet Minh. These villages were under complete Viet Minh control and inaccessible not only to government officials, but also to the armed forces. One third of the villages were only partially controlled by the government, and were gradually drifting into Viet Minh control, and less than one third were under effective government control. This conclusion was confirmed a year later, when the French were constrained to reduce their footprint in the north after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. In their retreat to their last strongholds in Hanoi and Haiphong, the first areas they had to evacuate were precisely the ones identified by Fall as heavily infiltrated by the Viet Minh (Fall, 1956).

Ten years later, the United States had to learn the lesson of a flawed assessment process. American counterinsurgency doctrine (based on international and American historical experience) was clear and consistent on the importance of integrating political and military action in order to isolate the insurgents while gaining the population's support through political action and the guarantee of security (Daddis, 2009: 29-31). To gauge progress towards these goals, the Department of Defense instituted a rigorous assessment regime based on quantitative analysis.¹ Much of the historiography of the American involvement in Vietnam maintains that the “body-count” was the only indicator of success for the US forces, but this was not the full story at all. The Pentagon had embraced the concept of qualitative analysis and it required periodic (and frequent) reports on a great many aspects of the progress of the war.²

¹The American phase of the Vietnam War was the first effort to apply a systematic assessment process to measure progress in a counterinsurgency.
²In fact, the Pentagon had no choice in the matter: Robert McNamara, the new Secretary of Defense was a strong believer in the utility of quantitative analysis.
In 1964 Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was collecting quantitative data on over one hundred indicators: from enemy order of battle, through major operations, ammunition expended as well as roads cleared, to casualty figures, desertions, and South Vietnamese forces trained. The reporting requirements overwhelmed the commanders in the field and often put soldiers at risk when they were required to collect body-count data in the combat zone. Consequently, the data that served as the basis for the aggregate reports were frequently based on estimates or guesswork (Connable, 2012: 107-113).

Several initiatives were launched – from within MACV and from outside it – to reduce the number of indicators and to include indicators that addressed aspects of counterinsurgency which were difficult to quantify (e.g. popular attitudes). None of these initiatives came to anything. MACV continued to gather data on subjects that were easy to quantify, and its mainframe computers produced a steady stream of reports that conflated military effectiveness with progress in the overall war effort. Statistics became a substitute for a comprehensive understanding of the social, political, economic and military aspects of the war (Daddis, 2009: 22).

Gradually the „body-count” emerged as the dominant metric: MACV was pursuing an attrition strategy that hinged on causing more losses to the enemy than he could replace. Reaching this „crossover point” became the primary goal of the campaign, and the body-count was viewed as the clearest indicator of progress towards that goal. Subsequently it was paired with the number of casualties sustained by the American forces and became part of the “kill ratio” or “exchange ratio.” This had the potential of being a more useful indicator, but since the underlying raw data was not screened and analyzed with sufficient care, its potential was not realized. In spite of cautiously optimistic reports from a vast statistical machine, the crossover point was never reached. In the end, the United States was compelled to withdraw not because it suffered a defeat in the field, but because the American public withdrew its support from the war.

A thoroughly negative aspect of the body-count and kill ratio developed quite early in the war and persisted to the last days of the American involvement. The two metrics were used to measure a unit’s (and a commander’s) effectiveness – thereby encouraging reliance on kinetic operations even in situations when other measures would have been more appropriate (Daddis, 2009: 140, 159, 168, 258, 271-272).

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made measuring progress in unconventional conflicts a much-debated subject again, especially in the American professional literature. There is a wealth of reports, doctrinal publications, dissertations, papers and articles discussing the subject. The very extent of this literature suggests that assessment was again a problem, and perusal of the literature confirms this impression.

In the early years of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, quantitative methods were again dominant, and analysts met with much the same frustration as in Vietnam: vast amounts of data were available, but neither the effects-based analytical framework nor technological advancement helped to make sense of it. Local context was lost due to centralized collection and analysis, and quantifying complex
social dynamics remained a flawed process. Eventually some qualitative indicators were also included to produce a more balanced approach, but the whole assessment process was subject to some serious criticism from some serious professionals and academics (Mushen and Schroeder, 2014: 22-23).

In Afghanistan the assessment process has gone through several changes, but aside from the brief interlude when General McChrystal was in command (mid-2009 to mid-2010), its focus has been qualitative data (Mushen and Schroeder, 2014: 26-30). Some of the same mistakes were committed as in Vietnam: the reporting requirements overwhelmed commanders in the field; assessment was centralized and top-down; and operationally relevant factors were overlooked. Since the political objectives of the campaign were not articulated clearly, there was no clear end state to assess against. At the strategic level, the assessment process still broke down, just as it had in Vietnam. The situation improved over time, but institutional constraints – as well as persistent ambiguities in the mission, strategy, and end state – led to mistaking activity for progress (Cordesman, 2012; and White, 2017).

**What Are the Appropriate Indicators?**

Numbers tell part of the story in an internal conflict, but do not account for such crucially important intangibles as the people’s confidence in the government, intimidation of the population by the insurgents, or the role of ideology. This is not to say that quantitative analysis has no place in assessing the progress of operations in an internal conflict. On the contrary, it can be a very useful tool for commanders in the field, as well as for political decision makers. However, it is precisely that – a tool; and in order to be of any use, the appropriate tool must be selected for the task, rather than the task adjusted to the tool at hand.¹ To capture the intangibles, the numbers must be supplemented with qualitative metrics. Since these are usually subjective, they are not only difficult to operationalize, but it is often difficult to recognize them as appropriate metrics in the first place. Nevertheless, an effort must be made to identify and operationalize them, otherwise the government will lack a clear idea of the success or failure of its efforts.

Success in the most general terms can be defined as the government defeating the insurgents at the political level by providing security, good governance, and economic progress, thereby gaining popular support (Cordesman, 2012: 2). Obviously, these conditions are too general to be of practical use. They must be disaggregated before any meaningful evaluation of progress can take place. A useful starting point for this disaggregation is the desired end state. As an example, take the general requirements for success listed in the US Joint Force publication *Counterinsurgency Operations* (JP 3-24, 2013, III-3):²

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¹ Abraham Maslow put it most succinctly: “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” (Maslow, 1966: 15)

² In addition to the four conditions listed here, JP 3-24 stipulates an additional one: non-indigenous counterinsurgent forces cease operations, while the insurgents’ external support wanes. This condition is omitted from further consideration, since it applies only in expeditionary operations, while this paper’s focus is internal conflict.
• The government exercises control over its population and territory via legitimate systems of governance that meet the population's expectations.

• The government has adequate capacity and willingness to address the root causes of insurgency (opportunity, motive, and means); government corruption is reduced and good governance increases.

• The security forces establish positive relations with the population, especially in the area of conflict, and have the quality not just quantity of sufficient strength to counter the insurgents. Insurgent violence has been reduced to a level that is manageable by the civilian authorities.

• The government's legitimacy is established by several factors and support by external actors.

These conditions can serve as a guide to define the details of the political-level end state that are appropriate for the circumstances of the specific internal conflict. They can provide a clear mission statement or such other guidance as the civilian decision makers find appropriate to the commander and to his civilian counterparts in the administration. At lower levels of command and administration more specific objectives are designated in the form of orders, policies and directives. As these are executed, their effects should be subject to continuous assessment through metrics that are relatively stable over an extended period in order to allow trends to be discerned.

The data overload syndrome that plagued the American forces in Vietnam or the ISAF in Afghanistan can be avoided by developing a vision of the nature and drivers of the conflict. Without such a shared diagnosis nobody will have any clear idea of what is important and what is not; staff at every command echelon and in every administrative office will collect on everything and amass huge quantities of data that will only make tracking progress more difficult. With a realistic diagnosis in hand, metrics that indicate whether the government is getting closer to achieving its goals can be developed. The metrics should validate and evaluate the overall strategy, by answering two dialectically linked questions:

• „Are we doing the right things?” Are the military operations, administrative policies, economic initiatives, and political actions bringing closer the desired end state?

• „Are we doing things right?” Are the operations, policies, etc. carried out as intended? Do they have the intended effect?

Some indicators can be readily quantified, but many are perception-dependent: how secure do the people feel with permanent military presence established in their neighborhood; which side provides more effective police protection; whose courts deliver fairer justice; do the economic initiatives improve life in the affected area. Popular perception is difficult to measure, but it can be done: public opinion surveys can be (and have been) conducted in combat zones, and intelligence can often provide the missing details. If the popular perception does not match the outcome of the analysis, the answers to the two fundamental questions are likely to be „no,” and the commanders and civilian officials must adjust their plans and policies.
The indicators can be usefully divided into military and non-military ones, and the actual situation may justify further subdivisions of these categories (e.g. ethnic minority engagement). No doubt the reader will realize that in some cases this division is not entirely appropriate, and strategic communication is one area where it is not appropriate at all. Strategic communication (or propaganda) has been an important element of internal conflicts since time immemorial. With the development of cheap and fast international messaging and the explosive growth of social media it has gained a disproportionate importance in the toolbox of every belligerent. A modern counterinsurgency campaign must have an overarching strategic communication design, and every military operation, every administrative policy, every economic initiative, and every political initiative must have its own strategic communication component (Pandalay 2016; Kiss, 2012). Assessing the effectiveness of strategic communication measures is notoriously difficult. Public opinion surveys can be quite useful, but the most reliable indicator is the behavior of the population: shrinking support for the insurgents and correspondingly growing support for the state, and participation in the political process.

**Military Indicators**

A consensus among authorities through the decades and over continents is that the most reliable indicator of the security forces’ success is the voluntary participation of the civilian population in the counterinsurgency effort. The three most significant signs that the people believe in the government’s ability to protect them and defeat the insurgents are volunteering to serve in the local militia or the regular security forces, offering actionable information on the insurgents, and disregarding the insurgents’ orders or rules on behavior such as dictates regarding smoking (Hosmer and Crane, 1963: 142; Gill, 1999). The absolute numbers are less important than the trend – and if the trend progresses in the right direction, eventually a virtuous cycle will develop. Successful surgical operations against the insurgents increases public confidence, and encourages more people to side with the government, provide the security forces with information on the rebels, and cock a snook at rebel demands. The increased flow of intelligence allows further successful surgical operations, and so forth – the cycle expands as it is repeated (Kiss, 2014: 177-178). The key for this virtuous cycle is the performance of the security forces at the tactical level: their skill in executing operations that cause no collateral casualties, and their interaction with the civilian population. Therefore, continuous monitoring and evaluation of the performance of individuals and organizations against the best practices of counterinsurgency is an essential part of assessment.

As the American experience in the Vietnam War has shown, the body-count and the kill ratio are deceptive metrics. However, even these can be turned into useful indicators if sufficient care is exercised in screening and interpreting the underlying data. The body-count should focus on the “quality kills”: the planners, technical specialists, trainers, recruiters, finance specialists, “fixers,” ideologues, and other “middle management.” These are the people who actually keep the insurgents’ war
effort going (Gill and Sahni, 2001: 79; Kiss, 2014: 201). Fighters are not difficult to replace even when lost in significant numbers, and the loss of senior leaders does not weaken the insurgency seriously either: there are young, ambitious and dedicated men ready to replace them. But losing specialists can seriously degrade the insurgents’ capabilities to carry out operations. The kill ratio has the potential to show a unit’s capabilities, its aggressiveness, and its will to win. For this metric to be meaningful, only confirmed insurgent casualties directly attributed to the unit’s actions must be counted; civilian deaths, as well as deaths attributable to air strikes, indirect fire or to other units in support must be excluded.

The ratio of kills to wounded or captured insurgents requires analysis. A rule of thumb for combat engagements is that there are usually three to five wounded insurgents for every one killed. A significant and consistent deviation from this may indicate an exceptionally dedicated opponent that always fights to the death, or an exceptionally high standard of marksmanship on the part of the security forces. But it is more likely that the unit is relying excessively on artillery and airpower, or on counting dead civilians as insurgents. A more insidious reason may be that the unit’s members engage in extrajudicial executions of suspected insurgents, or even worse, civilians. A related indicator is the ratio of surrenders to kills/captures. Fighting until killed or incapacitated indicates high motivation, while a high ratio of desertions and surrenders is a good indicator that the insurgents have a morale problem (Kilcullen, 2010: 66-67, 75).

Significant actions (SIGACTs) – tracked and prominently reported in Iraq and Afghanistan – are also unreliable indicators without rigorous analysis. The absence of SIGACTs in a particular area is generally taken as an indicator of the success of pacification. In reality, it may be due to the insurgents having other priorities in the area (for example trying to establish good relations with the locals). Alternatively, (a far more insidious problem) it may be the result of a tacit understanding between the security forces and the rebels to avoid each other. Conversely, a large number of SIGACTs may indicate that one side is contesting the domination of the area by the other side. Or it may be due to the fact that more contacts are being made, because the security forces have changed to a more aggressive patrolling regime or surged additional units into the area. SIGACTs can become a useful indicator if the underlying cause of changes are identified by analysis.

Winning engagements is as important in counterinsurgency as in conventional war. Due to their firepower, mobility, and tactical skill, the security forces usually do win their engagements: they manage to inflict significant casualties, retain ground the opponent wants to take, and protect the population the opponent seeks to dominate. Although the ratio of wins to losses may serve to evaluate a particular unit’s performance, it does not indicate overall success. On the contrary, tactical superiority, spectacular kill ratio, and consistent battlefield brilliance may distract attention from the operational, strategic, and political inadequacies of the constituted government. Rhodesia is probably the best illustration for the last point. The security forces won every engagement, large or small, during the Brush War (1962-1980).
Nevertheless, the war was eventually won by the African nationalist movements (Kiss, 2014: 51-81).

A far more useful indicator is who initiates (and therefore ultimately controls) an engagement: the first-to-fire ratio. The ability to initiate the engagement (whether ambush or planned attack) generally means superior situational awareness, better intelligence, and the ability to control the loss rate. If the insurgents have the initiative, they can simply avoid action when their losses reach an unacceptable level, regroup, recruit and train new fighters, and start operations again, once their recovery is complete. They do not have this luxury if they lose the initiative. Hence, if the security forces initiate most of the engagements, they can attrite and ultimately destroy the insurgents – provided they can maintain an adequate operational tempo (Kilcullen, 2010: 74).

Dismounted operations give a unit greater reach within its environment, since men on foot can go where vehicles cannot. Operating on foot also improves rapport with the civilian population. Since the soldiers are eye level with the pedestrians and can interact with them directly, they can cover their area of operations with their presence. Frequent dismounted operations also give the unit a “feel” for its environment, and confidence in its ability to handle any challenge. A similar effect will be achieved by moving out of fortified bases into the area of responsibility and conducting extended operations that last several days or even weeks, by conducting many small unit operations instead of a few large unit sweeps, and by conducting night operations. The unit will become intimately familiar with its area of responsibility and will dominate it, developing confidence in its ability to win its encounters with the insurgents, and protecting and developing rapport with the civilians in its area far more effectively.

Conversely, units that keep to the safety of their armored vehicles can only cover their area of responsibility via the muzzle of their weapons. Short duration daytime operations (generally large unit cordon and search sweeps or raids) then a rush back to the safety of the fortified base for the night indicate a lack of initiative, lack of confidence, and sometimes even a tacit bargain with the insurgents to leave each other alone. Units that behave in this manner cannot fight the insurgents effectively, cannot interact with the civilians, cannot build rapport with them, and cannot protect them.

One of the surest ways to alienate the civilians and drive many into the arms of the insurgents is by causing excessive collateral casualties and property damage. Riflemen with itchy trigger fingers can escalate a tense situation to a serious incident in a few seconds. This may be due to an aggressive attitude towards the civilians and insufficient emphasis on protecting them from insurgents. But it may also indicate nervous and frightened soldiers, whose unit has little rapport with the local population, lacks a reliable information network, and is consequently vulnerable to insurgent attack. Air or artillery support may be necessary occasionally to extract a unit from a difficult situation, but they have the potential to cause massive civilian casualties, if even a small error is made in the targeting coordinates. A unit that relies on these
assets excessively may be too nervous to engage the insurgent, or conversely, it may be overconfident, and routinely engage larger insurgent forces than it can handle. Yet a third possibility is that it is not strong enough to handle the insurgent forces in its area and should be reinforced.

**Non-military Indicators**

At least since Bernard Fall’s fieldwork in Vietnam in 1953, *taxation compliance* has been a classic indicator of the government’s degree of control: since taxes will be collected by someone – either by the government’s tax officials, or by the insurgents (Fall, 1956). In some cases, the government may be in control of a particular area, but venal officials siphon off the taxes, meaning that hardly any funds flow to the treasury. This situation requires a triangular comparison: the effects of insurgent taxation (the degree of compliance corresponds to the degree of insurgent control); the presumed effects of government taxation without embezzlement; and the effects of the tax officials’ corruption on social conditions and public opinion (Kilcullen, 2010: 61).

Since even in a partly free economy the market cannot be fooled for long, the *behavior of the economy’s actors* is a good indicator of the people’s perception of the security of a particular area. Producers and merchants will factor in the non-economic risks of transportation over insecure roads, of selling in a market that may be raided by the insurgents, and of transporting money home, and they will price their goods accordingly. For an accurate reading, the fluctuations of market prices (especially those of perishable farm produce) must be controlled for seasonal variations. The truckers will also factor in the risks of insurgent attacks, IEDs and road mines, kidnapping, as well as robbery (by insurgents, by criminals, and by venal officials). The variation in charges over time will show the variation in the public perception of security, criminality, and corruption along a particular route. Public perception of security and of a bright or cloudy future will also drive (or hinder) such commercial activities as obtaining and repaying credit, starting new businesses, the construction of housing, and *capital flight* (Fall, 1966; Kilcullen, 2010: 60-65).

The provision of basic services and infrastructure, as well as *economic development*, plays a key role in the government’s effort to elicit the support of a majority of the people and gain legitimacy. This is one of the areas where there is great temptation to rely on input figures as indicators: so many kilometers of roads cleared of mines and opened to traffic; so much money spent on restoring basic services in the areas recovered from the insurgents; so much money made available to help small businesses to start operating. The number of worthy projects and the monies disbursed on them can be expressed in concrete figures, and they can be shown on briefing slides, to the admiration of all. These data show only what the government agencies are doing, but do not show the effects of their actions. They do not provide insight into whether the government is doing the right things, or whether it is doing things right.
The resources earmarked for economic recovery and development are generally effective only if they contribute to the legitimacy of the government. They will not have achieved this purpose if they are siphoned off by a few politicians and government officials or if they exclusively serve to benefit big businesses close to the government. Even if they are distributed fairly and evenly, they will achieve their purpose only if they respond to local demand and provide results that are valued by the local population. This requires that those disbursing the funds pay attention to local needs. Timing is another significant factor: if there is an appreciable delay between the establishment of security and the first tranche of recovery and development resources, the expectations of the local population will have been frustrated (Donley, 2016).

As the French experience in Indochina has shown, freedom of movement for the military forces is an imperfect indicator. A far better measure is civilian freedom of movement. If the civilian population feels threatened in an area and avoids it for fear of the insurgents’ impositions, if government officials need an armed escort to move within their area of responsibility and conduct the government’s business, this indicates strong insurgent control. The nature of the traffic being interdicted may even serve as an indicator of the insurgents’ strategic goals. Interdiction of the shipment of products and materials that are major components of the government’s revenues targets the government’s ability and will to wage war (Besenyó 2009: 104-111). Interference with individual travel on trains and roads, collecting “contributions” at clandestine checkpoints, dividing the passengers of a bus or a train according to class, caste, ethnicity, or religion while subjecting some to abuse, are demonstrations of the government’s inability to protect its citizens, and are acts which serve to intimidate the civilian population (Gill, 1999).

Assassination of government officials sends a strong message to the public about the power of the insurgents (and may even meet with tacit approval if the victim had seriously abused his power). The frequent assassination of local government officials indicates significant instability, even if there is no other insurgent activity. On the other hand, low levels of violence against government officials does not necessarily mean that the area is solidly pro-government and under tight government control. On the contrary, such apparent stability may be due to the insurgents having established firm control over the area and taken over the administrative functions (Fall, 1966).

As the insurgency progresses, the rebels begin to usurp some of the traditional functions of the constituted government. One such area is the administration of justice (Gejji, 2013; Ledwidge, 2017). This can be quite elaborate in areas where the insurgents are in control, while in contested and government-controlled areas it is likely to be a simpler, often clandestine affair. In areas controlled by the insurgents, the people may have no alternative but to seek justice in the insurgents’ courts. As the insurgents try to extend their authority into areas controlled by the government, the citizens often have a choice to take their disputes either to the state’s or to the insurgents’ courts. The number of cases brought to each may show where the
population expects fairer and timelier judgment. Another such government function is public order and safety, the protection of the citizens from ordinary crime and violence. The side that performs better here is likely to be viewed as more legitimate. The insurgents’ versions of policing and justice are likely to be harsher than those of the state. But if the population perceives the verdicts of their courts to be fairer than those of the state’s courts, that will confer considerable legitimacy on the insurgents. Similarly, if the insurgents’ policing function is perceived as delivering protection to all—especially if they apply their rules to themselves as well—it will drain away legitimacy from the state.

The 2006 version of the US counterinsurgency manual states that one possible indicator of a state’s legitimacy and stability is “a culturally acceptable level of corruption” (FM 3-24, 2006: 1-21). The 2014 version of the manual omits this phrase, and it is not found in the NATO doctrine either—with good reason. In some societies there is indeed a certain acceptance of corruption, and this may be construed as a sign of stability in normal, peaceful times. However, in the unsettled conditions of an insurgency, venal politicians, well-placed officials, and members of the security forces can easily transgress any “culturally acceptable level” with impunity. They can demand substantial payment for such routine administrative actions as building permits, driver licenses or car registration; they can bypass public procurement procedures and award profitable government contracts to cronies; they can put relatives in influential positions or sell offices to the highest bidder. Unless the state finds a way to rein them in, corruption may escalate until it becomes one of the drivers of the insurgency. Some of the above indicators (acceptance of the insurgent’s police functions and courts, lack of economic progress) are due to corruption in law enforcement and public administration. Measuring the extent of corruption is a particularly difficult challenge, because all participants are interested in keeping it from view. All the same, it must be accurately measured and effectively suppressed, otherwise it will be a stubborn obstacle to resolution of the conflict.

Conclusions

One must be careful when criticizing the way civilian decision makers and senior officers prosecuted a war forty, fifty, or sixty years in the past. The generals in Southeast Asia, Iraq, and Afghanistan were (or are) highly trained, experienced and dedicated professionals. They have all acted upon the best available information and have relied on the state of knowledge at the time. The American Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War was a competent and successful administrator. His insistence on quantitative analysis and business management practices imposed discipline and transparency on an inefficient military bureaucracy.1 His premise behind the body-count (the crossover point strategy) was probably sound, but qualitative analysis seriously underestimated the enemy’s willingness to absorb casualties, and his ability to avoid engagements and thereby control his losses. Qualitative

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1 Some of the operational research and systems analysis methods McNamara introduced 50 years ago are still used by the US military for strategic planning purposes.
analysis methods also failed to account for such intangibles of war as morale, leadership, confusion, and faulty intelligence: the „friction” noted by Clausewitz (Mushen and Schroeder 2014: 3-9).

Most insurgencies (perhaps apart from those started by hopelessly inept and romantic armchair revolutionaries) fit into the category of the „wicked problem” as the term is defined by systems theorists. They are essentially unique problems and defy a definitive formulation that would contain all the information one needs to understand and solve them. They have no „stopping rule” – no criteria that shows when a solution has been found. Attempting to solve the problem changes the nature of the problem, so the attempts are not repeatable, cannot be undone, and there is no room for trial and error. There are no definitive true or false solutions, only „better,” „worse,” „good enough,” and similarly ambiguous ones (Rittel and Webber, 1973). In these circumstances the room for making mistakes is severely restricted, and a reliable assessment process that measures trends through the appropriate indicators is an essential element of success.

Despite overwhelming firepower, superior technology, and the benefit of excellent military education and training, the French, American, and South Vietnamese forces were driven from the field, and Vietnam was unified under the banner of the communist regime. The jury is still out on Iraq and Afghanistan, but thus far they cannot be classified as successes. Flawed assessment systems contributed in no small measure to these uninspiring outcomes. Better assessment may not have helped avoid failure, but at the very least it would have helped avoid self-deception – and it may have allowed the decision makers to recognize in time that failure was looming.

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RESTORING NORMALCY IN GREECE IN THE LATTER 1940s:
THE ROLE OF THE HELLENIC NAVY

Introduction
It is likely that no European country faced as many challenges as Greece did in the aftermath of the Second World War. This paper sketches the naval importance of Greece, the consequent US naval aid to that country, and the contribution of the Greek Navy to meeting these challenges successfully in the late 1940s.

At the end of the Second World War, the Truman administration feared that America would again sink into depression in view of the appeal of national planning and statist controls to many peoples in Europe and Asia (Leffler, 2010: 38, 67). Extending American economic and diplomatic support to Western Europe – akin to the role Roosevelt had tried to play there in the late 1930s – and devolving once more on Britain the primary responsibility for the security of the Continent, was initially seen as the best means of averting the spread of communism.1

Meanwhile, Britain had been trying, amid various plans, to sustain a succession of moderate Greek governments who were expected to keep Greece independent and non-communist. However, by the beginning of 1947, severe economic problems and the appalling winter of that year brought the British economy to a standstill which led to the suspension of British aid to Greece and Turkey (Jones, 1989: 32). The expected capitulation of Greece, and the probable loss of the Southern Mediterranean to Soviet Russia, convinced a Republican, cost-cutting, neo-isolationist US Congress to help Greece and Turkey at a tiny fraction of the cost of the Second World War (Keely, 2010: xvi; Acheson, 1969: 2019).2

1. American Naval Aid to Greece
Shoring up Greece required, amongst other things, American naval assistance. A dozen second-hand LST’s and additional patrol boats were given to the Greek Navy (Xydis, 1963: 240; Sazanidis, 1985: 310). Greece and Turkey have been major recipients of second-hand US vessels ever since this time (Anthony, 1990: 28).

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American naval aid to Greece also included financial aid, as well as the provision of thousands of tons of equipment (fuel, radio and electronic material, chronometers, navigational instruments, sounding machines, theodolite charts, chart paper, photographic supplies, ammunition, torpedoes, depth charges, underwater explosives, anti-submarine rockets, diving gear, miscellaneous training devices, instructional items, certain machines and laboratory equipment, clothing, medical supplies and equipment, laundry machinery, general stores, miscellaneous spare parts, mine sweeping gear, machine tools, glass, lumber, electrical cable steel plates, as well as paint and workshop tools necessary for the overhaul and refit of ships). The administration of the American naval supplies to Greece and the extension of valuable technical and planning assistance to the Greek Navy were entrusted to an American Naval Group, while training and supervision of the Greek Navy was largely reserved for a British naval mission to Greece which left the country for good during the Anglo-Greek fallout over Cyprus in mid 1950s (Smith, 1976: 22; Schwartz, 1995: 12, 14).

The American standpoint on the Greek Navy was that it should become capable of insuring the internal stability of Greece. It could also pin down Soviet reserves in Southern Russia and delay any Soviet thrust or sea denial attempt in the Eastern Mediterranean – an attempt that could have taken advantage of the peculiarly difficult anti-submarine war conditions in that sea. The Greek Navy could achieve the aforementioned objectives by effectively performing – on a modest scale and with ships no bigger than fleet destroyers – anti-submarine and submarine warfare, offensive and defensive mine warfare, combat and logistical support of the Greek Army and the Greek Air Force, sea transport (a vital task considering the inadequate road and rail network of the mountainous, archipelagic Greece), support of minor amphibious operations, net laying and tending, reconnaissance and patrol, and air defense.

The American position regarding Greek naval development reflected a contemporary movement toward increased versatility of the destroyers and their diversification in fleet and escort destroyers. An appreciable increase in the fighting capability of the fleet destroyer and an analogous increase in the anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities of the escort destroyer had taken place since the Second World War. These developments were particularly important in narrow seas like the Aegean.

The priorities of the American aid program also reflected the modern tendency toward large scale transportation of resources and power projection and the increase in the fighting capability of the submarine. Additionally, the agenda reflected the force structure and coastal missions of most NATO navies which were expected to perform less complicated but strategically important missions due to budgetary constraints and American reluctance to transfer the latest naval technology to her allies.

The accomplishment of such missions required that the Greek Navy should discard ships kept in reserve and be given comparable American naval assistance to that extended to the "less effective naval power of Turkey". As American naval units gradually replaced increasingly old British ships – which amounted to 75 per cent of the Greek fleet in 1947 – funds were diverted to the United States which would have been expended in England for spare parts, ammunition, equipment and overhaul. It also increased the morale and confidence of Greek naval personnel, kept active an increased number of US ships, and promoted the adoption of US training, operational, maintenance and administrative methods and procedures, thus strengthening the interoperability between the American, Greek, and Turkish navies (Matsakis, 1973: 45, 63-72; Baer, 1994: 440; Booth, 1979: 228; Hattendorf, 2004, 42; Zumwalt, 1976: 356; Nitze et al, 1978: 251; Faringdon, 1989: 196; Collins and Chwat, 1975: 9). American naval assistance was also extended for the reconstitution of the Salamis Arsenal, the development of training facilities at the naval base of Scaramanga near Piraeus, and the reconstruction of the ports of Salonika, Piraeus, Volos, Lavrion, and Patras.

In return for its important naval aid to Greece, the US Navy secured the right to conduct a wide variety of naval drills and amphibious exercises amid the many islands of the Greek seas. This came at a time when the US Navy placed a premium on developing its combined operations capabilities following its success in the Second World War. It also represented an attempt to offset Soviet military superiority in Europe (Sazanidis, 1985: 310; Till, 1990: 146). Greece was helped by the Americans because it "posed a formidable physical barrier to the projection of Soviet power in the Mediterranean, even if Moscow could have obtained direct or indirect control of the Straits. The 3,000 islands in the Aegean proved a further barrier for the Soviets, since no ship transiting the Aegean can avoid passing repeatedly within ten miles of land." (Hattendorf, 2000: 167).

2. The Work of the Greek Navy

As part of its development, the Greek Navy performed a variety of missions creditably which contributed to the restoration of normalcy in Greece after the war. The Greek Navy was initially entrusted with forcing the surrender of the last rem-

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2 „United States Naval Aid to Greece", ONI Review, 6 (October 1951): 395.
nants of the German occupying forces in the Aegean and Ionian seas in late 1944. It also fed many Greek island and coastal communities who had suffered a lot towards the end of the war.\footnote{http://www.hellenicnavy.gr/el/istoria/istoria-tou-pn.html, 26 April 2017.}

Feeding Greek coastal populations was a temporary yet necessary step towards restoring some semblance of economic order in the country. Promoting economic normalcy was a task of far greater magnitude and the Hellenic Navy contributed to this as well. The fuel crisis that prevailed through 1947-1948 in Greece was overcome by the distribution of naval reserve fuel oil by the tankers of the Hellenic Navy. In addition, the occasional movement of engineering equipment, animals and laborers used by ECA and various ministries in construction projects contributed to the success of the postwar Reconstruction Program of Greece.

Greek economic stabilization was also furthered by the advancement of hydrographic knowledge of Greek seas by the Greek Navy. Hellenic naval ships also cleared the Greek seas of several shipwrecks which constituted a navigation threat or blocked important maritime lines of communication such as the Corinth Canal. The raising of those vessels also provided scrap metals which were utilized by the Greek reconstruction and repair program. In addition, the restoration of war-torn Greek lighthouses facilitated trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and reconnected Greece with the world market.\footnote{N.H.C., JUSMAG Greece (Navy Group, American Mission, Aid to Greece) Box 199, Annual Report 1949: 2, Annex K: 2, Annex L: 6, Annex M: 1-2. National Archives and Records Administration (N.A.R.A.), RG 334, 957440, Box 186, Stassinopoulos to Glover, 25 August 1947. N.A.R.A., RG 59, 917360, Box 20, Report on a Plan for continuation of U.S. Naval Assistance to Greece by an adhoc Committee of General Planning Group, 6 December 1948: 3 & Greek Navy Budget 1949-1950, Naval Construction: 1-N.}

Sweeping the 17,419 mines that had been laid by Greece and the Axis powers in the Aegean and the Ionian Seas during the Second World War was equally important to the restoration of normalcy in Greece. These were located in 129 minefields that covered 12,000 square miles. The diversity of their types and the imperfect information regarding their actual state and location made them formidable threats to navigation. Counter-mine and counter-submarine structures also abounded in the Aegean and the Ionian seas and contributed to the near suffocation of the Greek economy because they closed Greek seas at a time when the northern land borders of Greece were also closed for political reasons.

Between 1945 and 1947 minesweeping in Greece was largely undertaken by naval units of the Royal Navy. Following the British withdrawal from Greece in March 1947, the Greek Navy utilized 35 American-built minesweepers and other suitably configured light naval units that enabled it to destroy 6,225 mines. In terms of coastal conditions, shipping and fishing were gradually rehabilitated and more coastal waters were opened to naval patrols during the course of the Greek Civil War with relatively few casualties given the demanding nature of the task (Gianopoulos, 1980: 15, 18, 23, 25; Schwartz, 1995: 12-13).\footnote{See also Arvanitakis, St. 1988, „He Diethnis Exelixi tou Narkopolemou kai he Historia tou sto Helleniko P.N.“, Naftiki Epitheorisis, 452: 63-67.}
The struggle between the Greek armed forces and the leftist Republican Army between 1946 and 1949 was decided on land. Therefore, the corresponding role of the Greek Navy was supplementary to that of the Greek Army. Submarine chasers, corvettes, mine sweepers, and numerous harbor craft and small boats were utilized in amphibious and combined operations as well as in special operations in co-operation with the Greek Army. Greek naval operations during the Greek Civil War focused on patrolling the very long domestic coast thereby denying the rebels use of it for transportation of arms and men. The Greek Navy also prevented the rebel forces from gaining a foothold on the islands, thus saving the Greek Army from stationing men there who would have been unavailable in the decisive theatre of operations in northern Greece. The Greek Navy further prevented the seaborne movement of agents, spies, saboteurs and raiding parties, hindered the escape by sea of rebel personnel who were being pursued by the Greek Army, and prevented the escape by sea of communist leaders interned on certain Aegean islands. Close liaison with the Greek General Staff and information received through patrol ship visits to coastal villages enabled the Hellenic Navy to maintain fairly accurate knowledge of rebel concentrations, their future objectives, and the landing sites for guerrilla resupply attempts. With vessels constantly on patrol, and the bases of Salonika, Volos, Piraeus, Patras, and Corfu alert to requests for support, the navy managed to provide supporting vessels wherever they were needed.

During the Greek Civil War, the Hellenic Navy also safeguarded ports, harbors, islands and coastal zones, upheld the morale of the local population by „flying the flag”, and committed some of its units to being stationed in sensitive areas to stabilize local situations. It provided gunfire support in landing operations, and its numerous small craft transported hundreds of thousands of men and a significant volume of materiel. While the Government forces were ferried comfortably and on time by sea transport, the men of the Republican Army usually reached the battleground tired and late after long marches. Small landings were also undertaken for reconnaissance purposes within guerrilla-occupied areas, and anti-submarine searches prevented the guerrillas from being adequately resupplied by submarines from communist countries (Xydis, 1963: 240, 620; Sail, 1976: 5; Chourchoulis, 2010: 220). On average, Greek naval units were called upon every second day to bombard rebel concentrations who either raided the Greek coastline or fought against the Greek army there. The creditable performance of the Hellenic Navy during the Greek Civil War impressed upon Admiral Snackenberg, the head of the American Naval Group to Greece, a high opinion of the Greek as a sailor: „Born to

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it most of them," he said, "and the officers are good for they are a seagoing people, have been for generations, and that's something you don’t find everywhere" (Eliot, 2010: 207).

The extent to which the Republican forces of Peloponnesus were compelled to depend on arms and ammunition from northern Greece is a good example of the influence of Greek sea power upon the land operations of the Greek Civil War. In July 1948, the Republican Army attempted to test the feasibility of moving supplies by caique from Albania to the Peloponnesus, but the shipment of twenty-two tons, including 500 Panzerfaust anti-tank rockets, 200 machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, never reached its destination. On 6 September 1948, the Greek corvette Polemistis intercepted a small, 250-ton caique and chased it into the bay of Fokianos, southeast of the town of Leonidion. The Polemistis received fire from both the caique and guerrilla positions on shore but succeeded in hitting the caique, which blew up, with no survivors. It was subsequently determined that at the Albanian port of Durres the caique had been loaded with some 2,000 rifles, 100 machine guns, 3,000 mines along with substantial amounts of ammunition, hand grenades, and communist printed propaganda. The Republican forces in the Peloponnesus were eventually crushed by the Greek Army during Operation Pigeon in 1949. During this campaign, the Hellenic Navy cordoned the Peloponnesian coast, thus preventing reinforcement or resupply of the Republican army or its escape by sea (Shrader, 1999: 145-146, 231).

**Conclusion**

All told, the development of the Hellenic Navy in the aftermath of the Second World War complied with American desiderata and proved capable of serving efficiently the restoration of normalcy in Greece. Its corresponding contribution was varied, and its results were immediate and satisfactory.

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Introduction
In the Netherlands, the armed forces have always played an important although controversial part in maintaining public order and safety. This paper will offer a short overview of the main trends and developments focusing on the strained relationship between Dutch police and the armed forces.

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
The modern Dutch state emerged two centuries ago after two decades of French occupation which brought an incorporation of the Dutch provinces into the Napoleonic empire. Like many other states in Europe, the new Kingdom of the Netherlands (which included all of the Low Countries, both the Netherlands and Belgium) set out to restore the order of the Ancien Régime. Yet behind the facade of restoration, many innovations that the French had introduced, such as the Code Pénal and conscription, were maintained. This awkward combination of restoration and modernization especially influenced the development of the Dutch police system - a legacy that is discernible even in the present day. Restoration in the Netherlands implied a decentralization of policing in the form of an exclusively municipal police force. In the first half of the nineteenth century, this was the only regular police force in the Netherlands.

There was, however, an exception to the rule. In the southern provinces of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, in present-day Belgium, the Gendarmerie installed there by the French remained in place. This state-controlled military police force was apparently well-suited to pacifying these unruly provinces. Yet because of widespread resentment against the centralized French police system, the authorities thought it wise to pay lip service to the principle of restoration by discarding the name Gendarmerie and replacing it with the original name of this military police force, Marechaussée. As a result, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee was created, but only in the so-called Belgian provinces. Like many other gendarmerie forces worldwide, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee uses the flaming grenade as its emblem and its members wear white shoulder cords or fourragères on their uniforms.

Elsewhere in the Netherlands, the municipal police were ill-equipped to maintain public order and safety. Most municipalities were reluctant to spend substantial
amounts of money on policing, which had disastrous consequences for both the quantity and quality of the local police forces. Amid efforts to rectify this situation, a new state police force was created in the 1850s alongside the municipal police, but overall conditions did not improve much. There were simply not enough police to deal with riots, and, just as importantly, they lacked the organization, training, and equipment to deal with large-scale disturbances. Since regular police forces were not able to contain the frequent and large-scale social upheavals of the second half of the nineteenth century, the authorities relied heavily on the military (Van der Wal, 2003). Frequently, infantry and cavalry units were brought in to quell riots in both the countryside and the cities, often at the cost of civilian lives. As part of a strategy to strengthen police presence in the countryside and to prevent riots from breaking out in the first place, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, which up to that moment was still restricted to the southern provinces, spread to the rest of the country between the 1880s and the 1920s. The new brigades of the Marechaussee were concentrated in areas where socialist workers were most active, such as the rural north-eastern provinces of the Netherlands and around Amsterdam and The Hague in the west of the country.

The use of regular army units to act against their civilian compatriots raised many objections, including from the military itself. There was a clear consensus that the civilian police should be responsible for maintaining public order, except in extraordinary circumstances. The army’s main purpose was to defend the country against external threats in case of war. However, by the end of the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century, despite undergoing a slow process of modernization and professionalization, the state and municipal police forces were still unable to cope with large-scale riots without the help of the military. Instead of deploying regular infantry and cavalry units to quell riots, the authorities increasingly relied on military police forces, which specialized in restoring public order (Fijnaut, 1979). It is important to note that by this time it was well established that all military units that were called upon to aid the police in restoring public order – whether regular army or military police – operated under civilian control.

After the First World War, as a parallel body to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, a second military police force was created: the so-called Police Troops (Smeets, 1997). The difference between these two military police forces was to be found in their day-to-day responsibilities: the Marechaussee was charged with regular civilian police duties, whereas the Police Troops were tasked with policing the army. Both the Marechaussee and the Police Troops were available to render military aid to the civil authorities and were frequently engaged in this capacity. One such instance was during large-scale disturbances in Amsterdam in 1934, and five civilians were killed during the suppression of these riots.

Communist threat

The extent to which the German occupation of the Netherlands during the Second World War affected Dutch policing is beyond the scope of this paper. It is
relevant to note, however, that the end of the war provided Dutch authorities with an opportunity to reorganize the police system. No one wanted to return to the highly fragmented pre-war police system in which the various police forces fought each other almost as much as they fought crime. Yet the goal of a single national police force proved to be unattainable at this time – unification had to wait until 2013 – since proponents of a centralized state police and those in favor of a decentralized municipal police could not reach a compromise. Both camps agreed, however, that there was no place in the post-war police system for a military police force with civilian police duties. Hence, the fate of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee hung in the balance.

The context of the emerging Cold War brought widespread fear of communist agitation – and this climate would prove to have a decisive impact on these reform dilemmas. Many believed that communist groups in the Netherlands, who had played an active part in the Resistance movement during the German occupation, had kept their weapons, including heavy machine guns and other heavy weaponry. In the unstable conditions just after the war, such groups were considered to pose a serious threat. Since the civilian police, still disorganized after the war, were not in a position to withstand a communist insurgency, and since regular army units had been shipped overseas to fight a war of decolonization in the former Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch government resolved to revive the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (though at the expense of the Police Troops). The Marechaussee would no longer be tasked with civilian police duties apart from border control, but its capacity to assist the regular police in case of armed insurgency would be greatly enhanced. For this purpose, a mobile (reserve) force was created, equipped with heavy weapons and armored vehicles (Roozenbeek, Van Woensel and Bethlehem, 2014: 87-93).

This mobile force was deployed at full strength in 1946, when a communist trade union organized a large-scale strike in the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, threatening the country’s food supply. The situation did not, however, escalate to a violent confrontation. A show of force sufficed. Subsequently, until well into the 1950s, the mobile force and other army units regularly conducted military exercises revolving around similar scenarios envisaging communist workers as the main opponent, but this specific threat never materialized. In fact, in this era the single largest deployment of Marechaussee forces assisting the regular police took place in 1956 to protect communist organizations in Amsterdam from people protesting against the Soviet invasion in Hungary. Under these conditions, the mobile force of the Marechaussee – and military aid to the civil authorities in general – simply faded into the background. The need for the Marechaussee to pay increasing attention to its Military Police role within the Dutch armed forces in the context of the Cold War certainly contributed to this process.

Partly due to this latter development, the state police force enlarged its potential for crowd and riot control to deal with large-scale riots and armed insurgencies. For the first time, Dutch civilian police forces acquired armored vehicles. The Police Law of 1957, the first of its kind in the Netherlands, reflected the conditions of the
time. It stipulated that regular police forces were responsible for maintaining public order in almost all situations. In cases where local police forces needed assistance, it was up to the state police force to send reinforcements. Military units, including the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, were available to render assistance, but they were only to be called upon in 'special circumstances' as an instrument of last resort.

**Challenges to authority**

This arrangement worked well until the mid-1960s – though in hindsight we can see that it only worked well because there were hardly any significant threats to public order. Social conditions in the Netherlands were stable since the generations that had lived through the Second World War generally accepted the re-established civic order. This changed in the 1960s, in the Netherlands as well as in many other countries across the globe. Post-war generations wanted to be freed from social constraints, challenging and provoking the authorities in multiple ways. In the Netherlands, this included the so-called Provo-movement that emerged in the 1960s, which aimed at provoking the authorities in every way it could imagine, and the squatter movement in the 1970s and 1980s.

Police authorities in the Netherlands were utterly unprepared for these challenges, which resisted authority generally but especially police authority. This became painfully evident in 1966 when large-scale public disturbances surfaced in the nation's capital, Amsterdam. What began as an assemblage of dissatisfied construction workers soon included other groups. The municipal police in Amsterdam – heavily under-staffed – were unable to contain the riots, while the state police force – equally under-staffed – was in no condition to render adequate assistance. The authorities therefore turned to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, which was able to send hundreds of military policemen into the city within a few hours. Two army armored brigades were held in reserve, and while their assistance was not needed, it had been a close call.

The 1966 Amsterdam riots proved to be a turning point in Dutch police history. From that moment on, local and national civilian authorities regularly called upon the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee to assist the police. The military police force had successfully demonstrated – and continued to demonstrate – that it, unlike the regular police forces, was able to render forceful, effective assistance at the push of a button. Military organization and discipline ensured that the Marechaussee would at all times fulfil its obligation to provide military aid to the civil authorities, at the cost of pushing its personnel to and even beyond their limits. Even though police authorities maintained that military aid to the civil authorities must remain the exception rather than the rule, the reality of the situation was a dependence which inverted this maxim.

The frequent use of Marechaussee assistance to maintain and restore public order conflicted directly with the provisions of the Police Law, but police authorities were quick to find creative ways to work around the legal restrictions. Almost any public order incident was considered ‘special’ enough to justify recourse to military aid. The Marechaussee, hoping to recover lost ground, embraced the situation and
was keen to respond promptly to all civilian requests for assistance. For more than twenty years, the Marechaussee even detailed some of its personnel to the under-staffed municipal police forces of Amsterdam and The Hague, where they worked side by side with regular police on a daily basis, providing basic law enforcement services. Some of them worked in the criminal investigation departments, although the Police Law at the time (until 1988) strictly limited military aid to public order issues.

Response to terrorist threats in the 1970s

It will come as no surprise that Dutch police, struggling with public order issues, were not equipped to deal with the wave of terrorist attacks that hit the Netherlands (as well as many other countries) in the 1970s. Several different terrorist groups – both ‘home-grown’ and ‘imported’ – were responsible for these attacks. The ‘home-grown’ terrorist group that posed the most serious threat at the time had its roots in Dutch colonial history. Its members belonged to the Moluccan population group in the Netherlands, originally from the Dutch East Indies. Many of them had fought alongside Dutch forces in the Indonesian War of Decolonization and had migrated to the Netherlands after Indonesia gained independence in 1949. Frustrated with the lack of support from Dutch authorities in their attempts to regain control of their homeland, some protagonists among the younger generation of Moluccans sought out violent means.

In 1970, a group of more than thirty armed Moluccans mounted an attack on the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in the Netherlands, killing a policeman and taking several people hostage. The Marechaussee contributed greatly to police presence with its modern armored vehicles (M 113 APC’s), which functioned as a means of protection against small arms fire and provided the police force with substantially increased firepower. After twelve hours, the hostage situation was resolved peacefully. This, however, did not conceal the fact that Dutch authorities and police had shown themselves utterly unprepared for a terrorist attack. In the absence of specialized counter-terrorism units and standardized protocols, all police measures had to be improvised.

This changed after the so-called Munich Massacre in Germany during the 1972 Olympic Games. This tragic event demonstrated the need for specific measures to deal with terrorist attacks. Authorities in many countries reacted swiftly, and the Dutch response was also prompt but perhaps somewhat more restrained than others (De Graaf, 2010). The Dutch government treated terrorist attacks as criminal acts, which implied that it was up to the police to deal with these attacks. In line with standard procedures, military aid would be employed only as a last resort. However, it soon became clear that in scenarios where all other means had failed, the regular police forces could not provide the highly specialized tactical units that were required to engage in the close combat necessary to rescue hostages by force and take down heavily-armed terrorists. The police forces were not only unable to provide these services – lacking the necessary organization, training, and equipment – but also unwilling, since many policemen deemed the use of violence of this
kind beyond their job description. It was therefore left to the military, specifically the Netherlands Marine Corps, to provide a close combat unit. The state police force did organize a specialized sharpshooter unit which ran parallel to a similar unit from the armed forces, while armored army units were available to seal off an operational area. In case of a terrorist attack, all these forces operated under control of civilian authorities (De Weger, 2006).

The counter-terrorism units were deployed on several occasions during the 1970s. In 1974, the close combat unit of the Marine Corps was utilized for the first time, successfully ending a hostage situation in a prison. A year later, in 1975, the Netherlands witnessed what is believed to be the first ever train hijacking by terrorists. This attack was carried out by a group of Moluccan terrorists, killing three hostages in the twelve days that the hijacking lasted. Although plans were drawn up for the counter-terrorism units to be deployed, the terrorists finally surrendered after long negotiations. A simultaneous hostage situation conducted by another group of Moluccan terrorists elsewhere in the country also ended peacefully.

Since the Dutch counter-terrorism units been perceptibly stretched by responding to two terrorist attacks at the same time, Moluccan terrorists again mounted simultaneous attacks in 1977. This included another train hijacking, near the village of De Punt. A second terrorist group occupied a primary school in the nearby town of Bovensmilde. More than hundred children and several teachers were taken hostage, although the terrorists released the children after a few days. This crisis lasted even longer than the previous stand-off. After twenty days of unsuccessful negotiations, the Dutch authorities decided to order the counter-terrorism units to put an end to both hostage situations.

In the early morning of June 11, the long-distance sharpshooters of the armed forces started firing on the train. They directed their fire at the compartments where they knew the terrorists resided, killing them or at least preventing them from getting to the hostages. Fighter jet airplanes with their afterburners on flew over the train at extremely low altitudes to disorient the terrorists. In the meantime, the marines of the designated close combat unit mounted the train, shooting any terrorist who resisted. In just over ten minutes, the situation was resolved. Six terrorists had been killed, three were arrested, and 49 hostages were rescued. Two hostages had been killed in the crossfire. At the same time, another group of marines, mounted in armored vehicles provided by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, attacked the primary school. This operation ended without bloodshed. Although Dutch counter-terrorism units have since been deployed on several other occasions, the events of 1977 have had the greatest impact on Dutch society up to the present day. The government decision to resort to violence to end the hostage situations has recently come under close scrutiny.

Recent developments

The events of the 1970s clearly demonstrated that the Dutch armed forces had an important part to play in fighting terrorism. That was certainly not what the
Dutch authorities had planned, but there were simply no alternatives available. As noted above, the same applied to the domain of maintaining public order in the face of large-scale riots, and even to policing in general. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee had, against all odds, proved its worth as an indispensable and above all reliable complement to the regular police forces. From 1988 onwards, the strict (although largely ignored) provisions of the Police Law that restricted military aid to extraordinary circumstances, were gradually relaxed. Moreover, in 1993, all police and security responsibilities for Amsterdam Schiphol Airport and other international airports in the Netherlands were assigned on a permanent basis to the Marechaussee. Without the precedent of large-scale assistance provided by the Marechaussee to the regular police in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, this would have been unthinkable.

Since the 1990s, military aid to the civil authorities has been viewed as one of the core tasks of the Netherlands armed forces. The terrorist threat of the last two decades – especially since the events of ‘9/11’ – has, if anything, increased the presence of the Dutch military in the public safety domain. At the time of writing, heavily-armed High Risk Security platoons of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee even guard the heart of Dutch democracy – the Binnenhof in The Hague. Several other government buildings are also under their guard, including that of the Department of Justice and Security, which is in charge of Dutch police army units that have been deployed in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Marechaussee frequently assist the police in searching premises owned by suspected drug dealers.

**Conclusions**

The use of Dutch military forces in domestic affairs is characterized and permeated by two conflicting trends (Van Reenen and Meershoek, 2012). On the one hand, there is the inclination of Dutch police authorities to exclude the military from the domain of maintaining public order and safety. On the other hand, however, this has not stopped the authorities from calling upon the military to render assistance to the police, especially in times when public order and safety were threatened by social unrest or terrorist attacks. This dependency on military aid was partly born of necessity, because the police were unable to deal with these problems independently. Yet it may also have been (at least partly) a deliberate choice. By keeping the door open for the military to assist the police, the police force was able to focus on basic police duties, in close contact with the people in the street. A strong emphasis on the use of violence by the police was deemed unwanted. In this regard, the presence of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, and of the armed forces more broadly, has functioned as a safeguard that allows simultaneously for an important, community-orientated disavowal of excessive violence in policing and a resource for maintaining public order under extreme conditions.

**Bibliography**


SECTION SIX:
INTERNAL THREATS AND RISKS AND WAYS OF COUNTERING
Octavian Ticu

SOCIETAL SECURITY AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: REGIONAL AND EUROPEAN COMPLICATIONS

Introduction

After the Cold War, the first-order importance of security asserted itself anew – not least because of the way security is situated between exercising power and maintaining peace. “Societal security” is an umbrella term for efforts to cope with modern security threats to society, and the concept was formulated to account for the phenomenon of instability arising out of damaged societal identity and cohesion. In other words, societal security refers to the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats (Weaver, Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, 1993: 23).

The term was coined in 1991 by Barry Buzan (Buzan, 1991) who argued that societal security was one aspect of his five-dimensional approach to security theory, along with military, political, economic, and environmental security. As the concept was refined, a clear separation between state security and societal security was posited: whereas state security is concerned with threats to its sovereignty, societal security is concerned with threats to a society’s identity (Weaver et al., 1993: 23). In this sense, societal security deals mainly with the preservation and affirmation of a society’s identity and the cohesion of society’s members. Theoretically, threats to societal security can be exemplified as follows: identity (minorities’ rights, extremism/nationalism, cultural identity, historical background, language) and cohesion (changes in demographic patterns, separatism, regionalism, anarchy, poverty/economic status, migration, family and household patterns).

In simpler terms, societal security addresses varying modes of perceiving threats as well as society’s reaction to the real or perceived threats to its identity and cohesion. Potentially, these two broad elements of societal security – perception and reaction – might be more appropriately investigated through close analysis of the processes driving national or civic identity-creation. This is an argument well worth considering, since the nation/state-building process is one of the most important determiners of identity pressures and societal cohesion in the newly created states after the collapse of the Soviet Union (including the Republic of Moldova). The Moldovan case is one which is shaped by this pattern – illustrating that identity-building dynamics can deeply disturb internal matters of state but also possess the power to create many complications regionally and in a broader European context.
The ensuing case-study of Moldova will be divided in four parts: the first is devoted to the general historical background of the problem; the second examines the Soviet legacy; the third discusses the situation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and the final part considers the implications of internal instability both regionally and in a European context.

**Historical background**

Until 1991, the territory of the Republic of Moldova was never recognized as an independent political entity. Its shape and borders are the result of successive projects of nation/state-building. Such efforts range from the practices of the medieval Moldovan state, to those of the Romanian Principalities, to the Ottoman and Russian empires, to Greater Romania, and to the affirmative nationality policies of the Soviet Union. As a result, perspectives on borders and territory in post-Soviet Moldova are deeply intertwined with competing visions of national and state identity and the imaginary geography that Moldovans attach to their republic’s current boundaries. The present article approaches the question of Moldova’s societal security by noting the interferences which have arisen from the various processes of state/nation-building, considering their historical implications, and reflecting on the ways such forces have affected the present shape of the Moldovan state as well as its configuration and crystallization in the geopolitical context of the “histoire durée.”

Prior to 1812, the territory of Moldova was part of the Romanian Principality of Moldova, which is said to have emerged in 1359 and which later, in the sixteenth century, came under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. In 1775, the Habsburg Empire annexed the northern part of the Moldovan state and renamed it Bukovina, while the eastern part, historically known as Bessarabia, became part of the Russian empire after the Russian-Ottoman war of 1806–12 and remained so until 1917. In 1859, the core area of the Romanian Principality of Moldova became attached to Wallachia as part of the modern Romanian state. After the Great War, Bessarabia was returned to Romania. This situation lasted until the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which added the region to the Soviet sphere of influence, and the subsequent occupation of Bessarabia by Soviet troops in 1940. On 2 August 1940, the Soviet Union created the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), comprised of Bessarabia and the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), which had been established in 1924 within the Ukrainian SSR. With the exception of a period of temporary reoccupation by Romania between 1941 and 1944, the Moldovan SSR was part of the Soviet Union until 27 August 1991, when the Republic of Moldova, on the eve of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, proclaimed its independence. The Declaration of Independence condemned the 1812 and 1940 annexations, thereby emphasizing Moldova’s territorial unity and historical continuity with Romania.

These territorial and political fluctuations – and the added impact of Moldova’s peripheral (and landlocked) location in regard to the powerful states that shaped its history – have often been portrayed as a constant shifting between East and
West that still affects the new Republic of Moldova. In their more recent expression, they can more precisely be understood as a confrontation between Romanian nationalism, which wants its historical province of Bessarabia to ‘return home’, and a Russian/Soviet imperialism driven by geopolitical strategies aimed at controlling Moldovan territory. This confrontation has left a particular legacy that continues to shape the current political and national physiognomy of the Republic of Moldova, which was deeply influenced by the Soviet experience (1940/1944-1989).

The Soviet nation-building legacy

The Moldovan SSR was the first state in history to be formed on the basis of an ethno-political unit, or nationality in Soviet parlance. Confronted with growing nationalisms, the Soviet authorities responded by systematically promoting the national consciousness of these nationalities and by creating for many of them institutional forms that are specific to nation-states (Martin, 2001; Suny 1993; Slezkine 1994). The logic and the content of the Soviet nation-building policy was mainly focused on four attributes: the creation of national territories; linguistic indigenization; the creation and promotion of native elites; and support for national cultures.

The Soviet understanding of nationhood was based on the Stalinist linkage between nationality, territory, and an indigenous political elite. Following Stalin’s definition of the nation, Soviet authorities promoted the idea of a nation attached to a particular territory. The major ethnic groups were assigned officially-recognized territories and organized into an elaborate administrative hierarchy, in which the fifteen Soviet republics represented the highest rank of statehood accessible to a Soviet nationality (Motyl, 1992: 33–5).

The case of the Moldovan SSR constituted an exception in the western part of the Soviet Union in that Soviet Affirmative Action (Martin, 2001) here aimed to create a nation where national sentiments had barely existed or only in the sense of a regionalism at a time when the territory was part of the Russian Empire or Greater Romania. Whereas other western republics had a strong sense of identity, the Moldovan SSR resembled more the republics of Central Asia in the 1920s, during the early stages of the indigenization policy (see Akiner, 1997 and Pipes, 1964). More particularly, the attributes of the Soviet nationalities policy were being promoted in Soviet Moldova to emphasize Moldovan primordiality and its distinctiveness from the Romania.

According to the pattern described by George Schöpflin (Schöpflin, 1993: 28–30), the Baltic countries, for instance, can be considered as traditional societies which preserved what they could from the past despite their Soviet experience and which only changed in largely unperceived ways during the Soviet period, while Moldovan society had been a Soviet creation ex nihilo, which means that it owed to the Soviet nation-building policy its very existence, its political status, and even its ethnic identity.

The roots of the current Republic of Moldova go back to the Soviet Union’s decision – in 1924 – to establish an autonomous Moldovan SSR within the Ukrainian
SSR. The Moldovan ASSR was formed on the basis of what Terry Martin has called the Soviet “Piedmont Principle”: by creating a “homeland” for Moldovans living beyond Romania’s border, the Soviet leadership hoped to advance their claims on Romanian territory. Even though the “Piedmont Principle” played no general role in Soviet policies of nation-building, in the exceptional case of the Moldovan Autonomous SSR this very principle was the main reason for its creation (Martin, 2001: 9, 274).

The Soviet Union never recognized the attachment of Bessarabia to Romania and, in response to it, created the Moldovan ASSR as part of the Ukrainian SSR, calling it, in the words of Volodymyr Zatonsky, “our own Moldovan Piedmont” (Martin, 2001: 274). Moldovans represented 31.6 per cent of the Moldovan ASSR’s population and Ukrainians 49.6 per cent (Gosstatizdat, 1926: 24), yet despite its small size and its dubious ethnic make-up, the newly created area received the status of an autonomous republic in view of an eventual annexation of Bessarabia.

When the Moldovan SSR was established by the Supreme Soviet on 2 August 1940 – purportedly on the initiative of a majority of the region’s working population (Repida, 1977: 246–7) – it was composed of historical Bessarabia as well as parts (but not all) of the Moldovan ASSR, since only six out of the Moldovan ASSR’s thirteen rayons were attached to it.

The Soviets did not follow any precise ethnic, historical, or cultural logic in the creation of the new republic but rather used strategic considerations. As a result, three counties of historical Bessarabia (Cetatea Alba, Ismail, and Hotin) were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR in exchange for parts of the Moldovan ASSR.1 In addition to destroying the territorial integrity of historical Bessarabia, Soviet officials pursued a strategy that would secure the Soviet Union’s access to the Danube River via a politically reliable Slavic republic, thereby transforming the Moldovan SSR into a landlocked entity. The Ukrainian lobby also played a major role in the transfer of these territories. Historical documents attest that it was Nikita Khrushchev who suggested to the Central Committee of the CPUS that the new Moldovan Soviet Republic should be created by unifying the “Moldovan population only” and not uniting the territories of Bessarabia and the Moldovan ASSR (Cioranescu et al., 1967: 163; Lazarev, 1974: 524). Attaching the disputed territory between the Dniester and the Prut Rivers to Ukraine meant that Bessarabia ceased to be an officially recognized territory. It was expected that this would block any future attempt to have the area returned to Romania.

In the long run, the unification of the two formerly distinct entities – known as Bessarabia and Transnistria (or the Left and Right Bank of the Dniester River) – into a territory that had never existed before in any sense, was critical for the further evolution of both the Moldovan SSR and the Republic of Moldova. It not only changed the ethnic balance in the Moldovan SSR, but the Soviet policy of colonization generated the premises of the future Transnistrian separatism. Indeed, the

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1 Sed’maya Sessija Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR (The 7th session of the Supreme Council of USSR). 1-7 avgusta 1940. Stenograflicheskiy octet (Stenographic transcript) 1940: 183.
powerful 14th Guards Army was installed on the left bank to guarantee national security and Soviet influence in the region. On 2 September 1990, the region, with political and military support from Moscow, proclaimed its independence as the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR- Transnistria) and ceased to take orders from the central government of the Republic of Moldova.

Since achieving sovereignty in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Republic of Moldova has embarked upon a process of state- and nation-building. When looking at the complex realities that characterize Moldova’s borders and identity, the reader should therefore always bear in mind that this process as well as Moldovans’ sense of state and nation is inextricably linked with Moldova’s former place – both imagined and real – within the Soviet Union. The Soviet era forms the main foundation on which independent Moldova must build its own political and national identity.

**The post-communist context**

More than two decades of the Republic of Moldova’s post-Soviet history have witnessed the rise of three projects of state/nation-building with various implications for internal and external situation. All are strongly influenced by the historical discourses present at the time of the Declaration of Independence or emerging in its immediate aftermath, and all refer to earlier projects of state- or empire-building. Each of these projects has been directly stimulated and influenced by actors outside the country, mainly Romania and the Russian Federation. Moldovan citizens have supported them inconsistently and with varying intensity.

1. *The Romanian option*

The first externally-driven narrative has a Romanian orientation. It identifies the Republic of Moldova as a second Romanian state and its history as part of the wider history of Romanians. Accordingly, Moldova’s current borders are thought to be the result of Russia’s imperial policy, which led to the annexation of Bessarabia in 1812, and of later Soviet expansionist policies during and after the Second World War. Supporters of this view can be found in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova. For them, ‘anti-Romanism’ and Russification were part of Moscow’s arsenal designed to ensure the denationalization of Romanians living in the Moldovan SSR. The latter’s resistance against these policies, as well as the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, are seen as proof of the impossibility of ‘Moldovenism’, as it is thought that the majority of the republic’s citizens have preserved an attachment to the Romanian language and identity. The independence of the Republic Moldova has been interpreted as a step towards reunification with Romania, along the lines of what happened in Germany in 1990. Finding a powerful echo in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the arguments advanced by Romanian-oriented political leaders and intellectuals were reflected in the Republic of Moldova’s Declaration of Independence, adopted on 27 August 1991. The declaration proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Moldova from the Soviet Union, condemned the annexations of Bessarabia by the Russian Empire in 1812 and by the Soviet Union
in 1940, and emphasized the Romanian character of the new state (Legea privind Declaratia de Independența a Republicii Moldova 1991). The Romanian tricolour became the state flag, the Romanian coat of arms the state emblem, the Romanian anthem ‘Wake up, Romanian!’ the national anthem, and the basic unit of the national currency was named leu, as in Romania.

The narrative lost its political force after the 1992 war in Transnistria, and with the subsequent arrival of the Moldovenization policy, but intellectuals and large parts of the population that identify themselves as Romanians still find it attractive. ‘Bessarabia is Romanian land’ (Basarabia – pământ românesc) is their well-known credo. Proponents of the Romanian option perceive Russia as the historical enemy and as the main threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. They are also very critical as regards the cession of the former territories of Bessarabia to the Ukrainian SSR and argue that Transnistria, never a part of Moldova in their view, should be exchanged for the southern and northern part of Bessarabia, now part of Ukraine.

While its adherents were persecuted under the government of the Party of Communists (2001–09), the Romanian narrative became intellectually attractive and politically powerful once more after the 2009 parliamentary elections and the street riots which led to the overthrow of the Communist government and the establishment of the democratic Alliance for European Integration. However, a political union with Romania is no longer on the agenda, or has at least been postponed until the Republic of Moldova manages to join the European Union, a goal that has become increasingly popular.

2. The ‘Moldovan’ stance

The second narrative is a ‘Moldovan’ one. Its origins go back to the Soviet ideology of the interwar period, gaining consistency in the post-war period as the official party line in both the Soviet Union and the Moldovan SSR. In this version, Moldovans and Romanians are two different peoples who speak two different languages, and their histories, even if they sometimes intersected in the past, have taken different routes since the common ethnogenesis. Considered historically obsolete when the Soviet Union collapsed, the narrative nonetheless survived Moldova’s independence and even gained prominence during the Communist Party rule (2001–09), which was justified in the name of Moldovan statehood.

It reached its apogee in the context of the 1994 parliamentary elections and, more precisely, on 5 February 1994. This was the occasion on which President Snegur, during the congress “Our House – the Republic of Moldova”, denounced the Romanian orientation and accused pro-Romanian intellectuals of denying “the legitimacy and historical foundations of the right to be a state and to call ourselves Moldovans” (Șarov, Cușco, 2011: 739). The former Soviet argument of a Moldovan language distinct from the Romanian one was reiterated and ushered in by the congress as the official ideology of the Moldavian state to be reproduced afterwards by the Democratic Agrarian Party and Communist governments. The theory of
Moldovenism and the notion of a 'secular Moldovan statehood' promoted by the Soviet ideology and propaganda were thus adapted to new political circumstances and once more seen as central elements of state-building and the national identity.

The return of Moldovenism also had an impact on the new constitution, adopted on 29 July 1994. Here, new policies replaced the anthem 'Wake up, Romanian!' and defined the 'Moldovan language' as the official language of the state. This policy of Moldovenization continued during the second presidency of Petru Lucinschi, who insisted on the idea of a 'millennial' continuity of the Moldovan people and state (Fruntușu 2002: 375). Its importance can largely be explained by the tenuous historical legitimacy of the new Moldovan state, which has resulted in there appearance of Soviet-style historical arguments, promoted especially by the Party of Communists. After coming to power in 2001, the Communist government took vigorous actions to formalize a Moldovan ideology, which culminated in the adoption of the 'Concept of National Policy of the Republic of Moldova' on 19 December 2003. The state thus attempted to assert its authority over the discourse on national identity, aimed at "continuing a centuries-old political and juridical process of the Moldovan people for statehood."¹

According to the Moldovenist narrative, the history of the Republic of Moldova can be traced back to the medieval Moldovan Principality of 1359 and all subsequent changes have left legacies that are reflected, for instance, in the particular shaping of Republic of Moldova's present borders. This thesis is, however, very hard to defend since the heart of the medieval Moldovan state was located in present-day Romania and the Transnistrian region was never a part of ancient Moldova.

The supporters of post-Soviet Moldovenism have frequently accused Romania of interfering in the internal affairs of Moldova and sometimes of having imperialist ambitions, while attributing a positive character to Russian and Soviet influence. They are highly critical of Romania's hesitation to sign the main border treaty with the Republic of Moldova. Whereas the Romanian authorities consider the border a consequence of historical injustices created by the 1939 Soviet-German pact, their Moldovan counterparts, especially during the Communist governments, detect behind this statement a hidden agenda bent on reclaiming a former Romanian province.

The idea of Moldovenism has been supported by the Russian Federation through various strategies, and sensitivity persists in such circles toward any attempt of rapprochement between Chișinău and Bucharest. The anti-Romanian stance of the Communist government reached its climax in the context of the protests of 7 April 2009, when the Romanian ambassador in Moldova was expelled and Romania was accused of organizing these disorders 'to dissolve Moldovan statehood'. The rejection of neo-Communist Moldovenism by large segments of the population and an overwhelming majority of intellectuals and students can be recognized as a manifestation of Romanian identity.

3. Transnistrian trend

The third narrative comes from the eastern part of Moldova – from Transnistria – where a majority group of Russians identify themselves as being part of the Russian political and cultural world. Pridnestrovie – russkaya zemlya ("Transnistria is Russian land") is their slogan even though Moldovans, or Romanians, represent one third of the population and Ukrainians another third. The emergence of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (PMR) on 2 September 1990 – an event which had been supported by the Soviet authorities, and was subsequently backed by the Russian Federation – divided the Republic of Moldova into two parts and led to a war that both parties have interpreted as one of independence, with Chișinău seeking its autonomy from the Russian Federation and Tiraspol seeking independence from the Republic of Moldova.

The Republic of Moldova no longer exercises any control over Transnistria, and it has developed a particular perspective on Moldovan statehood. It is argued that its beginnings go back to the creation of the Autonomous Republic of Moldova within the Ukrainian SSR, since the area had never been part of the medieval Moldovan state. Therefore, the Transnistrian regime has refused to acknowledge any historical connection with the Republic of Moldova and claims to subscribe to the condemnation of the 1812 Russian and 1940 Soviet occupations that forms part of the Moldovan Declaration of Independence of 1991, thereby legitimizing the existence of a Transnistrian state which had not been occupied. The authorities of the PMR consider themselves to be the authentic heirs of the Moldovan SSR and the Moldovenism created in 1924. They have preserved the emblem and flag of the former Soviet Republic but also introduced symbolic elements that have no historical connection with the territory, such as the image of the Moldovan ruler Dimitrie Cantemir on the Transnistrian one-hundred-ruble bill.

The authorities of the PMR see no future for a united Moldovan state and have been busily promoting the idea of a distinct Transnistrian people (Pridnestrovskii narod), made up from a melting pot of Moldovans (more than one third of the population), Russians, and Ukrainians (each almost one third). The Transnistrian border- and identity-constructions show many affinities with the Soviet pre-war conception of Moldova: Transnistrians are distinct from Moldovans as Moldovans were held to be distinct from Romanians.

Adherents of this narrative believe that the major threats to the integrity and security of Transnistria issue from the Republic of Moldova, Romania, as well as Ukraine since the 2005 Orange Revolution. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation is viewed as the guarantor of its existence. Although Russia officially recognizes the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova, it has remained the main ally of the Tiraspol administration by plying it with political, economic, financial, and military support (Vrabie, 2008: 79–88). Yet despite allowing Transnistria to function as a pseudo-state, the Russian Federation has been unwilling to confirm its independence. Thus, during the Russian-Georgian war, when representatives of the Tiraspol administration asked the Russian Federation to recognize the PMR on
similar grounds as those invoked for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow rejected their demand. Instead, Russian diplomacy seems to pursue the Transnistrierization of the Republic of Moldova by promoting a federal state in which Chişinău and Tiraspol would have equal status. Such a solution would ensure Russia’s influence over political decisions made by Chişinău, the safeguarding of its military base in Transnistria, and the recognition of Russian as the official language of the new state.

Of the three projects of state- and nation-building presented above, the first and the last are radically opposed and incompatible historically, ideologically and politically. Points of convergence can be observed between the first and second projects, which plead respectively for ‘Romanization’ and ‘Moldovenization’: both recognize Moldova’s territorial unity but differ on the prospects of a political union. The Romanian option stresses the unity of the Romanians on both banks of the Nistru River, while the second postulates the existence of a multicultural and bilingual Moldovan people. At the same time, both the Moldovan and Transnistrian projects promote Moldovan-Russian bilingualism and refer to Soviet Moldovenism. However, the Communist presidency of Vladimir Voronin has demonstrated that Moldovenism could not bridge the gap between Chişinău and Tiraspol even in times of great ideological proximity.

Neighbours and construction/deconstruction of societal security

Two states have shown a strong interest in the issue of the Republic of Moldova’s state/nation building processes. Romania has sort to assert its standing as an historical and geographical neighbor, whereas the Russian Federation has legitimized its interest in terms of the historical past and by invoking the presence of a large Russian minority. At the same time, two other important actors have voiced concerns about the future of the Moldovan state: the European Union and the United States.

1. Romania

Romania was the first state to recognize the independence of the Republic of Moldova. The Romanian government interpreted Moldova’s independence as the “proclamation of an independent Romanian state on the territories forcibly annexed as a result […] of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and a decisive step towards a peaceful solving of its fateful consequences for the rights and interests of the Romanian people” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, 1991).

A declaration by the Romanian Parliament on 3 September 1991 stated that: “the decision of the Moldovan Parliament establishes a deep longing for freedom and independence of the Romanians on the other side of the Prut River. ”It also asserted that: “the new conditions created by the Declaration of Independence of the Parliament of Moldova have opened good prospects for developing co-operation and multiple ties between the two neighbors who descend from a single trunk of the Romanian people, as it was formed historically” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, 1991).
Ever since Moldova’s accession to independence, the slogan ‘one nation, two Romanian states’ has been part of the rhetoric employed by Romanian politicians of various political parties. In Chişinău, the Transnistrian conflict and Russia’s growing influence, as well as the reappearance on the political scene of the former Soviet political elite, led to an exacerbation of Romanophobia and anti-Romanian sentiments. Accordingly, the political dialogue between Bucharest and Chişinău gradually deteriorated into altercations, especially during Communist Party’s presence in government.

Each capital adopted a position during the negotiations on the Basic Political Treaty and the Border Agreement that revealed a completely divergent understanding of the issue of statehood with regard to the Republic of Moldova. In Bucharest’s vision, the Basic Political Treaty was to establish an European partnership with Chişinău and enshrine the status of Romanian advocacy for Moldova’s integration into the European Union. Chişinău wanted – at least until 2009 – an ordinary treaty of partnership and a form of collaboration that would not only avoid any reference to an historical, ethnic and linguistic unity between Moldova and Romania but would expressly refer to the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, considered a relic of the past by Romanian politicians and ‘a barrier against Romanian irredentism’ by the successive governments in Chişinău. Matters came to a head during the rule of the Party of Communists (2001-2009). Romania considered the Peace Treaty obsolete and the resulting border demarcation a consequence of the “unjust and aggressive Molotov-Ribbentrop pact” whereas the Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin denounced Romania as the last “empire” in Europe and exposed to the international community “the Romanian hidden agenda regarding the Moldovan state.”

Until recently, the two countries had a very different take on the issues of Moldova’s European ambitions and Romania’s involvement in resolving the Transnistrian conflict. With regard to the first, Bucharest emphasized the principle of ‘one nation, two Romanian states’, while Chişinău stressed the formula of ‘two peoples, two different states.’ Moreover, whereas Romania advocated for a political solution of the Transnistrian conflict through negotiations, Chişinău wanted Bucharest to play a passive role by signing the two agreements that would strengthen the international status of Moldova: the Basic Political Treaty and the Border Agreement between Moldova and Romania.

In the context of the radical political change that occurred after the 2009 parliamentary elections, the newly created Alliance for European Integration succeeded in getting the Border agreement signed in November 2010, but not the Basic Political Treaty. This was an outcome that many political actors in Chişinău, especially the communists, attributed to a Romanian lack of goodwill concerning the future of the Moldovan state. Yet relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania, not least in view of Moldova’s European aspirations, have greatly improved and a sort of rapprochement has taken place.

1 ‘Preşedintele Vladimir Voronin consideră că România trebuie să înceteze intervenţia în Republica Moldova’ 2003.
2. The Russian Federation

“Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan are lost; Adzharia has fallen; Transnistria is under siege. Enemies have engaged in subversive activities in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and are approaching the gates of Belarus. Minsk is standing firm, but if it falls the road to Moscow will be wide open” (Furman, 2006: 68). This statement by Dmitry Furman, one of the leading figures from the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), reflects a common perception held by the Russian political and intellectual establishment as well as a majority of Russians. Russian geopolitical discussions have always focused on the Russian ‘near abroad’ as a place with special historical and cultural meanings for the Russians, while the West has deemed this semicircle of countries surrounding Russia to be of real strategic value because of its potential for containing Russia. For Russia, the ‘near abroad’ is not simply an area that must be controlled for strategic reasons but is also composed of territories that are intimately linked to Russia through historical, economic, and cultural ties. In this sense, Russian territorial consciousness extends beyond the country’s present borders and neither Russia, nor Russian identity, are confined to the space occupied by the present Russian Federation. After all, Russia’s international political history has always been dominated by action on her frontiers (O’Loughlin, Talbot, 2005: 29).

In the context of post-Soviet politics, relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova are marked by many contradictions. As noted above, Russia combines its official recognition of Moldova’s territorial integrity and its involvement in the settlement of the Transnistrian question with its political, economic, financial, and military support for the separatist regime in Tiraspol (Vrabie, 2009: 79–88), justifying its interest in the Republic of Moldova on historical grounds and by emphasizing the presence of a large Russian minority there.

Intent on safeguarding its interests, Russia has introduced two plans for settling the issue of Moldova’s territorial integrity. First, the 1997 Primakov Memorandum (‘Memorandum on the principles of normalization of the relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria’), signed the same year by Petru Lucinschi and the Transnistrian president Igor Smirnov. Second, the so-called Kozak Memorandum (Vrabie, 2009: 83), which was supposed to have been signed in 2003 but was rejected by the Communist government in Moldova after massive public protests and foreign pressure. Both aimed at the federalization of the Republic of Moldova (see above) in the expectation that maintaining a military base in Transnistria would allow Russia to exercise its influence over the new republic.

The Russian Federation’s interests in Transnistria are based on multiple strategic needs: maintaining the strategic positions of the Russian Federation in southeastern Europe; defending in Moldova the interests of the Russian minority and other nationalities that consider Russia as their historical motherland; maintaining strategic links with Transnistrian enterprises, many of which occupy a unique position within the military-industrial complex; solving the conflict in the interest of Russia’s own stability and of the consolidation of Russia’s relations with the states in the ‘near abroad’ that have a Russian minority; establishing stable and predictable
relations with Romania in an effort to reverse its growing influence on Moldova; and discouraging the EU and the United States to project stability on the Moldovan state (Țicu, 2011: 111-2).

Good bilateral relations have prevailed between Moldova and the Russian Federation provided that the Chișinău leadership has been receptive to Moscow’s wishes. Conversely, policies contrary to Russian interests have been followed by sanctions, as witnessed in 2003 when a refusal to sign the Kozak Memorandum led to gas and wine ‘wars’ against the Moldovan state.

The war with Georgia and the recognition of the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia represented a first – and at least partially successful – attempt by Russia to use the issue of territorial integrity in a strategy that combined the question of national security, neo-imperial ambitions, and a desire to be internationally recognized as a regional and world power. Yet the attempt has also been viewed as proof of the incapacity of the Russian political elite to transform the post-Soviet space in accordance with contemporary principles of influence and power. Should a similar scenario be expected in regard to the Republic of Moldova? The logic at work in Russian political action suggests that the Russian Federation has no other strategies at present beyond those aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of neighboring states in order to achieve its geopolitical goals (Țicu, 2011: 113).

Russia’s attitude and behavior towards its ‘near abroad’ attest that the Kremlin seems content to grant the Republic of Moldova internal sovereignty and territorial integrity, as long as the latter does not become a threat to Russia’s interests or challenge the perception of the ‘near abroad’ as Russia’s vital space. Obviously, the Russian Federation uses the issue of territorial integrity to influence policy-making in the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, Russia’s position on the Transnistrian question remains something of a puzzle and may have to be explained in terms of the great power game between the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United States.

3. The European Union

Relations between the European Union and Moldova have evolved in the highly complex international environment that emerged in the early 1990s and are in several ways archetypal of the geopolitical tensions and political identity politics that have played out in both East and West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As academic observers have indicated (Soitu, and Soitu, 2011), EU-Moldova relations cannot be clearly separated from the Moldova-Romania context. However, division regarding the merits of codifying European Union regulations, norms, and values did promote a struggle for geopolitical orientation among Moldovan political elites. Thus, Moldova lived through numerous alternating periods of pro- and anti-EU sentiment in which questions of Moldovan national identity simmered. Those siding with Russian Eurasian geopolitics understood Moldova as an inherently different culture, more closely linked to the Russian and Soviet past than to the West. These elites mistrusted what they saw as attempts to create EU hegemony and weaken Moldovan sovereignty. The counterargument of EU-friendly elites, who gradually
rose to prominence after 2009, placed Moldova at the heart of Europe with close historical, linguistic, and cultural links to Romania and Western nations.

Thus, the Republic of Moldova, for understandable reasons, has not been as coherent as the EU would have wanted in defining its foreign policy priorities. Successive shifts can partly be explained by the effects of Transnistria’s secession and Russia’s increasingly assertive influence in the region, forcing Moldova to achieve a certain balance in its foreign relations and even to adopt at times a neutral stance to safeguard its fragile statehood.

Moldova’s relations with the EU can be examined in three distinguishable periods. The first (1991–2001) could be considered a period of missed opportunities because Moldova at the time failed to join the movement towards EU integration along with other East European countries, including the Baltic states. The second coincides with the years in which the Communists governed (2001–09) and the European Union launched its Neighborhood Policy. The increasing interest of the EU in its neighborhood after the 2004 enlargement, together with other external and domestic factors such as the resolution process of the Transnistrian conflict, then made both parties more willing to advance their bilateral relations. The third period starts with the 2009 parliamentary elections in Moldova and the launching of the Eastern Partnership by the EU the same year. Since then, EU–Moldova relations have mostly been about Moldova’s future prospects in Europe.

A few days after the fifth enlargement wave of May 2004, the EU launched its European Neighborhood Policy, which marked a new turn in its policy approach towards sixteen countries in its neighborhood. In March 2005, the EU appointed a Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova whose mandate was to participate in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. Since October 2005, the EU has the status of an observer in the 5 + 2 negotiation process (Chirila, 2009: 168).

Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in October, the official opening ceremony of EUBAM took place on 1 December 2005. EUBAM at first received a two-year mandate, extended in 2007 for another two years (Chirila, 2009: 169). Officials in Tiraspol perceived EUBAM as an attempt to install an economic blockade against the PMR in order to impose the Moldovan plan for reintegration.

The EU has offered to both parties, on the left and right bank of the Nistru River, the benefits of European integration and EU officials have repeatedly expressed support for Moldovan territorial integrity under the control of Chișinău. The Transnistrian question was on the agenda of several high-level meetings of European and Russian leaders between 2010 and 2012. Finally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, during an official visit to the Republic of Moldova in August 2012, underlined her intention to provide support for Transnistria’s reintegration into the Republic of Moldova and to extend the benefits of future visa and free trade agreements to the region.

From 2009 onward, the government of Moldova officially adopted a strong commitment to the idea of European integration. Alliances were formed purportedly calling for European integration and ostensibly working toward such a goal. In
reality, the political landscape of this period was marked by a rivalry between Vlad Filat (the leader of the most important pro-European party and the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova from 2009-2013) and the unofficial leader of Democratic Party, an oligarch named Vlad Plahotniuc, whose capacity for influencing the staffing and complexion of state institutions and ministries steadily degraded citizens’ confidence in the reform process and the idea of European integration. Between 2009 and January 2016, under the cover of the idea of European integration, these two rivals actually carved up the spheres of influence in the Republic of Moldova and turned the political scene into a personal confrontation.

As a result, slipping from its high-point in 2010, when public and political support for EU integration was above 60%, support for this idea had dropped to 36% in 2017. In contrast, there was broad support for pro-Russian projects of integration (42%) and this period saw the election of pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon as president of the Republic of Moldova (Vox Populi, 2017).

**Conclusions**

The independence of the Moldovan state is based on a heritage of various mixed state- and empire-building processes with the Soviet nationality policy as the main foundation for national identity. In today’s complex geopolitical context, this has led to diverging and conflicting trends in approaching the issue of borders, territory, and state integrity, each supported by a specific historical narrative. One such narrative is the Romanian orientation, which sees the Republic of Moldova as the second Romanian state and its history as part of a general history of Romanians. A contesting narrative is the “Moldovan” one, according to which Moldovans and Romanians are two different peoples speaking different languages and harboring a different history despite a shared ethnic origin and a partly shared past. A third perspective, hailing from Transnistria in the east, stems from a situation where those of Russian heritage have formed a majority and taken control, declaring themselves to be an integral part of the Russian political and cultural world.

Perhaps more importantly, these projects have been directly stimulated and influenced by actors outside Moldova, mainly by Romania and the Russian Federation. Moldovan expressions of support have been sporadic and have varied in intensity. The three projects are essentially incompatible historically, ideologically, and politically and have led to internal political strife (and even to war and secession in the case of Transnistria). They also strongly diverge in terms of Moldova’s geopolitical orientation between West and East.

For these reasons, the future of Moldova’s political and territorial identity remains uncertain. Based on present positions taken by the various internal and external actors, and on their views in the recent past, numerous scenarios can be envisaged. The first one would result in a single Moldovan state that grants a large degree of autonomy to Transnistria; the second outcome would be a confederation composed of Chișinău and Tiraspol (plus the Gagauz region), each of them with an equal status; the third would be an integration of the Right Bank (i.e. the present Republic of Moldova minus Transnistria) into Romania on historical grounds.
that emphasize a Romanian unitary state which includes the historical territory of Bessarabia; the fourth outcome would mean the attachment of Transnistria to the Russian Federation along the lines of the two consecutive referendums voted in Transnistria, where this proposal was supported by a majority, albeit under circumstances marked by great irregularities; a fifth scenario might be one in which Transnistria joins Ukraine, a possibility suggested by history (since Transnistria was part of Ukraine between 1917 and 1940) as well as by demographic factors (since ethnic Ukrainians represent 28 per cent of the region’s population); and in a sixth scenario, Transnistria could become an independent state, as its officials and inhabitants have advocated numerous times.

However, many comparable historical experiences across the world – from post-Soviet cases in the Caucasus region to various examples in Africa and Asia – suggest that post-colonial or post-imperial contexts are hard to predict when a newly formed state’s political and territorial identity is fragile and collides with the great power ambitions of a former imperial center.

Since 1991, Moldova has often been perceived as being caught between two civilizational models. One is that of the Western world, represented in the eyes of Moldovans by the European Union and NATO, while the other is the Russian model with its Community of Independent States and various Eurasian supranational political and economic unions. However, the basic dilemma of finding a balance between East and West appears to go back to 1812. Today, it is frequently presented in terms of a strong dichotomy: the Republic of Moldova could become a European state, with Transnistria forming an integral part of it as a result of European integration; or it could become a confederation of Moldova and Transnistria under Russian control that would participate in the Eurasian projects of the Russian Federation. In both cases, the selected pattern would reflect not only the internal preferences of Moldovans, influenced by various state- and nation-building projects, but also the general context of conflicting or consensual relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation regarding this issue. For these reasons, the most likely outcome – both short-term and medium-term – seems to be preservation of the current status quo.

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Jordan Baev and Plamen Dimitrov

MIGRATION FLOWS AND BORDER CONTROL IN COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR BULGARIA: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

This article addresses three main issues. First, we examine the organization of Bulgarian Border troops as a part of the Armed Forces, noting the impact of multiple changes to their command structure. At various times they reported to the Ministry of Defense and in other phases to the Ministry of the Interior. Secondly, we discuss the specifics of border incidents and migration flows affecting the southern borders of Bulgaria with Greece and Turkey in the Cold War years. Thirdly, we scrutinize the efforts of the Bulgarian state authorities to fortify and protect the borders in response to the immigration wave that swept across Europe after 2012.

After the restoration of the Bulgarian state in 1878, national border control was marked by frequent organizational changes. Authority shifted back and forth between the Ministries of Defense and of Internal Affairs. This stemmed mainly from the different, sometimes opposing, conceptual and normative viewpoints on the subject and aims of border management. A prominent dynamic here was the functional dilemma of “protection” or “defense” of state sovereignty and integrity. In the first decade after national liberation, the newly established national army was used to fight paramilitary pro-Islamic detachments, sent illegally from the Ottoman empire. Subsequently, after the unification of North and South Bulgaria in 1885, the first ever law on Border Guards was approved by the parliament in December 1887. It stated that the Border Guards should report to the Ministry of the Interior. However, the legal parameters for organizing the Bulgarian army were updated in January 1895 so that the Border Guards were subordinated again to the War Ministry with a Border Guard battalion assigned discretely in each military district. Contesting political discourses continued to fuel the transformation of the security services, including Border Troops, and changes persisted throughout the following two centuries, leading to significant alterations of the roles, missions, and tasks to be assumed. The whole conceptual framework for the protection and control of the national borders underwent profound changes in Bulgaria as well. During the Cold War, the leading principle was to protect against violation of the borders from within: namely, against “illegal escape to the West.” In contrast, in the contemporary world, the principal goal and task is to prevent any external opportunity for violating the national borders, or subsequent illegal crossing of Bulgarian territory.
The Cold War Era

At the end of the Second World War, Bulgarian Border troops consisted of 7,300 servicemen, divided into five border districts which contained 35 border sectors in total. When the Armed Forces were reorganized in July 1946, initially an idea was discussed that envisaged creating a Border Militia. Later, in October 1946, a new law on Border Troops (with a supplemental law on Internal Troops) was approved by the Grand National Assembly. This law re-subordinated these units to the Ministry of the Interior. The official public explanation for the change was that the Bulgarian army had to be focused on preparation and implementation of other more important functions and duties. The real reason and philosophy driving the change, however, was suggested directly by the Kremlin and was caused by the start of the bipolar Cold War confrontation in Europe. Facing an emerging civil war in Greece, and the increasing involvement of neighboring countries in it, any responsive actions utilizing the armed forces could be viewed as a *casus belli*, while the activity of special Border Troops aimed exclusively at protecting the national territory.

At the height of the first Cold War wave (1948-1953), Bulgarian Border Troops covered eight border sectors in 1948, 11 border sectors in 1951, and 17 border sectors in 1953. Following the normalization of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries to the west and south (Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey) in 1954-1955, the border control system was reduced to 11 border sectors. Later, in accordance with Council of Ministers Resolution No. 1057 of 20 June 1962, the Border Troops were again subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense and were managed operationally by the General Staff of Bulgarian National Army. In June 1972, there was another transfer of management responsibility back to the Ministry of the Interior. Throughout the many organizational shifts, the education and training of Border Troops servicemen (both officers and soldiers) was accomplished in military schools. Constitutional and normative regulations decreed that Border Troops continued to be a part of the national Armed Forces.

The last wave of fundamental changes within the border control system in Bulgaria came soon after the transformation of the political and social system of the country in November 1989. In May 1990, the Border Troops were united with the Internal Troops into a joint Ministry of the Interior Troops. Further change was ushered in with the approval of a new law of the Ministry of the Interior in December 1997, and the Border Troops were reorganized once more, becoming National Service “Border Police”, while the former Internal Troops were renamed “National Gendarmerie.” The new law on Defense and Armed Forces of 1995 (Art. 62 and 63), and all consequent normative regulatory acts in the next two decades, divided clearly the “protection” of the national frontiers, which is a duty of the Border Police, from territorial “defense”, which is a duty of the Armed Forces (Land Forces, Navy, and Air Force).

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1 Centralized Archive of the Committee on State Security and Military Intelligence Dossiers (Archive COMDOS, Record Group “M”, Fond 14, Historical reference, p. 1-6.

2 Central State Archives (TsDA), Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 64, A.E. 415, p. 5. At that time, the Border Troops employed 7,470 servicemen.
The Greek Civil War, immediately after the Second World War, prompted a flow of thousands of refugees and political immigrants to Central and Eastern Europe. The flow increased significantly when battles intensified close to the borders with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania in 1947-1948, but everyday border crossings became almost uncontrolled at the end of the war in the summer and fall of 1949. A report from June 1948 by the Commander of Bulgarian Border Troops, Major-General Yonko Panov, offered the following summation: “the volume of Greek refugees who arrived in Bulgaria in 1945 was 6,568 men, in 1946 it was 2,156, while in the period from May 1947 to June 1948 about 4,000 Greek refugees crossed the border and entered Bulgarian territory.” This report also noted that in June 1948, 8,279 Greek refugees were accommodated in several settlements, mainly in Northern Bulgaria (Baev, 1999; Baev, 2007: 16-32).

The royalist government in Greece publicly declared that the leftist guerrilla detachments “evacuated” or actually “deported” thousands Greek children from Northern Greece toward neighboring Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Bulgarian archival documents confirm those claims, though not in such exaggerated numbers as announced by the official Greek propaganda. According to a report from the Bulgarian Ministry of Health and Social Care from April 1948, at that time 1,098 Greek children (aged from 2-15) were settled urgently in balneotherapy establishments or former military barracks in Bankya, Plovdiv, Hissar, Stara Zagora, Varshets, and Belogradchik. In a government discussion, Racho Angelov, Minister of Health, proposed that 200 graduate medical students assume immediate care of the Greek children.

As a result of the intensive battles close to the border with Bulgaria, in the summer of 1949 almost every day approximately 20-30 wounded guerrillas arrived in Bulgaria and were transferred to regional hospitals. On 2 September 1949, Rusi Hristozov, the new Minister of the Interior, stated: “Currently there are approximately 4,000 Greek refugees in our country. They are accommodated in military barracks in Berkovitsa and Belogradchik, which are enormously crowded, and some refugees sleep outside of the buildings. There is no prospect for their returning home in the near future; therefore, the question of their settlement is open.”

In those years, another kind of refugee crisis also affected the southern Bulgarian border. Due to the program of forced social transformation – especially the collectivization of agriculture and the harshly atheistic propaganda – the Islamic population in the south-eastern part of the country expressed an increasing intention to immigrate to neighboring Turkey (Baev, 1995: 155-173). In the second half of 1949, thousands of Bulgarians of Turkish origin declared their intention of moving to their “motherland” – Turkey. In January 1950, the Bulgarian government approved a resolution permitting all 250,000 Bulgarian Turks who had applied to immigrate to Turkey. In response to that decision, however, in August 1950, the Turkish government warned that it could not accept more immigrants from Bulgaria, and on 7 October closed entirely its northern border. Following urgent bilateral negotiations, in December the border was opened again. According to official data of Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered to the United Nations rep-
representatives, in the period between January 1950 and October 1951 about 154,000 Bulgarian Turks left the country, while 111,000 others who applied for immigration documents missed that opportunity due to a new closure of the border by the Turkish authorities on 7 November 1951. The unstable and unpredictable situation on the Bulgarian border with Turkey and Greece, and the intensity of the armed incidents, led the Bulgarian political and state leadership to approve six emergency resolutions in 1950-1952 for strengthening border control, which included increasing Border Troop personnel numbers and a re-armament process.

A similar refugee wave occurred in the second half of the 1980s across the Bulgarian-Turkish border, which contributed in some ways to the deepening of the societal crisis in Bulgaria and the downfall of the Communist regime of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989. At the end of May 1989, a mass migration flow – very emotive in terms of its impact – was created following the liberalization of a law on International Passports. This led to 362,000 Bulgarian Turks leaving the country. In accordance with a special order from Grigor Shopov, First Deputy Minister of the Interior, from late-May 1989 onward, more than 5,000 people from the so-called “enemy elements” list were forcefully expelled to Turkey. At the same time, a large proportion of those Bulgarian Turks who had re-entered the country – about 110,000 people – were forcefully relocated to other parts of the nation.

Illegal political emigration through the Bulgarian border with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey was another notable dynamic during the Cold War era. Here, a peculiar form of political repression was practiced with immediate detention and arrest of people for “illegal crossing of state borders”. In this category, there were victims not only among Bulgarians, but also citizens of other East European countries who tried to avail themselves of the favorable geographic situation of Bulgaria (bordering Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia) in their attempts to escape to the West. In the period between 1973 and 1978, authorities recorded 376 cases in which registered citizens of the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania attempted to cross the borders of the Bulgarian state illegally: 349 of them were detained and deported to the authorities of their countries; 11 were killed attempting to cross the border; and only 26 managed to escape to one of the three neighboring countries and depart from there to the West. The highest proportion of escapees – 207 people – came from East Germany, while 39 were Czechoslovakian and 37 were Polish.1

The post-Cold War Transition

In the early post-Cold War years, the transformation of the IR model and the establishment of a new European and Euro-Atlantic security architecture brought significant changes to the border management of Bulgaria. In April 1990, the Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 27 for removal of all active forward obstacles and barrages at the western border with Yugoslavia. This was to have consequences later during the “Yugo-crisis” (1992-1999) with the increase of smuggling

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1 Archive COMDOS, Record Group “M”, Fond 1, Opis 10, A.E. 100, p. 344; Opis 11-A, A.E. 118.
and underground traffic of weapons and people. As a result of bilateral and multilateral agreements for confidence-building measures with Greece and Turkey in 1992-1993, the removal of heavy forward obstacles on the southern border was also decreed. In the ensuing decade, prior to 2001, a network of 121 warning electric signal points and iron obstacles was totally removed from the forward border zones.

Over time, in the previous two decades, the frequent waves of administrative change affecting the Border Troops had led to significant vacillation and weakness in border control practices. In the post-Cold War era, the whole conceptual framework for protecting and controlling the national borders was overhauled. During the Cold War, the leading principle was protection against “illegal escape to the West.” Contrastingly, the principal contemporary goal and task became the prevention of any external opportunity to violate the country’s borders or any illegal crossing of the nation’s territory.

The summarized data on violation of the national borders in the first post-Cold War transition period (1989-1997), available in the archival records of Bulgarian Border Troops,\(^1\) shows an enormous increase in illegal arrivals on Bulgarian territory. This tendency meant not only an increase in individual border-violation cases, but also a drastic increase in the ethnic diversity of those apprehended. The reports for 1997, for instance, show border transgressions committed by people of 73 ethnicities, one third of whom were from non-European states. A significant proportion of the immigrants in those years continued to be from south eastern Europe (mainly from FYROM and Serbia) and former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Moldova, Central Asia). Their primary motives were economic – to find ways of reaching European Union states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attempts at border violation</th>
<th>Detained persons</th>
<th>Successfully crossed border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>753</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>904</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>694</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>2342</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3270</td>
<td>6496</td>
<td>2482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more recent (and unprecedented) migration flow for Bulgaria reached its peak in 2013-2015. This emergency situation prompted urgent security measures, including a re-building of iron fences and even walls on the Bulgarian border with Turkey, which stretches to 274 kilometers.

In the decades following the Second World War, Bulgaria amassed very little experience in accepting labor migrants, especially those with a foreign religion.

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\(^1\) State Military Historical Archive (DVIA), Veliko Tarnovo, Opisi 21-27, Fond 1391 (Border Troops Directorate).
and language. The only significant exception were the Vietnamese who worked in Bulgarian factories and plants between 1973 and 1990 in accordance with intergovernmental agreements. By 1989, their number had reached 20,000. However, they had the status of a temporary labor force; they did not integrate into Bulgarian society, and the vast majority of these laborers left immediately after the expiration of their contracts.

Until mid-2012, the number of registered illegal immigrants at the Bulgarian-Turkish border was not high. An increase was observed during the summer and autumn months of 2012 when the total number reached 2,100. In 2013, the tally rocketed to 11,200 – reaching a peak in October, when 3,600 people were captured at the border with Turkey (Tashev, 2015).

At the Council of Ministers Security Council meeting of 30 August 2013, 13 urgent steps were adopted to limit migratory pressure. By order of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski, national and regional centers were set up under the control of the Ministry of the Interior to implement strategic management of national resources to address migratory waves. An inter-agency information-analytical group was formed at the National Operational Center which summarized and analyzed information on the refugee crisis in the country.¹

As a matter of urgency, Bulgarian authorities began to repair abandoned army barracks in Sofia, and along the border with Turkey, in order to equip them as refugee camps. The first manifestations of discontent among the local population arose in the villages where new camps were planned. Nationalist formations took a firm anti-immigrant stance and held several rallies. A majority of Bulgarians have a negative attitude toward refugees, and according to a sociological survey conducted on February 2016, 78% of adult Bulgarians think the refugees are a burden for the country’s economy, while 60% consider migrants a threat to national security (Kyuchukov, 2016: 6).

On November 6, 2013, the Bulgarian government adopted a plan to respond to the crisis arising from increased migratory pressure. This was a thorough document defining the objectives, activities, resources, financing, deadlines and responsibilities of executive authorities in addressing the „crisis situation” arising from such a large influx of migrants. It is interesting that the term „migrants” and not „refugees” was used in this plan, revealing that even at this time the government was aware that a majority of foreigners entering the country illegally were not Syrians. Instead, they came from relatively secure countries and would not obtain refugee status.

One of the most important tasks outlined in the Crisis Management Plan was the construction – prior to the end of February 2014 – of a „30-kilometer blocking facility on the most sensitive sections along the state border” near Elhovo and Bolyarovo. The document noted that Turkey had been notified of the intention of the Bulgarian government to erect a fence along part of the border as early as October 2013. In

a decree from February 25, 2014, the government approved the extra spending of BGN 22.5 million to finance the implementation of the Crisis Management Plan. It became clear from the decree that the barrage facility at the border with Turkey would be built by Land Force formations (State Gazette, 2014: 11).

In the spring of 2014, the Bulgarian government adopted a plan designed to enhance response capabilities, since increased migratory pressure was expected at Bulgaria’s borders between April and December 2014. This document was a natural extension of the previous Crisis Management Plan dated 6 November 2013. For the period April-December 2014, the government set two main objectives: to limit the number of illegal immigrants on Bulgarian territory, and to increase the capacity for accommodation of foreigners. In early July 2014, the Bulgarian government adopted a National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration for 2015-2020. The document was a pre-requisite for the country to receive EU funding to address the migration problem. In 2014, migratory pressure on the Turkish border continued to grow. During the first 11 months of the year, 35,069 migrants tried to illegally enter Bulgarian territory, which was 2.3 times more than in the same period in 2013.¹

The 30-kilometer fence on the Turkish border was completed in the summer of 2014 and was usable from September 15 of the same year. Earlier, the Ministry of the Interior had declared the necessity of building a fence along the entire Bulgarian-Turkish border. However, from August until November 2014 the country was governed by a transitional government, which meant that the final decision was left for the cabinet that was formed after the early parliamentary elections. A month and a half after the Minister of the Interior from the newly elected government took office, he wrote a report to Prime Minister Boyko Borisov in which he justified the need to build a barrage facility for another 131 kilometers along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Thus, the total length of the fence along the land border would reach 161 kilometers, while about 100 kilometers would not be protected – mainly along the Tundzha, Rezovska and Deliija rivers. By the beginning of 2015, the Bulgarian state had already increased its readiness and planned its future activities to receive new refugee waves along the border with Turkey.

Migration pressure was perceived as a serious challenge to national security, which raised the question of military involvement in border protection. On January 14, Defense Minister Nikolay Nenchev announced that his office would join the protection of the Turkish border, contributing logistics and high-tech equipment; however, no troops would be sent to participate in patrols. At the end of the month, he specified that about 180 soldiers would be sent to the border to help the Ministry of the Interior (ClubZ, 2015). This decision was preceded by political debates as to whether the army should participate in border protection – an obligation that was not explicitly ascribed to the armed forces under the existing legal framework.

¹ Report from the Minister of the Interior, Veselin Vuchkov, to the Prime Minister, Boyko Borisov, 23 December 2014. A copy of the report is available online at: https://www.mvr.bg/press/%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BE/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4/%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8/dokumenti_501214.
In the summer of 2015, however, migratory pressure intensified further, and on September 17, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov approved a joint action plan that provided for the gradual deployment of up to 1,000 troops on the border with Turkey. They were to carry out routine border control together with border and national police forces but did not have the right to use their individual weaponry, nor the right to detain migrants (BNT, 2015). Shortly thereafter, Defense Minister Nikolay Nenchev stated that military border guards had the right to use weapons only in unavoidable self-defense and were instructed to „strictly adhere to national legislation, international humanitarian law and the UN Charter“ (Mediapool, 2015).

The migrant crisis became a major catalyst for a redistribution of responsibilities between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense. In February 2016, 31 deputies from different political parties, supported by the Defense Ministry, submitted to the National Assembly a draft amendment to the Defense and Armed Forces Act. This change in law explicitly stated that the Armed Forces could patrol the state border (Otbrana.com, 2016). On 25 February, The National Assembly passed the amendment unanimously.

In the following months, the number of soldiers sent to guard the border with Turkey ranged between 130 and 400. They did this in rotation, and by March 2018, around 4,800 troops had patrolled the border with Turkey, which constituted about a one fifth of the armed forces’ personnel (Ministry of Defence, 2018). In 2016, the cost of their stay in the border area was funded by the Ministry of Defense budget, however in 2017 the funds came mainly from the assistance Bulgaria received from the EU to manage the migrant crisis. In the summer of 2017, Defense Minister Krasimir Karakachanov, in an interview with German journal „Die Welt“, commented on the border guards, saying that “practice shows that the militaries were much more efficient than the police”, and he stressed that Bulgaria was going to use the army to protect the border with Turkey in the future.

Indeed, the shortest route from Turkey to Central and Western Europe passes through Bulgaria. Yet evidence shows that Bulgaria was subject to much less migratory pressure than Greece, Italy, and the countries of the Western Balkans. In the most critical year – 2015 – about 30,000 migrants entered the territory of Bulgaria, which constituted only 3% of the total number for the European Union and seemed negligible compared to 821,000 people entering Greece (Valchev, 2017: 70).

There were several reasons why migrants from Turkey should bypass Bulgaria and prefer the route to the Greek Aegean islands. First of all, crossing the land Turkish-Bulgarian border was more difficult and more expensive than the transfer by boat to Greece. This became particularly evident after the Bulgarian authorities built the fence along the border and reinforced the volume of security guards. Living conditions in the Bulgarian refugee centers were not particularly good either, and they compared unfavorably with those in Greece. In addition, migrants feared that if they were registered in Bulgaria, with the strict implementation of the Dublin Regulation of the EU, they would be sent back to the country even if they had managed to reach Western Europe.
Besides the EU, Turkey was the other important international player with whom Bulgarian authorities had to comply regarding their policy of managing migratory pressure. There were over 3 million migrants in this country whose goal was not to remain in Turkish territory but to move to the rich European countries. The authorities in Ankara had significant tools for influencing the attitudes and behavior of this large migrant mass, and during widely-publicized moments of exacerbation with the EU, President Erdogan threatened to release the wave into Europe. In addition, in the period 2015-2017, Turkey underwent serious internal political upheavals which affected its conduct in the international arena. With regard to Turkey, Bulgaria’s migration policy had two main objectives: first, Ankara was to be persuaded not to allow refugees to approach and cross the border with Bulgaria, and second, Turkey had to take back those migrants who had managed to cross the border.

The Bulgarian authorities were aware that it was best for relations with Turkey on migration to be placed in the broader context of EU-Ankara arrangements. An important step in this respect was the signing of a Re-admission Agreement between the European Union and Turkey on 16 December 2013. It was to enter into force on 1 October 2014, and after the expiry of the grace period for certain groups of persons, to be applied starting from 1 June 2016. However, this did not happen because the Turkish side did not complete the internal procedures necessary for its implementation. On May 5, 2016, Bulgaria was the first among all European countries to sign a separate protocol with Turkey for the implementation of the Re-admission agreement between Brussels and Ankara, but this did not help to bring it into effect either (Dnevnik, 2016).

When the Bulgarian government took over the rotating presidency of the European Union on January 1, 2018, Sofia activated its policy towards Turkey and proposed a new EU-Turkey negotiation initiative to be held in Varna. On March 26, 2018, talks were held between the EU leaders – President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Junker, – and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the state residence Euxinograd near Varna. This was a key event in the consistent efforts of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov to offer his “good offices” for the negotiation process between Brussels and Ankara. The only clear result stemming from the talks in Varna is that the Re-admission Agreement remains in force.

Conclusions

Bulgaria has applied various models of protecting its national borders during the last 140 years. The Border Troops have had their organizational structure altered multiple times as administrative authority has shifted between the Defense and Interior Ministries. Currently, they are a part of the internal security system; however, some Armed Forces units are also used for the protection of the national borders. The border control regime has existed through periods of controlling dominant orthodoxies as well as liberalization and has changed according to the geopolitical environment. The challenges faced by those protecting the national
borders have changed as well. In the Cold War era, the most challenging task was to stop the flow of people from Bulgaria toward its southern neighbors, while at the beginning of the 21st century, the main task took on an external complexion, enmeshed in European Union politics – stopping the migrant flow from Turkey toward Bulgaria.

The refugee wave of the last decade led to a serious re-thinking of the organization underpinning the protection Bulgarian borders, highlighting an urgent need for legislative and normative changes, which could permit the use of the armed forces in such emergency situations. The migrant crisis of 2014-2016 was also the first serious source of discord within the European Union in recent years – featuring contestation over the merits of a tough anti-migrant or a more liberal policy. The Bulgarian government adopted what it deemed a balanced and pragmatic position in this situation. While it supports the relocation of such migrants, at the same time it continues to build a wall at the borders with Turkey and declares that it does not have any capacity to accept a large group of migrants on its territory.

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APPENDIX A.

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**Sadi Saleh Sadiyev** is professor at Azerbaijan Republic War College of the Armed Forces. Dr. Sadyev was admitted to the State University of Languages in
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Daniela Șișcanu is a scientific researcher at the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, Romanian Ministry of National Defence. She holds a master degree in Politics and Governance of European Integration and International Relations from National School of Political Sciences and Public Administration in Bucharest. Dr. Șișcanu has received her PhD degree in history at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Moldova in Chisinau. Her PhD thesis was focused on the Soviet Propaganda in Poland, Finland, Baltic Countries and Romania in the years 1939-1940 after the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. Her academic research focuses on the study of ideology, totalitarianism and propaganda in Soviet Union, security and military dynamics in post-Soviet area, information warfare. She is the author of various studies and articles, published in Romania and abroad on topic related to regional security, Romanian national security policy, crisis analysis and crisis management in the former Soviet space.

Manuel Stănescu is a researcher at the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romanian Ministry of National Defense. He is a graduate of Bucharest University (1998) and received his PhD degree in history at the same university in 2011, with a thesis about the siege of Odessa (August – November 1941). For almost 9 years he served as an expert in the Romanian Military Archives. His main research areas are focused on the history of the world wars, theory of warfare, radical movements and civil wars in the interwar period. He published both scientific and popularity articles and is frequently invited to programs on historical themes. His publications include Epopeea cuirasatului Bismark. Triumf si tragedie (2015) [The Epopee of the Bismarck-class battleship. Triumph and tragedy] and Odessa. Gustul amar al victoriei. August - Octombrie 1941 [Odessa. The bitter taste of victory. August-October 1941] (2016)

Octavian Ticu is a researcher-coordinator at the Institute of History of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Moldova. He is also Associate Professor at Faculty of History and Philosophy, Moldova State University and Associate Professor at Grigore Gafencu Research Center for International Relations and Cultural Studies, Valahia University of Targoviste, Romania. He holds a PhD in history at the “Al.I.Cuza” University in Iasi, Romania. He was granted a Junior Visiting Research Fellowship in 2005 at the Central European University (Budapest, Hungary) and,
in 2006/2007 a Fulbright Research Scholarship at the Russian, East European and Eurasian Center, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, the United States of America. In 2013, Dr. Ticu served as Minister of Youth and Sport of the Republic of Moldova. His academic research focuses on contemporary history of Eastern Europe, the history of Soviet Union, the history of post-Soviet space. His publications include *Spassk 99: a history of Romanian POW in documents* (2016), *From Neighbourhood to Partnership: Highlights of Lithuania Relations with Romania and Moldova* (2013), *Problema Basarabiei și relațiile sovieto-române în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)* [The Bessarabia Problem and Soviet-Romanian Relationships in the Interwar Period (1919-1939)] (2004). Dr. Ticu was awarded Medal “Civic Merit” by the President of the Republic of Moldova for work conducted in the Presidential Commission for Condemning Communism, civic engagement and positive promoting of the Republic of Moldova image abroad (in 2010) and the National Prize of Moldova in the Field of Science and Literature for the book – *The Bessarabia Problem and Soviet-Romanian Relationships in the Interwar Period (1919-1939)* in 2004.
Soviet Attempts at Hybrid War against Romania in 1924
Daniela Șișcanu and Manuel Stănescu

While the means employed by states and non-state actors to conduct what we generically call “hybrid war” have changed, the fundamental principles of using a combination of conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve a political goal are a natural development in the history of conflict. Toward the end of WWI, all the elements of a hybrid conflict were identifiable in the concept of “world revolution” preached by the new leaders of Russia. This doctrine led to Romania—reunited with Bessarabia in 1918—becoming a target for Bolshevik subversive actions. The events that took place in 1924 made it clear that the Kremlin had a well-orchestrated plan regarding Romania. Moscow developed an entire strategy based on creating an effective network of agents and undercover organizations, as well as planning riots. Most importantly, they also created a new state entity on the left bank of Dniester river. The Soviets envisioned this as a bridgehead for their broader plans concerning not only Romania, but also the Balkans and Central Europe.

Keywords: hybrid war, World War I, Romania, world revolution, Tatar-Bunar, Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, soviet propaganda

Hybrid Warfare and Demographic Shift
Sadi Saleh Sadiyev, Daniel H. McCauley, Khayal Iskandarov

In this paper demographic shift is analyzed as a component of hybrid warfare. The paper considers future threats likely to arise from demographic shift, and it discusses how potential adversaries might employ this dynamic to exert influence on a target group. Past lessons are recalled and foregrounded, while enduring challenges in the contemporary security environment are outlined. Having studied the nature of demographic shift, we examine its practical and political implications while positing some recommendations for eradicating or at least staving-off future repercussions.

Keywords: hybrid conflict, hybrid war, conventional, irregular, demographic shift.

A New Aim for a New Army: The Armistice Army and French Domestic Security
Morgane Barey

The armistice conventions decreed by the Germans and Italians on 22 June 1940 were designed to humiliate and punish the French for the Versailles treaty. The terms involved an enforced re-organization of the French Army. Apart from
internal peacekeeping troops, the army was to demobilize and dismantle its forces, and only a small Armistice Army of 100,000 men (army, navy, air force, and police force) was authorized. The Armistice Army mattered greatly to the new French government, and it soon became an outlet and point of emphasis under the Vichy regime. It was viewed as a way to maintain French authority within its territories, and the government created new aims for these forces, and devised a new structure to facilitate a transformation. Military academies were re-organized and new academies were created, the training of officers and privates was re-conceived, and a new ideology was instilled in the troops. As collaboration grew between the French government and German authorities, and the impact of the national renovation carried out by Vichy regime spread, the Armistice Army quickly became a political tool employed by the new government. Accordingly, in domestic affairs the Armistice Army was used as the spearhead of “Révolution nationale” values.

**Keywords:** French army forces, armistice army, révolution nationale, officers.

**Civil Defense in Slovakia during the Normalization Period**
*Matej Medvecký*

This study describes and analyzes the civil defense system developed by the Communist regime in Slovakia (the eastern part of former Czechoslovakia) during the normalization period that followed the intervention of the Warsaw Pact armies in August 1968. Civil defense formed part of Czechoslovakia’s broader defense strategy and included measures for protecting the population or lowering casualty rates in the event of enemy attack. It also involved preparing the means to smoothly run the economy amid war conditions, and for dealing with the aftermath of any prospective attack. These objectives were pursued by training the population, building an early warning signal system, and constructing specialized structures (bunkers and shelters). Normalization period civil defense was divided into civil and military sections—and the latter comprised regiments and civil protection headquarters. The article also explores the impact of a specific decision made in 1976 in the realm of civil defense: the federalization of Czechoslovak civil defense and the initiative of re-shaping state defense branches by moving them from the interior ministry portfolio to the defense area of responsibility.

**Keywords:** Slovakia, Communism, history, army, military, civil defense

**A Defense Force for Domestic Consumption? The Danish Armed Forces in Greenland**
*Niels Bo Poulsen*

This study offers a critical assessment of the role of Denmark’s defense forces in Greenland. It argues that—viewed from the perspective of the local population—the most important function served by the Danish Armed Forces on the island is the diverse contribution to the economy and welfare of society offered by naval vessels, helicopters, and other military assets. The article notes that the military’s contribution to tasks such as ice breaking, medical evacuation, and fishery inspection is
crucial to the wellbeing of Greenland’s many scattered, small communities. It also contends that it would also be difficult to find a suitable replacement if Greenland became independent.

**Keywords:** Greenland, armed forces, independence movement, self-rule, Inuit population, coast guard

**Redefining the Role of the Armed Forces in Domestic Affairs: The Case of Georgia**

*Lana Mamphoria*

A democratic society is not a fully militarized society, since the indispensable principles of democratically controlling armed forces refers to the supremacy of civilian institutions and checks and balances applied to the military. This ethos underpins the conception that deploying armed forces domestically should remain a last resort. Much like the countries of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) are managed in accordance with the principles of democratic control based on defense and deterrence policy and on contributions to international/regional security. Highlighting such legal, political, and historical concerns, this article examines the domestic missions of the GAF and its re-defined responsibility in this realm. It notes the ways that the GAF’s core function of defending the nation from external threats has evolved and shifted in ways which better promote stability nationally and internationally. The paper concludes that amid a global tendency toward stalemated conflicts and increased instability within states, the domestic role of the military cannot simply be to function as an enshrined instrument of last resort but must extend to involvement in stabilization and securitization processes of internal affairs.

**Keywords:** Georgian armed forces, domestic affairs, national defense, emergencies, new security challenges.

**Vicissitudes of Race and Virtue in the Borderlands of Jacksonian America: The U.S. Army and the Removal of the Southeastern Indians**

*John W. Hall*

At once a standing army and a colonial constabulary, the early nineteenth-century U.S. Army epitomized the contradictions of the early republic. Although founded in defiance of metropolitan control and convinced that citizen soldiers were the ideal guardians of liberty, the United States discovered (and rediscovered) over its first forty years that these ideals could not meet the demands of territorial expansion and external security, and it gradually conceded the necessity of a regular army. Nevertheless, the U.S. Army remained a lightning rod for controversy—one capable of illuminating grave disagreements about the nature and future of American society. These debates reached a crescendo during the 1830s, as the army implemented the Jackson administration’s controversial Indian removal policy. Nominally, criticism of the army reflected entrenched views about the justice of the policy itself, but the attacks bespoke deeper schisms over the locus of sovereignty,
the meaning of national honor, the sources of republican virtue, and the currency of class and race as measures of human worth. Ironically, the army wielded by Andrew Jackson represented everything his supporters abhorred—military elitism, the superiority of federal authority, effeminate notions of manly honor, and hierarchy based on class and education rather than race. This paper, derived from my forthcoming book *Dishonorable Duty: The U.S. Army and the Removal of the Southeastern Tribes*, will critically re-evaluate the army’s role in the ethnic cleansing of the Old South and suggest that the removal project shaped national attitudes about race as much as it was shaped by them.

**Keywords:** regular army, territorial expansion, borderland, self-rule, colonialism

**The Six Day War and the Establishment of a Military Government in the Occupied Territories**

*Orit Miller-Kalav*

This study is intended to provide a general perspective on the main challenges facing the Israeli authorities in managing the newly occupied territories following the Six Day War. The War broke out on June 5, 1967 and was the shortest armed conflict in Israel's history; yet it changed the country profoundly. The battles of a war spanning just six days were sufficient for Israel to capture extensive territories and conquer their inhabitants. Overnight, the local residents came under the State of Israel's control. Israel began to realize that an organizational system should be put in place to meet the requirements of all parties: military, political, civilian, legal, and local. The first four months—from June to September 1967—were the most critical from practical and political standpoints. Decisions were made during these months—giving rise to military, political, and legal actions—which dictated the establishment of the government's infrastructure. The military government system was based on international law and Israeli law. The outcomes of the war led Israel to face complex challenges and two subsequent difficult wars. Jordan chose to pursue the path of talks and covert ties. Several proposals were made in Israel on how to deal with the occupied territories, namely The Allon Plan, the Galili Proposal, and the Committee of Four. The three documents did not yield practical results and failed to materialize.

**Keywords:** Israel, war, military administration, occupied territories, Allon Plan, Middle East, military government

**To Step into the Arena or not: Military Intervention in the Yugoslav Crisis (1981-1991)**

*Damijan Guštin and Vladimir Prebilič*

This article examines an internal crisis in a multi-national state and discusses the ways that the military leadership viewed a solution for the crisis undergone by the state and political regime. In the Yugoslav communist regime, the military was under strict
political control. Hence, the question of whether to act independently—seizing power along with responsibility for state leadership—had never really been on the Yugoslav Army’s agenda until the mechanisms of this political control fell apart. Consequently, the military leaders acted quite autonomously but endeavored to preserve dual elements: the socialist order as well as the state. Given the dissolution of the socialist system, these were contradictory efforts that robbed the state military of all legitimacy in the eyes of at least one side in the dispute. Thus, the Yugoslav Army attempted to implement its own vision of state preservation, even if this meant an increased role in incubating a state of emergency as a means of triggering a soft coup. Its unsuccessful direct involvement in the political crisis led to a total loss of any legitimacy and had an important impact on later military involvement in the Yugoslav wars.

**Keywords:** Yugoslavia, military intervention, Yugoslav Peoples’ Army, civil-military relations

### The „Monitor Mutiny” in Hungary in 1919

*Mihály Krámlí*

Hungary’s most renowned naval mutiny was the so called „Monitor Mutiny” in June 1919. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s collapse in 1918 had ushered in an independent Hungarian Democratic Republic by November of that year. Yet on 21 March 1919 the communists seized the power and proclaimed the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and the most serious uprising against the communist regime occurred on 24 June 1919. The uprising had two centers: the Ludovika (Military Academy) in Budapest and the flotilla. The latter site became famous as the Monitor Mutiny. The uprising in the Ludovika academy was soon suppressed, but from the flotilla two monitors and four patrol boats joined the mutiny. The ships crossed Budapest, firing at the „House of Soviets”, then reached Dunapentele, south of Budapest. On 26 June, at Paks, an artillery duel occurred between two patrol boats and a Red armed steamer. Two officers of the patrol boat Komárom died, while the armed steamer sunk. On the same day, the mutineers managed to cross the mine barrage at Uszód and reached Baja, which was a city under Serb rule. In Baja, the mutineers were interned, and their ships were disarmed.

**Keywords:** 1919, Hungarian Soviet Republic, counterrevolution, Danube monitor

### Yugoslav Army Engagement with Livestock Disease Control Regulations in the Julian Region 1946-1954

*Miljan Milkic and Dalibor Denda*

This article analyzes the activities of the Yugoslav Army in enforcing livestock disease control regulations in the Julian Region during a period when this area had a specific international legal status. The authors point out the complex relations between the Yugoslav and Allied Military Administrations in the Julian Region, and note the influence of Yugoslav-Italian relations within the framework of resolving
the Trieste crisis. The article draws upon documents from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, the Military Archives in Belgrade, the Archives of Yugoslavia, published normative documents, as well as relevant literature in Serbian, Slovenian, and English.

Keywords: Yugoslav army, Julian Region, Yugoslav military administrations, allied military administrations, Trieste crisis.

The Role of the Romanian Armed Forces in Domestic Affairs: 1907-1944
Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu

At the turn of the 20th century, the Romanian state faced major internal challenges. Given the amplitude and the nature of these domestic crises, the engagement of the military was to become a key vector in overall national efforts to secure domestic stability, prevent political chaos, and counter potential security threats. This paper will analyze the role played by the armed forces in managing the main internal crises which broke out between 1907 and 1944, while deciphering the circumstances which shaped the practical involvement of the military in domestic affairs. Although the use of the armed forces has provoked various controversies—even outright criticism—there is a broad consensus that the internal and external conditions shaping Romania’s security configuration largely justified the armed interventions and allowed the military to assume a higher profile in handling periods of domestic turbulence.

Keywords: armed forces, rebellion, domestic crisis, military regime, military intervention

Are We Winning or Losing? Assessing Success and Failure in Internal Conflicts
Peter A. Kiss and Stefan Maximilian Brenner

Periodic assessments show a commander the progress of an operation, suggest ways to allocate (or reallocate) resources, and indicate when it is necessary to alter operational design. At higher levels, assessments support strategic and political decisions. In a conventional conflict such assessment is reasonably straightforward: traditional military metrics may not identify the ultimate victor but do provide an indication of who is ahead at any given time. The operational environment in an internal conflict is different. When armed forces must apply force against fellow citizens, most of the traditional military metrics are meaningless. Quantitative analyses do have their place, but qualitative metrics are far more useful. Being qualitative, they are difficult to operationalize, and often it is quite difficult to recognize them as appropriate metrics in the first place. This paper investigates the issue of which assessment methods and evaluation metrics can serve as reliable indicators of progress in an internal conflict. Vignettes from several internal conflicts are used to provide examples of best and worst (or at least good and bad) practices in selecting and using assessment tools.

Keywords: insurgency, counterinsurgency, evaluation, indicators, metrics
Restoring Normalcy in Greece in the Latter 1940s: The Role of the Hellenic Navy

Zisis Fotakis

This paper discusses US naval aid to Greece in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It was a program which reflected the contemporary importance of Greece in American eyes. The aid aimed to transform the Greek Navy into an efficient policing force and a potential adjunct of British-American Sea Power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Navy progressed well and contributed to the restoration of normalcy in post-war Greece by helping the Greek Army in its fight against the Communist Republican Army during the Greek Civil War, by clearing Greek seas of mines and shipwrecks, and by restoring the Greek lighthouse network. Other important Greek Navy contributions included furthering hydrographic knowledge of Greek seas, distributing naval fuel during the fuel crisis of 1947-1948, and facilitating construction projects in the late 1940s.

Keywords: American naval aid, Greek civil war, mine sweeping, normalcy

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities in the Netherlands

Herman Roozenbeek

This paper will offer a brief overview of the strained relationship between Dutch police authorities and the armed forces, noting the major trends and developments in this dynamic. Two conflicting trends are identified in the national practice of using Dutch military forces in domestic affairs. The first is the inclination of Dutch police authorities to exclude the military from the domain of maintaining public order and safety. Yet a second, contrary trend is evident given that such misgivings have not stopped the authorities from calling upon the military to render assistance to the police, especially in times when public order and safety were threatened by social unrest or terrorist attacks. This dependency on military aid is analyzed as a factor partly born of necessity, since the police have at key points been unable to deal with these problems independently. However, the article contends that this pattern may also have been—at least in part—a deliberate choice.

Keywords: Dutch police, armed forces, Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, conscription, counter-terrorism units

Societal Security and State-Building in the Republic of Moldova: Regional and European Complications

Octavian Ţicu

“Societal security” is an umbrella term which addresses efforts to cope with modern security threats, and the concept was formulated to account for the phenomenon of instability arising out of damaged societal identity and cohesion. This article approaches the question of Moldova’s societal security via history and geopolitics, noting the impact of these forces on the various processes of state/nation-building which have modeled the present shape of Moldova. Until 1991, the territory of the Republic of Moldova was never recognized as an independent political
entity. Its fate was always inextricably linked to that of the Romanian medieval state of Moldova, of the Ottoman Empire, of the Russian Empire, of Romania, and more recently of the Soviet Union. Moldova’s national physiognomy has been especially affected by a confrontation between revanchist Romanian nationalism and Russian/Soviet imperialism. Cognizant of these key historical dynamics, the article analyzes the influence of three perspectives on the state and nation-building processes in post-Soviet Moldova, while pondering various regional and European implications. The first dynamic is of Romanian orientation, viewing the Republic of Moldova as the second Romanian state and its history as part of general history of Romanians. The second is a “Moldovan” vision in which Moldovans and Romanians are two different peoples who speak two different languages—their histories, even when intersecting in time, following different routes from ethno-genesis onward. The third narrative comes from the eastern part of Moldova—from Transnistria—where a majority group of Russians have consistently identified themselves as being part of the Russian political and cultural world.

**Keywords:** Societal Security, State/Nation-Building, European Union, Romania, Russia

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**Migration Flows and Border Control in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Bulgaria:**

**A Comparative Historical Overview**

*Jordan Baev and Plamen Dimitrov*

This article addresses three main issues. First, we examine the organization of Bulgarian Border troops as a part of the Armed Forces, noting the impact of multiple changes to their command structure. At various times they reported to the Ministry of Defense and in other phases to the Ministry of the Interior. Secondly, we discuss the specifics of border incidents and migration flows affecting the southern borders of Bulgaria with Greece and Turkey in the Cold War years. Thirdly, we scrutinize the efforts of the Bulgarian state authorities to fortify and protect the borders in response to the immigration wave that swept across Europe after 2012.

**Keywords:** border troops, migration flow, Cold War, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece
The 17th Annual Conference of the
EURO-ATLANTIC CONFLICT STUDIES WORKING GROUP

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

The Use of Military Forces in Domestic Affairs:
Lessons from the Past, Current Issues and Future Developments

29 May-2 June 2017
National Military Center
Bucharest, Romania

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### Panel III Armed Forces in Civil Wars and Internal Conflicts. Old Roles – New Paradigms

**Moderator:** Dr. Niels Bo POULSEN

**Speakers:**
- 16:10-16:30 Lt. Col. Prof. John W. Hall (USA), *Internal Colonialism, American Style: The U.S Army as Nation Builder in the Borderlands of the Old South*
- 16:30-16:50 Dr. Orit Miller-Katav (Israel)-Military Administration in the Occupied Territories 1967-1974
- 16:50-17:10 Dr. Damijan Guštin, Prof. Dr. Vladimir Prebilič (Slovenia), *To step into the Arena or Not: Military Intervention in the Yugoslav Crisis (1981-1991)*

**17:30 – 18:00 Discussions**

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**18:00-19:00**  
**Free time**

**19:00-21:00**  
**Official Dinner**

### Wednesday, May 31

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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| 09:30 - 11:20 | **Panel IV The Military in Internal Disturbances. Legal Issues and National Experiences**  
**Moderator:** Lt. Col. Prof. John W. HALL | Marble Hall |
|               | **Speakers:**  
09:30-09:50 Dr. Mihály Krámli (Hungary)-The “Monitor Mutiny” in Hungary in 1919  
09:50-10:10 LTC Dr. Miljan Milkic, LTC Dr. Dalibor Denda, (Serbia)-Yugoslav Army Engagement on Livestock Diseases Regulation in the Julian Region 1946-1954  
10:10-10:30 Dr. Carmen Sorina Rijnovceanu (Romania), The Use of Armed Forces on the “Domestic Front” during the first half of the XXth century. Romania’s case  
<p>|               | <strong>10:50 – 11:20 Discussions</strong>                                        | Moorish Hall |
| 11:20 - 11:40 | <strong>Coffee Break</strong>                                                      | Moorish Hall |</p>
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| 11:40 – 13:30| **Panel V** The Role of the Armed Forces: Redefining “Enemies” and Reshaping Military Tasks  
Moderator: Dr. Efpraxia PASchalidou  
Speakers:  
11:40-12:00 Dr. Almos Peter Kiss (Hungary): *Are You Winning or Losing? – Assessing Success and Failure in Internal Conflicts*  
12:00-12:20 Dr. Zisis Fotakos (Greece): *Restoring Normalcy in Greece in the Latter 1940s. The Role of the Hellenic Navy*  
12:20-12:40 Herman Roozenbeek, MA (Netherlands): *Military Aid to the Civil Power in the Netherlands*  
12:40 – 13:00 Col (ret) Prof. Dariusz Kozerawski (Poland): *The Role of the Polish Military and Police Contingents in Stabilization Process in Post-Conflict Situations in the 20th and 21st Centuries*  
13:00 – 13:30 Discussions                                                                 | Marble Hall |
| 13:30 – 15:00| **Lunch**                                                                                   | Moorish Hall |
| 15:00 – 16:30| **Panel VI** Internal Threats and Risks and Ways of Counteracting  
Moderator: Dr. Erwin SCHMIDL  
Speakers:  
15:00-15:20 Dr. Efpraxia Paschalidou (Greece), *The Hellenic Army in the Eve of a Civil War (1946-1947): a Historical Approach*  
15:20-15:50 Dr. Octavian Ticu (Republic of Moldova), *Societal Security and State-Building in Republic of Moldova: Complication for Regional and European Context*  
15:50-16:10 Prof. Jordan Baev, Dr. Plamen Dimitrov Petrov (Bulgaria), *Migration Flows and Border Control in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Bulgaria: A Comparative Historical Overview*  
16:10 – 16:30 Discussions                                                                 | Marble Hall |
| 16:30-16:50  | **Coffee Break**                                                                           | Moorish Hall |
| 16:50-17:10  | Overview on the CSWG’s History and Evolution-  
Dr. Robert Rush, Coordinator Emeritus of the CSWG                                                                 |            |
|              | **Conclusions and the Way Ahead:**                                                         |            |
| 17:10        | • Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen (Denmark)                                                            | Marble Hall |
| 17:45        | • MG (r) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu (Romania)                                                   |            |
|              | • Col. Dr. Christian Ortner (co-chair of CSWG)                                             |            |
| 17:45-19:00  | **Free Time**                                                                              |            |
| 19:00 – 21:00| **Dinner**                                                                                 |            |
**THURSDAY, JUNE 1**

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**FRIDAY, JUNE 2**

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APPENDIX D.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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Abstract

Whereas political and military co-operation is nearly as old as mankind, formal alliances are closely linked to the system of territorial states – a system usually associated with the peace of Westphalia of 1648, and presently undergoing dramatic changes which will reflect on the very concept of alliances. Numerous experiences from past history reveal general characteristics that remain valid today, and it was and continues to be one of the aims of the Military History Working Group (MHWG)/Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) to not only present and publish papers of high academic standards, but also to deal with issues that are relevant in a time when international associations and other alliance structures such as the European Union and NATO are themselves undergoing a period of strain and transformation.

Organized in 2000, the Partnership for Peace Consortium’s MHWG/CSWG is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, working groups within the PfP Consortium today. Initially working under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies, the MHWG became estranged from the PfPC in 2006 after the Consortium had its’ funding reduced and could no longer support the MHWG. For the next years, through dint of will and a willingness of the participating nations to assist one another, members continued hosting and attending the annual MHWG/CSWG conferences. Its’ yearly seminars and close coordination between the Western and Eastern host nations in the preparation of the events have strengthened the group members’ sense of mission and willingness to accommodate different viewpoints to achieve the common goal of better international understanding.

In contrast to the International Commission of Military History, which as a UNESCO-affiliated organization is by definition worldwide, the Military History Working Group united official military historians from various European countries as well as Canada and the USA, with the initial focus on diplomatic and military affairs of Central and South-Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. This was later re-defined to focus on issues of Euro-Atlantic interest including comparative studies from other regions and countries.
In 2009, the working group voted to rename the Military History Working Group the Conflict Studies Working Group. This decision aimed at accommodating requests extending research focus to integrate both military history and strategic and security studies.

The major activities of the working group are: 1) to convene an annual multilateral military history seminar, normally to be held at sites rotating between the capitals of Central and Eastern European members; 2) to promote exchange of research, lecturers, and publications between members of working group; 3) to undertake joint publication of seminar papers, and other works of mutual interest; 4) to establish means of sharing research, and conducting dialog, through Internet and Email; 5) through teaching, lecturing, and publications, to disseminate contributions of working group participants to defense academies, universities, and research institutions in member countries.

During the MHWG/CSWG's eighteen-year existence, each annual conference has had its' proceedings published, in the beginning by the PfP Consortium, and later either by the hosting co-chairs or by other sources, with total presentations numbering over 350. The success of the seminar is a tribute to the desire of scholars to meet on the common ground of historical science and scholasticism, notwithstanding past quarrels and conflicts. It was made possible by a combination of good will, eagerness to learn, and desire to achieve results without impediments of hierarchy or protocol.

Mission, Vision, Goals and Metrics of Success

On 6 April 2000, at Garmisch, Germany, the Military History Working Group was officially organized. In June 2000, at the Partnership for Peace Consortium meeting in Tallinn (Estonia), Germany and the United States had approved their proposal to establish of PfP Consortium Military History Working Group (MHWG). The following countries comprised the initial membership: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and the United States. As time progressed, the working group expanded to include the above nations plus Austria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey; with following nations as guests, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Macedonia, Moldova, South Africa, and Ukraine. Different Central and Eastern European nations host the symposiums, while the Western European co-chair assists with administration and funding.

The below MHWG Mission Statement written in 2000 very closely mirrors that in effect today:

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1 “Military History Working Group Purpose and Organization” 19-21 June 2000
2 See Appendix F for a near complete listing of papers presented
To establish, maintain and enhance a regular, multilateral, and open exchange of information, viewpoints and ideas between official military history institutions through annual thematic seminars that examine historical determinants of national military strategy, policy and objectives, as well as the historical context of current international and regional affairs. Secondly, enhance cooperation between institutions and nations in order to strengthen defense and military education and research.

The group's initial Vision was to bridge the different experiences of the NATO nations and those of the former Warsaw Pact with respect to historical interpretations.

The prolonged confrontation of the Cold War was a difficult period for soldiers and citizens on both sides of the Iron Curtain and on both sides of the Atlantic. The sixteen nations of NATO and the eight nations of the former Warsaw Pact had very different experiences as each played its role in challenging times. Bridging such differences with respect to historical interpretation is the primary purpose of the Military History Working Group. Military historians from the different nations come together to share ideas concerning important events -- and to gain an appreciation of differences in national perspectives with respect to them. This open sharing of opinion and historical research assists the different nations in moving away from confrontation and toward a lasting peace and stability.

Remaining viable today, in 2004, the MHWG/CSWG established Metrics of Success:

1. Does this group strengthen defense, military, and research by enhancing cooperation between institutions and nations?
   • Yes. All countries have established official military history offices and well as security studies institutes and other groups focused on conflict studies – this group brings them together in common endeavors to examine historical determinants of national military strategy, policy and objectives.

2. Does this group create a community and network of experts in the fields of defense and security studies in order to share best practices and practical solutions to common issues and problems?
   • Yes. Provides historical background to common issues and practices from an official history perspective.

3. Are the group's activities unique?
   • Yes. The only association of official military history offices and security studies institutes, able to mobilize military history resources within each country.

4. Does this group support defense military education and research within and without Consortium nations?
   • Yes. Participants represent official MOD offices and many are part of defense academies and institutes. Published proceedings from the CSWG meetings are distributed and/or made available through official channels, which support defense military education and research within and without Consortium nations.

5. Does this group apply across the spectrum of Consortium countries?
   • Yes. Twenty-two countries are officially represented by the CSWG with the topics covered having a direct relationship to today in the Balkans and Central Europe, education and training of the military, as well as other topics pertinent to Conflict Studies.
Aside from the essential yet intangible benefits that accrue simply by establishing and maintaining contacts, the opportunity for providing the different working group members with tangible historical analyses from other nations is a critical part of the MHWG/CSWG.

Organization

In the early years of the MHWG, the PfP Consortium’s financial assistance was crucial in supporting the participation of those nations receiving Warsaw Initiative Funding (WIF), and for financing translators during the seminars. By 2003, WIF funding began drying up and became critical in September 2005 when the different chairs/coordinates of the various working groups of the PfP Consortium received information that the Consortium was taking a 70 percent cut in Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) that was used to fund the different groups. This was due principally to US Department of Defense (DoD) oversight changing from the Europe desk to the Eurasia desk; as well as from the resolutions of the NATO summit in Istanbul in 2004.

In October 2005, the MHWG coordinator briefed the groups History and Strategic Plan to the PfP Consortium Senior Advisory Council (SAC) as well as being favorably received by senior representatives from the NATO Defense College (NDC), Austria, Germany and the United States. The general officers and senior civilians present understood the importance of history in current decision making, and were especially interested in several of the working group’s recent seminar themes such as Military Professionalization; Multi-national Operations, Alliances and International Military Co-Operation; and Post Conflict Operations, and how they applied to the different staff colleges within NATO. This elicited hope that the PfP Consortium would restore funding for the MHWG. Two of the SAC members later discussed the MHWG with officials in Washington. Unfortunately, this was not to be. In December 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense refused to fund MHWG in any manner and directed the PfPC not to assist by any means.

Into the Wilderness

In early December 2005, the PfP Consortium notified the working group coordinator that the decision had been made to withdraw DoD WIF funding for the MHWG. This affected not only the MHWG but also other groups within the PfP Consortium. Because of the short time between the notification decision and the MHWG annual conference, the Center of Military History assisted in defraying the costs of non-NATO colleagues. Unfortunately, the PfP Consortium, because of imposed constraints, was unable to accept these funds to assist in planning the travel and lodging for those formerly eligible for WIF funds, so the MHWG exploited alternate means outside the Consortium. The 2006 conference was the last supported in any manner by the PfP Consortium.

The question now was where did this leave the Military History Working Group? Although there was great interest in continuing the conferences even without the support from other organizations, there were worries the Working Group could not operate on its’ own. Although the group was vibrant, there was recog-
nition that it needed to affiliate with an organization recognized by the different governments within NATO and the PfP. Although attempts were made to affiliate with other organizations, efforts came to naught.\footnote{Rush, Robert S. “Letter to MHWG” 10 February, 2006}

Austerity measures became the norm. Beginning in 2007, the Group held the annual seminars without translation, with English as the only working language, thereby eliminating a major cost factor. The hosting MoD institutions continually provided in-kind support to former WIF nation participants, and which remains a crucial element for the continued success of the CSWG.

In 2007, when the working group separated from the PfP Consortium, the working group leadership remained with two co-chairs and a perineal point of contact, now titled coordinator, with somewhat different responsibilities for the coordinator. The coordinator assisted in finding national venues for the yearly seminars, in determining conference topics, and coordinating with outside agencies and within the group.

In 2009, the group’s name was changed from Military History Working Group to Euro Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) to reflect a broader focus to include both military history and current security dynamics-related topics in view of enhancing the inter-disciplinary approach. In 2012, the group, now named Conflict Studies Working Group, submitted a request to the PfP Consortium for readmission without funding, with the request granted beginning in late 2012. Since that period the CSWG has operated under the aegis of the Partnership for Peace Consortium. Because the increased workload, the coordinator position increased to two so that one coordinator would look inward and the other coordinating with the PfP Consortium and other working groups. The CSWG has also begun working with other working groups within the PfP Consortium.
Broadening the mission

The core mission remains the same, namely to encourage scientific dialogue and information-sharing among NATO and partner countries on topics related to the role of the armed forces and also to support professional military education in line with the PfP Consortium priorities. As part of its new approach and reintegration into the PfPC, the CSWG developed new directions of actions and assumed new tasks which allowed it to increase its relevance and strengthen its profile as an important contributor to the PfP Consortiums’ activities.

Mission and goals:

- Establish, maintain and enhance a regular, multilateral, and open exchange of information and research ideas by bringing together military historians as well as researchers and experts on security and defense studies from the Euro-Atlantic area, both NATO and partner countries.
- Develop a military research community and foster a broad regional dialogue concerning important, even controversial, events and topics: regional cooperation as driver of building regional transparency and confidence among NATO and partner countries.
- Combine research on military and diplomatic history-related issues with an analysis of current strategic, security and military developments, in order to identify historical determinants that shape the broader dynamics of defense policies and security strategies.
- Address military history-related topics connected to contemporary security affairs and generate expertise/policy recommendations on specific policy and military issues of relevance for decision makers and other interested parties.
- Produce academic curricula in order to support professional military education and increase greater intellectual and professional interoperability within and between partner countries and NATO alliance members. Between 2015 and 2017, at the request of the PfP Consortium, the CSWG elaborated the Counterinsurgency Reference Curriculum that will be circulated among the defense academies and specialized military education institutions of the NATO alliance and the partner nations.
- The activities of the CSWG are developed in line with the PfP Consortium guidelines and agenda of objectives aiming at enhancing professional dialogue, regional cooperation, and military education.

Relevance:

The aim of CSWG is twofold: first, to bring together military historians and specialists on security studies and encourage institutional and professional dialogue among NATO and partner countries; second is bring into discussion and address military history-related issues which are currently relevant at a time when international associations and other alliance structures such as the European Union and NATO are themselves undergoing a period of strain and transformation.
Support for enhancing regional cooperation and strengthening the trans-Atlantic unity/solidarity. The group’s activities help strengthening the cooperation with partner countries in the spirit of PfP, building regional trust, and creating grounds for deepening mutual understanding and transparency, generating common perspectives, and overcoming historical apprehensions.

Support for enhancing regional confidence. The CSWG helps in building a broad network of military and academic institutions and experts among NATO and partner countries. It allows the emergence of a military research-related community and the development of a broad regional dialogue concerning important, even controversial, events/topics. It also forges regional cooperation as driver of building regional transparency and confidence among NATO and partner countries.

Support for professional military education. In 2017, the CSWG finalized a Generic Reference Curriculum on Counterinsurgency. To this end, the CSWG coordinated a specific Counterinsurgency Working Group (COIN WG) which has been tasked to organize specific workshops and bring together experts and specialists in the field in order to draft an edit the reference curriculum concerning counterinsurgency (COIN Curriculum). The COIN Curriculum aims at serving as a reference for individuals or organizations in NATO member states and partner countries looking to develop and/or supplement their professional military education (PME) in the area of Counterinsurgency (COIN)\(^1\).

Results:

The proceedings of the annual conferences are published in a collective volume and circulated among the military research institutions and specialized agencies. Each volume addresses a specific topic by integrating various national views and perspectives and providing a platform of knowledge and information. This is an important dimension in fostering transatlantic research/scientific dialogue and provide a forum of open discussions and exchange of views on specific issues of strategic relevance (nature of war, the role of alliances, typology of states’ behavior and ways on conduct, impact of shifting ideologies, crisis management, etc.).

Working with other working groups. The CSWG remains interested to cooperate with other WGs of the PfPC on developing common projects/events. Members of the CSWG can contribute with expertise to other WG’s conferences/events. The cooperation with Education Development Working Group (EDWG DEEP) in implementing the COIN Curriculum and with the Emerging Security Challenges Working Group to advance a Hybrid Curriculum are important cooperative achievements.

Increased capacity of self-sustainability. The CSWG is a self-funded group. The overall costs of the participation at the group’s activities are covered by both the participants and their sending institutions and the co-partner countries that are responsible of organizing the annual conferences. The fact that each year participants from over 20 countries are willing to pay in order to attend and contribute to the

\(^1\) Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu, “CSWG.ppt”, used to brief PfP Consortium Joint SAC/CSC Meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, on 17 October 2017.
CSWG’s conferences is an important indicator of the increasing relevance of the group and of the commitment of the participating countries to remain engaged in supporting this platform of regional scientific dialogue.

**Impact:**

The CSWG has gained increased relevance as one of the most representative and longstanding formats of regional cooperation and dialogue in place for 20 years. Its broad and diverse participation and geographical representation make it unique as a tool of advancing trust and confidence and bringing people together to discuss military history and address strategic relevant issues. The CSWG offers a venue to discuss historical controversial topics in an open and cooperative framework, to overcome past grievances and strengthen the bonds between individuals and institutions.

In addition to its flagship annual conference, the CSWG’s member institutions regularly engage in smaller formats of cooperation - at bilateral or multilateral levels- and work to further extend the existing group’s networking by convening high-profile events (bilateral seminars, conferences, workshops, working meetings, etc). From this perspective, the CSWG provides opportunities for all NATO and partner countries to get access to a large network of specialists and to engage in an intensive debates on common issues of interest.

**CSWG/MHWG Conference Highlights**

![Conference Sites Map](image)

**Figure 2. Seminar Sites**

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2001

The Military History Working Group held its first annual conference in April 2001 in Bucharest, Romania, with the United States Army Center of Military History and the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History of Romanian Ministry of National Defense as co-chairs. Thirty-eight participants representing organizations from Bulgaria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, and the United States participated, with 15 papers being presented and later published by the PfP Consortium.

The Conference’s theme was “The Early Years of the Cold War 1948-1956” later published by the PfP Consortium. The PfP Consortium provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar, to include 23 participants through WIF (Warsaw Initiative Funding).

The sixteen nations of NATO and the eight nations of the former Warsaw Pact had very different experiences as each played its role in challenging times. Indeed, current discussions among North Americans, West Europeans, Central Europeans, and East Europeans concerning such controversial events as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 or the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 can leave one wondering if all parties were actually discussing the same event.

2002

In March 2002, the MHWG held its second annual conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, with Bulgaria (Defense and Staff College Rakovski) and France (Service Historique de l’armée de terre) as co-chairs. Forty-seven participants representing organizations from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the United States participated, with 21 papers being presented and later published by the PfP Consortium.

The Conference theme focused on “Military Policies in Europe at the turn of the Century, 1870-1914” later published by the PfP Consortium. The PfP Consortium provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar, to include 24 participants through WIF (Warsaw Initiative Funding).

Participants mentioned that this was the first seminar among official historians of the Balkan states to discuss the decisive events occurring during the 19th and early 20th centuries in the Balkans. Although the topic elicited strong debate between historians from the different countries involved in the Balkan wars, particularly on contentious national issues, the seminar helped clear the air for further dialogue.

2003

In April 2003, Czech Republic (Military History Institute) and Germany (Military History Research Office) co-chaired and hosted the third annual confer-

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ence in Prague, Czech Republic. Forty-nine participants representing organizations from Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the United States participated. The Conference’s theme was NATO and Warsaw Pact – the formative years 1948 – 1968. The scientific agenda include 19 papers that were later published by the PfP Consortium in Historie a Vojensv (History and the Military) 3-4/2003.

The PfP Consortium provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar, to include 13 participants through WIF (Warsaw Initiative Funding).

The monolithic image of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact certainly does not hold up under scrutiny. 1951-52 emerged as the period marking the height of the mutual distrust and fear separating the Eastern Bloc and NATO. What became evident was the former Eastern Bloc nations had to be very careful in balancing nationalist sensitivities against Soviet desires and subtle foot dragging by East European nations prevented adoption of a unified WP military command structure for almost thirty years. The same is true to a lesser extent in Western governments on the periphery of NATO, especially in the early years before sufficient conventional forces were in position to defend all of the member nations.1

2004

In April 2004, Hungary (Institute and Museum of Military History) and United States (Army Center of Military History) co-chaired the fourth seminar held in Budapest, Hungary. Forty participants representing organizations from Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the United States participated with 26 papers being presented.

The Conference’s theme was “Military Professionalization, 1900-1999: the Quest for Excellence”, with the papers being published by the Military History Working Group on CD and in the Revue Internationale D’Histoire Militaire No 80-2004. The PfP Consortium provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar, to include 12 participants through WIF (Warsaw Initiative Funding).

This seminar focused on how the different nations have professionalized their armed forces. Professionalization did not necessarily mean a turn to a regular army. Most Central European countries to meet NATO requirements, fenced certain of their units, while maintaining a citizen draft.

2005

In 2005, Austria (Austrian National Defence Academy, Vienna) and Canada (Canadian Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario) co-chaired the fifth conference in Vienna, Austria (4-8 April 2005). Forty-seven participants representing organizations from 14 nations participated: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic,

France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and the United States, with 26 papers being presented.

The Conference’s theme was “Multinational Operations, Alliances and International Military Co-operation: Past and Future”. The papers were published on CD by the Military History Working Group and in paper by the US Army Center of Military History in “Multinational Operations, Alliances and International Military Co-operation: Past and Future” (2005). The PfP Consortium provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar.

The topic of the conference holds particular importance today. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 failed to bring universal peace. On the contrary, crises and conflicts have erupted all over the globe, and the international community has had to assist many times to end wars, to stabilize countries, and to implement conditions that could serve as a basis for peace in the future. In our fast-moving times, past experiences and lessons are quickly forgotten, and there are tendencies to reinvent the wheel. Examining the outcomes of earlier operations, therefore, is not just of interest for armchair strategists or for historians; it also provides many vital tools for planning and executing future missions.¹

2006

In 2006, Slovakia (Institute of Military History) and France (Service Historique de la Défense) coordinated and co-chaired the sixth annual conference in Bratislava, Slovakia (3-7 April 2006). Sixty participants representing organizations from 18 nations participated: Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States with 29 papers being presented.

The Conference’s theme was Exiting War: Post Conflict Military Operations. The MHWG published the papers in a single volume and on CD. The co-hosts provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar, with the hosting nation subsidizing room and board for those unable to attend otherwise.

Overall, ‘war exits’ are a recent study subject with an indisputable historicity. It has its own logic, which can only be studied and even less defined out of context, in its double circumstantial and historical dimension. It embodies a new research field that deserves to be analyzed, thoroughly studied and reasonably criticized in order to determine if throughout all the war exits humanity happened to experience centuries after centuries, some constants would exist. This research field has to be cautiously addressed because the distortion between historic reality of war exits, and its present perception may confuse observation. Present vocabulary underlines the phenomenon in a way that contributes to describe an old phenomenon, war, with a more limited number of new words than before. Through that perspective war can be denied, in its legal reality whereas it is strongly experienced in its physical reality. Finally, war can, in its ter-

2007

In 2007, Canada (Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario) and Slovenia (Military Museum of Slovenian Armed Forces) coordinated and co-chaired the seventh annual conference in Kingston, Ontario (18-21 March 2007). Forty-nine participants representing organizations from 16 nations participated: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Republic of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. Participants presented 19 analytical military history papers on various aspects of prewar strategic planning, while a four-member workshop panel discussed how the various countries history offices supported currently deployed forces.

The conference’s theme was Strategic Planning for War. The General Staff of the Slovenian Army published the seminar proceedings in Strategic Planning for War (2008). The partner nations of the MHWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the conference. In particular, Canada funded one for one former WIF participants.

The participants at the conference discussed how strategic leaders, politicians, and soldiers conduct planning of armed intervention of any kind; a challenging issue for every soldier as well as a military historian. In their decision making process strategic leaders are faced with uncertainty, ambiguity and variability of the environment. Accordingly, interdisciplinary multidisciplinary skills are needed in order to manage an organization. However, an expert in one field may not necessarily have received appropriate training. Consequently, there is a necessity for supplementary training and interdisciplinary activity within and between organizations and military units. This necessity arises both during strategic planning and combat activities as well as during the analysis of the former to prevent recurrence of mistakes.1

2008

In 2008, Slovenia (Military Museum of Slovenian Armed Forces) and Austria (National Defence Academy), coordinated and co-chaired the eighth annual conference of CSWG held in Ljubljana, Slovenia (20-24 April 2008). Participants from 14 countries attended representing organizations from Austria, Canada, Croatia, France, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States. Participants presented 25 analytical military history papers.

The conference’s theme was Experiences of War. The General Staff of the Slovenian Army published the seminar proceedings in Studia Historica Slovenica Humanities and Social Studies Review, Maribor, 10 (2010), No. 1

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2 Strategic Planning for War, General Staff of the Slovenian Army, Ljubljana, 2008, 3.
of the MHWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar with the hosting nation subsidizing room and board for those unable to attend otherwise.

2009

In 2009, Romania (Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History of Romanian Ministry of Defense) and Germany (Military History Research Institute from Potsdam) organized and co-chaired the ninth annual conference in Bucharest, Romania (25-29 May 2009). Forty participants representing organizations from 17 nations attended the event: Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States. Participants presented 24 papers that brought both a historical perspective and more contemporary assessment on the relationship between nation states and empires with the aim of providing a better understanding of the complex and complicated factors that shape the dynamics of the systemic order and explain the cyclical shifts of the international system.

The Conference’s theme was: End of Empires. Challenges to Security and Statehood in Flux. The co-organizing countries and the partner nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the conference. The Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense published the seminar proceedings, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010. Important to mention that the annual conference in Bucharest was the first one when the group gathered under the name Conflict Studies Working Group.

This topic of a transnational view of history, which always should and must be regarded in a large overall context, vividly reflects the relationship between nation states and empires. While the empire is an invention of early high cultures and civilizations, the nation state is a secondary phenomenon whose character was formed in the late modern period. In addition to the historical considerations that play a role in this process, the security perspective is above all of vital importance to our conference. The socialization of security -- as is the case in the European Union -- is a third way besides the nation-state and the empire. Although nation states continue to exist formally in this alliance, they have organized themselves on a supranational scale and have ceded parts of their sovereignty. For decades, the European Union has continued along the path of expansion and consolidation. Although some voices can be heard saying that sight should not be lost of the pace of expansion, there can be no doubt that the integration of Europe is a cornerstone in the peaceful coexistence of the peoples in this region.

2010

In 2010, Poland (National Defense University) and Greece (Hellenic Commission of Military History) organized and co-hosted the 10th annual confer-

ence of CSWG (25-27 May 2010). Twenty-eight participants representing organizations from 13 countries participated, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, the United States. The conference agenda included 17 papers that addressed relevant issues related to the general topic of the conference.

The Conference's theme was: Military Conflict in the 20th century - political and military aspects. The co-organizing countries and the partner nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the conference. The National Defense University of Poland edited and published the conference proceedings (Warsaw, 2010).

The main aim of the conference was the exchange of research, thoughts, and experience related to military history with a focus on how these could be applied to today's concept of modern armed forces. Considering its originality, the conference volume should be distributed and applied to the education process in military schools and academies. It should also be used by other institutions as well as research and didactic centers, whose activities related to military history and international security1.

2011

In 2011, Serbia (Institute for Strategic Research, Belgrade) and Sweden (National Defense College, Stockholm) organized and co-chaired the 11th annual conference of CSWG, held in Belgrade, Serbia (23-27 May 2011). Thirteen-nine participants representing organizations from 14 nations attended the event, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States.

The Conference's theme was Irregular and Regular Warfare: experiences from History and Contemporary Armed Conflict. The conference volume was published by the Institute for Strategic Research of Serbian Ministry of Defense, Belgrade, 2012. Similar to previous years, the co-hosts nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar. Moreover, the co-host countries covered additional costs for a number of participants in terms of participation fee and accommodation. That was the only way to have the entire working group together in Belgrade because of their institutions' financial issues. This type support is one of the bulwarks of the working group, to give way together in assisting others in their effort to contribute.

The topic of "Regular and Irregular Warfare" continues to be of significance and relevance to all of us, our armed forces, and our nations. While irregular warfare has been conducted throughout history, it has seen a considerable resurgence since the end of the Cold War. Various non-state actors with aspirations of freedom, sovereignty, and other goals continue to seek legitimacy and influence around the world. This trend seems to be increasing. The presentations and panels of this conference address historical and contemporary accounts and implica-

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tions, from military, political, and social perspectives, of regular and irregular warfare. These relevant examples and interpretations should be of benefit to all of us, and will definitely also highlight the human dimension of soldiering throughout history.

2012

In 2012, Austria (Military Museum and Institute) and Hungary (Institute and Museum of Military History) hosted and co-chaired the 12th annual conference of CSWG (21-25 May 2012) that was held at Austrian National Defense Academy, Vienna. Forty-nine participants representing organizations from 15 nations participated, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States, with 25 papers being presented.

The Conference’s theme was: Past through Present: Thoughts on Military History at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of War. The conference volume was edited and published by the Austrian Museum of Military History, Vienna, 2013. Similar to previous years, the co-hosting nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar, with the hosting nation subsidizing room and board for those unable to attend otherwise.

The cyclical crises in the 20th century, stemming primarily from the economic and financial sector and subsequently spreading into all of the social systems, have also influenced the military subsystem. In such circumstances the military subsystem as a major user of budgetary resources would be under a twofold pressure: the diminishing resources would call for profound or even radical changes of its dimension and quality, while on the other hand the crisis would usually involve an increased security risk, which would in turn involve the increasing demands being imposed on the military system.

2013

In 2013, Bulgaria (G. S. Rakovski National Defense Academy) and France (Defence History Office) organized and co-chaired the 13th annual conference of CSWG in Sofia, Bulgaria (27-31 May 2013). Thirty participants representing organizations from 14 nations attended the event: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the United States, and the PfP Consortium during which researchers presented 16 papers.

The Conference’s theme was Nations at War; Why do Nations Participate in Wars, and Why Not. The conference volume was published by G.S. Rakovski National

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1 Dr. Jovanka Šaranović, Director of the Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade, in Harold E. Rough Jr. (ed), Regular and Irregular Warfare. Experiences of Historical and Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Belgrade: Institute for Strategic Research, 2012), 7-8
Defense Academy, Defense Advanced Research Institute, Sofia, 2014. The co-hosting nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar.

The topic of the conference -- “Nations at War: Why do Nations Participate in Wars, and Why Not?” -- is of special importance not only in the historic context, but also with regard to the challenges of our time. The main areas of studies are the mechanisms of making a decision whether to get involved or to refuse participation in a military conflict, the ways to start armed conflicts, and the transition from peace to war and from war to peace. These, however, do not cover all problems discussed at the research forum. Lively discussions are expected on other related topics: the significance of national culture in the military decision-making process; national specifics of military planning; national beliefs of “liberation” and “occupation”; the role of national interests in coalition operations; civil-military relations in times of crises and war; post-war transformation of defense systems; and restoration and strengthening of peace, among others.1

2014

In 2014, Slovakia (Institute of Military History) and Denmark (Royal Danish Defense College) hosted and co-chaired the 14th annual conference of CSWG held in Bratislava, Slovakia (7-11 April 2014). Participants representing organizations from ten nations attended the conference namely Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden, during which researchers presented 22 papers.

The Conference’s theme was Doctrinal Change, Using the Past to Fight the Present. The conference volume was published by the PfP Consortium with the support provided by the co-organizing institutions. Similar to previous years, the co-hosting nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar.

The theme title gives room for some thoughts on two rather general questions, namely how we make use of the past and how we initiate or adapt to change. The end of the Cold War and events from the Balkans to the Middle East and beyond have challenged our armed forces in new ways and -- to most -- in new places. So, our men and women in uniform have looked for different means, methods, and doctrines other than those of the previous generation, and a famous scholar even proclaimed “The End of History.” But again, ever so often they have eventually turned to the past to find answers in the development of new doctrines on counterinsurgency, on terrorism, and on piracy. So even as the modern battlespace increases in size and grows into new areas such as the seemingly limitless cyberspace we will continue to rely on and benefit from past experience.2

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2 Captain (Navy) Christian RUNE, Deputy Commander, Royal Danish Defense College, “First opening address” in Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Doctrinal Change Using the Past to Face the Present, Proceedings of the Annual Conference of CSWG (Bratislava: Slovak Institute of Military History, 2015), 7-8
In 2015, Greece (Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate) and Austria (Military Museum and Institute) organized and co-chaired the 15th annual conference of CSWG held in Athens, Greece (27-30 April 2015). Thirty-eight participants from 18 nations attended the conference, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States during which researchers presented 21 papers.

The Conference’s theme was The Warrior’s Ethos, the National Psyche and Soldiery. The conference volume was published by the co-organizing institutions in 2015. The co-hosting nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar that also included subsidizing room and board for those unable to attend otherwise. The financial support provided by the Austrian Military Museum and Institute was especially important to help organizing the event.

The leaders cannot ignore the importance of being the ethical examples. Every leader of any level must endorse the ancient Greek motto “who leads people, must keep three values: that he leads over humans, that he leads according to the law, and that he does not lead forever”. The professional soldier’s core qualities are commitment, competence, candor, compassion, and courage. These core qualities are the facets of the soldier’s character that underscore the ethos. As military people, our objective is “not to promote war, but to preserve peace” and to protect life. Even if deterrence fails and we go to war, our final objective is peace.1

In 2016, Slovenia (Ministry of Defense and Institute of Contemporary History) and France (Ministry of Defense History Office and Veterans and War Victims Office) organized and co-hosted the 16th annual conference of CSWG (4-7 July 2016). Thirty-three participants from 18 countries attended the conference, namely Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and the United States of America. The Conference’s theme was Veterans and Society, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants through History, examining the relationships between society and veterans both as individuals and as a community in times of war and peace throughout history.

The scientific agenda included 23 papers and a panel-discussion with expert speakers addressing the topic From expectations to reality, the complex relationships between veterans and the state. The papers presented during the conference were published by the Ministry of Defense of Slovenia in Contemporary Military Challenges, Junij 2017 – 19/st. 2.

According to the working procedures within the group, the co-hosting nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar.

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1 Brig. General Nikolaos Delatolas, Director, Army History Directorate, in Efpraxia S. Paschalidou, Christian Ortner (eds), The Warrior’s Ethos, the National Psyche and Soldiery (Athens: Hellenic Army General Staff, 2015), v-vi
When the weapons fall silent, as the stage is once again taken over by politicians and as normal life in its myriad of ways resumes (as war and its consequences are undoubtedly abnormal circumstances), the elimination of the consequences of war comes to the forefront. Precisely these consequences of wars leave permanent scars on the soldiers. Although the attitude of the state towards the veterans in fact reflects its maturity, sensitivity to the vulnerable, and respect of its most meritorious citizens, this issue is often not settled in a manner that one would expect. For this reason the discussion about the status of veterans is a very pressing topic, even today. At the same time the veteran organisations are the ones that represent a live historical memory of extreme efforts and great sacrifice. As such they are a living reminder of what wars and post-war events represent. The decision-makers should learn so much from them... And perhaps these sorts of discussions will contribute to changes in these relations. 

2017

In 2017, Romania (Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romanian Ministry of National Defense) and Denmark (Institute for Military History and War Studies of the Royal Danish Defense College) coordinated and co-hosted the 17th annual conference of CSWG (29 May-2 June 2017). The Conference’s theme was The use of military forces in domestic affairs: Lessons of history, current issues and future developments. The main focus was to examine, based on specific case studies, the main features and dynamics that shaped the role of the armed forces in domestic affairs during the last two centuries, and decipher some of the main challenges that they are facing today.

Thirty-nine participants representing organizations from 20 countries attended the conference, namely Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United States of America, during which researchers presented 23 papers. The papers presented will be published by the co-organizing countries in a special volume of conference proceedings.

Similar to previous years, the co-hosting nations of the CSWG provided organizational, structural, and funding support for the seminar.

The conference theme allowed the participants to explore and provide in-depth analyses on a topic of growing relevance having in view the rapid dynamics of the internal and external security environment. After a period characterized by expeditionary warfare and international missions, recent global events seem to underscore the domestic role of military forces. This is not only the case in terms of territorial defense but also in terms of updating the role and missions of the armed forces to tackle a broad range of non-conventional risks and threats. The rapid multiplication and diversification of the security challenges—terrorism, migration, hybrid actions, etc.—requires new perspectives and understandings on the need to generate new approaches and strategies to deals with the emerging domestic pressures.

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1 Vladimir Prebilić, Editorial. “Veterans and Society” in Contemporary Military Challenges, Junij 2017 – 19/st, 14
2 Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu, “CSWG ppt”, used to brieffp Consortium CSC meeting, Gydnia, Poland, 5-7 February 2018
Summary

Since its existence, the MHWG/CSWG has provided the different nations with essential, yet hard to attain, intangible benefits by establishing and maintaining personal contacts with policy makers and military personnel from Central and Western Europe, the CIS states, Canada and the United States. Its yearly seminars and close coordination between the Western and Eastern host nations in the preparation of the events have strengthened the group members’ sense of mission and willingness to accommodate different viewpoints to achieve the common goal of better international understanding. This program furnishes tangible historical analyses from the different national perspectives as well as historical, social, and cultural insight that are unique in their quality and are impossible to attain from other sources. Additionally, the close relationships established between historians of different nations have done much to further historical dialogue and cooperation outside the Conflict Studies Working Group. Lastly, the willingness of nations to assist one another toward the common goal by every means possible is a lasting tribute to the member individuals and their organizations.
# APPENDIX F.

**CSWG EVENTS SUMMARY**  
*By Robert S. Rush*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference Topic</th>
<th>Hosting Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>ANGELOV, Anju, Lt. Gen., Chief of the G. S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College</td>
<td>Bulgarian Armed Forces During the Period of Transition to the Cold War</td>
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<td>Participation of Bulgaria in the Warsaw Peace Treaty</td>
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<td>SARMANT, Thierry, Ph.D., Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre</td>
<td>The war that never took place. Awareness of threat: The French army and the Soviets' intentions in Eastern Europe 1945-1970</td>
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<td>Warsaw Agreement and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956</td>
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